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CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

DISTURBANCES

IN

HERZEGOVINA AND MONTENEGRO

IN

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CONFIDENTIAL.

Correspondence respecting Disturbances in Herzegovina and Montenegro in 1861 and 1862.

No. 1.

Mr. Longworth to Lord J. Russell.—(Received January 21.)

(No. 5.)

My Lord, *Belgrade, January 7, 1861.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit (herewith inclosed) to your Lordship the copy of a despatch, dated the 14th ultimo, to his Excellency Sir Henry Bulwer, relating to the seizure of munitions of war at Sulina, and apprehended insurrectionary movements in Hungary and the Turkish provinces.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. A. LONGWORTH.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Mr. Longworth to Sir H. Bulwer.

Sir, *Belgrade, December 14, 1860.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's despatch under date of the 3rd instant, wherein you notify to me that you learn by a despatch from Lord A. Loftus to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, dated the 7th of November last, the Austrian Government had rescinded the prohibition of the export and transit of arms over all the frontiers of Austria, with certain exceptions mentioned in your Excellency's despatch. To this fact I had myself called his Lordship's attention by a telegram identical with that transmitted to your Excellency under date of the 1st of November.

With reference to the restitution of the arms purchased by the Servian Government in Belgium, and in favour of which Her Majesty's Envoy at Vienna considers that the present tranquil condition of Servia, added to the more friendly relations which now exist between Austria and Russia, may operate, I cannot ascertain that the arms in question have been given up to the Servian Government, though there be every reason to anticipate they will be. Connected with the subject of the transport of arms and munitions of war, I have to confirm the contents of my telegram of this day's date to your Excellency with respect to the seizure by the Turkish authorities at Sulina of two vessels under the Sardinian flag laden with munitions of war and twenty-four cannons. They were supposed to be destined for the Hungarians. In addition to this information, which I obtained from Osman Pasha, I have learnt from another authentic source that to cut off as much as possible communications on the part of Hungarian refugees with Wallachia, the captains of the Austrian steamers have been ordered not to touch in future at any place on the left bank of the Danube below Orsova.

The appointment of M. Ceruti as Sardinian Agent at Belgrade is a most significant measure at this moment.

He took an active part as Consul-General here in the Hungarian insurrection of 1848 and 1849, and if he return to Servia it must be with a view to similar operations—his local experience, and the relations he formerly held with the leaders of the revolutionary party, eminently qualify him for this business.

An outbreak in Hungary is here looked upon as close at hand. The winter would certainly be the most favourable time for it, as the Austrian troops would, from the

badness of the roads and interruption of communications, find it impossible to take the field. If a diversion take place by means of an expedition under Garibaldi or any other Italian partisan chief, it will, in all probability, be effected by a descent on the coast of the Adriatic. It is not likely that any formidable inroad could be made from either Wallachia or Servia, though individuals and small detached parties may find their way thence into Hungary, and it is certain that many such are now collected on the frontiers. I have positive information that an Hungarian Colonel, who formerly served with distinction under General Bem, is now living in concealment at Belgrade. I will endeavour to discover his name as soon as possible. With respect to the part of the coast where an expedition could land, opinions would seem to be divided. While some think that the attempt would be made in Dalmatia or Croatia, others, and I have all along concurred in that view, are inclined to believe that it would have a better chance of success if directed upon Montenegro, which could be easily reached, and subsequently serve as a basis of operations for a force disembarking at Antivari. The excitement now prevailing, and the expectation of being engaged shortly in some extraordinary enterprize now generally entertained among the inhabitants of the mountain, would appear to favour this latter supposition.

I have been informed by my Austrian colleague that his Government had just received by telegraph from the authorities at Cattaro intelligence of a meeting of the Montenegrin Chiefs at Cettigné, where they were publicly exorted by their new Prince, Nicholas, to hold themselves in readiness for an irruption into the Turkish territory.

With these auxiliaries who would join them for predatory objects of their own? In connection with a revolt of the Rayahs in Bosnia, the expeditionary troops in question might not find it difficult to force their way through that province; not to the north, in which direction the distance to the Austrian frontier and the impervious nature of the country, added to the resistance to be expected from the Turkish forces, regular and irregular, would render a passage impracticable, but across the narrow tract which separates Montenegro from Servia. The Principality once entered, the remainder of the march to the Save would be comparatively easy.

Whatever might be the decision, under these circumstances, of Prince Michael, and it is almost certain he would assert his neutrality or declare himself openly for the Austrians, I feel assured that the Servians neither could nor would do anything to arrest the progress of the intruders. The chief obstacle would doubtless be offered by the passage of the Save; how that might be overcome I cannot pretend to say: but means of transport might, on an emergency, be not so impossible to procure. There are at present at Belgrade two suspicious-looking craft which have been lately brought here from France by a set of adventurers styling themselves the Franco-Servian Steam Navigation Company. With little or no prospect of being otherwise employed at this season of the year, either chance or design has conducted them hither for the very purpose apparently of facilitating such operations.

The most unanswerable objection which could be urged against an expedition such as I have described would be the difficulty, perhaps, of transporting guns of heavy calibre over a mountainous country. The difficulty would undoubtedly be very great, if not insurmountable; but, if so, may it not have operated as a reason for their shipment round by the Black Sea and the Danube, and may they not be the very cannons that have been seized at Galatz? It were pushing speculation too far, perhaps, to forecast circumstances arising from a rupture in the relations between the Porte and the Empires of Austria and Russia, and which might justify the former in restoring their guns to the Hungarians. But a restitution of this nature would not be more extraordinary than that which is now being made by Austria of their confiscated arms to the Servians. To conclude, I feel I owe your Excellency some apology for troubling you at so much length with a matter purely hypothetical; two additional circumstances, however, which have come to-day only to my knowledge have induced me to do so: the first of these is the appointment of M. Cernti as Political Agent at Belgrade; the other has been communicated to me by Osman Pasha, to the effect that he has just received a telegram from Sheriff Bey, the Turkish Commissioner at Mostar, informing him that preparations for some formidable enterprise were being made by the Montenegrins, and inquiring of him whether there were no signs of a corresponding movement in Servia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. A. LONGWORTH.

No. 2.

*Lord J. Russell to Mr. Fane.**

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 22, 1861.

THE Austrian and Turkish Governments ought to come to a complete understanding as to the means to be employed to defeat the insurrection preparing against both in Montenegro, Wallachia, Servia, and Bulgaria.

The Sultan should trust to the Grand Vizier for the means to procure money and men.

No. 4.

Lord J. Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 100.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 23, 1861.

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Representatives at Constantinople and Vienna relative to insurrectionary preparations in Montenegro and the Principalities.†

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 5.

Lord J. Russell to Consul Sir F. Gilbert.

(No. 2.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 28, 1861.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 32 of the 24th ultimo, requesting authority to proceed to Montenegro, in compliance with a suggestion of Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, in order to congratulate the reigning Prince on his election; and I have to state to you in reply that I think it very desirable that you should proceed to Montenegro for that purpose.

You will avail yourself of this opportunity to observe narrowly the state of public feeling in Montenegro and the policy of its Ruler in regard to Foreign Powers, especially to the neighbouring States, and you will report to me the result of your observations upon these points, as well as in regard to the military strength of the country, its commerce, and any other subjects of general interest on which you may be able to procure information.

You will charge the expense of your journey, which you will keep within as moderate bounds as possible, in your accounts with the Board of Treasury.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 6.

Lord J. Russell to Consul Sir F. Gilbert.

(No. 3.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 28, 1861.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 2 of this day's date, authorizing you to proceed to Montenegro, I have to state to you that if the Turkish or Montenegrin authorities request your assistance in settling disputes connected with contested properties, you are at liberty to proceed to the localities in question, and you will endeavour to arrange all such disputes in a conciliatory and equitable manner.

You will report to me the amount of expenses which you may incur while so employed, and I shall then be prepared to authorize you to charge the same in your account current with the Board of Treasury.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

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* A similar message was sent to Sir H. Bulwer. † No. 2.

No. 7.

Mr. Fane to Lord J. Russell.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 65.)
My Lord, *Vienna, January 24, 1861.*

I HAVE brought to the knowledge of Count Rechberg the substance of your Lordship's telegram of the 22nd instant, by informing his Excellency that Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that a complete understanding ought to be come to by the Austrian and Turkish Governments as to the means to be employed to defeat the insurrection which is preparing against both in Montenegro, Wallachia, Servia, and Bulgaria.

Count Rechberg observed that he fully concurred with Her Majesty's Government in this opinion, and informed me that some arrangements for meeting the dangers which appeared to threaten both Empires had already been concluded—such as a mutual agreement on the part of the two Governments to allow the passage of one another's troops through portions of their respective territories, and to permit temporarily the military occupation of neutral ground.

There was at the present moment, his Excellency said, a body of Turkish troops at Klek and Sutorina, and he could only wish that they were in a more efficient condition than he believed them to be in, for suppressing any attempt at insurrection in those quarters. He feared, however, that large arrears of pay were due to these troops, and that, owing to that cause, no great reliance could be placed on their fidelity and subordination.

Count Rechberg concluded by saying that he thought that the arrangements which had already been made between the two Governments might be extended with great advantage, and his Excellency took a note of the communication which I had made to him, with the view, I apprehend, of instructing Baron Prokesch to invite the Porte to further co-operation in the sense suggested by your Lordship.

I subsequently called on the Turkish Ambassador and informed his Excellency of the nature of the communication I had made to Count Rechberg, as I thought it would be expedient that he also should urge his Government to effect with the Austrian Government the complete understanding recommended by your Lordship. Prince Callimachi undertook at once to act upon my suggestion.

With reference to the troops at Klek and Sutorina, he expressed his belief that, since the conclusion of the recent loan, these troops had received in full their arrears of pay, and that the spirit of loyalty and discipline amongst them was, in consequence, such as could be relied upon.

In the course of conversation his Excellency said that he had himself recommended the Porte to detach a portion of the army of Roumelia to somewhat closer proximity to the Wallachian frontier, a precautionary measure which, he thought, was demanded by the aspect of affairs in Bulgaria and the Principalities, but which he had urged his Government to carry out with great circumspection, so as to avoid attracting attention and exciting alarm.

Prince Callimachi also observed, parenthetically, that he believed the Porte would act judiciously at the present conjunction in re-employing Omar Pasha, whose exceptional qualities as a strategist might render his Government oblivious of the moral delinquencies with which he was unfortunately charged, in common with many others of his rank, in Turkey.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JULIAN FANE.

No. 8.

Lord Bloomfield to Lord J. Russell.—(Received February 4.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, February 4, 1861.*

I HAVE read to Rechberg your Lordship's despatch No. 108 to Lord Cowley, regarding proposed Conference on Syria. He approves of every word of it.

His Excellency has news from Ragusa that Montenegrins had crossed into Turkish territory, and invested Nichsich. Facilities have been given by Austrian Government for the passage of Turkish troops to meet this emergency.

No. 9.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received February 6.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, February 5, 1861, 11 P.M.*

THE Montenegrins and some inhabitants of rebel districts have attacked Nichsich and other places on Turkish frontier, committing great atrocities.

The Porte has ordered Ismail Pasha to march against them, but not to pursue them within the Montenegrin frontier.

No. 10.

Lord Bloomfield to Lord J. Russell.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 20.)
My Lord, *Vienna, February 7, 1861.*

WITH reference to the telegram recorded in my despatch No. 11 of this date, I inquired yesterday of Count Rechberg if he had received any further news from Ragusa as to the incursions of the Montenegrins into Turkish territory. His Excellency said that nothing on this subject had reached him from an Austrian authority, but that the Turkish Ambassador had read to him a telegram from Mostar giving an account of cruelties committed by the band of insurgents on the Mussulman inhabitants of the district of Nichsich.

I have the honour to inclose for your Lordship's information a translation of this telegram as it has appeared in the "Ost-Deutsche Post."

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 10.

Telegram from Mostar, February 4, 1861.

(Translation.)

ON the 16th of the month Redjeb, a band of insurgents and Montenegrins surprised several villages in the district of Nichsich, and practised numberless cruelties on the peaceable Mussulman inhabitants. Forty-one lives were taken, amongst which were ten children and three women. One of the latter was with child, and they ripped up her belly, drew out the child, and hacked it to pieces.

Another band attacked Korianitch, the chief town of the district, and cruelties were practised here on the Mussulman population no less barbarous than those above-mentioned.

No. 11.

Consul Holmes to Lord J. Russell.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 15.)
My Lord, *Bosna-Serai, February 1, 1861.*

I HAVE this instant received the following telegram from Mr. Zohrab at at Mostar:—

"Nichsich attacked; Turks killed, forty-one; wounded, fifteen. Korianitch attacked; Turks killed, four. Suttorina taken by rebels; Turks killed, two. Troops marching to frontier with Dervish and Mahmoud Pashas."

Your Lordship will probably observe that the telegram is rather vague, not specifying clearly whether the attack on Nichsich was made by the Montenegrins or the native insurgents. Nichsich is the most important place on the frontier, being as it were the key of the Herzegovina. Its population is warlike and chiefly Mussulman, and the number of Turks killed indicates that the attack has been made by a certain force, and that the affair is of a serious nature. I think it probable that the attack has been made by the Montenegrins.

I have forwarded by telegraph to Sir Henry Bulwer the news from Mostar, and I will

not fail to give your Lordship the details of the affairs in question as soon as I can obtain them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 12.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received February 16.)

(No. 94.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, February 6, 1861.*

I ALWAYS regretted the breaking up of the Commission on the Montenegrin frontier without a final settlement of the questions likely or rather certain to lead to fresh hostilities.

A serious conflict seems to have taken place near Nichsich, on the confines of Montenegro, in the course of which the insurgents are accused of having perpetrated the grossest outrages.

I herewith inclose the translation of a telegram received by the Turkish Government from the General in command in that quarter; and likewise of the instructions he has received in reply.

Mr. Holmes, Her Majesty's Consul for Bosnia, reports the capture of Sutorina by the rebels; but this does not seem confirmed by the Porte's information.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 12.

Ismail Pasha to the Grand Vizier.

(Translation.)
(Telegraphic.) *February 1, 1861.*

IT appears from letters and the statements of persons come from Nichsich that the mountaineers in alliance with the revolted districts have made an incursion and commenced hostilities.

The number of persons I have reported by telegraph as killed is correct. Among them are women and children. The wombs of pregnant women were cut open and the heads of the children cut off. The town of Nichsich is in great danger. The district of Korianitch is also in danger. In order to rescue these two places from the danger they are placed in, please to authorize me to instruct Hadir Pasha and Mahmoud Pasha, who is gone to Bilikah to enter with forces into the districts of Zouptcha, Baguani, and Piva (to cause) the rebels to fall back, and if they resist to attack them.

Inclosure 2 in No. 12.

The Grand Vizier to Ismail Pasha.

(Translation.)
(Telegraphic.) *February 4, 1861.*

YOUR telegram dated 1st February, respecting the barbarous proceedings of the mountaineers acting in concert with the revolted districts, has been received.

All the world knows with what patience the Ottoman Government has endured such acts for the last four years, how it has always invited the inhabitants of the revolted districts with mildness and indulgence to make their submission, and that it has appointed a special Commission for this object.

Considering that the rebels have construed this indulgence into weakness, and, increasing their misdeeds, have at last committed the atrocities you speak of, it is impossible to put up with this in silence. It is necessary, as you say, to enter the districts of Zouptcha, Baguani, and Piva with troops, and if resistance is met with to oppose force to force, and rescue Nichsich and Korianitch from danger, but no reprisals must be in the least degree exercised by our inhabitants or irregular troops on the women, children, or property of the rebels in return for what they have done. But should the inhabitants of those districts throw the whole responsibility of these acts on the Montenegrins, offer no resistance, and make their submission, then it will not be necessary to attack them, but you will proceed to an investigation, discover the persons who have had a hand in these atrocities, convey them to a fit place and detain them, reporting to us immediately.

No. 13.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 100.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 16, 1861.*

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 94, respecting the disturbances which have broken out on the frontier of Montenegro, I have to state to you that the orders given by the Grand Vizier to Ismail Pasha for repressing those disturbances appear to me to be quite right.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 14.

Consul Holmes to Lord J. Russell.—(Received February 18.)

(No. 16.)
My Lord, *Bosna-Serai, February 6, 1861.*

I HAVE just received from Mr. Zohrab, at Mostar, despatches confirming the telegram of which I informed your Lordship in my despatch No. 15 of the 1st February. The news of the attack on Nichsich was communicated to Mr. Zohrab by Ismail Pasha, the Mushir, now commanding at Mostar. I inclose herein a copy of the Pasha's letter to Mr. Zohrab, which will give your Lordship the Turkish account of what has happened. Atrocities are imputed to the Montenegrins and insurgents which, I fear, are probable, but which I trust may be attributed to the exaggeration always accompanying the statement of both parties.

After the receipt of this letter Mr. Zohrab had an interview with the Mushir, who declared that all his overtures to the rebels had been treated with contempt, and that a continuance of the conciliatory system hitherto pursued was impossible; that he had sent to Albania for an immediate reinforcement of five battalions, and that he should now push forward his forces, and, as the Montenegrins did not respect any frontier line, so, in case of need, he should disregard all such distinctions in carrying out his plans.

His Excellency's intention seems, therefore, to involve neither more nor less than an invasion of Montenegro under certain circumstances.

This is a serious affair, and has by no means a promising aspect from any point of view. The Turks run considerable risk of defeat in the very outset, and if they should succeed in reducing Montenegro, what are they to do with it? The conquered Montenegrins would be regarded as victims and martyrs throughout Europe, while the Turks, surrounded by an entirely Christian and hostile population, with no idea of a properly organized commissariat, a deficient exchequer, and in a poor and barren country, could not hold their ground for six months. During the last three years, under much more favourable circumstances, the Herzegovina has been gradually escaping from them. A last effort will be now made to regain the more than half-lost province, with what success remains to be seen.

The difficulty of the Montenegrin question is very great, and lies mainly in the fact that two-thirds of the population of the mountain are forced by the barren and inhospitable nature of their country, and its isolated position, to live by the plunder of neighbouring provinces. I am assured that the arable land only supplies labour and support for about one-third of the population, and the country possessing no seaport which might give the rest of the people the opportunity of turning their attention to trade as a means of livelihood, have no other resource than brigandage. The independence of such a country seems to me to be incompatible with the tranquillity of its weakest neighbour, and the only possibility of a cessation of the present state of affairs would seem to be the absorption of this isolated province by its most powerful neighbour, one which could afford it the opportunity of engaging in commercial and other pursuits, and which would become responsible for its proceedings towards other adjacent States.

Hostilities in the Herzegovina have commenced this year earlier than usual, and in a more serious manner.

Suttorina is occupied by the insurgents. Korianitch was attacked, as related in the telegram, and has since been again assaulted, and forty-three houses destroyed. The insurgents, however, quitted the place on learning that Mehmet Pasha was advancing against them. Nichsich, the most important place in the Herzegovina, has hitherto remained firm in its allegiance to Turkey, notwithstanding the want of proper support and protection from the Government during the last three years. It cannot hold out, however, much longer, unless circumstances are changed. Its position has been made the more critical and unendurable by the cessions of territory which have been made to Montenegro, bringing the frontier to within a few minutes' walk of the place, and thus reducing it to a condition of perpetual siege.

The Mussulman population will probably soon do as numbers of their co-religionists in the Herzegovina have already done,—abandon their homes and emigrate to some other part of Turkey. Great fears are entertained that the district of Nevessin, which is very much disturbed, will break out into open revolt; 500 cavalry leave this to-day for that place; 2,000 Bashi-Bazouks will also start in a day or two for Mostar; and ammunition has been sent from Trawnik to head-quarters. Troops have marched from Mostar towards the Montenegrin frontier under Dervish and Mahmoud Pashas, the former proceeding to Trebigné and the latter to Bilikah.

Intelligence has been received at Mostar that a band of 7,000 men, 2,000 of whom are provided with spades and picks, has been collected in Montenegro, whether for the further invasion of the Herzegovina or for some other purpose is not known.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure in No. 14.

Letter addressed by Ismail Pasha to Vice-Consul Zohrab.

(Translation.)

Sir, my intelligent, honourable friend,

ACCORDING to what has been understood from official despatches received from Nichsich, and from the depositions of the persons who have come from thence, certain Chiefs of Montenegro, as Elia Gloginat and Yawan, Chief of Zhopa, having collected a large body of the Christian inhabitants of Dervinak, Benan, Grahova, Moracha, Suthcha, and other places, attacked the town of Nichsich, upon which a battle ensued, and, either in the fight or in the villages in the neighbourhood of Nichsich, or in the mountains, the number of Muslims ascertained to have been killed up to the date of the departure of the messengers who have come here is forty-one, and of those they wounded twenty-two. I herewith transmit to you a copy of the list which has arrived.

Among these victims are to be found women and children. Pregnant women have been ripped open with knives, and their offspring, thus brought into the world, have been decapitated. Three Muslim villages have been destroyed by fire, the names of which are given. Surpassing cruelties and ravages have been committed. Nichsich is placed in a state of danger, and the district of Kuryanik has been attacked and ravaged with fire.

The inhabitants of the insurgent districts have already had assurances of safety and repeated admonitions given to them; in spite of which, they have now again joined the men of Montenegro, and have brought about, in their insolence, the afflicting circumstances above detailed, which, if approved of and set forth to the world with attenuating explanations, would form an episode contrary to the sentiments of justice and humanity. Wherefore, lest interested persons should so represent this affair, I have brought the true state of the matter to your knowledge, in the hope that it will be made known to the Embassy of your exalted Government, although the having to do so gives me the greatest regret.

In conformity with the calls for pity and assistance which have come from the inhabitants of Nichsich and Kuryanik, it is a duty incumbent on me to protect those regions from the danger to which they are exposed, and to put a stop to the ravages committed on our territory by the afore-mentioned malefactors; and I have, therefore, commenced sending a military force against the insurgent districts. So soon as our troops reach the spot, they will try the effect of the necessary admonitions, in the first instance; but if the same be disregarded, every effort will be made to effect by force the prevention and repression of such outrages and cruelty.

In communicating the above to you, my honoured friend, I avail, &c.

(Signed) ISMAIL HAKKI, *Commanding in Chief the Army, Governor-General of the Province of Ruomelia.*

21st Rejeb, 1277 (February 1, 1861).

No. 15.

Consul Holmes to Lord J. Russell.—(Received February 18.)

(No. 18.)

My Lord, *Bosna-Seraï, February 6, 1861.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a despatch, No. 1 of the 28th January, which I have just received from Mr. Vice-Consul Zohrab, regarding the construction of carriage roads just commenced in the Herzegovina. I sincerely trust that these projects will be carried out, as, if tranquillity be restored and an occasion obtained for opening the port of Klek for commercial purposes, the existence of good roads will be found of the greatest value to the development of the trade which would certainly ensue between Great Britain and these countries.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure in No. 15.

Vice-Consul Zohrab to Lord J. Russell.

My Lord, *Mostar, January 28, 1861.*

IT is with much pleasure I have to report that the Mushir Ismail Pasha has commenced the construction of a carriage road from Mostar to the Port of Klek. The work is at present pushed on with energy, and promises to be completed in about six months.

A branch road to the town of Stolatz, six hours from this, is also in course of construction.

A portion of the plan of a road from Mostar to Konitza, half way to Bosna-Serai, has been sketched out, and the surveys for this work will be made in about three weeks time.

It is anticipated that this road will be laid down by means of voluntary contributions. About 1,000*l.* have been already collected for the purpose.

The road to Klek will not impinge at any point on to the Austrian territory, though to have taken it through Austria for about 1,000 yards would have lessened the difficulty of construction and the distance to be traversed. The Turkish authorities wished to take advantage of these facilities, but Austria refused to sanction the passage.

Austria could not oppose the construction of this road, but, I am told, the work is viewed with much dissatisfaction by her, as she apprehends it will lead to the opening of Klek to commerce. In this fear she is not wrong, for though the Turks studiously avoid every reference to Klek as a commercial port, their chief object in making the road is to render Klek what nature evidently intended it to be, the outlet for the commerce of these countries; and I feel no hesitation in saying that, when the road is completed, the entrance into Klek of a British ship-of-war would be favourably viewed by the Turks as a first step towards the desired end.

I have already, in my reports, adverted to the advantages which must accrue to these Provinces by the opening of Klek to commerce. I need not, therefore, now revert to the subject.

In conclusion, I would add that the opening of Klek will offer a new and promising field to British trade which should not be left untried.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAS. ZOHRAB.

No. 16.

Consul Holmes to Lord J. Russell.—(Received February 18.)

(No. 22.)
My Lord,

Bosna-Serai, February 7, 1861.

IT would appear that the Mushir Ismail Pasha, in the case of his being obliged to march in person against the insurgents of the Herzegovina, and, perhaps, Montenegro itself, contemplates inviting the Consuls of the different Powers at Mostar to accompany him as witnesses to his proceedings, as he says that hitherto the acts of the Turkish officers there had been grossly misrepresented, and that Europe had been led to believe that the Herzegovina, during last summer, had been the theatre of nothing less than a series of military massacres. I, therefore, hasten to ask your Lordship for instructions as to what to say to Mr. Zohrab in the event of his applying to me for authority to accept such an invitation, as it will of course be an occasion of some expense.

My French colleague here has already been authorized to send his Cancellier to accompany the Pasha under the circumstances stated, as the French have not yet any Consul at Mostar, and I think it would be well should I receive permission to send Mr. Zohrab, if the other Consuls go, as it will be the only means of obtaining authentic information of what may take place.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 17.

Consul Holmes to Lord J. Russell.—(Received February 18.)

(No. 23.)
My Lord,

Bosna-Serai, February 7, 1861.

MY French colleague, M. Wiet, has just shown me a despatch he has received from M. Thouvenel, inclosing copy of a document which purports to be a Proclamation of the Emperor Napoleon III to the people of Bosnia, which, in some manner not stated, has been communicated to the French Foreign Office as being in circulation here. The French Minister states that, not having heard anything from the Consul on the subject, he imagines the document in question has not appeared here, but at the same time desires him to inquire regarding it, and to make known in every possible manner its spurious character.

I send your Lordship a copy of this singular document. It has not been as yet in circulation here, the proper time for its emission not having probably arrived. We shall, perhaps, hear of it later, though steps have now been taken to prevent its appearance altogether. It has evidently been prepared by parties connected with the scheme of attacking Dalmatia, and carrying revolution through the Herzegovina and Bosnia to Hungary, and shows that such designs are in actual contemplation. The spring is the time fixed for them in all probability, and it is certain, I think, that overtures have long since been made to the Montenegrins, and accepted by them, to aid these projects. This will account for the Proclamation of the Prince last November, indicating hostile intentions towards Austria; also for the present assemblage of troops and warlike preparations in the mountain, and for the unusually early commencement of hostilities in the Herzegovina.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure in No. 17.

Proclamation.

A TOUS les peuples qui se réuniront à l'Italie, dont Napoléon III est le protecteur, et qui se lèveront contre l'Autriche, il est fait savoir pour l'avenir sur quoi ils peuvent compter en vertu de cette Proclamation :—

1. Liberté de culte.

2. Union à la Bosnie, comme pays de la Couronne, des provinces suivantes :—Herzégovine, Monténégro, Servie, Hongrie, Pologne, Slavonie, les confins militaires sous un Prince Bosniaque ou Hongrois.

3. Suppression de tous impôts et charges vis-à-vis du nouvel Etat pendant l'espace de quinze années.

4. Erection d'une Caisse d'Etat spéciale pour les dépenses militaires et autres.

5. Après que moi (Napoléon III) j'ai donné ma parole d'honneur à l'Empereur d'Autriche à Villafranca de ne plus lui faire la guerre, il ne m'est plus possible aujourd'hui de l'attaquer; mais j'ai trouvé le moyen de lui faire faire la guerre aux frais de la France par l'Italie élevée au rang de Grande Puissance sous le sceptre de Victor Emmanuel et de mettre tout en œuvre pour délivrer de la tyrannie Autrichienne les pays qui soupirent sous son joug, en les réunissant à la Bosnie et à l'Herzégovine et les organisant tous en un seul Etat constitutionnel.

6. En dédommagement des efforts que lui aura coutés cette glorieuse entreprise, j'ai promis au Roi Victor Emmanuel la Vénétie, qui sera réunie à l'Italie.

Pour l'exécution des desseins énoncés dans les Articles 5 et 6, et pour éviter une plus grande effusion de sang, il est nécessaire qu'une armée Italienne vienne se réunir aux Hongrois par le Monténégro et la Bosnie pour diviser les forces Autrichiennes et atteindre mieux le résultat souhaité. C'est dans ce but que la présente demande vous est adressée afin que vous donniez la main à l'armée Italienne qui traversera le Monténégro et la Bosnie, se dirigeant sur la Hongrie, et vous réunissiez à elle; en récompense de quoi les conditions indiquées dans les quatre premiers Articles vous seront assurées.

Ce plan heureusement exécuté, je vous arracherai au sceptre de la Turquie et je vous élèverai au rang d'un état vaste et puissant par la réunion des provinces voisines actuellement possédées encore par l'Autriche.

No. 18.

Consul Holmes to Lord J. Russell.—(Received February 18.)

(No. 24.)
My Lord,

Bosna-Serai, February 14, 1861.

I HAVE the honour to request that your Lordship would grant me one month's leave of absence to make a hasty visit to England.

I make this request on private grounds, but I also much desire to have the advantage of a conversation with your Lordship on the position of affairs in these quarters.

In case of consent, I venture to beg your Lordship kindly to authorize Mr. Alston to inform my brother, Mr. T. P. Holmes, that leave has been granted to me, so that he may immediately send me the information by telegraph.

In making this request, I should observe that my last letters from the Herzegovina state that nothing serious is likely to be undertaken before the spring fairly sets in, and it is also the general opinion of my colleagues here that nothing of much importance is likely to happen in any direction until the middle of April or May. Should anything, however, occur to change this opinion before the receipt of your Lordship's permission, I should not avail of it.

I propose, with your Lordship's sanction, to leave the Consulate during my absence in charge of Mr. E. B. Freeman, my Cancellier.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 19.

Lord J. Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 222.)
My Lord,

Foreign Office, February 23, 1861.

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches* upon the subject of the state of affairs in Montenegro and the Herzegovina.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

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* No. 14 and Inclosure.

No. 20.

Consul Sir F. Gilbert to Lord J. Russell.—(Received February 25.)

(No. 2.) *Scutari, January 29, 1861.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship copies of certain correspondence which has lately passed between the Pasha, the Prince of Montenegro, and the Consuls at Scutari:—

Copy of the telegraphic despatch from the Prince of Montenegro to the Consuls;

Copy of the telegraphic reply of the Consuls to the above-mentioned despatch;

Copy of the translation of a Turkish letter addressed by Abdi Pasha to the Consuls;

Copy of the answer to Abdi Pasha.

Abdi Pasha and the Prince of Montenegro have been for some time in direct communication with each other, and everything seemed to be progressing so very favourably, that we were much astonished on the 9th of the present month to hear the sound of cannon in the direction of Spuz. Being determined this time to arrive at the truth of the matter, and not to trust to the statements of either the Pasha or the Prince, it was agreed among the Consuls that two dragomans should be sent to Spuz to investigate the whole affair, which was done, and the substance of their report is contained in the answer to the Pasha.

Nothing can be clearer or more straightforward than the report itself, and the whole blame falls upon the Turks. Moreover, had the Imperial troops not taken part in the quarrel, it would probably have ended in one or two only being killed or wounded, as is usual in a border fight.

I have much pleasure in informing your Lordship that, on the 25th instant, I had the honour of making the personal acquaintance of the Prince and all the Court and Senators of Montenegro.

The Prince telegraphed to M. Hecquard, the French Consul, to say that the annual grand fishing would take place in the Rieka River, and requested him to invite the other Consuls, in His Highness' name, to be present at it, both as a diversion as well as that he might be personally acquainted with us.

The Pasha, in the most obliging spirit, lent us the small steam gun-boat to take us up to the head of the Lake of Scutari, from whence we proceeded in boats up the river to meet the Prince, by whom we were received in the most cordial and friendly manner.

The Prince is a tall, handsome, well-educated young man, of about twenty-one years of age. He has a strong influence over his people, who appear to be a far superior race to the Turks and Albanian Christians of these parts.

We had a long talk about the last conflict between the Turks and Montenegrins, in the course of which he told us distinctly that his people would soon begin to look upon him as a coward if he did not take some signal vengeance on the Turks for the insults he had compelled his people to submit to, rather than disturb the peace of the frontier. We parted much pleased with our visit, and returned to Scutari the same evening.

Yesterday, at the request of Abdi Pasha, we (the Consuls) had an interview with him, to take into consideration as to what ought to be done relative to the late conflict at Spuz, but, I regret to say, that, after spending upwards of four hours with the Pasha, we could not get him to come to any decision either as to the punishment of those who crossed the frontier and fired the first shot (though we gave him their names), nor the reprimand, if not dismissal, of the Medjlis of Spuz, who had so wilfully misrepresented the facts, this same Medjlis having been the cause of the Mixed European Commission of 1859 being obliged to suspend their work and proceed to Scutari.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. H. GILBERT.

Inclosure 1 in No. 20.

The Prince of Montenegro to the Consuls at Scutari.

(Translation.) *Cattaro, January 15, 1861.*

(Telegraphic.)

THE fight at Spuz occurred thus:—

Some Turks came into the wood of Martinich to cut down some of it. Being requested to withdraw, they fired off their guns, and wounded one of my subjects. A fight immediately commenced, in which only about 100 peasants took part. The Turks cut off the heads of four Montenegrins, and exposed them on the walls of the fort.

Such proceedings I will no longer endure. Thursday next I intend to attack the fort of Spuz with 2,000 men.

I thus give you due warning, that it may not afterwards be said that it was a surprise.

Inclosure 2 in No. 20.

The Consuls at Scutari to the Prince of Montenegro.

(Télégraphique.) *Scutari, le 15 Janvier, 1861.*

NOUS ne pouvons qu'engager votre Altesse à la modération; les Consuls vont faire une enquête sur les derniers faits, et s'ils se sont passés comme on a rendu compte à votre Altesse, le Gouvernement Turque lui rendra justice.

En déclarant la guerre et se faisant justice elle-même votre Altesse assumerait une immense responsabilité; que votre Altesse écoute nos conseils et tente ce moyen avant de commencer les hostilités.

Inclosure 3 in No. 20.

Abdi Pasha to Consul Sir F. Gilbert.

(Translation.)

Sir, *Scutari, 5 Redjib, 1277.*

ON the 22nd Gemasul-evvel, I had the honour to inform you that the Montenegrins had crossed the frontier and attacked the village of Memseich, and had dared to plunder it and spill blood. Whilst I was demanding the punishment of those who had committed these disturbances, and was making every exertion to enable the Commission to renew their labours of delimitation, with very great surprise I find myself obliged to bring to your knowledge the latest most unpleasant events which have taken place at Spuz.

On the 27th of the last month, the people of Piperi, Bulopavlovich, Comana, Martinich, and Zagarath, united themselves into a band of about 6,000 armed men, without any pretext but for the sole purpose of seizing the fort and town of Spuz. They suddenly surrounded and attacked it, and although the inhabitants of Spuz and the Imperial troops who happened to be within the fort and the town made a most vigorous resistance, they were not altogether able to drive off the Montenegrins, who were in very great numbers.

This circumstance having been communicated to the inhabitants of Podgoritza, a number of them set out to assist the threatened city; but as the Montenegrins were in possession of the road leading to Spuz, the people of Podgoritza, being few in number, could not force a passage; consequently six companies of soldiers were sent, who overcame the obstacles caused by the Montenegrins, and got into Spuz, and after a severe and vigorous fight, succeeded in driving off the Montenegrins. In this fight sixteen soldiers were wounded and one of the irregulars killed; thus this attack by the Montenegrins may be looked upon as more violent and daring than any that has taken place for the last twenty years in these parts.

Near the gate called "the gate of the island," a young girl of 11 years old was killed at her own door.

You are well aware, Sir, that, although the bearing of the Montenegrins towards our Commissioners was haughty and threatening, nevertheless everything was borne with great patience; and, in order to come to an amicable arrangement of the question relative to the territory in dispute, no means were left untried on my part. The Montenegrins, by attacking the village of Memseik, broke the peace and caused an effusion of blood. To avoid, for the future, the renewal of such scenes on account of the contested lands, I asked for the punishment of those who caused the disturbance; and, whilst I signified to the Prince of Montenegro the measures I was endeavouring to carry out in order to find a remedy for the dissolution of the Commission, in accordance with the wishes of His Majesty's Government, and conformably with the just decisions of the Representatives of the Great Powers in Constantinople, I made every possible effort to

avoid these disturbances, and to cut short the causes of evil. In such a state of affairs, the violation of the frontier, the attack on the fort and town of Spuz, and the effusion of so much blood by the Montenegrins, besides being contrary to the decisions and wishes of the High Powers, demonstrates an implacable animosity.

I have the honour to report to you these facts, and I beg that you will take the necessary steps for obtaining me justice from the Prince, and communicate to me as soon as possible your opinion and advice on the above-mentioned subjects.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ABDI.

Inclosure 4 in No. 20.

Consul Sir F. Gilbert to Abdi Pasha.

M. le Gouverneur, *Scutari, le 23 Janvier*, 1861.

J'AI l'honneur d'accuser réception à votre Excellence de sa note du 5 Redjeb; si j'ai tant tardé à lui répondre et à lui donner, comme elle le désirait, mon opinion sur cette affaire, c'est que j'attendais le retour des Drogmans des Consulats d'Autriche et de Russie envoyés par mes collègues et moi pour faire une enquête sur les derniers événements.

Ces messieurs sont revenus hier soir; de leur rapport, fait on ne peut plus consciencieusement, il résulte: Que le 9 de ce mois, 9 ou 10 Turcs de Spuz allèrent couper du bois près de Mormovisca Glavitza. Que rencontrés par des bergers, ceux-ci leur firent remarquer qu'ils avaient passé les confins, et les invitèrent à se retirer. Qu'au lieu d'en tenir compte les Turcs firent feu et blessèrent un homme de Martinich, fils de Nookristov. Que les bergers tirèrent à leur tour et blessèrent un Turc.

Qu'en entendant ces coups de feu la forteresse donna l'alarme, et qu'il sortit aussitôt environ 250 Spudziani, 300 réguliers, et 150 Toskes. Que les Martinichi et les Bielopavlichi se réunirent au nombre de 500 personnes et qu'à sept heures le combat s'engagea, les forces Turques étant appuyées par le canon de la forteresse. Qu'au bruit de la fusillade les gens de Comana et de Zagaratch accoururent au nombre de 250 environ dans le nouveau village construit dernièrement dans la Rassolena Glavitza.

Qu'alors le Capitaine Petro Peroja s'approcha des Turcs et les engagea à cesser leur feu, parce qu'ils avaient reçu des ordres sévères du Prince de ne pas outrepasser les confins. Que les Turcs continuant, les Monténégrins ripostèrent et les chassèrent jusqu'à Beglisch.

Que là les habitants de Spuz, renforcés par le Nizam et les Toskes, puis, plus tard, par le bataillon de Selim Effendi et des Bashi-Bazouks venus de Podgoritza, forcèrent les Monténégrins à se retirer, et que les Spudziani leur coupèrent deux têtes.

Enfin, que la forteresse tira sur les Piperis qui gardaient leurs confins sans faire feu.

Ces messieurs rapportent aussi que la jeune fille qui, d'après le rapport fait à votre Excellence avait été tuée dans sa maison par les Monténégrins, fut blessée légèrement au front par une balle perdue. Enfin, d'après les renseignements pris sur les lieux, il est certain que ce sont aussi les habitants de Mimitch qui ont le 23 Novembre provoqué le conflit.

Votre Excellence verra combien ce rapport accorde peu avec celui qu'elle a bien voulu me communiquer. Je ne puis que regretter qu'elle soit toujours si mal renseignée et qu'on l'expose à jéter l'alarme pour des faits, qui sans importance au début, ne deviennent sérieux que par l'intervention des troupes régulières. Je ne puis que blâmer très sévèrement la conduite du Medjlis de Spuz qui, dans cette circonstance, a si gravement altéré la vérité et compromis ainsi votre Excellence auprès de son Gouvernement.

Votre Excellence m'ayant demandé mon avis, je croirais manquer à mon devoir si je ne lui disais ce que j'en pense. J'aurai du reste l'honneur de m'entretenir avec votre Excellence et mes collègues sur cet événement, et sur les mesures qui me semblent les plus propres à prévenir le retour de faits si regrettables.

Agréez, &c.
(Signé) F. H. GILBERT.

No. 26.*

Lord J. Russell to Consul Holmes.

(No. 5.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 26, 1861.

I HAVE to state to you, in reply to your despatch No. 22 of the 7th instant, that in case Ismail Pasha requests Mr. Vice-Consul Zohrab to accompany him on any such expedition as that which he appears to contemplate making into the Herzegovina, you should direct Mr. Zohrab to do so, and you will furnish him with such instructions as you may consider necessary.

You will transmit to me a copy of such instructions, and when the service is completed, you will forward an account of the expenses which Mr. Zohrab may have incurred while thus employed.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 27.

Consul Sir F. Gilbert to Lord J. Russell.—(Received February 27.)

(No. 3.)
My Lord, *Scutari, February* 9, 1861.

FINDING that his Excellency Abdi Pashi would not or could not come to any decision relative to the claim for satisfaction demanded by the Montenegrins, nor the punishment of the authors of the last two disturbances, it was agreed among the Consuls assembled at the French Consulate to draw up and send an identical letter ("lettre identique") of which I have the honour to transmit a copy to our respective Ambassadors at Constantinople, explaining the actual state of affairs and suggesting certain measures for promoting a durable peace on the frontiers for the future.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. H. GILBERT.

Inclosure in No. 27.

Consul Sir F. Gilbert to Sir H. Bulwer.

Excellence, *Scutari, le 5 Février*, 1861.

DESIREUX de connaître la vérité et de contrôler les dires des autorités Turques et Monténégrins si différents entre eux, mes collègues et moi fimes faire une enquête sérieuse sur les derniers événements. Ce rapport, que j'ai eu l'honneur d'envoyer à votre Excellence, fit sentir à mes collègues et à moi la nécessité de nous réunir pour discuter ensemble les moyens sinon de mettre un terme à ces conflits au moins de leur retirer la gravité qu'ils ont pris dans ces derniers temps. Comme j'ai eu l'honneur de l'écrire plusieurs fois à votre Excellence, j'ai toujours trouvé dans mes collègues un esprit d'impartialité et un désir de conciliation qui, tout en rendant nos relations agréables, ont heureusement profité à une prompte et bonne solution des affaires. Il était donc hors de doute que nous nous entendrions parceque nos efforts communs ne tentaient qu'au maintien de la tranquillité.

Nous nous sommes réunis aujourd'hui au Consulat de France et nous avons décidés d'envoyer à nos Ambassadeurs respectives le mémoire identique suivant que nous avons rédigé en commun.

Du rapport si consciencieusement fait des Drogmans des Consulats d'Autriche et de Russie il résulte:—

1. Que ce sont les sujets Turques qui furent les provocateurs de ces deux derniers conflits, dont la cause fut, comme toujours, les terrains dont la propriété est restée contestée.

2. Que ces rixes n'ont dégénéré en combats que par l'intervention des troupes régulières.

Avant d'aborder les moyens qui me semblent les plus pratiques pour obtenir la tranquillité sur les frontières, votre Excellence me permettra de jeter un coup d'œil sur la situation du pays.

Son Altesse le Prince de Monténégro, de même que son Excellence Abdi Pacha, je

* Nos. 21-25 *nil.*

dois le reconnaître, sont tous les deux fort désireux de vivre en bonne intelligence, et chacun de leur côté a fait leurs efforts pour atteindre ce but. S'ils n'y parviennent pas toujours, c'est qu'ils ont affaire, l'un et l'autre, à des populations tributaires, divisées par des haines qu'il faudra bien du temps pour faire disparaître. A ces haines viennent se joindre des causes toutes locales que le Gouverneur de Scutari a lui-même reconnues. Comme le sait votre Excellence la Haute Albanie n'est pas soumise au recrutement; ses habitants continuent à rester armés. Nul doute pour eux qu'ils ne doivent cette exception qu'aux craintes causés par le Monténégro, aussi ont-ils la conviction qu'elle cesserait et qu'ils seraient appelés à faire partie des armées régulières le jour où une paix durable serait établie sur les frontières. De là des intrigues partant non-seulement de Podgoritza et Spuz mais sortant de Scutari, où le parti fanatique a conservé une immense influence, influence accrue encore par le retour des Chefs exilés dont le plus redouté assiste en armes au Medglis en vertu des ordres de la Sublime Porte. Votre Excellence comprendra dès lors les difficultés que doit rencontrer son Excellence Abdi Pacha. En effet, lorsque, grâce aux précautions qu'il prend d'accord avec le Prince, la tranquillité se maintient pendant quelques mois, les Chefs de Podgoritza ou de Spuz font naître des conflits, qu'ils grossissent en y faisant aussitôt intervenir la population armée qui sait qu'elle sera bientôt secourue par les forces régulières. Puis ils font aussitôt des "Masbata," pièces officielles, auxquels son Excellence Abdi Pacha est forcé de croire, et dans lesquels ils altèrent la vérité et intervertissent toujours les rôles. Ces manœuvres ont jusqu'ici parfaitement réussi, et cette fois encore nous (les Consuls) eussions été trompés comme le Pacha, si nous n'eussions envoyés sur les lieux.

De son côté, le Prince est jeune; il n'a pas fait ses preuves, et s'il lui faut une grande volonté pour contenir ses populations dans les temps ordinaires, il lui en faut une bien plus grande encore pour empêcher les représailles lorsque les torts sont du côté des Turcs, car on l'accuse alors de manquer de courage. C'est ainsi qu'à la suite de la dernière affaire il fut poussé à nous écrire qu'il allait attaquer Spuz et qu'il dut se couvrir de la défense des Consuls et promettre une réparation pour empêcher un mouvement en avant dont bientôt il n'eut plus été le maître. Il est donc d'une sage politique de lui tenir compte de ses efforts et de lui faciliter sa tâche en punissant d'une manière exemplaire les provocateurs des derniers conflits, et en destituant les Medglis de Spuz et de Podgoritza, promoteurs de ces désordres, et qui l'en sont rendus les complices en jetant partout l'alarme par leurs rapports faux et exagérés.

Je prendrai la liberté, Excellence, d'insister sur la nécessité d'une satisfaction à donner au Monténégro dans cette circonstance. D'abord parcequ'elle nous mettra à même de l'exiger de lui; ensuite parceque si l'on ne fait rien je suis persuadé que le Prince sera débordé et contraint malgré lui de se mettre à la tête d'un mouvement qui, dans les situations des esprits, aurait, je n'en doute pas, son contrecoup dans les autres parties de la Turquie d'Europe, où l'attente d'une guerre Européenne au printemps a jeté une grande agitation.

Quant aux mesures à prendre pour le maintien de la tranquillité, elles sont de deux natures: les uns se rapportent aux causes directes, les autres atteignent les individus ayant intérêt à maintenir les désordres.

Les premières seraient:—

1. Le règlement prompt et définitif des questions des propriétés contestées surtout dans les environs de Spuz et de Podgoritza. Pour y arriver, je recommande une entrevue en présence des Consuls, de manière à pouvoir constater ce que y serait convenu du Prince Nicolas et de son Excellence Abdi Pacha. Le Prince a une grande estime pour son Excellence, et je ne doute pas qu'ils s'entendraient facilement. Quant aux moyens d'exécution, le Prince délégerait deux de ses Sénateurs les plus influents qui seraient chargé de faire appliquer en présence des Consuls les décisions prises par la Commission Mixte.

2. D'éviter autant que possible l'immixtion des troupes régulières dans ces conflits, empêcher les habitants des villes voisines de se mêler aux moindres rixes, comme ils le font aujourd'hui. Quant aux troupes régulières, son Excellence Abdi Pacha, à qui j'ai demandé, m'a répondu qu'il avait l'ordre de repousser par la force toute violation de frontière. Il considère ainsi l'entrée sur son territoire de quelques Monténégrins repoussant des individus venus jusque chez eux commettre quelques délits en faisant feu sur eux sans sortir des confins. En interprétant ses ordres de cette manière, son Excellence donne une importance qu'il n'aurait pas au moindre conflit, la plupart des terrains contestés, Mali et Veli Berdo par exemple, se trouvant dans la frontière Turque, le Général fait intervenir ses troupes dès qu'un coup de feu est tiré, et il serait difficile de faire comprendre aux Monténégrins qu'ils violent la frontière Turque lorsqu'ils empêchent de couper du bois ou de paître des troupeaux dans des terres qu'ils considèrent comme leur appartenant. Il

faut, il me semble, faire la part du milieu dans lequel on se trouve; or, en se faisant justice soi-même, on s'expose à des représailles, et toute action régulière devient impossible.

3. Enfin, le remplacement des Bachi-Bozouks par des troupes régulières dans tous les districts de la frontière, le Gouvernement Ottoman trouverait d'abord à cette mesure une grande économie, car ces troupes lui coûtent fort cher, et il en paie toujours le double de ce qu'il y en a réellement. Ensuite j'ai remarqué que ce sont presque toujours les Bachi-Bozouks qui causent les désordres, et il ne peut guère en être autrement, puisque la plus grande partie des habitants de Spuz sont considérés et payés comme soldats irréguliers, et qu'ils apportent dans leurs rapports avec les Monténégrins leurs rancunes et leurs intérêts personnels, qu'ils croient tous plus ou moins compromis par la délimitation.

Quant aux autres mesures, je pense qu'il serait de l'intérêt, bien entendu de la Sublime Porte, de soumettre le Pachalic de Scutari au recrutement comme le reste de l'Empire; et de désarmer les habitants des villes qui ne se trouvent pas sur les frontières. En le faisant, elle applanirait la plus grande partie des difficultés que rencontrent les Gouverneurs; se procurerait de bons soldats, et mettrait fin à une injustice qui lui aliène les Chrétiens. En effet, il semble dur à ces derniers de payer le lourd impôt du Nizamie lorsqu'il en exempte les Turcs qui, pas plus qu'eux, ne rendent des services militaires. Enfin cette mesure retirant aux Albanais l'intérêt qu'ils trouvent à troubler la paix sur la frontière, donnerait une plus grande facilité pour le maintien de la paix, et pour me servir du mot du Curé de Podgoritza, mettrait un terme à la prépotence et à l'arrogance des Turcs, promoteurs de tous les conflits.

Tels sont, selon moi, Excellence, les seuls moyens de mettre un terme aux conflits, et je me permets de prier votre Excellence d'en recommander l'adoption à la Sublime Porte.

J'ai, &c.
(Signé) F. H. GILBERT.

No. 28.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 121.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 28, 1861.

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, copy of a despatch from Mr. Consul Holmes, together with a copy of my answer directing him to allow Vice-Consul Zohrab to accompany Ismail Pasha on a military expedition which he contemplates making into the Herzegovina, and to furnish Mr. Zohrab with such instructions as he may consider requisite.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 29.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received March* 2.)

(No. 134.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February* 20, 1861.

HER Majesty's Consul for Bosnia informs me that there is a reason to believe the Consular body at Mostar will be invited to accompany Ismail Pasha, the Commander-in-chief in Roumelia, on an expedition he is about to undertake in the Herzegovina in order to put a stop to the inroads alleged to be constantly made by the Montenegrins; and Mr. Holmes, whilst stating that the French Government has allowed its Vice-Consul to accompany Ismail Pasha, has written to consult me as to the course it would be proper for Her Majesty's Vice-Consul at Mostar to pursue in case this invitation should be addressed to him.

I have accordingly informed Mr. Consul Holmes, in reply, that I should apprize your Lordship that I have taken upon myself to authorize him to permit Mr. Zohrab, the Vice-Consul at Mostar, to accompany the expedition in question in the event of his being requested to do so by Ismail Pasha, and that the Agent of any other foreign Power should also accompany the Pasha.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

No. 30.

Consul Holmes to Lord J. Russell.—(Received March 4.)

(No. 28.)
Bosna-Serai, February 21, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's information, copies of three notes lately addressed by Shefik Bey, Turkish Commissioner for the Affairs of the Herzegovina at Mostar, to Mr. Vice-Consul Zohrab, relating to various events which have just occurred in that province.

Document No. 1 states that a band of about 2,000 rebels collected from Piva, Drobniak, Chireovitza, and other places, under a Montenegrin, Captain Novitza, made an attack about a fortnight ago on the village of Gradovitch, in the district of Fochia. A skirmish took place between part of the attacking force and some irregulars stationed at the village, during which the remainder of the rebels plundered the village and killed eighteen men, burnt thirty-four houses, and left some 200 women and children naked and without shelter.

The Captain made all kinds of false declarations to the people and retired, taking away his killed and wounded, on learning that some regulars and Bashi-Bazouks were coming from Fochia. Also that in the district of Bihor, in the sandjack of Yeni Bazar, some villages had been attacked, when eighty houses were burnt and 200 men killed, besides many women and children burnt.

Document No. 2 relates the particulars of a skirmish between some troops under a certain Suleiman Effendi, Mudir of Gasko, at a pass on the road to the block-house of Cristatz, which was besieged by the rebels and Montenegrins, and to the assistance of which Suleiman Effendi was marching. The Turks are represented as having driven off the enemy.

Document No. 3 relates the circumstances of a raid on a village called Comina, near Pogitel, whence the Montenegrin Captain, Drago, with some twenty or thirty men, drove off some 600 sheep and four or five oxen belonging to a Roman Catholic Rayah of that place; how pursuit was made by the inhabitants of the village, both Christian and Turks, and by some cavalry and the people of neighbouring villages; and how the spoil was eventually recovered with the loss of a known Montenegrin named Zereovitch killed, and four men wounded on the part of the robbers, and two men slightly wounded on the side of the pursuers.

The district of Bihor is on the extreme frontier of Bosnia adjoining Albania, and your Lordship will perceive from these accounts, and from my previous despatches, that at various points along the entire frontier of Montenegro the Turkish territory has been attacked.

Nichsich is still in a state of siege, and it would seem that the only road by which succour could arrive is in the hands of the insurgents. Suttorina is also occupied by the rebels.

I hear that the Austrians have marched troops towards that place to keep their own frontier. All the troops stationed here, with the exception of a company of infantry, have left for Fochia and Bihor, and the Ferik Pasha commanding is daily expected to leave for the same destination.

Mr. Zohrab informs me that the Mushir Ismail Pasha, commanding in the Herzegovina, seems quite puzzled how to act, as he has been strictly ordered by the Porte to refrain from violating the Montenegrin frontier. Under these circumstances his troops are harrassed and become quite demoralized. The rebels retreat within the frontier when the Turks advance, but issue forth the moment the latter retire or can be taken at a disadvantage; and his Excellency thus sees no end to these troubles.

I think it very doubtful whether, even were the Turkish Commander to receive full powers to do whatever he might consider necessary to terminate satisfactorily the present state of affairs, he would succeed in accomplishing his object, and he certainly will not do so when permitted only to take half measures.

The atrocities said to be committed by the Montenegrins and rebels on the women and children who fall into their hands are, I am informed, quite characteristic and indubitably facts, and are such as to make it highly desirable, for the sake of humanity, that the disgustingly inhuman warfare which is now taking place in the Herzegovina should be made to cease.

If the Turks continue the course they have hitherto pursued, to judge from what has occurred in the Herzegovina during the last three or four years, that province will certainly be lost to them without much longer delay. It is most confidently predicted that if that be the case Bosnia must follow.

I can scarcely imagine that the Powers who guaranteed the integrity of Turkey contemplate the eventuality of the two valuable provinces of Bosnia and the Herzegovina being annexed to Montenegro, a country of the most fanatical, savage, and ignorant barbarians existing, I suppose, in Europe; and yet such is the tendency of what is now going on.

These people, whose social condition I slightly intimated in my despatch No. 16, endeavour to advance their frontiers by forcing the inhabitants of the Herzegovina to revolt under pain of pillage and murder. The Turkish Government is incredibly negligent in protecting its people, or is incapable of doing so, and thus the revolt has spread.

A mistaken sympathy on the part of certain European Powers for the Montenegrins as Christians is the reason why the Turks are forced to respect their frontier, a circumstance which gives the former the power of inflicting immense injury on Turkey with the most certain impunity.

The Montenegrins are in a great measure the cause of the discontent and poverty existing in Bosnia, as it is to keep them in order that a large army is maintained in the Herzegovina, for the support of which in men, money, animals, and provisions so many harrassing requisitions are made on this province.

The extreme activity of the Russians in fostering and aiding the revolt in the Herzegovina is a certain indication of the consideration attached to it by that Power, and it seems to me of the highest importance to Turkey, and to those who have an interest in her preservation, that not a moment should be lost in checking most effectually the movement which is now taking place in the Herzegovina, and in devising means of confining the Montenegrins to their mountains.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 31.

Consul Sir F. Gilbert to Lord J. Russell.—(Received March 6.)

(No. 4.)
Scutari, February 19, 1861.

My Lord,

MY colleagues and myself have continually urged upon the Pasha the necessity of giving some satisfaction to the Montenegrins for the last two attacks made upon them by the Turks of Spuz and Podgoritza, and we warned him of the probable consequences of a refusal, and now, at the moment of sending off my cavass with the post to Antivari, I have received the following intelligence, which fully carries out our warnings to the Pasha, viz., that if he did not give satisfaction to the Montenegrins, they would take it for themselves.

Petro Pejovich, a cousin of the Prince, is here, the bearer of a letter from the Prince to Abdi Pasha, to demand satisfaction for the last two outrages on the part of the Turks against the Montenegrins; but the Pasha being unfortunately absent at Podgoritza, he (Petro Pejovich) purposes remaining till the return of the Pasha, and I shall then do myself the honour of reporting the result.

It appears from a letter which has come here from Podgoritza that on the 13th instant a number of the inhabitants of Spuz went out in the afternoon and wantonly insulted and attacked some men and children of Novosello who were quietly pasturing their flocks. The people of the village went to the rescue, and a fight having begun, the troops and Toskes (irregulars), who were previously prepared, made a sortie from Spuz, and drove the shepherds and the other Montenegrins back to the village of Novosello, killing the captain, Petko Perow, and five others, two of whose heads they cut off and carried away.

On the 15th instant a deputation of the Piperi, Bielopavlovich, and Comani waited on the Prince of Montenegro, and vehemently demanded revenge for the last three attacks. The Prince forcibly recommended patience, adding that he would obtain satisfaction for them, and immediately sent off the above-named Petro Pejovich to Scutari, to ask for an explanation from the Pasha.

On the 16th instant the people of Piperi, Comani, and Zagaratch (not at all satisfied with the reply of the Prince), having heard that a convoy of provisions was going to Spuz, placed themselves in ambush to await their return, on which they attacked the two companies of soldiers, and killed all of them, with the exception of twelve who managed to escape. At the same time another party of Montenegrins attacked four other com-

panies at the post of Daliana, and killed fifteen Bashi-Bazouks, among them a Bimbachi (Lieutenant-Colonel) belonging to Hodo Bey's irregulars.

The Montenegrins were about 1,000 in number, and it is stated by an eye-witness that the Piperi alone carried away about sixty heads of the Turks.

There is also a report that, on the 15th instant, Novitza, a senator who had been disgraced by the late Prince Danilo, had attacked Lower Kolaschine, and destroyed that village, but of this fact I have received no details.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. H. GILBERT.

No. 32.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received March* 11.)

(No. 150.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, February* 27, 1861.

BY the reports of Her Majesty's Consuls at Scutari and Bosna-Serai, your Lordship will have been placed in possession of the most recent intelligence from that quarter.

I have deemed it my duty to call the serious attention of the Porte to the aggressive intentions attributed by Mr. Consul Holmes to Ismail Pasha, the Commander-in-chief of Roumelia, with respect to the military operations about to be undertaken against Montenegro; and I have been assured by Aali Pasha, in reply, that Ismail Pasha has received the most positive instructions to confine himself to a defence of the Turkish territory, and on no account to carry hostilities into Montenegro.

I need not, however, say that this position of Turkey, lying open to constant aggressions which she may repel but not punish, is not favourable to her tranquillity, or, indeed, to the permanent peace of the frontier. Recently, however, the Turks themselves, according to the accounts we have received, appear to have been the aggressors.

With reference to these late transactions, Aali Pasha informed me that he had already received a copy of the despatch addressed by the European Consuls at Scutari to their respective Representatives here; and that in accordance with the advice given in that despatch, Abdi Pasha, the Governor of Scutari, had been directed to station a large regular force on that frontier for the preservation of peace, and likewise to endeavour to obtain, through the Mixed Commission appointed for that purpose, an early settlement of the pending question as to disputed property in the neighbourhood of Spuz and Podgoriza.

His Highness did not undertake to adopt the advice given by the Consular body at Scutari as to the satisfaction to be accorded to Montenegro on account of the aggression committed by the Turks; but I have reason to believe that the Porte is not disinclined to make some concession on this point, and that the Grand Vizier has written to Abdi Pasha to authorize him, if possible, to come to an honourable arrangement with the Prince of Montenegro.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

No. 33.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received March* 11.)

(No. 151.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, February* 27, 1861.

IN a despatch dated the 11th instant, which has likewise been forwarded to your Lordship, Her Majesty's Consul in Bosnia acquaints me that the other foreign Powers have all appointed Consuls at Mostar, and that Great Britain alone continues to be represented by a Vice-Consul.

The importance of Mostar having increased greatly, owing to the separation of the Herzegovina from Bosnia and to the critical condition of the surrounding districts, and Mr. Zohrab being a tried and able servant of Great Britain, I venture to suggest to your Lordship that it would be advisable to give Mr. Zohrab the same rank as the other foreign Consuls at Mostar, and to grant him a corresponding increase of salary.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

No. 34.

Earl Cowley to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received March* 12.)

(No. 360.)
My Lord, *Paris, March* 11, 1861.

THE Turkish Ambassador had been with M. Thouvenel shortly before I saw his Excellency this morning, and had communicated to him a telegram just received from Constantinople, in which the Porte requested the French Government to use their influence with the Prince of Montenegro to prevent a continuation of the encroachments of the Montenegrins upon the Turkish territory of Albania and the Herzegovina.

Almost simultaneously with this communication, M. Thouvenel had received a telegram from the French Consul at Scutari, dated the 9th instant, stating that the Consuls had unanimously refused to entertain a similar request made to them by Dervish Pasha, because they considered the Turks to be the aggressors; and a telegram from M. de Lavalette, dated yesterday, informing him that the Representatives of the five Powers had proposed to the Porte to send European Commissioners, to whom a Turkish Commissioner should be adjoined, with a view of settling the affairs of the Herzegovina. That the Porte had returned no answer at the time the telegram was sent, but that he hoped the French Government would approve the proceeding.

On my asking M. Thouvenel what answer he had returned to M. de Lavalette, he replied that he had sent the telegram to London, to know the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, adding, with a considerable display of irritation, that he was determined not again to take the initiative in any propositions with regard to Turkey, since everything he proposed was received with suspicion.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 35.

Lord J. Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 304.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, March* 13, 1861.

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copy of a despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople on the subject of the disturbances in Montenegro and the neighbouring districts.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 36.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 148.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 13, 1861.

UPON the receipt of news from the Herzegovina, the Representatives unanimously agreed to offer their good offices with a view to put a stop to the effusion of blood on the frontiers of Montenegro and in the neighbouring districts. We offer to send an European Commission with a Delegate of the Porte furnished with full powers. This is a message from the French Ambassador at Constantinople to Thouvenel.

Her Majesty's Government propose to agree to what you have done at Constantinople.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 37.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received March* 14.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, March* 14, 1861, 5 P.M.

THE various reports from the Montenegrin frontier made me consider it was our duty to offer our good offices to the Porte, either by such a Commission as mentioned, or in any other way the Ottoman Government would point out.

I have not Ali Pasha's answer.

I explain matters by the messenger. Meantime I am much obliged to Her Majesty's Government for last paragraph of despatch.

No. 38.

Earl Cowley to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received March* 15.)

(No. 398.)
Paris, March 14, 1861.

My Lord,

M. THOUVENEL informs M. de Lavalette by telegraph that he approves the steps taken by the Representatives of the Great Powers to put a stop to the troubles which have manifested themselves on the frontier of Montenegro. He did this after inquiring of me what your Lordship had done—an inquiry which your despatch No. 304 of yesterday's date enabled me to answer.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 39.

Lord Bloomfield to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received March* 15.)

(Telegraphic.)
Vienna, March 15, 1861, 5 P.M.

I HAVE read to Rechberg your Lordship's telegram of 7th March. He quite approves of intended instruction to Lord Cowley. Metternich is authorized to agree to any arrangement as to Syrian Convention that receives the sanction of the Porte.

Rechberg has received intelligence from Consul at Ancona that 200 Garibaldians, among them 100 officers, have embarked at Sinigaglia, it is supposed for Spitza, object being to support the Montenegrins.

An application of Porte to disembark 1,200 Bashi-Bazouks at Ragusa is granted.

No. 40.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(Telegraphic.)
Foreign Office, March 15, 1861.

HER Majesty's Government approve the steps you have taken in respect to Montenegro.

No. 41.

Lord J. Russell to Earl Cowley.

(Telegraphic.)
Foreign Office, March 15, 1861, 2·35 P.M.

YOU may inform M. Thouvenel that Her Majesty's Government have approved the steps taken by Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople in respect to Montenegro.

No. 42.

Consul Holmes to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received March* 18.)

(No. 32.)
Bosna-Serai, March 7, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that Ismail Pasha, the Mushir commanding at Mostar, left that place rather unexpectedly on the 27th ultimo for Stolatz, whence he almost immediately proceeded to Trebigné.

Affairs in the Herzegovina do not appear to be progressing very favourably for the Turks. The Livah Mehmet Pasha, a few days ago, was sent from Trebigné with a battalion of infantry and some irregulars to retake the village of Suttorina and relieve

the besieged garrison—a party of about seventy Albanians, who had taken refuge in a block house.

By permission of the Austrian authorities, Mehmet Pasha and his party proceeded to Ragusa and from thence by land to a place called Connolé, from which point a pass leads into Suttorina. This pass was found to be so strongly occupied by the insurgents that the Pasha decided on awaiting for reinforcements. In the meantime, however, the attitude of the Austrian peasantry became so hostile that he became alarmed, and an Austrian officer having arrived from Ragusa, decided him to return to Trebigné, by advising him to lose no time in effecting a retreat. As soon as he had withdrawn, the insurgents burnt the village of Suttorina, and the Albanians fled to the Austrian frontier, where they were disarmed and permitted to pass. This information, it is said, induced Ismail Pasha to proceed to Trebigné to superintend matters in person. I am informed that Mehmet Pasha requested permission of the Austrian authorities to proceed to Suttorina by sea—a proceeding which would have secured the success of his expedition. His request, however, was refused, but he was nevertheless permitted to pass through Austrian territory by land, where he had to encounter a strongly defended pass, was intimidated by a hostile Austrian population, and met with everything calculated to ensure disaster.

The intention of these proceedings of the Austrian authorities, if they have been correctly reported, is sufficiently apparent.

Dervish Pasha, with three or four battalions and a considerable force of Bashi-Bazouks, is established in an entrenched camp in what he considers a strong position in the plain of Zuptzi. A force of some 5,000 Montenegrins and insurgents are collected at Grahovatz a few hours distant, and an attack on the Turkish force was daily expected. When the post was leaving Mostar, a report reached that a battle was being fought, but the result was unknown.

Nichsich is still besieged and is reported to be suffering from famine. Mustapha Pasha, the Ferik who commanded the troops here, and who left this for Fochia about ten days ago, found the rebels who had committed the outrages there occupying a pass called Sottiska, intercepting the highway from Fochia to Gatsko and Nichsich. A skirmish took place, which resulted in the retreat of the insurgents. The Pasha at present remains where he is to keep the roads open.

Your Lordship will remember that Ismail Pasha was sent to these provinces as head of a Commission of Inquiry into the affairs of Bosnia and the Herzegovina, to fulfil the intentions of the Grand Vizier's promised visit last autumn. From time to time I observe remarks in some of the Constantinople journals laudatory of the energy with which the Commission is working; but I can assure your Lordship that people at Mostar and in Bosnia are unaware of anything beyond the nominal existence of the Commission, and Ismail Pasha's attention is totally absorbed by the command of the troops and the movements of the insurgents and Montenegrins.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 43.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received March* 19.)

(No. 168.)
Constantinople, March 5, 1861.

My Lord,

IN reply to my communication to Aali Pasha of Sir Francis Gilbert's despatch No. 4 of the 19th ultimo, respecting the satisfaction demanded by the Montenegrins, I have the honour to state that Aali Pasha has sent telegraphic instructions to Abdi Pasha to come to a speedy arrangement with the Prince's Commissioner, Pero Perowitch.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

No. 44.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received March* 19.)

(No. 170.)
Constantinople, March 6, 1861.

My Lord,

AS it is possible that Mr. Consul Holmes may have been unable to forward to your Lordship a detailed account of the most recent intelligence from the borders of

Montenegro, I have the honour to inclose herewith translations made in this Embassy of three Reports placed by the Turkish authorities in the hands of Her Majesty's Vice-Consul at Mostar, which have reached me in a private letter from Mr. Holmes.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

Inclosure in No. 44.

Reports from Montenegrin Frontier.

(Translation.)

A LETTER from Captain Mehmed Aga, dated yesterday, 3 Shaban (14th February), and addressed to Ismail Pasha, says that on the night of Monday, the 1st instant (11th February), Captain Drago, with twenty or thirty brigands, crossed the border of the district of Nevesign, and after taking possession of about 600 sheep and four or five animals, the property of a Latin Christian of the village of Coumnia, in the district of Polchetil (Blaghaï), had gone to the village of Belgrade. Thereupon Jussuf Effendi, lieutenant of cavalry stationed at Odziak Kariessi, with a sub-lieutenant and a party of cavalry, the beys, and the inhabitants of the neighbouring villages, all under arms, proceeded to Belgrade, where he heard that the insurgents had gone to the village of Leskofsa. He started in pursuit of them, accompanied by all the able-bodied men of the village, both Mussulmans and Christians. Nicola Vukotchich ex Rodgiabashi, who was there, hearing that they were going to the mountain, collected together about twenty persons from among his relations, connections, and neighbours, and having overtaken the robbers, attacked them. As soon as Jussuf Effendi above-mentioned heard of it, he went to the ex Kodgia-Bashi's assistance with the troops and people under his command, and took part in the fight. The rebels were made to part with their plunder, and retreat to the mountains. During this action the notorious rebel Zakovitch fell, and four others were wounded. On our side the ex Kodgia-Bashi was wounded on his left arm. A nephew of his was also wounded. They returned to Nevesign in the night at two, and the plundered cattle was restored to their owner.

4 *Shaban*, 1277 (*February* 15, 1861).

The Staff-Major Mahmoud Bey, at Ghatchka, writes to his Excellency Ismail Pasha on the 2nd Shaban (13th February), stating that for the last three or four days the inhabitants of Bugnani, the Uskebs, the Montenegrins, and the insurgents of Piva continue their attack against Christadg without interruption, whilst Captain Murad Agha of the irregulars was defending that place with all the forces under his command. Last Sunday he reported that the rebels were coming to attack that place in force. Therefore Suleiman Effendi Mudir, of Ghatchka, was sent to its assistance with a sufficient detachment, composed of some of the regulars stationed at Ghatchka, the irregulars of Nevesign and Fotcha, and the able-bodied inhabitants. Following the rules of warfare, he left a reserve in his rear, and marched upon Christadg. Within an hour of it, at Boyoutoghronila, the insurgents had established themselves on the heights on each side of the road, and opened fire, which was immediately returned.

But as the insurgents, thus posted on each side of the road, were under cover of blocks of stone, whilst our troops were entirely exposed, after the engagement had lasted an hour, it became evident that there was no other alternative but to carry the heights by storm. The regulars were, therefore, sent against the right side, the irregulars against the left. The enemy could not withstand them, and took to flight.

During this engagement thirteen men were killed and about fifty wounded on the enemy's side. On our side about six persons were slightly wounded. A Montenegrin decoration was found on one of the insurgents, and has been sent here. The sword of Suleiman Effendi was hit by a shot and injured.

4 *Shaban*, 1277 (*February* 15, 1861).

It appears from a mashata (report) received by the Commander-in-Chief from Fotcha, that the Montenegrin Captain Noumtcha, having again collected 2,000 men from Piva, Drobniak, Dgvikoptcha, and other revolted districts, attacked on the morning of Friday, the 28th day of last month (14th January), the village of Ghrebovitch, in the district of Votcha, and that the pandours (armed police) of that place attempted to fight

for a short time; but as the insurgents were numerous, the pandours could not hold their ground, and locked themselves up in a house where they sustained a siege. The insurgents entered the village, burnt the mosques and thirty-four houses. They killed seventeen villagers and a man from the town. In order to prevent this village from being succoured, they surrounded it, and plundered all that it contained, stripping the women completely naked, and leaving more than 200 women and children without a roof over their heads.

The insurgents sustained some loss in killed and wounded, but left no traces of it. Their captain, moreover, spread all kinds of false reports. Finally, on the arrival of our reinforcements, consisting of regular and other troops, the insurgents withdrew to Gradanitza.

It further appears from the verbal report of a zaptieh that last Saturday night a numerous body of rebels invaded the village of Biher, in the sandjak of Yenibazar, and burnt eighty houses, 200 Mussulmans were killed, and several women and children burnt in the fire.

It is with great regret that I report these distressing occurrences.

6 *Shaban*, 1277 (*February* 17, 1861).

(Signed) SHEFIK (Bey), *Imperial Commissioner*.

No. 45.

Consul Sir F. Gilbert to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received March* 20.)

(No. 5.)

My Lord, *Scutari, March* 4, 1861.

I HAVE the honour herewith to transmit a copy of a letter addressed by Abdi Pasha to the Consuls here, also a copy of a letter from him to the Prince of Montenegro, and a copy of the synonymous reply of the Consuls to Abdi Pasha.

It is lamentable to think how much blood is uselessly shed in these border fights in consequence of the Imperial troops taking part on every occasion; but a very short while since a soldier might have passed entirely unmolested, from the fact that the troops were never brought into action, and at most two or three inhabitants of the borders were killed or wounded; but now the case is very different; moreover, the troops, who are badly led, have no personal feeling or private quarrel against the Montenegrins, and it would be a mercy to the soldiers if orders could be sent from Constantinople to prevent their taking any part for the future in these border feuds unless in extreme cases.

It is reported that the officer in command of the escort jumped off his horse on seeing the Montenegrins rise out of their ambuscade, ran away, and shut himself up with a few others in a small block-house near the spot, leaving his men to their fate.

One thing is quite certain, that unless Abdi Pasha receives full powers to act in conjunction with the Prince of Montenegro as to the settlement of the disputed lands, peace never can be obtained.

Another point I beg leave to impress upon the attention of the Turkish Government, that unless the Montenegrins obtain satisfaction when they are injured by the Turks, I much fear the rule of Prince Nicolas will be a short one, for already they are much dissatisfied with him, and openly murmur against his want of courage and his submission to the wishes of the Consuls at Scutari.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. H. GILBERT.

Inclosure 1 in No. 45.

Abdi Pasha to Consul Sir F. Gilbert.

(Translation).

Sir, *Scutari, February* 25, 1861.

IN my former letters of the 22nd Djemazil-avvel and 5th Régib I had the honour to inform you from whence the conflicts on the border arose, and that to follow out in every respect the Imperial Orders relative to the maintenance of peace and tranquillity as it was agreed among us, the other day I went to Podgoritza.

In accordance with the above, whilst I was on the spot making inquiries, 7,000 or

8,000 Montenegrins crossed the frontier and violently attacked some Imperial troops who were escorting provisions to Spuz; sixty officers and soldiers were killed, and twenty-five wounded. You know, Sir, well, that ever since I have had charge of this province I have never ceased making every effort to keep peace, and to cause the frontier, as marked out by the Commissioners of the Great Powers, to be respected; thus, though with regard to the settlement to be arrived at relative to the properties in dispute no effort has been omitted with regard to the Montenegro affairs, I have always addressed myself to the Consuls.

But the Montenegrins, in spite of all this, have never ceased to quarrel and fight with our people from personal motives, and in this way give opportunities to evil and disorderly people. Lately, whilst the event of which I am now writing took place, Prince Nicholas sent here his cousin, Pejo Pejovich, who verbally asserted to me that all this had happened without the knowledge of the Prince. Such being the case, either the declaration of the ignorance of the Prince was a deception to blind my eyes, or else it shows that the authority of the Prince is not sufficiently strong to restrain and keep in order the Montenegrins.

I have answered decidedly to the Prince that the Sublime Porte desires peace and good order, and I have the honour to inclose a copy of that letter for your information. In addition, however, to the above, the Montenegrins are gathering together into a large body, certainly to attack some place. Such being the case, you see, Sir, clearly (and must approve of it) that I am compelled to hold myself on the defensive, and to drive the Montenegrins back by force if they attempt again to pass the frontier. On these subjects I beg to have your opinion.

(Signed) ABDI PACHA.

Inclosure 2 in No. 45.

Abdi Pasha to the Prince of Montenegro.

Scutari, le $\frac{9}{21}$ *Février*, 1861.

Altesse,

J'AI l'honneur d'accuser réception de la note que votre Altesse m'a adressée en date $\frac{3}{15}$ Février.

Votre Altesse trouve que ce sont les Turcs qui, depuis quelque temps, se permettent d'attaquer les Monténégrins, y piller leurs biens et ravager leur pays.

Quoique les faits et les rapports qui m'ont été adressés à plusieurs réprises sur ces déplorables événements m'eussent mis dans la nécessité d'être d'une autre opinion, j'avais promis aux Consuls des Grandes Puissances residant à Scutari de me porter personnellement sur le théâtre des conflits pour pouvoir vérifier de par moi-même le véritable état de choses, et y apporter un remède de nature à nous faciliter l'accomplissement de l'œuvre de pacification si ardemment désirée par le Gouvernement de la Sublime Porte, et je partis Vendredi le 15 pour Podgoritza.

Dimanche, $\frac{5}{17}$ Février, quelques compagnies des troupes Impériales, qui escortaient un convoi de vivres pour Spuz, furent à l'imprévu attaquées sur la route qui conduit à cette ville par un corps de plusieurs milliers de Monténégrins, qui, violant les frontières et le droit de gens, s'étaient embusqués, toute me porte à supposer, dans le but d'atteindre ma personne pendant le voyage que je devais faire de Podgoritza à Spuz. Les troupes Turques, tombées dans cette embuscade, furent impitoyablement massacrées avec préméditation, et avec un rage que l'Europe certainement ne peut pas applaudir.

Ce fait, que je ne sais assez déplorer, est une preuve que ce ne sont pas les Turcs qui donnent toujours occasions aux rixes et aux conflits, et qu'ils ne se permettraient pas de tendre des piéges et des embuscades aux Monténégrins qui journellement fréquentent les bazaars de la Turquie, où ils sont respectés ni plus ni moins que les sujets de Sa Majesté le Sultan.

Votre Altesse peut bien se faire une idée de la sensation qu'à mon rétour de Podgoritza j'ai dû éprouver en trouvant à Scutari l'envoyé de votre Altesse aussi bien qu'une note, avec laquelle votre Altesse me presse de lui indiquer si c'est la Turquie qui veut la guerre, ou si ce sont les Turcs des frontières qui se permettent de troubler la paix et le bon ordre.

Votre Altesse doit être bien convaincue des mes dispositions amicales et des efforts qui depuis si longtemps je n'ai point cessé de faire pour obtenir une entente cordiale, et mettre un terme aux conflits et à cette inutile effusion de sang. J'ai l'honneur donc de

déclarer à votre Altesse que je me trouve toujours dans les mêmes dispositions amicales, que le Gouvernement de la Sublime Porte désire la tranquillité, et que les Turcs ne sont pas ceux qui entravent les arrangements à l'amiable que les Grandes Puissances nous ont proposé pour établir l'ordre et la sécurité. Dans l'état d'agitation où le dernier événement a plongé les populations de cette province, il me serait bien difficile, il est vrai, de prendre sous ma responsabilité un parti que le manque de sécurité pourrait certainement rendre insuffisant, mais je m'empresse de me référer au Gouvernement de la Sublime Porte pour obtenir les instructions dont j'ai besoin, afin de pouvoir prendre l'initiative de la conciliation et apaiser les esprits que tant des meurtres et des ravages ont aigri et irrité.

En attendant ces instructions j'ai l'honneur d'assurer votre Altesse que je continuerai toujours à n'épargner aucun effort en mon pouvoir pour empêcher les désordres et faire respecter l'inviolabilité des frontières et la sécurité publique.

(Signé) ABDI PACHA.

Inclosure 3 in No. 45.

Consul Sir F. Gilbert to Abdi Pasha.

Scutari, le 1 *Mars*, 1861.

M. le Gouverneur,

J'AI reçu la note que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser à la date du 17 Chaban, ainsi que la copie de sa lettre à Son Altesse le Prince de Monténégro.

L'attaque des troupes régulières par les Piperi, Comani, Zagaratchi, m'a causé une impression excessivement pénible, et je ne saurais trop la blamer. Quant au nombre des assaillants, que votre Excellence porte à 8,000, il se trouve peu en rapport avec les données que j'ai reçu des témoins oculaires. Comme votre Excellence, je pense que cette attaque a eu lieu sans le consentement du Prince, mais elle me permettra de lui faire remarquer que mes collègues et moi avions prévu ce résultat et l'en avions avertie. Dans les diverses conversations que nous eûmes à ce sujet avec votre Excellence, nous cherchâmes à lui démontrer la nécessité de punir les provocateurs des dernières affaires, qui, votre Excellence elle-même l'a reconnu, étaient des sujets Turques. Mes collègues et moi lui fimes alors observer que si elle laissait ces provocations impunies, si elle ne donnait aucune satisfaction au Prince, elle affaiblirait certainement son autorité sur ces tribus turbulentes, et lui retirerait ainsi le pouvoir d'empêcher les représailles. Votre Excellence en parut convaincu et nous promit de partir le lendemain pour Podgoritza. Malheureusement elle ne le fit que trois semaines après; pendant ce temps votre Excellence oublie de nous en parler; des nouvelles provocations avaient lieu. Le 13 Février des Bachi-Bozouks de Spuz tendaient une embuscade à des gens de Novosello, coupaient deux têtes qu'ils importaient, tuaient cinq hommes, parmi lesquels le Capitaine du village. A la suite de cette affaire une démonstration eut lieu à Cettigné contre le Prince qui, espérant calmer les esprits, envoyait à votre Excellence son cousin le Capitaine Pejo Pejovich. Il était trop tard, comme nous l'avions prévu; le Prince se trouvait débordé et les Piperi agissaient malgré lui. En vous faisant ces remarques, je n'ai pas la pensée d'excuser les Monténégrins, mais vous comprendrez, M. le Gouverneur, combien je dois regretter que votre Excellence n'ait pas cru devoir suivre nos conseils qui, en calmant les esprits, arrêtant de nouvelles provocations, eussent empêché cette malheureuse affaire. Votre Excellence me fait savoir qu'une bande de Monténégrins se réunit pour renouveler une attaque; j'aurais désiré qu'elle voulut bien entrer à ce sujet dans de plus grands détails et me fit connaître le lieu de ce rassemblement. Il me semble qu'il est de l'intérêt de tout le monde d'empêcher ces conflits, et que l'on doit toujours faire ses efforts pour les prévenir, or, si j'avais eu quelques renseignements plus circonstanciés, en agissant de concert avec mes collègues auprès du Prince Nicolas et en l'avertissant par le télégraphe des projets de ses sujets, nous eussions sans doute pu, comme nous l'avons fait tant de fois déjà, arrêter ou empêcher l'attaque que prévoit votre Excellence. Si cependant ces craintes se rapportent à Tugemille, je dois porter à votre connaissance que le jour même où, sur la demande de votre Excellence, le Prince faisait rendre les deux enfants pris chez les Zupci, le Bairaktar de Tugemille, embusqué avec 5 hommes, tirait 4 coups de fusil sur un Monténégrin, qu'il blessa grièvement, votre Excellence comprendra combien il est difficile de conserver la tranquillité, si pendant qu'elle fait faire des démarches par les Consuls auprès du Prince elle laisse impunies les représailles de ses sujets.

Agréez, &c.

(Signé) F. H. GILBERT.

No. 46.

Lord J. Russell to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 61.) *Foreign Office, March* 20, 1861.

My Lord,

YOUR despatches No. 88 to No. 103 of the 14th instant have been received and laid before the Queen.

The present aspect of affairs in Hungary, coupled with the news of an outbreak in the Herzegovina, is so serious that Her Majesty's Government hesitate to pronounce any decided opinion.

It is to be hoped rather than expected that the ancient connection of Hungary with Austria may be persevered by a conciliatory spirit on both sides.

Her Majesty's Ambassador at the Porte has instructions not to favour the views of Prince Conza unless he shall appear to his Excellency to be sincerely devoted to the maintenance of the Ottoman Power.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 47.

Lord Bloomfield to Lord J. Russell.—(Received March 21.)

Vienna, March 21, 1861, 5 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

BY a telegram just received from Constantinople, Rechberg hears that, in face of the disturbance in Herzegovina, it has been proposed, and the proposition is agreed to by the Porte, that the five Powers shall appoint a Commission to mediate between the Turks and the insurgents. His Excellency entirely approves of this project, and hopes Her Majesty's Government will support it. He would object to the Scutari Consuls forming the Commission on account of Hacquard. He says if something is not immediately done, the Austrian military frontier stations must be strengthened.

An account has reached Rechberg that a boat containing about fifty filibusters was taken in tow by an English steamer carrying a mail from Corfu to Trieste and cast loose near Spitza, where they landed and were received by a body of Montenegrins.

No. 48.

Lord J. Russell to Lord Bloomfield.

Foreign Office, March 21, 1861.

(Telegraphic.)

HER Majesty's Government are very willing to have Commission sent from Constantinople respecting Montenegro and Herzegovina. But I have left a discretion to Sir H. Bulwer, and Austrian Internuncio will do well to consult with him.

No. 49.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.

Constantinople, March 21, 1861, 3 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

I HAVE got a large portion of the arms from Galatz, and hope to have all away by to-morrow.

Mr. Churchhill informs me that a Hungarian plot in the Principalities, which a General Bertzentzey is at Galatz to effect, has been completely frustrated by the removal of the arms. Meantime fifty Garibaldians have arrived at Spitza, a port on the Turkish coast near Scutari. The Internuncio has orders to insist on the Commission I recommended being sent immediately to Scutari.

If the Porte hesitates, Austria will be obliged to take military measures to prevent the threatened invasion of its dominions and those of Turkey. I advise Baron Prokesch to come to an understanding with the Ottoman Government, and shall advise this Government to act in concert with Austria if the case seems to require it.

No. 50.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 168.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 22, 1861.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 150 of the 27th ultimo, on the subject of the state of affairs on the Montenegrin frontier, and I have to state to your Excellency that in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government the Porte will do well to conciliate the Prince of Montenegro.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 51.

Lord J. Russell to Lord Bloomfield.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March* 23, 1861.

HER Majesty's Government decline to instruct their Admiral to intercept expeditions to the coast of Turkey in the Adriatic. They are of opinion that the Austrian and Turkish force ought to be sufficient, and that neither British or French force is needed. Her Majesty's Government approve of Commission of Inquiry, but only if the Porte consents.

If the Government of Turkey should prove incapable of putting down an insurrection in Herzegovina and Bosnia a new state of things will arise of which the consequences may be very serious. Her Majesty's Government must wait to see the result of the present efforts of Turkey.

No. 52.

Lord Napier to Lord J. Russell.—(Received March 23.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, March* 23, 1861, 11·45 A.M.

PRINCE GORTCHAKOW has received intelligence of the landing of a revolutionary band at Spitza, near Montenegro. He asks whether the English Government will station a ship to prevent further landings in Turkey. He cannot send a Russian vessel. The French, if asked, might perhaps co-operate.

No. 53.

Lord J. Russell to Lord Napier.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March* 23, 1861.

HER Majesty's Government decline to instruct their Admiral to intercept expeditions to the coast of Turkey in the Adriatic. They are of opinion that the Austrian and Turkish force ought to be sufficient, and that neither British or French force is needed.

Her Majesty's Government approve of Commission of Inquiry, but only if the Porte consents.

No. 54.

Lord J. Russell to Lord Napier.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March* 23, 1861, 2·30 P.M.

HER Majesty's Government approve of an European Commission and Turkish Delegation for the pacification of Montenegro and of Herzegovina, and trusts the Porte will not object.

No. 54*.

Lord Bloomfield to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received March* 23.)

Vienna, March 23, 1861.

(Telegraphic.)

RECHBERG hears from St. Petersburgh that Gortchakow proposes a combined English and French naval expedition to the Adriatic. His Excellency objects to France taking part in such expedition, but would gladly see the English flag there in force.

His Excellency learns that the Porte refuses consent to Commission of Inquiry into affairs of Herzegovina.

Prokesch reports Turkey to be powerless at this moment, and totally incapable of quelling the insurrection there. Rechberg seems of opinion that if Turkey is thus paralyzed, a Commission should be insisted on as the last chance of restoring order.

No. 55.

Lord J. Russell to Earl Cowley.

Foreign Office, March 23, 1861.

(No. 368.)

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches* upon the state of affairs in Hungary and the Herzegovina.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 56.

Lord Bloomfield to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received March* 25.)

Vienna, March 21, 1861.

(No. 111.)

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward a translation by Mr. Dillon of an article from the "Ost Deutsche Post" on the events passing in the Herzegovina, which gives, I believe, a faithful and an alarming picture of the state of that Turkish province.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 56.

Extract from the "Ost Deutsche Post" of March 20, 1861.

(Translation.)

EVENTS IN THE HERZEGOVINA.

Serajevo, March 10, 1861.

IN the midst of the political complications in Europe, the bloody events at present taking place in the Herzegovina deserve the fullest attention of the public. The Christian population of Turkey, excited by the instigations of the Montenegrins, have begun a contest against the Turks, the consequences of which cannot be foreseen. Foreign influences seem to take no unimportant part in these events. Uskoks ("Uskoken") from Montenegro formed an alliance for mutual defence with the Christian inhabitants of the Herzegovina, and we thus see that a fearful contest has broken out in the whole extent of the Herzegovina, in which hitherto the insurgents have in every case remained victors. If we reflect that the towers of Sutorina have been taken and destroyed at Wukolowies, that the Turkish garrison has been driven out, and thereby the door opened on the side of the sea to an expected armed auxiliary force; if we further consider that the insurgents have already in part occupied the pass situated at a distance of eight hours between Servia and Montenegro by burning and destroying the great Turkish village and its inhabitants (at Bibor), and have thereby already established a communication with Servia, and that similar contests are taking place in the neighbourhood of Nichsich, Koronito, and Zubci, up to the gates of Trebigné, we shall at once perceive that a systematic movement such as hitherto never existed in the

* Nos. 46, 51, 53, and 54*.

former struggles of these wild tribes, and united military operations, are offered to our view which enables us to judge of the importance of the events. From Serajevo, the Travnik Nahie, even from Kraina and the Kraimakawie of Ranjaluka, already 600 Bashi-Bazouks, as well as all the regular military, have been sent in haste to the Herzegovina, where in addition large forces were already collected. The Bosnian Government shows the greatest activity in forwarding military and commissariat stores. Whether, however, the Government can continue to supply the great wants of the army in the face of the extremely pressing financial necessities, whether the Generals Ismail and Dervish Pasha will be able to suppress the insurrection, or, at least, to set limits to it, is a question which will be shortly answered.

No. 57.

Lord Bloomfield to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received March* 25.)

Vienna, March 21, 1861.

(No. 118.)

My Lord,

THE Turkish Ambassador has mentioned to me that, by orders lately received from his Government, he had stated to Count Rechberg that the incursions into the Herzegovina, whether openly encouraged by the Montenegrin Government or not, were becoming so serious that the Porte intended to make the Prince responsible for them, and was taking measures to re-establish order; and that the Austrian Government have behaved with great consideration for Turkey in this matter.

Prince Callimaki said also that M. de Balabine had received instructions from St. Petersburgh (an identic despatch having also been addressed to the Turkish Minister at that Imperial Court), the substance of which he was directed by Prince Gortchakow to communicate to him, and that the Russian Envoy had been ordered to call on the Prince of Montenegro to refrain from mixing himself up in disturbances in the Herzegovina.

M. de Balabine appears to have assured Prince Callimaki that he had written in the sense of the instructions which he had received; but at the same time he defended the young Prince from the accusations of participating in the attempts to excite revolt in the neighbouring Turkish provinces, saying that the disturbances were not fostered by him, but by Meiko, his uncle.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 58.

Lord Bloomfield to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received March* 25.)

Vienna, March 21, 1861.

(No. 120.)

My Lord,

YOUR Lordship will have learned by my telegrams of the 15th and 20th instant, recorded in my despatches Nos. 106 and 107 of to-day's date, how anxious Count Rechberg is respecting the Herzegovina and the re-establishment of Turkish authority in that province. The Austrian Government is disposed to do everything in their power to assist the Porte, and they are seriously alarmed at the support the insurgents are receiving, and which, according to the information that reaches them, comes from abroad, and chiefly from Italy.

I judge by the language of Count Rechberg that he would willingly believe that these filibustering expeditions were not countenanced by the Sardinian Government if he could do so, but he receives daily reports of hostile proceedings along the frontier of Venetia, which lead him to attribute these acts to their agency.

At the same time I do not hear that the Austrian Government entertain a thought of changing their expectant attitude in Italy; but Count Rechberg spoke very strongly yesterday respecting a second disembarkation which he believed had taken place at Spitza, on the coast of Albania, to the south of, and close to, the Montenegrin frontier, and of the assistance which the expedition had received from an English merchant-steamer conveying a mail from Corfu to Trieste. His Excellency, moreover, remarked that the Imperial authorities on the Adriatic were clamorous for orders, and that unless an improvement took place in the disturbed state of the frontier, some military measures must be taken for their security.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 59.

Lord J. Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 375.) *Foreign Office, March* 25, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAD a long conversation to-day with the Austrian Ambassador.

He began by expressing the surprise and suspicions of the Cabinet of Vienna which had been caused by the late events at Warsaw. The Austrian Government, he said, were unable to understand on what grounds the conduct of the people of Warsaw had been so leniently dealt with by the Russian Government, which almost appeared to view it with complacency. Count Rechberg was disposed to infer from what had passed that the event had been expected, and that France and Russia had come to an understanding on the subject of Poland, according to which Posen and Gallicia would be invited to join the Russian Polish provinces, and so form a new Kingdom of Poland under the sovereignty of a Russian Prince.

Count Apponyi went on to say that Count Rechberg did not expect that this new kingdom would long remain attached to Russia, but would in course of time take up a position of independence, and thereupon Russia would direct her whole attention to the East, and Count Rechberg wished to know how such a state of things would suit England.

I said that there was much of conjecture in this view; that if the Emperor Alexander should encourage the nationality of Poland, it did not follow that he would seek to deprive Austria of Gallicia, or Prussia of Posen; and that he could not do so without war.

Count Apponyi replied that this was just what the Austrian Government expected, and that they feared that while Austria and Prussia should be engaged in war in Poland, the Rhine would be left defenceless.

Passing on to the affair of the East, Count Apponyi said that the language of M. Thouvenel to Prince Metternich was singular. The French Minister stated that the Emperor of the French had been exposed to so much suspicion by his conduct last year that he was determined to let things take their course. His Imperial Majesty intended to let Turkey fall to pieces without any interference on his part.

M. Thouvenel admitted, however, that with Austria the case was different, and he expressed the hope that the Emperor of Austria would send 6,000 Austrian troops to the Herzegovina, a province bordering on the Austrian frontier.

M. Thouvenel also professed to view with favour the dispatch of an European Commission to Montenegro; but he did not conceal his opinion that in the present state of its finances and of its army the Turkish Empire would not last long.

Count Apponyi adverted, in the next place, to the expeditions which have been sent from Italy to Montenegro, and he asked whether a British force would not protect the Turks from filibusters.

I replied that the question had been submitted to the Cabinet, who had determined not to act in the present imperfect state of their information; that the Cabinet had, in short, resolved to wait for further events. Count Apponyi rejoined that we might wait till it was too late.

The conversation ended with some observations made by Count Apponyi respecting Sir Henry Bulwer and Prince Conyn, to which I will refer on a future occasion.

In the meanwhile the question naturally arises out of M. Thouvenel's avowal that France will do nothing to avert the fall of the Turkish Empire—To whom does the Emperor of the French destine the succession of the Sultan?

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 60.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, March* 25, 1861, 11·40 P.M.

THE Porte has determined upon blockading ports along Albanian coast from Durazzo to Austrian frontier, and will employ steamers of war for that purpose.

No. 61.

Consul Holmes to Lord J. Russell.—(Received March 20.)

(No. 33.) *Bosna-Serai, March* 14, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose copies of despatches Nos. 10 and 11 of the 10th instant, which I have this week received from Mr. Vice-Consul Zohrab.

With respect to the former, I may remark that I am not aware that Ismail Pasha is under any obligation to inform the foreign authorities at Mostar of his movements, and, as he did not even inform either Vassif Pasha or Shefik Bey or any of the other Consuls, his abstaining to inform Mr. Zohrab can scarcely be considered as a discourteous act towards that gentleman.

At the same time your Lordship will probably be of my opinion that the Turks do themselves much harm by the manner in which they always seem anxious to conceal their proceedings, and that a little more confidence shown towards each other and to those who are undoubtedly their well-wishers, and a little less readiness to make promises which they do not intend to perform, would be a desirable improvement on their present system.

Despatch No. 11 announces various reported movements of the Turkish troops, and other matters, all of which more or less require confirmation. Any event of importance, however, will soon be known, and, should the agents of any other Powers be ordered to proceed to the head-quarters of the Turkish army, I think it highly desirable that Mr. Zorab should be sent there also. I have not yet received any answer on the subject from your Lordship, but I have been informed by Her Majesty's Ambassador that in his Excellency's opinion, under the above-mentioned circumstances, Mr. Zohrab should be sent.

I am sorry to say that among those whose experience of affairs in the Herzegovina is greater than mine, by longer residence and more extended opportunities of observation, there seems to be an impression that the Turks will very shortly meet with disaster, and that it is impossible for them to set matters right in that province. This impression arises without doubt from the result of proceedings during the last three years, and will be realized, unless Ismail Pasha, contrary to general opinion, proves himself more capable than his predecessors, and worthy of the confidence which the Porte seems to place in his abilities.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure in No. 61.

Vice-Consul Zohrab to Consul Holmes.

Sir, *Mostar, March* 10, 1861.

I HAVE in vain endeavoured during the past week to obtain authentic information of the movements of the army in the rebel districts, and of the events which have occurred there. Mistrusting the reports flying about the country, I have appealed to Vassif Pasha and Shefik Bey, and from both these officials the answer has been a positive assurance that, since his departure for Trebigné, the Mushir has not deigned to keep them informed on any subject, that his correspondence has been confined to the mere statement of his wants, that like myself they are obliged to have recourse to the bazar for news from the rebel districts, and that consequently they cannot add to or rectify any of the information I am possessed of.

I stated in the despatch I had the honour to address you on the 1st February, that Ismail Pasha had officially told me ("resmingé") that he would invite me, as well as the other Consuls resident here, to accompany him whenever he proceeded to the frontier to be witnesses of the movements and acts of the army. His Excellency, however, as you will have perceived by my despatch No. 8, quitted this place for Trebigné without even informing me that he was about to leave. This discourteous act, I must say, has for me no precedent here, for since my residence in this town none of the authorities have ever quitted it without intimating to me their intended departure and its object.

I called on Shefik Bey to-day, and in the course of conversation I expressed my regret at the course pursued by Ismail Pasha, a course I said which evidently intimated a distrust of me, and a wish to conceal his operations from my Government. I regretted this the more, I added, as it left me but two doubtful sources from whence to obtain my information—the bazar and the Russian and Austrian version of events, and that,

however incorrect the latter might in reality be, the reserve of the Mushir gave them an air of truthfulness. Shefik Bey coincided with me, and he said that he was not surprised at the Mushir's silence to me, as his Excellency did not even inform him of his intended departure. He would, he told me, inform Ismail Pasha of the tenor of our conversation, and he hoped it would produce a result in accordance with my wishes.

Shefik Bey complained in rather bitter terms at the subordinate position assigned to him by Ismail Pasha; he said that as matters go his presence here is worse than useless, as he incurred needless expense, for though named by the Porte Commissioner for the affairs of this province, together with the Mushir, he was not allowed to have a voice in any decision, or to give an opinion on any point, that he saw none of the correspondence carried on with the rebels or with the capital, and that in fact he was quite a nullity.

The Turkish authorities have been loud in protesting against the partiality shown to the Montenegrins and rebels, and the manner in which all their acts have been misconstrued and misrepresented; and while operations on the frontier were impossible, on account of the winter, they expressed the wish that the Consuls would accompany their troops and witness events. This cry, with the return of spring has, however, died away, and incomprehensible reserve and even efforts at concealment have evidently taken its place.

The field is thus left open to the enemies of Turkey, who spare neither pains nor money to obtain information, to be able to put forward their version of events with the least possible delay, while those who feel it a duty to state facts in their real colours are left from the want of necessary means and distrust of the authorities to mere chance for their information.

Such being the case, the Turkish authorities will have only themselves to blame if the European papers make them appear as tyrants and the perpetrators of massacres.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAS. ZOHRAB.

Inclosure 2 in No. 61.

Vice-Consul Zohrab to Consul Holmes.

Mostar, March 10, 1861.

Sir,

DERVISH PASHA, with the division under his command, retired from the intrenched position he held at Zoutzi to Trebigné during the past week. The retreat is attributed here to the menacing attitude assumed by the rebels and Montenegrins in his neighbourhood; how far this may be correct I am not in a position to assert.

Ismail and Dervish Pashas have now proceeded to Bilikah, where, I hear, they are concentrating their forces, but with what object I do not know.

I have also been informed that the Secretary of the Prince of Montenegro has visited Ismail Pasha at Trebigné for the purposes, it is said, of complimenting his Excellency on his arrival, and to give him the assurances of the Prince that His Highness disapproved the conduct of the rebels, and that the Montenegrins who aided them in their resistance to the Turks would be punished. If this is true, His Highness will have to punish, according to all reports, many thousands of his subjects.

From Nichsich I have nothing further to report, all communication with that town appears to be cut off.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAS. ZOHRAB.

No. 62.

Lord Napier to Lord J. Russell.—(Received March 26.)

(No. 11. Confidential.)

St. Petersburgh, March 17, 1861.

My Lord,

MR. MICHELL, Attaché to Her Majesty's Embassy, has been enabled confidentially to place in my hands the accompanying report from Prince Labanow to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting the recent collisions on the frontier of Montenegro.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 62.

Prince Labanow to Prince Gortchakow.

Pera, le 21 *Février*, 1861.

JE me suis fait un devoir de communiquer à Aali Pacha la lettre de votre Excellence du 6 Janvier, ainsi que le télégramme ci-joint de M. Zolotarew. Je suis revenu avec instance sur la nécessité de prendre des mesures sérieuses pour prévenir le retour d'agressions qui se renouvellent sous la protection de l'impunité.

Aali Pacha m'a dit qu'il n'avait aucune nouvelle directe l'Abdi Pacha sur les faits que je venais de lui communiquer, mais qu'il lui demanderait sans délai des explications par télégraphe.

A mon retour de chez le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, j'ai trouvé un second télégramme de Scutari, également ci-joint; mes collègues ont reçu de leurs agents des rapports identiques. J'ai envoyé immédiatement à Aali Pacha une copie de cette pièce, qui confirme les renseignements précédents, et je l'ai prié d'adresser au plus tôt des ordres pressants et explicites au Gouvernement Turc.

J'ai, &c.

Inclosure 2 in No. 62.

M. Zolotarew to Prince Labanow.

(Télégraphique.)

Scutari, le $\frac{5}{17}$ *Février*, 1861.

LE $\frac{1}{13}$ Février des Bachi-Bozouks de Spouz, ayant provoqué une rixe avec les Monténégrins, s'introduisirent dans le Monténégro jusqu'à Novo-Selo, taillèrent deux têtes Monténégrines, tuèrent le capitaine du village et trois autres individus, et blessèrent deux. Les habitants de Spouz et les troupes régulières y prirent part.

Inclosure 3 in No. 62.

M. Zolotarew to Prince Labanow.

(Télégraphique.)

Scutari, le $\frac{3}{15}$ *Février*, 1861.

LE $\frac{1}{13}$ Février les Bachi-Bozouks de Spouz, soutenus par les troupes régulières, provoquèrent les Monténégrins; puis s'étant avancés jusqu'à Novo-Sélo, tuèrent cinq hommes, dans ce nombre le capitaine du village, et coupèrent deux têtes.

Pour se venger, le $\frac{5}{17}$, les Monténégrins surprisent deux compagnies régulières allant à Spouz, et les détruisirent entièrement, moins douze hommes; quatre compagnies et des Bachi-Bozouks, attaqués plus loin, eurent 15 morts et 21 blessés.

On parle d'une attaque sur Kolachine; pas de détails.

Cette affaire eut lieu pendant qu'un envoyé du Prince venait demander satisfaction pour les dernières affaires.

No. 63.

Lord Bloomfield to Lord J. Russell.—(Received March 26.)

(No. 126. Confidential.)

Vienna, March 23, 1861.

My Lord,

COUNT RECHBERG spoke to me this morning with great earnestness on the two subjects of which I have reported the substance in the telegram recorded in my despatch No. 125 of this day.

With reference to Prince Gortchakow's proposal that, in consequence of the disorders in the Herzegovina and neighbourhood, a combined English and French naval force should be sent to the Adriatic, his Excellency said that the more English men-of-war that were stationed there the better should he be pleased, but that the appearance of a single French flag in those waters would be objectionable, and would tend rather to rouse than to allay the rebellious spirit that already existed, and that, further, the Montenegrins would certainly consider the arrival of a French squadron as an encouragement to their pretensions.

With regard to the Commission of Inquiry into the state of the Herzegovina, Count Rechberg said that it would be difficult, in face of the opposition of the Porte, to insist on its formation; but if the Internuncio's reports of the powerless condition of the Ottoman Government, and of its inability to quell the insurrection, were true, he thought the Commission might, at all events, have the effect of arresting the spirit of revolt which unfortunately existed in the neighbouring provinces, and that, as for Austria, she was too deeply interested in the Herzegovina to be able to look on at the present disturbed state of that district without cause for the most intense anxiety, and without considering what measures it would be necessary for her to take for her own security.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 64.

Earl Cowley to Lord J. Russell.—(Received March 27.)

(No. 464. Confidential.)
Paris, March 26, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE some reason for believing that Prince Metternich has been desired to ascertain how a proposal for the occupation of the Herzegovina by an Austrian force would be received here, but I am unable to say how he has been met. In a conversation which I had with M. Thouvenel yesterday, I alluded to the apprehensions which were entertained at Vienna in consequence of the state of that province.

M. Thouvenel observed that the position of Austria was most difficult, for that were the Turks to attempt any violent proceedings against the Christians, the neighbouring Austrian districts, which still retain ancient reminiscences of the horrors to which they had been subjected when under Turkish rule, would either make it a grievance with the Austrian Government, if it did not interfere, or would interfere themselves. On the other hand, the Austrian Government, true to its traditional policy, had to take care that nothing would be done which would impair the sovereignty and independence of the Porte.

M. Thouvenel took this opportunity of inveigling against the stupidity and obstinacy of the Porte in refusing its sanction to the European Commission which Sir Henry Bulwer had proposed to send into the Herzegovina, with a view of calming the agitation which reigned there.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 65.

Earl Cowley to Lord J. Russell.—(Received March 27.)

(No. 467.)
Paris, March 26, 1861.

My Lord,

M. THOUVENEL assures me that no proposal, either direct or indirect, has been made to him from the Russian Government, as is reported at Vienna, to station a naval squadron in the Adriatic for the purpose of intercepting any expedition that might be planned by Garibaldi; and I infer further from his Excellency's language that, were such a proposal to be made, it would not be listened to favourably. His Excellency seems to consider that any attempt on Dalmatia by such a force as Garibaldi could collect must end in failure, and that therefore it will not be made.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 66.

Lord Bloomfield to Lord J. Russell.—(Received March 27.)

(Telegraphic.)
Vienna, March 27, 1861, 4·30 P.M.

TURKISH Ambassador has informed Rechberg that four war-steamers left Constantinople yesterday with orders to blockade Albanian coast from Durazzo to Austrian frontier.

Three Austrian steamers will be employed to watch their own coast.

No. 67.

Lord J. Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 381.)
Foreign Office, March 27, 1861.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches, as marked in the margin,* upon the subject of the state of affairs in the Herzegovina.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 68.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 185.)
Foreign Office, March 28, 1861.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, copies of correspondence, as noted in the margin,† respecting the affairs of Montenegro and the Herzegovina.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 69.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(Telegraphic.)
Foreign Office, March 28, 1861.

BLOCKADE of Albanian coast must be regularly notified. Advise the Porte not to take hasty measures respecting Bulgarian refugees in Servia. What does the Sultan propose to do respecting the Turks and Druses condemned to death in Syria? Her Majesty's Government think that, with the exception of four or five of the most guilty, the sentence should be commuted to imprisonment for life. The Turkish officials condemned to imprisonment for life should undergo their sentence, and not suffer capitally. Lord Dufferin and other Commissioners should stay in Syria till May, unless required at Constantinople by the Representatives of Great Powers unanimously. In that case they should all go to Constantinople.

No. 70.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 191.)
Foreign Office, March 28, 1861.

Sir,

THE accounts from Montenegro and the neighbouring districts represent the existence of a state of things very embarrassing to the Porte, and calculated to give rise to much trouble. The Turkish Government has, however, so frequently succeeded in quelling disorders of the same kind on its frontier that Her Majesty's Government suppose that the like result will attend its endeavours to do so on the present occasion.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

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* Nos. 67 and 68.

† Nos. 50, 53, 54, 54*, 65.

No. 71.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received March* 30.)

(No. 190.) *Constantinople, March* 18, 1861.

My Lord,

THE accounts from Montenegro, the Herzegovina, and the adjoining countries have of late been such as to create great and just alarm. The inclosed Memorandum, drawn up with great attention by Mr. Wodehouse, contains the substance of our own Consular despatches relative to the conflicts which have recently taken place, and the actual position of the belligerent parties.

Your Lordship will perceive that a great effusion of blood is constantly taking place between the people on the Albanian frontier.

Here the border warfare may, to a certain degree, be attributable to the territorial disputes which I was so anxious that the Boundary Commission should have settled, and which that Commission, having separated in opposition to my remonstrances, left to the Consuls, who, notwithstanding an agreement that was come to with the Porte on the subject, and which was stated in my despatch No. 82 of February 8, 1860, have been able to do little to establish a better condition of things; whilst I am obliged to add, as your Lordship will see by my comments on a joint note which they have addressed to the Representatives of the Great Powers, that I do not entirely concur either in the equity or the practicability of all the measures they propose.

But it is not on this side of Montenegro that the greatest danger lies. The insurrectionary state of certain districts in the Herzegovina (an insurrectionary state that has too long been left without remedy, partly from the reluctance of the Turks to make concessions, partly from the apprehension that the European nations would not allow them to use force) is receiving constant support from Montenegro, and spreading wider and wider.

Nichsich, on the north-western frontier, is besieged and likely to surrender; Sutorina, on the extreme southern frontier, is in the hands of the rebels; and I understand that a Turkish corvette, with some troops on board, attempting to recover it, has been repulsed by the insurgents; whilst I am sorry to say that the Austrian population bordering on the disturbed districts of the Herzegovina is almost as hostile to the Turks as the insurgents themselves.

In the meantime, the despatches of Mr. Holmes will have pointed out to your Lordship the unsatisfactory condition of Bosnia, where the peasantry, consisting of the Christian population, and the Mussulmans, forming the class of proprietors, are much in the condition of which the history of Ireland in its worst periods (when the Protestant had the position of the Mussulman, and the Catholic that of the Christian) furnishes an example.

If we cast our eye further to the East, we are little quieted by our reports from Servia, where an armed nation and a restless Prince, with more ambition than capacity, frets at being confined within narrower limits than those to which he undisguisedly aspires.

Let us add to this the knowledge that a vast conspiracy, beginning in Venetia, and perhaps not ending till within the walls of Warsaw—a conspiracy which may possibly count a man with the energy and enterprize of Garibali at its head—is actively at work to promote projects which, if not unnatural or without excuse, are at all events calculated to disturb Europe and shake this Empire to its very foundations.

On the other hand, what is the position of the Turks? Their irregular army, which is brave and patient, and not, perhaps, so ill-commanded as events lead us to suppose, is nevertheless, on the one hand, crippled by those contradictory orders which almost necessarily issue from Constantinople as one Power or the other gets its representations listened to, and also by the utter want of that credit or those pecuniary resources which alone give an army vitality by giving order and decision to its movements.

To increase this army appears useless, or worse than useless (since an increased force would augment an expenditure which cannot now be borne), without adding greatly to its military strength; for in those mountainous regions a small number of troops advantageously posted may command the country. But a General has to consider not so much where his soldiers should be placed to fight as where they must be placed to eat; the possibility of getting, by promises or threats, those supplies for which it is impossible to pay being the first consideration which an officer has to bear in mind.

The Mussulman strength, notwithstanding what I have said, is still great in the provinces I have been speaking of; 30,000 Albanians, ready armed, could probably be raised within a week, and it would only be necessary to appeal to the Mussulman and to

the warlike spirit which still animates the feudal Chiefs in Bosnia to collect together a formidable force. But this force would be an irregular force, willing no doubt to defend the Ottoman Empire, but wholly out of the control of the Ottoman Government. Fanatic, ferocious, and undisciplined as it is, and united with the remains of that regular army which has so long been suffering almost every insult and every privation, it is easy to understand that the success this wild and exasperated soldiery might achieve would be almost worse than defeat, and, by deeds that would excite the horror and indignation of Europe, provoke the question of European intervention and occupation. The only two Powers likely to interfere would be Austria and Russia, and it is needless to say that whether these Powers interfered separately or conjointly, the Turkish Government would not be without serious ground for apprehension.

It is this desparate state of things which makes me conceive that pacification by any means is a necessity.

Had the Ottoman Government named Omer Pasha to the supreme command in this part of its dominions, it is possible that his great prestige, and the dread which his name equally inspires in Mussulmans and Christians, might with prudent counsels have effected such pacification.

But this appointment, which I have been urging since last summer, has not only been opposed by some of my colleagues, but is distasteful to the Turks themselves, who have never been satisfied with the reputation which the renegade acquired, and who can doubtless point to many defects in the character of a man in favour of whom one can only plead, on the other side, that he has qualities to which peculiar circumstances may render it desirable to have recourse. It is true that I at last succeeded in getting the long-promised Commission, of which Ismail Pasha is the head, sent to Bosna-Serai; and the instructions given to it, and which include an amnesty, are intended at once to obtain submission and give satisfaction. But I doubt whether, under the present aspect of affairs, it will carry with it the prestige or be backed by the power necessary to produce these results.

I have thus endeavoured to give your Lordship a general view of those facts in consideration of which my views have been recently formed and my conduct guided.

In the first place, it seemed to me that, under such circumstances, the Representatives of the Guaranteeing Powers could not remain passive spectators of the state of things from which so much danger was to be apprehended, and that it was at least their duty to offer their good offices to the Porte, as well for the purpose of preventing the frightful effusion of blood natural to barbarous warfare, as for establishing by peaceful means tranquillity in places where revolt—difficult to put down by force of arms—was nevertheless likely, if persisted in, to increase and produce consequences of the most serious kind. I was induced, moreover, to think that persons representing the Great Powers, and charged with the task of endeavouring to establish order and promote reconciliation, and acting in conjunction with the Ottoman Commission, might furnish to that Commission assistance which would compensate for any deficiency in its own composition, and the unfavourable circumstances in which it finds itself placed.

It was thus that, at a meeting which took place at the English Embassy between the Representatives, I did not hesitate to put forward this opinion, coupling it, however, with the declaration that I deemed we could only express such an opinion, leaving it entirely to the Porte to adopt or reject it, as well as to point out her own views and indicate any other manner in which she thought we could lend her our assistance.

The paper I drew up expressing these sentiments, and which followed a long discussion, and the exposition of a variety of facts more or less contained in the present despatch, received general acquiescence, and has been delivered by each of the Representatives present at the Conference I have alluded to to his Highness Aali Pasha.

I, for my own part, added at the same time thereto a friendly and unofficial letter, which your Lordship will find inclosed, together with the document it accompanied.

My reasons for writing that letter arose from a conversation I had with the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs almost immediately after the meeting of the Representatives of which I have been speaking.

His Highness, without, I think, sufficiently considering that a proposition has to be judged, not according to abstract principles, but according to its necessity or expediency, and the intentions with which it is made, was at first somewhat too hastily disposed to compare the idea, which on this occasion was submitted to him, with the project which Prince Gortchakow communicated to the European Powers about a year ago.

I cannot see any more than a speculative analogy between the two cases. The Prince's proposition was communicated to the Five Powers with the intention that, through their joint instrumentality, it should be made more or less compulsory on the Porte.

The proposal was to the effect that a Commission of foreigners was to be sent into countries under the jurisdiction of the Ottoman Government, and at that time perfectly tranquil, in order to sit in judgment upon Turkish laws and administration, and acquit or condemn the conduct of the functionaries of an independent Power.

The present proposal, or rather suggestion, is abandoned entirely to the consideration of the Porte, the Ottoman Government being told that we are not only ready to assist it in this, but in any other way it may point out.

The head of the Commission, to which any gentlemen named by the Representatives would be attached, would be a Turkish functionary, and the sole object of these gentlemen would be to aid that functionary in restoring tranquillity to a portion of the Sultan's dominions now deluged with blood, in a state of insurrection, which for two years has remained unsuppressed, and becoming daily more formidable, owing to a variety of concomitant circumstances, not only to Turkey but to Europe, and which, after a careful consideration of the actual position of affairs, it did not seem likely that the Ottoman Government would by itself be able to cope with, unless at the risk of provoking some greater calamity than that which it was necessary to overcome.

It is made, moreover, by the agent of a Power which has been as constantly the friend of Turkey as Russia has been her enemy, that agent himself having taken a very active part in opposition to the Russian proposal of last year, and having also on various occasions shown in a marked manner his deep concern in the independence as well as in the prosperity of the Turkish Empire. It was, indeed, my idea, that if such a proposal ought to be made, it had better be made by myself, in order to prevent thereby any prejudice which, if it had come from other quarters, might attach to it.

I do not say that the principle it involves is in itself a good one. It is doubtless much better that parties intimately connected should arrange their differences between themselves, and without calling in the aid of a third party. But it often happens in private as in public life that those who could not agree between themselves have been brought to agree by the interference of another.

There is also a great difference between interfering in the general internal affairs of a country and interfering with respect to a particular spot in that country, a spot contiguous to other countries the general peace and tranquillity of which the events that take place within it may effect.

With respect to Montenegro, indeed, for many years foreign interference has been constant, and though Montenegro and the Herzegovina are not precisely in the same condition, the circumstances which induced foreign Governments to interfere, and the Turkish Government to accept their interference, in the one case, are pretty much the same in the other.

It is merely, however, I confess, in the dearth of all other expedients, after looking matters fairly in the face, that I suggested a project such as that which is now under consideration. There is but one observation made by Aali Pasha in opposition to this project which struck me as having weight. He said a Turkish Commission had just been named and sent, and until it was seen what that Turkish Commission could do, it was unwise and would be unnecessary to have recourse to any other measure intended to produce the result which the said Turkish Commission has in view. This observation is not without force, but it is to be observed that the Commission in question was appointed when the state of things were very different from that which exists at the present moment, that that Commission has remained for six months as it were in suspense, during which time events have taken a rapid and fatal progress.

That Ismail Pasha, who is to be at its head, has long been on the spot and done nothing; and that as the spring approaches, every day lost becomes of importance. Indeed, in a month from this time affairs may get beyond our grasp, and render even the somewhat extreme expedient I would resort to now ineffectual.

There is, besides, one consideration to which I am inclined to attach some importance. We know that every effort has been made to induce the European populations in Turkey to suppose that certain European Powers are inclined to support the revolutionary plans which are discussed there. We have lately heard of an apocryphal letter from the Emperor of the French, which was either in circulation or intended to be circulation in the very districts to which the Mixed Commission that has been alluded to would be sent.

It strikes me, consequently, that the presence of agents of the different Powers, acting in conjunction with the Ottoman Government for the maintenance of tranquillity, might be a valid answer to the stories propagated, and have for its moral effect rather to strengthen than to enfeeble the prestige of the Porte.

It would, however, be very essential, were the plan I am speaking of adopted, that

the persons joined by the Representatives to Ismail Pasha should not be men disposed to intrigue, or too prone to acquire personal influence by making partizans on the one hand or the other. The choice of these persons is indeed the greatest difficulty in the whole affair.

But at all events the question at issue is merely placed before the Porte for its consideration, and if Aali Pasha objects to what we have proposed, and proposes anything else, this will, if at all practicable, have my support

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

Inclosure 1 in No 71.

Memorandum on the late Events on the Albanian and Herzegovine Frontier.

The late Events on the Albanian Frontier.

ON the 1st of December some Albanians (Christians by religion) drove their flocks on to the lands of Mali Berda and Vili Berda,* on which the Montenegrins had been forbidden by the Prince to pasture their flocks, as the ownership was under dispute. The Albanians were driven off by the Montenegrins and a number of their sheep captured; the inhabitants of Podgoritza came to their assistance. Troops were sent by the Governor to separate the combatants, but they were surrounded, and obliged to defend themselves. In the fight which ensued many were killed on both sides, but the Montenegrin loss was the heaviest.

On the 9th of January some Turks of Spuz went to cut wood near Marmorisca Gravisca,† and fired on the Montenegrins who remonstrated with them for crossing the frontier, a fight took place, and the inhabitants of Spuz, with some irregular troops came out and advanced on Treberna Ghiritza.‡ The Montenegrins having in vain summoned them to retire, drove them back to Begluch, but reinforcements of Turkish troops having come up, were compelled to retire with loss.

Pero Perovich, cousin of the Prince, proceeded to Scutari to demand satisfaction, but whilst waiting for the return of Abdi Pasha, on the 15th of February, some inhabitants of Spuz attacked some shepherds of Novosello; these retaliated, but were driven back by the regular Turkish troops.

The Prince recommended patience, promising them satisfaction, but on the 16th the people of Pipera,§ Cornam, and Gagarach‖ attacked a convoy on its way to Spuz, killed nearly all the escort, besides a Binbashi and fifteen Bashi-Bazouks at the military station of Daliani, and further attacked the troops in Spuz.

Her Majesty's Consul at Scutari, whose despatch is written in common with his French, Russian, and Austrian colleagues, blames the Turks, as being the aggressors and as having raised the border quarrels to more serious proportions by the intervention of regular troops. He says that Abdi Pasha and the Prince are anxious to prevent these disorders, and ascribes the causes of them to the inhabitants of Upper Albania, who, desiring the continuance of the struggle, to which they owe their exemption from regular military service, themselves excite the conflicts, whilst they deceive the Pasha as to their real origin.

Events which have taken place along the Herzegovine Frontier.

About the 11th of February some 2,000 insurgents from Piva, Drobniak,¶ and Chircovitza, commanded by a Montenegrin, attacked Gradovitch near Fochia,** and retired after killing eighteen men and plundering and burning the houses.

The village of Beriche near Behor†† was similarly attacked, 67 houses burnt, 37 men killed.

In a skirmish near Gasko,‡‡ the Turkish troops drove off the rebels and Montenegrins.

At Comina, near Pogitel, a band of Montenegrins drove off a quantity of sheep and

* South-east of Spuz on the boundary line in 1856, according to Montenegrin statement.
† North-west of Spuz. ‡ West of Spuz, on line as stated by the Montenegrins.
§ North of Spuz. ‖ West of Spuz.
¶ North of Nichsich. ** Near the northern frontier of Herzegovina.
†† On the extreme frontier of Bosnia adjoining Albania. ‡‡ North-west of Nichsich.

cattle, but were pursued by the inhabitants (Christians and Mussulmans) and some cavalry, the spoil recaptured, and one Montenegrin killed.

Nichsich* about that same time was attacked by rebels and Montenegrins, and 41 Turks killed. It is still besieged, but not likely to hold out long. The Turkish population will probably soon emigrate, as its position, according to the new arrangement, close to the frontier, exposes it to continual attacks.

Sutorina is occupied by the rebels. Mehemet Pasha has marched in that direction, but has been obliged to retire through the Austrian territory.

All the troops have left Bosna-Serai for Fochia and Bihor.

The insurgents retire within the Montenegrin frontier, which the Turks hesitate to cross, and only issue forth when they can do so with advantage. Great atrocities are said to be committed by the Montenegrins.

Mr. Holmes thinks the loss of Herzegovina imminent, and says that the Montenegrins "force the inhabitants to revolt under pain of pillage and murder," whilst they are indirectly the cause of the discontent, as it is against them that the army is maintained, the support of which harasses the province.

Ismail Pasha, the Mushir (Commander-in-chief in Roumelia) at Mostar, has sent for reinforcements from Albania, and announces his intentions of advancing into Montenegro. Troops have already left Mostar for the frontier under Dervish and Mahmoud Pashas.

There was a report on the 26th February at Bosna-Serai that a battle had been fought between the Turks and Montenegrins at Kilikisch,† near Trebigné.

It is reported that a band of 700 men has been collected in Montenegro.

Her Majesty's Consul thinks it doubtful whether Turks could reduce Montenegro, and certain that they could not hold it, whilst the Montenegrins would be considered throughout Europe as martyrs to the Christian religion.

He says that the Montenegrins cannot subsist otherwise than by brigandage, as the country is too barren to support the population and concludes that the only end to the present state of affairs would be the absorption of the province "by its most powerful neighbour."

Inclosure 2 in No. 71.

Sir H. Bulwer to Aali Pasha.

Constantinople, March 15, 1861.

Highness,

IN communicating to your Highness the result of a meeting of the Representatives of the Great Powers touching the present condition of the districts bordering on Montenegro, I do not wish to express an opinion that these districts are kept in a state of agitation only by disputes between Christians and Mussulmans. On the contrary, it appears that on more than one occasion the Montenegrins have made attacks upon villages inhabited by a mixed population, and in which consequently the Christians and Mussulmans have suffered in an equal degree, and had in an equal degree to defend their common homes. Nor do I desire, whilst believing in the advantages which would, in this exceptional case, result from the nomination of a Mixed Commission to control in the least, with regard to this question, the will or the judgment of the Sublime Porte, which is no doubt capable of appreciating at their true value the circumstances to which its attention is now called.

But, in reference to a conversation which we had the other day on this matter, I think it right to observe to your Highness that there is an immense difference between the proposition made last year by the Russian Government, namely, that of sending a Mixed Commission to places enjoying the most perfect tranquillity to examine into the conduct of the Ottoman Government in the ordinary exercise of its functions, and the present project of sending such a Commission for the purposes of conciliation to districts in which a struggle has already begun, where murders are of daily occurrence, where it is absolutely necessary to allay excitement, and where any great display of force on the part of the Ottoman Government (not to mention the expense) would give rise to many dangers and inconveniences, whether the struggle were favourable or otherwise to the Ottoman troops. It is useless, as it appears to me, in carrying out a wise and practical policy, to endeavour to establish analogies in cases in which numberless considerations render such analogies imperfect.

* Close to the Montenegrin frontier.

† Trebigné, in the south-east of Herzegovina, not far from Sutorina.

Moreover, the projects attributed to Garibaldi and others render the position of the frontier districts of which I am speaking more critical; and I cannot but think that at the moment when the populations of these districts believe that certain European Powers are not opposed to these projects of war and insurrection, the presence of agents of all the Great Powers, acting conjointly with the Ottoman authorities for the maintenance of order and tranquillity, could not but produce a result favourable to the interests of the Empire and the general peace.

But, leaving the document which I have the honour to inclose to those reflections which your Highness' own sound sense and superior judgment will naturally suggest, I merely desire to assure your Highness that whatever may be the assistance which the Sublime Porte may require from the Representatives of the Great Powers in the present conjunction of affairs, I shall for my own part be cordially disposed to render it any service in my power.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

Inclosure 3 in No. 71.

Memorandum presented by Representatives of the Five Powers to the Porte respecting Pacification of Montenegro.

Pera, ce 10 *Mars*, 1861.

LES Représentants des Grandes Puissances à Constantinople s'étant remis le 10 Mars, 1861, ont échangé leurs idées sur la situation critique des pays qui avoisinent le Monténégro et sur les conflits dont ces contrées sont le théâtre, entre les Chrétiens et les Musulmans.

Cet état de choses leur paraît de plus graves, et ne voulant pas rester passifs en de semblables circonstances, ils ont recherché les mesures les plus propres au rétablissement d'une paix durable.

La plus efficace, à leur avis, serait l'envoi d'une Commission nommée conjointement par la Porte et par les Représentants, et dont les membres seraient munis de pouvoirs suffisants pour travailler d'un commun accord à la pacification du pays.

Un arrangement ayant déjà été proposé et adopté pour le règlement de certaines questions litigieuses, que la récente délimitation avait laissées en suspens, sur quelques territoires contigus à la frontière Turco-Monténégrine, la Commission aurait d'abord à veiller à ce que cet arrangement soit mis fidèlement à exécution.

En second lieu, elle aurait à fixer les bases d'une réconciliation équitable entre les populations divisées, en cherchant à satisfaire, autant que possible, les intérêts légitimes et à calmer les passions rivales.

En soumettant cette proposition à la Sublime Porte, les Représentants des cinq Cours ne veulent préjuger en rien ses droits souverains. C'est seulement une offre de leurs bons offices qu'ils lui adressent en vue d'arrêter une inutile et douloureuse effusion de sang, qui menace la Turquie, et peut-être l'Europe, de périls auxquels ils ne sauraient être indifférents.

Dans le cas où le projet qui a obtenu l'assentiment des Représentants des cinq Cours ne serait pas agréé par le Gouvernement Ottoman, les Représentants inviteraient et invitent dès à présent, son Altesse Aali Pacha à leur faire connaître les vues de son Gouvernement et dans quelle mesure il juge possible de mettre à profit les dispositions amicales qu'ils se plaisent à lui témoigner.

No. 72.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received March 30.)

(No. 196.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, March* 19, 1861.

YOUR Lordship will have received an identic note of the Consuls, dated Scutari, 5th February. I am perfectly willing to believe that the action of the Medjlis is, as those gentlemen say, entirely guided by local passions and local interests, and calculated to counteract the better intentions of the governing Pasha, and his powers of carrying them into execution. I have always looked upon these Councils under their present Constitution as a great impediment of introducing the reforms projected by the Porte, and the policy which it would wish its officers to pursue.

On this point I agree with the Consuls. I am likewise of opinion that a fair and

friendly understanding between the Prince of Montenegro and the Ottoman Government, through the channel of the officer commanding on the frontier or the Pasha governing there, accompanied by explanations and excuses for any fault that either party may have committed, is a wise and sound principle to adopt.

The prompt and definite settlement of the territorial questions in the neighbourhood of Spuz and Podgoritza, and the mode of doing so, first by a meeting in the presence of the Consuls between Prince Nicholas and Abdi Pasha; and secondly, by the appointment of two Senators from Montenegro to execute the arrangement then arrived at, seems excellent. But the notion of requiring the regular troops of Turkey to be prohibited from repressing disorders in, or aggressions upon, the Turkish territory, seems to me out of the question, though some regulations might possibly be adopted by the Turkish Government on this subject, so as to make the employment of troops a last resource.

The withdrawal of the Bashi-Bazouks as a means of defence from the frontier, and the substitution of regular troops, is a subject of serious consideration.

1. The Consuls wish regular troops, not to act in putting down disturbances or repelling aggressions; then they propose to increase the regular troops, whose action is to be thus confined.

The two measures are inconsistent the one with the other. It must likewise be remembered that the Ottoman Government cannot easily pay and maintain regular troops, which, if raised on the spot, would be under the same influence as the Bashi-Bazouks; if brought from a distance, would cause great expense. Neither would their action be so effective in repelling invasions of a country with which they had no interest as is that of the inhabitants of that country; the Bashi-Bazouks dissolved, moreover, would be a new element of disorder difficult to regulate.

Lastly, although the recruiting in the Pashalic of Scutari ought doubtless to be placed on the same footing as in the rest of the Empire, it would cause great discontent to do so at this moment; whilst the disarmament of the inhabitants of towns would not be unlikely to create a revolt, and would also leave those towns, in the present condition of the Ottoman army, wholly without defence should the enemy appear before them; the Montenegrins in the meantime remaining armed.

It is possible that these measures would destroy the prestige and preponderance of the Turks; and this the Consuls seem to consider an advantage; but it is only on the Turks that the Turkish Government can rely in these countries—countries, moreover, of which the population, if the warlike spirit which distinguishes it were abruptly and imprudently thwarted, might easily be rendered hostile and not very easily subdued, if it were so.

I cannot, therefore, lightly pass an opinion in favour of a project of which the advantage is doubtful, the danger great, and the practicability most uncertain. At a less critical time, with a well paid and well organized Turkish army, such a scheme might merit consideration. At present it should, in my opinion, be laid aside.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

No. 75.

Earl Cowley to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received March* 30.)

(No. 486. Confidential.)

Paris, March 29, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Lordship's despatch No. 375, Confidential, of the 25th instant, giving an account of a conversation which you had held with the Austrian Ambassador.

From the tenor of Count Apponyi's language it would appear—

First.—That in the opinion of the Austrian Government some understanding exists between France and Russia on the subject of Poland, according to which Posen and Gallicia would be invited to join the Russian Polish provinces, and so form a new Kingdom under the sovereignty of a Russian Prince.

Secondly.—That M. Thouvenel had declared to Prince Metternich that the Emperor of the French intended to let Turkey fall to pieces without any interference on his part.

Thirdly.—That M. Thouvenel, admitting that Austria had greater interest in the preservation of the Ottoman Empire, had expressed the hope that Austria would send 6,000 Austrian troops into the Herzegovina.

Your Lordship adds that the question naturally arises out of M. Thouvenel's avowal that France will do nothing to avert the fall of the Turkish Empire—To whom does the Emperor of the French destine the succession of the Sultan?

I will address myself in the first place then to this supposed declaration on the part of the French Minister.

I should not have demurred, without any reference to M. Thouvenel himself, to give your Lordship the assurance that his Excellency's language had been misunderstood or exaggerated. It is true that he is made to speak in the Emperor's name, but still as Minister he could hardly make the statement in question without adopting it as the basis of his own policy. That he entertains grave doubts of the possibility of maintaining the Ottoman Empire is perfectly true: that in moments of irritation he has said to me that if every proposal which France makes with regard to Turkey is to be received with suspicion, France will leave the Sultan to his fate. I cannot deny that he may have so expressed himself to others is extremely probable, but I must add, on the other hand, that in his calmer moments I have ever observed great solicitude for the welfare of an Empire in the concerns of which he has so much personal experience and in which he has not ceased to take a lively interest.

Indeed, on the very day on which your Lordship's despatch is dated, I happened to have a long conversation with him on the present state of Turkey, and certainly his language then was that of a man examining by what means a threatened catastrophe might be procrastinated, if not altogether averted. If, again, I look to his acts, I have seen him lately doing all in his power to obtain money for the Porte in order to prevent the discredit which must have fallen upon it, and the ruin of many European houses doing business with the Levant, had the bills of the Turkish treasury been protested.

But in a matter of such great importance I have thought it desirable that M. Thouvenel should have an opportunity of admitting or disavowing the statement imputed to him, and I asked him therefore yesterday whether it was true that he had made to Prince Metternich the declaration in question, and whether he had coupled with it the proposal that Austria should send 6,000 troops into the Herzegovina.

His Excellency denied in the most positive and unqualified terms that any expression had ever fallen from him which would admit of the interpretation that the Emperor intended to let Turkey fall to pieces without any interference on his part; and with regard to himself, he added, that I ought to know that the whole policy in respect to the Porte was of an opposite tendency.

With reference to the occupation of the Herzegovina, Prince Metternich, he said, had come to him and had expressed great alarm at what was passing in that province, adding, that Austia could not with safety to herself permit the revolution to spread in that quarter, and must take measures in consequence; that he (M. Thouvenel) had therefore said that as Austria could not act alone with reference to the interior of a Turkish province, he recommended that if she considered the danger imminent she should lose no time in laying the matter before the Great Powers, and that if her intention should be to propose to send troops into the Herzegovina, he need hardly say that the French Government would not offer any opposition. He himself would not take the initiative in making such a propesal, because his motives would be suspected. This, M. Thouvenel said, was the substance of the conversation which had passed between Prince Metternich and himself. I asked whether Prince Metternich had first hinted at the occupation of the Herzegovina by Austria. M. Thouvenel replied in the negative, but added that it seemed to him that she would require but little persuasion to undertake it.

I will endeavour to ascertain, for your Lordship's further information, how far this statement is corroborated by Prince Metternich, but I should not be surprised to find that M. Thouvenel had gone further in his language respecting the occupation of the Herzegovina than he is willing to admit. At the same time it must be remarked that, even on Count Apponyi's statement, M. Thouvenel proposes the occupation as a conservative and not as a destructive measure, though of course the purity of his intentions may be called in doubt, if his general policy with regard to Turkey seems equivocal.

I now revert to the understanding supposed to exist between France and Russia with regard to Poland.

I cannot but think that the Austrian Government is too prone to jump at conclusions without sufficient reflection. Surely there are reasons enough to account for the concessions which Russia has made to Poland without supposing an understanding to exist with France for the accomplishment of a scheme which must, when carried into effect, be a perpetual danger to Russia, besides throwing her back in the ranks of civilization. I do not mean to say that the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh may not have been impressed

with the necessity of taking account of the sympathies of France for Poland, and that this may not have had a great weight on the decisions which have been taken, for it may fairly be presumed that the internal weakness of Russia must make her hesitate at having recourse to force in a conflict which might bring France into the field for Poland as it has brought her into the field for Italy; nor ought we to conceive that Russian statesmen are so lost to reason as not to profit by historical lessons. They must see that the progressive tendency of all nations is towards greater freedom, and that concessions made in time may be the means of preventing many a catastrophe afterwards.

I have ventured to make these observations because I am convinced that the understanding supposed by Count Rechberg to exist between France and Russia for the resuscitation of the old Kingdom of Poland is pure imagination. I do not state this conviction on light grounds. I pass over the ignorance in which I know the Emperor's Ministers to be upon the subject, because it is possible, though hardly probable, that the secret might have been kept from them. For the same reasons I refrain from dwelling upon the suspicions of General Kissieff as to the loyalty of the French Government; but I believe I may assure your Lordship not only that the late events of Warsaw have taken the Emperor by surprise, but that he is perfectly astonished at the helpless condition in which he conceives that Russia must find herself when consenting to concede so much without a struggle.

But, while expressing this opinion, I would not lull Her Majesty's Government into a false security. If the information which I have received, and on which I think I can rely, represents the Emperor as amazed at the helplessness of Russia, and as persuaded of her uselessness as an ally, it also portrays him as foreseeing in that weakness the possibility of the resuscitation of Poland as a nationality and a kingdom, for the accomplishment of which His Majesty would be ready to sacrifice the Ottoman Empire. In other words he would let Russia and Austria indemnify themselves in Turkey for the loss of their Polish possessions.

That this is the sense in which the Emperor has expressed himself since the late events at Warsaw your Lordship may be assured. It is possible, then, that that which I believe I can safely assert has not yet taken place may result from future negotiations, and that if Russia finds she cannot continue to hold Poland, she may look for compensation elsewhere, in which she will be assisted by France.

Your Lordship may rely upon my employing all the means at my disposal to learn whether this idea has taken root in the Emperor's mind, or whether it is only the ebullition of the moment caused by events which have taken him by surprise. I will only add that His Majesty appears as yet to have no disposition to attain the independence of Poland by force.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 74.

Consul Holmes to Lord J. Russell.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 34.)
My Lord,

Bosna-Serai, March 21, 1861.

I HAVE from a trustworthy source been made acquainted with the contents of a despatch addressed to the Russian Embassy at Vienna by M. Petcovich, Russian Consul at Ragusa. The despatch relates to what is passing in the Herzegovina, and may be interesting to your Lordship.

It would appear that the Secretary of the Prince of Montenegro, M. Vasilik, on his return from a visit to Ismail Pasha at Trebigné, passed through Ragusa, and informed M. Petcovich that he had been well received by the Mushir, and that he trusted soon to see an amicable solution of the frontier question. M. Vasilik had urged the Pasha, on the part of the Prince, to make concessions to the insurgents instead of attacking them, the concessions to consist in permitting the Herzegovina to govern itself on paying a fixed annual tribute to the Sultan. At the same time he had declared that the insurrection was disapproved by the Prince, who had counselled the rebels to submit to the Turkish Government.

The Mushir had replied that since the Prince had disavowed all countenance of the proceedings of the insurgents, their subjection would be a matter of no difficulty; that he was ready to grant concessions, and would even go beyond his instructions on that point; and that it only remained for the rebels to send their Chiefs to treat with him.

Remarking on his conversation with M. Vasilik, M. Petcovich says that he does not expect to see any amicable arrangement between the rebels and the authorities, as the former, having no faith in Turkish promises, will not send deputies to head-quarters. He also throws doubt on the friendly assurances of the Prince and of Ismail Pasha. It remains to be seen, he says, which will succeed in deceiving the other—the Prince, who wishes to gain time, and to have his troops disposable for other points, or the Mushir, whose object is to bring up his reinforcements.

I am quite of M. Petcovich's opinion, and doubt the possibility of any satisfactory arrangement being made on the spot. The question will, sooner or later, I imagine, have to be settled with the aid of the European Powers at Constantinople.

M. Petcovich, I am told, also states that a deputation from Spitz, a Turkish seaport situated between Cattaro and Antivaro, had waited on the Prince of Montenegro to pray that they might be admitted as subjects of Montenegro.

The Prince acceded to their request, and, after presenting them with Montenegrin decorations, dismissed them with orders to introduce the Montenegrin code among their people at once.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 75.

Consul Holmes to Lord J. Russell.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 35.)
My Lord,

Bosna-Serai, March 21, 1861.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a despatch, with its inclosure, which I have just addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, in reference to the small value of the Province of Herzegovina in comparison to the enormous expense it has been to the Turkish Government during the last three years, the long continuance of the revolt, and suggesting to Sir Henry Bulwer the idea of a Christian Kaïmakam for the Herzegovina as a possible means of arrangement should the possession of the province be considered indispensable to Turkey.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure 1 in No. 75.

Consul Holmes to Sir H. Bulwer.

Sir,

Bosna-Serai, March 19, 1861.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a despatch of the 17th instant, just received from Mr. Vice-Consul Zohrab, by which your Excellency will perceive that nothing of particular interest has occurred during the last week.

Mr. Zohrab makes some reflections on the worthlessness of the possession of the Herzegovina to the Turkish Empire in comparison with the heavy expenditure its retention entails, and seems to suggest the idea of its cession to Montenegro; but should its possession be considered indispensable to Turkey, he considers the only means of retaining it to be the nomination of a military commander capable of quenching the revolt, and the sincere adoption of the reforms so long solicited.

I am inclined to think that there would be a difficulty in finding such a commander, and that the people so often deceived would never believe in the possibility of any Turkish Pasha inaugurating real reforms, and I would suggest, for your Excellency's consideration, the idea of a Christian Kaïmakam for the Herzegovina as a possible means of arranging matters in that province.

Some short time ago the appointment of Christians to high office in Turkey was much talked of, and I cannot imagine a fitter occasion for the experiment than in the Herzegovina, where the Christian population vastly outnumbers the Mussulmans, and where Turkish rule, without some ingenious device to preserve it, seems to be rapidly becoming impossible.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES

Inclosure 2 in No. 75.

Vice-Consul Zohrab to Consul Holmes.

Mostar, March 17, 1861.

Sir,

THE news from the rebel districts this week presents no features of interest.

Ismail Pasha, with the head-quarters of the army, is still at Bilikah. What his object is in taking up that position I am not directly informed; but, from vague statements, it would seem his Excellency contemplates a diversion in favour of Nichsich, whether he will await the arrival of Ferik Mustafa Pasha before moving does not appear; but if more energy and activity are not exhibited than have hitherto been displayed, I apprehend the attempt to relieve Nichsich will come too late.

In reviewing the military movements on the frontier since the army left its winter quarters, it cannot fail to strike the observer that nothing in reality has been done yet to check the further progress of the rebellion, to protect menaced points, or to relieve the attacked; and, as far as a distant witness can judge, the whole operations have consisted of a series of marches and counter-marches, I cannot say without aim, but at least without any results beneficial to the Turkish cause.

The troops have been exposed to fatigue, to the inclemency of the weather, and to privations; nor have the peaceable inhabitants been in the meantime left unmolested, the Mussulmans have had to give their quota to the irregular force, and the Christians their horses and their attendance for the transport of the material of the army.

The cost of the present army in the Herzegovina cannot be estimated at less than 10,000 purses per month; this expenditure, under the present system, cannot be limited to any period, as a settlement of the frontier after three years' efforts seems to be as remote as ever.

The length of time through which this question has trained without making progress, but rather seriously retrograding, added to the vast sums which have been spent and the larger amounts which will have to be disbursed before a final settlement will be obtained, should make it a matter of the first consideration to the Turkish Ministers, under the present pecuniary difficulties of the Sultan, whether in reality the Herzegovina is so valuable to Turkey as to render its possession worthy any further outlay. Hitherto the Porte has derived no pecuniary benefit from its possession, and it will take many years of fostering government before any revenue can be derived from it; its present value, therefore, is in relation to Bosnia, and it remains to be seen whether this relative value is of vital importance.

The revolt of an insignificant population, which I feel no hesitation in saying a capable officer would have extinguished without difficulty in its germ, has, through the incapacity or timidity of the Turkish leaders, been permitted to assume an aspect which seriously threatens the subversion of the Turkish authority in the province as a final result. If, therefore, the possession of the Herzegovina is considered indispensable, it can, in my opinion, only be retained by the immediate nomination of an able and active military commander to quench the revolt and secure internal tranquillity, and by the sincere adoption of the reforms so long solicited.

Ismail Pasha, I have no doubt, is a brave, honest man; indeed, his reputation as such is widespread, but, from my observation of him, I do not think him possessed of the talents and activity necessary to oppose the cunning of the Montenegrins, or to overcome the guerilla resistance of the insurgents.

His Excellency has several times stated to me, as well as to others, that he could easily put down the revolt, and also reduce the Montenegrins to terms; but the opposition of France to any hostile measures being adopted by him prevents his putting into execution any efficient plans. His Excellency may be sincere in this assertion, but I must confess it strikes me he has created an imaginary obstacle in which he firmly believes to conceal a real difficulty which he does not know how to overcome.

I must apologise for having thus trespassed on your time, but the urgency of the case induces me to state my opinion frankly; and I trust the interest I take in the question at issue will be admitted as an extenuating circumstance in my favour, if I have exceeded the limits of my duty.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAS. ZOHRAB.

No. 76.

Consul Holmes to Lord J. Russell.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 56.)

My Lord, *Bosna-Serai, March* 21, 1861.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the members of the Commission of Inquiry for Bosnia and the Herzegovina have at last arrived at Ragusa, where they await Ismail Pasha's instructions.

It is the universal opinion here that this Commission will prove a totally useless expense to the Government, as there is not the most remote possibility of its ever being of the slightest benefit to these provinces. The Turks laugh at it, and the Christians think that it would be more likely to do them harm than good; but both seem to think it an official farce. I confess to being of the same opinion.

The Government may mean well, but its agents do not understand how to carry out, or will not carry out, its intentions; and during an experience of twenty years in Turkey, I have generally found that the result of such inquiries has been absolutely null; while the grand object of the parties charged with conducting them seems to be simply to receive their special salaries for the longest possible period.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 77.

Lord Napier to Lord J. Russell.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 31.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, March* 22, 1861.

PRINCE GORTCHAKOW requested me to call upon him at the Foreign Office this afternoon at one o'clock. I found the Representatives of Austria and Prussia there at that hour, and we were shortly afterwards joined by the Ambassador of France. On being shown into the Prince's room, his Excellency bade us take our seats, and entered with some formality at once upon the subject for which we had been summoned together.

His Excellency reverted to the anxiety which he had felt, to the warnings which he had given, and to the remedies which he had proposed, in reference to the condition of the Christians in European Turkey. His anticipations, he said, had been realized; the last intelligence was most alarming; the general discontent had in Herzegovina burst out in hostilities and collisions in a number of quarters; a band of Italians had effected a landing at Spizza. No one could predict the consequences of these incidents unless they were arrested and circumscribed by immediate action.

In illustration of these occurrences, Prince Gortchakow imparted to us two telegrams, one announcing the landing of forty Garibaldian partizans at the place abovementioned, in a vessel towed by an English ship, or one bearing the English colours, the other having reference to the disturbances in Herzegovina, and to the proposal made by the Representatives of the Five Powers at Constantinople to send a European Commission for the pacification of that province, accompanied by a delegate of the Porte, a suggestion which, it seems, the Porte rejected.

The Duke de Montebello, on his part, exhibited a despatch corroborating the disorders in Herzegovina, and the overtures of the Ambassadors to the Turkish Government.

The Russian Minister also submitted to our inspection a telegram from Vienna to the effect that M. de Reichberg thought the dispatch of a Commission of the Five Powers for the regulation of the Montenegrin frontier (pour règler les frontières du Monténegro) indispensable to the restoration of tranquillity. It did not clearly appear, however, whether the proposed Commission was the one contemplated at Constantinople for the pacification of those parts, or whether it had reference to a new Commission for the actual rectification of the frontier line of Montenegro.

Some doubt having arisen as to the position of Spizza, maps were called for and brought in by the Director of the Oriental Department, from whom we learned that Spizza, though on the Turkish territory, had been for some days previously occupied by the Montenegrins, who were thus brought into immediate contact with the sea and the Italian adventurers.

A discussion of a very desultory nature ensued, Prince Gortchakow not having

made any very distinct, practical suggestions to the Conference, if such it may be termed. The conversation, indeed, ran into many irrelevant topics and the policy or position of England in regard to revolutionary movements was very freely canvassed. The attention of the Representatives having been recalled to business, it was found that the wishes of Prince Gortchakow were chiefly directed to two points: (1) To the despatch of the Commission above-mentioned to Herzegovina; and (2) to the defence of Her Majesty's ships of the Turkish coast, and, perhaps, of Dalmatia, against revolutionary incursions, though the protection of the Austrian coast, in the presence of Count Thun, was not distinctly urged.

I engaged to consult your Lordship on these two points by telegraph without delay.

In regard to the action of Her Majesty's ships on the Adriatic Coast of Turkey, I remarked that such an intervention, in conjunction with the Turks, might possibly not be repugnant either to the policy or Her Majesty's Government or to public opinion in England, for we were engaged by peculiar obligations to defend and maintain Turkey, and our people had that object strongly at heart. I did not see, however, why the Prince called on me for aid alone: the Garibaldians had landed at a spot occupied by his protégés, the Montenegrins; was there no Russian vessel to prevent this dangerous conjunction, or did he not intend to send one? Or why did he not invoke the assistance of France; France was interested in the maintenance of Turkey, and had no sympathy for Garibaldi? Or why was Austria not engaged in the same cause; she had the interest of contiguity, and had a deep stake in the preservation of the Ottoman Empire?

Prince Gortchakow replied that there was no Russian vessel in the Adriatic, and that he could not employ one in that way. He could not appear to put a constraint upon, or take an active part against, the Montenegrins while they and their neighbours were the victims of a system of oppression. What he desired to see was the exhibition of the English flag and the employment of English influence against revolutionary aggression, and that might be done here in conformity with our declared policy and interest. He would, however, take a part in any general measure or engagement by which the action of the Italian Revolution should be severed from all external influences, and be confined strictly to Italy.

The Prince did not explain himself very fully; he spoke with some warmth, and while I endeavour to render his meaning or feeling correctly, I can hardly affirm that his expressions were used with deliberation, or have any actual official significance.

M. de Montebello thought that an overture on the part of England to France for co-operation on the Adriatic Coast of Turkey might possibly not be unacceptable.

All parties agreed at least in this, that a European Commission, in conjunction with a Turkish delegate, for the restoration of tranquillity in Herzegovina, was a measure which deserved to be supported by the Powers, and to be pressed on the acceptance of the Porte.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 78.

Lord Napier to Lord J. Russell.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 39.) *St. Petersburgh, March 25, 1861.*

My Lord,

I IMPARTED the substance of your Lordship's telegram of the 23rd instant to Prince Gortchakow this morning, to the effect that Her Majesty's Government declined to instruct the English forces in the Adriatic to protect the Turkish coast against revolutionary incursions, and that they were in favour of a European Commission to Herzegovina, accompanied by a Turkish Delegate, subject to the consent of the Porte.

I remarked to the Prince that, from the tenor of your Lordship's message, I conceived you were in possession of information respecting the Austrian and Turkish squadrons in those waters which we had not received, and I asked him whether he had any news of the arrival of the Turkish squadron and troops which were reported to have been dispatched from Constantinople to the Albanian coast.

The Prince said he had no knowledge of the arrival of the Turks. In reference to the refusal of Her Majesty's Government to act against the revolutionary bands, he said Her Majesty's Government should consider that, according to the telegraphic report from Trieste, the English colours had been already adopted by the expedition which had landed at Spizza; he feared the Turkish and Austrian vessels would hardly venture to

interfere with ships bearing that flag, the display of which, in connection with the invasion of the coast, would have a great effect on the population. He thought Her Majesty's Government should take measures to prevent the employment of English vessels for the purpose referred to, or the illicit adoption of the English flag to cover others; that object would best be effected by the presence of an English vessel on the coast. If that were not consistent with the views of Her Majesty's Government, some declaration might at least be made that Her Majesty's Government would not tolerate the abuse of the British colours in that manner, which would, in some degree, tend to discourage similar undertakings.

I recognized that there was some force in the observations made by the Prince, and that it was not improbable that our colours would be exhibited by vessels engaged in those enterprizes. I was confident that Her Majesty's Government would not resent the arrest and examination of such vessels by the Austrian and Turkish cruizers, but that I would lose no time in laying his views before your Lordship.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 79.

Lord Bloomfield to Lord J. Russell.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 132.) *Vienna, March 28, 1861.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship herewith the despatch which I have received from Mr. Dunlop.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 79.

Mr. Dunlop to Lord Bloomfield.

Pesth, March 23, 1861.

My Lord,

THE news received here through Servia and the Bosnian frontier is disquieting, though the rumours are vague and somewhat contradictory.

Accounts, considered to be authentic, arrive of great excitement and discontent in the whole of Servia, and of suspicions and doubts prevailing there respecting the present proceedings of Prince Michael, and of his real position, both at Vienna and Bucharest.

Letters come from the Herzegovina stating that numbers of Croatians and Dalmatians have joined the Montenegrins, and that there has been a serious collision (unfavourable to the Turks) between these combined irregular troops and Ismail Pasha, who was endeavouring to advance at the head of a considerable force to rid the Herzegovina of these revolutionary bands, who demanded, amongst other things, from the Turkish authorities, full and free passage and communication from Antivari, on the Adriatic, to the gates of Belgrade.

The moderate party here begin therefore to be uneasy lest what is going on in these districts may lead to a more speedy awakening of the Oriental question than had been anticipated, because of Turkish difficulties imminent along the Danube; and that if the Servians and Bosnians (whether aided or not by the Croatians and Dalmatians) make an immediate insurrection in any degree successful, the violent amongst the leaders and the populace throughout Southern Hungary will be difficult to control.

The main hope now of the Eötvös-Deak party here is in the Diet meeting not under martial law, and in some wise solution being fortunately arrived at then in the multitude of counsellors.

They are aware that a time of crisis is approaching them on more sides than one, and they see perils inevitably before them which can only be lessened or averted by facing and meeting them. They are still not without faint hopes of concessions from Vienna, even though the eleventh hour is passing away. They trust a good deal to Providence, and a little in the Emperor.

People are beginning also to speculate as to what will be done first when the Diet does meet. It seems now that all the ultra-Liberals in Austria are pressing the Government in Vienna not to yield in the question of the Hungarian participation in the con-

tralized Reichsrath, and are confident that the eighty-five members allotted for Hungary would, if once assembled at Vienna, side with them in the extreme measures which they certainly will propose for the whole Empire. They cannot do very well without the Hungarians, and would be triumphant with them.

Apropos of this subject, it appears also that the Liberal and aristocratic parties in Bohemia (Slavic-Czech) have already united, and are joining the Clerical section (who favour the Concordat) so as to compete in the Reichsrath with the German party there.

I am at present inclined to fear that, in consequence of all these circumstances, and from what is taking place in Poland, and also because the news from Italy—especially from Mantua—has of late been unfavourable to Austrian rule there, that a majority of the members of the Diet will begin by placing themselves in an attitude too defiant and too exacting.

Communications are often received here just now from Hungarians in Italy, giving details which speak for themselves, of great disaffection in some of the garrisons, of sickness amongst the soldiery, and of officers deserting.

It is most desirable that, if possible, some scheme of mutual concession could be arranged either at Vienna or here before the Diet. At present the Emperor and the Hungarians are standing face to face, at a wide distance from each other, with a gulf between them, and with no firm ground in view where they might meet and confer, and settle preliminaries towards agreement.

It will be very hazardous, considering present external possibilities, if this common ground is left to be fixed amidst the turbulent excitement necessarily attending the commencement of such an assembly as the Diet must be. Should no plan of mutual compromise be previously suggested, discussed, or arranged, and no common agreement be arrived at during the very early part of the Session (force and military dictation not being taken into account, neither of which will ever now finally settle the points at issue) the great question will probably arise suddenly for the Austrians and Hungarians practically to consider "which can best do without the other!"

Here, I need not say, the confidence is evidently strengthening that the Hungarian capability for existence independent of Austria is greater than are the Austrian powers of vitality without Hungary; and, unfortunately, there is a spirit of sanguine and arrogant trust among the Hungarians that, by profiting of the expected troubles in Turkey, and of the possible aid from external events in the Adriatic (directly or indirectly affecting Hungary), and occurring propitiously at the very moment they desire, they are in a position now to shut their ears to any hint of compromise, however moderate or reasonable.

There is still the same hostile sentiment (to which I have previously alluded) amongst the peasantry in many districts of Hungary against the nobles and proprietors. They openly declare, in some comitats, that they know that the magnates are conspiring against them, and are trying to bring back the state of affairs, for the present, which existed previous to the year 1848.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. GRAHAM DUNLOP.

No. 80.

Lord Bloomfield to Lord J. Russell.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 133.)
My Lord, *Vienna, March 28, 1861.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram of the 23rd instant, informing me that Her Majesty's Government decline to interrupt expeditions to the coast of Turkey in the Adriatic, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that, when I called on Consul Rechberg to inform him of the substance of your Lordship's telegram, he seemed quite prepared for this result of the communication that had been made from St. Petersburgh proposing a combined English and French naval expedition in that sea, and on my observing that in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government the Austrian and Turkish forces ought to be sufficient, he said that the Porte had been so long preparing a squadron for the purpose of acting along the coast of Albania, that he was at a loss to understand the real cause of the delay, unless it was the want of money to fit out the ships that were under sailing orders.

Your Lordship will have been informed by my telegram of yesterday, recorded in my despatch No. 130 of the 27th instant, that a Turkish squadron had at last left Constantinople; and, in giving me this information, Count Rechberg said that he hoped the landing of filibustering expeditions would at all events be rendered more difficult, but he added that the insurrection in the Herzegovina had now assumed such large dimensions that there was no calculating where it would stop.

I asked his Excellency, with reference to a former conversation we had held, in which he seemed to apprehend that some active military measures on the part of Austria might become necessary, whether this matter had been again under his consideration, as any interference such as that implied in the internal affairs of Turkey might be attended with doubtful consequences.

His answer was, that, under present circumstances, no such project was entertained, and that attention would be directed solely to the defence of Austrian territory and interests, and that three Imperial steamers would shortly be acting in concert with the Turkish squadron that had left Constantinople, but he did not add that there was any question of their taking part in a blockade.

As to the landing of filibustering expeditions on the coast of the Adriatic, he said that he had not received any news in confirmation of the account he had given me last week of a boat having been towed by an English steamer, and cast loose near Spitza, where fifty men had landed, but he had positive information that an expedition had very lately left a small port near Ancona for the opposite coast, and that strange boats were continually arriving from the sea, and landing people up the Cattaro water; he might say almost under their own guns, so openly, added his Excellency, were these expeditions carried on.

Count Rechberg believes that they are all fitted and prepared in the Italian ports, and that the object of these expeditions is 'to foment discontent in the Herzegovina through Montenegrins and other agents, and ultimately raise the spirit of revolt in the rear of the Austrian dominions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 81.

Lord Bloomfield to Lord J. Russell.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 140.)
My Lord, *Vienna, March 28, 1861.*

ON the receipt of your Lordship's telegram of the 21st instant, thinking it of importance that Count Rechberg should be at once acquainted with the substance of it, and being unable to count upon seeing his Excellency on the following day, I addressed to him the letter of which I have the honour to inclose a copy, stating the opinion of Her Majesty's Government on the Commission it was proposed to send from Constantinople respecting Montenegro and the Herzegovina.

Count Rechberg has since informed me that he immediately sent instructions to Baron Prokesch to confer with Sir Henry Bulwer on the steps to be taken on this question.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 81.

Lord Bloomfield to Count Rechberg.

Dear Count Rechberg, *Vienna, March 21, 1861.*

I LOST no time in acquainting Her Majesty's Government with the proposal which you communicated to me yesterday respecting the appointment by the Five Powers of a Commission to mediate between the Porte and the insurgents in Herzegovina. Having received a reply to the communication I addressed on this subject to Lord John Russell, I hasten to inform you that Her Majesty's Government would approve of a Commission to be sent to Constantinople respecting Montenegro and the Herzegovina, but they have left discretion to Sir Henry Bulwer, and would be glad if the Imperial Internuncio were instructed to consult with him as to the steps it may be advisable to take in this matter.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 82.

Lord J. Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 398.) *Foreign Office, April* 1, 1861.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatch, as marked in the margin,* on the subject of the state of Montenegro and the neighbouring districts.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 83.

Earl Cowley to Lord J. Russell.—(Received April 2.)

(No. 493. Confidential.) *Paris, April* 1, 1861.

My Lord,

SINCE I addressed your Lordship my despatch No. 486 of the 29th ultimo, I have had an opportunity of conversing with Prince Metternich on the subject of the declaration which Count Apponyi informed your Lordship M. Thouvenel had made to the Prince with reference to the Emperor's policy in Turkey.

Prince Metternich confirmed the whole of M. Thouvenel's statement to me, as recounted in that despatch. He went, indeed, further, for he said that it was he who had hinted to M. Thouvenel that an occupation of the Herzegovina might become necessary, and had asked how it would be viewed by France. M. Thouvenel had in reply, while assuring the Prince that it would not be opposed by France, reminded him that it could not be done without the consent of the other Powers and the Porte.

But although no positive and sweeping declaration, such as your Lordship had been led to suppose, had been made by M. Thouvenel, that the Emperor would allow the Turkish Empire to fall to pieces without interference, Prince Metternich infers, from the general tone of M. Thouvenel's language, that his Excellency considers the Ottoman Empire to be approaching its dissolution, and that there exists no inclination to prevent the catastrophe.

I asked Prince Metternich what had led his Government to suppose that an understanding exists between France and Russia with regard to the resuscitation of the Kingdom of Poland. Had he, I inquired, any knowledge or suspicion of such an understanding?

None in the least, he replied; far from it, he was convinced of the contrary, and he could not conceive what had led Count Rechberg to entertain such a notion.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 84.

Lord J. Russell to Lord Napier.

(No. 35.) *Foreign Office, April* 2, 1861.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatches Nos. 31 and 39 of the 23rd and 25th ultimo, I have to observe that the fears of Prince Gortchakow respecting an Italian invasion of the territories of Austria and Turkey seem to have misled him as to the British flag. We have no authentic statement that the British flag has been used to cover a Garibaldian invasion. Her Majesty's Government have not been invited by Turkey to join in the protection of her coasts.

Too much care of Turkey may increase the helplessness it is intended to remedy. Her Majesty's Government are quite as anxious as the Russian Government to maintain the independence of the Ottoman Porte, but we conceive that a little self-reliance and native energy on the part of the Turks may be more useful to that end than occupations of Turkish territory by foreign troops and joint interventions of foreign Governments between the Sultan and his subjects.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

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* No. 70.

No. 85.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, April* 2, 1861.

BLOCKADE of the Albanian coast has been notified to the diplomatic body by an official note dated March 28.

The Porte means to take no steps whatever respecting the Bulgarian refugees in Servia.

The Porte intends sending another Governor to Candia with Christian Council.

No. 86.

Lord J. Russell to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 79. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, April* 3, 1861.

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris,* relative to the affairs of Herzegovina.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 87.

Lord J. Russell to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 80.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, April* 3, 1861.

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris,† on the subject of a Russian naval force being stationed in the Adriatic for intercepting any expedition that might be planned by Garibaldi.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 88.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received April 5.)

(No. 207.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, March* 23, 1861.

WITH reference to Mr. Consul Holmes' despatch No. 9 of the 11th ultimo, stating that all the foreign Powers are now represented at Mostar by Consuls except Great Britain, I venture to suggest to your Lordship that, at a moment when events in the Herzegovina are daily acquiring increased importance, it might be expedient to give the rank of Consul also to Mr. Zohrab, Her Majesty's Vice-Consul at that place.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

No. 89.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received April 5.)

(No. 212.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, March* 23, 1861.

YOUR Lordship will have seen by Sir Francis Gilbert's despatch No. 4 of the 19th ultimo the language held by the Consular body at Scutari to Abdi Pasha, with reference to the outrages committed, as it is asserted in this instance, by the Montenegrins.

That despatch having been communicated by me to Aali Pasha, his Highness stated that all such acts on the part of the mountaineers are passed over in silence, but that when the Mussulmans retaliate for previous and repeated aggressions, no one thinks

* No. 64. † No. 65.

of remonstrating with the Prince of Montenegro against the consequences of his proceedings.

If the Montenegrins, continued his Highness, are not seriously admonished to keep within the bounds of their own territory, I am afraid that the Mussulman population of the frontier villages will be driven to despair, and will, as one man, rise to avenge their wrongs, and then the Porte will be compelled to resort to vigorous measures to protect and assist its subjects. Humanity, he said, is always pleaded where Christians are concerned, whilst no one utters a word in behalf of the Turks. It would appear to be a settled object to exterminate the Mussulman element in those parts. If the Montenegrins did not call themselves Christians, the whole of Europe would have long since insisted upon their atonement for the cold-blooded atrocities daily committed by them. I here merely repeat the words of the Turkish Minister.

Aali Pasha informs me that things are now at that pass that he has written to the Porte's Representatives abroad that their continuance can no longer be tolerated, and that it must, as a matter of course, if the Montenegrin aggressions are not otherwise checked, adopt adequate measures for the protection of the population committed to its rule, the Sultan's Government being no longer able to remain an inactive spectator of the struggle which its co-religionists have constantly to wage under such disadvantageous circumstances, without altogether losing its authority.

The Montenegrins, he says, make an incursion; they are driven back or retire to repeat the offence, secure against chastisement when once within their own limits; and this alternately excites and discourages the Turks.

These observations were not, perhaps, so appropriate on this occasion as they would be on others, and I have not failed to represent this to the Porte, and also to advise forbearance; but the fact undoubtedly is that the Turks, as matters now stand, are placed in a false and almost impossible position.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

No. 90.

Consul-General Longworth to Lord J. Russell.—(Received April 5, 10·30 P.M.)*

(Telegraphic.) *Semlin, April 5, 1861, 6·30 P.M.*

I HAVE this day been told by an Englishman, late of Garibaldi's legion, and now on his journey to join General Türr, from whom he assures me he has received a letter stating that he had landed at Spitza, and is now in the mountains of Montenegro waiting for reinforcements. General Türr has about 2,000 men with him.

No. 91.

Lord J. Russell to Sir J. Hudson.

(No. 68.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 5, 1861.*

HER Majesty's Government were glad to learn, by your telegram of the 29th ultimo, that Count Cavour had assured you that he would do his utmost to prevent the departure of the Hungarian expedition reported to be preparing at Marsala, and would even send orders for the capture of General Türr if he should be met with at sea on his way to join it, which he was supposed to contemplate.

In your subsequent telegram of the 2nd instant you reported that Garibaldi was expected at Turin, and that it was supposed he would proceed to Hungary with an armed force in the event of any rising occurring in that country.

You say that the Italian Government will endeavour to prevent Galibaldi from doing so, and had ordered a squadron to the Adriatic. But if Garibaldi takes his departure from Turin to lead an expedition against the Austrian and Turkish coasts, the imputation of having sanctioned such an expedition can hardly fail to attach to the King of Italy. It would be wiser, therefore, for the Government to take steps for stopping the expedition on its departure from the ports where it may be preparing rather than to defer measures of repression until the expedition has entered the Adriatic.

The presence of an Italian squadron in that sea at the present moment will necessarily be viewed with distrust both by Austria and Turkey, and it is not impossible

* Sent to Sir Henry Bulwer.

that collision might ensue if the naval Powers of the respective countries should, under existing circumstances, be cruizing at the same time in the Adriatic.

The Austrian and Turkish forces would in all probability be able to repel by their own means any attempts which might be made by armed bands under Garibaldi or others to effect a landing.

Her Majesty's Government trust, however, that the influence of the Italian Government will be successfully exerted to prevent Garibaldi from undertaking an expedition which can scarcely fail to involve serious consequences, and may even imperil the peace of Europe.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 92.

Lord J. Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 414. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, April 5, 1861.*

I SPOKE yesterday to the Count de Flahault of the general rumours respecting the activity of French agents in Hungary, in Poland, in Herzegovina, and the Principalities.

I observed at the same time that although the belief in their existence seemed very general, not one had been arrested and convicted.

He said, "Let them be arrested and convicted, and hanged, if found guilty. But, in fact, though French agents may exist, agents of the French Government stirring up insurrection do not exist. Others may send them and employ them, but the French Government do not."

I have no doubt M. Thouvenel would make to you the same declaration.

But arms are sent to the Principalities, to Greece, and elsewhere. Whence do they come?

Is it true that the arms stopped at Galatz were sent to Genoa from Marseilles?

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 93.

Lord J. Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 418.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, April 6, 1861.*

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches* upon the subject of the state of affairs in the Herzegovina.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 95.

Lord Napier to Lord J. Russell.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 50. Most Confidential.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, April 2, 1861.*

THE inclosed report from the Russian Minister at Vienna, obtained from a confidential source, confirms an assurance frequently made to me by Prince Gortchakow to the effect that he had discouraged the Prince of Montenegro from taking any part in exciting discontent among the Christians in the provinces adjoining.

M. Balabine, with the concurrence of his Turkish colleague, suggests, as a partial remedy for the disorders referred to, that a good understanding under the mediation of the European Consuls should be established between the Prince of the mountain and the Pasha of Scutari.

* Nos. 74, 75, and 76.

The despatch of the Russian Minister is written in a cool, impartial tone, and does not appear to justify the great alarm expressed by Prince Gortchakow respecting the state of affairs in that portion of Turkey.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

Inclosure in No. 95.

M. Balabine to Prince Gortchakow.

Vienne, le 15 Mars, 1861.

AUSSITOT que me parvint le télégramme de votre Excellence du 9 Mars, j'ai télégraphié à M. Petkowitch de faire parvenir au Prince de Monténégro l'avis qui y était contenu. La réponse de notre Consul, qui ne se fit pas attendre, portait qu'il exécuterait sans retard l'ordre que lui était transmis, mais que pour sa part, il continuait à infirmer toute participation du Prince ou des Monténégrins proprement dits aux troubles qui agitaient les populations aux alentours de la Montagne.

Parmi les nombreux rapports de Scutari, Sarajevo, et que je transmets aujourd'hui au Général Kowalewsky, se trouve une pièce digne de fixer l'attention et qui n'est pas sans importance dans la lutte entre les Chrétiens et les Turcs qui se poursuit dans ces parages. C'est la copie d'une note identique adressée à Abdi Pacha par les Consuls à Scutari en date du $\frac{17 \text{ Février.}}{1 \text{ Mars.}}$ Cette pièce a d'abord cela de remarquable qu'elle constate un accord des plus satisfaisants entre ces agents, chose malheureusement fort rare en Orient. En second lieu, elle réduit à sa juste valeur les exagérations si fréquentes des données transmises à la Porte par les Chefs des provinces. Troisièmement, en faisant une répartition équitable des torts de part et d'autre, elle prouve que les faits dont se plaint le Pacha eussent pu être évités s'il avait suivi les conseils salutaires qu'ils lui avaient donnés.

M'étant rendu chez le Prince Kallimaki pour connaître la teneur du télégramme auquel se référait celui de votre Excellence et l'entretenir de ces affaires, je constatai chez l'Ambassadeur un point de vue dont je ne peux que reconnaître la justesse. Il est d'avis qu'il n'est nul besoin de recourir aux causes extérieures pour expliquer l'excitation locale; les luttes qui ensanglantent ces contrées se produisent, selon lui, en dehors et contrairement à la volonté des Pachas Gouverneurs des provinces et du Chef de la Montagne. Elles sont la suite inévitable d'un état de choses auquel il n'a été remédié que particllement, d'une solution qui a du ménager bien plus les exigences Européennes que prendre en considération les besoins locaux. Il pense,—et c'est également mon avis- qu'en l'absence d'un remède radical, le seul palliatif efficace serait des explications et une entente directe entre le Prince et les Pachas et à laquelle les Consuls prêteraient leur concours obligeant. Ce moyen, s'il était employé des deux côtés avec sincérité, serait en tout cas mieux fait pour assurer la tranquillité que le système habituellement pratiqué par les autorités Turques. Ainsi, chaque hiver des commandes considérables sont faites pour l'approvisionnement et le casernement de corps supplémentaires de troupes et les mesures sont prises pour des mouvements éventuels de concentration. Aux yeux des Turcs, et peut-être dans les intentions de la Porte, ce sont autant de mesures défensives; aux yeux des Chrétiens, ce sont au contraire des préparatifs d'agression, et il n'en faut pas d'avantage pour leur faire prendre les armes—mouvement bien naturel chez des populations dont l'existence est précaire au point que leurs ressources alimentaires dépendent parfois d'un défilé que l'ennemi parviendrait à surprendre.

C'est dans ce sens d'une entente entre le Chef de la Montagne et les Pachas que j'écris à M. Petkowitch. Le Prince, qui a été élevé à Paris et qui vraisemblablement reçoit les journaux, peut se convaincre au surplus qu'il n'y a pas jusqu'aux perturbateurs les plus émérités qui en ce moment ne prêchent la paix et n'ajournent leurs projets.

Agréez, &c.

No. 96.

Lord Bloomfield to Lord J. Russell.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 151. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Vienna, April 4*, 1861.

THE Turkish Ambassador called upon me yesterday, and said that a report had reached him that the French Ambassador at this Court had lately put out a feeler to the Austrian Government on the question of the cession of Venetia, and had mooted the question of compensation to be obtained in some other quarter, meaning the Turkish Empire; and he asked me if I knew anything on the subject.

I replied that I was not aware of the French Ambassador having taken any steps of the kind; but that, some months ago, it was said that French agents had elsewhere held language in the sense which he described.

Having myself met the Marquis de Moustier later in the day, I asked if he had been directed to make any overtures respecting Venetia, and he denied it most emphatically.

Count Rechberg afterwards confirmed this assurance; and I took the opportunity of asking his Excellency in what form the French Government had lately proposed to Austria to send a small force into Herzegovina, and whether this proposition had the appearance of being seriously made.

He replied that the idea had dropped incidentally from M. Thouvenel in the course of a conversation between that Minister and Prince of Metternich, and that it would certainly not be taken up and acted on by the Austrian Government, for they had no wish to add to the already existing complications of the affairs of Turkey.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 97.

Lord Boomfield to Lord J. Russell:—(Received April 8.)

(No. 153.)
My Lord, *Vienna, April 4*, 1861.

HAVING again spoken to Count Rechberg respecting the supposed landing of fifty filibusters at Spitza, who, according to information that had reached him, had been assisted by an English steamer bound for Corfu to Trieste, as reported in my despatch No. 107 of the 21st ultimo, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that his Excellency has now heard from General Mamula, who commands at Ragusa, that, after making every possible inquiry into the matter, he has no reason to believe that there is the least foundation for this story.

I have, &c
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 98.

Lord J. Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 425.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, April 8*, 1861.

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches* upon the subject of the state of affairs in the Herzegovina.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

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* Nos. 77 and .

No. 99.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 209.) *Foreign Office, April* 8, 1861.

Sir,

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 212 of the 23rd ultimo, reporting the conversation which you had with Aali Pasha on communicating to his Highness Sir Francis Gilbert's despatch of the 19th of February last respecting the recent outrages on the frontier of Montenegro.

There is much truth in Aali Pasha's observations as reported in your Excellency's despatch. But is it possible to prevent outrages and atrocities on the Montenegrin frontier, whether by Turks against Montenegrins, or by Montenegrins against Turks?

If it were possible to exchange the Prince of Montenegro's territory for some other part of the Sultan's territory, the Prince of Montenegro might enjoy his Principality in peace, acknowledging the Sultan in the Suzerain like the Prince of Servia, and the Porte would be freed from the injuries and expenses of these border forays.

You may sound Aali Pasha on this subject without mentioning any particular territory of the Sultan's.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 100.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 211.) *Foreign Office, April* 8, 1861.

Sir,

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency, in reply to your despatch No. 190 of the 18th ultimo, that Her Majesty's Government approve your views with regard to the measures which it would be advisable to take in order to restore order and peace on the Montenegrin frontiers of Turkey; but Her Majesty's Government cannot insist against the will of the Porte upon the appointment of a Commission such as you propose in order to obtain this purpose.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 101.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 213.) *Foreign Office, April* 8, 1861.

Sir,

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government concur in the opinions which you express in your despatch No. 196 of the 19th ultimo, in regard to the measures suggested by the Consuls at Scutari, in their identic note of the 5th February to their Representatives at Constantinople, for promoting durable peace on the frontiers of Montenegro.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 102.

Sir J. Hudson to Lord J. Russell.—(Received March 30.)

Turin, March 29, 1861, 11 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

INFORMATION of Hungarian expedition fitting out at Marsala reached me to-day. I have spoken to Cavour. He says that he will do all in his power to prevent it. It is said that General Türr will leave Genoa on Tuesday next to join it. Cavour declares he will send orders to Admiral at Genoa to capture him on the high sea if he sails from that port under justifiable suspicion. Garibaldi's men suspected of a design to embroil this country with Austria on Venetian frontier. Minister of the Interior has told General Bixio if the attempt be made, the Garibaldians shall be shot by the King's

troops. Cavour has sent orders to General Durando, commanding at Parma, in same sense. Bixio denies there is any such intention.

No. 103.

Lord J. Russell to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 88.) *Foreign Office, April* 10, 1861.

My Lord,

WITH reference to that portion of your Excellency's despatch No. 151, marked Confidential, of the 4th instant, which states that the idea of sending French troops to the Herzegovina originated with M. de Thouvenel in an interview he had had with Prince Metternich, I have to observe to your Excellency that, according to the information received by Her Majesty's Government, the suggestion to this effect seems to have been made by Prince Metternich to M. de Thouvenel.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 104.

Lord J. Russell to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 91.) *Foreign Office, April* 10, 1861.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a despatch* from Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, relative to the movement in the Herzegovina.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 105.

Lord J. Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 434.) *Foreign Office, April* 10, 1861.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches† upon the subject of Venetia and the Herzegovina.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 106.

Lord J. Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 446.) *Foreign Office, April* 11, 1861.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches‡ upon the subject of Montenegro.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 107.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 232.) *Foreign Office, April* 11, 1861.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a despatch from Lord Bloomfield,§ reporting his conversations with the Turkish and French Ambassadors at Vienna, relative to the rumoured proposals of France to Austria respecting Venetia and the Herzegovina.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

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* No. 77. † Nos. 96 and 103. ‡ No. . § No. 90.

No. 108.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 233.) *Foreign Office, April* 11, 1861.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, copies of the despatches noted margin* respecting the affairs of Montenegro and the Herzegovina, and the steps to be taken to stop revolutionary movements in the Adriatic.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 109.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 238.) *Constantinople, April* 2, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith the translation of a Circular addressed by Aali Pasha to the Diplomatic Body at this capital officially notifying the blockade, from the 13th instant, of the coast of Albania, from the port of Durazzo, in the south, to the frontier of Austria, in the north.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

Inclosure in No 109.

Circular addressed by Aali Pasha to the Foreign Representatives at the Porte.

(Translation.)

Sir, *Sublime Porte*, 16 *Ramazan*, 1277 (*March* 28, 1861).

OWING to certain well-known events, the Ottoman Government finds itself placed in the sad necessity of laying an effective blockade by sea on places situated on the coast of Albania, beginning from the port of Durazzo and ending with the extreme frontier, *i.e.*, with the conterminous provinces of Austria. The Commanders of Ottoman men-of-war have, in consequence thereof, received orders to treat ships visiting that coast according to the laws of blockade.

Your Excellency is, therefore, requested to inform those whom it may concern that the coast of Albania above described will thus be placed in a state of blockade from the 13th of April, N.S.

I avail, &c.

(Signed) USHED MEHEMED MIN AALI.

No. 110.

Consul Holmes to Lord J. Russell.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 39.) *Bosna-Serai, March* 29, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge your Lordship's despatch No. 5, instructing me that in case Ismail Pasha should request Mr. Vice-Consul Zohrab to accompany his Excellency on any expedition in the Herzegovina I am to authorize him to do so, and to furnish him with such instructions as I may consider necessary, transmitting a copy to your Lordship, and also directing me to forward, on the completion of Mr. Zohrab's service, an account of the expenses he may have incurred.

Your Lordship will have seen by the Inclosure I in my despatch No. 33 that Ismail Pasha has not invited either Mr. Zohrab or anyone else to accompany him, although he had previously declared that he should certainly do so. His Excellency Sir Henry Bulwer has informed me in a despatch, copy of which I inclose, that in his opinion, if the Agent of any other Power accompanies the Pasha, Mr. Zohrab should be sent also.

I imagine that, even without a request from the Pasha, should any French or Russian agent be sent from Mostar to the Pasha's head-quarters, both your Lordship

* Nos. 77, 78, 80, 84, 91.

and Sir Henry Bulwer will be of the opinion that Mr. Zohrab should be sent too, and in such a case, therefore, unless I receive orders to the contrary from your Lordship, I shall direct Mr. Zohrab accordingly, and will send your Lordship a copy of any instructions I may think it necessary to address to him.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure in No. 110.

Sir H. Bulwer to Consul Holmes.

Sir, *Constantinople, February* 20, 1861.

I HAVE to acquaint you, in reply to that portion of your letter of the 15th instant which relates to the intended expedition of Ismail Pasha into the Herzegovina, that it is, in my opinion, quite proper, if the agent of any other foreign Power accompanies the Pasha, that you should authorize Mr. Zohrab to do so likewise.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

No. 111.

Consul Holmes to Lord J. Russell.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 42.) *Bosna-Serai, April* 3, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that Ismail Pasha, the Mushir commanding in the Herzegovina, reached Mostar on the 31st ultimo. He was very unwell, having been copiously bled in consequence of an attack resembling a fit of apoplexy.

The members of the Bosnian Commission of Inquiry have now all reached Mostar, and, if the Mushir's state of health improves, they may soon be expected to enter on their duties.

Letters from Mostar announce some unimportant skirmishes near Bilikah, but Nichsich is still besieged, and, as yet, nothing appears to have been done to relieve the place, which would seem to be abandoned to its fate.

It is impossible to understand what the Turks intend to do in the Herzegovina. The Mushir, with the army, has been marching and countermarching during the last two months without the slightest apparent result, and he has now returned to Mostar, and it is said will soon be here at the head of the Bosnian Commission. Nichsich was besieged when his Excellency began his military promenades and is besieged still. It is supposed here that, as hitherto, the Turks have completely failed in doing what they contemplated in the Herzegovina, and that they will now, as heretofore, endeavour to make it believed that they had nothing to do, and that the revolt is a mere trifle; that they will now also begin to make promises to the rebels and endeavour to effect arrangements, the former of which will not be believed and the latter not succeed, but which will drag through the summer, leaving matters as they are—the country in a wretched state of anarchy, with the prospect of the whole affair to be again begun, according to custom, next spring. In the meantime, however, these provinces are being ruined by requisitions for the army, which are not properly paid for. The soldiers, also, are in arrears, I am told, at least ten or twelve months; but notwithstanding the poverty of its Treasury and the discontent of its troops and subjects, Moslem as well as Christian, the Porte does not hesitate to declare that it can put down of itself the revolt in the Herzegovina, though in fact it has signally failed in doing so during the last three years. My colleagues, French, Russian, and Austrian, unceasingly urge on their respective Governments the necessity of putting a termination in some way or another to this miserable state of affairs, a condition which has become chronic, and to which the Turks, at any rate, while forbidden to violate the Montenegrin frontier, seem quite incapable of applying a remedy.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 112.

Consul Holmes to Lord J. Russell.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 43.) *Bosna-Serai, April 4, 1861.*

My Lord,

THE Ferik Mustafa Pasha, commanding here, returned from Fochia on the 2nd instant. I saw his Excellency last night, and from what he said it is evident that the suppositions mentioned in my despatch No. 42 as to the failure of the Mushir's proceedings in the Herzegovina are perfectly correct.

It would seem that there was a plan organized by which three different bodies of troops were to march for opposite points through the rebel districts, converging towards a given centre, towards which the insurgents were to be driven, and eventually surrounded and taken.

All the necessary dispositions were made, and the Ferik was to march from Fochia at the head of one column towards Colashin. This he found himself totally unable to do, in consequence of the entire want of means of transport and of provisions. The country itself is most inaccessible, barren, and poor, and yields nothing; the villages for the most part consist of three or four houses—mere huts—and rarely obtain the number of twenty of these cabins.

Under these circumstances Mustafa Pasha could not carry out his part of the plan, and it would seem that the same want of anything like a Commissariat prevented the other generals from performing their parts also.

Consequently Mustafa Pasha, seeing that nothing could be done, has returned here, and the Mushir, as I have already announced, has returned to Mostar suffering from an attack of appoplexy, probably brought on by the annoyance of seeing all his intentions and projects so completely frustrated.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 113.

Lord Bloomfield to Lord J. Russell.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 165.) *Vienna, April 11, 1861.*

My Lord,

COUNT RECHBERG mentioned to me yesterday that the Turkish blockading squadron had arrived in the Adriatic, and that he regretted to say some serious disputes had arisen between the two squadrons, but that instructions had been sent off by telegraph to the Austrian commanding officer, and that he hoped harmony would be re-established, which, he said, was most essential, at a moment when the cordial co-operation of the two Powers was necessary, in order to effect the common object in view, namely, to prevent the landing of filibustering expeditions.

His Excellency said that he was informed upon creditable authority that the inhabitants of Spitza had declared their independence of Turkey, and their annexation to Montenegro.

If this annexation is effected, it will prove a most important addition to the Montenegrin territory, and be the realization of the long-cherished wish of the population for the acquisition of a sea-port.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 114.

Lord Bloomfield to Lord J. Russell.—(Received April 15.

(No. 167.) *Vienna, April 11, 1861.*

My Lord,

HAVING heard that a considerable increase had been lately made to the military posts on the eastern frontier, I made an inquiry on the subject of Count Rechberg, and was informed by him that a brigade of lancers were on the march to Slavonia. In consequence of the disturbed state of Herzegovina and Bosnia, and the threatening of invasion by the Adriatic, his Excellency said it had been considered essential so to dispose the military resources of the Empire that they could be best available for every direction, as it was impossible to say from whence the danger was most imminent.

I understand that in addition to this brigade of lancers the force of artillery has also been considerably augmented in the direction of Slavonia, and it would seem, moreover, that the Austrian Government are very intent on their south-eastern frontier, for the Turkish Ambassador has mentioned to me that he had lately communicated to his Government an offer of military assistance from Austria in the event of the disturbances in Herzegovina continuing, but that he had received no answer from Constantinople.

This offer appears to me to have been made more as a proof of goodwill for the Porte than in the expectation that it would be accepted, for, according to Count Rechberg's assurances, it is far from the wish of Austria to move beyond her frontier under the most pressing circumstances, and that dangers were at her very door.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 115.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received April 20.)

(No. 208.) *Constantinople, April 9, 1861.*

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 190 of the 18th ultimo, inclosing the copy of an identic note addressed to the Porte by the Representatives of the Great Powers on the affairs of Montenegro, I have now the honour to transmit to your Lordship copy of the answer returned by the Porte to that communication, explaining the grounds on which the Turkish Government are compelled to decline the proposed appointment of a Mixed Commission to mediate between the contending parties on the frontier of Montenegro.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

Inclosure in No. 115.

Note Verbale.

LA Sublime Porte a pris en sérieuse considération le procès-verbal que leurs Excellences MM. les Représentants ont bien voulu lui communiquer relativement aux affaires Monténégrines.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan n'hésite pas à rendre hommage à la sincérité des intentions qui ont dicté cette démarche; il s'empresse d'y répondre avec cette confiance et cette franchise qu'elle mérite.

Leurs Excellences doivent être persuadées que leurs conseils ont toujours un très grand poids aux yeux des Ministres de Sa Majesté Impériale, et que le désir le plus ardent de leur auguste Maître est d'empêcher par tous les moyens possibles l'effusion de sang de ses sujets.

Depuis quatre ans les Monténégrins ont soutenu publiquement l'état de rébellion dans les districts qui avoisinent la Montagne et nos troupes y ont resté inactives précisément parceque nous espérions pouvoir ramener les insurgés sans recourir aux moyens extrêmes.

Une Commission composée des membres distingués du clergé des deux rites Chrétiens et des laïques vient de partir pour l'Herzégovine pour s'enquérir des besoins et de vœux des habitants des dits districts, et pour tâcher de les détromper. Encore aujourd'hui et malgré les derniers événements qui ont considérablement aggravé leur situation, la Sublime Porte est prête à les accueillir avec bienveillance, à considerer le passé comme non-avenu, et à redresser les griefs légitimes qu'ils peuvent avoir. Il semble que devant cette disposition si bienveillante et si sincère du Gouvernement Impérial; devant l'évidence de l'intérêt vital de la Sublime Porte de voir cette partie de l'Empire pacifiée un moment plustôt, il ne saurait exister aucun doute, et les insurgés ne peuvent pas alléguer la moindre crainte à cet égard.

La Sublime Porte espère, donc, que MM. les Représentants voudront bien apprécier avec leur justice habituelle les explications qui précèdent, ainsi que les motifs impérieux qui l'obligent à ne pouvoir partager leur opinion sur l'envoi d'une Commission Mixte, motifs que nous avons eu l'honneur d'exposer de vive voix à leurs Excellences.

Quant à la Commission pour régler définitivement l'affaire des terrains en litige, le

Gouvernement Impérial s'empressera de donner au Gouverneur de Scutari les instructions nécessaires pour se concerter là-dessus avec les Consuls des Grandes Puissances.

Le 23 Mars, 1861.

No. 116.

Lord Napier to Lord J. Russell.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 59. Confidential.)

St. Petersburgh, April 12, 1861.

My Lord,

I FOUND yesterday, on sounding Prince Gortchakow on the subject, that his Excellency was acquainted with the overture hazarded at Paris by the Ambassador of Austria for a military occupation of Herzegovina by that Power alluded to in Lord Cowley's despatch No. 486 of the 29th ultimo.

M. Thouvenel had written to the Duke de Montebello on the subject. According to the version which Prince Gortchakow gave me, M. de Thouvenel had in his reply called the attention of Prince Metternich to the fact that, when France dispatched her troops to another Turkish Province, she did so as the delegate of an European Conference, implying that Austria must, if her project were seriously urged, follow the same course. I asked him what he thought of the suggestion. He replied that he required some security as to the objects and effect of such an occupation; if it were merely proposed to re-establish Turkish authority without providing for the welfare of the Christians, he could not regard such an occupation with much favour. If the Christians in Turkey rose against the oppression of their rulers, the least we could do was not to take part against them. He might invoke the principle of non-intervention there which had been invoked elsewhere. An Austrian intervention did not inspire him with much confidence, but he did not regard the proposal as one of an official character.

I have, &c.

(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 117.

Lord Napier to Lord J. Russell.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 62.)

St. Petersburgh, April 12, 1861.

My Lord,

WHEN I had the honour of seeing the Emperor on my arrival, His Majesty expressed to me emphatically his desire to co-operate with England for the good of the Christians in Turkey, and complained of a want of zeal on the part of Her Majesty's Government in that respect. Prince Gortchakow also expressed his opinion that for the preservation and improvement of the Ottoman Government at least we might labour together in common.

I told the Emperor then, and I have constantly repeated to Prince Gortchakow, that we are most sincerely desirous to correct the abuses of Turkish administration, and that our power of acting with Russia for that purpose would be much facilitated if Her Majesty's Government and the English people were thoroughly persuaded that Turkey has no cause to apprehend danger or aggression from any external quarter.

On the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 28 of the 26th ultimo, I thought the moment had come for bringing Prince Gortchakow's good will to the test; I therefore waited upon his Excellency yesterday and imparted to him the substance of your Lordship's expressions. I told him that Her Majesty's Government discouraged the notion of any separate protectorate on the part of any single Power in Turkey, as well as the notion of intervention on behalf of any particular race or creed of the Sultan's subjects, but that they held that the amelioration of the condition of all classes should be pursued by the Powers in common, and that they would be most happy to co-operate with Russia in that sense. I added that your Lordship had conceived a sense of a want of frankness and participation on the part of the Russian Government in their Eastern policy.

The Prince here stopped me, and asked for examples of this alleged want of openness or confidence.

I replied by reading him the paragraph of your Lordship's instruction, in which you refer first to the refusal of Prince Labanoff to join Sir Henry Bulwer when the latter

proposed to assemble the Representatives of the Five Powers for the consideration of Christian grievances; and, secondly, to the independent movement of the Russian Minister at Constantinople without previous communication with Her Majesty's Government for an inquiry to be conducted under the presidency of a Commissioner of the Porte.

Prince Gortchakow demurred to the interpretation placed on his course by your Lordship in these instances. He called for the papers and showed me, in reference to the first, a portion of his correspondence with Prince Labanoff. From these documents it plainly appeared that, in declining to meet Sir Henry Bulwer's overture, Prince Labanoff had two grounds, first, that the inquiry proposed was to be based on reports of the English Consular authorities alone, collected without previous communication of this design to the other Representatives; and, secondly, because the Sardinian Minister had been already called to the contemplated Conference.

The first reason, Prince Gortchakow said, would not alone have been sufficient to justify Prince Labanoff in declining to take part in the proposed deliberation, though the inquiry should have comprehended information adduced from general sources, but the introduction of the Sardinian Minister was a positive bar. The relations of Sardinia were suspended with France and Austria, and he, for his part, held that in such an inquiry Sardinia had no claim to take a part. This inquiry had no direct reference to the Articles of the Peace of 1856, it was a general investigation prompted on general grounds in which the Great Powers and Turkey were exclusively concerned.

In his telegraphic reply to Prince Labanoff, Prince Gortchakow accordingly ratified the conduct of the former on the ground only of the proposed intervention of the Sardinian Minister. The subsequent written instruction addressed by Prince Gortchakow to Constantinople was to the same effect, and did not, I must allow, manifest any general want of inclination to co-operate with Her Majesty's Government or their Representative at the Porte.

In regard to the subsequent step taken by Russia at Constantinople, referred to by your Lordship, without previous concert with Her Majesty's Government, Prince Gortchakow's explanation was not satisfactory. He said, in general terms, that he had had no desire to withhold that step from Her Majesty's Government; if it had not been imparted to them earlier it was probably owing to the departure of the messenger for Constantinople having anticipated that of the courier for London, or because Baron Brunnow had not taken the necessary steps, or for some reason or other irrespective of any want of openness or cordiality. I did not press the question, for my purpose was rather to improve the future than to exasperate the past.

On the general question of co-operation and confidence, I said, however, that I thought it right to remark (though not desired to do so by your Lordship) that it was generally believed, and I thought with good reason, that on all questions he (Prince Gortchakow) combined and concerted confidentially, by anticipation and apart, with France before opening himself to England, and that such a course was not exactly calculated to create confidence.

Prince Gortchakow admitted this at once, and added, with some animation, that the French Government had "made an engagement" with him not to enter upon ("entamer") any great question of European international policy without previous communication with him. He had every reason to be satisfied, on the whole, with that engagement; it had been faithfully kept. Having said this, however, the Prince wavered, and added that he did not approve of the course pursued by France in all respects, and his Excellency even hinted at a want of clearness and sincerity. I threw in a few words on behalf of France, which caused the Prince to express his doubts of the policy of the Emperor more positively, but still in very general terms. The Prince, being now roused, expressed his apprehension that it would be difficult to co-operate heartily and usefully even at Constantinople with Her Majesty's Government, when the policy of England generally was so different from that of Russia everywhere. His Excellency, however, softening gradually, came to the conclusion that something might be done, and, on my request, agreed to write to Prince Labanoff, and desire him to place himself on a better footing with Sir Henry Bulwer in reference to acting on behalf of the Christian subjects of the Porte.

I waited on Prince Gortchakow again this afternoon by his desire, when his Excellency read me an instruction to Prince Labanoff, to be dispatched to-morrow, in which the views of Russia for the welfare of the Christian subjects of the Porte are reiterated, and a desire is expressed that this object may be pursued by a friendly concert between the Representatives. The Prince is also advised of the desire of Her Majesty's Government to co-operate sincerely with that of Russia in the sense referred

to, and he is directed in general terms to maintain a good understanding with his English colleague.

This may not be exactly what Her Majesty's Government desire, for the Prince still speaks of the Christian subjects of the Porte, and not of all creeds and classes, but still I hope that something may have been done to found a sincerer co-operation at Constantinople than that which has hitherto existed. In speaking of Sir Henry Bulwer, I am bound to add that Prince Gortchakow remarked there was a want of consistency in his conduct and opinions which would render a common course of action between him and Prince Labanoff very difficult. His Excellency also expressed his hope that Her Majesty's Government would make their views distinctly known to Sir Henry Bulwer, and would see them exactly carried out.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 118.

Lord Napier to Lord J. Russell.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 68. Most Confidential.)
St. Petersburgh, April 13, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE received from a very confidential source the accompanying despatch from Prince Labanoff to Prince Gortchakow, reporting the refusal of the Porte to permit an European Commission for the pacification of the Herzegovina.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

Inclosure in No. 118.

Prince Labanoff to Prince Gortchakow.

Pera, le $\frac{1}{13}$ *Mars*, 1861.

LA note identique que j'ai eu l'honneur de soumettre à votre Excellence par ma dépêche du $\frac{5}{17}$ Mars a été remise à la Porte par les cinq Représentants; elle n'a pas trouvé un accueil favorable auprès du Grand Turc, Aali Pacha m'avait déjà fait pressentir que la Porte accepterait difficilement la proposition de former une Commission appelée à exercer une intervention directe dans les rapports du Gouvernement Ottoman avec ses sujets insurgés.

Etant revenu hier sur cette question Aali Pacha m'a dit que notre proposition avait été soumise aux délibérations du Conseil des Ministres, que la Porte envisage l'insurrection de l'Herzégovine comme une affaire intérieure qui exclut toute ingérence étrangère: "D'ailleurs," ajouta-t-il, "en ce moment même il y a sur les lieux une Commission envoyée par la Porte et chargée de vouer tous ses efforts à la pacification de cette province; on ne peut ni nous accuser d'un manque de sollicitude à l'égard des populations, ni nous contester le droit, lorsque tous les moyens de conciliation auront été épuisés, de recourir à la force pour réprimer l'insurrection."

Quant à la deuxième partie de notre proposition concernant la délimitation des propriétés privées en litige sur la frontière de l'Albanie, Aali Pacha me dit que des ordres allaient être envoyés pour hâter l'application des mesures qui avaient été recommandées à la Porte l'année dernière par les cinq Représentants.

Dans ma réponse je m'appliquai à démontrer une fois de plus l'insuffisance des expédients auxquels on avait eu recours jusqu'ici pour calmer les esprits dans l'Herzégovine; les promesses solennelles faites par les Commissaires du Sultan n'ont jamais été accomplies, il est donc naturel que les habitants aient perdu toute confiance dans les assurances qui peuvent leur être prodiguées; les collisions sanglantes se renouvellent et menacent de prendre des proportions qui compromettraient la tranquilité générale de l'Empire; pour donner une valeur réelle aux engagements que la Porte contracterait envers les populations, l'intervention de l'Europe est indispensable, elle seule peut encore arrêter un mouvement dont il est difficile de prévoir dès à présent l'extension et les conséquences.

J'ai pu me convaincre que la Porte était fermement décidé à opposer un refus pur et simple à notre demande; mes collègues ont reçu la même réponse, cependant nous nous

reservons de revenir avec insistance sur notre proposition. M. Lavalette a reçu de Paris un télégramme d'après lequel le Cabinet des Tuileries approuve entièrement son langage, et l'informe que le Gouvernement Britannique a également exprimé son adhésion à la marche que nous avons adoptée.

J'ai, &c.
(Signé) LOBANOW.

No. 119.

Mr. Longworth to Lord J. Russell.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 32.)
Belgrade, April 15, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith inclosed to your Lordship the copy of a despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, No. 22, dated Belgrade, April 15th, 1861, in which I inform his Excellency that a certain M. Outrebon, an unavowed agent of the French Government, has just left Belgrade on a mission to Bosnia and the Herzegovina.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. A. LONGWORTH.

Inclosure in No. 119.

Mr. Longworth to Sir H. Bulwer.

Belgrade, April 15, 1861.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that M. Outrebon, the French agent whom I have repeatedly had occasion to mention in my late despatches, left Belgrade on the 13th instant for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

I understand that this gentleman is *en route* about to visit Loznitza, the place from which the Bosniac petitions were forwarded to the Consular body at Belgrade.

The mission of M. Outrebon, whom, although unavowed, I know positively to be an agent of the French Government, and who has been for some months past engaged by the Russian Consulate here in writing articles in several papers hostile to the Turks, is not likely to be of a nature in any way favourable to the Porte.

M. Outrebon is accompanied on his journey by a Mr. Nangel, an Irishman, who is also a correspondent for various newspapers.

He served in the Garibaldian legion under General Türr, and is now on his road to join the revolutionists who have lately arrived in Montenegro. I am informed by him that about 2,000 men, chiefly Hungarians, are now in the mountains of Montenegro, and that more are daily expected there. He also told me that it was the intention of General Türr, if possible, to break through Bosnia by Yeni-Bazar, and from thence to pass through Servia into Hungary.

With such a force as the one above-mentioned, it is not likely that he would be able to effect much, but should he be joined by 10,000 or 12,000 men, there is no doubt that the Montenegrins would be greatly encouraged to carry on their aggressive movements against the Turks, and that the province of Herzegovina and, indeed, the adjoining provinces, will be kept in a state of great disorder and alarm.

Such being the case, the Porte would be compelled to keep on foot a larger army than would otherwise be required for the purpose of observation on the frontiers of Montenegro. But this is, perhaps, not the only difficulty that the Turkish Government might have to contend with, for Austria, seeing that her own provinces would be endangered from such a state of things, might think it necessary, or, at all events, bring it forward as a plea for marching troops into Bosnia and Servia.

Would it not, therefore, be advisable for every precaution to be taken to prevent any additional reinforcements joining the foreign force (whatever may be its numbers) at present assembled in Montenegro?

Could this be accomplished, the hands of the Turkish General in the Herzegovina would then be more free, and the Porte would have the advantage of finding more troops at her disposal to send to the Danube or any other place where their presence might suddenly be required.

I have, &c.
(Signed J. A. LONGWORTH.

No. 120.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received April 22.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, April 22, 1861, 2 P.M.*

NICHSICH, on the Herzegovina frontier, on the point of falling into the hands of rebels and Montenegrins, and massacre of 4,000 Turks threatened. Representatives order Consuls at Mostar to the spot, and Consuls at Scutari to Cettigné; the first, with a view to obtain an armistice, if possible, and, if not, a suitable capitulation; the second, with a view to obtain the withdrawal of Montenegrins.

Omer Pasha will start as soon as possible with orders that seem most conciliatory and satisfactory.

I would have held still stronger language to Prince of Montenegro, but should have been in dissidence with French, Russian, and Prussian colleagues.

No. 121.

Consul Sir F. Gilbert to Lord J. Russell.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 13.) *Scutari, April 6, 1861.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship a copy of a note I have received from Abdi Pasha, the Governor of this district, informing me that six Ottoman steamers have arrived off this coast, which will be declared in a state of blockade on the 1st of April, o.s., from Durazzo to the Austrian boundary. This step has been taken at Constantinople, I presume, partly at the desire of the Austrian Internuncio, who lately telegraphed to the Consulate here that fifty Garibaldians had landed at Spizza (near Antivari), and had gone up to Montenegro; and partly from the fears of the Turkish authorities lest the Prince of Montenegro might be induced, by returning Hungarian and other refugees, to make a diversion in their favour by fomenting or aiding an insurrection in Herzegovina, from which district we hear most alarming accounts. Whatever may happen hereafter, I beg to assure your Lordship that up to the present moment no debarkment has taken place on this coast, nor have the telegraphic wires been cut; in short, the whole account is a pure fiction, and I suppose that what is intended is that these steamers are to keep a look out on the coast in connection with the Austrian vessels which now cruise down as far as the Turkish frontier.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. H. GILBERT.

Inclosure in No. 121.

Abdi Pacha to Consul Sir F. Gilbert.

(Traduction.)

M. le Consul, *Scutari, 26 Ramazan, 1277 (6 Avril, 1861).*

J'AI l'honneur de vous informer que, conformément à une disposition de la Sublime Porte, six vapeurs Ottomans, sous le commandement du Colonel Dilaver Bey, sont arrivés dans ces parages pour mettre en état de blocus les côtes de Durazzo jusqu'aux confins Autrichiens, et pour visiter les batiments qui voudraient s'approcher de ces côtes, situés en dedans de la ligne de blocus. Ce blocus sera activé en commençant du 1er Avril, style Grecque, de l'an 1861, et de cette époque seront mis en vigueur les règlements relatifs au blocus.

Agréez, &c.

(Signé) ABDI.

No. 122.

Consul Holmes to Lord J. Russell.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 47.) *Bosna-Serai, April 11, 1861.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship copy of a despatch, No. 18 and its inclosures, which I have just received from Mr. Vice-Consul Zohrab, by which your

Lordship will perceive that, as indicated in my previous despatches Nos. 42 and 43, the Turks having entirely failed in coercing the rebels, are now, as they have hitherto done under similar circumstances during the last three or four years, again endeavouring to persuade them to lay down their arms, accompanying their exhortations with menaces, which the insurgents have learnt to regard with contempt.

The proclamation announces that a Commission composed of Christian as well as Turkish members is ready to hear their grievances. It exhorts them to lay down their arms and to return quietly to their allegiance, promising them every consideration for their demands; that hitherto force has not been employed against them, but that in the case of this last appeal to them being disregarded, they will have nothing to expect but severe punishment.

Ismail Pasha has in no way distinguished himself in the Herzegovina. He has been baffled, as were his predecessors, in his military operations, and he is not likely to meet with greater success in his negotiations. He has exactly followed the course which has been hitherto adopted, and which has hitherto always failed; and persons are not wanting in the Herzegovina who take infinite pains to make it clear to the insurgents that the Turks only treat with them after having in vain endeavoured to punish them, and who try to prevent every chance of a pacific arrangement.

It is certainly much to be desired that the Commissioners make an intelligible and faithful report of the state of affairs in the Herzegovina. The impression at Constantinople that the whole affair is a mere trifle is not quite consistent with the fact of the number and heavy expense of the troops employed during the last three years in unsuccessful attempts to restore tranquillity; but it has been, perhaps, produced by the reports of successive governors and generals anxious to preserve their places and reputations at the expense of the truth; and also by their endeavours to counteract the exaggerated statements of those interested in making matters appear even worse than they really are.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure in No. 122.

Vice-Consul Zohrab to Consul Holmes.

Sir, *Mostar, April 7, 1861.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a letter addressed to me by Ismail Pasha, inclosing Turkish translation of a proclamation which has been issued by his Excellency to the rebels.

From the tenor of these documents it would appear that this will be the last attempt on the part of the Government at a pacific settlement of the Montenegrin frontier, and if it is unsuccessful force will be resorted to.

The experience I have already had of the success which Turkish promises and proclamations have hitherto met with the rebels, makes me feel almost certain that this effort will not lead to the desired result; it will, I fear, be regarded as a fresh attempt at deception, and also as a further proof of the weakness of the Turks and the inability of the Government to restore order by force of arms.

The proclamation is viewed by my Russian and Austrian colleagues with dissatisfaction; they consider it as vague and holding forth no assurance of redress of grievances, and even as insulting to the people to whom it is addressed. How the document can be so construed I cannot, however, imagine.

I regret to state that the alarming illness of the Mushir has prevented the Commission entering on its duties. The attention of the Commissioners is, in the meantime, directed towards the collection of information on the condition of the country.

I have had several conversations with the different members of the Commission, and I find that the majority entertain one opinion, that the Herzegovinian question is surrounded by many and serious difficulties, and that, if a satisfactory settlement can be attained, it will only be after much labour and time.

I am assured that at Constantinople the Herzegovinian difficulty is looked upon as "une chose de rien," which can be settled easily. The Ministers, I am told, have not an idea of the serious turn the revolt has taken, nor are they aware of the influence which events here will have on the Empire. The Commissioners left Constantinople under the impression that their duties would consist, in the first instance, in merely reducing to obedience and order a small unimportant isolated district; they are now persuaded that

upon the issue of the struggle will depend the existence of many, if not all, of the provinces in European Turkey as Turkish possessions. It remains to be seen whether the Commissioners will be able to make their opinions understood and appreciated in their full importance at the Porte.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAS. ZOLRAB.

No 123.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

Foreign Office, April 23, 1861.

(Telegraphic.)
I APPROVE your conduct in the affairs of Montenegro, as reported in your telegram of the 22nd instant.

No. 124.

Lord J. Russell to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 101.) *Foreign Office, April* 24, 1861.
My Lord,
I INCLOSE, for your information, copies of two despatches from Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh relative to the affairs of Turkey and of Herzegovina.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 125.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 260.) *Foreign Office, April* 25, 1861.
Sir,
I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches† from Her Majesty's Ambassadors at St. Petersburgh and Vienna respecting the disturbed state of affairs in Montenegro and the Herzegovina, and the consequent movements of Austrian troops.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 126.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 279.) *Constantinople, April* 16, 1877.
My Lord,
THE affairs of the Herzegovina have become even more serious and alarming, since not only does it appear that the Montenegrins and Vassovichlees attacked and burnt the villages of Luzelzirs, Bologh, Rodochif, and Zoban, in the district of Bihor, Sandjak of Yeni-Bazaar, but the Bashi-Bozouks, acting on behalf of the Turks, have committed depredations in other villages which have hitherto been friendly to the Turks, and plundered a monastery. With respect to the depredations of the Bashi-Bazouks in the villages, I should judge from the advices I have received and those which have been received by my colleagues, that these are of an exaggerated character; and with regard to the monastery, Dervish Pasha had the culprits seized and what he could get of the plunder restored.

But the fears I have always entertained, that if the struggle continued, frightful scenes of plunder and murder would be perpetrated, are confirmed.

A conference, therefore, took place at the British Embassy yesterday, at which the Representatives of the Great Powers were present, and we agreed to invite Aali Pasha to meet us and consider conjointly the state of affairs in the disturbed provinces, which is the more alarming, since the Christian population of Austria is favourable to the insurgents, and the Austrian Government itself will be each day more embarrassed by their conduct.

* Nos. 116 and 117.

† Nos. 113, 114, and 116.

It is difficult to say before the meeting takes place what may be decided upon, but the plan which I have chalked out for myself, and which I believe my colleagues will follow, is that the Representatives of the Great Powers at Constantinople should send a Commission to the spot where the Turkish Commission is assembled.

Its first object should be to act with the Turkish Commissioners in endeavouring to procure an armistice. The second in inducing the revolted districts to accept the conditions which the Porte may offer, providing they are reasonable (which I believe they are), and that the Porte assures us that they will be duly executed. Without some security of this kind the insurgents will not trust to any promise made to them by the Ottoman authorities; with it, they will probably lay down their arms; and the foreign Governments will not in this case have done more than further the success of the propositions which the Ottoman Government will itself have made.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

No. 127.

Consul Sir E. Gilbert to Lord J. Russell.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 14.)
My Lord, *Scutari, April* 7, 1861.
IN accordance with your Lordship's despatch No. 2 of January 28, 1861, I availed myself of the absence of the other Consuls and Dragomans from Cettigné to proceed to Montenegro viâ Antivari, it being impossible to take the shorter route by the lake on account of the strong north wind which usually prevails at this season.

At Antivari I was detained a day by the non-arrival of the steamer, and heard a most singular tale from an inhabitant of Spizza, viz., that four delegates from the Prince of Montenegro had come to their village to ask if they would join in an attack upon the Turks. (I presume Ingemille or some other village near Antivari). They refused, giving as a reason that when the Montenegrins retired to their mountains they (the Spizziani) would be left at the mercy of the Turks; they were then asked if they would fire on the Montenegrins in the event of their passing through or near the village of Spizza, to which they replied they would not.

At Cattaro I learnt that there were about 8,000 troops in the forts and in the town itself, with 300 guns, also three ships in port, and a number of small gun-boats were shortly expected.

Having with much difficulty procured animals I began the ascent of the mountains, and at the Montenegro frontier was met by two of the Prince's body-guard, and a groom with a good stout horse for myself. The ascent was difficult and at times dangerous, being a simple narrow track over rocks covered with deep snow, which commenced falling afresh ever since I passed the frontier; almost the entire surface of the country, as far as I could see, to within a mile or two of Cettigné, appearing to be barren rocks, with little wood or vegetation, but I must say that wherever a piece of soil of only a quarter-of-an-acre or less could be found, it was sure to be cultivated.

After a ride of six hours I arrived at Cettigné, where the Prince received me in a most cordial and hospitable manner, apologized for not receiving me into the Palace on account of the smallness of the accommodation in it (his father and mother live with him), and assigned me appartments in his father's house, which was close by, and engaged me to breakfast, or rather lunch, and dine with him daily during my stay.

Cettigné is a mere straggling village, built without any order or regularity. It contains the ancient monastery or strong-hold of the former Vladikas, also the famous tower on which the heads of the slaughtered Turks used to be exhibited. The Palace is a very recent edifice—a long low barrack-looking building, raised only one story from the ground. It is substantially built of solid well-cut hard stone; so likewise are the houses of the villagers, with doors and windows as well made as in any part of the world, effectually keeping out cold, snow, and rain. I front of the Palace there is a battery of twelve light brass guns—a present from the Emperor of Austria—well suited for mountain warfare. There are about sixty more in different parts of the country, but not mounted. I was told that the gunners are tolerably expert.

The customs and manners of the Prince and his people are simple and patriarchal; his usual mode of living is very modest, about equal to that of a gentleman in England in easy circumstance; no display of plate or glass. It was most unfortunate that it snowed the whole time I was at Cettigné, and the cold was intense, for I should have wished to have seen more of this people and their country; moreover, I intended to have

gone round by the Bielopávlovichi and the Piperi, where, I learnt from the Prince, there are quantities of fine timber, both hard and soft, suitable for naval purposes. The roads, however, and the country generally, were in such a state that I was forced to give up the design for the present, but I hope at a future day, with your Lordship's permission, to inspect these forests, for should the timber prove to be such as represented, it might be most valuable as regards England; there being several large rivers, such as the Zeta and the Moratcha, which intersect those districts and flow into the Lake of Scutari, from whence the timber might easily be floated to the mouth of the Bojana, for which purpose the Prince stated that he should be most willing to enter into an engagement for any amount with the British Admiralty.

I took an early opportunity of mentioning the story I had heard at Antivari; he assured me there was no foundation for it, as far as he was concerned, adding, that the people of Spizza had repeatedly requested to be included in the Montenegro territory, but he had hitherto steadily refused. With respect to the insurgents who had beaten and driven back the Turkish troops at Sutorina and other places in Herzegovina, and who are repeatedly called Montenegrins in the newspapers, he disclaimed them altogether, stating also that they had several times sent delegates to him, but he had replied that they were rayahs, *i.e.*, subjects of the Sultan and not Montenegrins, though of the same religion and probably origin, and that he would have nothing to do with them. He begged me to assure my Government that he had no desire for war or discord with any of his neighbours; he sincerely wished for peace in order to improve his country and his people. More schools are required. He is projecting, with the assistance of his people, a carriage-road from Cattaro to Cettigné and thence to Ricka, a village situated on a river of the same name which falls into the Lake of Scutari, and navigable for the largest boats (loudra) up to that village, where he has built a fine long quay in front of the village and a stone bridge of two arches for crossing the river at all periods of the year.

The population of Montenegro is about 120,000; they are a fine, tall, active race, and seem particularly attached to the Prince, to whom they pay on all occasions very great, but not servile, respect.

There are altogether eight schools in Montenegro; these the Prince wishes to increase in number and usefulness, and to procure masters of the Italian and Selave languages, as well as for other branches of education. I visited the school at Cettigné, the master of which had lately left Scutari, where the schools, hitherto kept up by the Austrian Government, have lately been reduced; amongst others, I saw twenty boys who are clothed, fed, and educated solely at the expense of the Prince, and I was pleased to see several grown-up young men in the classes who had already fought in their country's defence.

The revenue is about 12,000*l.* a-year, in addition to which the Prince receives 9,000 golden ducats from Russia.

The chief exports are bear, wolf, fox, deer, ox, sheep and goat skins, dye-wood, wool, a few sheep and goats, and dried fish, especially of a species of sprat called "senranzi," which is taken in large quantities in the month of January, and salted and smoked both for home consumption and exportation.

There is a solid well-built powder depôt near Cettigné, the manufactory for the supply of which is for safety situated apart in a valley concealed by hills near Ricka. The Prince assured me he could easily bring 20,000 men into the field, and probably 5,000 or 6,000 more if necessary, in a very brief space of time, *i.e.*, as soon as the signals could be made and the men have time to arrive at the rendevous.

The prison, which is close to the Palace and Senate House, seldom has a tenant except for the detention of a disobedient subject; crime is almost unknown. The following circumstances which occurred whilst I was at table with the Prince and his family is a good illustration of Montenegrin character:—

The Prince had threatened to shoot anyone found guilty of cutting off noses and similar mutilations in the battle-field. After the late fight near Spuz the Pasha of Scutari complained to the Prince that one of the soldiers had had his nose cut off, and sought redress for the outrage. The answer returned was that the perpetrator had been afterwards killed in the same fight. Subsequently, the Prince discovered the culprit, a lad about 17 or 18, to be alive; it appeared that it was his first fight; he wished to prove his manhood to his family, and in consequence committed the savage act. He was brought to Cettigné, and locked up in the prison, and the sentence passed on him by the Prince was that he should not be shot, but he should be paraded on a donkey through his native district, with a placard attached setting forth his crime. This so galled the lad, that when the keeper of the prison came in with his food, he seized one of the keeper's

pistols and shot himself; luckily, the ball only passed through his shoulder, and there seemed to be no doubt that he would recover.

There are an immense number of churches (to each of which one priest at least is attached), these the Prince is gradually reducing in number, as well as the priests; he intends to leave a number of the churches as mere chapels for occasional use, and thereby create an ecclesiastical fund for the better payment of the clergy.

With regard to foreign Powers, the Prince stated that he and his people were on very good terms with their neighbours the Austrians, that they were indebted to them for many and valuable services, but they were too near, and too powerful to be sought as safe protectors; moreover, there were continual petty disputes, and oppressions exercised by the Austrian police, Customs, and other parties in brief authority on the frontier.

Russia, in the absence of other Powers, must always have a certain influence in Montenegro, in consequence of the similarity of race, language, hatred of the Turks, and religion especially, the Montenegrin Archimandrite being invariably consecrated in Russia, and also from the ancient intercourse of the two people, though the Prince seemed to hint that a people subject to too much Russian influence or protection was apt to degenerate in character and become mere tools in the hands of the Russian Government for its advantages and purposes. He distinctly repeated several times that what he earnestly prayed for was the moral protectorate of some powerful nation distantly situated geographically, such as either England or France.

He complained bitterly of the want of a sea-port, as his people had to buy every foreign article at an exorbitant price either at Cattaro or Scutari; at either of which places they were liable to be insulted, more especially on the lake of Scutari, where they had to pull up alongside of the Turkish guard-boat to have their loudras examined before they were allowed to pass. The inhabitants of Spizza, near Antivari, are chiefly of the Greek religion. They formerly belonged to Montenegro, and would most probably return to it if they dared, and he thought it very hard that the port of Spizza should be within half-an-hour's walk of his frontier or thereabouts and he was not allowed to make use of it. He offered to give up the half of the Kutchi, a fine fertile district near Podgoritza, which belongs to Montenegro, to the Turks, provided they would give him the port of Spizza in exchange. By this arrangement there is no doubt that the Turks would gain the whole of a valuable territory (of which they now only possess the half) for a port of which they make no use whatever, and a district which is the cause of continual trouble to them.

In the morning of the day on which I left Cettigné, the Prince said to me, please to tell Abdi Pasha with my compliments that I desire peace above all things, if he will only keep his people within their own frontier, I will do the same by mine, and transgressors on either side must be punished, but if the Turks prefer war, let him give me due notice as I would do, and have already done. We Montenegrins do not fear the Turks in the least, let them come in what numbers they will, at the same time, bid him recollect that our co-religionist in Herzegovina, Bosnia, Servia, &c., are constantly looking to me, and I am well aware that slight encouragement on my part in the present crisis of political affairs, would raise the greater portion of those provinces against the Turks, and most probably in such a manner that they would be lost to the Ottoman Empire for ever.

He expressed his gratitude very warmly for the hospitality and protection I had afforded to his cousin, Captain Petro Pejovich, whom he had sent to Scutari with a letter for the Pasha, and, for fear of accidents, I removed from the hotel to my own house, when the French and other Consuls distinctly told him (Petro Pejovich) that they would not guarantee his life since the tidings had arrived of the massacre of the Turkish troops near Spuz. He thanked me for my visit, and hoped I would renew it soon when the weather was more favourable, and finally requested my acceptance of a Montenegro cross, which I declined as politely as I could, stating that British subjects were not permitted to accept decorations from foreign Princes without permission from their Government; he still urged me to accept it, or at least to ask permission to do so; I promised I would mention the subject to your Lordship, but I told him at the same time that I feared the application would be useless, and we then separated.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. H. GILBERT.

No. 128.

Consul Holmes to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received April* 29.)

(No. 50.) *Bosna-Serai, April* 17, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a despatch of the 13th instant, received from Mr. Zohrab, regarding Nichsich.

Last night I received the following telegram from that gentleman:—

"*April* 16.—Nichsich reduced to last extremity; if not succoured immediately it must fall. Population, more than 4,000, will be massacred without doubt. Turks cannot relieve it. Must be done by allies by immediate orders to agents to oblige Montenegrins and rebels to withdraw. Dervish expected to-night. I telegraph to-morrow final decision of authorities; in mean time first steps must be taken by allies without moment's loss."

I have this morning telegraphed as follows to Sir Henry Bulwer:—

"*April* 17.—From Mostar.—Nichsich reduced to last extremity. Population, above 4,000, will probably be all massacred. Turks cannot relieve Nichsich. Can anything be done by European Powers to prevent this calamity?"

I need make no other observation on these matters than that it is difficult to suppose that if the Turks had the power of relieving the place they would abandon so many of their subjects and co-religionists to starvation, and the ultimate chance of being all massacred by the Montenegrins. It is one thing to treat rebels with lenity, but quite a different matter to allow them to besiege towns and massacre the inhabitants without opposition; and I conceive that the facts indicated in Mr. Zohrab's despatch, and, indeed, all the facts connected with the revolt, are entirely incompatible with Turkish official declarations.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure in No. 128.

Vice-Consul Zohrab to Consul Holmes.

Mostar, April 13, 1861.

Sir,

HAVING received from various quarters reports that the inhabitants of Nichsich were suffering severely from want of provisions, and seeing no indication of any attempt on the part of the military to relieve the beleaguered town, I considered it my duty to appeal to the authorities on the subject.

With this object in view I waited on Vassif Pasha, on Shefik Bey, and on Ibrahim Bey. I laid before these officers a resumé of the information I had collected, and I stated my opinion as to the events which would follow on the fall of that town.

I said that they must be as fully aware as myself that the surrender of Nichsich would lay the entire province open to the Montenegrins, that all the other frontier towns must necessarily and immediately fall, that the revolt, whose gradual extension the troops have not been able to check, would at once extend through the entire Greek population, and that the fall of the Turkish Power in this province would be an almost certain and speedy consequence.

Looking at the position of Nichsich, surrounded by a band of cold-blooded, barbarous wretches, who would assuredly massacre the entire population if it fell into their hands, humanity demanded its speedy relief.

The war carried on by the rebels was one of extermination, and I felt persuaded that not one of the people of Nichsich, against whom the Montenegrins have long entertained an intense hatred, would be spared; but, I added, I hardly thought Europe would exonerate the Turks from all responsibility in such a calamity when the fact became known that a town had been permitted to fall after a protracted siege into the hands of a ruthless, exasperated band of peasants, almost in the presence of a Turkish army. The Turks would, I feared, be looked upon as responsible, and, as such, would be blamed.

The justice of my argument was admitted. They said that many circumstances had hitherto prevented the army proceeding to the relief of Nichsich, but that the necessary

arrangements were now completed, and Dervish Pasha would, in a few days, march to its assistance; that the immediate wants of the inhabitants had been relieved by the opportune arrival of some grain which an Austrian merchant had undertaken to convey from Albania, through Montenegro, to Nichsich, he having received permission to do so from Prince Nicola on paying a certain toll or duty.

They felt that the case was urgent and grave; they, however, hoped that Dervish Pasha's efforts would be crowned with success; but, at the same time, they quite agreed with me that the Porte ought to be made fully aware of the importance and peril of Nichsich, so that, should Dervish Pasha fail, other measures for its relief might be adopted without delay; and to this end they requested me to inform my Government also.

I have in my despatches reported the position of Nichsich. I allude to it once more in the hope that the Government will be induced to adopt measures to terminate this state of terrible suspense.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAS. ZOHRAB.

No. 129.

Consul Holmes to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received April* 29.)

(No. 51.) *Bosna-Serai, April* 17, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that on the 14th instant I received from Sir Henry Bulwer the following telegram:—

"Is it true that five Christian villages, not in revolt, have been burnt or plundered by Bashi-Bazouks, and that the monastery of Rosienez has also been pillaged? Answer by telegraph."

I immediately communicated with Mr. Vice-Consul Zohrab, and, on information received from that gentleman, replied as follows:—

"From Mostar I learn that Turks went to Petrovich (?) to reconnoitre, were attacked by rebels, and burnt the village in the fight. Party of Bashi-Bazouks quitted main body, and partially plundered monastery. On information from its priest Dervish Pasha sent cavalry, seized culprits, retook part of plunder; culprits under arrest. Information regarding other villages contradictory. I have ordered Zohrab to proceed to the spot, if possible, and ascertain facts."

I have now the honour to transmit copy of a despatch on this subject from Mr. Zohrab, inclosing a long account of the matter in question, communicated by Shefik Bey.

As I learnt from Mr. Zohrab that there are difficulties at present in the way of his reaching the villages alluded to, which are also much further from Mostar than I had imagined, and as, moreover, the matter has been referred to the Commission for examination, and the priest and others have been invited to Mostar, I have since desired him to await the result of the inquiry. If no satisfactory or reliable details of what has happened should issue from the statements of the parties in opposition, it will then be time, if necessary, that Mr. Zohrab proceed to the villages themselves to obtain information.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure 1 in No. 129.

Vice-Consul Zohrab to Consul Holmes.

Mostar, April 14, 1861.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a statement of events which have taken place during the past few days in the rebel districts, communicated to me by Shefik Bey.

The statement is so clear in itself that I shall not enter into details on the subjects it contains.

The document describes an attack made by the rebels on a reconnoitring party at the village of Petrovich, in Bagnani, and details an act of brigandage committed by some Bashi-Bazouks on the convent of Kosyerevo.

In connection with this act you will perceive that Dervish Pasha arrested the offenders, and restored part of the stolen property. I have to add that the Commission have requested Dervish Pasha to send the prisoners to Mostar to be tried, and to invite Theodosius to come also to witness against them.

Shefik Bey proceeds to give the details of the murder of three Moslem shepherds, and of an attack on a point near Nichsich, which resulted in the repulse of the rebels, and the loss to the besieged of about 250 head of cattle.

My Russian and Austrian colleagues state that the following villages have been burnt by the Turks :—Bilatovich, Koroonitzs, Balka, Petrovich, Miroosha, Bratschanovichi, and Delcucha. In regard to six of these villages, I learn that they were to within a short period tranquil, but that Dervish Pasha, seeing lately some suspicious movements amongst them, warned the inhabitants to be quiet once or twice, but this not having the desired effect, he occupied the villages, not, however, before the inhabitants had fled and joined the rebels. It is probable that some huts in them have been fired.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JAS. ZOHRAB.

Inclosure 2 in No. 129.

Statement by Shefik Bey

(Translation.)

To Mr. Zohrab, British Vice-Consul, Mostar.

THE Chiliarch (Major, or Chef-de-bataillon), Kyazim Bey, who, with the mission of inquiring into the circumstances of the defensive measures which had taken place at Platowicha not long since, into the quantities of goods and cattle carried off from divers places, and into the truth or otherwise of certain accounts, according to which the priest Simon had been wounded, has come from those parts, was invited to appear before the Commission, and being interrogated, the substance of his depositions is as follows :—

A large number of malefactors from among the people of Montenegro and Uskoks had assembled in the district of Benan, and were preparing to carry their depredations into a certain quarter. This having been reported to the Pasha Commanding-in-chief, he, acting according to the rules of military tactics, sent forward companies of regulars to make a reconnaissance, and the next day went thither himself with a certain force of irregulars, and directed them against the village of Petrovich, situated near the district mentioned above.

No sooner had the irregulars arrived there than a number of malefactors, to the amount of about 200, who were therein, posted themselves in several empty houses, thatched with rye-straw and surrounded with walls, from whence they commenced to fight. After a combat of about half-an-hour's duration, the attack made by the troops being found irresistible, the malefactors took to flight. About the same time the straw with which the houses were thatched took fire and was burnt.

During the fight a certain number of the malefactors were engaged in driving the cattle they had with them towards the church (or monastery) inhabited by Priest Theodosius. This circumstance was perceived by a certain Chieftain of the irregulars, Adam by name, and his brother Musa. These two, taking about fifty irregulars with them, set out in chase; but, as they were advancing, they ascertained that the malefactors had reached in safety the banks of the River Trebinicha. For this reason, and because nothing remained to be done, the Chief collected the other troops also, and was returning, when, assistance having been received by the malefactors, they also came back and followed the troops, who replied to their fire.

When they arrived abreast of a hill, situated at about half way, the malefactors numbered about 1,500 men. There was no resource left, therefore, but to charge them, and this was crowned with success. The charge was accompanied by a loss on our side of one corporal killed, one irregular and four regular privates wounded, while fourteen were killed among the malefactors, who then took to flight, and our troops returned.

But, according to what the Bey had latterly heard, a body of about fifty irregulars, who had proceeded to the church, as above mentioned, had entered it, and, according to a list presented to the Pasha Commanding-in-chief by the above-named Theodosius,

took away property and cattle of his to the value of 3,000 or 4,000 piastres. It was, however, currently reported that the cattle so taken did not belong to him, but to the peasantry, and that his own cattle were on the other side of the frontier (?).

Furthermore, when the Pasha heard of these proceedings, he caused the greater number of those concerned to be put under arrest; he also took away from them all the property and cattle they were possessed of, and sent all back, giving orders at the same time for the recovery of the remainder.

In regard to the Priest Simon, when Kyazim went to Platowicha the priest was there. So much so, that the two were in company for several days, after which, on a sudden, and without any apparent cause, the Priest fled to the district of Benan. The next day his family, with their own hands, set fire to their dwelling, and went away after him. He is now still in Benan, and all that Kyazim Bey knows or has heard relating to him amounts to what is here given. The tenor of a despatch formerly received from the Pasha Commanding-in-chief, and relating to this subject, is also confirmatory of the above statement by Kyazim Bey.

Again, on Monday, the 21st of last month (Ramaxan, 1st April, 1861), the malefactors of Benan came to a hill in the vicinity of the village of Okolshta, and slew causelessly three Mussulman shepherds they met there. They cut off their heads, and carried them away, besides cutting their bodies to pieces. The troops left in reserve in the place, having heard of the occurrence, set out in pursuit of the malefactors, but failed to overtake them. Such we learn to be the case from despatches received the day before yesterday by his Excellency the Generalissimo from the Pasha Commanding-in-chief.

On the 25th of that month (5th April) the people of Montenegro and the inhabitants of Piva and Derubnak, to the number of about 3,000 malefactors, came to the Balkan (woody mountain or pass) of Tudik, half-an-hour's distance from the town of Nichsich. They there attacked the Pandurs, who had been stationed for the protection of the shepherds and flocks of the inhabitants of Nichsich, which were feeding in the pasturages of the villages Vragahuka and Lubezha there situated. They carried off the cattle in the sight of the townspeople; whereupon four companies of Imperial regulars, about 500 irregulars, and a number of the inhabitants, set out for the scene of pillage, attacked the marauders, and engaged in a combat which lasted from the third until the eighth hour of the day, when the malefactors took to flight. Six of the townsmen fell in the battle, and twelve more were wounded, but a considerable portion of the cattle was recovered. The losses on the side of the malefactors are as yet unknown; but a Montenegro decoration found on the head of one of the slain left behind by them has been sent hither. This is what we gather from a despatch received yesterday from his Excellency the Generalissimo, and which we hasten to communicate to you.

(Signed) SHEFIK.

4th Shewaal, 1277 (*April* 14, 1861).

[In the original the indication of each speaker or actor is extremely confused throughout, Mr. Zohrab's personal knowledge being apparently relied upon to make necessary distinctions.

J. W. REDHOUSE.

London, May 1, 1861.]

No. 130.

Consul Holmes to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received April* 29.)

(No. 52.)

My Lord, *Bosna-Serai, April* 17, 1861.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a despatch which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador informing his Excellency that my French colleague here had given me a copy of a note presented to the Porte as the result of a Conference held by the Representatives of the European Powers on the subject of affairs in the Herzegovina, and also with a copy of the Porte's reply, and making some observations on the statements contained in that reply.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure in No. 130.

Consul Holmes to Sir H. Bulwer.

Bosna-Serai, April 13, 1861.

Sir,

MY French colleague has had the kindness to furnish me with a copy of a note, dated the 10th March, which was presented to the Porte as the result of a Conference held by the Representatives of the European Powers on the subject of affairs in the Herzegovina, and also with a copy of the Porte's reply.

Not having been favoured by your Excellency with any information regarding the Conference on the official documents in question, should the following remarks on the Porte's reply be considered superfluous, the importance of the subject will, I trust, secure for me your Excellency's indulgence.

The Turkish note states:—

"Depuis quatre ans les Monténégrins ont soutenu publiquement l'état de rébellion dans les districts qui avoisinent la Montagne, et nos troupes y ont resté inactives précisément parceque nous espérions pouvoir ramener les insurgés sans recourir aux moyens extrêmes."

Your Excellency will have gathered from my late despatches a fact which is important to a true appreciation of affairs in the Herzegovina, viz., that the Turks have always first endeavoured to suppress the revolt by force of arms, and only after having each year signally failed have they endeavoured to conciliate the insurgents; the result has naturally been that their overtures have proved unsuccessful. They have now only just withdrawn from an attempt at coercion, which, from want of means of transport and funds and provisions, totally failed; and in the face of this failure they again make conciliatory overtures, to which it is highly probable the insurgents will not listen, or if they do, it will only be, as usual, to gain the time necessary to get in their sauty crops, after which they will all again appear in arms. They know well that the Turks cannot act against them amongst their inaccessible mountains, and see with perfect indifference every fresh arrival of troops, which the Turks can neither utilize, feed, nor pay, and who only, in reality, add to their embarrassment.

Your Excellency may form an idea of the utter uselessness of incurring the expense of further reinforcements from a comparison of the present numerical forces of the combatants in the Herzegovina. The Imperial troops form an effective force of about 15,000 men, composed of 17 battalions of infantry, 4 squadrons of cavalry, 20 pieces of artillery and 1,000 artillerymen, and 4,200 irregular infantry and 600 horsemen. On the other hand, the insurgents are put down at 1,500 horses, or 3,000 combatants, a high estimate, and if 1,000 brigands (Uskoks) and 1,000 Montenegrins be with them, this would give 5,000 undisciplined and badly-armed rabble against 10,000 disciplined and 5,000 irregular troops. Now if this comparatively overwhelming force, to pay and to feed which there is immense difficulty, have not been able to restore tranquillity, one is led to think that any addition to it would be more likely to entail insuperable embarrassment than success.

The note also alludes to the Commission just sent into the Herzegovina. I have already intimated to your Excellency my idea that it would fail in producing any good result. I may now state that almost every individual member in private conversation and separately has confessed to Mr. Vice-Consul Zohrab and to others that he sees no chance of doing any good, and that the Commission is already at a loss how to proceed. I may remark that any Commission composed of Turkish subjects, whether Moslem or Christian, the latter being considered as mere cyphers under Mussulman influence, will fail to command the confidence of the insurgents, while a Mixed Commission, such as proposed at the Conference, would undoubtedly receive it. A Turkish officer here observed to me a short time ago that the introduction of the Tanzimat into the Herzegovina had been a great mistake, and the cause of all the late difficulties which have arisen there. When Mehemet II conquered these provinces, in 1463, he allowed the inhabitants of Herzegovina the privilege of being almost free from taxation on condition of their keeping order along the Montenegrin frontier. The result of this was a perpetual state of petty war, it is true, but both parties were always prepared, and the balance was kept even.

Omar Pasha, to whom the introduction of the Tanzimat was intrusted, was not allowed time to watch over and consolidate the new order of things, which, in fact, solely resulted in establishing onerous taxes, and which, without any material benefit to the Government, and without conferring any compensating advantages in the way of protection and order, simply exposed a people whose country is only capable of producing the bare necessities of existence to the ruinous impositions of the farmers of the revenue.

The consequence has been that the Herzegovina has made common cause with the Montenegrins against the Turkish Government, and a revolt has ensued which has cost the latter the value of the province ten times told.

I think I may safely venture to predict that, left to themselves, the Turks will continue to offer a spectacle of failure in the Herzegovina, prolonging a state of affairs shocking to humanity and alike dangerous to the peace of Europe and ruinous to the interests of the Ottoman Empire.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 131.

Consul Holmes to Lord J. Russell.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 55.)

My Lord, *Bosna-Serai, April* 17, 1861.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that on the 14th instant I forwarded to Sir Henry Bulwer the following telegram:—

"*14th April.*

"Just been informed by Turkish authorities that Montenegrins and Vassovichlees attacked and burnt the villages of Lazchzir, Balogh, Kodochil, and Zochan, in the district of Bihor, Sandjak of Yeni-Bazar. Were eventually repulsed by Bashi-Bazouks, and inhabitants leaving. Forty-seven dead. Twelve defenders killed. Ismail Pasha leaves Mostar for Constantinople."

I have no further particulars of this affair.

At Mostar the authorities are extremely anxious that a successor to Ismail Pasha should be named without delay.

Your Lordship will remember that when Ismail Pasha was appointed to the command in Bosnia and the Herzegovina I anticipated what has since happened. He has succeeded in nothing, and the anxiety and vexation he has consequently experienced has probably brought on the illness which now incapacitates him altogether.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 132.

Lord Bloomfield to Lord J. Russell.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 191.)

My Lord, *Vienna, April* 18, 1861.

THE Turkish Ambassador received instructions a few days ago by telegraph to demand an explanation why the Austrian Government had prevented by force the landing at Klek, from a Turkish transport, of stores and provisions which had been sent for the use of the troops in Herzegovina. Before addressing a note to Count Rechberg, Prince Callimachi spoke to his Excellency on the subject, and learned that instead of the Turkish Government having a right to complain of the proceedings of the Austrian naval authorities in this matter, it was they, on the contrary, who would be justified in requiring satisfaction from Turkey.

Count Rechberg has spoken to me on the subject, and said that the captain of the transport had been warned not to proceed to Klek and discharge his cargo until the usual authority was obtained, and was told, moreover, that it should be asked for by telegraph without a moment's delay. The transport, nevertheless, continued her voyage and had commenced unloading when she was interfered with by an Imperial man-of-war.

It would appear, from what Count Rechberg and Prince Callimachi both said, that it has been usual for the Turkish vessels to proceed without molestation to Klek, but a special authority to pass the Austrian gunship was always required for each vessel; the Turks excuse themselves by maintaining that the immediate discharge of the cargo was important to their interests, and that they had no intention of acting irregularly, and considered that the proceeding was entirely in the spirit of the relations of the two Governments.

Orders have been forwarded from here to permit the transport to unload her cargo,

and I understand that during the present disturbed state of Herzegovina a general power will be given to the Austrian authorities to allow Turkish vessels to pass on to Klek without detention.

At the same time that the Austrian Government are willing to make this temporary concession to the interests of Turkey, and desire also to give every reasonable facility to the passage of regular troops to the army, they entirely decline to grant permission which has been requested for a force of Bashi-Bazouks to cross the Austrian territory. The Imperial Government declare that these troops are in the habit of committing every species of atrocity on their march, and are under no control whatever, and that in order to avoid serious collisions between them and the Austrian population, who hold them in detestation, the application is refused.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 133.

Lord Bloomfield to Lord J. Russell.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 196.)
Vienna, April 25, 1861.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 165 of the 11th instant, in which I mentioned a report which had reached Count Rechberg that the inhabitants of Spizza had pronounced in favour of annexation to Montenegro, I have the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's information, an article, in original and translation, by Mr. Dillon, from the "Donau Zeitung," which refers to this subject.

I inquired yesterday of Count Rechberg if he had received any authentic intelligence connected with the movement at Spizza, and he replied that an attempt had been made by armed bands from Montenegro to raise an insurrection, and that there had been a collision attended with bloodshed; but there appeared to be a strong party at Spizza which desired to continue their allegiance to Turkey, that a reactionary movement had taken place, and that the present attempt seemed likely to prove a failure.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 133.

Extract from the "Donau Zeitung."

(Translation.)

AFFAIRS IN MONTENEGRO AND THE NEIGHBOURHOOD.—The plan of the Montenegrins to possess themselves, at any cost, of Spizza and its neighbourhood, which is partly inhabited by Roman Catholics and partly by Greek Christians, and thereby to obtain a port on the Adriatic, is continually prosecuted by them, and brought as near as possible to its accomplishment by intimidation as well as by open violence. On the 9th instant, armed Montenegrin bands summoned the Catholic inhabitants of some villages in that district to repair to Miglievzi, and there treat about their submission to Montenegro. Their refusal to do so was punished two days later by ill-treatment, driving away their cattle, and threats of burning their houses in case they did not submit.

Ahdi Pasha, Governor of Scutari, has, in consequence of this act of violence, addressed a note, signed also by the European Consuls, to the Prince of Montenegro, in which a request is made that the stolen property be restored, and measures taken to prevent the recurrence of similar violence. No answer from the Prince is as yet known of, and the poor Catholic inhabitants of the threatened district can only hope for preservation and safety from energetic action on the part of the Turkish troops. Omer Pasha, who has been appointed Commander-in-chief of all troops in Roumelia and Herzegovina, is said to have already embarked on board the "Saïdie," and the hopes of these unfortunate people may perhaps, therefore, be fulfilled in a short time.

No. 134.

Lord Bloomfield to Lord J. Russell.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 197.)
Vienna, April 25, 1861.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 191 of the 18th instant, respecting the interference of the Austrian naval authorities in preventing a Turkish transport from landing stores at Klek, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that, having inquired of Count Rechberg if anything further had taken place relating to this subject, his Excellency said an arrangement had been made with the Porte to facilitate the communication with the army in Herzegovina by way of Klek, which would continue in force during the present crisis, but that it was a mere provisional one, and that Austria reserved all her rights connected with the approaches to Klek.

Count Rechberg added that the arrangement had been effected by an exchange of notes between himself and Prince Callimachi, and that the whole affair had been concluded in twenty-four hours.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 135.

Lord Bloomfield to Lord J. Russell.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 201.)
Vienna, April 25, 1861.

My Lord,

COUNT RECHBERG'S attention has been fixed on the efforts making by the Montenegrins to extend their influence, and his Excellency is much alarmed at the increasing weakness of the Turkish Government in Herzegovina and Bosnia. He has been urging the Porte for some time past to apopt more determined measures for the suppression of the rebellion in these provinces, and he now looks forward, with some degree of confidence, to the assumption by Omer Pasha of the command there. He gives him credit for energy, and believes that there is a sufficient Turkish military force there, if properly handled, to restore the Sultan's authority.

His apprehensions, however, are very great for the fate of Nichsich, but he has still some hopes that the combined efforts of the Consuls, who have proceeded, as he hears, from Scutari to Cettigné and to Nichsich, will prevent the expected massacre of the Mussulman population.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 136.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 273.)
Foreign Office, April 29, 1861.

Sir,

IN answer to your Excellency's despatch No. 279 of the 16th instant, I have to state to you that Her Majesty's Government approve of the course which you intend to pursue, in conference with the other Representatives of the Great Powers and Aali Pasha, with a view to re-establish peace and order on the frontiers of the Herzegovina and Montenegro.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 137.

Lord J. Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 529.)
Foreign Office, April 29, 1861.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches* upon the subject of Montenegro.

I am, &c,
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

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* No. 133.

No. 138.

Consul Holmes to Lord J. Russell.—(Received April 30.)

(No. 56.) *Bosna-Serai, April 19, 1861.*

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 50, I have the honour to report to your Lordship that yesterday evening I received from Mr. Vice-Consul Zohrab the following telegram:—

"Time fixed by besieged expires to-morrow. I appealed officially to Vassif, answered troops moving, but Nichsich in danger. Seen Vassif and Dervish to-day; verbally both state Nichsich in great danger. If Montenegrins are not made to retire place is lost, population massacred. Allies 'alone can save it.'"

And half-an-hour later the following from Sir Henry Bulwer:—

"Take instantly any measures you deem advisable on your own account and my authority. I will get the Representatives to act collectively as soon as possible. Telegraph reply."

All that could possibly be done from this place was to explain the circumstances and transmit Sir Henry Bulwer's telegram instantly to our Consul at Scutari, in the hope that an immediate appeal to the Prince of Montenegro might be of some effect. This I did within half-an-hour after the receipt of Sir Henry Bulwer's telegram, and at the same time I telegraphed to Mr. Zohrab, letting him know what I had done, and instructing him if possible to communicate to the people of Nichsich to hold out as long as possible, as the European Powers would probably concert means to deliver them.

I then replied to his Excellency the Ambassador as follows:—"Sent your Excellency's despatch to Consul at Scutari, inviting him if possible to act immediately at Cettigné, ordered Zohrab to communicate to Nichsich to hold out in hope of aid from Powers. From Serajevo any other steps impossible. Probably all too late."

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 139.

Consul Holmes to Lord J. Russell.—(Received April 30.)

Bosna-Seraï, May 30, 1861.

(Telegraphic.)

CONSULS arrived 25th, defile "Duga." Insurgent Chiefs accepted respectfully and without condition their proposals, and opened passage for convoy provisions for Nichsich. Consuls proceed there 26th. Omer Pasha, bearer of acceptable conditions, not arrived.

I have not yet received any further intelligence from Herzegovina.

No. 140.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received May 4.)

(No. 292.) *Constantinople, April 23, 1861.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose the Proclamation with which Omer Pasha is to begin his mission, and which seems to comprehend the principal demands of the inhabitants of the Herzegovina; and I have the satisfaction to say that all the Representatives, and amongst them those who were most opposed to his nomination, have, since speaking to him, been much struck by the views he expresses and the good sense and moderation which he carries into the difficult task assigned to him.

It is probable that, with Aali Pasha's sanction, the Representatives will send delegates to aid Omer Pasha in prevailing on the revolted population to return to their allegiance and accept the conditions proposed.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

Inclosure in No. 140.

Proclamation.

SA Majesté Impériale le Sultan, notre auguste Maître, a daigné me mettre à la tête de sa vaillante armée de Roumélie avec l'honorable mission de présider la Commission *ad hoc* envoyé ici pour s'enquérir de vos besoins et redresser les griefs que vous pourriez avoir.

Je viens au milieu de vous avec des ordres positifs de notre auguste et magnanime Souverain de vous traiter avec cette indulgence et cette générosité qui le caractérisent.

Vous avez été égarés et, par conséquent, obligés depuis bientôt quatre ans à endurer bien des souffrances. La ligne de conduite que des gens intéressés à troubler votre repos vous ont induits à suivre, aurait attiré sur vous des calamités incalculables sans la commisération dont vous avez été l'objet de la part de Sa Majesté Impériale. C'est à vous maintenant à prouver à notre Souverain que vous êtes ses fidèles sujets et que vous êtes dignes de ses bontés paternelles.

Venez donc avec confiance auprès de moi. Je vous apporte de la part de Sa Majesté Impériale, et je le proclame en son auguste nom, un pardon plein et entier avec la remise de vos impôts arriérés. Je vous promets également:—

1. De confirmer le choix que chaque village est autorisé à faire d'un ou deux mouktars ou maires selon l'importance du village.

2. De nommer pour chaque nahié deux Kodja-Bashis, pris parmi les indigènes jouissant de la confiance de leurs concitoyens.

3. La liberté absolue de culte avec la faculté de bâtir des églises comme tous les sujets Chrétiens de Sa Majesté Impériale et de vous servir de cloches.

4. De ne plus permettre aux zaptiés de loger dans vos maisons, mais de les faire descendre dans les endroits destinés par chaque village pour les recevoir.

5. De mettre immédiatement en vigueur les arrangements réglant les rapports entre les propriétaires et les fermiers, arrangements qui ont été adoptés de concert avec la députation des propriétaires et des fermiers de Bosnie, appelés à cet effet à Constantinople.

6. De vous permettre que la quote-part des impôts de chaque maison soit prélevée et remise à l'autorité par vos mukturs et Kodja-Bashi.

7. De vous faciliter enfin l'acquisition des propriétés foncières. Vous voyez donc que notre auguste Maître vous offre généreusement non seulement l'oubli du passé, mais tout ce dont vous pouvez avoir besoin pour assurer votre bonheur et votre prospérité future. Empressez-vous de vous conformer aux conseils bienveillants que je vous adresse encore une fois, profitez en et cessez de vous tenir dans un état qui ne peut tourner qu'à votre détriment. Epargnez au Gouvernement Impérial l'immense peine et la triste nécessité de vous traiter comme rebelles. Epargnez à vous même les conséquences désastreuses de ce traitement.

No. 141.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received May 4.)

(No. 295.) *Constantinople, April 23, 1861.*

My Lord,

I HAVE already had the honour of reporting to your Lordship by telegraph the steps which have been taken by the Representatives of the Great Powers here to prevent the town of Nichsich, on the borders of Montenegro and Herzegovina, from falling into the hands of the insurgents, by whom the Turkish population, amounting to about 4,000 souls, is in great danger of being massacred.

The first step, as your Lordship knows, was taken by the Representatives in instructing their Consuls at Mostar to take at once the course which, under the emergency, they deemed best to prevent the massacre they deemed probable without some intervention.

Before, however, setting out for Nichsich to mediate between the contending parties, the Consular body at Mostar requested instructions by telegraph as to the course they should pursue in case it turned out, as was asserted, that the Montenegrins were taking an active part in the siege, and they inquired whether they would, in that case, be justified in summoning the Montenegrins, in the names of their respective Governments, to retire.

On the evening of the 21st instant a meeting of the Representatives was held to

discuss this point, and I, for my own part, thought we had every right to insist on the retirement of the Montenegrins, who, if they were acting against the Prince's orders, were no better than brigands, and if they were acting with the Prince's orders, were exposing the Prince to forfeit justly all claim to the protection which Europe has afforded him.

The French, Russian, and Prussian Representatives objected, however, to giving any such direct or positive answer.

I then proposed that we should, at least, declare that it was contrary to the principle established that the Montenegrins should attack any town on the Turkish territory, but that we left it to the Consuls to determine what course it would be best to pursue for arriving at the end of preventing a massacre—by an armistice, if possible, and if not, by a proper capitulation. This was agreed to.

A telegraphic instruction was likewise addressed to the Consular body at Scutari, desiring them to proceed to Cettigné, and whilst asserting the principle—which no one could dispute—to endeavour to persuade the Prince of Montenegro to support the intervention of the Consuls at Nichsich, and to enforce the adoption of humane measures.

I have just received a telegram from Scutari stating that the Consuls there, accompanied by some Montenegrin Senators, proceed themselves to Nichsich, and, as by further accounts from Her Majesty's Consul at Bosna-Serai, the inhabitants of Nichsich hoped to be able to hold out for another week, this would give time for the arrival of the Consuls above-mentioned, and the employment of their influence for at least the prevention of the massacre of the Turkish inhabitants.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

No. 142.

Lord Bloomfield to Lord J. Russell.—(Received May 5)

Vienna, May 5, 1861, 5·30 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

INTELLIGENCE has arrived of massacre by Montenegrins of the advanced guard of an escort of provisions for Nichsich and subsequent insult of Consular messenger sent to remonstrate.

Rechberg considers that Porte's instructions for Omer Pasha's guidance in Herzegovina are most conciliatory, and that he should be supported by active agents of the Great Powers.

Colonel Johanovitch is to be sent on the part of Austria, and will join Omer Pasha at Mostar on the 23rd instant.

Rechberg would be glad if Her Majesty's Government could send Major Cox there.

Both these officers were employed last year in marking out Montenegrin frontier.

No. 143.

Consul Holmes to Lord J. Russell.—(Received May 6.)

Bosna-Serai, April 24, 1861.

(No. 61.)

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship copies of my despatches Nos. 33 and 34, with their respective inclosures, lately addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, regarding the measures which have been taken to preserve the inhabitants of the besieged town of Nichsich from massacre by the Montenegrins.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure 1 in No. 143.

Consul Holmes to Sir H. Bulwer.

Bosna-Serai, April 23, 1861.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that after Mr. Zohrab's interview with Vassif Pasha and the other authorities at Mostar on the subject of Nichsich,

reported in his despatch No. 21 inclosed in mine, No. 24, he made other visits to Vassif Pasha on the 16th and 17th instant, in which he urged instant measures being taken to relieve the place. He also addressed a note to Vassif Pasha, a copy of which I inclose. I also transmit copy of Vassif Pasha's reply. Your Excellency will observe it is vague and reserved. It acknowledges that Nichsich has been besieged for three months, and that it is in danger. It attempts to excuse the military for their inactivity by stating that the severe winter and snow prevented earlier action, and their present inactivity is excused by the assertion that as the rebels are aided by the Montenegrins no forward movement can be hastily undertaken; hence the delay.

Dervish Pasha evidently forgets that if the rebels, without organization, stores, or good clothing, could maintain the blockade of Nichsich in spite of the winter and snow, a superior force with every necessity at its disposal should have been equally able to resist the cold and overcome the difficulties of a thirty miles march to relieve it.

Vassif Pasha repeatedly urged Mr. Zohrab verbally to endeavour to obtain some aid from the British Government, and on this Mr. Zohrab first telegraphed to me the imminent danger of Nichsich. I communicated the intelligence to my colleagues here, and invited them to make it known to their respective Ambassadors; but they thought that the Porte having refused their intervention there was no occasion to take any steps in the matter. I judged otherwise, and for the sake of preventing a horrible butchery, telegraphed immediately to your Excelleney, as follows:—

"From Mostar.—Nichsich reduced to last extremity; population, about 4,000, will probably be all massacred. Turks cannot relieve Nichsich. Can anything be done by European Powers to prevent this calamity?"

I soon received your Excelleney's reply to take any steps I could on your Excelleney's authority. I instantly adopted the only measures which were possible from this place, which I communicated to your Excellency in the following telegram, commencing with news just then received from Mostar:—

"Received from Mostar.—Time fixed by besieged expires to-morrow. I appealed officially to Vassif, answered, troops moving, but Nichsich in danger. Seen Vassif and Dervish to-day, verbally both state that Nichsich in great danger. If Montenegrins are not made to retire place is lost, population massacred. Allies alone can save it. Signed Zohrab.

"Sent your Excelleney's despatch to Consul at Scutari, inviting him if possible to act immediately at Cettigné. Ordered Zohrab to communicate to Nichsich to hold out in hope of aid from Powers. From Serajevo any other steps impossible. Probably all too late."

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure 2 in No. 143.

Vice-Consul Zohrab to Vassif Pasha.

D'APRES mes informations la ville de Nichsich, assiégée depuis trois mois, est réduite à la dernière extrémité; à défaut d'un secours immédiat, elle succombera dans quelques jours.

Votre Excellence ne l'ignore point, j'en suis convaincu, que la chûte de Nichsich exposera toute la portion de la province située sur la rive gauche de la Narenta, et que, dans ce cas, la pacification de ce pays, si difficile déjà, deviendra plus difficile encore.

Outre ces conséquences éventuelles pour la province, sur lesquelles je n'ai nullement l'intention d'appuyer, il y aura des conséquences immédiates pour la garnison et les habitants Musulmans de la ville assiégée.

La cruauté implacable qui entache tous les succès passés des assiégeants ne laisse malheureusement aucun doute sur le sort qui attend les vaincus; ils seront impitoyablement massacrés.

Je ne doute guère que votre Excellence envisage avec horreur cette éventualité, et qu'elle voudrait la voir conjurée.

Il était permis de nourrir un espoir légitime que les troupes Ottomanes concentrées depuis six semaines en nombre imposant dans la proximité de Nichsich sauraient la débloquer, mais aujourd'hui cet espoir ne paraît plus admissible. Mes craintes sont-elles fondées?

Je serais très reconnaissant à votre Excellence si elle voulait bien ou détruire mes

alarmes ou les confirmer par écrit, afin que je puisse en avertir mon Gouvernement, qui pourrait vouloir aviser au nom de l'humanité.

J'ai, &c.
(Signé) JAS. ZOHRAB.

Inclosure 3 in No. 143.

Consul Holmes to Sir H. Bulwer.

Busua-Serai, April 23, 1861.

Sir,

I HAD the honour to receive from your Excellency two telegraphic communications of the 19th April, informing me of the steps which had been taken by the Representatives of the European Powers, with a view to save Nichsich. I telegraphed to your Excellency in reply as follows:—

"Instructions of Representatives have been addressed to Consuls at Mostar. I have ordered Zohrab to act with them. He says beseiged have seven days' provisions. Nichsich may therefore yet be saved if Montenegrins can be prevailed on to retire. All Mostar Consuls leave to-morrow for Nichsich."

I had, as I informed your Excellency in my telegram of the 18th, instructed Mr. Zohrab to communicate to Nichsich hopes of succour. This he did, Dervish Pasha also writing at the same time, as your Excellency will see by the copy of despatch received this morning. Your Excellency will learn from this despatch all that has taken placewith regard to this affair, and will, I hope, be of my opinion that Mr. Zohrab has acted throughout with much judgment and intelligence. I instructed him on the 21st to act conjointly with his colleagues. I believe they left Mostar for Nichsich yesterday, and that everything possible has now been done to prevent the impending catastrophe.

I earnestly hope, it being quite clear that the Turks by themselves cannot restore tranquillity to the Herzegovina, that efficient means will be taken conjointly by the Representatives of the European Powers at Constantinople to put an end once for all to a state of affairs which has for the last three years been a source of misery and ruin to all this part of Turkey, and from the expense and responsibility of which the Porte, one would conceive, should be most anxious to escape.

It is much to be regretted that any intervention on the part of the European Powers should be needed at all, but their joint interference on this occasion is, I think, the sole means of safety for the Porte, and which, if obstinately refused, will at length bring about a state of affairs which will result in an intervention or even an occupation of one or two of them which might be fatal to the independence of Turkey and dangerous to the peace of Europe. A joint intervention, in which at least some of the members are really friendly to Turkey, paralyzes the dangerous and unceasing activity of those who are secretly endeavouring to undermine her power, and who, while ostensibly offering their friendly aid in joint intervention, are only too glad to see it refused. They feel that the end really desired by them will be the more certain and rapid. Once, however, relieved from the immediate danger of her present circumstances, the Porte will have no excuse for not immediately giving her most earnest attention to the reforms necessary for this country. If the Government would only cause those already long since promulgated to be properly carried out, if the inhabitants could once be made to feel it was at last really and honestly acting for their benefit instead of making promises which they now never believe, there would be little need of any future interference; but while the Porte, in the most critical circumstances, obstinately refuses all intervention in her favour, making assertions which are not true, and promising to do what she never performs, she is, I believe, only hastening and insuring a result which her true friends will in vain endeavour to prevent.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure 4 in No. 143.

Vice-Consul Zohrab to Consul Holmes.

Mostar, April 21, 1861.

Sir,

ON the 18th instant I received your telegraphic despatch directing me to use my utmost efforts to save Nichsich from the cruel fate with which it is menaced.

I reported to you by telegraph in answer to this despatch, that I had addressed a letter to the Nichsichlees, encouraging them to hold out, as they are not abandoned. Dervish Pasha inclosed this letter in one from himself to the same effect, and at the same time he sent orders to Mahmoud Pasha at Gasko to prepare for an immediate advance. It was agreed between Dervish Pasha and myself that if in two days' time nothing was done to relieve Nichsich, I should go myself to Nichsich and act as circumstances might suggest.

I had proceeded thus far in my arrangements when the Agents here of France, Russia, and Austria received identic despatches from their Ambassadors at Constantinople, instructing them to collectively use their influence to prevent a catastrophe at Nichsich. I was requested to join them in their efforts. I accepted the invitation, as I considered that by doing so I acted in the spirit of your instructions, and for the benefit of Nichsich.

Collectively we had an interview yesterday with Vassif and Dervish Pashas.

Dervish Pasha stated to us that Nichsich could hold out for seven days; that if in the meantime we could induce the Montenegrins to withdraw their aid, the rebels would be obliged to lay down their arms, the communications would be free, and he would instantly throw ample provisions into Nichsich. The provisions are collected in large quantities at Gasko and Cristatz.

I asked Dervish Pasha whether he could, in the present state of affairs, force a passage to Nichsich. He replied that it would be his duty to attempt it, but by advancing to the Dooka Boghas, a pass in the road to Nichsich, he felt convinced that he should expose his troops to the dangers that threaten Nichsich.

Dervish Pasha asked if we were empowered to treat with Montenegro; we, with the exception of M. Martyrt, replied that though not ordered to do so directly, our instructions were so ample that we considered ourselves authorized to do so if the safety of Nichsich required it.

Dervish Pasha suggested that we should telegraph for authority to treat with Montenegro, as it would be with the Montenegrins alone we should have to act in delivering Nichsich. My colleagues of France and Russia agreed with me in not considering it necessary. M. Martyrt, the Austrian Consul, however, thought otherwise, and he said he could not go further into the matter without more precise instructions.

To prevent discord, and also to satisfy Dervish Pasha, who seemed to think we should be much better able to effect our purpose by having precise instructions, we consented to sign the telegram, of which I have the honour to inclose copy. To this despatch M. Martyrt added a postscript in German to the effect that he would await instructions before proceeding any further.

I have, with M. Bezobrazow and M. Moreau, decided on starting for Nichsich to-morrow to examine the difficulties which surround that town, and to act as circumstances may suggest.

I trust the course I have pursued will meet with your approval.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAS. ZOHRAB.

Inclosure 5 in No. 143.

Despatch addressed by the Foreign Consuls at Mostar to their respective Ambassadors at Constantinople.

(Télégraphique.) *Mostar, 20 Avril, 1861.*

AYANT délibéré sur les mesures à prendre dans l'affaire Nichsich, trouvâmes indispensable de nous y rendre après-demain Lundi. Ses autorités reconnaissent le danger imminent, l'attribuent à la présence des Monténégrins parmi les insurgés. Si nous le constatons sur les lieux pouvons-nous, au nom de nos Gouvernements, sommer les Monténégrins de se retirer?

No. 144.

Lord Bloomfield to Lord J. Russell.—(Received May 6.)

(No. 222.)

My Lord, *Vienna, May 2, 1861.*

COUNT RECHBERG has been so much occupied these last days with preparations for the meeting of the Reichsrath that I have scarcely been able to see his Excellency.

He has just told me that the only news of interest which he has received from abroad since I last saw him is that the Porte now agrees to the Commission in the Herzegovina, and that, as Baron Prokesch has nobody with him whom he can well detach on this service, the Austrian Government will probably send the officer on this service who was employed last year in the demarcation of the Montenegrin frontier.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 145.

Consul Holmes to Lord J. Russell.—(Received May 7.)

Serajevo, May 6, 1861.

(Telegraphic.)
AGREEMENT concluded by Consuls for the opening of defile Duga violated by insurgents. Upwards of forty Turks escorting convoy of provisions massacred. Consuls, 4th May, remained at Nichsich to tranquilize population and demand assistance. Succour by force impossible. Safety only seems to lie in the possibility of a capitulation under the patronage and guarantee of the Prince of Montenegro. I have asked instructions from Ambassador.

No. 146.

Consul Holmes to Lord J. Russell.—(Received May 9.)

Serajevo, May 6, 1861.

(Telegraphic.)
ZOHRAB and Russian colleague arrived at Cettigné. Made arrangements, subject to Ambassador's approval, for provisioning Nichsich viâ Montenegro. Proceeded next day to Scutari to obtain provisions. French and Austrian Agents remained at Nichsich.

No. 147.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

Foreign Office, May 8, 1861.

(Telegraphic.)
THE massacre of Turks going to Nichsich shows how wrong the Representatives of France, Russia, and Prussia were not to take your advice in regard to the Montenegrins. If the Prince of Montenegro is to be allowed to do as he pleases, the foreign Representatives ought to allow Omer Pasha on his side to maintain the Sultan's authority with all his forces.

No. 148.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 294.) *Foreign Office, May 8, 1861.*

Sir,
I TRANSMIT to your Excellency, for your information, a copy of a despatch from Mr. Consul Gilbert,* giving an account of a visit which he recently paid to the Prince of Montenegro, and reporting His Highness' sentiments with regard to the political position of his country; and I have particularly to call your Excellency's attention to what the Prince stated to Mr. Gilbert respecting the Port of Spizza.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

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* No. 127.

No. 149.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

Foreign Office, April 23, 1861.

(Telegraphic.)
I APPROVE your conduct in affairs of Montenegro as reported in your telegram of the 22nd instant.

No. 150.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received May 11.)

(No. 315.) *Constantinople, April 30, 1861.*

My Lord,
WITH respect to the affairs of the Herzegovina, everything has been arranged according to the last plan I proposed, that is to say:—

1. The Porte has prepared a proclamation which satisfies all the legitimate grievances of the Herzegovinians, and this proclamation will be published on his arrival by the new Commander-in-chief—Omer Pasha—whose name alone seems likely to produce a salutary effect.

2. The Representatives are to send delegates to assist in the work of pacification by reassuring the insurgents as to the sincerity of the Porte and counselling the acceptance of that arrangement now offered to them.

The Representatives are to meet Omer Pasha at my house on Thursday evening, when we are to fix the place where the delegates are to join him. I believe it will be Mostar. I intend to name Mr. Holmes our delegate. He is well known to Omer Pasha, and each has confidence in the other.

Mr. Zohrab, with whom I have of late been much satisfied, will act as Consul *pro tem.* at Bosna-Serai, and if any agent is wanted at Mostar I shall send Mr. Ricketts. But this may not be required.

It appears to me probable, from the last accounts we have received, that the insurgents themselves are well disposed to submission, and that when they hear the language of the delegates they will make it, in which way I shall hope to have contributed not inconsiderably in tranquillizing that important frontier.

With regard to Nichsich, on the one hand, Mr. Holmes seems to maintain it is blockaded and in extreme danger; on the other, the Prince of Montenegro declares that the whole history of the blockade is a fabrication; and it certainly appears clear that a contractor was allowed by him to send through his territory grain to the fortress. What I deem probable is that the town has been blockaded by seizing the passes at some distance from it, which would have prevented all communication with Mostar, from which place the intelligence of the blockade first proceeded.

The pass on the side of Montenegro was probably in the hands of Montenegrins, and the Prince, on receiving a sum of money, ordered these to allow a certain quantity of grain to pass without being seized.

The Prince, however, as it would appear from Sir F. Gilbert's despatches, holds my conciliatory language, and seems disposed to cultivate friendly relations with us.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

P.S.—*May* 1, 1861.—A telegram from the Consuls proceeding from Mostar to Nichsich states that on their representations the insurgents at once opened the passage on their road for the convoy of provisions, and seem willing to await Omer Pasha's arrival for a settlement.

H. L. B.

No. 151.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received May* 11.)

(No. 317.) *Constantinople, May* 1, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith the copy of a note from Aali Pasha, inclosing a French translation of the Proclamation which Omer Pasha is directed to issue on his arrival in the Herzegovina.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 151.

Aali Pasha to Sir H. Bulwer.

Sublime Porte, le 30 *Avril*, 1861.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

J'AI l'honneur de vous adresser, ci-joint, la traduction en Français de la Proclamation que son Excellence Omer Pacha est chargé de publier à son arrivée en Herzégovine.

La Sublime Porte espère que votre Excellence verra dans ce document une nouvelle preuve de la sincérité du désir de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan d'éviter, par tous les moyens en son pouvoir, l'effusion du sang de ses sujets.

Tout le monde connaît la longanimité avec laquelle le Gouvernement Impérial a procédé à l'égard des habitants des districts qui sont depuis quatre ans en état de rébellion contre l'autorité légitime de leur Souverain. Les excitations, les encouragements et les promesses d'appui qu'ils n'ont cessé de recevoir de la part de leurs voisins de la Montagne Noire, ont rendu vains jusqu'ici tous les efforts de la Sublime Porte pour amener la pacification de cette contrée. Plus le Gouvernement du Sultan s'est montré indulgent plus les insurgés se sont cru libres de commettre impunément toutes ces atrocités dont les détails font frémir le cœur humain. A l'heure qu'il est les choses en sont venues au point où il devient impossible à la Sublime Porte de rester inactive et de ne pas procéder à une répression énergique et sérieuse. Mais avant de recourir à cette triste extrémité le Gouvernement a cru devoir faire un dernier essai des moyens pacifiques, en concédant aux insurgés tout ce qu'ils peuvent désirer raisonnablement.

Pour qu'aucun doute ne puisse entraver l'accomplissement de l'œuvre humanitaire qu'elle poursuit, et comme une nouvelle preuve de sa parfaite confiance dans les sentiments d'amitié des Grandes Puissances, ses augustes alliées, la Sublime Porte a résolu de faire de la Proclamation, dont il s'agit, l'objet d'une communication à votre Excellence ainsi qu'à MM. ses collègues d'Autriche, de France, de Prusse et de Russie.

Devant une manifestation aussi solennelle, aucune méfiance n'est plus permise de la part des insurgés. Nous espérons que les délégués que vous, et vos collègues, vous vous proposez d'envoyer sur les lieux donneront au Commandant-Général des troupes Impériales tous leurs concours dans les mesures convenues, pour atteindre le but commun qui est le rétablissement de la paix.

(Signé) AALI.

Inclosure 2 in No. 151.

Proclamation.

(Traduction.)

SA Majesté Impériale le Sultan, notre auguste maître, a daigné me mettre à la tête de sa vaillante armée de Roumili, avec l'honorable mission de présider la Commission *ad hoc* envoyée ici pour s'enquérir de vos besoins et redresser les griefs légitimes que vous pourriez avoir.

Je viens au milieu de vous avec des ordres positifs de notre auguste et magnanime Souverain de vous traiter avec cette indulgence et cette générosité qui le caractérisent.

Vous avez été égarés et par conséquent obligés depuis bientôt quatre ans à endurer bien des souffrances. La ligne de conduite que des gens intéressés à troubler votre repos vous ont induit à suivre, aurait attiré sur vous des calamités incalculables sans la commisération dont vous avez été l'objet de la part de Sa Majesté Impériale. C'est à vous maintenant à prouver à notre Souverain que vous êtes ses fidèles sujets et que vous êtes dignes de ses bontés paternelles.

Venez donc avec confiance auprès de moi. Je vous apporte de la part de Sa Majesté Impériale et je le proclame en son auguste nom un pardon plein et entier avec la remise de vos impôts arriérés.

Je vous promets également :—

1. De confirmer le choix que chaque village est autorisé à faire d'un ou deux Mouktars (ou Maires), selon l'importance du village.

2. De nommer pour chaque nahié deux Kodja-Bachis, pris parmis les indigènes jouissant de la confiance le leurs concitoyens.

3. La liberté absolue de culte avec la faculté de bâtir des églises comme tous les sujets Chrétiens de Sa Majesté Impériale et de vous servir des cloches.

4. De ne plus permettre aux zaptiehs de loger dans vos maisons, mais de les faire descendre dans les endroits destinés par chaque village pour les recevoir.

5. De mettre immédiatement en vigueur les arrangements réglant les rapports entre les propriétaires et les fermiers ; arrangements qui ont été adoptés de concert avec les députations des propriétaires et des fermiers de Bosnie, appelées à cet effet à Constantinople.

6. De vous permettre que la quote-part des impôts de chaque maison soit prélevée et remise à l'autorité par vos Mouktars et Kodja-Bachis.

7. De recommander au Patriarchat de vous envoyer désormais des évêques de votre nation et parlant votre langue.

8. De vous faciliter l'acquisition des propriétés foncières.

Vous voyez donc que notre auguste maître vous offre généreusement, non-seulement l'oubli du passé, mais encore tout ce dont vous pouvez avoir besoin pour assurer votre bonheur et votre prospérité future.

Empressez-vous de vous conformer aux conseils bienveillants que je vous adresse encore une fois ; profitez en et cessez de vous tenir dans un état qui ne peut tourner qu'à votre détriment. Epargnez au Gouvernement Impérial l'immense peine et la triste nécessité de vous traiter comme rebelles. Epargnez à vous mêmes les conséquences désastreuses de ce traitement.

No. 152.

Consul Calvert to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received May* 11.)

(No. 23.) *Monastir, April* 25, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship, herewith inclosed, a copy of my despatch of this date to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, in continuation of my reports respecting the movements in the army of Roumelia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CHARLES T. CALVERT.

Inclosure in No. 152.

Consul Calvert to Sir H. Bulwer.

Monastir, April 25, 1861.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's despatch of the 14th instant, and in continuation of my notices respecting the army of Roumelia, I beg leave to report that one battalion of Redifs, 650 strong, from the Sandjak of Serres, and two battalions of Redifs, containing 1,400 men, from Philippopolis, have arrived at Monastir within the last week. There are many sick among them. The troops, with two companies of Chasseurs of the line, and two batteries of horse artillery, are under orders to march to Yanina, under the command of Brigadier-General Ali Pasha. Pioneers have been sent on to repair some parts of the road impracticable to the passage of artillery in their present condition.

In my despatch of the 14th instant, instead of four pieces, four batteries of field artillery have been dispatched to Prishtina. They are intended, it is believed, for service in Herzegovina.

Férik Salih Pasha has returned to Monastir, after having dispatched to the north the Redifs who were assembled at Ochrida.

Seventy remounts have just arrived for the corps of Cossacks and Dragoons. They

have been purchased by their General, Sadyk Pasha, at Constantinople. The greater number of the horses of this corps, about 1,200 in all, are old or worn out, and would not stand the fatigue of a campaign; but, however desirable it may be to maintain the efficiency of this branch of the army, that is impossible in the present state of financial embarrassment, as the necessary funds cannot be raised by the Government.

The same may be said of the artillery. There were, until recently, in the artillery-shed here, before the four batteries above mentioned were sent away, eighty-two field-pieces, varying from 5 to 25 pounders, mounted on very serviceable carriages, but, in consequence of the want of horses, only seven batteries or forty-two guns are available for service. Upon an emergency, 200 gun-carriages, with their ammunition-waggons and horse equipments, could be turned out of the artillery stores at this place.

I recently went over the barracks and stores, and found everything in good order. The barrack rooms were particularly clean. The men's clothing is quite ragged, and there is in the depôt stores new clothing for only a fraction of the army. The rediffs from Philippopolis wear dyed cotton trousers, as a chief substitute for cloth.

The Serdar-Ekrem, Omer Pasha, who has been appointed to succeed Ismail Pasha in the Command-in-chief of the army of Roumelia, is expected to pass through Monastir on his way to Bosnia. The Turkish authorities here allow no intelligence of events in Herzegovina and Montenegro to transpire; it would, therefore, be useless to repeat the numerous rumours which are in circulation in unofficial quarters. I may merely mention that they represent a state of things generally unfavourable to the Turkish army.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHARLES T. CALVERT.

No. 153.

Consul Holmes to Lord J. Russell.—(Received May 13.)

(No. 62.)
Bosna Serai, May 1, 1861.

My Lord,

ON the 26th ultimo I had the honour to receive a telegram from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, informing me that the Scutari Consuls had telegraphed from Cettigné to say that Nichsich was neither besieged nor blockaded, and that the whole story was a fabrication. I replied by telegram as follows:—"Siege of Nichsich, fact avowed by local authorities and every one at Mostar during more than two months. I believe the Consuls have been deceived by the Prince. The truth will soon be known." The following day my French colleague received a telegram from M. Hecquard, French Consul at Scutari, to say that the English Consul at Bosna-Seraï had been most unworthily deceived; that Nichsich was neither besieged nor blockaded; that the Prince had even allowed an Austrian subject, who had contracts for provisions with the Turkish authorities, to convey through Montenegro to Nichsich so many horseloads of provisions on the 23rd instant; and that the nearest insurgents to Nichsich were at a place called "Duga."

It is evident to myself and all my colleagues here that the Consuls for Scutari have been deceived, and not ourselves. The blockade at Nichsich has been an avowed fact for the last three months, and what Mr. Zohrab has written to me on the subject, and what I have written to your Lordship, has been confirmed from other sources. A person escaped from Nichsich passed by this a few days ago, and stated to Osman Pasha almost exactly the facts which have been reported. Now it is to be remarked that the permission stated by M. Hecquard to have been given by the Prince to allow provisions to be taken to Nichsich was given after his Highness had received information that the Representatives of the European Powers at Constantinople had determined, if possible, to prevent the fall of that place. The statement that the nearest insurgents to Nichsich are at Duga is perfectly true, but only proves that the Consuls of Scutari have been kept in ignorance as to all the circumstances of the case except a mere name or two. Your Lordship must understand that Nichsich is situated in a small plain, one side of which is bounded by Montenegrin territory, and all the others inclosed by impassable mountains, the only communication with the Herzegovina being a long narrow pass through them called the "Duga Boghas," or the "long defile." This is situated between Cristatz and Nichsich, and the insurgents, according to all accounts, have blocked up this pass with immense rocks and have occupied it with a strong force for the last three months. The Turks have not dared to attempt to force it, and this operation alone has constituted what has been variously called the siege or the blockade of Nichsich. No provisions could be

introduced except from the side of Montenegro, for which permission had not been given until, as M. Hecquard states, the 23rd instant, and according to the accounts of the inhabitants who from time to time have escaped the town was in despair of relief—famine was staring the people in the face—and the catastrophe appeared inevitable.

The exact state of affairs will now soon be known. It is very probable that the Nichsichlees in their alarm have exaggerated the imminence of their peril, but that they have been cut off from the Herzegovina by blockade for three months is an undoubted fact, and the peremptory assertion by the Consuls at Scutari that the whole story is a fabrication shows an absence of information as to what has been lately taking place in the Herzegovina, and of credulity in the interested statements of Prince Nicola, for which myself and my colleagues here were entirely unprepared.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 154.

Lord Bloomfield to Lord J. Russell.—(Received May 13.)

(No. 232.)
Vienna, May 9, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, for your Lordship's information, a telegram, in cypher, which I have received from Her Majesty's Consul-General at Belgrade, reporting that large bodies of armed men are collecting in different parts of Servia, and that the Austrian Government are preparing a corps of 30,000 men to put down disorders in the Principality.

Your Lordship will observe that Mr. Longworth applies to me for instructions, but as I cannot consider him placed under my orders, but those of Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, I have refrained from doing so, and in fact can have no wishes to express on the subject of his communication, except that he should carefully collect and forward without delay all the valuable information which reaches him.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 155.

Lord Bloomfield to Lord J. Russell.—(Received May 13.)

(No. 238.)
Vienna, May 9, 1861.

My Lord,

COUNT RECHBERG has received intelligence from Constantinople that the Representatives of the Great Powers had decided to invite the Prince of Montenegro to exercise his influence in favour of the besieged of Nichsich, and expressed to me his regret that the Internuncio should have agreed to any appeal being made to the Prince. His Excellency considers the idea to have originated with the Marquis de Lavalette and Prince Labanoff, and that it will only serve to raise the position and increase the pretensions of the Prince of Montenegro.

Count Rechberg looks to the arrival of Omer Pasha in Herzegovina with some degree of confidence, and believes that if order is to be restored in that province by Turkish means this Pasha will do so.

He has already decided, as I have informed your Lordship by telegraph, to send Colonel Johanovitch to the head-quarters of Omer Pasha. Colonel Johanovitch was lately at Agram and has already proceeded to Mostar, and it is at his suggestion that Count Rechberg has put forward the idea of Major Cox being also sent to Mostar, and he has been induced to do so in consequence of the complete understanding that existed between them when employed together on the Montenegrin Boundary Commission.

Count Rechberg thinks that mutual confidence between the British and Austrian Agents in Herzegovina would be useful in counteracting the French and Russian influence that he expects will be exercised there in opposition to the true interests of the Porte.

His Excellency said that Colonel Johanovitch is ordered to give Omer Pasha all the support in his power in carrying out the humane instructions with which he is to be provided.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 156.

Lord Bloomfield to Lord J. Russell.—(Received May 13.)

(No. 241.) *Vienna, May 9, 1861.*

My Lord,

THE Turkish Ambassador has been instructed by telegraph to inquire as to the truth of a rumour which had reached Constantinople that Austria was about to concentrate a force of 30,000 men on the Turkish frontier, and it would seem that this intelligence had been derived from the same source as that transmitted by Mr. Longworth in his telegram recorded in my despatch No. 232 of this date.

I have spoken to Count Rechberg on the subject, and learn from his Excellency that a corps of observation of about 15,000 men is being collected on the frontiers of Bosnia to be composed chiefly of infantry of the line and frontier regiments, but he assured me that Austria has no aggressive intention, and that this force would be assembled solely for defensive purposes. He said the Imperial Government would be mad, in the face of all that is passing in Turkey and in Servia, from whence serious intrigues are now being carried on against her authority in Croatia, not to prepare for eventualities.

Count Rechberg added that it was no easy matter to concentrate troops in the poor country in which they were to be stationed, and that much time would elapse before it would be possible to collect the necessary provisions for the support of the forces.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 157.

Lord A. Loftus to Lord J. Russell.—(Received May 13.)

(No. 188. Confidential.) *Berlin, May 11, 1861.*

My Lord,

BARON SCHLEINITZ informed me lately that he had received information that a large Austrian force was being concentrated on the Save, for the purpose it was said of an occupation of Servia. He stated that at Brody, where a large Austrian force was now quartered, pontoons were in readiness to enable the Austrian army to cross the frontier at any moment. He considered this intention, if really meditated by Austria, as likely to be of serious gravity. In referring to the reported wish of the Austrian Government, expressed a short time back at Paris, to intervene in the Herzegovina, his Excellency stated that although France might not take umbrage at it, Russia would not view passively any such intervention in Servia. He had accordingly telegraphed to Vienna to ascertain whether or not the reports alluded to were founded, and that if the answer should be in the affirmative he should certainly endeavour to dissuade the Austrian Government from a measure which might be productive of serious consequences.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 158.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received May 13.)

Constantinople, May 13, 1861, 5 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

ON Thursday Omer Pasha starts for Mostar. I think, during his stay, Holmes should have a Cypher. Would the Foreign Office send him one, or might Dufferin's, if no longer wanted in Syria, be sent by me?

No. 159.

Lord J. Russell to Consul Sir F. Gilbert.

(No. 6.) *Foreign Office, May 14, 1861.*

Sir,

I HAVE received your despatch No. 14 of the 7th ultimo, containing a report on the present state of Montenegro, and an account of your reception by Prince Nicholas, and I have to express my approval of your proceedings as therein reported, and of your having declined the decoration which was offered to you by His Highness.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 160.

Lord J. Russell to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 132.) *Foreign Office, May 15, 1861.*

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your information, a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Minister at Berlin, relative to the reported concentration of Austrian troops on the Save.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 161.

Lord J. Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 589.) *Foreign Office, May 15, 1861.*

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches upon the subject of Montenegro.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 162.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 328.) *Constantinople, May 8, 1861.*

My Lord,

THE affairs in the Herzegovina have gone through various phases.

First, came a report that Nichsich was on the point of surrendering, and that the inhabitants were likely to be massacred.

2ndly. Instructions were sent on our part to the Consuls at Mostar instructing them to do whatever they deemed best to prevent this catastrophe.

3rdly. They informed us that they should proceed to Nichsich, but that the principal danger came from the Montenegrins, and that they required to know whether they might summon the Montenegrins to retire.

4thly. We answered that the Montenegrins had certainly not the right to attack a Turkish fort, and that we left it to them to do what they deemed best on the spot, and under the circumstances they might find there.

5thly. We sent our Consuls at Scutari to urge the Prince to recall any Montenegrins, if there were any, besieging Nichsich. The Prince said Nichsich was not besieged, that there were no Montenegrins, and that provisions had been sent to the town with his consent through the Montenegrin territory.

In the meantime the Consuls at Mostar proceeded to Nichsich, found the passage at Douga blocked, and agreed with the Chiefs who held it that the Turks should be allowed to pass a convoy of provisions through the defile. They then went on to Nichsich.

6thly. The convoy not arriving, they sent a letter to the rebel Chiefs to inquire the reason; and these sent back an insolent message, declaring that sixty Turks had come, and been massacred by them in spite of their engagement.

* No. 157.

7thly. The Consuls telegraphed to us from Nichsich, saying that under the circumstances they considered it their duty to remain where they were, and share the fate of the besieged town, the critical position of which called for immediate succour.

8thly. We telegraphed to our Consuls at Scutari to go immediately to Cettigne, and call upon the Prince to interfere and insure the safety of Nichsich and of our Agents; adding that all the Representatives of the Great Powers considered the concessions announced in the Proclamation of Omer Pasha satisfactory, and that in supporting them with us he would obtain the sympathy of Europe. We wait the result.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

No. 163.

Consul Holmes to Lord J. Russell.—(Received May 20.)

(No. 64.) *Bosna-Serai, May 7, 1861.*

My Lord,

YESTERDAY I received a telegram from Mr. Zohrab, written from Nichsich on the 28th April, but telegraphed from Cattaro the 4th May, stating that the insurgents had treacherously violated the agreement they had made with the Consuls, and had massacred upwards of forty Turks who formed the advanced guard of a convoy sent from Cristatz to Nichsich on their assurance of free passage; that the Consuls were obliged to remain at Nichsich to pacify the inhabitants, that their position was critical, and that they required instant succour. I immediately sent to your Lordship the following telegram:—

"Agreement concluded by Consuls for the opening of defile Duga violated by insurgents. Upwards of forty Turks escorting convoy of provisions massacred. Consuls, 4th May, remained at Nichsich to tranquillize the population and demand assistance. Succour by force being impossible, safety only seems to lie in the possibility of a capitulation under the patronage and guarantee of the Prince of Montenegro. I have asked instructions from Ambassador."

The date at which the Consuls were at Nichsich should have been the 28th April, when the despatch was written, instead of the 4th May, when it was only sent from Cattaro.

On the receipt of the telegram from Cattaro, I communicated its contents to my French colleague, and we consulted together as so what could possibly be done. Succour by force appeared just as impossible now as it has been found to be during the last three months, unless, indeed, Omer Pasha were on the spot and exhibited more generalship and courage than his predecessors, and any Treaty or arrangement with people who clearly intend to keep no conditions seemed equally impossible unless it should be guaranteed by some one who had influence over them, and would accept the responsibility of the whole affair. The only person who could do this is the Prince of Montenegro, and therefore, I made the suggestion contained in my telegram, and my French colleague sent a similar despatch to the French Ambassador at the Porte. Whether the Prince will be willing to accept such a proposal, or whether it will be considered expedient even to make it, we did not stop to consider, we simply offered the suggestion as the only means which appeared to present a chance of safety for Nichsich.

The conduct of the insurgents is calculated to deprive them of all sympathy, if even they deserved any, and seems very much to bear out a view of affairs in the Hervegovina which has been occasionally offered to me, viz., that money is liberally expended by the agents of a certain Power to keep the country in perpetual disorder, and that the rebels, or at least their Chiefs, find much greater profit in the present state of things than under any other condition, and that, therefore, they do not wish for peace or care for any promises of reform, and nothing but a strong hand and severe measures will ever restore tranquillity. It has also often been told me by Turks, that if the chief officers of the army of the Herzegovina really desired it, the whole affair could be settled in a month, but with the return of tranquillity a wide field for peculation would disappear, and they, therefore, prefer the existing disorder. This is nothing new to me, for I have seen in Koordistan rebellions secretly got up by Government officers merely for the sake of the profit to be made in pillage and otherwise while putting it down. I think that neither of the circumstances alluded to are imaginary, and, without accepting them as the sole causes of the long continuance of the revolt, I am inclined to attribute to them a considerable share in this result.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 164.

Consul Sir F. Gilbert to Lord J. Russell.—(Received May 20.)

(No. 17.) *Scutari, April 30, 1861.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship copies of the following despatches, and a report of the late mission of the Consuls of Scutari to Cettigné (for the relief of the fort and town of Nichsich, reported to be closely besieged by the Montenegrins) undertaken in accordance with instructions received from our respective Ambassadors at Constantinople:—

A telegraphic despatch from Sir Henry Bulwer desiring me to insist at Cettigné on the retirement of the Montenegrins from Nichsich.

A reply to the above that my colleagues and myself think that a truce ought to be made with the insurgent Chiefs at Nichsich, and not with the Prince at Cettigné.

A collective despatch to the Prince of Montenegro, transmitting a copy of Sir Henry Bulwer's despatch of April 19, and urging him to comply therewith.

A telegraphic despatch from Consul Holmes (received only on the 21st) requesting me to act instantly if possible at Cettigné.

From the date and contents of this despatch, I presume the first portion was sent from Serajevo to Sir Henry Bulwer on the 18th of April, and was the motive for his Excellency's telegraphing to me to insist on the retirement of the Montenegrins from Nichsich.

A telegraphic despatch from M. de Lavalette containing orders from our respective Ambassadors to proceed at once to Cettigné.

A telegraphic despatch to Sir Henry Bulwer to announce our immediate departure for Cettigné, and that being nearer to Nichsich than Mostar, we would go on to Nichsich as soon as we could procure some influential Montenegro Senators from the Prince to accompany us.

Reply of the Prince, vindicating his conduct ever since the death of his uncle, and denying that Nichsich is besieged by the Montenegrins, but that, on the contrary, he permits provisions to pass through his territory, free of transit duty, for the Ottoman troops in Nichsich, and affirms, on his honour, that there are no Montenegrins in Herzegovina with his permission.

A telegraphic despatch to the Ambassadors at Constantinople from the Consuls of Scutari, stating that the Consul at Serajevo has been deceived—Nichsich is neither besieged nor blockaded by the Montenegrins.

A letter to be delivered to the Consuls of Mostar on a mission to Nichsich, by M. Vaclik, explaining the reasons for the presence of the Consuls of Scutari at Cettigné, and communicating all the information in possession of the latter relative to Nichsih.

A telegraphic despatch from the Consuls of Scutari to the Ambassadors at Constantinople, being a copy of the telegraphic despatch transmitted to Scutari by Baron de Lichtenberg.

The report of the Consuls of Scutari of the mission to the Prince of Montenegro relative to the blockade of Nichsich.

A telegraphic despatch from Baron de Lichtenberg, communicating a Convention made by the Consuls of Mostar with the insurgents at Duga

From the above-mentioned documents your Lordship will perceive that there has been some gross deception, as it is clearly proved that Nichsich is not at the extreme necessity it was reported to be; that it is true the insurgents (subjects of the Porte) have adopted the Montenegro badges, but that there are no real Montenegrins among them with the consent of the Prince; and that in spite of all the provocations and petty vexations the Prince and his people are continually receiving from the Turks, he has acted most nobly throughout the whole time that the insurrection has existed. As the state of Nichsich appeared so alarming to the Representatives of the Great Powers at Constantinople, there was no time to communicate with your Lordship by despatch on the subject before acting on the orders sent by telegraph, and I hope I have acted in a way that will meet with your Lordship's approbation; and though we were not obliged to proceed to Nichsich, I find that my expenses, including my share of the telegraphic messages, amounts to 10*l.* 8*s.*, for which sum I trust I may be allowed to draw for on Her Majesty's Commissioners of the Treasury.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. H. GILBERT.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Inclosure 1 in No. 164.

Sir H. Bulwer to Consul Sir F. Gilbert.

(Telegraphic.) *Pera, April* 19, 1861.

INSIST at Cettigné on the Montenegrins retiring from Nichsich, or they will incur the consequences.

If they join in an attack on Turkey they forfeit the protection of the Great Powers, and when Omer Pasha arrives, may fare the worse. Armistice or capitulation are, I presume, the alternatives according to circumstances. You can concert with your colleagues. All the Representatives at Constantinople are agreed in preventing massacre.

Inclosure 2 in No. 164.

Consul Sir F. Gilbert to Sir H. Bulwer.

(Télégraphique.) *Scutari, le 20 Avril*, 1861.

J'AI agi de concert avec mes collègues auprès du Prince; d'après nos renseignements nous pensons tous que pour faire une trève ce n'est pas à Cettigné mais près des Chefs insurgés qu'il faut agir.

Prière communiquer aux Ambassades.

Inclosure 3 in No. 164.

Collective Note addressed by Consuls at Scutari to Prince of Montenegro.

M. le Prince, *Scutari, le 20 Avril*, 1861.

NOUS avons l'honneur de communiquer à votre Altesse un télégramme envoyé par son Excellence M. l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à M. le Consul de cette Puissance. Dans cette dépêche son Excellence M. l'Ambassadeur demande que les Monténégrins se retirent de Nichsich, car votre Altesse assumerait une grande responsabilité si elle permettrait à ses sujets de s'unir aux insurgés pour attaquer la Turquie.

Nous ne doutons donc pas, Monseigneur, que dans le cas où les Monténégrins prêteraient leurs concours aux insurgés votre Altesse s'empresserait de les rappeler

Nous prions votre Altesse de vouloir bien nous faire connaitre les mesures qu'elle aura prise à ce sujet.

Agréez, &c.

(Signé) DUBRAVEICH.
HECQUARD.
F. H. GILBERT.
SOUTCHENKOFF.

Inclosure 4 in No. 164.

Consul Holmes to Consul Sir F. Gilbert.

(Telegraphic.) *Serajevo, April* 18, 1861.

NICHSICH is at the last extremity; risk of a population of 4,000 being massacred by the Montenegrins; this information has been sent to Sir Henry Bulwer. Reply received:—"Take any measures you deem advisable on your own account and my authority. I will get the Representatives at Constantinople to act collectively as soon as possible.—Signed, BULWER." If you can act at Cettigné, do so instantly.

N.B.—This despatch only arrived late on the 21st April, 1861.

Inclosure 5 in No. 164.

M. de Lavalette to M. Hecquard.

(Télégraphique.) *Constantinople, le 22 Avril*, 1861, 12·10 *matin.*

L'AMBASSADEUR d'Angleterre n'a pas reçu la dépêche que vous annoncez. Nos Consuls à Mostar reçoivent l'ordre de se rendre à Nichsich pour négocier une armistice, et en cas extrême une capitulation entre les assiégeants et les assiégés; rendez-vous avec vos collègues à Cettigné, obtenez du Prince d'appuyer les nôtres, de le faire respecter, et de défendre de concert avec nous les droits de l'humanité.

Nous nous adressons au Prince avec d'autant plus de confiance, que comme nous il ne peut admettre en principe qu'il y ait des Monténégrins en armes sur le territoire Turque.

Communiquez cette dépêche aux Consuls Anglais, Russe, et Autrichien de la part de leurs Chefs.

Inclosure 6 in No. 164.

Consul Sir F. Gilbert to Sir H. Bulwer.

(Télégraphique.) *Scutari, le 22 Avril*, 1861.

NOUS partons immédiatement pour Cettigné; étant plus près de Nichsich que les Consuls de Mostar, afin d'éviter un retard pouvant être dangereux, nous nous y rendrons directement avec des Sénateurs que nous demandrons au Prince.

Inclosure 7 in No. 164.

The Prince of Montenegro to M. Hecquard.

M. le Consul, *Cettigné, le 23 Avril*, 1861.

J'AI reçu la lettre collective et la copie de la dépêche télégraphique de Son Excellence M. l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'adresser. Je suis heureux de ce que vous me fournissiez l'occasion de répondre à toutes les calomnies dont on accable le Monténégro.

Depuis la mort de mon oncle bien aimé, j'ai fait tous mes efforts pour conserver la tranquillité; vous savez mieux que personne comment j'ai toujours résisté aux provocations des Turcs et que c'est malgré moi et au moment même où j'espérais terminer pacifiquement ces conflits que les Piperis et les habitants de Novosello ont tiré une terrible vengeance de la mort de leur Capitaine dont les Turcs avaient emporté la tête. Depuis lors, j'ai redoublé de vigilance, et cependant les Turcs de Zablak viennent encore de provoquer une rixe en insultant une femme et en tirant sur des travailleurs inoffensifs. Du côté de l'Herzégovine ma conduite a été aussi correcte; loin d'encourager les insurgés, j'ai usé de mon influence pour les engager à la soumission; si mes conseils non pas été entendus, il faut l'attribuer aux vexations et aux mauvais traitements dont les Turcs abreuvent nos malheureux coreligionnaires. Faisant taire l'exaspération que ces actes d'oppression inspiraient à mes sujets j'ai risqué ma popularité en faisant vendre les biens de quelques uns d'entre eux qui, au mépris de mes ordres, étaient allés secourir leurs parents et amis. Aussi, M. le Consul, je proteste solennellement contre les accusations que le Gouvernement Ottoman porte contre moi, plaise à Dieu qu'il remplisse toujours aussi exactement ses engagements que je tiens les miens. Aucun Monténégrin, je le répète, et je l'affirme sur mon honneur, n'est de mon consentement en Herzégovine; si, se servant de ce prétexte, la Porte envoie contre moi Omer Pacha, qu'il vienne, nous l'attendons sans craintes. Forts de notre droit, certains d'avoir rempli notre devoir, mettant notre confiance en Dieu et dans la protection des Grandes Puissances qui ne voudront pas laisser commettre une injustice, nous nous montrerons dignes de nos ancêtres et saurons mourir, s'il le faut, pour repousser une agression inique. Je n'ai pas compris la dernière partie de la dépêche de Son Excellence, mais s'il s'agit de mettre un terme aux massacres, le meilleur moyen serait, selon moi, l'intervention des Grandes Puissances assurant aux insurgés un traitement équitable pour l'avenir. Je vous envoie avec le Capitaine Pero un moine du Monastère de Kosorievo.

Agréez, &c.

(Signé) NICOLAS.

Inclosure 8 in No. 164.

The Consuls at Scutari to the Ambassadors at Constantinople.

Cettigné, le 23 Avril, 1861.

(Télégraphique.)

LE Consul de Serajevo a été indignement trompé. Nichsich n'est ni assiégé ni bloqué par les Monténégrins, car le Prince de Monténégro a donné l'autorisation à M. Tchelovich, sujet Autrichien, de Risano de faire passer par son territoire cent charges de blé par mois pour la garnison, et avant hier un convoi pour cette destination passait encore par Grahovo. Ce qui a pu donner lieu à ce bruit est que la route de Mostar à Nichsich par Duga est intercepté par les Chrétiens insurgés.

Le Prince proteste énergiquement contre les calomnies repandues contre lui, et les provocations des Turcs qui exaspèrent son peuple.

Inclosure 9 in No. 164.

The Consuls at Scutari to the Consuls at Mostar.

Cettigné, le 24 Avril, 1861.

Messieurs,

CETTE lettre vous sera remise par M. Vaclik, Secrétaire de Son Altesse le Prince de Monténégro, qui vous donnera tous les renseignements que vous pourrez désirer.

D'ordre de nos Ambassadeurs, nous nous sommes rendus à Cettigné pour engager Son Altesse à unir ses efforts aux nôtres pour empêcher le massacre des 4,000 hommes qui étaient, disait-on, assiégés dans Nichsich. Comme nous le savions déjà, Son Altesse nous a renouvelé l'assurance qu'aucun Monténégrin de son consentement se trouve en Herzégovine. Nous avons appris aussi que Nichsich n'était nullement bloquée, puisque Son Altesse le Prince autorisait M. Tchelovich, sujet Autrichien, de Risano, à traverser son territoire pour porter chaque mois cent charges de farine pour la garnison de Nichsich, et qu'il nous a dit qu'avant hier trente-cinq chevaux chargés étaient passés par Grahovo pour cette destination.

Votre tâche, Messieurs, sera donc simplifiée, et nous n'avons qu'un regret, c'est qu'on vous ait fait faire si mal à propos un semblable voyage.

Son Altesse vous prie, puisque vous vous trouvez sur les lieux, de faire un enquête sur les événements qui viennent de passer à Oputna-Roudina, où neuf églises ont été profanées et ruinées, seize villages saccagés, des femmes violées, des enfants emmenés par les Turcs.

Nous vous serions fort reconnaissants si vous vouliez nous transmettre par l'intermédiaire de M. Vaclik les résultats de vos observations, d'autant plus importants pour nous que le Supérieur du Couvent de Kosorievo se trouve à Scutari pour y déposer une plainte.

(Signé) FRANCESCHI.
HECQUARD.
F. H. GILBERT.
ZOLOTOREFF.

Inclosure 10 in No. 164.

The Consuls at Scutari to the Ambassadors at Constantinople.

Scutari, le 26 Avril, 1861.

(Télégraphique.)

LE fournisseur Tchelovich déclare qu'il a le 23 Avril consigné trente-sept charges farine, riz, &c., à Nichsich, que trente chevaux chargés sont encore partis hier. Les insurgés sont à Duga huit heures de Nichsich.

Inclosure 11 in No. 164.

Report.

AYANT reçu des Représentants des Grandes Puissances à Constantinople l'ordre de nous rendre à Cettigné, pour engager le Prince à appuyer les démarches qu'allaient faire les Consuls de Mostar, nous prîmes les dispositions nécessaires pour cette course, qui pouvait durer plusieurs jours. Son Excellence Abdi Pacha ayant mis à notre disposition le vapeur de l'État pour remorquer les barques qui devaient nous conduire à Ricka, nous nous y embarquâmes à quatre heures du matin le 23 courant. A onze heures nous étions à Ricka, où nous apprenions que Nichsich n'avait rien à craindre et que seulement le blé y était fort cher par suite de la difficulté qu'on avait de s'en procurer en Herzégovine où les routes étaient interceptées par les insurgés. Nous nous hâtâmes cependant de continuer notre route, car ne pouvant croire à ces informations quoiqu'elles concordassent toutes entre elles, nous avions l'intention de partir le même jour pour Nichsich. A deux heures nous arrivions à Cettigné, et le Prince, que nous avions fait prévenir la veille, impatient de connaître les communications que nous avions à lui faire, vint nous trouver aussitôt. Après avoir pris lecture du télégramme qui nous était adressé, le Prince nous donna l'assurance que la nouvelle du blocus de Nichsich était fausse. "Quant à ce qu'il soit bloqué par les Monténégrins," ajouta Son Altesse, "si ces continuelles accusations n'étaient pas odieuses, elles seraient visibles, et vous en conviendrez, messieurs, lorsque vous saurez que c'est par mon territoire, et avec ma permission spéciale, que passent les vivres de la garnison de Nichsich. C'est M. Tchelovich, sujet Autrichien, de Risano, qui a la fourniture des troupes Ottomanes, et pour donner à la Sublime Porte une preuve de mon désir de vivre en bonne intelligence avec elle, je lui ai donné l'autorisation de faire passer chaque mois par Grahovo cent chevaux chargés de farine que j'ai exemptés des droits de transit que je perçois sur les autres marchandises, et avant-hier, le 21 Avril, un convoi pour cette destination se trouvait à Grahovo. Quant à la présence de Monténégrins en Herzégovine, comme je vous l'écrivais hier, je vous assure sur mon honneur qu'il n'y en a pas un avec mon consentement."

Son Altesse nous expliqua alors comment les insurgés Chrétiens s'étaient appropriés l'organisation des Monténégrins, avaient nommés des capitaines, des officiers, des caporaux, auxquels ils avaient donné les mêmes insignes que portent les Monténégrins. Qu'il avait vainement demandé jusqu'ici, mais qu'il allait encore insister auprès les Chefs insurgés, pour qu'ils prissent d'autres insignes. Que cette organisation, le costume qui était aussi le même, pouvait donner le change à des gens ne connaissant pas le pays, mais que les Turcs ne pouvaient s'y tromper puisqu'ils avaient à leur service les Musulmans de Trébigne, Gatzko, &c., qui connaissent fort bien les insurgés.

M. le Baron de Lichtenberg, Consul de Prusse à Raguse, qui, chargé de la même mission que nous, vient le lendemain à Cettigné, nous confirma les assertions du Prince. Il avait vu, nous dit-il, la veille de son départ de Raguse un individu habillé comme les Monténégrins et portant les insignes de caporaux, et ayant voulu lui demander des nouvelles de Cettigné, celui-ci lui avait dit qu'il était de Zupci, où l'on portait maintenant tout le costume Monténégrin.

Le Prince Nicolas protesta ensuite énergiquement contre les provocations des Turcs, contre leur manière d'agir envers lui, les calomnies des autorités Ottomanes, qui sans être l'objet d'aucun contrôle, sont ensuite repétées dans tous les journaux, et font un tort immense aux Monténégrins. Son Altesse se plaignit ensuite du blocus, de la menace qu'on lui faisait de l'envoi d'Omer Pacha. "Veuillez, je vous prie," nous dit le Prince, "faire remarquer à vos Gouvernements combien l'on rend ainsi ma position difficile; mon peuple, vous le savez, est déjà exaspéré de toutes les cruautés que les Turcs commettent en Herzégovine, la présence de tant de malheureuses familles réfugiées sur mon territoire, et qui se trouvent sans pain et sans asyle, l'irrite encore. Partout l'on murmure contre moi; j'use ma popularité à contenir mes sujets, et au lieu de m'en tenir compte, de m'aider dans la tâche difficile que je me suis imposée, l'on me crée toutes espèces d'embarras. Si Omer Pacha doit venir, qu'on ne fasse rien pour l'arrêter; grâces à Dieu nous avons de la poudre, un peu d'argent, et mieux vaut une guerre déclarée que de sourdes hostilités, et que des provocations auxquelles je ne puis répondre par respect pour les Grandes Puissances, et pour lesquelles jamais je n'ai pu obtenir la moindre satisfaction."

Le President du Sénat, Mirko, père du Prince, étant arrivé sur ces entrefaites, Son Altesse lui raconta le but de notre venue à Cettigné. Celui-ci nous assura encore qu'il n'y

avait rien de vrai dans la nouvelle du blocus, et que ce qui avait pu y donner lieu, c'était que la route de Mostar à Nichsich était interceptée par les insurgés qui occupaient Duga; puis s'échauffant par dégrès en racontant les injustices des Turcs, il finit par conseiller au Prince de transformer cette calomnie en vérité, en défendant le passage sur son territoire aux vivres des troupes. Nous n'eûmes pas cependant de peine à faire comprendre au Prince combien cette mesure serait inopportune, et combien il était plus avantageux pour lui de continuer à suivre la ligne de conduite qu'il avait tenue jusqu'alors.

Dans la soirée le Prince nous parla de la dernière affaire de Zablak, que son Excellence Abdi Pacha nous avait représentée comme une attaque dirigée contre la forteresse, et qu'il a dû télégraphier dans ce sens à Constantinople. Voici d'après ce que nous a dit Son Altesse et ce que nous avons entendu nous-mêmes à Ricka, comment aurait commencé cette rixe. Un certain nombre d'habitants et de Bachi-Bazouks de Zablak, embusqués dans une maison en ruines qui se trouve près de la frontière, auraient fait feu sur trois Monténégrins venus pour labourer leurs terres, et en auraient tué deux. Le troisième, secouru par les habitants de Dodosche, aurait combattu jusqu'au soir pour empêcher les Turcs d'emporter les têtes de ses compagnons, ce à quoi ils réussirent. Dans cette lutte, vingt-six Monténégrins ont été blessés et presque tous par les balles des soldats réguliers, qui, de la forteresse, soutenaient les Turcs embusqués. Le Prince s'est plaint aussi de ce que les habitants de Spuz ont creusé le long de la frontière, un fossé dans lequel ils se mettent pour tirer sur les Bielopavlovichi, lors qu'ils viennent travailler leurs terres, et nous a prié d'engager le Pacha à mettre fin à ces aggressions qui finiront par avoir des sérieuses conséquences.

Dans cette même soirée le Prince nous parla beaucoup des insurgés de l'Herzégovine et nous raconta les derniers événements. D'après le récit de son Altesse, qui nous fut confirmé par les informations qu'avait reçues M. le Consul de Prusse à Raguse, et les réclamations du Supérieur du Couvent de Kosorievo, les Turcs auraient détruit tous les villages d'Oputna-Roudina, quoique leurs habitants fussent soumis depuis longtemps et payassent les impôts, auraient dévasté et profané neuf églises, tué les hommes qui ne s'étaient pas enfuis à temps, et plus de 200 femmes ou jeunes filles choisies parmi les plus belles auraient été conduite au camp Turque d'où elles ne furent renvoyées qu'au bout de huit jours, après avoir subi les derniers outrages. A la suite de cette exécution, les femmes et les enfants s'étaient réfugiés dans le Monténégro, où le Prince était obligé de les nourir et les hommes étaient allés grossir le nombre des insurgés.

En nous racontant ces faits, le Prince nous manifesta la crainte que lui causait le voyage des Consuls de Mostar, que les insurgés pouvaient tuer en les prenant pour des Turcs.

A notre demande il envoya alors un Perianik à Duga, par où devaient passer nos collègues pour se rendre à Nichsich, afin de prévenir les insurgés de leur venue, et de les accompagner; puis il fit partir le lendemain son Secrétaire, M. Vaclik, avec la mission de rejoindre ces messieurs à Nichsich et de leur donner tous les renseignements qu'ils pourraient demander. M. Vaclik doit aussi les prier de la part du Prince de passer par Oputna-Roudina, dont ils sont peu éloignés, afin de s'assurer par eux-mêmes de la véracité du récit du Supérieur du Couvent de Kosorievo. Nous avons de notre côté envoyé à ces messieurs une lettre pour leur faire connaître ce que nous avions appris à Cettigné et leur faire part du désir de Son Altesse.

D'après le Prince, il y aurait peu d'espoir d'arriver à reconcilier les insurgés avec leur Gouvernement. Ils ont été trops de fois trompés, et M. de Lichtenberg nous a raconté que lorsque la députation envoyée par la commission instituée à Mostar était allée trouver Luka Vukalovich, celui-ci avait refusé de recevoir la lettre qu'on lui adressait, en leur montrant une des Consuls de France et d'Angleterre, Messieurs Hecquard et Churchill, qui écrivaient en 1858 aux insurgés de faire leur soumission et de croire aux promesses de Kemal Effendi, promesses que ces messieurs assuraient être sincères; montant, dit-il, cette lettre, Luka Vukalovich répondit aux députés que lorsque les deux Gouvernements que représentaient ces Consuls n'avaient pas pu faire tenir les promesses qu'ils avaient ainsi moralement garanties, ils ne pouvaient plus croire qu'en leurs fusils. Le Prince nous dit qu'il ne croyait pas cependant que cette insurrection s'étendit à moins d'événements se passant au dehors, mais qu'il pensait qu'elle ne serait pas reprimée. Que les Turcs brûleraient les villages, tueraient beaucoup de monde, perdraient sans doute aussi un grand nombre de soldats, mais que lorsque le mauvais temps reviendrait ils seraient obligés de se retirer, et que ce serait à recommencer l'année suivante. Le Prince est dans le vrai, et tous ceux qui connaissent ce pays penseront comme lui. La seule chose possible serait de donner à ces populations une organisation spéciale se rapprochant de celle des montagnes de Scutari, alors peut-être aurait-on la paix; nous disons peut-être, car il y aurait encore à vaincre les prétentions qu'ont les Musulmans de Trébigne, de Nichsich, de

Klobuk, &c., sur les terres occupées par ces tribus. Le Prince, avec qui nous parlions de ces événements, nous dit alors:—

"Il y aurait un moyen, proposez-le, messieurs, à vos Gouvernements; ce serait de me donner l'administration de ces tribus, pour lesquelles je payerais l'impôt à la Sublime Porte. Je suis certain qu'elles reconnaîtraient volontiers mon autorité. On éviterait ainsi l'effusion du sang, la Porte ne serait pas obligée d'entretenir une nombreuse armée qui lui cause des dépenses inutiles, et l'on mettrait fin à l'agitation que cette insurrection qui, au moindre succès peut s'entendre et entraîner mon peuple malgré moi, cause chez toutes les populations Slaves de l'Empire."

Ce moyen, nous devons en convenir, serait certainement le plus pratique d'en finir, mais nous doutons qu'il soit jamais agréé par la Sublime Porte. Son Altesse avait fait appeler à Cettigné M. Tchelovich pour qu'il nous donnât lui-même des renseignements sur ce qui se passait à Nichsich. Le temps ayant été affreux Mercredi, ce monsieur n'arriva que le jour de notre départ, mais comme nous avons eu l'honneur de le faire savoir à nos Ambassadeurs, il déclara devant M. le Consul de Prusse, resté à Cettigné, que le 23 Avril il avait consigné à Nichsich 37 chevaux chargés de farine et de riz pour la garnison de cette ville, que le 25 Avril il en avait fait partir 30 autres pour la même destination, et que les insurgés les plus rapprochés de Nichsich se trouvaient à Duga, c'est-à-dire, à huit heures de cette ville.

Il est vraiment facheux que les autorités Ottomanes se plaisent ainsi à dénaturer les faits, et à les exagerer; il serait bien désirable qu'on mit fin à ces fausses alertes, et qu'on exigât des Gouverneurs qu'ils contrôlassent sévèrement les faits avant de les rapporter.

Par les faits contenus dans ce mémoire on peut facilement juger ce qu'étaient l'assaut livré à Zablak, les blocus, et siége de Nichsich, et tant d'autres trouvés erronés chaque fois qu'une enquête sérieuse et impartiale a été faite. Ce dernier fait tout particulièrement peut mettre les Consuls de Mostar, s'ils arrivent auprès des insurgés avant d'avoir reçu de nos nouvelles, dans la position à la fois pénible et fausse de négocier, et de signer peut-être même, une capitulation pour une ville qui n'est pas assiégée.

Son Excellence Abdi Pacha a, du reste, lui-même reconnu le peu de confiance que méritent les sources qui sont à sa disposition. Il y a huit jours, lorsqu'au sujet de l'affaire de Zablak nous lui en exprimions nos doutes et l'engagions de se procurer des renseignements précis: "Vous avez raison, Messieurs," nous répondit-il, "mais jugez vous-mêmes combien ma position est difficile, j'ai des rapports officiels, des Mazbatas signés par des Medglis entiers, je suis forcé de les transmettre et cependant je vous assure que je ne manque pas d'envoyer aussi vos renseignements, qui, je le reconnais, sont généralement vrais."

Telles sont les informations que nous avons recueillies au sujet de l'état de Nichsich, et de l'exactitude desquelles nous sommes si certains, que si, par hazard, arrêtés par les insurgés, nos collègues de Mostar ne pouvant aller jusqu'à la ville susmentionnée, et n'en ayant pas de nouvelles, en concluaient qu'elle est bloquée, nous sommes prêts à y conduire un officier Turc pour s'assurer lui-même de la situation.

(Signé) FRANCESCHI.
HECQUARD.
F. H. GILBERT.
ZOLOTOREFF.

Scutari, le 26 Avril, 1861.

Inclosure 12 in No. 164.

The Baron de Lichtenberg to the French Consul at Scutari.

(Télégraphique.) *Raguse, le 20 Avril*, 1861.

CONVENTION faite des Consuls de Mostar avec les insurgés à Duga. Passage par là vers Nichsich ouvert aux transports des vivres, mais l'escorte ne doit-être que de tant soldats comme nécessaires pour maintenir l'ordre, la troupe Impériale ne fera aucune démarche offensive, les différends seront réglés pacifiquement, la troupe gardera bien la discipline.

Chancelier Autrichien y était, Consul malade.

No. 165.

Lord A. Loftus to Lord J. Russell.—(Received May 20.)

(No. 201.)
My Lord, *Berlin, May 17, 1861.*

I INQUIRED yesterday of Baron Schleinitz what reply he had received from Vienna to the question which he had addressed to the Austrian Government with respect to the object of their military preparations on the Save, as reported to your Lordship in my despatch No. 188 of the 11th instant.

His Excellency stated that he had received the most satisfactory assurances from the Cabinet of Vienna on this subject, which stated that the Austrian Government had not the remotest idea of any intervention, and that the concentration of military forces on the Servian frontier was merely intended for defensive purposes, and to ward off any attack which might be made against Austrian territory in that quarter.

Further assurances were given that if, even at any future time, an intervention were to be regarded as necessary for the maintenance of order and tranquillity in Servia, no such intervention would take place without referring to the Great Powers.

His Excellency stated that the reply which he had received from the Austrian Government had entirely relieved him of all anxiety on the subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 166.

Lord J. Russell to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 141.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, May 22, 1861.*

I INCLOSE, for your information, copies of despatches marked in the margin,* respecting affairs of Herzegovina.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 167.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 320.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 20, 1861.*

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a despatch addressed by Aali Pasha to M. Musurus, and communicated by the latter to me, respecting the affairs of the Herzegovina and the course of clemency which the Porte has resolved upon following towards the insurgents in that province; and with reference to the hope expressed by the Porte in regard to the conduct of the Delegates of the Great Powers, I have to inform you that Her Majesty's Government would wish in every way to respect the sovereign rights of the Porte.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 167.

Aali Pasha to M. Musurus.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Sublime Porte, le 1 Mai, 1861.*

VOUS savez avec quelle longanimité le Gouvernement Impérial a traité jusqu'ici les insurgés de l'Herzégovine. Vous n'ignorez non plus de quelle manière ils y ont répondu.

Malgré les calomnies et les récriminations injustes dont les journaux Européens ne cessent de se remplir contre la conduite de nos agents, nous espérons que la vérité finira par se faire jour, et qu'on saura alors à la charge de qui doivent tomber toutes ces atro-

* No. 167 and Inclosures.

cités qu'une malveillance systématique cherche toujours à mettre sur le compte des Musulmans.

Je vous ai envoyé, il y a quelque temps, copies des pièces échangées entre la Sublime Porte et les Représentants des cinq Grandes Puissances à Constantinople au sujet de la proposition de nommer une Commission Mixte, dans le but d'examiner sur les lieux les prétendus griefs des insurgés et de les amener à la soumission moyennant un arrangement quelconque. Nous avons dû décliner cette offre d'intervention, et MM. les Représentants ont reconnu la force et la justice des raisons qui nous empêchaient d'y adhérer.

Cependant, notre auguste maître, animé, comme toujours, du désir ardent d'éviter par tous les moyens imaginables l'effusion de sang de ses sujets, a bien voulu ménager aux habitants égarés des districts qui sont en état de rébellion une nouvelle porte de salut. Sa Majesté Impériale a, en conséquence, et de son propre mouvement, décidé le nouveau Commandant-en-chef de l'armée de Roumélie, son Excellence Omer Pacha, de leur porter, en son nom, une Proclamation par laquelle il leur accorde, non-seulement une pleine et entière amnistie, mais encore toutes les améliorations dont ils peuvent raisonnablement avoir besoin.

J'ai l'honneur de joindre ici une copie de ce document avec celle d'une lettre identique que je viens, par ordre de Sa Majesté Impériale, d'adresser aux Représentants.

Nous espérons que les augustes amis de la Sublime Porte apprécieront la haute portée de cet acte de clémence du Sultan, notre maître, et voudront bien recommander à leurs Délégués une conduite conforme au sentiment de respect qu'ils professent à l'égard des droits de souveraineté de la Sublime Porte.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) AALI.

Inclosure 2 in No. 167.

Proclamation.

SA Majesté Impériale le Sultan, notre auguste Maître, a daigné me mettre à la tête de sa vaillante armée de Roumili, avec l'honorable mission de présider la Commission *ad hoc* envoyée ici pour s'enquérir de vos besoins et redresser les griefs légitimes que vous pourriez avoir.

Je viens au-milieu de vous avec des ordres positifs de notre auguste et magnanime Souverain de vous traiter avec cette indulgence et cette générosité qui le caractérisent.

Vous avez été égarés et, par conséquent, obligés depuis bientôt quatre ans à endurer bien des souffrances. La ligne de conduite que des gens intéressés à troubler votre repos vous ont induit à suivre, aurait attiré sur vous des calamités incalculables sans la commisération dont vous avez été l'objet de la part de Sa Majesté Impériale. C'est à vous maintenant à prouver à notre Souverain que vous êtes ses fidèles sujets, et que vous êtes dignes de ses bontés paternelles.

Venez donc en confiance auprès de moi. Je vous apporte de la part de Sa Majesté Impériale, et je le proclame, en son auguste nom, un pardon plein et entier avec la remise de vos impôts arriérés.

Je vous promets également:—

1. De confirmer le choix que chaque village est autorisé à faire d'un ou deux Moultars ou Maires selon l'importance du village.

2. De nommer pour chaque nahié deux Kodja-Bachis, pris parmi les indigènes jouissant de la confiance de leurs concitoyens.

3. La liberté absolue de culte avec la faculté de bâtir des églises, comme tous les sujets Chrétiens de Sa Majesté Impériale, et de vous servir de cloches.

4. De ne plus permettre aux zaptiés de loger dans vos maisons, mais de les faire descendre dans les endroits destinés par chaque village pour les recevoir.

5. De mettre immédiatement en vigueur les arrangements réglant les rapports entre les propriétaires et les fermiers, arrangements qui ont été adoptés de concert avec la députation des propriétaires et des fermiers de Bosnie, appelée à cet effet à Constantinople.

6. De vous permettre que la quote-part des impôts de chaque maison soit prélevée et remise à l'autorité par vos Moultars et Kodja-Bachis.

7. De recommander au Patriarcat de vous envoyer désormais des évêques de votre nation qui connaissent et parlent votre langue.

8. De vous faciliter l'acquisition des propriétés foncières.

Vous voyez donc que notre auguste Maître vous offre généreusement non-seulement

l'oubli du passé, mais encore tout ce dont vous pouvez avoir besoin pour assurer votre bonheur et votre prospérité future.

Empressez vous de vous conformer aux conseils bienveillants que je vous adresse encore une fois; profitez-en et cessez de vous tenir dans un état qui ne peut que tourner à votre détriment. Epargnez au Gouvernement Impérial l'immense peine et la triste nécessité de vous traiter comme rebelles. Epargnez à vous-mêmes les conséquences désastreuses de ce traitement.

Inclosure 3 in No. 167.

Aali Pasha to the Representatives of Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia.

Le 30 Avril, 1861.

J'AI l'honneur de vous adresser ci-joint la traduction en Français de la Proclamation que son Excellence Omer Pacha est chargé de publier à son arrivée en Herzégovine.

La Sublime Porte espère que votre Excellence verra dans ce document une nouvelle preuve de la sincérité du désir de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan d'éviter par tous les moyens en son pouvoir l'effusion de sang de ses sujets.

Tout le monde connaît la longanimité avec laquelle le Gouvernement Impérial a procédé à l'égard des habitants des districts qui sont depuis quatre ans en état de rébellion contre l'autorité légitime de leur Souverain. Les excitations, les encouragements, et les promesses d'appui qu'ils n'ont cessé de recevoir de la part de leurs voisins de la Montagne Noire ont rendus vains jusqu'ici tous les efforts de la Sublime Porte pour amener la pacification de cette contrée. Plus le Gouvernement du Sultan s'est montré indulgent, plus les insurgés se sont crus libres de commettre impunément toutes ces atrocités dont les détails font frémir le cœur humain. A l'heure qu'il est, les choses en sont venus au point où il devient impossible à la Sublime Porte de rester inactive, et de ne pas procéder à une répression énergique et sérieuse. Mais, avant de recourir à cette triste extrémité, le Gouvernement a cru devoir faire un dernier essai des moyens pacifiques, en concédant aux insurgés tout ce qu'ils peuvent désirer raisonnablement.

Pour qu'aucun doute ne puisse entraver l'accomplissement de l'œuvre humanitaire qu'elle poursuit, et comme une nouvelle preuve de sa parfaite confiance dans les sentiments d'amitié des Grandes Puissances, ses augustes alliées, la Sublime Porte a résolu de faire de la Proclamation dont il s'agit l'objet d'une communication à votre Excellence, ainsi qu'à MM. ses Collègues de ———.

Devant une manifestation aussi solennelle, aucune méfiance n'est plus permise de la part des insurgés. Nous espérons que les délégués que vous et vos collègues vous vous proposez d'envoyer sur les lieux, donneront au Commandant-Général des troupes Impériales tout leur concours dans les mesures convenues pour atteindre le but commun qui est le rétablissement de la paix.

No. 168.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 331.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, May 23, 1861.*

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, copies of three despatches, relative to the affairs of Montenegro and the Herzegovina.*

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 169.

Lord J. Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 640.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, May 23, 1861.*

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches as marked in the margin, upon the subject of the state of affairs in the Herzegovina.†

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 170.

Lord Napier to Lord J. Russell.—(Received May 27.)

(No. 126. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, May 20, 1861.*

THE apprehensions of Prince Gortchakow appear to have been aroused rather unnecessarily by a statement in the public journals to the effect that the cession of Venetia by Austria was to be managed under the influence of Great Britain and France in consideration of a money payment by Italy, and of a territorial compensation to be taken in the Adriatic dominions of the Sultan, who in his turn would receive a pecuniary indemnity from the Italian Treasury. His Excellency stated that such schemes had certainly been entertained at Paris, but he could never accede to them, for they involved the transfer of the people of Herzegovina, and from one Government to another, without their participation or consent, like a herd of cattle.

I replied to the Prince that I had no official information of the views of Her Majesty's Government in regard to any territorial compensation to be offered to Austria in case of the cession of Venetia, yet I took upon me to say that the notion of transferring provinces from the dominion of the Sultan to that of the Emperor, and of disposing of the fate of the inhabitants without consulting their interests and sympathies, was altogether foreign to the policy of Her Majesty's Government, and contrary to the sentiments of the British people. I thought, therefore, the Imperial Government need be under no anxiety as to our concurrence in the scheme referred to, supposing it to be seriously entertained in any quarter.

I have, &c.

(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 171.

Lord Napier to Lord J. Russell.—(Received May 27.)

(No. 128. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, May 21, 1861.*

PRINCE GORTCHAKOW has had the goodness to show me the correspondence of Prince Labanoff relative to the mission of Omar Pasha to Herzegovina, and to the terms offered by the Government of the Sultan to the insurgents in that province. The Russian Minister appears to have joined heartily with his colleagues in their identic letter to the Porte, and in their identic instruction to the Commissioners appointed to attend the Pasha and aid in the work of pacification. Those documents recognize most

* Nos. 155, 156, and 165. † No. 167 and Inclosure.

explicitly that the concessions of the Porte are satisfactory and ample. I remarked to Prince Gortchakow that I was happy to see the name of the Russian Minister attached to these papers, which contained such explicit testimony to the good intentions of the Turkish Government, and that I thought the harmony and united action of the Representatives in this matter reflected credit on them, and would have the best results.

I did not find that Prince Gortchakow entered entirely into these views. He intimated that in his opinion Prince Labanoff might have gone too far in joining in such an unqualified approval of the measures of the Porte, and he was disposed to question the prudence of his conduct in sanctioning the expedition of the Consular body to Nichsich, where those functionaries are now shut up by the Christian rebels. The Prince, however, added that he did not like to blame Prince Labanoff, of whose capacity and discretion he had a high opinion.

Among the papers forwarded by Prince Labanoff was a telegraphic despatch to the Russian Consul in Montenegro, directing him to solicit the assistance of the Prince of the Mountain in controlling the faithless conduct of the insurgents and opening a road to Nichsich. The telegraphic reply of the Prince promised his aid, declared that supplies might be carried across the territory of Montenegro for the relief of the place above mentioned, and that he would dispatch a "Senator" to the scene of disturbance. In the same telegram the Prince, however, complains of the conduct of the Turkish authorities in Albania, but I did not understand in what respect.

In one of his despatches Prince Labanoff expresses his great concern on account of the treacherous conduct of the Christians in cutting off the van of the convoy directed by the Turkish authorities on Nichsich, in violation of a solemn stipulation sanctioned by the European Consular body. His Excellency could only explain or extenuate this fact on the hypothesis that the Turks were attempting to throw in troops at the same time, an hypothesis totally unwarranted by any intelligence we possess.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 172.

Lord J. Russell to Lord Napier.

(No. 92.) *Foreign Office, May* 28, 1861.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE herewith, for your Excellency's information, copies of a note from Aali Pasha to Musurus,* and of a despatch I have addressed to Sir Henry Bulwer respecting the affairs of the Herzegovina.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 173.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 340.) *Foreign Office, May* 28, 1861.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency copies of a despatch and of some of its inclosure from Sir F. H. Gilbert† respecting the late mission of the European Consuls at Scutari to Cettigné, in consequence of the reported siege of the town and fort of Nichsich by the Montenegrins.

Her Majesty's Government consider that it is very desirable to ascertain the truth in reference to Montenegro.

If the Prince of Montenegro has been wronged, he ought to be supported and encouraged.

If he has deceived the Turks, your Excellency must support and encourage the Turks.

But the story of this matter is at present very obscure.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

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* Inclosure in No. 167.

† No. 164 and Inclosures.

No. 174.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received May 31.)

(No. 351.) *Constantinople, May* 19, 1861.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 328 of the 8th instant, upon the subject of the siege of Nichsich, I have now the honour to transmit to your Lordship the copy of a letter addressed by the Prince of Montenegro to the Representatives of the Great Powers here, through their respective Consuls at Scutari, relative to his differences with the Porte, and likewise a copy of the identic instruction which has been addressed to the Consuls in reply to the Prince's communication.

I may take this opportunity of forwarding to your Lordship the names of the Delegates composing the European Commission about to meet at Mostar with a view to the pacification of the Herzegovina:—

Great Britain.—W. H. Holmes, Esq., Her Majesty's Consul at Bosna-Serai.
Austria.—Major Jovanovitch, a staff-officer.
France.—M. Tissot, Consul at Adrianople.
Prussia.—M. Blau, Consul at Bosna-Serai.
Russia.—M. Brezobrazoff, Consul at Mostar.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 174.

Answer of Prince Nicolas to the English and Russian Consuls.

VOICI réponse écrite remise par le Prince Nicolas:—

"Les Consuls Anglais et Russes de Mostar étant venus me trouver, autorisés par leurs Ambassadeurs à traiter avec moi, je leur ai proposé par écrit de laisser passer par mon territoire autant de vivres et de munitions que le voudraient les Turcs, à charge de réciprocité. Nichsich étant à la dernière extrémité, de l'aveu même des Turcs, il était naturel de tirer un avantage du secour qu'on me demandait. Aujourd'hui que les Représentants des Grandes Puissances font appel à la générosité et aux sentiments d'humanité du Prince de Monténégro, j'abandonne les avantages pouvant résulter de cette situation et je continuerai à faciliter le passage des vivres nécessaires pour ravitailler Nichsich. Désirant voir la tranquillité rétablie et cesser un état de choses qui repand l'agitation et met à notre charge 600 familles mourant de faim vous pouvez assurer vos Gouvernements qu'il me trouveront toujours prêt, comme je l'étais jusqu'à présent, à prêter mon appuis pour faire accepter les conditions qu'ils jugent satisfaisantes. S'ils le désirent je mettrai même un Sénateur à leur disposition pour faire entendre hautement les conseils que je ne cesse de donner à ces malheureuses populations. Je saisis cette occasion de prouver aux Grandes Puissances notre reconnaissance pour la confiance qu'elles nous montrent. J'espère que mon empressement à satisfaire leur désir de mettre un terme aux défiances dont je suis l'objet, et je vous prie qu'il soit pris d'urgence des mesures énergiques pour mettre un terme aux continuelles aggressions des Turcs du côté de l'Albanie.

(Signé) NICOLAS.

Cettigné, le 10 *May*, 1861.

Inclosure 2 in No. 174.

The Representatives to the Consuls of the Five Great Powers at Cettigné.

(Télégraphique.) *Constantinople, le* 17 *Mai*, 1861.

NOUS étions dispersés; nous n'avons pu répondre plutôt. Nous avons apprécié le loyal concours que le Prince a donné et donnera au ravitaillement de Nichsich. Nous avons été plus encore touchés des sentiments généreux et pacifiques que Son Altesse exprime. Ils prouvent qu'il nous a parfaitement compris.

Omer Pacha est parti ce matin animé des intentions que manifeste le Prince de Monténégro lui-même. C'est dans une entente directe avec lui qu'il faut chercher les mesures d'urgence que réclame l'état des frontières et mettant autant que possible à l'écart les griefs de chaque côté, arriver avec lui à un accord qui établisse la paix pour le présent

et pour l'avenir. Ces dispositions mutuelles, que nous constatons à la fois dans la lettre du Prince et dans les paroles du Général-en-chef, seront soutenues énergiquement par les sympathies des Représentants des Grandes Puissances.

Communiquez cette dépêche à vos collègues qui, comme vous, en donneront copie au Prince.

No. 175.

Consul Holmes to Lord J. Russell.—(Received June 3.)

(No. 67.)
My Lord,

Bosna-Serai, May 16, 1861.

THE post from Mostar has brought me no letters, and I am consequently still without the details of what has lately been taking place in the Herzegovina. I received a telegram on the 13th instant from Mr. Vice-Consul Zohrab to the effect that on the 11th instant the Russian Consul and himself were at Cattaro, where they had concluded a contract for provisions, and that they were on the next day about to return towards Nichsich to superintend the execution of (I suppose) an arrangement which had been made with the Prince Nicholas to allow the said provisions to pass through Montenegro.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 176.

Consul Holmes to Lord J. Russell.—(Received June 3.)

(No. 68.)
My Lord,

Bosna-Serai, May 16, 1861.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that his Excellency Sir Henry Bulwer has informed me that I shall be appointed British delegate to assist Omer Pasha in the pacification of the Herzegovina. During my absence for the purpose his Excellency suggests that Mr. Zohrab should act here.

Omer Pasha leaves Constantinople to-day, and will arrive here by the Danube in about a fortnight. I hope that before that time Mr. Zohrab will have concluded his business at Nichsich, and will be ready to come here.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 177.

Consul Holmes to Lord J. Russell.—(Received June 4.)

(No. 71.)
My Lord,

Bosna-Serai, May 23, 1861.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that I have received from Her Majesty's Ambassador a despatch appointing me to be British Delegate to assist Omer Pasha in the pacification of the Herzegovina, and inclosing a copy of a Proclamation of which Omer Pasha is the bearer to the insurgent population. I do not inclose copies of these documents, as they have doubtless been communicated to your Lordship by Sir Henry Bulwer. I beg, however, to inclose copy of my despatch No. 44 of the 21st instant, in which I acknowledge the receipt of that of his Excellency, and make some remarks regarding the concessions of the Proclamation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure in No. 177.

Consul Holmes to Sir H. Bulwer.

Sir,

Bosna-Serai, May 21, 1861.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge your Excellency's despatch of the 4th May, informing me that, an arrangement having been made with the Porte to that

effect, a Commission, composed of the Delegates of Austria, France, Great Britain Russia, and Prussia, is about to meet at Mostar, where also his Excellency Omer Pasha will proceed, for the purpose of putting an end, if possible, to the present lamentable state of affairs in the Herzegovina, and that your Excellency has done me the honour to appoint me as Delegate for Great Britain. I have also to acknowledge the receipt of the copy of the Proclamation of which Omer Pasha is the bearer. The instructions for my guidance contained also in the despatch will command my careful attention, and I shall endeavour, to the best of my ability, to aid Omer Pasha in the difficult task confided to him. I say difficult, because I imagine it will be by no means easy either to persuade the insurgents that the conditions of the Proclamation will be conscientiously carried out, even with the guarantee of the Representatives of the European Powers, or that the Porte has the power of punishing them if they refuse to accept them.

With regard to the concessions of the Proclamation, I would remark that the most important, if not all of them, have been long since nominally accorded here, and, I believe, in the Herzegovina, but never carried out in fact, as the insurgents are well aware. For instance, the promise of permission to build churches as other Christian subjects of the Porte seems delusive, when it is known here that one of the Christian communities—the Orthodox Greeks—have collected money to build a church, but are prevented from doing so on the frivolous pretext of its being near a mosque, the said mosque being more than 150 yards from the site proposed for the church, and hardly visible from it. The admirable arrangement between the farmers and proprietors of land, made some time ago with the deputation who proceeded from Bosnia to Constantinople for that purpose, is well known to have remained a dead letter. Every possible obstacle is still also thrown in the way of the purchase of land by Christians, and very often after they have succeeded in purchasing and improving land, it is no secret that on one unjust pretext or another it has been taken from them, and it is thus natural to expect that the insurgents will reply as they have replied to other similar proclamations, "Let us see your promises carried out in the provinces still under your Government, and then we will believe that they will be really accorded to us." I shall not fail to observe to Omer Pasha on his arrival here how much his mission would be facilitated were matters otherwise in Bosnia, and even that an immediate permission to construct the church in question would not be without effect.

With regard to the second difficulty, I trust that the insurgents will see in Omer Pasha a commander of a very different stamp, as regards ability and energy, from those to whom they have lately been habituated; and if my colleagues will only act in good faith and sincerely in accord with the instructions they have received, I see no reason to despair of restoring tranquillity to the Herzegovina. From what precedes, your Excellency will, however, see that there is a possible contingency of Omer Pasha's being obliged, as a primary condition of success, to convince the rebels of his power to coerce them previous to his being able to bring them to any terms, or to taking the necessary measures to prevent them being again in a position to revolt. Should this unhappily be the case, then the subsequent faithful execution of the promises of the Proclamation would doubtless eventually convert them into contented subjects of the Porte. It is to be highly desired, however, that this may be accomplished without any recourse to arms, and the endeavours of the Commission will certainly be to ensure a satisfactory arrangement without any such appeal. I mention the possibility of it, but I have always hoped that, where others would fail, the prestige alone of Omer Pasha's name will be sufficient to impose on the insurgents, and enable him to occupy without bloodshed the positions necessary to secure the future tranquillity of the country, and to accomplish its pacification.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 178.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received June 6.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, June 6, 1861, 4 P.M.

AALI PASHA begged me to request your Lordship not to compromise, before hearing the views and opinions of the Porte, Her Majesty's Government in favour of a transaction to be brought about by giving Venice to Sardinia and Bosnia and the Herzegovina to Austria. He seemed alarmed on the subject.

No. 179.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 368.)
Foreign Office, June 6, 1861.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, reporting a conversation which he had with Prince Gortchakow on the affairs of the Herzegovina.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 180.

Consul Holmes to Lord J. Russell.—(Received June 8.)

(No. 75.)
Bosna-Serai, May 28, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to report that on the 25th instant I forwarded to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople the following telegram:—

"Yazah Pasha has entered Nichsich with provisions by defile Douga. Turks fortify their position there."

From what Mr. Zohrab tells me the rebels had retired and left the pass free, perhaps owing to letters lately written by the Prince Nicholas to the Montenegrin authorities on the frontier, but I think also that something is to be attributed to the approach of Omer Pasha.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 181.

Consul Holmes to Lord J. Russell.—(Received June 8.)

(No. 78.)
Bosna-Serai, May 30, 1861.

My Lord,

BEING about to leave Bosnia on the mission with which I have been charged by his Excellency Her Majesty's Ambassador at the Porte, I have the honour most respectfully to beg that your Lordship will inform me as soon as possible how I may draw from time to time for the expenses which I may incur. From the wretched condition of the Herzegovina, and the number of troops collected there, the common necessaries of life are at famine prices. Horses, which are indispensable in these countries, are at fabulous rates, considering the wretched animals which are presented for sale, and thus, to begin with, it will require a considerable outlay to enable me to move. My family, of course, remains here; and during my absence the ordinary official expenses of stationery, dragoman, cavasses, &c., will be defrayed by me as usual. Your Lordship, therefore, will easily understand that my salary is not sufficient to keep up my establishment here, and also to be in advance for the expenses attending my mission in the Herzegovina. This may be of limited duration, or may possibly drag on for some months; and I would therefore beg your Lordship's permission to draw for what I may require as the occasion offers, as in the Herzegovina it is not always easy to obtain money for a bill of any kind.

I will send in my accounts in any manner which your Lordship may direct.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 182.

Consul Zohrab to Lord J. Russell.—(Received June 8.)

(No. 81.)
Bosna-Serai, May 30, 1861.

My Lord,

IT is with regret I have to report that the neighbourhood of Nichsich has been the theatre of another massacre of troops.

Vassif Pasha informs me from Mostar that on the 23rd instant ninety horses in

* No. 171.

charge of a milazim (lieutenant), and forty-two soldiers were sent from Nichsich to Kusinski-most to bring to that town a portion of the grain for which M. Besolrasow and myself had contracted at Risano; Kusinski-most, two hours from Nichsich on the frontier, being the point at which the contractor undertook to deliver the grain. The grain was taken in charge by the troops, and the convoy had proceeded some distance on its return when it was attacked by a band of Montenegrins and rebels, the officer and thirty-eight soldiers murdered, and the loads and horses carried off.

From inquiries I have made here, it appears that of the 19,200 okes of grain for which we had contracted a considerable portion had been permitted to pass unmolested into Nichsich, probably with a view on the part of the Montenegrins or rebels to deceive the Turks into a sense of security; this attained, the favourable moment was seized and the act of treachery perpetrated.

The Turks accuse the Montenegrins of co-operation in this attack; I cannot say they do so gratuitously; and though Prince Nicholas assured me that while in Montenegro the Turkish convoys would be quite secure, from the manner in which he expressed himself, I felt persuaded that if the greatest caution were not used by the Turks at the point of delivery a deplorable event would result. This conviction induced me to write from Grahovo to M. Moreau, at Nichsich, to impress on the authorities there either to send only Christians to take over the convoys, or troops sufficient to repel an attack. In the first instance my advice was followed, but apparent security seems to have rendered the authorities careless.

On taking leave of Prince Nicholas at Cettigné, His Highness said to me, in nearly the following words:—

"I have now given without conditions permission for provisions to pass through my territories to Nichsich; they will be quite safe while in my territories, but woe to the Turks ('gare aux Turcs') if they accuse the Montenegrins should they be attacked after crossing the frontier."

This evidently indicated that an attack might be expected, indeed the Prince said he felt certain that the rebels would not permit the third or fourth convoy to pass freely; of this I felt convinced, and I also felt sure that if an attack were made it would be either by Montenegrins or by the rebels through orders from Montenegro. Food, however, was of the first necessity in Nichsich, and no alternative was left us but to put faith in the assurances of the Prince, and to caution the Nichsich authorities against treachery.

In my report on the blockade of Nichsich, I shall endeavour to set forth the share that Montenegro has taken, and is still taking, in the revolt in the Herzegovina. This report I shall lay before your Lordship as early as possible.

In conclusion, I feel it my duty to state that I anticipate further and more serious treachery, and if the Turkish Commanders do not show vigilance and caution heavy losses will have to be deplored.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAS. ZOHRAB.

No. 183.

Lord Bloomfield to Lord J. Russell.—(Received June 8.)

(No. 291.)
Vienna, June 6, 1861.

My Lord,

REPORTS continuing to exist that an Austrian army was being concentrated at Brod with the object of watching events in Servia, I have again spoken with Count Rechberg on the subject. He replied that the force actually assembled was very small, that he believed at present it only consisted of a couple of regiments, but that in a few days it could be increased from the frontier regiments, as he had told me on a former occasion, to 15,000 men; but that there was no aggressive project whatever in this concentration of troops, and that it had been ordered simply for defensive purposes.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 184.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

Foreign Office, June 8, 1861.

(Telegraphic.)

HER Majesty's Government are not in any way compromised in a transaction to be brought about by giving Venice to Italy and Bosnia and the Herzegovina to Austria. No foreign Minister or Ambassador has hitherto proposed such a project to Her Majesty's Government. It has been loosely suggested in conversation, but Her Majesty's Government would listen to the views and opinions of the Porte before compromising themselves in any way.

No. 185.

Consul Sir F. Gilbert to Lord J. Russell.—(Received June 10.)

Scutari, May 22, 1861.

(No. 18.)

My Lord,

I DID hope that, through the intervention of the Prince of Montenegro, our colleagues of Mostar would have succeeded in opening communications with the countries around Nichsich, at least, for the free transport of provisions, and that, therefore, they would be able to leave that town, and that our presence was no longer necessary at Cettigné, but it appears that, either from misconception or by design, the advanced guard of the convoy was killed; but of this circumstance your Lordship will of course have the full details from Mr. Zohrab, Her Majesty's Consul at Mostar; suffice it to say that a telegram was received here instructing the Consuls of Scutari to return to Cettigné, and to remain there till matters were satisfactorily arranged for supplying Nichsich with provisions, and at the same time to engage the Prince warmly to support the Proclamation which Omar Pasha was to publish on his arrival in the disturbed districts.

Out of the many despatches and telegrams which passed between various parties, I will only request your Lordship's attention to the following copies:—

Telegram from the Ambassadors at Constantinople to the Consuls at Scutari to return immediately to Cettigné.

The answer of the Prince of Montenegro to the request of the Consuls founded on the above telegraphic despatch.

Letter of the Consuls of Scutari addressed to Messrs. Zohrab and Besobrason, at the urgent request of the Prince of Montenegro, after those gentlemen had left for Cattaro.

Two reports to the Ambassadors at Constantinople from the Consuls at Scutari and our collegues of Prussia at Ragusa.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. H. GILBERT.

Inclosure 1 in No. 185.

The Ambassadors at Constantinople to the Consuls at Scutari.

Pera, 6 Mai, 1861.

(Télégraphique.)

NOS Consuls de Mostar se sont rendus à Nichsich, où ils se trouvent encore, sur la foi d'une Convention qui, paraît-il, a été indignement violée.

Cette malheureuse circonstance offre au Prince Nicolas une occasion signalée de jouer un rôle utile, honorable, et généreux en sauvegardant à la fois nos Consuls et la ville de Nichsich. La proclamation du Général Omer Pacha accorde des concessions considérées comme généralement satisfaisantes par tous les Représentants des Grandes Puissances; le Prince, en les soutenant avec nous, se conciliera la sympathie de l'Europe entière. Vous vous rendrez donc à l'instant à Cettigné, et vous vous y entendrez avec le Prince sur les voies et moyens.

Insistez énergiquement sur les considérations précédentes et restez y jusqu'à la solution. Répondez télégraphiquement.

Inclosure 2 in No. 185.

The Prince of Montenegro to the Consuls at Cettigné.

Cettigné, le 10 Mai, 1861.

MM. les Consuls,

LES Consuls Anglais et Russe de Mostar étant venus me trouver, autorisés par leurs Ambassadeurs à traiter avec moi, je leur ai proposé par écrit, de laisser passer par mon territoire autant de vivres et de munitions que le voudraient les Turcs à charge de réciprocité. Nichsich étant à la dernière extrémité, de l'aveu même des Turcs, il était naturel de tirer un avantage des secours qu'on me demandait.

Aujourd'hui que les Représentants des Grandes Puissances font appel à la générosité et aux sentiments d'humanité du Prince du Monténégro, j'abandonne les avantages pouvant résulter de cette situation pour le Monténégro, et je continuerai à faciliter le passage des vivres nécessaires pour ravitailler Nichsich.

Désireux de voir la tranquillité rétablie et de voir cesser un état de choses qui repand l'agitation dans mon peuple et met à la charge du Monténégro, déjà si pauvre par lui-même, plus de six cents familles mourant de faim, vous pouvez assurer vos Gouvernements qu'ils me trouveront toujours prêts, comme je l'ai été jusqu' à présent, à prêter mon appui pour faire accepter les conditions qu'ils jugent satisfaisantes, et que même s'ils le désirent, je mettrai un Sénateur à leur disposition pour faire entendre hautement les conseils que je ne cesse de donner à ces malheureuses populations.

Je suis heureux de saisir cette occasion de prouver aux Gouvernements des Grandes Puissances notre reconnaissance pour la confiance qu'ils nous montrent. J'espère que mon empressement à satisfaire aux désirs des Grandes Puissances mettra un terme aux défiances dont je suis l'objet, et je vous prie de demander qu'il soit pris d'urgence des mesures énergiques pour mettre un terme aux continuelles agressions des Turcs du côté de l'Albanie.

Le Prince de Monténégro,

(Signé) NICOLAS.

Inclosure 3 in No. 185.

The Consuls at Scutari to the Consuls at Mostar.

Cettigné, le 11 Mai, 1861.

Messieurs,

LE Prince, M. Mirco, et plusieurs Sénateurs nous disent qu'ils pensent qu'il serait plus prudent de faire passer les vivres par Niegoch, Cevo, et Silva, que par la plaine de Grahovo, parceque par cette dernière route la frontière se trouvant plus éloignée de Nichsich, il pourrait arriver que les insurgés apprenant le départ de ce convoi fassent un détachement pour l'attaquer dès qu'il aura dépassé le territoire Monténégrin, chose qui peut arriver par l'autre route. Le Prince nous prie de vous donner cet avis, car il pense comme nous que dans ce moment-ci on ne saurait prendre trop de précaution. Pour votre gouverne nous vous faisons savoir que le jour du départ du convoi de Krstaz il y a eu un mouvement de troupes et que le convoi composé seulement de trente chevaux était précédé de soixante-deux Bachi-Bozouks et suivi d'une compagnie de réguliers; que les Bachi-Bozouks sont entrés dans le défilé deux heures avant le convoi, et enfin que les insurgés disent que la Convention a été violée par les Turcs, qui se préparaient à profiter du passage de ce convoi pour occuper le défilé.

Voila, messieurs, les nouvelles qui nous arrivent et que vous pouvez plus tard vérifier si vous le jugez convenable.

Agréez, &c.

(Signé) DUBRAVCICH.
HECQUARD.
F. H. GILBERT.
LICHTENBERG.
ZOLOTAREFF.

Inclosure 4 in No. 185.

The Consuls at Scutari to the Ambassadors at Constantinople.

Cettigné, le 12 Mai, 1861.

MM. les Ambassadeurs,

AUSSITOT après l'arrivée de MM. Besobrasow et Zohrab, Consuls de Mostar, à Scutari, nous nous sommes rendus avec ces messieurs auprès de son Excellence Abdi Pacha pour lui demander d'expédier immédiatement un convoi de vivres à Nichsich par Spuz et les Bielopavlovichi, route la plus courte pour se rendre dans cette ville. Son Excellence éleva des objections: "Pour envoyer des vivres à Spuz, il fallait," nous dit-elle, "les faire escorter par toute la garnison de Podgoritza, un convoi aussi nombreux que celui que nous lui demandions serait exposé à être enlevé par les Piperis." A cela nous répondîmes que nous ne demandions pas d'escorte, que nous ferions accompagner ce convoi par nos Drogmans, nos Cavas, et un Capitaine Monténégrin se trouvant à Scutari, et que nous répondions qu'il ne serait pas attaqué par les Monténégrins. Cette difficulté levée Abdi Pacha en trouva d'autres.

C'était d'abord le manque de chevaux, puis le temps qu'il faudrait pour envoyer des vivres à Podgoritza; enfin, il finit par nous avouer que sa plus grande crainte n'était pas celle des Monténégrins, mais celle des habitants de Spuz et de Podgoritza, qui pourraient eux-mêmes empêcher le départ du convoi en le croyant destiné au Monténégro. En conséquence, il nous proposait de remettre ces vivres sur le bord du lac, où le Prince les ferait prendre. C'était un fin de non recevoir, car son Excellence savait aussi bien que nous qu'il n'existe sur le bord du lac aucun village Monténégrin ayant de route conduisant en Herzégovine.

Après une discussion longue et oiseuse, l'on prit la décision suivante. Notre collègue d'Autriche aura la complaisance de télégraphier à Vienne pour demander que des ordres fussent donnés à Cattaro afin de faciliter l'achat et l'envoi des vivres à Nichsich. MM. Zohrab et Besobrasow se rendraient avec nous à Cettigné pour connaître les résultats de notre entrevue avec le Prince, et de là s'ils étaient favorables, ils partiraient pour Risano afin de surveiller et de hâter le départ du convoi. Enfin, Abdi Pacha remettrait le même jour au Consulat d'Autriche 50,000 piastres pour faire face aux dépenses d'achat et de transport.

Ces affaires réglées, nous nous mîmes en route le 9 Mai et arrivâmes le jour même à Cettigné, où se trouvait M. le Baron de Lichtenberg, notre collègue de Prusse, parti la veille de Raguse par la voie de terre. M. Soutchenkoff, Consul de la Russie à Scutari, depuis longtemps malade, s'était fait remplacer par son Drogman M. Zolotareff.

Malgré toutes les difficultés que cela rencontre à Cettigné, Son Altesse avait bien voulu donner des ordres pour que logements nous fussent préparés, et elle nous accueilli avec son affabilité accoutumée.

Nous vîmes le Prince dans la soirée, et nous lui communiquâmes verbalement la dépêche de vos Excellences. Son Altesse nous dit que cette affaire étant d'une grande importance pour l'avenir du Monténégro, il nous priait de vouloir bien lui remettre notre demande par écrit (ce que nous fîmes), qu'il réunirait le Sénat et nous rendrait le lendemain une réponse. "Nous pouvions être assurés," ajouta Son Altesse, "qu'elle ferait tous ses efforts pour montrer aux Gouvernements des Grandes Puissances qu'ils avaient eu raison d'avoir confiance en elle."

La position du Prince était assez difficile, quelques jours auparavant MM. Zohrab et Besobrasow étaient venus à Cettigné, autorisés par vos Excellences à traiter du ravitaillement de Nichsich par le Monténégro, et le Sénat, que Son Altesse avait consulté, avait décidé qu'on ne devait y consentir qu'à charge de réciprocité; c'est-à-dire, que sous la condition que la Turquie accorderait aussi au Monténégro le libre transit par son territoire de tout ce dont il peut avoir besoin. Il fallait donc le faire revenir sur cette décision dans un moment où tout le monde était irrité de ce qui venait de se passer à Novosello. Dans un entretien particulier que nous eûmes avec le Prince, nous nous attachâmes à lui faire remarquer que la situation était changée, que lors de la venue de nos collègues il s'agissait de faire une Convention, et qu'il était dès lors naturel que le Monténégro cherchât d'en tirer des avantages, tandis qu'il avait maintenant à répondre à une demande des Grandes Puissances; que, selon nous, il valait mieux tout accorder sans condition, et qu'il ne pouvait être douteux pour lui, que nos Gouvernements lui sauront gré de cette marque de déférence pour leurs conseils, et lui tiendraient certainement compte quand le moment sera arrivé.

La dépêche de vos Excellences, portant à notre connaissance que la Porte accordait aux insurgés une amnistie complète, la remise des impôts arriérés, et qu'elles avaient

trouvé satisfaisantes les autres concessions contenues dans la Proclamation d'Omer Pacha, nous arriva dans ce moment.

Nous en donnâmes connaissance au Prince Nicolas. Quant à cette partie de la demande de vos Excellences Son Altesse n'hésita pas, et nous promit d'appuyer de tout son pouvoir la Proclamation du Général Turc.

Toutefois, Son Altesse nous fit observer, et tous les Sénateurs et personnages influents que nous eûmes l'occasion de voir nous dirent de même, que le choix d'Omer Pacha était fort malheureux; qu'au Monténégro, on le considérait comme un signe de guerre, et que dans la Bosnie et l'Herzégovine il rencontrerait un sentiment de haine non seulement chez les Chrétiens, qu'il avait désarmés après s'être servi d'eux, mais aussi chez les Musulmans, qui n'ont pas oublié que c'est Omer Pacha qui abolit les priviléges dont ils jouissaient. Son Altesse ajouta qu'elle ne connaissait pas les concessions promises, mais qu'elles avaient peu de chances d'être acceptées, et de produire un résultat durable, si on ne donnait pas à ces tribus une administration particulière sous un Voivode de leur religion.

Son Altesse nous ayant réunis le 10, nous remit la déclaration écrite dont nous avons eu l'honneur de donner connaissance à vos Excellences par notre télégramme du même jour. Puis elle nous pria d'insister auprès de nos Gouvernements pour en obtenir qu'il soit immédiatement mis un terme aux agressions des Turcs en Albanie. Enfin, Son Altesse nous fit savoir que pour éviter tout retard et veiller à la sécurité de nos collègues, il mettrait à leur disposition le Capitaine Pajo de Grahovo.

A la suite de cette décision MM. Zohrab et Besobrasow partirent le 11 au matin pour Risano, munis d'une lettre de M. le Consul d'Autriche pour M. le Capitaine Circulaire de Cattaro et d'un pouvoir de faire une traite sur lui jusqu'à la concurrence des 50,000 piastres déposés dans son Consulat.

Un télégramme que nous reçûmes de Scutari faillit remettre tout en question. Abdi Pacha avait déclaré à MM. Soutchenkoff et Franceschi qu'il ne voulait pas envoyer d'homme à Cattaro si les vivres pour Nichsich devraient être remis aux Monténégrins, et qu'il n'enverrait un homme que si ces vivres étaient remis à un délégué des Consuls des Grandes Puissances, sur la garantie desquelles et de Son Altesse le Prince le convoi traverserait le territoire Monténégrin. En présence de cette contradiction avec ce qu'il nous avait déclaré à Scutari et de ces exigences qu'on ne saurait qualifier quand il s'agissait d'une ville Turque, dont la situation devait l'intéresser plus que nous, nous fûmes tous d'avis de passer outre pour ne pas perdre de temps, ces messieurs voulant bien se charger de faire le contrat avec le fournisseur et de veiller à la prompte expédition des vivres.

Hier au soir nous avons appris que les insurgés se plaignent de ce que les Turcs ont violé la Convention faite avec les Consuls. Suivant eux tous les généraux Turcs se seraient rassemblés à Kretaz le 27 Avril le jour du départ du convoi. Ce même jour aurait eu lieu un mouvement en avant des troupes réunis à Gasco. Enfin, au lieu de mettre avec le convoi quelques hommes pour maintenir l'ordre, les Turcs l'auraient fait précéder par 62 Bachi-Bazouks de Nichsich, et de troupes nombreuses se préparaient à suivre le convoi composé seulement de 30 chevaux de charge que pensant dès lors que la Convention n'avait pas été acceptée, ils avaient attaqués l'avant-garde du convoi pour ne pas le laisser maîtresse de la position du défilé. Le Consul Autrichien de Trébigné et les Agents restés à Mostar sauront sans doute ce qu'il y a de vrai dans ces allégations des insurgés. Quoiqu'il en soit, voila nos collègues compromis à la fois vis-à-vis des insurgés et des Turcs puisque les uns et les autres les accusent d'avoir voulu les tromper. A la suite de ces nouvelles le Prince nous a engagés à conseiller MM. Zohrab et Besobrasow de quitter le moins possible le territoire Monténégrin et de prendre à cet effet la route de Niegosh, Cevo, et Sliva plutôt que celle de Grahovo. La frontière Monténégrine se trouvant de ce côté séparée de Nichsich par un grand bois dans lequel les insurgés, s'ils en avaient connaissance, pourraient s'embusquer pour enlever le convoi, nous en avons aussitôt donné avis à ces messieurs.

Veuillez, &c.

(Signé) DUBRAVCICH.
HECQUARD.
F. H. GILBERT.
LICHTENBERG.
ZOLOTAREFF.

Inclosure 5 in No. 185.

The Consuls at Scutari to the Ambassadors at Constantinople.

Cettigné, le 18 Mai, 1861.

MM. les Ambassadeurs,

AINSI que nous avions eu l'honneur de le faire savoir à vos Excellences, MM. Zohrab et Besobrasow étaient partis pour Risano.

Là, ils firent un marché avec M. Tchelovitch, fournisseur des troupes, pour l'achat et le transport d'une certaine quantité de vivres.

Aujourd'hui, tous ces messieurs sont arrivés de Nichsich ; d'après ce qu'ils nous ont dit, un convoi était arrivé dans cette ville. Ces messieurs entretiendront vos Excellences de ce qui s'y est passé ; nous avons eu à peine le temps de les entrevoir et ils sont immédiatement repartis pour Cattaro.

D'après les conversations que nous avons eu avec eux, nous avons pu remarquer que leur manière de voir différé de la nôtre ; cela dépend sans doute du milieu dans lequel ils se sont trouvés. Pour eux, et sans doute ils l'écriveront à vos Excellences, se serait le Monténégro qui pousserait à l'insurrection, qui ferait attaquer les convois, &c., &c. Voila dix jours que nous sommes à Cettigné, et nous avons été à même de constater le contraire. Nous avons vu l'inquiétude du Prince Nicolas et des Sénateurs lorsqu'ils ont su que le convoi devait traverser la distance qui sépare Kutchitski-Most de Nichsich et le plaisir qu'en a éprouvé Son Altesse lorsqu'elle a su qu'il était arrivé à bon port.

Nous avons eu l'occasion de parler longuement avec le Prince Nicolas ; nous savons qu'il comprend qu'il est de son intérêt de n'être pas compromis dans les événements se passant autour de lui et qu'il tremble toujours de l'être. Ainsi, nous avons pu voir à Cettigné tous les Capitaines qui, suivant ces messieurs, se trouvaient avec les insurgés, et l'on n'a pu nous tromper, car nous les connaissons tous personnellement. Enfin, le Prince a témoigné devant ces messieurs et nous la crainte que les convois suivants fussent attaqués par les insurgés hors de son territoire, et a déclaré qu'il ne pouvait en prendre la responsabilité. Ces messieurs en ont tiré la conséquence que ces convois seraient certainement attaqués. Nous ne pouvons penser de même, en ce qui touche du moins la participation du Monténégro à cette attaque. S'il est ainsi, le Prince Nicolas n'eut pas insisté comme il l'a fait pour qu'on donnât aux convois une autre direction, qui, suivant Son Altesse et les Consuls de France et de Prusse, connaissant parfaitement ces contrées, est certainement plus sûre.

Pour conclure nous dirons, le Prince Nicolas est rempli de bonne volonté, mais il a à lutter contre bien de difficultés ; d'abord, contre son peuple, qui ne comprend rien à ces atermoiements et l'accuse de ne pas oser combattre les Turcs ; ensuite contre le Sénat lui-même, qui se laisse souvent égarer par la passion, et que Son Altesse a de la peine à convaincre. Il faudrait donc lui en tenir compte et l'aider dans ses efforts au lieu de lui rendre sa tâche plus ardue, comme on le fait depuis cinque mois surtout en Albanie.

Ces messieurs étant de retour, nous avons pensé notre mission était terminée et comme nous avons eu l'honneur de le faire savoir à vos Excellences, nous partons demain pour retourner à nos postes.

Agréez, &c.

(Signé) DUBRAVCICH.
HECQUARD.
F. H. GILBERT.
LICHTENBERG.
ZOLOTAREFF.

No. 186.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 397.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, June 20, 1861.*

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna,* reporting a conversation which he had with Count Rechberg respecting the concentration of Austrian troops on the Save.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

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* No. 183.

No. 187.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received June 21.)

No. 403.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, June 10, 1861.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith the copy of a telegram received here from the Consuls at Scutari upon the subject of the conclusion of a truce between the Turks and Montenegrins on the Albanian frontier ; and likewise the copy of the answer returned by the Representatives of the Great Powers. A duplicate of this telegram has been forwarded to the delegates at Mostar.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 187.

The Consuls at Scutari to the Ambassadors at Constantinople.

(Télégraphique.) *Scutari, le 7 Juin*, 1861.

A NOTRE demande le Prince de Monténégro avait consenti à proposer une trêve sur la frontière de l'Albanie. Le Gouverneur, à qui nous en avions fait parler, nous écrit qu'Omer Pacha lui a fait savoir que, commandant toute la Roumélie, il fallait s'adresser à lui si le Prince désirait une trêve.

Le Prince n'avait consenti à cette démarche que par le respect pour le désir des Grandes Puissances ; il ne voudra certainement pas demander à Omer Pacha la conclusion d'une trêve, et si toutes les mesures urgentes ne peuvent être prises que par Omer Pacha, il en résultera des pertes de temps dangereuses.

Ne serait-il pas plus prudent de laisser au Gouverneur de Scutari sa liberté d'action jusqu'à l'arrivée d'Omer Pacha dans ce pays, ou devons-nous entrer en relations avec Omer Pacha ?

La Commission Mixte pour le règlement des terrains contestés existe-t-elle toujours ? L'entrée des Monténégrins chez les Kutchis Turcs, annoncée par la poste d'hier, est démentie.

Inclosure 2 in No. 187.

The Ambassadors at Constantinople to the Consuls at Scutari.

(Télégraphique.) *Constantinople, le 9 Juin*, 1861.

IL n'y a pas de guerre, il ne peut donc être question de trêve proprement dite. Mais il y a des rixes et des désordres partiels sur les frontières de l'Albanie. Le rôle du Gouverneur-Général de Scutari et du Prince est d'encourager de tout leur pouvoir les bessas entre les populations ennemies.

La Commission Mixte pour le règlement de la question des propriétés contestées existe et doit fonctionner sans retard d'accord avec Abdi Pacha, dont l'autorité civile n'est en aucune façon suspendue ni diminuée.

Des questions d'un ordre plus général peuvent être et seront, nous l'espérons, traitées entre Omer Pacha et le Prince. Mais ces questions regarderaient la Commission de l'Herzégovine, qui doit compter sur le concours que vous lui donnerez.

No. 188.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received June 21.)

(No. 411.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, June 12, 1861.*

I INCLOSE to your Lordship the instructions which I gave to Mr. Macdonell, who carries the Cypher to Mr. Holmes on his way to England.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

Inclosure in No. 188.

Sir H. Bulwer to Mr. Macdonell.

Constantinople, June 7, 1861.

Sir,

YOU will proceed to Mostar and deliver the Cypher with which you are charged to Mr. Holmes.

You will, of course, have some conversation with that gentleman, and also with Omar Pasha, to whom he will present you. You should endeavour to obtain what information you can as to the state and prospects of the country.

The three principal points to which I direct your attention are:—

1st. The probability of putting down the insurrection in the Herzegovina without bloodshed.

2nd. The chances of failure or success if arms have to be resorted to.

3rd. The general conduct and bearing of the different foreign delegates and Consuls, and especially that of the lately-named Prussian Consul, M. Blau, who is also the delegate of Prussia in the Commission which is to assist Omar Pasha.

It would be also desirable to ascertain whether Omar Pasha is disposed to put into execution in Bosnia those reforms promised to Bosnia but not yet effected; and also whether the promises made to the people in the Herzegovina are such as, if fairly carried out, ought to satisfy that population.

You will show these instructions to Mr. Holmes, and you will communicate to me by the first safe opportunity all the information you collect, furnishing Her Majesty's Government, on your arrival in England, with a copy of your communications to me.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

No. 189.

Mr. Longworth to Lord J. Russell.—(Received June 23, 6 P.M.)

Semlin, June 23, 1861, 2 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

PRINCE has informed me that a body of insurgents from Herzegovina have entered Servia and attacked the Resident of Turkey at Kzitcha.

No. 190.

Lord Bloomfield to Lord J. Russell.—(Received June 24.)

(No. 325.) Confidential.)

Vienna, June 20, 1861.

My Lord,

COUNT RECHBERG mentioned to me to-day that he had received a most extraordinary communication from the Prince of Montenegro, forwarding to him a document containing the depositions of an individual (whose name he could not exactly recollect) which were to the effect that the murder of the late Prince had been instigated by the Austrian Government and paid for with Austrian money. He said the letter of the Prince of Montenegro was drawn up in language with which no fault could be found, and the Prince even remarked in his letter that he disbelieves the truth of the statement forwarded, but observed his Excellency the depositions were taken before the French, Prussian, and Russian Consuls, and he is at a loss to understand why these persons should have affixed their signatures to such a document, and must believe that the whole affair was got up by M. Hecquard. He added that he had spoken to Mr. Bakuline, the Russian Envoy here, who expressed his indignation at the proceeding and his conviction that the Consuls' conduct would be disavowed by Prince Gortchakow.

Count Rechberg said that no answer should be given to such atrocious calumnies, and he remarked that people must be very ignorant of the relations which existed between the late Prince Danilo and Austria to attribute his murder to Austrian agency, for friendly and confidential intercourse with him had been established for some time previous to his death, and his loss was a sensible one and greatly deplored by the Austrian Government.

His Excellency spoke with much bitterness at the part taken in this matter by

Baron Lichtenberg, the Prussian Consul (whose usual residence, moreover, is Ragusa) but he lays the blame of the proceeding entirely on M. Hecquard, and even absolves the Prince of Montenegro from a wilful participation in the business, though he naturally finds fault with him for allowing himself to become a mere tool of the French Agent at Cettigné.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 191.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Grey.

(No. 109.)

Foreign Office, June 26, 1861.

Sir,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna respecting the death of the late Prince of Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 192.

Consul Holmes to Lord J. Russell.—(Received June 29.)

(No. 1.)

Mostar, June 17, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that I reached Mostar on Tuesday the 11th instant. On Wednesday I paid my official visits to his Highness Omer Pasha, to the local authorites, and to my colleagues of the Commission in the Herzegovina, and the same afternoon assisted at the first Conference.

The following morning, at the invitation of his Highness Omer Pasha, another Conference was held at his Highness' residence.

The proceedings at both these meetings your Lordship will find in the copies of the Protocols of the first and second Conferences herein inclosed. I have also the honour to transmit herewith a copy of our collective letter to the insurgents in French and Serbe.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure 1 in No. 192.

Protocol of the 1st Conference of the Commission in Herzegovina.

12 Juin, 1861.

LE Mercredi 12 Juin, 1861, à quatre heures de l'après-midi, MM. les Délégués des cinq Grandes Puissances en Herzégovine se sont réunis chez M. Blau, Délégué Prussien, afin de s'entendre sur la meilleure marche à suivre pour arriver à l'accomplissement de la mission dont ils sont chargés.

Etaient présents:

M. le Major Jovanovich;
M. Tissot;
M. Holmes;
M. Blau;
M. Bezobrazow.

Lecture faite des instructions identiques dont MM. les Délégués ont été munis par leurs Ambassades respectives, MM. les Commissaires d'Autriche, de France, de Prusse et de Russie font part à M. Holmes, Commissaire Britannique, des impres-

* No. 190.

sions que leur a laissées leur entrevue de la veille avec son Altesse Omer Pacha, Commandant-en-chef des forces Impériales en Herzégovine. Dans le cours de cet entretien son Altesse le Serdar Ekrem ne leur a point dissimulé son intention de prendre certaines mesures stratégiques tout en poursuivant, par le moyen de la proclamation dont il est porteur, l'œuvre de pacification qui lui est confiée et à laquelle doivent concourir les Délégués des cinq Grandes Puissances. MM. Jovanovich, Tissot, Blau, et Bezobrazow, communiquent également à M. Holmes les observations qu'ils ont cru devoir soumettre à cet égard à son Altesse Omer Pacha. Il serait regrettable, dans leur opinion, que le Commandant-en-chef des forces Impériales se livrât à aucune opération de guerre avant d'avoir épuisé, de concert avec les Délégués des cinq Grandes Puissances, tous les moyens pacifiques qui peuvent être employés. Les Délégués d'Autriche, de France, de Prusse, et de Russie, ont de sérieuses raisons de penser que tout mouvement offensif des troupes Ottomanes, dans les circonstances actuelles, aurait pour conséquence de redoubler les défiances que paraissent nourrir déjà, à l'endroit de leur intervention, les chefs des districts insurgés, et de rendre par suite fort difficiles, sinon impossibles, les négociations qu'ils devront sans doute ouvrir avec ces mêmes chefs pour atteindre le but qu'ils ont à poursuivre. Ils font observer, en outre, que la mission dont le Serdar Ekrem est chargé, est avant tout, comme son Altesse l'a constatée elle-même à diverses reprises, dans ses deux premiers entretiens avec MM. les Délégués d'Autriche, de France, de Prusse, et de Russie, une mission de paix et d'humanité: que cette mission, dans l'intention de son Altesse, ne doit perdre ce caractère qu'à la dernière extrémité. Ils estiment que le Gouvernement Ottoman est assez fort en Herzégovine, du moment où il y est représenté par son Altesse Omer Pacha, pour pouvoir donner le cours le plus entier aux intentions généreuses de Sa Majesté le Sultan, et ne recourir à des démonstrations armées qu'autant que toutes les voies de conciliation auront été épuisées.

M. le Commissaire Britannique se ralliant à ces considérations, il est décidé que des observations dans ce sens seront soumises à la première occasion, par les Délégués des cinq Grandes Puissances, à son Altesse le Serdar Ekrem.

MM. les Délégués passant ensuite aux concessions offertes aux districts insurgés par la proclamation que doit publier son Altesse Omer Pacha, sont unanimement d'avis que ces concessions doivent être étendues le plus tôt possible aux districts restés dans l'obéissance. En agissant ainsi, le Gouvernement Ottoman ôte aux insoumis un argument qu'ils ont déjà opposé aux propositions d'Ismail Pacha, et fait acte de sage générosité vis-à-vis de populations d'autant plus intéressantes qu'elles n'ont point pris part au mouvement insurrectionnel. Il est convenu que ces observations seront également soumises à l'appréciation de son Altesse Omer Pacha.

MM. les Délégués abordent enfin la question de savoir par qu'elle voie ils entreront en rapport, le cas échéant, avec les chefs de l'insurrection, sont d'avis de la réserver jusqu'au moment où ils pourront s'entendre à ce sujet avec son Altesse le Serdar Ekrem.

MM. les Délégués décident, en outre, qu'il sera rédigé un Protocole de la présente Conférence ainsi que de celles qui auront ultérieurement lieu.

(La séance est levée à sept heures.)

(Signé) JOVANOVIC, *Major.*
TISSOT.
W. R. HOLMES.
DR. O. BLAU.
VAL. BEZOBRAZOW.

Inclosure 2 in No. 192.

Protocol of the 2nd Conference of the Commission in Herzegovina.

13 *Juin*, 1861.

LE Jeudi 13 Juin, 1861, à 10 heures du matin, MM. les Délégués des cinq Grandes Puissances se sont rendus, sur l'invitation qui leur avait été adressée, la veille, à cet effet, auprès de son Altesse Omer Pacha, Commandant-en-chef des forces Ottomanes en Herzégovine.

Son Altesse s'expliquant tout d'abord, sur l'objet de la réunion provoquée, exprime le désir de s'entendre avec MM. les Délégués des cinq Grandes Puissances sur les moyens d'atteindre le but commun proposé à leurs efforts et aux siens. Elle constate que cette réunion n'a rien d'officiel, les instructions de son Gouvernement ne lui permettant d'entretenir que des rapports purement amicaux avec MM. les Délégués, déclaration dont ces derniers se bornent, pour le moment, à prendre acte. Son Altesse témoigne, d'ailleurs, de son sincère désir de faciliter de tout son pouvoir l'accomplissement de la mission dont sont chargés MM. les Délégués et les invite à lui faire part tant des résolutions qu'ils ont pu déjà prendre que de celles qu'ils sont disposés à adopter.

M. le Commissaire Britannique, prenant la parole au nom de ses collègues, soumet à son Altesse le Serdar Ekrem les deux points sur lesquels MM. les Délégués sont tombés d'accord dans leur première réunion.

Quant au premier point, c'est-à-dire à ce qui concerne le *statu quo* que MM. les Délégués désirent voir maintenu au point de vue militaire, le Commandant-en-chef des forces Impériales se déclare résolu à n'opérer que les mouvements indispensables à la sécurité de ses troupes, c'est-à-dire le déplacement pour les concentrer autour de Gatzko de quatre bataillons, stationnés en ce moment à Seritza, Tachlitza et Fotcha. Le Commissaire Français insistant pour qu'on n'agisse point au-delà des lignes actuellement occupées, son Altesse n'hésite pas à prendre à cet égard un engagement formel, qui ne souffrira qu'une exception résultant de la nécessité de ravitailler la ville de Nichsich. Son Altesse Omer Pacha constate que d'après les rapports qui lui sont parvenus, la place n'a plus que pour vingt jours de vivres; qu'un ravitaillement prochain est dès lors nécessaire, que ce ravitaillement ne peut s'opérer, d'ailleurs, qu'en faisant escorter le convoi par des forces suffisantes; son Altesse explique que si Dervich Pacha a pu, récemment, avec des forces moindres, pénétrer jusqu'à Nichsich et y porter quelques approvisionnements, il ne l'a du qu'à cette circonstance, que les insurgés, pris à l'improviste, n'occupaient pas les défilés de Dougo en nombre suffisant et n'ont point opposé de résistance, cas inadmissible désormais, Dervich Pacha ayant du se replier de Nichsich sur Kristadj en prévision de l'attaque générale dont le menaçait l'insurrection.

MM. les Délégués expriment la crainte que le ravitaillement de Nichsich, dans les conditions projetées par son Altesse, ne soit l'occasion d'un conflit sanglant qu'il importerait d'éviter. Ils proposent, par conséquent, que l'approvisionnement de cette place s'opère, comme par le passé, par Risano et le Monténégro, combinaison qui leur paraît offrir le double avantage de remplir également le but que se propose son Altesse sans porter atteinte au *statu quo* ni provoquer l'effusion de sang.

Son Altesse objecte que les convois dirigés de Risano à Nichsich par le Monténégro ont été enlevés à deux reprises. Une discussion s'élève à cette occasion sur le rôle joué dans ces deux affaires par les Monténégrins. Dans l'opinion de son Altesse ces derniers seraient coupables de la double attaque. MM. les Délégués, d'après les renseignements contraires qui leur sont parvenu et qu'ils soumettent à son Altesse, déclarent ne pouvoir partager cet avis. Son Altesse Omer Pacha reconnaît du reste que dans l'affaire de Kutchinski-Moste il y a eu négligence évidente de la part du Commandant des forces Ottomanes. MM. les Délégués en concluent que l'itinéraire actuel, d'après lequel les approvisionnements sont consignés à Kutchinski-Moste, reste praticable à la condition pour le Commandant de Nichsich de prendre les précautions militaires voulues, et expriment de nouveau le regret avec lequel ils verraient le ravitaillement s'opérer par la force.

Quant au second point, c'est-à-dire en ce qui concerne l'extention aux populations soumises des concessions offertes aux insurgés, son Altesse déclare avoir des ordres pour l'accorder en effet, moins la remise des impôts arriérés. Le Serdar Ekrem se propose de faire lire publiquement, dès demain, par l'intermédiaire de l'autorité locale, le Firman qui consacre ces concessions.

MM. les Délégués de Prusse et de Russie demandant à son Altesse si elle verrait quelque inconvénient à ce que les cinq Délégués assistassent à la lecture du firman, le Serdar Ekrem abandonne la question à leur appréciation; il lui semble néanmoins que l'abstention des Délégués établirait mieux aux yeux de la population Musulmane la louable initiative du Gouvernement Ottoman. MM. les Délégués, reconnaissant toute la justesse de cette observation, renoncent spontanément au projet d'assister à la lecture du Firman.

Le reste de la séance est consacré à combiner en commun les moyens de faire parvenir aux insurgés la Proclamation que le Serdar Ekrem a fait rédiger en langue Turque et Serbe. Il est convenu que son Altesse l'enverra dès demain au district de Zupci par Trébigné, de Banjani par Bilek, de Piva et de Drobnjak par Gatzko, de Vassoivich par Scutari et Gussinje. Il est convenu, en outre, que MM. les Délégués transmettront de leur côté la Proclamation, par des voies différentes, en l'appuyant par une lettre collective, et inviteront les chefs des insurgés à se rendre auprès d'Omer Pacha. Il est convenu enfin que dans le cas malheureusement à prévoir où cet appel resterait sans effet MM. les Délégués aviseront personnellement aux moyens de se mettre en rapport direct avec les chefs du mouvement sur un terrain, où ces derniers n'hésiteront sans doute pas à se rendre. Son Altesse Omer Pacha exprime, en terminant, le désir qu'il soit dressé procès-verbal tant de

résolutions prises dans la présente réunion que de celle qui pourraient être ultérieurement adoptées.

La séance est levée à midi.

(Signé) JOVANOVIC, *Major.*
TISSOT.
W. R. HOLMES.
DR. O. BLAU.
VAL. BEZOBRAZOW.

Inclosure 3 in No. 193.

Letter addressed by the Delegates of the Five Great Powers to the Inhabitants of the Disturbed Districts in Herzegovina.

SON Altesse Omer Pacha, Commandant-en-chef des troupes Impériales en Roumélie, vous a envoyé de son côté la Proclamation qu'il a publiée à son arrivée en Herzégovine, et dont vous trouverez ci-jointe une copie.

Les Grandes Puissances prenant en considération la malheureuse position dans laquelle vous vous trouvez et désireuses d'améliorer votre sort par des moyens pacifiques, et de faire cesser un état de choses regrettable à tous égards, nous ont envoyés ici en qualité de leurs représentants pour vous faire comprendre toute la valeur des concessions contenues dans la Proclamation.

Nous vous engageons donc d'avoir pleine confiance dans les promesses du Gouvernement Ottoman et nous vous répétons, au nom de nos Gouvernements, que la fidèle exécution de ces promesses est formellement et solennellement garantie aux Représentants de cinq Puissances à Constantinople.

Empressez-vous donc de venir ici auprès de son Altesse, où nous sommes réunis pour lui faciliter l'accomplissement de la mission qui lui est confiée et dont le but est de pacifier avant tout le pays en faisant justice des abus qui l'ont soulevé.

Mostar, le $^{9}/_{21}$ *Juin*, 1861.

(Signé) JOVANOVIC, *Major.*
TISSOT.
W. R. HOLMES.
DR. O. BLAU.
VAL. BEZOBRAZOW.

No. 194.

Consul Holmes to Lord J. Russell.—(Received June 29.)

(No. 2.)

Mostar, June 17, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that, on the evening of the 14th June, on the occasion of a communication made by M. Hecquard, French Consul at Scutari, to M. Tissot, French Commissioner here, to the effect that he had been charged by his Government to bring about an interview between the Prince and Omer Pasha, a collective telegram was sent to the Ambassadors of the Five Great Powers, of which the following is a copy:—

"Omer Pacha, communiention faite par Tissot de télégramme d'Hecquard, paraît disposé à voir le Prince. Devons-nous l'accompagner? Quel sera en général notre rôle dans cette circonstance?"

In answer to this despatch I yesterday received the following from his Excellency Sir Henry Bulwer:—

"My opinion is that, if Omer Pasha is well disposed to this, you should accompany him, and the part taken by the delegates should clearly be that of promoting some understanding between the two parties, which might be cemented by an agreement on certain points most essential for keeping the peace."

My colleagues of Austria, France, Russia, and Prussia, have also received similar replies.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 195.

Consul Holmes to Lord J. Russell.—(Received June 29.)

(No. 3.)

Mostar, June 17, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of an identic letter addressed by myself and my colleagues of the Commission for the Herzegovina to our respective Ambassadors to ascertain the character of our mission, whether it is of an official or simply of an officious and friendly nature.

I may remark that I stated my opinion that it was of the latter character, but, as some of my colleagues desired to put the matter beyond doubt, I agreed to the proposition of an identic letter to our respective Ambassadors at the Porte.

Several Conferences have been held, the Protocols of which it has not been possible to prepare for this post. What occurred with regard to this letter will appear in them in its proper order, but I have thought it advisable to send your Lordship a copy without loss of time.

I may also here state that, up to the present moment, the most satisfactory accord exists among the members of the Commission and also between the Commission and his Highness Omer Pasha.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure in No. 195.

Consul Holmes to Sir H. Bulwer.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

Mostar, le 15 *Juin*, 1861.

AINSI que votre Excellence le verra par le Protocole de notre 2me Conférence, Omer Pacha se refuse à nous reconnaître un caractère officiel, "ses instructions," nous dit-il, "ne lui permettant d'entretenir avec nous que des rapports purement amicaux." Comme votre Excellence le remarquera également nous nous sommes bornés à prendre acte de cette circonstance.

Jusqu'ici, en fait, ces reserves du Serdar Ekrem ne nous ont nullement empêchés d'agir soit vis-à-vis des insurgés, soit auprès d'Omer Pacha lui-même.

Mais on peut prévoir telle circonstance—celle, par exemple, à laquelle faisait allusion notre télégramme collective d'hier—où l'intérêt même de notre mission exigerait que nous pussions agir vis-à-vis du Serdar Ekrem au nom d'un titre officiel formellement reconnu.

Dans le cas où votre Excellence, M. l'Ambassadeur, jugerait que ce titre ne peut nous être dénié, je lui serais reconnaissant de vouloir bien m'adresser des instructions qui me mettent à même de le revendiquer à l'occasion.

Mes collègues d'Autriche, de France, de Prusse, et de Russie, avec lesquels je me suis préalablement entendu à cet égard, adressent d'ailleurs, sous la date de ce jour, une dépêche identique à leurs Ambassades respectives.

J'ai, &c.
(Signé) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 196.

Lord Napier to Lord J. Russell.—(Received July 1.)

(No. 180.)

St. Petersburgh, June 23, 1861.

My Lord,

PRINCE GORTCHAKOW stated to me to-day that he had no recent information of the posture of affairs in the Herzegovina. He did not know what had been the result of the manifesto of the Porte and the arrival of Omar Pasha. His Excellency added that the conduct of the Prince of Montenegro had in this matter been highly laudable and deserved the commendation of the European Governments. The good offices of the Prince had already been acknowledged by Russia and appreciated by the Porte. His Excellency hinted they might deserve the recognition of other Governments.

Your Lordship will be able to judge how far the Prince of the Mountain deserves the praise bestowed upon him by Prince Gortchakow, and whether some influence might

be gained over him by an encouraging communication on the part of the Western Powers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 197.

Lord Bloomfield to Lord J. Russell.—(Received July 1.)

(No. 334. Confidential.)

Vienna, June 27, 1861.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 325 of the 20th instant, on the subject of a letter received here from the Prince of Montenegro, inclosing the copy of a deposition, taken before the Austrian, Prussian, and Russian Consuls, that the late Prince Danilo had been murdered at the instigation of the Austrian Government, Count Rechberg has mentioned to me that a judicial inquiry into the subject has been ordered at Ragusa, and that General Mamoula will make every effort in his power to bring the truth to light.

His Excellency has remonstrated at Berlin, Paris, and St. Petersburgh at the proceedings of the three Consuls in this affair.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 198.

Acting Consul Zohrab to Lord J. Russell.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 1. Political.)

Bosna Serai, June 15, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith my report on the measures adopted by my colleagues and myself, in obedience to instructions from the Ambassadors at Constantinople, for the relief of Nichsich.

I venture to hope that the course I pursued in the dangerous duty I had to perform will meet with your Lordship's approval.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAS. ZOHRAB.

Inclosure in No. 198.

Report on the Measures adopted by the Consuls of Mostar for the Relief of Nichsich.

ON the 25th April, together with my Russian, French, and Austrian colleagues, who had received instructions from their respective Ambassadors to employ collectively every means in their power to prevent a catastrophe at Nichsich, I arrived at the Dooga Boghas, a pass situated between Nichsich and Cristatz, through which the only road connecting Nichsich with the rest of the Herzegovina lies.

This pass has for several years been infested by bands of robbers, who frequently waylaid and destroyed travellers; up to last year, however, it was considered safe to parties of about fifty persons. Since November the Dooga Boghas has been held in force by bands of rebels and Montenegrins, and all communications between Nichsich and other points altogether interrupted. Various reports were in circulation as to the force holding the pass, the lowest estimate being 3,000 men. Against such a band it was evident the military alone could act, but the officers commanding the troops deemed the experiment of forcing the pass too hazardous to try, and they abandoned Nichsich to its fate, while to cover their unjustifiable, if not cowardly conduct, they excused themselves by asserting that as the Montenegrins led the rebels, and they had strict orders from Constantinople not to commit hostilities in any way against Montenegro, they could not move in support of Nichsich. Such being the case, one course alone remained by which the blockaded town might be saved, that of negotiating with the rebels or Montenegrins, should the latter show themselves, for the opening of the road. It was to attain this object that we quitted Mostar.

At a point called Golià, in the Dooga Boghas, we met by previous arrangement the Chiefs of the bands holding the pass, they were four in number: Joko Radof Milinich Serdar, of Bagnani, Rayah; Philip Mandich, of Gasko, Rayah; Peko Paulovich, Montenegrin; and Rado Covachevich, Montenegrin; they were accompanied by about thirty followers.

It has been the custom in Montenegro, and also in the districts bordering that country, where a state of constant war has long existed between the Mussulmans and Christians, to conclude truces ("bessas"), and hitherto these suspensions of hostilities have, with rare exceptions, been faithfully observed on both sides. Relying on the religious observance of this old custom, we unhesitatingly entered into negotiations with the insurgent leaders.

The instructions contained in the telegraphic despatch from the Ambassadors at Constantinople of the 22nd April gave us power to conclude an armistice. This we effected after negotiating for twenty-four hours on the following terms:—That Joko Serdar and the other Chiefs, with their followers, should at once retire to their homes in Bagnani, and quietly await the settlement of the grievances of the Rayahs, which the information contained in the above telegram enabled us to assure them would speedily take place. We promised them, in the name of our respective Governments, that justice would no longer be delayed or evaded, that their complaints would be strictly and impartially investigated, and their just demands acceded to; but to have these promises faithfully carried out, we demanded the immediate evacuation of the Pass. This was acceded to on oath, and Joko Sirdar undertook that no rebels should remain in the Dooga Boghas by the morrow.

To the Montenegrins, who declared that they were outlawed by the Prince, we promised to employ our influence with the Prince to obtain for them an amnesty, provided they also retired to Bagnani and awaited tranquilly the results of our efforts on their behalf. To enable them to live in the meantime, we gave them 58 ducats, promising them a further remittance should the amnesty delay long.

We also promised that, pending the examination of their grievances, no offensive movement should be made by the Turkish troops against the Rayahs at any point, on condition that they faithfully adhered to their engagements.

The Montenegrins also accepted on oath our conditions. Having concluded an armistice according to the custom of the country, and obtained from the rebels the unconditional opening of communications with Nichsich, we addressed to the Commandant at Crestatz a letter, of which a copy is subjoined, authorizing him to forward provisions to Nichsich.

Our arrival at Nichsich, on the 26th April, was viewed by the inhabitants as a sure indication of safety. Our presence appeared to spread universal joy.

Soon after our arrival M. Vadik, Secretary of Prince Nicholas, joined us. He was deputed by His Highness, according to his own statement, to afford us information regarding certain villages and the monastery of Kossulevo. He was the bearer of a letter from the Consuls of Scutari. I inclose copy of this document and of our answer.

As we expected, we found no force besieging the town, but we discovered that it was cut off from all communication with other points; in fact, that a strict blockade was maintained by the rebels and the Montenegrins.

The authorities stated to us that about 500 families (nearly half the population) were destitute, and that the rest had supplies which would hold out for periods varying from one to six months. Our inquiries bore out these statements; many families we found living on grass, roots, &c.; salt, coffee, tobacco, vegetables, were altogether wanting. The bazaars were closed, not a single article was exposed for sale. The few animals still left to the people, about 3,000 in all, were miserably thin. The town bore an aspect of abject misery.

On the morning of the 27th April, no convoy having been announced, we dispatched a messenger to Cristatz for information. Our messenger returned the same evening. He was the bearer of a letter to us from the rebels detailing the act of treachery perpetrated by them that morning.

Our messenger stated that a corps of Bashi-Bazouks had passed into the Pass to prepare a station for a convoy which was to follow immediately; that at an unguarded moment they were attacked by a large band of rebels and Montenegrins, and forty-five of their number were massacred.

At dawn on the 28th, the authorities waited on us in our camp, and urgently begged us to retire into the fortress. They stated that the advanced guard which had been cut off consisted of natives of Nichsich; that five of the number who had succeeded in

escaping had just arrived, and that by remaining without the fortress during the first transports of griefs of the inhabitants after the intelligence spread, we incurred great danger. We complied with their request, and immediately retired.

By the massacre hardly a family escaped the loss of a relative, and many have been left utterly destitute. I must, in justice to the population, say that to us no violence was attempted, and two days after the sad event was known we went about the town unattended.

Having been, unfortunately, the unwitting cause of so much misery to the people, we felt that our duty required us to remain for the time in Nichsich to endeavour to alleviate by our efforts the condition of its unhappy inhabitants.

Our efforts during our stay were directed towards opening the roads through Montenegro, to procuring supplies to relieve the daily wants of the poorest, and in assuring and keeping tranquil the people.

Our endeavours to procure provisions met with but small success, the authorities along the Montenegrin frontier sometimes permitting us to make very small purchases, at others refusing us altogether.

On the 5th May, finding that our letters to the Scutari Consuls and our appeals to the Prince and to Constantinople remained unanswered, Mr. Besobrason and myself quitted Nichsich for Cettigné, intending to apply to the Prince ourselves to allow provisions to pass from Albania to Nichsich through his territories. Messrs. Moreau and Aingria, the French and Austrian Delegates, remained at Nichsich to maintain tranquillity.

We arrived at Cettigné on the 6th May, and were very politely received by the Prince. After some show of resistance, His Highness gave us, in writing, the conditions on which he would permit provisions destined for Nichsich to pass through his territories. These conditions were easy of fulfilment, merely requiring reciprocity of trade, and permission to the Montenegrins to pass into the Turkish provinces, guaranteed by the Great Powers.

With these conditions we proceeded to Scutari, where we were informed by the Consuls that they had just been directed by telegraph from Constantinople to make an appeal to the sense of humanity and generosity of the Prince on behalf of Nichsich. The conditions of which we were the bearers were, therefore, no longer necessary. The course we had pursued was telegraphed to Constantinople by the Scutari Consuls, who, being charged with the affairs of Montenegro, relieved us from further action in that part of our mission relating to Montenegro.

In a consultation we had with the Governor of Scutari, Abdi Pasha, his Excellency, in reply to our demand as to whether he could consign to us provisions on the Montenegrin frontier near Spooj, said that he could not undertake to do so, as he felt certain that if the Montenegrins did not take advantage of the suspension of hostilities, which must first be agreed upon, to gain some supposed superiority by the murder of a few Mussulmans, the Albanians would do so to avenge some previous deed of blood; he begged, therefore, that some other plan might be adopted for provisioning Nichsich. I proposed that supplies be purchased at Cattaro or Risano, and sent by the Austrian Government to Nichsich. The proposal was accepted, and 50,000 piastres were deposited by Abdi Pasha at the Austrian Consulate for the purpose.

On the 9th May, together with the Consuls of Scutari, we returned to Cettigné.

The Prince, in a letter addressed to the Consuls of Scutari, replied to the appeal to his generosity by granting without conditions permission for convoys to traverse his territories. A copy of this document is annexed.

While we were at Cettigné, the Austrian Consul received a telegram from Vienna, instructing him that, while Austria gave permission for the purchase of provisions, the contracts and the transport must be effected by Turkish agents.

This reply induced my colleague and myself to undertake the purchase, so that no time might be lost. On the 11th May we proceeded to Cattaro, accompanied by the Montenegrin Captain of Grahovo, who was placed by the Prince at our disposal for the purpose of procuring for us transport horses.

At Cattaro we concluded a contract for 19,200 okes of grain and 1,000 okes of salt, deliverable at a point called Kusinski-most, on the frontier, two hours from Nichsich.

We accompanied the first convoy of this contract, consisting of sixty horse-loads, to the point of delivery, where, after consigning the grain, we were met by Messrs. Moreau and Angrin, with whom, having accomplished the object of our mission—that of saving Nichsich from a catastrophe, and opened a road for the passage of provisions—we returned to Cettigné.

We returned to Mostar viâ Ragusa on the 22nd May.

In the preceding portion of this Report, I have adhered to a mere journal of our proceedings. I shall now endeavour to show, in refutation of the assurances to the contrary of other agents who seem to have a personal interest in the aggrandizement of Montenegro, and who unhesitatingly state that Nichsich was perfectly free, and that Montenegro observed the strictest neutrality, whether Nichsich was really blockaded and reduced to distress, by whom it was surrounded, or rather shut off from all communication with other points, and to what extent the inhabitants were justified in apprehending a catastrophe.

As stated before, we did not find the town besieged; such a position our knowledge of the surrounding populations and of the means at the disposal of the Montenegrins precluded us from anticipating. We, however, found that, while the only road connecting Nichsich with other points of the Herzegovina was cut off by bands of rebels and Montenegrins, the Montenegrins had also on their side completely shut their frontiers to the Turks, had refused them the necessaries of life, and informed the Turkish authorities by letter that no Mussulman would be allowed to pass into Montenegro. Thus was the blockade established.

The assertions that the Montenegrins did not unite with the rebels, and that the Prince, far from assisting to reduce Nichsich, actually assisted towards its preservation by permitting provisions to pass to it, are, I think, altogether incorrect. Had such been the case, the rebels would not have been so daring, the Montenegrin frontier would not have been closed, nor would the Prince have made, when asked by us, the free passage of convoys through his territories a matter to demand certain concessions from the Turks. His Highness' letter to the Scutari Consuls, of which I inclose a copy, however, proves rather clearly that he not only took part in the blockade, but that he expected to reap the fruits of the fall of the town.

I discovered Montenegrins in the Dooga defile. They were, it is stated, there against the wishes of the Prince; and, by their presence, they had incurred the penalty of perpetual banishment, and the confiscation of the property they possessed in Montenegro. This punishment I found, on inquiry in Montenegro, had been carried out only against one individual, Peko Paulovitch, for crimes committed against the late Prince, and not for joining the rebels. The first Montenegrin I met on entering Montenegro, a pandoor (frontier policeman), boasted to me that he had taken part in the massacre of the 27th April. Others I met with during my stay in the country related to me the part they had taken in various fights in the Herzegovina and Bosnia this year. I may also state that, during my stay in Cettigné, M. Mirko, the father of the Prince, and President of the Senate, decided in Council a case in which two individuals disputed the possession of a goat taken by them in an attack made about the end of last March on a Turkish village near Nichsich.

I inclose two documents in proof of Montenegrin participation in the rebellion. No. 6 is a letter to us from the Scutari Consuls stating that the Prince sent us a perinnik (sergeant) to conduct us through the Dooga Pass. This perinnik must have been in the Pass while we were there, but he did not show himself, and, I fear, though ostensibly sent to protect us, his real mission was to thwart our efforts. The letter was given to us at Nichsich.

No. 7 is the translation of a letter received by Mr. Vaclik from Captain Vukotich; it relates to the inhabitants of Ozenich, a village situated one-and-a-half hours from Nichsich, on the Montenegrin frontier, which was burnt by the Turks after the battle of Grahovatz. It is in reply to a proposal made by the authorities of Nichsich, through us, to the people who now reside on the borders of Montenegro, to return to their fields.

I examined several Christians who came to Nichsich from the rebel districts during my stay there; they all swore to the presence of Montenegrins, led by Montenegrin officers, in the defile at the time of the massacre.

Against this mass of evidence we have only the assertion of the Prince that Montenegro has not identified herself with the revolt, and one testimony in proof is offered, that a certain Signor Tchelovich is permitted to transport provisions to Nichsich through Montenegro to the extent of 100 loads a-month. Evidently his Highness has never calculated what a population of about 5,000 souls and a battalion of infantry can consume in a month; a little consideration would have induced him rather to conceal a concession which was made to cover the underhand hostility of Montenegro, but which, after all, sets it forth clearly.

His Highness has also to explain how he could afford us protection in the Dooga Boglias if he were not looked upon by the insurgents as their leader.

In conclusion I have only to say that, in consequence of the blockade, I found about

half the population of Nichsich reduced to a state of almost starvation, the few animals left could not be driven out to graze one mile in any direction without incurring the risk of loss. Every village in the plain had been attacked and burnt, and the inhabitants who fell into their hands were subjected to horrible treatment by the rebels and Montenegrins, and finally, if aid had not been sent, Nichsich as a Turkish town would soon have ceased to exist.

(Signed) JAS. ZOHRAB.

Bosna-Serai, June 14, 1861.

Annexes.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Mahmood Bey, commanding the position of Cristatz.

Défilé de Douga, le 25 Avril, 1861.

Monsieur,

Le Chef des insurgés qui occupent le défilé de Douga, cédant à notre invitation, laisse dès aujourd'hui la route de Nichsich libre. Vous pouvez donc, M. le Lieutenant-Colonel, expédier les vivres destinés au ravitaillement de cette ville, dès que vos moyens de transport vous le permettront. Nous vous prions que le détachement qui accompagnera le convoi n'excédat point le chiffre strictement nécessaire au maintien de l'ordre dans ce convoi ; un déploiement de force plus considérable serait inutile et pourrait éveiller des soupçons gratuits.

Veuillez aussi porter à la connaissance de vos chefs, qu'en négociant avec les insurgés sur l'abandon des positions qu'ils occupaient jusqu'aujourd'hui, nous leur promîmes, comme c'était d'ailleurs convenu entre nous et son Excellence Dervish Pacha avant notre départ de Mostar, qu'aucun mouvement offensif des troupes de Sa Majesté le Sultan ne sera dirigé contre leurs districts et que le différend sera réglé par des moyens pacifiques et que les troupes observeront la plus stricte discipline.

Agréez, &c.

(Signé) CINGRIA.
MOREAU.
ZOHRAB.
BESOBRASOW.

The Consuls of Scutari to the Consuls of Mostar at Nichsich.

Cettigné, le 23 Avril, 1861.

Messieurs,

Cette lettre vous sera remise par M. Vaclik, Secrétaire de Son Altesse le Prince du Monténégro, qui vous donnera tous les renseignements que vous pouvez désirer.

D'ordre de nos Ambassadeurs nous nous sommes rendus à Cettigné pour engager Son Altesse à unir ses efforts aux nôtres pour empêcher le massacre de 4,000 hommes qui étaient, disait-on, assiégés dans Nichsich.

Comme nous le savions déjà Son Altesse nous a renouvelé l'assurance qu'aucun Monténégrin n'était de son consentement en Herzégovine. Nous avons appris aussi que Nichsich n'était nullement bloqué puisque Son Altesse le Prince Nicholas autorisait M. Tchelovich, sujet Autrichien de Risano, à traverser son territoire pour porter chaque mois cent charges de farine pour la garnison de Nichsich, et qu'elle nous a dit qu'avant hier quinze chevaux chargés étaient passés par Grahovo pour cette destination.

Votre tache, Messieurs, sera donc fort simplifiée et nous n'avons qu'un regret, c'est qu'on ait fait faire, si mal à propos, un semblable voyage.

Son Altesse vous prie puisque vous vous trouvez sur les lieux de faire une enquête sur les événements qui viennent de se passer à Opoutna Rudiné, près du Couvent de Kossierevo, où neuf églises profanées et ruinées, seize villages saccagés, des femmes violées, des enfants emmenés par les Turcs.

Agréez, &c.

(Signé) GILBERT.
HECQUARD.
ZOLOTOREFF.
FRANCESCHI.

P.S.—Nous vous serions fort reconnaissants si vous vouliez nous transmettre par l'intermédiaire de M. Vaclik les résultats de vos observations, d'autant plus importantes pour nous que le Supérieur du Couvent de Kossierevo se trouve à Scutari pour y déposer une plainte.

G.
H.
Z.
F.

The Consuls at Nichsich to the Consuls of Scutari at Cettigné.

Nichsich, le 27 Avril, 1861.

Messieurs,

M. Vacklik, qui est arrivé ici hier soir, nous a remis votre lettre en date du 23.

En vous remerciant des renseignements qu'elle contenait nous nous empressons de vous en fournir à notre tour.

Nous ne trouvâmes, il est vrai, point d'armée assiégeante devant Nichsich, ce fait ne nous surprit guère, notre expérience des hommes et des choses dans ce pays d'exagération nous en empêchait. Nous ne trouvâmes pas même une blocade absolue. Mais ce que nous constatâmes par nous mêmes, c'est que la seule route qui à travers le défilé de Douga relie Nichsich au reste de l'Herzégovine soumise, était depuis trois mois interceptée par les Chrétiens de Bagnani, de Piva et de Drobniak. Tant que cette route ne serait ouverte la situation de Nichsich est réelment sérieuse.

Les Chrétiens sont aidés ou conduit par une centaine de Monténégrins, parmi lesquels nous bivouaquions la nuit du 25 Avril à la grande satisfaction de notre sentiment du pittoresque, mais au prix de privation de toute nature.

Les Monténégrins nous déclarent qu'ils se trouvaient à Douga en volontaires par sympathie pour leurs compatriotes en détresse mais contre la volonté et les ordres du Prince.

En prenant acte de cet aveu nous les engageâmes, dans le sens de nos instructions, à ne pas entraver désormais la pacification de ces contrées qui allat s'effectuer à des conditions dont Omer Pacha était porteur et que les Ambassadeurs des Grandes Puissances trouvaient acceptables.

Les volontaires Monténégrins, tout en se déclarant prêts à obéir à notre sommation, ne nous cachèrent point que leur participation à la levée des boucliers en Herzégovine leur fermait les portes de la patrie où leurs biens étaient confisqués et leurs personnes proscrites, force leur était donc de continuer leur vie d'avantures sanglantes.

Nous leur promîmes de prendre en considération leur position réelment difficile, et de soliciter en leur faveur une amnistie. Nous vous prions donc, Messieurs, de vouloir bien nous nider en cette occasion en assumant le rôle de nos intermédiaires auprès de Son Altesse le Prince Nicolas.

En attendant cet acte de clémence, nous remîmes une cinquantaine de ducats à l'ancien Perianik, Peko Pavlovich de Cevo, afin qu'il puisse subvenir à l'entretien de ses compagnons sans avoir besoin de recourir à des moyens illégaux qui refailleraient sur ses compatriotes de l'Herzégovine, les autorités Turques à Mostar, aussi bien que le commandant des troupes régulières à Nichsich, reconnaissent volontiers la courtoisie de Son Altesse le Prince Nicolas, qui veut bien accorder à M. Tchelovich le libre passage de sa fourniture. Mais en admettant même que les arrivages de ces vivres puissent s'effectuer plus régulièrement que ce n'est pas le cas, la quantité de ces provisions ne pourrait guère suffir aux besoins de toute la population dont les terres, cultivées jadis, sont aujourd'hui abandonnées en majeure partie à cause du danger réel ; un grand nombre d'habitants vit en effet, nous assure-t-on, en mangeant de l'herbe bouillie, sans pouvoir l'assaisonner du sel, qui manque absolument.

Nous ne savons pas encore si nos efforts pour rouvrir la route de Douga ont abouti ou non ; nous l'espérons, attendu que le Serdar qui y commande nous le promis formellement. Nous attendons aujourd'hui ou demain, au plus tard, les Chefs de Bagnani et de Piva auxquels nous avons offert des sauf-conduits.

Dès que notre mission en aura abouti nous passerons par Kossierevo et par les villages qu'on dit incendiés ou saccagés. Nous nous en occupâmes, soyez en sûrs, messieurs, bien avant l'arrivée de votre lettre, et la Commission qui siége à Mostar en est saisi. Il est donc à regretter que le Supérieur du Couvent de Kossierevo soit allé à Scutari, où il ne saurait trouver aucun remède au mal dont il se plaint. Ce serait plustôt à Mostar qu'il devait venir, vu que le danger qu'il paraît redouter à Mostar n'est pas

moindre à Scutari, et la protection qu'il y trouverait auprès de vous ne serait guère plus efficace que celle que nous saurions lui accorder à Mostar.

Agréez, &c.
(Signé) CINGRIA.
MOREAU.
ZOHRAB.
BESOBRASOW.

Prince Nicolas to the Consuls of Scutari.

Cettigné, le 10 *Mai*, 1861.

MM. les Consuls,

Les Consuls Anglais et Russe de Mostar étant venus me trouver, autorisés par leurs Gouvernements à traiter avec moi, je leur ai proposé, par écrit, de laisser passer par mon territoire autant de vivres et de munitions que le voudraient les Turcs à charge de réciprocité. Niehsich étant à la dernière extrémité, de l'aveu même des Turcs, il était naturel de tirer un avantage des secours qu'on ne demandait. Aujourd'hui que les Représentants des Grandes Puissances font appel à la générosité et aux sentiments d'humanité du Prince de Monténégro, j'abandonne les avantages pouvant résulter de cette situation pour le Monténégro, et je continuerai à faciliter le passage des vivres nécessaires pour ravitailler Niehsich.

Désireux de voir la tranquillité rétablie, et de voir cesser un état de choses qui répand l'agitation dans mon peuple et met à la charge du Monténégro, déjà si pauvre lui-même, plus de 600 familles mourant de faim, vous pouvez assurer vos Gouvernements qu'ils me trouveront toujours prêts, comme je l'ai été jusqu'à présent, à prêter mon appui pour faire accepter les conditions qu'ils jugeront satisfaisantes. S'ils le désirent, je mettrai même un Sénateur à leur disposition pour faire entendre hautement les conseils que je ne cesse de donner à ces malheureuses populations.

Je suis heureux de saisir cette occasion de prouver aux Gouvernements des Grandes Puissances notre reconnaissance pour la confiance qu'ils nous montrent.

J'espère que mon empressement à satisfaire aux désirs des Grandes Puissances mettra un terme aux défiances dont je suis l'objet, et vous prie de demander qu'il soit pris d'urgence des mesures énergiques pour mettre un terme aux continuelles aggressions des Turcs du côté de l'Albanie.

Agréez, &c.
(Signé) NICOLAS I.

The Consuls of Scutari to the Consuls of Mostar.

Cettigné, le 23 *Avril*, 1861.

Messieurs,

A notre demande, Son Altesse le Prince du Monténégro vous envoie un Perianik pour vous sauvegarder au milieu des insurgés si vous le conduisez avec vous à Niehsich, où vous rejoindra demain M. Vaclik, Secrétaire du Prince; veillez, nous vous prions, à sa sûreté.

Agréez, &c.
(Signé) GILBERT.
HECQUARD.
ZOLOTOREFF.
FRANCESCHI.

Translation of a Letter from the Montenegrin Captain Vukotich to M. Yovan Vaclik.

Brschno, le 21 *Avril*, 1861, o.s.

J'ai reçu votre lettre de Jeudi, et ayant compris tous ce que vous me dites au sujet d'Ozrenich. J'ai rassemblé tous les habitants d'Ozrenich, et leur ai expliqué à plusieurs reprises toutes les raisons alléguées par vous. Ils m'ont donné la réponse suivante:—

"Nous remercions tous les Consuls de ce qu'ils nous invitent de rentrer à Ozrenich, mais pourquoi donnent-ils raison aux Turcs? et leur disent d'Aferim! nous n'avons pas abandonné nos maisons, parceque nous nous croyons assez forts pour remporter sur les Turcs, mais à cause des oppressions et des vexations criantes des Turcs qu'ils continuent à exercer aujourd'hui même en Herzégovine."

Yovan dite au Consuls que les Ozrenichiens déclarent qu'ils préfèrent tous de se faire brûler vifs ou de se noyer que de retourner à Ozrenich aux conditions mentionnées dans votre lettre.

Yovan, tant que je ne me trouve pas ensemble avec vous et tous les Consuls, la question ne peut être décidée. Les habitants de Niehsich vous portent chaque jour des plaintes vraies ou fausses, et si moi je vous écris sur papier toutes les plaintes des habitants d'Ozrenich et de tous les sujets du Prince attaqués et provoqués par les Turcs, je ne pourrai le terminer dans l'espace de trois jours. Si vous vous fiez aux habitants de la ville il n'y a (à espérer). J'ai compris de ce que vous m'écrivez que vous avez reçu une lettre de Cettigné. Quant aux Ozrenichiens ils disent tous petits et grands qu'avec l'aide de Son Altesse le Prince ils ne seront jamais sujets Turcs.

Yovan j'ai entendu qu'un Consul est arrivé voie de Roudiné du moi qui est-ce.

(Signé) YOVAN VUCOTICH

No. 199.

Consul Holmes to Lord J. Russell.—(Received July 3.)

(Telegraphic.)
(Secret and Confidential.)

Mostar, July 3, 1861.

——— confidentially told me that Grand Vizier stated to him that England would not regard with disapprobation an attack on Montenegro. This indicates at least that the subject has been discussed at Constantinople, and I fear that there is a secret desire for war rather than pacification.

No. 200.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 432. Confidential.)

Foreign Office, July 4, 1861.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches as noted in the margin* respecting the affairs of Montenegro, and the assertion that the murder of the late Prince Danilo had been investigated by the Austrian Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 201.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 4, 1861.

THE Grand Vizier has no authority for saying that England would not disapprove an attack on Montenegro.

No. 202.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received July 5.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, July 5, 1861, 4 P.M.

ON receiving a despatch from Mr. Holmes stating that the Grand Vizier had alleged that England would not disapprove an attack on Montenegro, I telegraphed in substance, as follows:—

"Omer Pasha is wrong, and tell him so.

"England wishes matters to be settled peaceably, and would think war a great calamity."

The Consuls seem to me going wrong, and wishing to be the official channel of communication between the Turkish Government and the insurgents. I have desired Holmes to tell the insurgents they must address themselves to Turkish Commander-

* Nos. 190, 196, and 197.

in-chief, and that he and his brother Delegates can then give them assistance officiously.

No. 203.

Lord Napier to Lord J. Russell.—(Received July 8.)

(No. 201.) *St. Petersburgh, July 2, 1861.*

My Lord,

I TOLD Prince Gortchakow this morning that I had conveyed to your Lordship the favourable opinion which he had conceived of the conduct of the Prince of Montenegro during the late disorders in the Herzegovina. I added that I saw by the last advices that the Turkish squadron had found it necessary to cannonade the port of Spizza in order to expel the Montenegrins who had occupied that point of the Turkish coast. It might be regretted, I observed, that the Prince of Montenegro had not carried his conciliatory disposition to the extent of causing that place to be peaceably evacuated, and I hinted to his Excellency that any influence which he could exert might be well employed in persuading the Prince to draw off his people to the mountain within their own borders.

Prince Gortchakow said that the question was by this time probably decided. He allowed that the Montenegrins had no right to Spizza, yet he did not seem to like the notion of driving them out by force. He stated that he hoped Omer Pasha would not be induced to attempt a serious invasion of the Mountain. He had more than once been employed in that quarter, and been arrested in his designs: it might be that he had some old grudges to gratify.

I replied that I was confident that Her Majesty's Government had no desire to see an attempt on the part of the Porte to subjugate the Mountain, but the Turkish Commander was surely justified in clearing his own country of the Montenegrin marauders, and driving them within their boundaries.

The Prince remarked that he had no distinct intelligence of what was passing.

I have, &c.

(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 204.

Mr. Macdonell to Lord J. Russell.—(Received July 8.)

London, July 6, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE been directed by his Excellency Sir Henry Bulwer to furnish your Lordship, on my arrival in England, with a copy of his Excellency's instructions directing me to proceed to Mostar and deliver the Cypher with which I was charged to Mr. Holmes, and to endeavour, at the same time, to obtain information relative to the actual state and prospects of the Herzegovina.

I have the honour to inclose herewith to your Lordship a copy of his Excellency's instructions above alluded to, and of my answer thereto.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HUGH G. MACDONELL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 204.

Sir H. Bulwer to Mr. Macdonell.

Constantinople, June 7, 1861.

Sir,

YOU will proceed to Mostar and deliver the Cypher with which you are charged to Mr. Holmes.

You will, of course, have some conversation with that gentleman, and also with Omer Pasha, to whom he will present you.

You should endeavour to obtain from them and others what information you can as to the state and prospects of the country.

The three principal points to which I direct your attention are:—

1. The probability of putting down the insurrection of the Herzegovina without bloodshed.

2. The chances of failure or success if arms have to be resorted to.

3. The general conduct and bearing of the different foreign Delegates and Consuls, and especially that of the lately-named Prussian Consul, M. Blau, who is also the Delegate of Prussia in the Commission which is to assist Omer Pasha.

It would be also desirable to ascertain whether Omer Pasha is disposed to put into execution in Bosnia those reforms promised to the Bosniacs but not yet effected, and also whether the promises made to the people in the Herzegovina are such as, if fairly carried out, ought to satisfy that population.

You will show these instructions to Mr. Holmes, and you will communicate to me by the first safe opportunity all the information you collect, furnishing Her Majesty's Government, on your arrival in England, with a copy of your communication to me.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

Inclosure 2 in No. 204.

Mr. Macdonell to Sir H. Bulwer.

Sir, *Paris, July 5, 1861.*

IN accordance with your Excellency's instructions, I proceeded to Mostar, and there delivered to Mr. Holmes the Cypher with which I was charged.

On leaving Ragusa I proceeded to Metteovich, on the Turkish frontier, and I then followed the right bank of the River Narenta, in order to make myself acquainted with that part of the Herzegovina which I have been led to believe was in the hands of the insurgents.

Many facts were related to me, particularly at the Greek Convent situated on the above-named river, and off the road which leads to Mostar, and I beg leave to state that, with the exception of a few unfortunate Christians, who are compelled to work at the road in construction, the country in general seemed to me tolerably quiet.

I was struck with the abject poverty prevailing among the Christians, whilst the Turkish population appears to live in comfort. This I attribute to the tyranny of the beys, or landowners; and the harshness with which the Christians appear to be treated certainly suggests many painful reflections.

From the information I was able to gather, both in conversation with his Highness Omer Pasha and the Commissioners, and with other persons resident in the country, it would appear that the actual state of the province is far from satisfactory, but that, with the exception of a few villages on the frontier of Montenegro, occupied by the insurgents, the province itself is not in a worse state than most of the other provinces of the Empire. It would appear, on the contrary, that, owing to its position and the vicinity of a great Power, its resources have to a certain degree been developed.

The most crying evil is the want of communications, which render a military movement almost impossible, and the expense of carrying provisions doubles their original cost; and I believe that had the Herzegovina been properly provisioned and garrisoned, as the Turkish authorities of that province have led the Porte to believe by their reports, the insurgents could never have forced the Turkish troops to fall back gradually upon Mostar as they have done. The corruption which is so predominant among the Turkish officers has not only sapped the authority of the Sultan, but it has so demoralized the troops, owing to the privations and sufferings which they have experienced, that they can scarcely now be reckoned upon.

Mr. Holmes appears to be under the impression that the regular troops in that province number 10,000 men, but I have been assured by the Turkish officers themselves that they can only muster 12 battalions of 500 effective men each. Moreover, the constant defeats to which the small columns have been exposed on the frontier, the infamous conduct of their officers, the privations, the inefficient resources, the absence of medical attendance, and finally, the twenty months' arrear of pay, have rendered the task of their reorganization a matter of great difficulty.

Both his Highness and the Commissioners are certainly determined to use their best endeavours in bringing about the pacification, and are kindly disposed towards the insurgents. The day previous to my departure from Mostar a message had been sent by the insurgents to the Commissioners which stated that they were willing to meet the latter and come to terms. The pacification may, therefore, be considered as certain. I would here draw your Excellency's attention to the fact that the insurgents appear willing

rather to submit to the Commissioners than to the Representative of the Sultan. This, however, may in some degree be attributed to the fact that once before the Turkish Government is supposed to have failed in the fulfilment of its engagements towards the Christians of that province; how far the Government was to be exclusively blamed for that apparent want of good faith, I cannot state as a certainty, but I believe it to be true that Messrs. Churchill and Hecquard at that time guaranteed the fulfilment of certain reforms which were never carried into effect; it is but natural, therefore, that the Christians should not be willing to trust the Turkish authorities a second time.

With the exception of one point or two, to which I shall refer hereafter, I believe that on the whole the insurgents appear satisfied with the promises now held out to them, and their readiness to come to terms proves it. I can safely assert that the appointment of his Highness Omer Pasha has given general satisfaction, and that a better choice could never have been made. Both the Mussulmans and the Christians of the province are of opinion that he is the only person who can re-establish order. But, as a matter of course, the permanent existence of the province and the welfare of the country depend, not only on its pacification, but wholly, I may say, on the carrying into effect of the Proclamation issued; for, after the departure of the Commissioners, the task of watching over the strict fulfilment of the promises held out to the Christians must devolve upon the Consuls resident at Mostar, on whose perfect unanimity, as well as on the conscientious conduct of the Turkish authorities, the fate of the country will depend, and without which the labours of the Commission will have been unavailing.

It would be difficult to predict what would be the chances of failure or success if arms have to be resorted to. As I have already stated to your Excellency, Omer Pasha cannot reckon on the troops under his command, and I may add that, owing to the want of communications and of the necessary special equipments, these troops would find it difficult, if not impossible, to make a successful movement. Moreover, the deficiency of means and the difficulty of obtaining supplies would soon prove fatal. His Highness will, I feel certain, improve the actual state of things, but for this two things are absolutely essential, money and efficient officers, both of which appear to be equally wanting.

There are about 2,000 Bashi-Bazouks in the province, and without entering into details, his Highness' own words will suffice to prove their inefficiency. He assured me that "they are the scourge of the province, and that should he be forced to advance upon the insurgents he would have to leave these Bashi-Bazouks under the surveillance of a battalion of regular infantry." His intention, however, is to disband them, but he can only do so by degrees, as it would be unsafe to let loose such a band of robbers on the province.

It may be well to call your Excellency's attention to the momentous fact that the Montenegrins hold themselves in readiness to come at the first call to the assistance of the insurgents, a circumstance which the Turks do not look upon without uneasiness, and which they have every reason to dread; for not only are the Montenegrins accustomed to that sort of warfare, but it is undoubtedly the case that they have been well supplied with arms and money. Their object is to keep the province in a constant state of ferment, by which means they have everything to gain and nothing to lose, having no mode of existence in their own country, and having been led to hope that no opposition will be made by certain Powers to an extension of their territory, either towards the plains of the Herzegovina or towards the sea. I would venture here to remark that the Commissioners do not appear to take sufficient notice or watch closely enough the conduct of certain foreign agents in Montenegro, who may soon prove troublesome.

Though the Commissioners appear animated with the best intentions, yet I cannot help thinking that some of them aim at deriving ulterior advantages from the effects of the pacification and from the non-execution of the Proclamation.

Your Excellency is already acquainted with the French Commissioner M. Tissot. He has taken the lead in the Commission, and without appearing to press his opinions on the other members, his suggestions are generally adopted. But as all the Commissioners appear to act with one accord, M. Tissot's preponderance in the Commission cannot be productive of evil.

The Austrian Commissioner, Major Jovanovitch, has already been employed on the Commission for the delimitation of the Montenegrin frontier. He has a perfect knowledge of the Slavonic language and of that country. He belongs to the corps of Engineers, and is, I dare say, a very deserving officer in his special branch of the service; but he appears to take very little interest in the labours of the Commission, and is anxious to see them terminated.

Mr. Bezobrazon, the Russian Commissioner, is one of the most active members. He is foremost in proclaiming the anxious wish of his Government to see the authority of

the Sultan upheld, and endeavours to give every assurance of his earnest desire to co-operate with Omer Pasha in carrying out the reforms, yet his conduct and bearing are in contradiction to his assertions.

His knowledge of the language and his influence over the Greek clergy, a proof of which I obtained during my visit at the Greek Convent on the Narenta, have led me to conclude that he is not over zealous in subduing that feeling of animosity reciprocally entertained between Christians and Mussulmans. The general tone of his conversation would also lead one to suppose that though he is anxious to see order re-established, he hopes that it will never be of a permanent nature, and that the joint efforts of the foreign Powers will only tend to give a fresh proof of the impotency of Turkish rule, which, in his estimation, cannot fail to advance the views of his Government.

M. Blau, the Prussian Delegate, appears to be independent, conscientious, and well-intentioned, and is, moreover, well informed of what is going on both in Montenegro and on the Austrian frontier. I may here add that it is to be hoped, when the resident Consuls shall have to continue the work of the Commission, that M. Blau will not be removed, but will continue to reside at Mostar, for, however willing and able Mr. Zohrab may be to fulfil the task which will devolve upon him, I fear he will not be able to hold his ground against two such powerful adversaries as the Russian and Austrian Consuls.

Your Excellency will perceive, therefore, that little doubt can be entertained as to the probability of the insurrection in the Herzegovina being put down without bloodshed. But, on the other hand, time alone can prove to what extent the promises made to the people are likely to be carried out to the satisfaction of that population.

The whole matter appears to rest not only with Omer Pasha, but on the collective action of the Agents of the five Powers who have guaranteed the execution of the reforms. His Highness will use his utmost endeavours for that purpose. But how far will the Agents appointed to continue the task of the Commissioners be able to fulfil that duty with unanimity? for should they not act in concert, they will not only paralyse Omer Pasha's generous efforts, but they will destroy for ever the authority of the Sultan in that province, and then all hope must be abandoned of re-establishing order under his rule.

His Highness is not only disposed to grant all the concessions set forth in his Proclamation, but he is anxious, if the Porte authorizes him to do so, to extend the reforms beyond the expectations of the people; and in order to carry out his views a supply of funds and the honest support of the Government are essential.

Omer Pasha's attention will be directed, provisionally—

1. To the reform of the Medjlis. This judicial body is to be composed for the future of an equal number of Christians and Mussulmans, in lieu of two Christians and ten Mussulmans as heretofore.

2. To the reform of the relations between tenants (mostly Christians) and landowners. A contract properly registered will be effected between the landlord and tenant, binding upon both parties, by which means the Christians will be released from the oppressive grasp of the Mahommedan landlords. His Highness stated also that the taxes will for the future be properly and fairly assessed. He purposes also to apply to the Government for granting to the Christians vast tracts of uncultivated land in the province. Should the Porte accede to this proposal, not only will this measure lay the foundation of a permanent peace, but will serve as a precedent for the Christian subjects of the Porte to hold real property throughout the Empire.

3. To the reform of the police by the total disbandment of the Bashi-Bazouks, and the formation of a regular corps of gendarmerie wholly dependent on their pay.

I beg to call your Excellency's attention to that passage in the Proclamation by which the insurgents are exonerated from the payment of all arrears of taxes, whilst the unoffending portion of the population remain subjected to the integral payment of their debt to the State.

The presence of the beys (landowners) may also become an obstacle to the prompt execution of the reforms, they having most to lose by the emancipation of the Christians. If the Government would sanction their temporary removal from the province, it would greatly facilitate the carrying out of the reforms.

I may therefore conclude by stating that at present the labours of the Commission are progressing favourably, apparently to the satisfaction of the Bosniac population in general, and in a manner almost at first unhoped-for both by his Highness Omer Pasha and the Commissioners.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH G. MACDONELL.

No. 205.

Lord J. Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 689.) *Foreign Office, July 8, 1861.*

My Lord,

I INCLOSE for your Excellency's information copies of despatches as marked in the margin upon the subject of Montenegro.*

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 206.

Lord J. Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 712.) *Foreign Office, July 13, 1861.*

My Lord,

I INCLOSE for your Excellency's information copy of a despatch and its inclosure from Mr. Macdonall, containing a report of his visit to the Herzegovina.†

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 207.

Earl Cowley to Lord J. Russell.—(Received July 16.)

(No. 860.) *Paris, July 15, 1861.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to return herewith to your Lordship the original despatch and its inclosures from Mr. Macdonell, containing a report of his visit to the Herzegovina, as marked in the margin,† which were transmitted to me for my perusal in your Lordship's despatch No. 712 of the 13th instant.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 208.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 457.) *Foreign Office, July 18, 1861.*

Sir,

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency, for your information, a copy of a despatch from Lord Napier‡ reporting Prince Gortchakow's opinion of the conduct of the Prince of Montenegro during the late disturbances in the Herzegovina.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 209.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received July 20.)

(No. 482.) *Constantinople, July 4, 1861.*

My Lord,

HAVING desired Mr. Pisani to communicate to Aali Pasha the substance of Lord Bloomfield's despatch No. 291, inclosed in your Lordship's No. 397 of the 20th ultimo, I took that opportunity of asking his Highness whether the Porte were now satisfied that the concentration of an Austrian force on the Save had not been made with any aggressive intentions against this country.

Aali Pasha desired Mr. Pisani to state to me in reply, that, from the assurances he had lately received from the Austrian Government, he was convinced that there was no ground whatever for apprehension in that quarter.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

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* No. 202. † No. 204. ‡ No. 203.

No. 210.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received July 20.)

(No. 490.) *Therapia, July 8, 1861.*

My Lord,

HAVING received no recent intelligence from Her Majesty's Consul at Scutari on the affairs of Montenegro, I herewith inclose copies of two telegrams to the French Ambassador here, reporting that the Prince of Montenegro has inflicted exemplary punishment on the authors of the recent attack on the small town of Spizza, on the coast near Antivari, and that the Prince, in spite of the opposition he meets with at Cettigné, continues to display conciliatory intentions towards Omer Pasha and the Turkish authorities.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 210.

M. Hecquard to M. de Lavalette.

(Télégraphique.) *Cettigné, Vendredi.*

LE Prince a fait fusiller Marco Andrina, destitué et exilé Capitaine de Glohndoli, imposé une amende à tous les Monténégrins ayant participé à l'affaire de Spitza.

Tous les objets pris ont été restitués.

Inclosure 2 in No. 210.

M. Hecquard to M. de Lavalette.

(Télégraphique.) *Cettigné, le 6 Juillet, 1861.*

LE Prince de Monténégro, malgré son père, le Sénat et le sentiment général, accepte une entrevue sur le territoire Ottoman, mais dans un lieu plus rapproché de ses frontières, Mostar étant à cinq journées, Klek à six journées de marche de Cettigné.

Le Prince de Monténégro envoie complimenter Omer Pacha.

No. 211.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received July 20.)

(No. 491.) *Constantinople, July 8, 1861.*

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram of the 4th instant, stating that the Grand Vizier had no authority for the assertion attributed to him by Omer Pasha, that England would not disapprove the employment of force by the Turkish Government against Montenegro, I have the honour to inclose herewith the copy of a report from M. Etienne Pisani, stating that the Grand Vizier denies that he ever said anything to Omer Pasha to that effect.

I likewise transmit a translation of a telegram addressed to Omer Pasha by the Grand Vizier recommending him not to have recourse to coercive measures against Montenegro without the assent of the European delegates at Mostar.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 211.

Mr. E. Pisani to Sir H. Bulwer.

Therapia, July 6, 1861.

Sir,

HAVING read and explained to the Grand Vizier your Excellency's instruction to me of yesterday's date, stating that Mr. Holmes has been confidentially informed by Omer Pasha that the Grand Vizier had said to him that England would not disapprove an attack on Montenegro, His Highness gave the most absolute denial to Omer Pasha's

statement, and asserts that he never made any allusion to him either verbally or in writing to that effect, and that your Excellency never said anything to the Porte conveying any such impression.

His Highness read to me a telegram he had yesterday addressed to Omer Pasha, a copy of which I have the honour to inclose for your Excellency's information, recommending him to use all peaceable means to avoid bloodshed, and if, finally, compelled to resort to coercive measures, not to do so without previously showing, and being able to prove to the Commissioners, the urgency of employing force against the insurgents.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. A. PISANI.

Inclosure 2 in No. 211.

The Grand Visier to Omer Pasha.

Constantinople, July 5, 1861.

(Telegraphic.)

IT is most essential to do your utmost to avoid the effusion of blood by making a frank and diligent use of the means of pacification which are at our disposal at this juncture. And if, after all, a necessity for such a course (*id est* hostilities) should manifest itself, you must exert all your intelligence to procure the means of showing such proofs of such a necessity as it will be impossible for the Commissioners to deny.

Details will be written to your Excellency later.

No. 212.

Lord Napier to Lord J. Russell.—(Received July 22.)

(No. 210. Confidential.)

St. Petersburgh, July 9, 1861.

My Lord,

I CALLED on Prince Gortchakow yesterday to take leave of him before his departure for Peterhof, where he is about to spend a month for the benefit of his health, or, as some would say, to maintain his interest and influence at Court. His Excellency did not find much in his recent intelligence from abroad of interest to Her Majesty's Government. In touching upon the affairs of Montenegro and Herzegovina he made, however, the following remarks:—

The European Commission, acting in connection with Omer Pasha, said the Prince, as I understood it, may be recommended on two grounds:

1. Its presence may inspire confidence in the promises of the Porte and thus facilitate the restoration of tranquillity.

2. Its presence renders the Porte in a manner responsible to Europe for the execution of the engagements which have been taken towards the Christian population.

Further than that, in the opinion of the Russian Minister, the action of the Commission ought not to be extended. His Excellency stated that the influence of the Commissioners, especially of the French Commissioner, had been used to prevail on the Prince of Montenegro to wait upon Omer Pasha and to obtain from the Prince that he should employ his mediation in promoting the submission of the Christians in arms against the Turkish Government. In the opinion of the Russian Minister, the Prince of Montenegro, being an independent Chief, did not owe any such mark of respect to the Turkish Commander as would be implied by a visit, nor could he be expected to cooperate with the Pasha for the re-establishment of Turkish authority—a course of action quite irreconcilable with his position, with the tradition of his office, and with the sentiments of his people. His Excellency also said that he had conveyed to Omar Pasha the expression of his hope that no attempt would be made to invade the territory of Montenegro, and added that he was about to order by telegraph that should any such aggression occur, the Russian Commissioner should at once withdraw.

I said to Prince Gortchakow that although we might not expect any positive cooperation on the part of the Prince of Montenegro in restoring tranquillity on Turkish territory, we might at least demand from him that he should cause his own people to retire from the positions which they had seized beyond their frontier, and I asked him whether the Montenegrins had evacuated Spizza?

The Prince replied that he did not know exactly what was the nature of the force which had taken possession of Spizza; whether it was composed of Montenegrins properly so called, or of insurgents. He had no further information on the subject than that which was contained in the newspapers; he was not even acquainted with the real character of the movement in Herzegovina.

I observed that Prince Gortchakow was not altogether satisfied with the part taken by Prince Labanoff in joining frankly in the project of a Commission to aid in pacifying Herzegovina and in approving the tenor of the powers given to Omar Pasha as expressed in an identic note to the Porte and in an identic instruction to the Russian Commissioner. The Prince, I doubt not, secretly expected that the revolt in Herzegovina might attain considerable proportions and might defy the power of the Turkish Government, so as to give occasion for the establishment of his favourite "autonomy" or local administrative independence in that province accompanied by an extension of the power of the Prince of Montenegro. This scheme or hope, if his Excellency ever cherished it, is now on the point of being frustrated with the full concurrence of the Russian Minister at Constantinople.

The Prince is vexed by the turn which affairs have taken, but he cannot openly blame his agents, for they act in conformity with his avowed policy—the maintenance of the Turkish Government in connection with the improvement of the condition of the Christians.

In this affair I see the great expediency of taking the Russian Government at its word, of assuming its sincerity, and of addressing ourselves cheerfully and frankly to its Representative at Constantinople for assistance; for thus, as in the present case, the Russian influence may be actually made instrumental to our own honest intentions and to the interests of the Porte, while, without question, the heart of the Russian Minister is bent on far different results.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 213.

Lord J. Russell to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 180.)

Foreign Office, July 24, 1861.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your information, copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople relative to the affairs of Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 214.

Lord J. Russell to Lord Napier.

(No. 133.)

Foreign Office, July 24, 1861.

My Lord,

HER Majesty's Government approve the language which your Excellency made use of to Prince Gortchakow on the subject of the affairs of Montenegro and Herzegovina in the conversation of which your Excellency gives a report in your despatch No. 210 of the 9th instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 215.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received July 25.)

Constantinople, July 25, 1861.

(Telegraphic.)

OMER PASHA writes from Scutari on the 23rd that Prince of Montenegro has addressed him an offensive letter, proposing a meeting on Montenegrin territory.

* No. 210.

The Delégates have gone to Cettigné to arrange matters, if possible, but the Prince appears now to be in the hands of the party opposed to pacific measures.

No. 216.

Consul Calvert to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received July 26.*)

(No. 48.) *Monastir, July* 11, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the regiment of Cossacks has set out from Monastir on the morning of the 7th instant on its march to the Plain of Cossova. The money, barely sufficient to cover the expenses by the way, was with some difficulty provided by the military authorities. No advances on account of the arrears of pay due to the officers and men were made; and as the regiment was unwilling to march before discharging its liabilities in the town, the Governor-General, Abdul Kerim Pasha, had no choice but to hold himself personally responsible towards the creditors for the sums owing to them, the amount to be deducted from the pay of the debtors whenever the Treasury may issue it.

The Cossacks were reviewed by the Governor-General of Roumelia on the day preceding their departure. The regiment is short of its complement, and is now made up of young men recruited in Roumelia. Only a small proportion remain of the Russians, Hungarians, and Poles who were enrolled in the ranks on the formation of this regiment during the Crimean War.

The Dragoons at Perlépé, I have been given to understand, refused to march unless their debts in the town were previously paid. As this regiment owes 2,000*l.*, their honourable pretension has caused some embarrassment; but the difficulty will doubtless be got over in the same way as in the case of the Cossacks.

The ultimate destination of both Cossacks and Dragoons is believed to be Herzegovina, where Omer Pasha intends to employ them in active service.

Their General, Mehmed Sadyk Pasha, who proceeded to Constantinople last autumn, has not yet returned.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CHARLES J. CALVERT.

No. 217.

Consul Holmes to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received July 26.*)

(No. 15.) *Mostar, July* 13, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose copies of the Protocols, with their annexes, of the 14th and 15th Conferences of the Commission for the pacification of the Herzegovina.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure 1 in No. 217.

Protocol of the 14th Conference of the Commission in Herzegovina.

Le 2 Juillet, 1861.

LE Mardi, 2 Juillet, 1861, à 10 heures du matin, MM. les Délégués des Cinq Grandes Puissances en Herzégovine se sont réunis chez M. le Délégué de Prusse.

Etaient présents:

M. Jovanovic,
M. Tissot,
Mr. Holmes,
M. Blau,
M. Bezobrazow.

Les Protocoles des 10e, 11e, 12e, et 13e Conférences sont lus et adoptés.

MM. les Délégués de France et de Prusse rappellent que le délai de trois jours

demandé par la Commission avant de faire une nouvelle démarche auprès des Chefs insurgés est sur le point d'expirer et qu'il y a lieu par suite de donner une réponse définitive à son Altesse Omer Pacha. M. Tissot fait observer, d'autre part, que l'entrevue projetée entre son Altesse et le Prince de Monténégro peut avoir lieu d'un jour à l'autre, que son Altesse a exprimé elle-même le désir de voir MM. les Délégués assister à cette entrevue; qu'il est impossible dès lors à la Commission de s'éloigner pour le moment de Mostar. Il propose en conséquence à la Commission d'envoyer un ou plusieurs de ses Drogmans aux Chefs insurgés, afin de s'assurer de la sincérité de leurs dispositions, de vérifier les pleins pouvoirs qu'ils ont déclaré dans leur lettre collective conférer à Jovan Vassiliev Bacevic de Banjani, et de convenir avec ce dernier de l'époque et du lieu d'une entrevue avec MM. les Délégués. Cette manière de procéder lui paraît ménager la dignité de la Commission, qui ne peut songer à aller chercher, un à un, dans leurs districts respectifs, les Chefs de l'insurrection, et offre à ses yeux le double avantage d'agir immédiatement sur ces derniers tout en permettant à MM. les Délégués d'accompagner le Serdar Ekrem dans l'entrevue qu'il peut avoir d'un moment à l'autre avec le Prince de Monténégro.

MM. les Délégués d'Autriche, de la Grande Brétagne, de Prusse, et de Russie adhérant à la proposition de leur collègue, M. Markovich, Drogman de M. le Délégué de Prusse, est désigné pour remplir cette mission.

MM. les Délégués rédigent ensuite une réponse, dont M. Markovich sera porteur, à la lettre collective des Chefs des insurgés. Copie de cette pièce est annexée sous le No. 1, au présent Protocole.

MM. les Délégués, après avoir donné à M. Markovitch les instructions verbales qui doivent le guider, rédigent une note, dont copie est annexée sous le No. 2 au présent Protocole, et par laquelle, en informant le Serdar Ekrem de la résolution qu'ils viennent d'adopter, ils prient son Altesse de vouloir bien prendre les mesures nécessaires pour faciliter à M. Markovich l'accomplissement de la mission dont il est chargé.

La séance est levée à 4 heures un quart.

(Signé) JOVANOVIC, *Major.*
CH. TISSOT.
W. R. HOLMES.
Dr. O. BLAU.
VAL. BEZOBRAZOW.

Inclosure 2 in No. 217.

Letter addressed by the European Delegates to the Inhabitants of the Insurgent Districts.

LES Soussignés, Délégués des Cinq Grandes Puissances, ont reçu la lettre qui leur a été adressée au nom des habitants des districts Zupci, Banyani, Rudina, et Piva par Iovan Vassiliev Bacovic et l'Hégoumène Théodosi.

Les Soussignés félicitent les habitants des districts précités des sentiments de fidélité au Sultan qu'ils expriment dans cette lettre. Ils ne manqueront pas, de leur côté, de justifier la confiance que les habitants de ces districts mettent en eux et sont disposés à entrer en relations directes avec leurs représentants.

Les Soussignés envoient à cet effet le drogman de M. le Délégué de Prusse, M. Markovich, à Iovan Vassiliev Bacevic pour s'entendre sur l'époque et le lieu de l'entrevue; et engagent Iovan Vassiliev Bacevic à ajouter foi pleine et entière à tout ce qu'il lui dira en notre nom.

(Signé) JOVANOVIC, *Major.*
CH. TISSOT.
W. R. HOLMES.
Dr. O. BLAU.
VAL. BEZOBRAZOW.

Inclosure 3 in No. 217.

The European Delegates to Omer Pasha.

LES Soussignés, Délégués des Cinq Grandes Puissances en Herzégovine, ayant reçu, comme ils l'espéraient, avant l'expiration du délai qu'ils avait fixé, la réponse des Chefs des districts de Banyani, Zupci, Rudina, et Piva à leur lettre collective, ont l'honneur de

prévenir son Altesse le Serdar Ekrem, qu'ils se proposent à prendre les mesures indiquées dans leur communication du 29 Juin.

Les Soussignés ne pouvant d'ailleurs s'absenter de Mostar au moment où peut avoir lieu, d'un jour à l'autre, l'entrevue projetée entre son Altesse le Serdar Ekrem et le Prince de Monténégro, entrevue à laquelle son Altesse elle-même a exprimé le désir de les voir assister.

Les Soussignés ont décidé à cet effet qu'ils enverraient immédiatement un de leurs drogmans auprès des Chefs des districts précités pour s'entendre avec eux sur l'époque et le lieu d'une rencontre qui pourrait s'effectuer dans une localité aussi rapprochée que possible de Mostar, si non à Mostar même.

Ils prient, en conséquence, son Altesse le Serdar Ekrem de vouloir bien délivrer à M. Markovich, drogman de M. le Délégué de Prusse, désigné pour remplir cette mission, un sauf-conduit valable pour tous ceux des Chefs insurgés qui pourraient consentir à le suivre, et de donner des ordres pour que M. Markovich trouve à son retour aux avant-postes Ottomans, un officier chargé de veiller à sa sûreté et à celle de ses compagnons.

(Signé) JOVANOVIC, *Major.*
CH. TISSOT.
W. R. HOLMES.
Dr. O. BLAU.
VAL. BEZOBRAZOW.

Inclosure 4 in No. 217.

Protocol of the 15th Conference of the Commission in Herzegovina.

LE Mercredi 3 Juillet, 1861, à dix heures du matin, MM. les Délégués des Cinq Grandes Puissances en Herzégovine se sont réunis chez M. le Délégué de Prusse.

Etaient présents:

M. Jovanovic,
M. Tissot,
Mr. Holmes,
M. Blau,
M. Bezobrazow.

Le Protocole de la quatorzième Conférence est lu et adopté.

M. Blau donne communication d'un télégramme de son Excellence le Ministre de Prusse à Constantinople, duquel il résulte que la Sublime Porte reconnaît les relations officielles de son Délégué en Herzégovine avec Omer Pacha.

M. Tissot déclare avoir reçu un avis semblable de son Excellence M. l'Ambassadeur de France à Constantinople.

M. le Délégué de Prusse croit devoir prévenir ses collégues qu'il lui est revenu de différentes sources qu'un individu aurait parcouru, il y a une dizaine de jours environ, les districts insoumis, et se disant chargé d'une mission secrète de la part de MM. les Délégués, aurait excité les insurgés à reprendre les armes. M. Blau croit savoir que des informations analogues ont été transmises à son Excellence le Serdar Ekrem.

Sur l'avis motivé de M. le Délégué de France, qui déclare avoir également reçu les mêmes informations, MM. les Délégués décident qu'une lettre sera adressée à M. Markovich pour inviter ce dernier à prendre tous les renseignements qu'il lui sera possible de recueillir sur le fait qui vient d'être signalé, et le charge de prémunir contre de pareilles manœuvres les chefs des districts insoumis.

Il est décidé en outre, que communication de cette lettre rédigé en Français et en Serbe sera immédiatement donnée à son Altesse le Serdar Ekrem, et qu'une copie en sera annexée au présent Protocole.

La séance est levée à midi et demi.

(Signé) JOVANOVIC, *Major.*
CH. TISSOT.
W. R. HOLMES.
Dr. O. BLAU.
VAL. BEZOBRAZOW.

Inclosure 5 in No. 217.

The European Delegates to M. Markovic.

Mostar, le 3 Juillet, 1861.

Monsieur,

IL nous revient de différentes sources qu'un individu se serait présenté, il y a quinze jours environ, dans les districts insoumis et se donnant comme chargé d'une mission secrète, à laquelle les membres de la Commission Européenne d'Herzégovine ne seraient pas étrangers, aurait excité les habitants de ces districts à reprendre les armes.

Quelque méprisable que soient de pareilles menées, nous ne saurons les laisser impunis; il s'agit non seulement de l'honneur de la Commission, mais de l'intérêt même des populations qu'elle s'efforce de ramener dans la voie du devoir et que leurs ennemis cherchent à égarer de nouveau.

Vous devez, en conséquence, Monsieur, prendre toutes les informations qu'il vous sera possible de recueillir, tant sur le fait même qui nous est signalé que sur les individus qui s'en seraient rendus coupables. Vous êtes autorisé à donner communication de cette lettre à Jovan Vassiliev Bacevic, ainsi qu'aux autres chefs des districts insurgés, en les invitant de notre part à n'ajouter aucune foi à quiconque se présenterait, soit en notre nom collectif, soit au nom d'un ou de plusieurs d'entre nous, sans produire une pièce attestant sa mission et revêtue de nos cinq signatures et de nos cinq cachets.

Recevez, &c.

(Signé) JOVANOVIC, *Major.*
CH. TISSOT.
W. R. HOLMES.
Dr. O. BLAU.
VAL. BEZOBRAZOW.

No. 218.

Consul Holmes to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received July 26.*)

(No. 17.)

Mostar, July 14, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that on Monday, the 8th instant, the Prussian Consul at Ragusa arrived here, accompanied by a Montenegrin Senator, bearer of the Prince of Montenegro's answer to Omer Pasha's invitation to an interview either at Gabella or Klek.

The letter is very satisfactory, stating the Prince's earnest desire that the pacification should take place and accepting the invitation, but for various reasons proposing either the plain of Nichsick, Klokuk, or Tabliak, on the lake of Scutari, as the place of meeting. I have not yet received a copy of the Prince's letter, and, therefore, cannot inclose one, but will send one later. Omer Pasha treated the Senator with every possible attention, and named Tabliak for the interview, both as the most convenient for the Prince and also as being in the neighbourhood of the telegraph at Scutari.

The Prussian Consul and the Senator, apparently much satisfied with Omer Pasha, left Mostar on the 11th, the former for Ragusa and the latter for Montenegro. If nothing unexpected occurs, Omer Pasha, accompanied by the Commission, will leave Mostar to-morrow morning for Tabliak viâ Klek and Antivari.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 219.

Lord J. Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 768.)

Foreign Office, July 26, 1861.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches* on the subject of Montenegro.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

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* No. 215.

No. 220.

Earl Cowley to Lord J. Russell.—(Received July 27.)

(No. 908.)
Paris, July 26, 1861.

My Lord,

M. BILLAULT mentioned to me yesterday, with expressions of regret, that he had just learnt that the interview which had been arranged between Omer Pasha and the Prince of Montenegro, having for its object the pacification of the frontier between the Herzegovina and Montenegro, could not take place, the Prince having been dissuaded by the Montenegrins from trusting himself upon Turkish soil.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 221.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 469.)
Foreign Office, July 30, 1861.

Sir,

HER Majesty's Government have learnt with satisfaction from your Excellency's despatch No. 491 of the 8th instant that the Grand Vizier denies having said to Omer Pasha that England would not disapprove the employment of force by the Turkish Government against Montenegro.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 222.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 477.)
Foreign Office, July 31, 1861.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches * respecting the affairs of Montenegro and the Herzegovina.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 223.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received July 31, at night.)

(Telegraphic.)
Constantinople, July 31, 1861, 11 P.M.

THE insurgents in the Herzegovina having rejected the pacific overtures of the Delegates, it is almost certain that Omer Pasha will have to resort to hostilities. In that event the Representatives here are disposed to direct the Delegates to withdraw from Mostar. No decision will be taken until to-morrow evening, in the hope of better news.

No. 224.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(Telegraphic.)
Foreign Office, August 1, 1861.

THE Turkish Ambassador has informed me that the Sultan thinks it necessary to have recourse to force in order to pacify the country in the neighbourhood of Montenegro. Her Majesty's Government cannot judge of this necessity, and await your report of the negotiations.

The Delegates should withdraw.

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* Nos. 212 and 220.

No. 225.

Earl Cowley to Earl Russell.—(Received August 2.)

(No. 930.)
Paris, August 1, 1861.

My Lord,

THE Turkish Ambassador informed M. Billault this morning, by order of his Government, that Omer Pasha having failed in his attempt to come to a friendly understanding with the Prince of Montenegro, it had become necessary by the Porte to vindicate its authority by force, and that such also was the opinion of the European Commission.

M. Billault replied that he trusted that Omer Pasha was not acting under the influence of temper at having, as he conceived, been slighted by the Prince of Montenegro, and that the Porte would weigh well the consequence of commencing hostilities. As to its being the opinion of the European Commission that the Porte ought to employ force for the vindication of its authority, his Excellency doubted that a Commission whose duty it was to endeavour to preserve tranquillity would advocate the employment of force. At all events he wanted the corroboration of the French Commissioner.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 226.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)
Constantinople, August 2, 1861, 1 P.M.

AT a Conference held last night, at which Aali Pasha was present, it was agreed that an identic telegram should be addressed to the Delegates at Mostar instructing them, in the event of the failure of the attempt to negotiate with the insurgents and the resort of Omer Pasha to coercive measures, to consider their mission as suspended for the time. But the Delegates have been told that in case any fresh opportunity for negotiation should offer, they are to refer to the Representatives here for instructions.

No. 227.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 794.)
Foreign Office, August 3, 1861.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches, as marked in the margin,* upon the subject of the insurrection in Turkey.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 228.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received August 3.)

(No. 5.)
Mostar, June 27, 1861.

My Lord;

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's information, copies of the Protocols of the third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh Conferences of the Commission for the pacification of the Herzegovina, together with copies of annexes, except such of them as I have already transmitted.

These documents will convey to your Lordship a clear idea of what has taken place up to this time. For your Lordship's further information, however, I may state that we have not yet received any reply from the insurgents to the letter we addressed to them, but we have received intelligence that meetings have been held at Grahovo on the subject, at which a Montenegrin Senator, a certain Ivo Drago, was present and gave good advice to the people. It is intimated that an answer will be sent to us to the effect that none of the Chiefs will come to Mostar, but will be happy to meet us at any place we may appoint on the frontier—that they will declare themselves faithful subjects of

* Nos. 223, 225, and 226.

the Sultan, being only in opposition to their oppressive landlords—that they will consent to pay the taxes on the produce of the soil, also a ducat per house, but that they will decline any arrangement with the proprietors of the soil. Nothing, however, can be positively known until their letter actually arrives, when we shall consult as to what is necessary to be done.

With regard to the interview between the Prince Nicolas and Omer Pasha, difficulties are made on both sides. The Prince hesitates to take any initiative, and Omer Pasha declines to entertain the question until he has received the attention of a complimentary visit from some officer on the part of the Prince, and then only after the pacification of the province is accomplished.

I am of opinion, and I think my colleagues agree with me, that the Prince, without hesitation, should send an officer to compliment Omer Pasha, a step which is only a usual attention, and which cannot be considered derogatory to His Highness's position, as a general officer was sent by the Emperor of Austria to compliment the Serdar Ekrem at Belgrade, I think. We are all agreed as to the advantage of an interview between the Prince and Omer Pasha, particularly as regarding the effect which it may have on the future of Montenegro and the Herzegovina, as propositions not at present contemplated may be suggested and arrangements then concluded by which a permanent settlement of affairs may be made more probable.

I hope, therefore, that the difficulties which at present appear to surround this question will not prove insurmountable.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure 1 in No. 228.

Protocol of the 3rd Conference of the Commission in Herzegovina.

Le 13 *Juin*, 1861.

LE Jeudi, 13 Juin, 1871, à deux heures et demie de l'après-midi, MM. les Délégués des cinq Grandes Puissances se sont réunis chez M. le Délégué de Prusse.

Etaient présents :

M. Jovanovic,
M. Tissot,
Mr. Holmes,
M. Blau,
M. Bezobrazow.

MM. les Délégués s'entretenant des résultats de la Conférence qu'ils viennent d'avoir avec Omer Pacha, M. Tissot se demande s'il n'y a pas lieu pour la Commission de protester plus formellement qu'elle ne l'a fait à propos de la résolution exprimée par le Serdar Ekrem de ravitailler Nichsich par la force. Il y a là, selon lui, un fait de guerre caractérisé. MM. les Délégués d'Autriche, de la Grande Bretagne et de Prusse sont d'avis que dans la position faite aux Commissaires Européens par la déclaration d'Omer Pacha relativement à la nature purement amicale des relations qu'il compte entretenir avec eux, il est impossible de faire utilement plus qu'ils n'ont fait. MM. Jovanovich, Blau, et Bezobrazow reconnaissent du reste avec M. Tissot qu'il conviendrait avant tout de trancher la question de savoir à quel titre la Commission d'Herzégovine agit auprès d'Omer Pacha. Mr. Holmes pense que la position des Commissaires vis-à-vis du Commandant-en-chef des troupes Impériales n'a rien d'officiel, et croit que les Représentants des cinq Grandes Puissances ont eu l'intention de conserver à cette intervention un caractère purement amical ; les cinq Délégués ne sont munis d'aucune pièce qui les accrédite en cette qualité auprès d'Omer Pacha ; il lui semble d'ailleurs, que le Gouvernement Ottoman n'a accepté l'envoi d'une Commission Européenne en Herzégovine qu'à titre officieux, le Serdar Ekrem serait pleinement autorisé, dès lors, à dénier aux Délégués tout caractère officiel. MM. Jovanovich, Tissot, Blau, et Bezobrazow pensent, au contraire, que ce caractère ne saurait leur être valablement contesté ; les instructions identiques, dont MM. les Délégués sont munis, leur instituent un titre, dont le Serdar Ekrem ne saurait méconnaître la valeur. Le caractère, dont les Commissaires Européens sont revêtus, semble résulter, en outre, de la mission dont les investissent ces mêmes instructions : chargés de concourrir à la pacification de l'Herzégovine, ils ont pour atteindre ce but, non seulement à s'entendre

avec Omer Pacha, mais à agir indépendamment de lui, s'ils le jugent convenable, sauf à le tenir au courant de leurs démarches ; et quel titre dès lors les Délégués Européens peuvent-ils le faire, si ce n'est en vertu d'un mandat officiel, formellement reconnu par le Gouvernement Ottoman ? Mr. Holmes admet que les Délégués peuvent et doivent agir indépendamment du Serdar Ekrem, mais il y trouve un argument de plus en faveur de la thèse qu'il soutient ; c'est précisément dans l'intérêt de cette indépendance qu'il repousse tous rapports officiels entre Omer Pacha et la Commission. Il importe au succès même de la mission de MM. les Délégués autant qu'à leur dignité que leur action paraisse aussi libre et aussi impartiale que possible.

Bien que la question n'ait pas un intérêt actuel, vu la nature satisfaisante des rapports de la Commission avec Son Altesse Omer Pacha, elle paraît néanmoins assez importante aux MM. les Délégués pour qu'ils conviennent unanimement de demander de nouvelles instructions à cet égard à leurs Ambassades respectives.

Le reste de la séance est employé par MM. les Délégués à rédiger en Français et en Serbe la lettre collective dont ils devront accompagner la Proclamation d'Omer Pacha, et dont copie est annexée au présent Protocole.

(La séance est levée à six heures et demie.)

(Signé) JOVANOVIC, *Major.*
CH. TISSOT.
W. R. HOLMES.
Dr. O. BLAU.
VAL. BEZOBRAZOW.

Inclosure 2 in No. 228.

Protocol of the 4th Conference of the Commission in Herzegovina.

Le 14 *Juin*, 1861.

LE Vendredi 14 Juin, 1861, à 10 heures du matin, MM. les Délégués des cinq Grandes Puissances en Herzégovine se sont réunis chez M. le Délégué de Prusse.

Etaient présents :

M. Jovanovic,
M. Tissot,
Mr. Holmes,
M. Blau,
M. Bezobrazow.

Les Protocoles des deux premières Conférences sont lus et adoptés.

M. Tissot communique à ses collègues une dépêche télégraphique de M. Hecquard, Consul de France à Scutari, par laquelle ce dernier l'informe qu'il a reçu l'ordre de ménager une entrevue entre le Prince de Monténégro et Omer Pacha, et l'invite à sonder les dispositions du Serdar Ekrem à cet égard. Bien que cette dépêche le concerne exclusivement le Commissaire Français exprime le désir de ne point séparer son action de celle de ses collègues, et demande aux autres membres de la Commission s'ils voient quelque inconvénient à appuyer auprès de Son Altesse Omer Pacha les ouvertures qu'il se propose de faire.

M. le Délégué Britannique déclare que, dans son opinion, une semblable demande ne peut que contribuer puissamment à la pacification, et que dès lors, bien qu'il n'ait point d'instructions spéciales de son Ambassade, il ne voit point d'objection à s'unir, dans ce but, à son collègue de France.

M. le Délégué d'Autriche apprécie comme Mr. Holmes l'utilité de l'entrevue dont il s'agit, mais n'ayant ni instructions de son Gouvernement, ni avis du Consulat Impérial et Royal de Scutari, il se réserve de consulter l'Internonciature.

M. le Délégué de Prusse, en l'absence d'instructions spéciales, décline également toute initiative, mais il ajoute que dans le cas où le Serdar Ekrem paraîtrait disposé à accepter l'entrevue, il appuierait la demande du Commissaire Français.

M. le Délégué de Russie, se trouvant également sans instructions, ne croit pas pouvoir appuyer officiellement des ouvertures, dont il reconnaît cependant l'utilité ; il est disposé à le faire officieusement, sauf à demander des directions à son Gouvernement.

MM. les Délégués d'Autriche, d'Angleterre, de Prusse et de Russie conviennent

d'ailleurs qu'ils attendront, pour consulter leurs Ambassades respectives, le résultat de l'entrevue que M. Tissot doit avoir avec Son Altesse Omer Pacha.

Une copie de la dépêche du Consul de France à Scutari est annexée au présent Protocole.

(La séance est levée à onze heures.)

(Signé) JOVANOVIC, *Major.*
CH. TISSOT.
W. R. HOLMES.
Dr. O. BLAU.
VAL. BEZOBRAZOW.

Inclosure 3 in No. 228.

M. Hecquard to M. Tissot.

Mostar, le 13 *Juin*, 1861.

(Télégraphique.)

Al ordre de ménager une entrevue entre Prince Nicolas et Omer Pacha. Je monterai à cet effet Dimanche à Cettigné. Veuillez me faire connaître les intentions d'Omer Pacha au sujet.

Inclosure 4 in No. 228.

Protocol of the 5th Conference of the Commission in Herzegovina.

Le 14 *Juin*, 1861.

LE Vendredi 14 Juin, 1861, à 4 heures de l'après-midi, MM. les Délégués des cinq Grandes Puissances se sont réunis chez M. le Délégué de Prusse. Etaient présents:—

M. Jovanovic,
M. Tissot,
Mr. Holmes,
M. Blau,
M. Bezobrazow.

Le Commissaire Français faisant part à ses collègues du résultat de son entretien avec le Serdar Ekrem, leur annonce que ce dernier s'est déclaré prêt à avoir une entrevue avec le Prince de Monténégro. MM. les Délégués conviennent de demander immédiatement à leurs Ambassades respectives des instructions ayant pour but de préciser l'attitude qu'ils auront à prendre dans cette éventualité vis-à-vis d'Omer Pacha. Un télégramme collectif, dont copie est annexée au présent Protocole, est rédigé et expédié, séance tenante, à cet effet. M. Tissot dépose en même temps sur le bureau de la Commission cinquante exemplaires de la Proclamation en langue Serbe, que le Serdar Ekrem a mis à la disposition de MM. les Délégués, pour être directement expédiés par eux aux districts soulevé. Un exemplaire de cette Proclamation est annexée au présent Protocole.

MM. les Délégués s'occupent ensuite à signer et à revêtir de leurs cachets trente-deux exemplaires de la lettre collective par laquelle ils appuient auprès des populations insoumises de l'Herzégovine la Proclamation d'Omer Pacha.

Six Chrétiens, choisis par le Khodja-Bachi Orthodoxe de Mostar, sous sa responsabilité, sont chargés de porter ces différentes pièces ainsi que les lettres par lesquelles la Commission les recommende aux Négoumènes des couvents de Douji, Kossierova et Piva. Le salaire convenu pour chaque courrier est de 4 ducats, dont la moitié leur est immédiatement avancée.

Il est convenu qu'un certain nombre de ces exemplaires, destinés aux districts limitrophes du Monténégro, seront acheminés vers leur destination par Cettigné, la voie directe offrant quelque danger pour les courriers. MM. les Délégués rédigent à cet effet une lettre au Prince de Monténégro, dont copie est également annexée au présent Protocole.

La séance est levée à 9 heures.

(Signé) JOVANOVIC, *Major.*
CH. TISSOT.
W. R. HOLMES.
Dr. O. BLAU.
VAL. BEZOBRAZOW.

Inclosure 5 in No. 228.

The European Delegates to the Prince of Montenegro.

Monseigneur, *Mostar, le Juin*, 1861.

LES démarches que votre Altesse a bien voulu faire déjà, à la demande des cinq Grandes Puissances, dans le but d'apaiser les troubles de l'Herzégovine, nous permettent d'espérer que votre Altesse voudra bien prêter son concours à la mission dont nous avons été chargés dans le même but par nos Ambassades respectives.

En recherchant les moyens de donner le plus de publicité possible à la proclamation que vient de lancer son Altesse Omer Pacha et que nous avons pour instructions d'appuyer, nous avons dû nécessairement penser à répandre cette Proclamation dans les districts de l'Herzégovine limitrophes du Monténégro.

L'accès de ces districts présentant, d'ailleurs, de ce côté, quelques difficultés, nous venons prier votre Altesse, Monseigneur, de vouloir bien donner des ordres pour que les exemplaires ci-joints de la Proclamation, ainsi que de la lettre collective dont nous l'accompagnons, soient acheminés à leur destination.

En vous priant, &c.

(Signé) JOVANOVIC, *Major.*
CH. TISSOT.
W. R. HOLMES.
Dr. O. BLAU.
VAL. BEZOBRAZOW.

Inclosure 6 in No. 228.

Protocol of the 6th Conference of the Commission in Herzegovina.

Le 15 *Juin*, 1861.

LE Samedi 15 Juin, 1861, à 9 heures du soir, MM. les Délégués des cinq Grandes Puissances se sont réunis chez M. le Délégué de Prusse sur l'invitation qui leur en a été adressée par leur collègue de Russie.

Etaient présents:

M. Jovanovic,
M. Tissot,
Mr. Holmes,
M. Blau,
M. Bezobrazow.

M. Bezobrazow, rappellant à ses collègues la nouvelle qui leur a été donnée la journée par son Altesse Omer Pacha, d'une attaque des insurgés unis aux Monténégrins sur un groupe de maisons Turques dans le voisinage de Gatzko, leur communique à son tour un télégramme qu'il vient de recevoir de M. Vaslik, Secrétaire du Prince de Monténégro, et d'après lequel les Turcs auraient attaqué soixante maisons Monténégrines dans la Toupa et enlevé des troupeaux. M. le Délégué de Russie demande s'il ne serait pas à propos que la Commission communiquât au Serdar Ekrem un fait qui lui semble de nature à entraîner de graves conséquences.

MM. Jovanovich, Tissot, Holmes, et Blau émettent l'opinion que ce fait, pas plus que celui dont le Serdar Ekrem a entretenu MM. les Délégués dans la journée, ne saurait modifier en rien, en ce qui concerne la Commission, comme en ce qui regarde Omer Pacha, la ligne de conduite qu'elle lui a conseillée, et qu'elle s'est présentée à elle-même. La situation est telle qu'on doit s'attendre à chaque instant à voir surgir des conflits de ce genre; rechercher dans cette série de représailles de quel côté vient l'aggression est désormais aussi superflu que difficile. Les Délégués n'ont plus à s'occuper de ces faits de détail, si regrettables qu'ils soient, mais bien à hâter de tout leur pouvoir le moment où leur intervention directe y mettra peut-être une fin.

Il est convenu que MM. les Délégués ne communiqueront à Omer Pacha, qu'à titre d'information pure et simple, comme ils ont accepté eux-mêmes la nouvelle de l'affaire de Gatzko, le télégramme de M. Vaslik à leur collègue de Russie.

M. Bezobrazow ayant assisté dans la journée, comme les autres Délégués, à la récep-

tion de Dervich Pacha par le Serdar Ekrem, rappelle que, de l'aveu même du général Ture, le dernier ravitaillement de Nichsich s'est opéré sans coup férir, un convoi de 350 chevaux de charge, escorté par quatre bataillons, a pénétré dans la place par les défilés de Douga, où l'on ne comptait pas plus de 200 insurgés, contrairement aux rapports précédents du même Dervich Pacha.

MM. les Délégués donnant suite à la résolution précédemment adoptée dans la troisième Conférence, s'entendent sur les termes d'une dépêche identique à adresser à leurs Ambassades respectives relativement à la question de savoir à quel titre ils agissent auprès d'Omer Pacha.

Ils expédient dans la même séance leur lettre collective au Prince de Monténégro; M. le Délégué de Russie, à la prière de ses collègues, se charge de ce soin.

La séance est levée à 11 heures un quart.

(Signé) JOVANOVIC, *Major.*
CH. TISSOT.
W. R. HOLMES.
DR. O. BLAU.
VAL. BEZOBRAZOW.

Inclosure 7 in No. 228.

Protocol of the 7th Conference of the Commission in Herzegovina.

Le 17 Juin, 1861.

LE Lundi, 17 Juin, 1861, à 10 heures du matin, MM. les Délégués des cinq Grandes Puissances se sont réunis chez M. le Délégué de Prusse.

Etaient présents :

M. Jovanovic,
M. Tissot,
Mr. Holmes,
M. Blau,
M. Bezobrazow.

M. le Délégué de Prusse rend compte à ses collègues de l'entrevue qu'il a eue la veille avec Omer Pacha, et dans laquelle il a communiqué à son Altesse le télégramme adressé par le Secrétaire du Prince de Monténégro à M. le Délégué de Russie au sujet d'une incursion des Turcs dans la Toupa.

Le Serdar Ekrem affirme n'avoir aucune connaissance de ces faits. Il se déclare disposé à punir de pareils actes et à en prévenir le retour, pourvu que le Prince de Monténégro prenne un engagement analogue. Son Altesse laisse d'ailleurs à MM. les Délégués le soin de répondre dans ce sens, s'ils le jugent à propos, à la communication de M. Vaslik.

M. le Délégué d'Autriche est d'avis que la Commission fasse savoir au Serdar Ekrem, qu'elle a pris acte de sa déclaration et qu'elle charge M. Bezobrazow de répondre dans le sens indiqué par son Altesse au Secrétaire du Prince de Monténégro.

M. Blau fait observer que bien qu'il ne puisse douter personnellement des excellentes intentions du Prince Nicolas, il craint qu'il ne soit difficile pour Son Altesse de tenir l'engagement qu'on l'invite à prendre, en raison du peu d'autorité qu'il exerce dans certains districts de la frontière.

M. le Délégué de Russie fait observer qu'un certain nombre d'habitants de l'Herzégovine, ruinés par la lutte qu'ils ont soutenue, se sont réfugiés au Monténégro, où se trouvent provisoirement établies leurs familles; et leur passage légitime du Monténégro en Herzégovine, où ils cultivent encore leurs terres, donne lieu, dès lors, au reproche d'incursion qu'on adresse aux Monténégrins, dont ils portent le costume.

La motion de M. le Délégué d'Autriche étant adoptée, la Commission rédige le télégramme, dont copie sera annexée au présent procès-verbal, et qui, sur la proposition de M. le Délégué de Prusse, doit être probablement soumis à l'approbation de Son Altesse.

MM. les Délégués d'Autriche, de France, de la Grande Bretagne, de Prusse, et de Russie reçoivent à ce moment de leurs Ambassades respectives une réponse au télégramme collectif du 14 Juin. Il résulte de l'ensemble de ces communications que la Commission

est libre d'entreprendre toute démarche qui lui semblerait de nature à contribuer au succès de la mission qui lui est confiée.

(La séance est levée à deux heures de l'après-midi.)

(Signé) JOVANOVIC, *Major.*
CH. TISSOT.
W. R. HOLMES.
DR. O. BLAU.
VAL. BEZOBRAZOW.

Inclosure 8 in No. 228.

M. Bezobrazow to M. Vaslik.

Mostar, le 17 Juin, 1861.

EN réponse au télégramme du 15, communiqué à Omer Pacha, Serdar Ekrem a donné ordres sévères pour empêcher tous actes offensifs et punir les coupables. Il invite le Monténégro d'agir de la même manière.

(Signé) BEZOBRAZOW.

No. 229.

Consul Holmes to Lord J. Russell.—(Received August 3.)

(No. 6.)

My Lord, *Mostar, June 29*, 1861.

HAVING been informed by Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople that Her Majesty's Government desired me to report on the course of conduct pursued by the newly-appointed Prussian Consul for Bosnia and the Herzegovina, I addressed to his Excellency Sir Henry Bulwer a despatch on this subject, of which I have now the honour to inclose a copy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure in No. 229.

Consul Holmes to Sir H. Bulwer.

Sir, *Mostar, June 27*, 1861.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's despatch of June 7, informing me that Her Majesty's Government desires me to report upon the course of conduct pursued by the Prussian Consul in Bosnia.

Mr. Blau can hardly be said yet to have commenced the duties of his office, as, being named Prussian Commissioner in the Herzegovina, he merely passed through Bosna-Serai on his way to Mostar. On arriving here he visited Trebigné and Gasko, with a view to see something of the Herzegovina before the Commission assembled. His conduct in the Commission appears to be perfectly in accord with the identic instructions given to the different Delegates, and he seems, as far as can be known at present, cordially to desire a peaceful solution and permanent settlement of the unhappy state of affairs which has so long obtained in this province. When we shall have returned to Serajevo, and he is settled in his Consulate there, I shall not forget to observe and report on the course of conduct he may pursue.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 230.

Consul Holmes to Lord J. Russell.—(Received August 3.)

(No. 7.)

My Lord, *Mostar, June 29*, 1861.

UP to the present moment we have received no satisfactory answer from the insurgent Chiefs to our letters inviting them to accept Omer Pasha's Proclamation, and to come to Mostar to arrange a settlement of their grievances. A sufficient time has now

elapsed to have enabled them to answer us. Some of my colleagues have information that an answer is preparing, but it ought to have reached us ere this. In the meantime two attacks have been made, according to Omer Pasha's statements, on his troops, now acting merely on the defensive. One occurred ten days ago at Christatz, when the insurgents killed two soldiers and twelve Albanian Bashi-Bazouks, and the other a few days since at a place called Platovitza, in which some fifty-five soldiers were killed and wounded. These facts inspire little confidence in Omer Pasha that his Proclamation will be accepted, and in a letter addressed to-day to the European Delegates on this subject, his Highness observes that the present state of affairs is inconsistent with the object of his mission and the dignity of the Turkish Government, and expresses the opinion that it would be well that the Commission should endeavour without loss of time to arrange an interview with the insurgents, in which at least their real intentions would be ascertained. In answer to this letter the Commission replied by a note proposing to delay a final decision until the 2nd of July, by which time it is expected by some of the Delegates that a definite answer to the letter addressed to the insurgents will have arrived. Should this, however, not be the case, measures will be taken without delay to endeavour to arrange a meeting with the insurgents, probably at Kossierova.

It is a very general opinion that the insurgents are merely endeavouring to gain time, and that they will not peaceably submit on any conditions short of annexation to Montenegro, or almost entire independence, on paying a certain tribute to the Porte. I trust, however, that this will not prove to be the case, as then coercion will be the only alternative, and at this present moment Omer Pasha is not prepared to take military measures. He has found the army without provisions or ammunition, the soldiers demoralized, and fifteen months' pay in arrear—the troops at Scutari, I am told, are thirty-six months in arrear—and he has no money to pay them. His Highness has few, I might almost say no officers, on whom he could rely for the efficient execution of any military measures he might decide upon. He is, however, exerting himself to collect provisions, ammunition, and baggage animals, with, I believe, considerable success, and hopes to be soon in a position to take active measures if necessary. But considering all the above-mentioned circumstances, and also that the insurgents are as elated with their success as the troops are disheartened, your Lordship will understand that the Commander-in-chief will have no easy task before him if the European Commission should fail to bring the insurgents to reasonable terms.

Omer Pasha appears most suspicious of the conduct of Montenegro at this moment. His Highness declares to us that he is surely informed that the Montenegrin Senator, Ivo Drago, who was said to have been sent among the insurgents by the Prince to give good advice to them, has, on the contrary, been exciting them to resist the Turks, and that he was actually in Baynani when the attack was made by the people of that district on the troops at Platovitza. Some of my colleagues, however, particularly the Prussian Delegate, insists that the information he receives from the Prussian Consul at Ragusa is to the effect that Ivo Drago has given excellent advice to the people, and urged them to accept the Proclamation, and that he, Dr. Blau, has every reason for trusting the accuracy of this information. My other colleagues acquainted with Montenegro declare also that, in their opinion, if such had been the intention of the Prince, another man would have been chosen, as Ivo Drago is well known as moderate in his opinions and inclined to peace.

This despatch will serve to give your Lordship an idea of the state of affairs up to the present moment. The letters alluded to, as well as the proceedings of the Commission, will appear in due course in the Protocols of our Conferences, which I shall always take care to transmit as soon as possible after their completion.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 231.

Consul Holmes to Lord J. Russell.—(Received August 3.)

(No. 8.)
My Lord, *Mostar, June 29, 1861.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that 1,200 French, Austrian, and Sardinian uniforms were seized, a day or two ago, at Metcovitch, by the commandant there, on orders from Vienna. These uniforms were embaled and addressed to a merchant at Bosna-Serai. They are said to have been destined for Garibaldians, who are to appear, or were to have appeared, somewhere in this country; Omer Pasha thinks

in Montenegro. I rather imagine, however, that they were to have been sent into Servia, though with what eventual destination or object it is difficult to surmise.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 232.

Consul Holmes to Lord J. Russell.—(Received August 3.)

(No. 9.)
My Lord, *Mostar, June 29, 1861.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the news of the death of Sultan Abdul Medjid and the accession to the throne of Sultan Abdul Aziz reached Omer Pasha by telegraph on the 26th instant, and was immediately communicated by his Highness to the Delegates of the European Commission for the Herzegovina.

It is generally supposed that this event will inaugurate a state of affairs very different from that which has lately obtained in the Ottoman Empire. I trust, however, that the change will be of a nature entirely opposed to that which is anticipated by the Mussulman population here, who rejoice at the prospect of a return to a golden age of religious fanaticism and of the entire supremacy of the Moslem over the other subjects of the Porte. It is curious to find how much this idea pervades the respectable middle classes and the officers of the army, even to the superior grades. It has even already taken the form of occasional menace towards the Christians, and it will be well for the interests of Turkey that these nascent ideas of a retrograde policy be extinguished as soon as possible,

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 232*.

Consul Holmes to Lord J. Russell.—(Received August 3.)

(No. 10.)
My Lord, *Mostar, June 30, 1861.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that I yesterday received the following telegram from Sir Henry Bulwer:—

"I understand that Omer Pasha is instructed to propose an interview to Prince of Montenegro at Mostar. Should the latter object, you may join your colleagues in urging Omer Pasha to meet the Prince at some place less distant from his own country, but as the first advance will be made by Omer Pasha, Prince ought not to object to come into Turkish territory."

Last night the Commission assembled, at Omer Pasha's request, at his Highness' residence, and at the meeting the Commander-in-chief informed us that, besides the attacks which had been made on the Imperial forces at Christatz and Platovitza, the Montenegrins had attacked the troops at Spitz, now engaged in erecting a fortification there, and were also at that moment aiding the insurgents in an attack on Trebigné. His Highness then informed us that he had been instructed to propose an interview with the Prince, but intimated that as circumstances had considerably altered since the instructions were decided on, the Montenegrins now seeming determined openly to attack Turkey in aid of the insurgents, his Highness thought that it would be well to ask for fresh instructions as to the interview. Observations were then made by most of the European Delegates with which his Highness agreed, and to save most valuable time in a matter of such importance, and before events could arise which might altogether render an interview impossible, eventually determined to address the invitation to the Prince without a moment's delay. It was agreed that this step, magnanimously putting aside any consideration of what was actually taking place, with the humane desire of preventing further bloodshed, was not inconsistent with the dignity of the Ottoman Government, and that should the Prince of Montenegro refuse to accept it, he would be obnoxious to the whole responsibility of anything that might hereafter occur.

A letter, copy of which I inclose, was, therefore, immediately written to the Prince, and was sent off a little after midnight by express to Ragusa, with a request to the Prussian Consul there, who is supposed to have considerable influence with His Highness, to be the bearer of the letter to Cettigné in person.

This morning we assembled to sign a collective telegram to the Representatives of the Five Powers at Constantinople, to inform them that the invitation to the Prince had been dispatched. While this was being done, my colleagues of Austria, France, and Prussia, received telegrams from Ragusa confirming in a great measure the news which Omer Pasha had communicated to us last night. The Austrian telegram was from General Rodich, dated Lastua, at midnight yesterday, to the effect that on Friday the 28th instant Abdi Pasha and the Prince of Miredect, who, with 3,000 Albanians, were at Spitz protecting the works of the fortress which is now being constructed there, were unsuccessfully attacked by the Montenegrins; that the female inhabitants, with their flocks, had, at the commencement of the affair, fled into Austrian territory, but that they had mostly returned, and that nothing further had occurred. The French telegram was from M. Hecquard, and seemed a copy of one addressed to the Prince of Montenegro, stating that Abdi Pasha was blockaded by Montenegrins at Nihaj, close to Spitz, and expressing a hope that orders had already been given by the Prince for the withdrawal of his subjects. The Prussian despatch stated that the Prussian Consul would be prepared to proceed to Cettigné with Omer Pasha's letter the moment it arrived; it confirmed the news of the attacks on the Turkish troops at Christatz, Platovtza, and Spitz, and also admitted that Ivo Drago was still in the Turkish territory.

From all this it results that the news received by Omer Pasha is correct, with the exception perhaps of the engagement in the neighbourhood of Trebigné, and that the Montenegrins indubitably are, and have been, active abettors of the insurrection in Herzegovina, and that unless the Prince of Montenegro accepts Omer Pasha's invitation and some definite and satisfactory arrangement be then made between the Porte on the one hand, and the Montenegrins and insurgent leaders on the other, there is little or no chance of any settlement except such as may result from a sanguinary contest.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure in No. 232.

Omer Pasha to the Prince of Montenegro.

Mostar, le 30 Juin, 1861.

Monseigneur,

VOTRE Altesse connaît les regrettables événements dont les districts de l'Herzégovine voisins du Monténégro ont été depuis longtemps et sont encore en ce moment le théâtre. Pénétré, en ce qui me concerne, du plus sincère désir d'épuiser tous les moyens possibles d'arrêter l'effusion du sang, je viens proposer à votre Altesse de joindre ses efforts aux miens dans une dernière tentative de conciliation.

Persuadé que votre Altesse partagera le sentiment d'humanité que me dicte cette démarche, je me plais à espérer qu'elle consentira à se rencontrer avec moi, soit à Gabela, soit à Klek, à son choix.

Votre Altesse jugera d'ailleurs sans doute comme moi, qu'en raison de la gravité des circonstances il serait désirable que l'entrevue eût lieu dans le plus bref délai possible.

En attendant la réponse de votre Altesse je la prie, &c.

(Signé) OMER.

No. 233.

Consul Holmes to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received August* 3.)

(No. 11.)

Mostar, June 30, 1861.

My Lord,

TWO days ago, not imagining that an interview between Omer Pasha and the Prince of Montenegro was so imminent as the circumstances detailed in my despatch No. 10 has rendered probable, I addressed a despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador, copy of which I inclose, regarding what was likely to occur at the interview then only in contemplation, and making some observations as to what, in my humble opinion, might possibly be the best policy of the Porte on the occasion of an arrangement with Montenegro.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure in No. 233.

Consul Holmes to Sir H. Bulwer.

Sir,

Mostar, June 28, 1861.

IN anticipation of a probable interview between Omer Pasha and the Prince of Montenegro, it may not be inexpedient to consider what is likely to occur, and what result it is desirable to obtain, and I take the liberty of offering a few remarks to your Excellency at this early moment in order that the subject may be taken into consideration beforehand, and that, if necessary, the Porte may be induced to decide on the course of action it will adopt in making a settlement with Montenegro.

It is generally believed that Montenegro, on the occasion of the pacification of the Herzegovina, in which it will take the credit of having performed an important part, will demand certain favours from the Porte, and among others the cession of Spitz, the small fishing village which a short time ago declared itself subject to Montenegro. I do not know what other demands, if any, may be made, or what objections may be offered to them, but I think that, putting aside all questions of details, and taking for a starting point the great interest and necessity which the Porte has to conciliate and to content Montenegro, it cannot do better than prepare to act in the most liberal and munificent manner possible.

Some object that, whatever may be done for Montenegro, the result will always be the same—that she will never quit her habits of brigandage, and that the more she obtains the more she will want, and would prefer a system of coercion to conciliation. There may also be truth in this view of the question, and it might suit the views of a powerful nation to act up to it; but is Turkey in a position to adopt it? Is she in a position to support the expense it would entail? Has she not rather shown during the last three years that she is quite incapable of carrying out such a policy?

Partial and unwilling concessions to Montenegro would be of little avail, as, if they failed in contenting her, they might just as well be refused. The Montenegrins would consider them extorted from Turkey and would probably imagine that a renewal of disturbances would be the surest way to obtain more. The sympathy also of many of the European Powers would probably be with a people which would represent itself as in a difficult position with regard to the means of support and employment for its population and hardly dealt with by Turkey.

On the other hand, liberal and perhaps unhoped-for concessions to Montenegro would remove the idea of their having been extorted, and would not be unsuitable to the dignity of the Ottoman Government. Moreover, unexpected munificence in the matter seems to me not only calculated to content Montenegro, but to assure to the Porte the admiration and sympathy of all the Powers of Europe, which would be of no small account if afterwards the Montenegrins should show themselves ungrateful for advantages so liberally and unhesitatingly bestowed upon them.

I believe that the demands and hopes of the Montenegrins will be limited to a seaport and a few strips of territory which would round off their frontier line and make Montenegro more compact in their eyes than it is at present; and when the small value of the whole of the Herzegovina to Turkey be considered, and it is remembered that in consequence principally of the antagonism of Montenegro to Turkey, the rebellion in the Herzegovina has cost the Porte immensely more than the district is worth, and has almost entailed the ruin of the neighbouring beautiful and formerly rich province of Bosnia, almost any concession short of the whole of the Herzegovina would seem trifling in comparison with the immense advantage which would result to Turkey from the permanent establishment of peace, advantages which would be felt not only locally but far and wide, and which are important for even the Empire itself. The utmost that the Porte could do to fully content Montenegro cannot be compared to more than sacrificing the little finger to save the arm or even perhaps the whole body.

I have spoken on this subject to my French colleague, who seems to be quite of my opinion on this question. I think also from a few words with my Prussian colleague that he likewise coincides with my views. As far as I have been able to ascertain the ideas of my Austrian colleague, he is personally of my opinion, but he thinks it possible that Austria might oppose the cession of a port to the Montenegrins.

Omer Pasha would not venture to take upon himself to propose any cession of territory or other advantages to Montenegro, unless the Prince would consent to recognize the suzerainty of Turkey; but in a conversation I had with his Highness on the subject, he said that on that condition the Porte would probably confer the rank of Mushir on the Prince and make very large concessions. This, however, is quite another consideration. The present despatch is merely intended to express my opinion to your

Excellency of the expediency, and indeed the necessity, of the Turkish Government treating any propositions which the Prince of Montenegro may think fit to make with ready munificence, all the more easy that such a policy will obtain for Turkey the advantages indicated in this despatch in exchange for what is really of little or no value to her, while on the other hand I think that niggardly and grudging concessions would be worse than useless.

It would be of much use to me to be informed as soon as may be possible of the idea of the Turkish Government on this subject, and also of those entertained by your Excellency.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 234.

Consul Holmes to Lord J. Russell.—(Received August 3.)

(No. 12.) *Mostar, July* 6, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose copies of the Protocols, with their annexes, of the 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th 12th, and 13th Conferences of the Commission for the pacification of the Herzegovina.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure 1 in No. 234.

Protocol of the 8th Conference of the Commission in Herzégovina.

Le 19 *Juin*, 1861.

LE Mercredi, 19 Juin, 1861, à 10 heures du matin, MM. les Délégués des cinq Grandes Puissances en Herzégovine se sont réunis chez M. le Délégué de Prusse.

Etaient présents :

M. Jovanovic,
M. Tissot,
Mr. Holmes,
M. Blau,
M. Bezobrazow.

Le procès-verbal de la 7me Conférence est lu et adopté.

M. Blau fait part à ses collègues d'un entretien qu'il a eu la veille avec son Altesse Omer Pacha.

Son Altesse le Serdar Ekrem, en chargeant M. le Délégué de Prusse de remercier la Commission de la communication du procès-verbal de la 1re Conférence, lui a remis à son tour, pour être placée sous les yeux de MM. les Délégués, une note désignée sous le nom de programme, et résumant la mission qui lui est confiée, ainsi que les mesures qu'il a déjà prises ou qu'il se propose de prendre pour la remplir. Cette communication, a ajouté le Serdar Ekrem, n'a rien d'officiel ; elle est faite *privatim*.

MM. les Délégués prennent connaissance du document qui leur est communiqué et décident que copie en sera annexée au présent procès-verbal. Ils se réservent, d'ailleurs, d'en faire ultérieurement, s'il y a lieu, l'objet d'un plus ample examen.

La séance est levée à 1 heure et demie.

(Signé) JOVANOVIC, *Major.*
CH. TISSOT.
W. R. HOLMES.
Dr. O. BLAU.
VAL. BEZOBRAZOW.

Inclosure 2 in No. 234.

Programme of Omer Pasha's Mission in Bosnia and the Herzegovina.

LA mission qui me fut confiée par Sa Majesté le Sultan se compose de quatre parties principales, comme suit :

1. La pacification des districts insurgés.
2. Empêcher les attaques journalières des Monténégrins et des insurgés contre les districts non insurgés.
3. Le maintien de l'ordre public dans la Province de Bosnie et d'Herzégovine.
4. La présidence de la Commission *ad hoc*.

Pour arriver à la réalisation de ces quatre parties qui constituent ma mission, voici l'exposé de la conduite que je me suis tracée et des mesures que j'ai jugé urgentes.

1. Annoncer d'abord aux provinces restées fidèles, puis aux insurgés, une Proclamation en langue Serbe et Turque, dans laquelle Sa Majesté le Sultan accorde les améliorations et réformes jugées opportunes pour le bien-être de ces provinces, et afin d'ôter à la population tout soupçon à l'égard de cette Proclamation, je prouverai par des actes la vigoureuse réalisation de ces réformes. En même temps, avant l'arrivée de la réponse des insurgés à ma Proclamation, je ne ferai aucun mouvement offensif au-delà de la ligne militaire qu'occupent maintenant nos troupes.

2. En ce qui concerne la seconde partie du programme, il est notoire que, par les nombreux mouvements de notre armée, occasionnés par les attaques partielles et journalières des insurgés et des Monténégrins, et la violation par ces derniers de la ligne de démarcation tracée par la Commission Internationale, l'ensemble tactique de nos troupes a été brisé, de sorte que leur position n'est plus suffisamment garantie contre de nouvelles attaques éventuelles. C'est pourquoi il est de mon devoir militaire de rétablir l'ensemble tactique de nos troupes et de former les réserves nécessaires au soutien et à la garantie de notre position et des districts non insurgés.

3. La mesure la plus efficace pour maintenir l'ordre public dans les deux provinces en question est d'occuper militairement les points que je crois importants, afin que les commandants respectifs puissent étouffer à la source toute nouvelle tentative et insurrection. Cette partie de mon programme attire principalement mon attention pour le motif suivant. Les 2,000 Chrétiens de Bosnie revoltés l'année dernière non seulement refusent d'accepter l'amnistie que leur accorde la générosité de Sa Majesté le Sultan, mais malheureusement le Gouvernement Serbe tolère leur sejour sur son sol d'où ils menacent sans cesse d'invasion armée les districts de Bosnie et d'Herzégovine. En vue de cette attitude, j'ai formé un cordon d'observation sur la frontière avec les réserves nécessaires dans le but de repousser énergiquement toute invasion et d'empêcher tout mouvement insurrectionnel. En même temps les commandants respectifs ont reçu ordre de ne faire emploi de leurs forces qu'après que leurs sommations de respecter et de maintenir l'ordre public auront totalement échoué.

4. Quant au quatrième point, en ce qui concerne la présidence de la Commission instituée *ad hoc*, je me tiendrai strictement aux instructions que j'ai reçues de mon Gouvernement.

(Signé) OMER.

Mostar, le 18 *Juin*, 1861.

Inclosure 3 in No. 234.

Protocol of the 9th Conference of the Commission in Herzegovina.

Le 26 *Juin*, 1861.

LE Mercredi, 26 Juin, 1861, à 10 heures du matin, MM. les Délégués des cinq Grandes Puissances se sont réunis chez M. le Délégué de Prusse.

Etaient présents :

M. Jovanovic.
M. Tissot.
Mr. Holmes.
M. Blau.
M. Bezobrazow.

Le Protocole de la 8me Conférence est lu et adopté.

MM. les Délégués de la Grande Brétagne et de Prusse font observer que la Com-

mission pourrait utiliser le temps qui doit s'écouler encore jusqu'à la réception de la réponse des chefs des insurgés en étudiant les diverses questions que peuvent soulever, soit l'application des concessions déjà inscrites dans la Proclamation du Serdar Ekrem, soit les demandes que formuleront sans doute les populations insoumises en dehors des dites concessions. MM. Holmes et Blau donnent en conséquence lecture de la motion suivante :

"Vu les instructions identiques par lesquelles MM. les Délégués des cinq Grandes Puissances en Herzégovine sont appelés à poursuivre l'entier rétablissement de l'ordre dans cette province et l'exécution sincère et complète des concessions qui peuvent le ramener;

"Vu la nécessité pour MM. les Délégués de s'entendre entre eux et avec son Altesse le Serdar Ekrem sur les conditions qui peuvent amener l'entier rétablissement de l'ordre dans les districts insoumis avant d'entamer toute négociation avec les chefs de l'insurrection;

"MM. les Délégués devront s'occuper, dès à présent, de poser les conditions d'une pacification durable du pays, et d'aviser aux moyens d'en garantir la complète et sincère exécution."

MM. les Délégués d'Autriche, de France et de Russie se ralliant à cette proposition, MM. Holmes et Blau communiquent à leurs collègues un programme des questions auxquelles il a été fait allusion et qu'ils se proposent de soumettre également à son Altesse le Serdar Ekrem. MM. les Délégués des cinq Grandes Puissances se réservent d'arrêter dans la prochaine réunion les termes de ce programme qui, unanimement adopté, doit servir de base aux travaux de la Commission.

M. le Délégué de Russie se déclare chargé par son Altesse le Serdar Ekrem de communiquer à ses collègues la nouvelle d'une attaque qui aurait été opéré sur Kristadj par les insurgés unis aux Monténégrins. Son Altesse le Serdar Ekrem invite MM. les Délégués à envoyer un agent sur les lieux pour vérifier les faits, s'ils le désirent. MM. les Délégués, pour des raisons déjà exposées dans un des précédents procès-verbaux, jugent cette mesure complètement inutile et se bornent à prendre acte de la communication qui leur est fait comme ils l'ont déjà fait en pareille occasion.

M. le Délégué de Russie donne ensuite lecture à ses collègues d'une lettre adressée à la Commission, sous sou couvert, par le Pope Tarko Lechevich de Piva en réponse à la lettre collective de MM. les Délégués. Il semble résulter de cette mission, conçue en termes évasifs, que les chefs des insurgés du district de Piva ne donneront de réponse formelle qu'après s'être entendus entre eux et avec les chefs des districts voisins.

La séance est levée à midi et demi.

(Signé) JOVANOVIC, *Major.*
CH. TISSOT.
W. R. HOLMES.
DR. O. BLAU.
VAL. BEZOBRAZOW.

Inclosure 4 in No. 234.

Protocol of the 10th Conference of the Commission in Herzegovina.

Le 28 Juin, 1861.

LE Vendredi, 28 Juin, 1861, à 10 heures du matin, MM. les Délégués des cinq Grandes Puissances en Herzégovine se sont réunis chez M. le Délégué de Prusse.

Etaient présents:—

M. Jovanovic.
M. Tissot.
Mr. Holmes.
M. Blau.
M. Bezobrazow.

Le Protocole de la 9ème Conférence est lu et adopté.

MM. les Délégués, discutant le programme proposé dans la précédente Conférence par MM. Holmes et Blau, en arrêtent la rédaction définitive et l'adoptent comme base de leurs travaux ultérieurs. Une copie de cette pièce est annexée au présent protocole. M. le Délégué d'Autriche est d'avis que ces travaux entrent trop dans le détail de l'administration intérieure de la province et sont par conséquent plutôt du ressort de la

Commission d'enquête. Persuadé, cependant, qu'un pareil travail ne pourrait être qu'avantageux au point de vue du rétablissement de la tranquillité, il adopte les conclusions de ses collègues à titre d'éclaircissement à donner à son Gouvernement.

MM. les Délégués procèdent ensuite à la nomination des membres des deux Comités chargés d'étudier les deux questions spéciales de la réforme des impôts et des rapports entre propriétaires et fermiers. MM. Blau et Bezobrazow doivent composer le premier Comité; MM. Holmes et Tissot le second.

M. le Délégué d'Autriche fait observer que, dans son opinion, le moment approche où la Commission devrait prendre des mesures plus efficaces pour amener la soumission des insurgés que celles qui ont été employés jusqu'à ce jour. Il demande s'il n'y a pas lieu de fixer un délai au delà duquel on cessera d'attendre la réponse des insurgés. MM. les Délégués de France, de la Grande Brétagne, de Prusse et de Russie partagent en principe l'opinion de M. le Major Jovanovic, mais pensent que la Commission doit attendre trois ou quatre jours encore, délai suffisant, mais nécessaire pour recevoir la réponse des habitants de Banjani.

La séance est levée à 2 heures et démie.

(Signé) JOVANOVIC, *Major.*
CH. TISSOT.
W. R. HOLMES.
DR. O. BLAU.
VAL. BEZOBRAZOW.

Inclosure 5 in No. 234.

Programme of Reforms required to ensure the Tranquillity of the Herzegovina.

MM. LES DELEGUES des cinq Grandes Puissances en Herzégovine, recherchant les conditions d'une pacification durable du pays, ainsi que les moyens d'en garantir la sincère et complète exécution, adoptent les conclusions suivantes, qu'ils espèrent être en harmonie avec les idées et les intentions de son Altesse le Serdar Ekrem.

Les concessions contenues dans la Proclamation de son Altesse Omer Pacha se résument en trois catégories: questions religieuses, questions sociales, questions administratives.

1. Quant aux questions religieuses, MM. les Délégués ne peuvent qu'approuver les Articles 3 et 7 de la Proclamation. Ils expriment le vœu que tous les usages locaux restreignant l'exercice d'un ou de plusieurs des droits religieux stipulés dans les dites Articles soient considérés désormais comme nuls et non avenus.

2. Quant aux questions sociales, MM. les Délégués placent en première ligne, parmi les réformes à exécuter, celle que consacre l'Article 8 de la Proclamation, en facilitant aux Chrétiens l'acquisition de propriétés foncières. MM. les Délégués estiment que son Altesse le Serdar Ekrem contribuerait essentiellement à la prospérité de la province en mettant en vigueur le projet, dont elle a tracé d'ailleurs les bases, de vérifier incessamment les titres de propriété des terres, et d'abandonner tous les terrains incultes, que se trouveraient ainsi la propriété du Gouvernement, aux populations Chrétiennes, en leur accordant gratuitement et pour le fait même du défrichement un titre de propriété libre et légitime avec exemption de tout impôt foncier pour un certain nombre d'années, à l'expiration desquelles elles se retrouveraient dans les conditions communes aux autres sujets Chrétiennes de la Sublime Porte.

MM. les Délégués considèrent encore comme devant contribuer efficacement à l'entier rétablissement de l'ordre les Articles 5 et 6 de la Proclamation que promettent la mise en vigueur immédiate des arrangements réglant les rapports entre propriétaires et fermiers. Ils pensent qu'en vertu de leur mandat ils auront à examiner soigneusement les dispositions du règlement mentionné dans l'Article 5, et ils désignent deux d'entre eux pour préparer le plus tôt possible un rapport spécial sur cette matière. A cet effet ils prient son Altesse le Serdar Ekrem de mettre à leur disposition, pour leur donner les éclaircissements nécessaires, un employé de la Sublime Porte ayant une connaissance spéciale de ces questions.

Pour ce qui concerne l'administration intérieure, MM. les Délégués ne peuvent qu'approuver les mesures indiquées dans les Articles 1, 2, et 4 de la Proclamation. Ils félicitent son Altesse le Serdar Ekrem d'avoir songé à développer l'autonomie des districts insurgés par la nomination de Chefs Chrétiens relevant directement des Gouverneurs de la province. Ils se demandent s'il n'y aurait pas lieu d'instituer une Caïmacamie Chrétienne.

Ils recommandent également à la sérieuse attention de son Altesse, en vu du sincère

accomplissement des conditions de la pacification, la réorganisation des Tribunaux Mixtes, tant dans la capitale de la province que dans les chefs-lieux des districts sur les bases suivantes:—

1. Libre élection des membres assesseurs.
2. Proportion équitable entre les membres Musulmans et Chrétiens.
3. Rétribution des vacations moyennant une taxe *ad hoc* sur toute la population.

MM. les Délégués constatent à regret l'absence dans la Proclamation de toute clause consacrant l'admission en justice du témoignage des Chrétiens, concession réclamée par l'équité, et formellement promise, d'ailleurs, par le Hatti-Humayoun de 1856.

MM. les Délégués pensent enfin que pour obtenir l'entier rétablissement de l'ordre et donner complète satisfaction aux populations, il ne suffit pas d'accorder la remise des impôts arriérés, mais qu'il est indispensable d'introduire une répartition plus équitable des impôts mêmes. Ils renvoient l'étude de cette importante question à deux d'entre eux qui devront se mettre en rapport à cet effet avec un employé du Gouvernement Ottoman, et présenter aussitôt que possible un rapport à la Commission.

En ce qui concerne enfin les moyens par lesquels pourra s'opérer l'exécution sincère et complète des réformes jugées nécessaires et adoptées par le Gouvernement Impérial, MM. les Délégués reconnaissent que les plus sures garanties de cette exécution seraient:—

1. Le plus grand scrupule à apporter dans le choix des Généraux et des troupes destinés à occuper l'Herzégovine après la pacification; le licenciement des Bachi-Bozouks, l'emploi exclusif des troupes régulières; la nomination de Gouverneurs civils et militaires, dont le caractère même fut une garantie pour l'ordre et l'humanité.
2. Le concours incessant prêté aux autorités Ottomanes par les agents des cinq Grandes Puissances en Herzégovine dans le but de surveiller et de procurer l'entière et sincère accomplissement des réformes ordonnés par la Sublime Porte.

Inclosure 6 in No. 234.

Protocol of the 11th Conference of the Commission in Herzegovina.

Le 29 Juin, 1861.

LE Samedi, 29 Juin, 1861, à 10 heures du matin, MM. les Délégués des cinq Grandes Puissances en Herzégovine se sont réunis chez M. le Délégué de Prusse.

Etaients présents:—

M. Jovanovic,
M. Tissot,
Mr. Holmes,
M. Blau,
M. Bezobrazow.

Lecture est donnée d'une lettre de son Altesse le Serdar Ekrem à MM. les Délégués. Aux termes de cette communication, dont copie est annexée au présent Protocole, son Altesse Omer Pacha, d'après les rapports qui lui parviennent sur les dispositions des districts insoumis ainsi que sur l'attitude du Monténégro, croit opportun que MM. les Délégués se rendent aussitôt que possible sur un point où ils puissent entrer en rapports avec les Chefs insurgés.

MM. les Délégnés délibérant sur les conclusions de la communication précitée, et considérant que la réponse des Chefs de quelques districts insoumis ne leur est pas encore parvenue,—que ce retard peut s'expliquer, de la part de ces derniers, par le désir de concerter une réponse commune, que la Commission ne peut, dès lors, avant d'avoir reçu cette réponse, dont l'envoi prochain lui est d'ailleurs annoncé, regarder la première partie de sa tâche comme accomplie—décident qu'il y a lieu pour la Commission d'attendre trois jours encore avant de procéder à la démarche dont son Altesse le Serdar Ekrem constate l'opportunité. Une réponse, dont copie est également annexée au présent Protocole, est immédiatement rédigée dans ce sens et adressée à son Altesse Omer Pacha.

La séance est levée à 1 heure et demie.

(Signé) JOVANOVIC, *Major.*
CH. TISSOT.
W. R. HOLMES.
Dr. O. BLAU.
VAL. BEZOBRAZOW.

Inclosure 7 in No. 234.

Omer Pasha to the European Delegates.

Mostar, le 29 Juin, 1861.

Messieurs,

J'AI l'honneur de faire à MM. les Délégués l'exposé du résultat de mes démarches pacifiques auprès des districts insurgés, et des faits qui se sont passés depuis l'envoi de ma Proclamation.

Le district de Piva a envoyé une réponse favorable, en ce sens, que ses Chefs veuillent se rendre à Mostar auprès de moi; le district de Banian convoque une assemblée publique dans le but de faire leur soumission à Sa Majesté le Sultan; quand aux autres districts insurgés, nous n'avons reçu aucune réponse.

Tandis que le Chef de Monténégro proteste de ses sentiments tout pacifiques, et parait conseiller aux Herzégoviniens la soumission à Sa Majesté le Sultan, son Sénateur Ivo Racco, envoyé auprès des insurgés à Banian, ordonne à ces derniers de persévérer dans leur attitude hostile, et de rejéter toute proposition faite dans le sens de la pacification; de plus, le Chef de Monténégro a envoyé à tous ses habitants soldats et aux insurgés l'ordre de se munir chacun de 300 cartouches et de trois paires de chaussures.

Vucalovich, de son côté, pour ne pas déposer sa dictature, met tout en jeu pour empêcher la soumission.

Telle est, MM. les Délégués, le tableau de la situation actuelle que je vous depeinds en me fondant sur divers renseignements dignes de foi, dont la véracité est prouvée par des faits, en nous citant les deux attaques que viennent de faire les insurgés contre nos troupes, la première à Kristac, la seconde à Pratoritza, où malheureusement le sang a coulé des deux côtés.

Enfin je ferai observer à MM. les Délégués que seize jours se sont écoulés depuis que vous avez envoyé aux chefs insurgés vos lettres d'exhortation à la soumission, et cependant nous n'avons encore pas reçu de réponse, bien que huit jours suffisent pour aller et venir, et que les autres huit jours sont un temps matériel assez long pour préparer et envoyer une réponse. Cette lenteur même vient à l'appui de mes renseignements sur l'opiniâtreté des insurgés.

En vue de cette situation, qui n'est plus compatible avec le caractère de ma mission et la dignité de mon Gouvernement, tout en protestant encore une fois de mon sincère désir d'épuiser tous les moyens de conciliation, je crois opportun que MM. les Délégués se rendent, aussitôt qu'il leur sera possible, sur un lieu où ils pourront avoir une entrevue avec les chefs du mouvement et leur expliquer verbalement les avantages de leur soumission. En même temps je prie MM. les Délégués de me faire connaître le résultat de leur démarche, et de m'avertir, en cas de non réussite, si toutes les voies d'un accomodement pacifique sont épuisées ou non, afin que la responsabilité des conséquences sanglantes reste tout à la charge des districts insurgés.

(Signé) OMER.

Inclosure 8 in No. 234.

The European Delegates to Omer Pasha.

Mostar, le 29 Juin, 1861.

LES soussignés, Délégués des cinq Grandes Puissances en Herzégovine, ont reçu la lettre que son Altesse le Serdar Ekrem leur a fait l'honneur de leur adresser aujourd'hui.

Les soussignés, tout en se déclarant prêts à faire auprès des chefs insurgés la démarche personnelle dont son Altesse constate l'opportunité, désirent la différer encore jusqu'au retour des courriers qu'ils ont envoyés dans le district de Banjani. Un délai de trois jours leur paraît nécessaire pour qu'ils puissent considérer comme épuisés leurs premiers tentatives en vue de la pacification. Passé le terme précité, ils aviseront à prendre les mesures nécessaires pour se rendre dans le plus bref délai auprès des chefs insurgés.

Les soussignés saisissent, &c.

(Signé) JOVANOVIC, *Major.*
CH. TISSOT.
W. R. HOLMES.
Dr. O. BLAU.
VAL. BEZOBRAZOW.

Inclosure 9 in No. 234.

Protocol of the 12th Conference of the Commission in Herzegovina.

Le 29 Juin, 1861.

LE Samedi, 29 Juin, 1861, à 8 heures du soir, MM. les Délégués des cinq Grandes Puissances en Herzégovine se sont réunis chez son Altesse le Serdar Ekrem sur l'invitation qui leur en avait été adressée par ce dernier.

Etaient présents:—

M. Jovanovic,
M. Tissot,
Mr. Holmes,
M. Blau,
M. Bezobrazow.

Son Altesse le Serdar Ekrem annonce à MM. les Délégués qu'il a reçu de son Gouvernement l'ordre de proposer une entrevue au Prince de Monténégro. D'un autre côté, les rapports qui lui parviennent des districts soulevés lui signalent une série d'attaques de la part des insurgés qu'exciteraient les conseils hostiles d'un envoyé Monténégrin. En présence de ces faits, qui modifient complètement l'état des choses, son Altesse croit devoir s'abstenir, dans l'intérêt de la dignité de son Gouvernement, de la démarche qui lui est commandée. Il se propose d'exposer la situation à son Gouvernement et de solliciter de nouvelles instructions.

MM. les Délégués faisant observer qu'il y a péril dans la démeure, que tout retard peut amener un conflit qui rend impossible une entrevue dont la Sublime Porte elle-même reconnaît l'utilité, que la dignité du Gouvernement Ottoman ne saurait souffrir d'ailleurs d'une démarche conseillée par l'humanité. Son Altesse le Serdar Ekrem déclare qu'il prend ce motif en considération et que pour donner une dernière preuve des sentiments de générosité de la Sublime Porte, ainsi que de son désir personnel d'épuiser toutes les voies possibles de conciliation, il est disposé à inviter le Prince à une entrevue qui pourrait avoir lieu, soit à Gabela soit à Klek, au choix de ce dernier.

Son Altesse adresse en ce sens au Prince de Monténégro une lettre qu'un aide-de-camp doit porter immédiatement à Raguse. M. le Consul de Prusse dans cette dernière ville devra, suivant le désir qu'en exprime son Altesse le Serdar Ekrem, se charger de ce pli et le remettre personnellement au Prince de Monténégro.

La séance est levée à 2 heures du matin.

(Signé) JOVANOVIC, *Major.*
CH. TISSOT.
W. R. HOLMES.
DR. O. BLAU.
VAL. BEZOBRAZOW.

Inclosure 10 in No. 234.

Protocol of the 13th Conference of the Commission in Herzégovina.

Le 30 Juin, 1861.

LE Dimanche, 30 Juin, 1861, à 5 heures du soir, MM. les Délégués des cinq Grandes Puissances en Herzégovine se sont réunis chez M. le Délégué de Prusse.

Etaient présents:

M. Jovanovic,
M. Tissot,
Mr. Holmes,
M. Blau,
M. Bezobrazow.

Lecture est donnée par M. Bezobrazow d'une lettre adressée à la Commission par les Chefs insurgés des districts de Zupci, Banjani, Rudina, et Piva, et signée par Jovan Vassiliev Bacevic, Chef de Banjani, ainsi que par Théodosi l'Hégoumère du Monastère de Kossirovo. Il résulte de cette pièce, dont une traduction est annexée au présent Protocole,

que les habitants des districts insoumis expriment une entière confiance dans les Délégués des Puissances Chrétiennes, se déclarent prêts à entrer en rapports avec eux, témoignent de leur fidélité à Sa Majesté le Sultan, acceptent en principe la Proclamation qui leur a été adressée par son Altesse le Serdar Ekrem, formulent quelques demandes accessoires, et désignent pour les représenter le Voïvode Jovan Vassiliev Bacevic de Banjani.

MM. les Délégués considérant cette lettre comme étant de nature à constituer une base pour des négociations ultérieures avec les Chefs insurgés se transportent chez son Altesse le Serdar Ekrem pour lui en donner communication.

Son Altesse relevant dans cette pièce certaines expressions qui lui semblent incompatibles avec la dignité de son Gouvernement, et ne pouvant admettre, notamment, que les Chefs des districts insurgés parlent, ainsi qu'ils le font, au nom de "tout le peuple de l'Herzégovine," déclare considérer cette communication comme nulle et non avenue.

MM. les Délégués font observer à plusieurs reprises à son Altesse que la communication dont il s'agit n'a d'autre sens, à leurs yeux, que de témoigner du désir des chefs insoumis d'entrer en négociation avec la Commission, qu'on ne saurait attacher aucune importance à des expressions auxquels les rédacteurs de la lettre n'ont certainement pas donné la portée que son Altesse leur attribue,—que le document dont il s'agit, d'ailleurs, n'est point adressée à son Altesse, mais bien aux cinq Délégués,—qu'il n'y a point lieu, dès lors, pour elle de protester contre les termes d'une pièce qui ne lui est communiquée qu'à titre officieux.

Son Altesse insiste pour que sa précédente déclaration soit consignée au procès-verbal de la Conférence et fait prendre une copie de la lettre des Chefs insurgés.

La séance est levée à minuit.

(Signé) JOVANOVIC, *Major.*
CH. TISSOT.
W. R. HOLMES.
DR. O. BLAU.
VAL. BEZOBRAZOW.

Inclosure 11 in No. 234.

Letter addressed by the Inhabitants of Zupci, Baniani, Rudina, and Piva, to the European Delegates.

(Traduction.)

DE nous pauvres, malheureux et fidèles sujets du Sultan, de Zupci, Baniani, Rudina, et Piva, et tout le peuple de l'Herzégovine à la glorieuse et illustre Commission des cinq Grandes Puissances de l'Europe à Mostar, le très humble salut.

Nous avons reçu vos lettres en date du 2 Juin, lesquelles ont réjoui les cœurs de tous les habitants de l'Herzégovine. Nous avons compris que vos hauts Gouvernements ont décidé dans leur générosité d'améliorer la position des Chrétiens souffrants Orthodoxes de l'Herzégovine. Nous avons reçu de même la Proclamation de son Altesse le Serdar Ekrem Omer Pacha, datée 2 Juin, par laquelle il nous fait des promesses qui sont loin de nos espérances. Par notre* et conformément aux désirs de tout le peuple il suit:—

1. Quant au premier point, nous avons des Chefs comme nous les avons eu auparavant; ceci est connu au Gouverneur de Mostar, ainsi qu'à vous, qui nous avez adressé vos lettres, ainsi que les Proclamations de son Altesse Omer Pacha.

2. Tous les Chefs de tous les districts des populations de l'Herzégovine ont conféré toute l'autorité à Jovan Vassiliev Bacevic, Voïvode de Baniani, auquel on donne le plein pouvoir de communiquer au nom du peuple avec les Commissaires des Grandes Puissances pour le bien du peuple.

3. Pour la permission de construire les églises et de mettre les cloches nous remercions très honorablement, nous prions encore pour les églises brulées dans les environs de Nichsich au nombre de neuf, ainsi que dans d'autres endroits, comme ainsi pour notre ancien Monastère de Kossierovo, qu'ils soient réparés aux frais du Gouvernement, et qu'il leur est restitué tout ce que les Turcs leur ont pris par force, enlevé, détruit, brulé, saccagé.

4. Sur ce point nous ne pouvons pas tomber d'accord et nous ne voulons pas que de nouveau les zaptiés vivent parmis nous ou qu'ils construisent des maisons, ou qu'ils viennent chez nous parceque jamais ce ne pourrait aboutir à une paix, tant de leur part que de la nôtre.

* Not legible in the original.

5. Les terrains que nous possédons à présent et que tant de fois nous avons défendus en versant notre sang, tant contre les Turcs, que contre les Monténégrins limitrophes, jamais nous ne les donnerons à personne à ces conditions.

6. Que seulement les Chefs remettront les impôts aux représentants du Gouverneur nous en remercions aux bontés de Sa Majesté le Sultan ainsi que pour le

7. Point nous remercions Sa Majesté et nous prions seulement de pouvoir choisir un Métropolitain que l'illustre Commission nous confirmera.

8. Quant à ce qui regarde le dernier point notre très humble prière à ce sujet est contenue dans l'Article 5.

Telles sont nos plaintes et nos désirs, illustre Commission, pour l'exécution desquels nous prions très humblement vos Seigneuries, afin d'améliorer finalement notre position de souffrance dans laquelle tout le peuple de l'Herzégovine n'a pas eu depuis si longtemps ni repos ni tranquillité.

Nous prions que la très illustre Commission veuille bien accepter nos très humbles remercîments et qu'elle veuille soutenir en entier nos désirs lesquels, comme nous croyons fermement en Dieu ne nous refusera pas aussi la miséricorde intarissable de notre très miséricordieux Souverain le Sultan Abdul Medjid, que Dieu prolonge sa vie, et que son règne soit glorieux pour longtemps, ainsi que toutes les Grandes Puissances Européennes qui ont intercédé auprès de Sa Majesté le Sultan pour nous pauvre peuple de l'Herzégovine; que Dieu les bénisse. Amen!

Par décision de tout le peuple de l'Herzégovine en assemblée au Monastère de Kossierovo. Signé au nom de tous les Chefs.

(Signé) JOVAN VASSILIEV, *Voïvode de Banjani.*
THÉODOSI, *Legoumère du Monastère de Kossierovo.*

No. 235.

Consul Holmes to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received August* 3.)

(No. 13.) *Mostar, July* 7, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith copy of despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at the Porte, recounting events that have occurred during the past week in the Herzegovina.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure in No. 235.

Consul Holmes to Sir H. Bulwer.

Mostar, July 7, 1861.

Sir,

MY last information to your Excellency was that a letter had been received from the insurgents addressed to the Commission which had rather displeased Omer Pasha. His Highness, however, seems on reflection to have entirely adopted the view taken by the Commission on this matter, and I am happy to state that our good understanding with Omer Pasha has not been disturbed. In accordance with the opinion expressed in your Excellency's telegram to me, we shall certainly endeavour to avoid as far as possible any proceedings with the insurgents which can just give dissatisfaction to His Highness.

As soon as the three days' delay (mentioned in the note of the Commission in reply to Omer Pasha's letter of the 20th June—Annex to Protocol No. 11) had expired, it was determined, of course with Omer Pasha's approval, to send M. Markovich, the Prussian Delegate's dragoman, on the part of the Commission, to endeavour to persuade as many Chiefs of the insurgents as possible to come to Mostar, or, failing in that, to make arrangements for a meeting between them and the Commission. M. Markovich was sent because, in expectation of the desired interview between the Prince of Montenegro and Omer Pasha, it was considered inexpedient for the Commission to quit Mostar. M. Markovich left this for the insurgent districts on the 3rd instant.

The attacks made on the Turkish posts reported in my despatches No. 9 and 12 are said to have been the results of intrigues going on in the Herzegovina. It would seem that our letter to the insurgents had produced an excellent effect, and matters were proceeding most satisfactorily, when an agent or agents appeared among the people, giving

out that they were sent by the European Commission at Mostar to tell them to pay no attention to any letters addressed to them by that body, but to take up arms again as their only hope of deliverance, and that they would not be unsupported.

From the assurances most solemnly given, and from the steps taken by those of our colleagues open to suspicion, we are convinced that these intrigues have other sources, and that all the members of the Commission have acted loyally together.

The intrigues in question are generally attributed—with what justice it is impossible to state, as there are so many conflicting interests involved in the pacification of the Herzegovina—to the known personal jealousy and ill-humour of the Russian Consul at Ragusa, or of the French Consul at Scutari, at not having been named members of the European Commission at Mostar, and also perhaps to the action of the Austrian Consul here. However this may be, M. Markovich has been charged by the Commission to endeavour to discover the agents and authors of these disgraceful proceedings, and we have addressed a letter to the insurgents warning them to listen to no advice, and to believe nothing as proceeding from us, unless it be by a letter or through an agent accredited to them by a letter signed and sealed by all the members of the Commission.

A telegram from the French Consul at Scutari to M. Tissot, regarding the attack by the Montenegrins on Spitz, states that the Prince has had one captain shot, two others dismissed, and has imposed a fine on all engaged in the affair. He has also caused all plunder to be restored. We have to-day received a letter, dated the 20th June, from the Prince, in answer to our communication requesting His Highness to cause copies of our letter to the insurgents to be distributed in the districts close to Montenegro. His Highness says this shall be done. He complains that Omer Pasha had not notified to him his arrival in the Herzegovina, and remarks on an attack which had been made by Turks on the Montenegrin territory, for which he shall require satisfaction.

Before receiving this your Excellency will have learnt by a telegram which I shall forward to-day that the Prince of Montenegro accepts Omer Pasha's invitation to an interview, but begs that it may be close to the Montenegrin frontier. I need say nothing more on this point, as it will probably be the subject of telegraphic communication.

Omer Pasha informed us yesterday that an affair had taken place near Gasko in which 200 insurgents or Montenegrins were killed; all are said to have been clothed in Montenegrin costume. Since the affair of Platovtza, when some fifty soldiers were killed while obtaining water, instructions have been sent to commanding officers to take the greatest precaution against surprise. On the occasion above mentioned it would appear that the troops were detailed to bring in firewood, but an attack being expected, two or three companies were placed in ambush, and when the insurgents presented themselves they were exposed to a cross fire, and were completely routed with the result stated above. I imagine the number of killed, however, to be an exaggeration. Omer Pasha told me that he had given the most strict orders that no bodies should be mutilated in the slightest degree.

I communicated to Omer Pasha your Excellency's telegram regarding the eventuality of war. His Highness agreed that the two conditions were necessary, and expressed his determination to exhaust every means of conciliation before resorting to hostilities.

My French and Prussian colleagues have received telegrams to the effect that Omer Pasha will be instructed to recognize the Commission officially.

His Highness has just informed us that fourteen villages in the district of Droum, between Trebigné and Piva, which revolted last year and emigrated to Montenegro, had demanded permission to return to their homes, which request had been granted.

It is difficult to keep your Excellency informed as to all the isolated affairs which are continually occurring, and it seems superfluous to enter into details, or to offer opinions, which may to-morrow become of no interest or prove incorrect. In the present despatch I have endeavoured simply to give an account of what has taken place during the past week, limiting myself to such events as appear interesting or of importance.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 236.

Lord Bloomfield to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received August* 5.)

(No. 419.) *Vienna, August* 1, 1861.

My Lord,

WITH reference to the telegrams from the French Consul at Scutari to the French Ambassador at Constantinople, inclosed in Sir Henry Bulwer's despatch No. 490 of the

8th instant, Count Rechberg tells me that M. Hecquard's announcement that the Prince of Montenegro had caused Marco Andrina to be shot is false, as the said person had been killed in a conflict with a Turkish Colonel. Neither is it true, according to Count Rechberg, that the Prince had dismissed and exiled Captain Glolindoli, as that officer continues to hold his employment in the Prince's service.

Count Rechberg says also it is false that the Montenegrins concerned in the affair at Spizza have all been punished, or the stolen goods restored.

Count Rechberg does not know the exact reason why the Prince of Montenegro finally declined the meeting with Omer Pasha, but he declares the one assigned, illness, is not the real one, and he believes M. Hecquard to be at the bottom of the intrigue which prevented the meeting of the Prince of Montenegro and Omer Pasha on Turkish territory.

His Excellency said to me that the falsehood of many of the reports which this French Agent sends to his Government having been clearly proved by Prince Metternich, M. Thouvenel has been obliged to give him a warning, and to request that he will be more careful in future in ascertaining the truth of what he writes before transmitting information to his Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 237.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 799.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, August 5, 1861.*

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches as marked in the margin* on the subject of the state of affairs on the Austro-Turkish frontier.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 238.

Earl Russell to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 189.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, August 7, 1861.*

I INCLOSE, for your information, copy of a despatch from Mr. Consul Holmes† relative to the present state of affairs in the Herzegovina.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 239.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 817.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, August 8, 1861.*

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches as marked in the margin‡ on the subject of Turkey and Montenegro.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 240.

Earl Cowley to Earl Russell.—(*Received August 10.*)

(No. 977. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Paris, August 9, 1861.*

M. THOUVENEL, in conversing with me yesterday on the affairs of the Herzegovina, observed, though guarding himself from speaking in his Ministerial capacity,

* No. 230, 231, 232, and 233. † No. 230. ‡ No. 236.

that he could not help suspecting that Austria was not sorry that a state of excitement and disquiet should prevail in that province. He did not wish to accuse her of fomenting discontent, but she perhaps thought that the time might arrive when she might turn existing discontent to good account, meaning, as I understood him, that the protection of the Christians there might help the Austrian Government to find favour with their own border subjects. "At all events," said M. Thouvenel, "the Austrian, Prussian, and Russian Agents do but little to help their French and British colleagues in their endeavours to establish a better understanding between the Turks and Montenegrins. They express concurrence as far as words go, but they exercise no pressure either with Omer Pasha or with the Prince of Montenegro, and seem more disposed to let matters take their course."

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 241.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received August 12.*)

(No. 567.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, August 2, 1861.*

HAVING received no recent intelligence from the Delegate of Her Majesty's Government at Mostar, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith the translation of a telegram addressed by Omer Pasha to the Grand Vizier, respecting the failure of the attempted negotiation with the insurgents in the Herzegovina.

I have, &c.
(For Sir H. Bulwer),
(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

Inclosure in No. 241.

Omer Pasha to the Grand Vizier.

(Telegraphic.) *July 29, 1861.*

WE have come from Scutari to Castel Nuovo. A special Commissioner had previously been sent by the Delegates to the Chiefs of the revolted districts, in order that they might come there.

As he reported that they would come to Sutorina, I waited at Castel Nuovo in the port of Sutorina for three days, at the request of the Delegates. To-day the Chief of Zouptcha came to the quarantine station of that port. The Delegates unfurled their flags, went to his feet, and pressed him to come to us, two of their number remaining as hostages, and the others accompanying him, but the fellow did not come. I shall remain here to-night and then proceed to Mostar. The Delegates will remain here one day more.

Forsooth, the Chief of Bagnam Yrwan being about to come, they are going to confer with him; but the general belief is that he also will not agree. The day after, the Delegates are to make their way towards Mostar, by a special steamer supplied by the Austrian Government. As at last there is no alternative, they are going to give a document when they are at Mostar saying that we are justified in employing force.

No. 242.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(*Received August 12.*)

(No. 433. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Vienna, August 8, 1861.*

COUNT RECHBERG has learned, with regret, that in consequence of the Prince of Montenegro having put forward a demand of independence of the Porte, and of facility of using the port of Spizza, and some other propositions which were considered totally inadmissible, the Consular Commission in Herzegovina had separated, and Omer Pasha had applied to Constantinople for instructions.

His Excellency has observed to me, in speaking on this subject, that Omer Pasha could not act otherwise than he has done, and he certainly appears disposed to give him

full credit for his praiseworthy efforts to bring about an arrangement with the Prince of Montenegro, which, he states, failed of success in consequence of the inadmissible pretensions of the Prince.

Count Rechberg says further that, according to the information which has reached him, the failure in the negotiations is to be mainly attributed to the advice which has been offered on one side by M. Hecquard, and on the other by M. Petkovitch, the Russian Consul, for they have both supported the Prince in the pretensions now put forward, which pretensions, moreover, his Excellency says, are in exact accordance with the opinions entertained on this question by the Representatives of Russia and France at Constantinople.

It would, however, appear impossible to decide whose counsels are most to blame, or which has had the most influence on the Prince, for Count Rechberg observed, in his conversation with me, that France accuses the Russian Agent of having pushed matters to extremities, whilst Russia lays the blame at the door of M. Hecquard.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 243.

Consul Sir F. Gilbert to Lord J. Russell.—(Received August 12.)

(No. 26.) *Scutari, July 25, 1861.*
My Lord,

I AM truly grateful to your Lordship for granting me permission, by telegram, to leave my post at once; there is no doubt that I was seriously, indeed dangerously ill, this having been the fourth and worst attack of a nature which I have never had before my arrival in Scutari. I am sorry to add that my doctor, a clever Sardinian physician, assures me that he does not think I shall ever be able, even with the greatest care, to be entirely free from a return of these attacks, as the climate evidently does not agree with me, which he attributes to the fact of my having lived all my life on the sea-coast, and, consequently, that the exhalations from the large freshwater lake of Scutari have some peculiar effect on my constitution.

I am now so far recovered that I will, with your Lordship's permission, defer taking leave of absence till later in the year, provided I have no relapse, as Her Majesty's Ambassador has written to say that it would be very desirable that I should remain at my post if possible till the affairs of Herzegovina and Montenegro are settled, and also from the ominous words of Omer Pasha just before leaving Scutari, viz.: "We are on the eve of most grave complications and events"—an opinion which I fear has every probability of being fulfilled.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. H. GILBERT.

No. 244.

Consul Sir F. Gilbert to Lord J. Russell.—(Received August 14.)

(No. 29.) *Scutari, July 29, 1861.*
My Lord,

CONSUL HOLMES will have duly informed your Lordship of the abrupt termination of the mission of Omer Pasha and the Foreign Commissioners to the Prince of Montenegro. It will be out of place on my part to enter into any details, which your Lordship will learn far better and more clearly from the Commissioner himself, but I merely wish to make a few remarks.

Before the arrival of Omer Pasha, there was a deal of intrigue, and sending off of "estafettes," going on, chiefly on the part of one of my colleagues who was disappointed at not being on the Commission; and there being also a very strong rumour current that the Prince would not go to Zabjak to meet Omer Pasha, I sent a telegram to the Prince, begging him to reflect seriously before coming to such a decision. This appears to have had some effect, for early in the morning of the day (July 20th) on which Omer Pasha was expected to arrive at Scutari, a boat arrived here from Dodosche (Montenegro), just opposite Zabjak, with a letter from the Prince to Omer Pasha, under cover of one to his cousin, Captain Pejo, who had been sent here some days before to await the arrival of Omer Pasha; in that letter it was stated that the Prince had been waiting

according to appointment four days at Dadosche, and that he should leave that same evening for Cettigné, unless he heard some tidings of Omer Pasha. Unfortunately there was a high wind blowing down the lake, so that the boat could not return. Abdi Pasha and all the Chiefs had gone some miles out of town to meet Omer Pasha, when Captain Pejo came to me and intreated that I would ride out to Abdi Pasha and get an order for the lake steamer to convey a letter without delay to the Prince to beg him to wait a day or two longer, as Omer Pasha was hourly expected. I happily succeeded in this, and thus the Commissioners were enabled to have an interview on Monday, the 22nd of July. Not so Omer Pasha; for it appears that shortly after the conference of the Commissioners with the Prince, the latter returned to Cettigné from Dodosche without any notice of his intention having been given. It is curious that no one can find out who made the appointment with the Prince, who, I am told, declined to give any explanation.

Yesterday an order was issued by Abdi Pasha, in the name of Omer Pasha, that no Montenegrin is to be allowed under any pretext whatsoever to pass the frontier, and no Ottoman subject is to buy of or sell to them; in short, all communication is cut off between Montenegro and the Ottoman territory.

One master stroke of policy on the part of Omer Pasha I must not omit to mention. Your Lordship is aware that this part of Albania is exempt from recruitment. When the Chiefs of the various quarters of the town came to pay their respects, Omer Pasha affected to admire their appearance, praised them a good deal, and ended by saying that he should like to have a guard of Albanians about his person; this so flattered the unwary Chiefs, that they without hesitation acceded to his wishes. He promised that each man should receive 120 piastres (1*l.* sterling) per month besides rations, and he ordered that the respective quarters to which they belonged should give, by subscription, 400 piastres to each recruit for his outfit and little expenses on the road; he has obtained 120, chiefly, I am happy to say, of the greatest rascals unhung, and I have no doubt that next year a similar levy will be made, and thus the system of exemption from military recruitment will be gradually done away with.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. H. GILBERT.

No. 245.

Earl Russell to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 102. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, August 14, 1861.*

I INCLOSE, for your information, copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris relative to the state of affairs in the Herzegovina.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 246.

Earl Cowley to Earl Russell.—(Received August 15.)

(No. 1003.)
My Lord, *Paris, August 14, 1861.*

M. THOUVENEL has again spoken to me upon the state of affairs in the Herzegovina, which, he is convinced, require immediate attention. According to the reports which his Excellency has received from the French Commissioner, reports which, he says, are full of interest, and copies of which he will send to M. de Flahault for your Lordship's information, not only are all the Commissioners agreed as to the course which ought at once to be pursued, but Omer Pasha partakes their opinion. There ought then to be no serious difficulty in the way of a final arrangement. From the few explanations which M. Thouvenel gave me, I gathered that the course recommended by the Commissioners is the recognition by the Porte of the independence of Montenegro, and a sufficient grant of territory on the plain as will enable the mountaineers to find means of subsistence without having recourse to raids and plunder.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

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* No. 240.

No. 247.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 845.) *Foreign Office, August* 15, 1861.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches as marked in the margin* on the subject of the state of the Herzegovina.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 248.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 506.) *Foreign Office, August* 15, 1861.

Sir,

WITH reference to your Excellency despatch No. 490 of the 8th ultimo, I transmit, for your information, a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna,† reporting the observations made by Count Rechberg on M. Hecquard's reports on Montenegrin affairs.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 249.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 513.) *Foreign Office, August* 15, 1861.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, copies of correspondence as noted in the margin‡ respecting the affairs of Montenegro and the Herzegovina.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 250.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 515.) *Foreign Office, August* 15, 1861.

Sir,

I HAVE have this day sent your Excellency the following telegram in cypher:—

"Is it true that all the Commissioners to the Herzegovina are agreed that the Prince of Montenegro ought to be acknowledged as an independent Prince, and that his territory ought to be increased so as to afford the mountaineers subsistence on the plain?"

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL

No. 251.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received August 16.)

(No. 536.) *Constantinople, August* 2, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE had the honour to receive from your Lordship this day (2.30 P.M.) the following cyphered telegram, dated London, August 1, 5.20 P.M.:—

"The Turkish Ambassador has informed me that the Sultan thinks it necessary to have recourse to force in order to menace the country in the neighbourhood of Montenegro. Her Majesty's Government cannot judge of this necessity, and await your report of the negotiations.

"The Delegates should withdraw."

I have, &c.

(For Sir H. Bulwer),

(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

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* No. 241. † No. 236. ‡ Nos. 225 and 240.

No. 252.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received August 16.)

(No. 540.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, August* 6, 1861.

THE recent correspondence of Mr. Consul Holmes has doubtless prepared your Lordship for the unsatisfactory issue of the late negotiations, under the auspices of the European Delegates, between Omer Pasha and the insurgents in the Herzegovina, on the one hand, and between Omer Pasha and the Prince of Montenegro on the other.

On the receipt of telegraphic intelligence to this effect, through the French and Prussian Delegates and the Porte, the Russian Envoy immediately requested Aali Pasha and the Representatives of the Great Powers here to hold a Conference for the purpose of considering what instructions should be given to the Delegates at Mostar in consequence of the failure of their attempts at mediation.

I therefore directed Mr. Erskine to assist at the intended meeting, and to agree to any proposal which had the assent of Aali Pasha for suspending the functions of the Mostar Commission in the event of Omer Pasha being compelled to resort to coercive measures against the insurgents, but I at the same time desired Mr. Erskine not to agree to the actual dissolution of that body, which might again become an useful instrument in case either Omer Pasha or the insurgents should hereafter incline to a more pacific policy.

On the 1st instant this meeting was held at the house of the Russian Minister at Buyuderek, and I have already, in my despatch No. 535 of the 2nd instant, acquainted your Lordship with the result.

I now inclose a copy and translation of the telegram, which, with the full assent of Aali Pasha, was addressed to the different Delegates at Mostar.

Prince Lobanow has, from the first, displayed such eagerness to get rid of this Commission, that I cannot but think he is still smarting under the disavowal to which Prince Gortchakow alluded in a conversation reported to your Lordship by Lord Napier. He is probably aware that his Government have no desire to co-operate in any course calculated to lessen the difficulties which surround the Sultan's Government, and has seized upon the first favourable opportunity of withdrawing from a position which tends to show that in this instance, at all events, Turkey is animated by the best intentions towards her Christian subjects, and that the latter are alone to blame if the Government are compelled to resort to force. In fact, the Prince betrayed what was passing in his mind by saying to Mr. Erskine, just before the Conference opened, "that whatever his colleagues decided, he she should direct his Delegates to withdraw, 'pour ne pas assister au mitraillement des Chrétiens par les Turcs.'"

Were any additional evidence required to establish the policy of Russia in this question, it would be found in a circumstance mentioned to Mr. Erskine by Count Goltz, on the authority of the Prussian Delegate at Mostar, viz., that the secret agent adverted to in one of the Protocols as employed in counteracting the efforts of the Commission to pacify the Herzegovina, by advising the insurgents to hold out, was the private secretary of M. Bezobrazow, the Russian Member of the Mostar Commission!

In the course of a long discussion, with which it is not necessary that I should trouble your Lordship, Aali Pasha observed that he was anxious that it should be well understood that the Commission was dissolved owing to no fault on the part of the Porte, and he repeated more than once that whatever might be the result of the approaching hostilities, the Sultan had no intention of receding from the promises held forth in the Proclamation issued by Omer Pasha on his first arrival in the Herzegovina. At the close of the coming struggle, said his Highness, and even if the Ottoman troops are completely successful, the promised concessions will still be recorded by Omer Pasha.

In answer to these observations the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires and Mr. Erskine assured his Highness that their respective Governments had no intention of casting blame on the Porte by withdrawing their Delegates, but that, on the contrary, their object was to leave Omer Pasha entirely unfettered in carrying out the military measures he might see fit to adopt.

A somewhat warm discussion ensued between Aali Pasha and the Russian Minister and French Chargé d'Affaires as to the policy of a measure taken by Omer Pasha, viz., that by which the Montenegrins are prohibited from holding any intercourse with the plains, the two latter asserting that this measure must infallibly drive the Montenegrins into open hostility. Aali Pasha did not attempt to justify this act, but merely pleaded for delay, in order that more detailed accounts might be received as to the reasons which had induced its adoption.

The Russian Minister and French Chargé d'Affaires cautioned Aali Pasha against an attack on Montenegro.

His Highness replied that there was no intention, for the present, of making any such attack, but that Omer Pasha would be unquestionably entitled to pursue the insurgents were they to take refuge on Montenegrin territory with a view to the resumption of hostilities at some more favorable opportunity, and were the Prince of Montenegro to decline adopting the precautions usually observed between friendly States under such circumstances.

Mr. Erskine here interposed, and pointed out the injustice of denying to Turkey, with respect to her unruly vassal, a right which belonged to every Sovereign State, viz., that of making war on adequate provocation, and Count Lallemand was obliged to admit that, under certain contingencies, Omer Pasha would be justified in invading Montenegro, adding that all he meant was to warn the Porte that France would not tolerate any attempt to reconquer Montenegro. Prince Lobanow, however, maintained an obstinate silence on this point, and left it to be inferred that Russia would not, even under strong provocation, permit an attack by Turkey on Montenegro.

Whilst on this subject, I may add that Count Lallemand stated to Mr. Erskine in the most explicit terms that the French Government were not without jealousy of Austria in this struggle. There was at all events no doubt, he said, that the proposal to send an Austrian army of occupation into the Herzegovina was made originally by Count Rechberg to M. de Moustier—a statement which, as your Lordship is aware, is denied by the Austrian Government.

I have, &c.
(For Sir H. Bulwer),
(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

Inclosure in No. 252.

Draft Instructions from the Representatives of the Five Powers to the Delegates at Mostar.

Si, par suite de l'insuccès des négociations pacifiques avec les insurgés, Omer Pacha se décidait à recourir à l'emploi de la force contre eux, vous considéreriez votre mission comme provisoirement suspendue. Dans le cas cependant où il se présenterait quelque nouvelle chance de négociation, vous en référeriez aux Représentants et vous attendriez leurs ordres.

English version sent to Mr. Holmes by Telegraph on August 2, 1861.

If, in consequence of the failure of pacific negotiations with the insurgents, Omer Pasha should decide upon resorting to coercive measures against them, you will consider your mission as provisionally suspended. In the event, however, of a fresh opportunity for negotiation offering, you will refer to the Representatives, and await their orders.

(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

No. 253.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell[1].—(*Received August* 17.)

Constantinople, August 17, 1861.

(Telegraphic.)

I HAVE no reason to believe that all the Delegates are of the opinion mentioned in your Lordship's telegram of the 15th. On the 24th July the British Delegate reported some such demands on the part of the Prince of Montenegro without expressing any opinion on them. Russian Delegate would of course assent, and perhaps French, but I cannot think the others can have acquiesced in concessions which would certainly be resisted by the Porte as a step towards dismemberment.

On the plea of age and ill-health, but really from want of funds, Omer Pasha has tendered his resignation, which has not been accepted. He has now been supplied with some money and five fresh battalions, whilst overtures are being made to the insurgents, through a priest, which the Porte say may lead to peace.

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[1] Repeated to Paris.

No. 254.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 853.)

Foreign Office, August 17, 1861.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches on the subject of Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 255.

Mr. Hammond to Consul Sir F. Gilbert.

(No. 10.)

Foreign Office, August 17, 1861.

Sir,

I AM directed by Earl Russell to express to you his Lordship's approval of the intention announced by you, in your despatch No. 26 of the 25th ultimo, not to avail yourself until later in the year of the leave of absence granted to you by telegram on the 16th ultimo.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. HAMMOND.

No. 256.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(*Received August* 19.)

(No. 253.)

St. Petersburgh, August 13, 1861.

My Lord,

THE Porte addressed a telegraphic despatch to the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires at this Court, under date of July 30, stating that the Prince of Montenegro having declined a meeting with Omer Pasha, and the rebels in Herzegovina having refused the gracious terms of adjustment offered by the Sultan, no other course remained open to the Turkish Government than to restore its authority by force of arms, a resolution in which it had, according to Ali Pasha, the full approval of the European Commissioners. This despatch has not been followed by any further relation of the recent course of affairs in Herzegovina, nor of the circumstances under which the Commissioners have given their alleged assent to the resumption of hostilities. In making this rather tardy communication to me, Prince Gortchakow added that he had informed the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires that the Russian Commissioner would withdraw instantly as soon as Omer Pasha had recourse to measures of violence; his functions would then be at an end.

I represented to Prince Gortchakow that although the duties of the European Commissioners might seem to be naturally terminated by the close of negotiations, yet they might still be of service subsequent to the renewal of active operations against the insurgents, for if Omer Pasha should be successful, the latter might be soon disposed to submit, and the mediation of the Commissioners might be useful to all parties; I should, therefore, regret to see the Russian Commissioner separate himself precipitately from his colleagues.

Prince Gortchakow replied that there were Consuls everywhere in those provinces whose good offices might be used; he did not deny that some latitude of action might be allowed according to local circumstances; the general line of conduct had, however, been laid down by Prince Labanoff to the Commissioner as he had stated.

I did not press the matter further. It is no doubt highly satisfactory that the Representative of Russia at Constantinople should have been drawn into an open common avowal of the good intentions and valid concessions of the Porte, and that the Russian Commissioner should have been made an unwilling witness to the sanguinary treachery and unreasonable obstinacy of the insurgents; but should Omer Pasha find it necessary to proceed to severities against the rebels, his freedom of action might rather be impeded by the presence of a Russian Commissioner carping at all his measures and harassing him with protests at Constantinople and St. Petersburgh. No further good can now perhaps be got out of a Russian Commissioner, and if chastisement has to be inflicted on the Montenegrins and their allies, the sooner the Russian is removed the

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* No. 242.

better. I am, however, entirely without information as to the nature and extent of the Herzegovina insurrection, and the share which the Prince of Montenegro has had in it by active participation or connivance.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 257.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received August 19.)

(No. 450. Secret and Confidential.)
Vienna, August 15, 1861.

My Lord,

THE state of Herzegovina causes much anxiety to the Government, and the Montenegrin insurgents, Count Rechberg has just told me, have been attacking some Austrian escorts crossing the Sutorina, which has obliged the Imperial authorities to march a battalion in order to obtain satisfaction from these mountaineers.

His Excellency mentioned, in strict confidence, requesting the intelligence might not be repeated, that a cyphered correspondence between the Prince of Servia and the Prince of Montenegro was being continually carried on by telegraph, and that great suspicions had been raised as to the object of it.

He said, further, that a sabre of honour had lately been presented by the Prince Michel to the Chief of the rebels in Herzegovina, and that one of the employés in His Highness's Foreign Department was now there, probably carrying on some intrigue against the interests of the Porte.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 258.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received August 21.)

(Telegraphic.)
Constantinople, August 21, 1861, 2 A.M.

I HAVE desired Holmes to join his colleagues at Mostar, fresh overtures having been made by Luca Vucalovich through the Russian Consul.

Hecquard has been sent in the place of Tissot.

No. 259.

Earl Russell to Lord Napier.

(No. 150.)
Foreign Office, August 21, 1861.

My Lord,

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith, for your information, a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople* relative to a conference held at the Russian Legation at that place, on the subject of the failure of the negotiations begun, under the auspices of the European Delegates, between Omer Pasha and the insurgents in the Herzegovina.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 260.

Earl Russell to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 197.)
Foreign Office, August 21, 1861.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your information, copies of despatches from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople and St. Petersburgh relative to the affairs of the Herzegovine.†

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

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* No. 252.

† Nos. [redacted] and 256.

No. 261.

Earl Russell to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 198.)
Foreign Office, August 21, 1861.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 450, marked Secret and Confidential, of the 15th instant, relative to the intrigues which Count Rechberg has privately informed you are being carried on against the Porte by the Princes of Servia and Montenegro, I have to observe that it would be desirable that the Internuncio should inform the Grand Vizier of these proceedings.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 262.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 872.)
Foreign Office, August 21, 1861.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches upon the subject of Turkey and Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 263.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(Telegraphic.)
Foreign Office, August 22, 1861.

USE your utmost endeavours to obtain a friendly solution of affairs of Herzegovina and Montenegro. It is important to the Sultan not to commence his reign with acts of bloodshed.

You should also endeavour to arrange speedily the affairs of the Principalities.

No. 264.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 885.)
Foreign Office, August 24, 1861.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE for your Excellency's information copies of despatches† upon the subject of the Herzegovina and Montenegro.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 265.

Mr. Longworth to Lord J. Russell.—(Received August 26.)

(No. 47.)
Belgrade, August 15, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, inclosed to your Lordship, the copy of a despatch dated August 3, 1861, and addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, in which I informed his Excellency that the Prince of Servia has applied to the Austrian Government for leave to send home through Austria the Montenegrins who lately crossed the frontier at Uzitcha.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. A. LONGWORTH.

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* Nos. 244 and 256.

† Nos. 257, 261, and 263.

Inclosure in No. 265.

Mr. Longworth to Sir H. Bulwer.

Belgrade, August 3, 1861.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch dated the 1st ultimo, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the Prince of Servia has applied to the Austrian Government for leave to send home through Austria the Montenegrins who lately crossed the frontier at Uzitcha.

With this request the Austrian Government has after some delay refused to comply, and the band in question, upwards of 200 in number, will therefore have to remain here for the present; an alternative, perhaps not altogether unwelcome to the Servian Government, for though the Predstevnik has not ceased since their arrival to complain of the expense and inconvenience the Principality is put to by them, it is not true that they have, as he asserted, been disarmed and disbanded. The Pasha of Belgrade affirms on the contrary, that they retain their arms and have been divided into three bodies, which are now posted in the neighbourhood of the Turkish fortresses of Semendria, Shabatz, and Uzitcha; and his Excellency states, moreover, that to his certain knowledge this corps came here in pursuance of an understanding between the Governments of Servia and Montenegro, under the expectation that the Servians would rise and join them as soon as they appeared on the frontier, but the contingent which Montenegro was to furnish had been originally fixed at 1,500, whereas only 200 reached the Servian territory.

However this may be, and whatever the number of this contingent, it must, as far as it goes, be regarded as so much additional material for internal combustion, though the danger, if, as your Excellency anticipates, the flame of insurrection be no longer fed from without, cannot be very great.

With respect to the Bulgarian emigration, there is a similar appearance of the foreign agency by which it was originally set on foot being withdrawn, and in the meanwhile, multitudes of houseless refugees, men, women, and children, amounting to 500 or 600, have yet to be provided for. This may not be so easy a matter as the Servian Government seems first to have imagined, and the probability is that these misguided people, after encountering much hardship and privation, will have eventually to return to their villages in Bulgaria.

A deputation of these peasants came last week to Belgrade; in the petitions they presented to the Prince and to the Consulates, the usual complaints against the Turkish authorities, the same amount of murder and violation, but the almost total absence of particulars, leads me to infer that the charges of this nature are, if not invented, at least grossly exaggerated. What is true in these petitions, and what I suspect forms the gravamen of them, is the excessive taxation to which the Rayahs are now subjected; new burdens have also been imposed, such as the pig and wine taxes, which are felt to be not only oppressive in themselves, but invidious as falling exclusively on the Christian part of the population. If to these fiscal grievances be added the simultaneous quartering upon them of the Tartari emigrants, nobody can be surprised at the discontent prevailing among the Christians of Bulgaria. Your Excellency in your despatch observes, with reference to the prevention of emigration, that the best way is to try to content the resident population.

This, I believe, it is difficult to do, consistently with the increase of taxation. The Porte, like other Governments, is compelled to increase its war establishments, and to meet this expenditure new and additional taxes have to be raised. There is a danger, however, that this may be done to a greater extent that the people can bear, and those who have the direction of the finances at Constantinople should take care not to deceive themselves in this respect. It is not only by the extent and fertility of the soil, together with the population upon it, that their resources should be measured, but the amount and quality of the labour, all of which is exceedingly backward and defective, should also be taken into account, it being, moreover, a mistake to suppose that the industry of the Christian portion of the population is so much more efficient and productive than that of the Mussulman. The disaffection of the Bulgarians to the Government is chiefly owing to the new taxes, aggravated by the brutality of the tax-gatherers. It is not likely, however, that they would of themselves have been induced to revolt or emigrate, if foreign emissaries had not been among them to take advantage of this state of feeling. The strongest inducements were held out to those wretched peasants to emigrate both to Servia and the Crimea, and when, from some reason or other, probably a financial difficulty, the door was unexpectedly closed in the latter direction, the tide was naturally

turned into the former. However the Prince and the Servian Government may disclaim having encouraged it, it forms, I have no doubt, an essential part of their policy to do so. They undoubtedly desire the Rayahs of the adjacent provinces to look to Servia for refuge and protection, and also as the centre of the south Slavonic movement; they care little what amount of disorder and distress they create in pursuit of these wild visionary objects. Having enticed 6,000 Bulgarians to pass into Servia, they either will not or cannot find them the means of colonization.

They talk, therefore, of returning to Bulgaria, and I promised the deputation who called upon me that if they would embody their wishes to this effect in a formal petition, signed by the majority of the emigrants, I would contribute all in my power to facilitate their return. This was a measure, I told them, far more likely to be realized, and of more practical advantage to them, than the scheme of a Christian Government in Bulgaria, which they had been instructed by foreign agents to petition for.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. A. LONGWORTH.

No. 266.

Mr. Longworth to Lord J. Russell.—(Received August 26.)

(No. 49.)

Belgrade, August 17, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, inclosed to your Lordship, the copy of a despatch dated July 1, 1861, and addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, relative to the entrance of a body of 200 Montenegrins into Servia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. A. LONGWORTH.

Inclosure in No. 266.

Mr. Longworth to Sir H. Bulwer.

Belgrade, July 1, 1861.

Sir,

I HAVE to report to your Excellency that advices have been received by the Servian Government to the effect that a body of insurgents, consisting of upwards of 200 men from Montenegro and Herzegovine, had entered Servia in the district of Uzitcha. It was at first reported that they had attacked the Turks there, but this was subsequently denied; the fighting is now said to have been on the other side of the border in a district of Novi Bazaar, whence the insurgents first appeared, bringing with them some of their killed and wounded, together with a number of Turkish heads, which in this barbarous warfare are prized as trophies. Prince Michael, on receiving intelligence of the event, immediately dispatched a Servian officer, Colonel Ranko Alempitch, with orders to disperse and drive back this band over the frontier. The Prince informed me that such were his instructions, and further, if there should be any resistance on the part of the brigands, to massacre them. On my observing to His Highness that Ranko Alempitch, the officer he had selected for this task, was a well-known Russian partisan, he admitted that such was the case, but he said he, nevertheless, fully relied on his fidelity in this instance. The Prince expressed his belief that the object of the intruders was to induce the people of Servia to rise against the Turks, which they believed them ready to do, but with respect to which, added he, they are much mistaken, the Servians only wish to remain quiet. The information which the Pasha has received as to this affair by no means agrees with the account given above. He has telegraphed to Osman Pasha, the Governor of Bosnia, who has answered that no such armed body has crossed the frontier from Bosnia. Khourshid Pasha therefore thinks that the band in question is one of those which had been collected in Servia with a view of making incursions into Bosnia, and with reference to which bands, six in number, he had received authentic intelligence. And he surmises that the Servian Government, having for some reason or other abandoned its aggressive policy, has determined to disarm these levies. There is undoubtedly something plausible in this view of the case; and the employment of Ranko Alempitch, one of the Chiefs of the Russian party, may consistently therewith be accepted as a proof that the Russian Government has also repudiated its former line of action.

The last accounts received by the Servian Government are that the corps in question has been disarmed and disbanded.

A telegram was a few days ago received by the Governor of the fortress from Mehtad Pasha, the Vali of Nisch, informing him that the Turkish patrol had been fired upon by the Servian frontier guard.

Under existing circumstances the report has occasioned less alarm than it would previously have done, and hopes are generally entertained that this may be the last of similar outrages.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. A. LONGWORTH.

No. 267.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received August 26.)

(No. 458. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Vienna, August 22, 1861.*

PRINCE CALLIMACHI called on me some days ago and said that he had received intelligence from Constantinople which had caused him pain, inasmuch as the Government appeared to doubt the accuracy of his impressions respecting the intentions of Austria in the Herzegovina. He added that he had no reason to distrust the assurances given to him by Count Rechberg on this subject, and he asked if intelligence had reached me which could throw any doubt as to the projects of the Austrian Government in that direction. I replied to the Turkish Ambassador that nothing was known to me which could justify such doubts, and that I believed the Austrian Government were desirous to give all the support in their power to the interests of Turkey in that direction. The internal and external difficulties of Austria were so great, I observed, that at times her acts and military preparations might create suspicions, but I certainly had no well-grounded reason at the present moment to doubt the sincerity of the assurances which Count Rechberg had given me as to Herzegovina.

Prince Callimachi then said that he believed the rumours existing at Constantinople were the results of French intrigue, which sought to throw discredit on the acts of Austria in every direction, but that it was not the less disagreeable to him to find that at Constantinople it was supposed he had been duped and deceived, and had led his Government into error as to the projects and policy of Austria.

Prince Callimachi intended to speak to Count Rechberg on the subject, but I am not aware of the result of the interview which will have taken place.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 268.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received August 26.)

(No. 462.)
My Lord, *Vienna, August 22, 1861.*

COUNT RECHBERG has expressed to me his great satisfaction at learning that the negotiations between Omer Pasha and the insurgents in the Herzegovina are to be renewed, and observed that this had been effected through Russian agency.

He said that he had lost no time in directing Colonel Johanovitch to return from Ragusa to Mostar, and that he hoped the meeting would produce some satisfactory result, though he was quite unprepared, after the last proceedings of the Montenegrins, to say that he foresaw the probability of arriving at an arrangement.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 269.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received August 26.)

(No. 463. Most Confidential.)
My Lord, *Vienna, August 22, 1861.*

COUNT RECHBERG has mentioned to me, begging that I would consider the communication to be made in the strictest confidence, that Prince Gortchakow had lately inquired of the Austrian Minister at St. Petersburg the origin of reports which had reached him that Austria was by no means dissatisfied with the movements in the Herzegovina, and was even desirous of encouraging them; and that Count Thun had requested to be enabled formally to contradict the existence of any such intention on the part of the Imperial Government.

This, Count Rechberg said, he should do without delay, though it was hard to be called on to deny such iniquitous accusations, simply invented by French Agents to throw discredit on Austria.

His Excellency added that he should immediately write to Count Thun, denying that there existed any ground for this suspicion; but his Excellency observed that he could not conceal from me that, if the insurrectionary movements in the Herzegovina were by some misfortune to increase, and endanger the peace on the frontiers of the Empire, he will not answer for Austria looking on quietly, and her independence in that case would be justifiable as an act of self-preservation. "But," continued his Excellency, "we have enough to do at home, and shall only be too thankful if affairs on our frontier continue to be quiet, for we have no desire whatever to be mixed up in the like proceedings."

"Some time ago," Count Rechberg said, "Prince Gortchakow accused us of an intention to excite disaffection in Bosnia with a view to justify our interference in restoring order, and spoke of projects of annexation entertained by us as compensation for our late losses; but we were able to produce undeniable proofs, which satisfied Prince Gortchakow that it was France that had suggested such a project to Austria, and happily she had at once refused to listen to any propositions of the kind. This, Count Rechberg said, had, for a moment, shaken the confidence placed by Prince Gortchakow in the French Government; but as His Highness's policy was always one of 'utility,' he soon forgot the proceedings of France in this case. Austria, however, could not do so. She first invited us to adopt an unjustifiable policy towards Turkey, and, because we refused to listen to her insinuations, she accused us of having originated them."

Count Rechberg declares that the suspicions entertained as to Austria's aggressive intentions are mere dreams, and the inventions of those who wish her ill; and that Austria has interests enough to look to at home without thinking of encouraging insurrections elsewhere, which could only add to all her other embarrassments.

I must not omit to mention the statement of Count Rechberg that there could be no better proof that these reports originated with France than the fact of the suspicions of the Turkish Government being raised by the apprehension that Austria was encouraging disaffection amongst the Mussulman population, whilst at St. Petersburgh the rumour in circulation at the same time was that Austria was intent on exciting revolt amongst the Christians. These insinuations, his Excellency said, were clearly traceable to Paris, and served as a further illustration of the ill-faith with which the French Government are continually seeking to carry out their policy, and of their unceasing endeavours to raise suspicions and excite distrust between the Powers of Europe.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 270.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 893. Secret.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, August 28, 1861.*

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's own information, only copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna,* reporting a conversation with Count Rechberg on the reports in circulation that Austria was favourable to the insurrection in the Herzegovina.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

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* No. 269.

No. 271.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley

(No. 895.) *Foreign Office, August* 28, 1861.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of two despatches* upon the subject of question connected with the state of affairs in the Herzegovina.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 272.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 542. Confidential.) *Foreign Office, August* 29, 1861.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, copies of correspondence† respecting the affairs in Montenegro and the Herzegovina.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 273.

Earl Russell to Lord Napier.

(No. 157. Secret.) *Foreign Office, August* 31, 1861.

My Lord,

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna,‡ reporting Count Rechberg's views as to the disturbances in the Herzegovina.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 274.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received September 1.)

Constantinople, August 31, 1861.

(Telegraphic.)

HOLMES writes from Bosna-Serai on the 27th that Omer Pasha declines fresh negotiations with the Commission without instructions, his last negotiations having failed. He is ill, but proposes to march, and troops and money are being sent to him. Neither French nor Austrian Delegates are at Mostar. Luca Vucalovich's letter was addressed to Russian Consul only, and was insolent towards the Turks and Omer Pasha. Holmes thinks it would be injudicious to interfere at present, and for that reason has not gone to Mostar. His opinion indeed is that no concessions will really be accepted until the Turks show they are capable of taking the field, which the people have been persuaded is not the case. I think myself he should enter the country when he has such a preponderating force as to prevent resistance, publishing a pardon to all who submit and renewing the Sultan's promises. Once there in a strong position, and carrying out effectually the reforms promised, the mass of the people would be tranquil, and the partial manœuvres of the Montenegrins, even if continued, have no great effect.

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* Nos. 267 and 268.

‡ No. 269.

† Nos. 242, 250, 267, 268, and 269.

No. 275.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received September 7.)

(No. 18.) *Bosna-Serai, August* 16, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship copies of Protocols Nos. 16, 20, 21, and 22, with their respective annexes.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure 1 in No. 275.

Protocol of the 16th Conference of the Commission in Herzegovina.

Le 14 Juillet, 1861.

LE Dimanche, 14 Juillet, 1861, à dix heures et démie du matin, MM. les Délégués des cinq Grandes Puissances en Herzégovine se sont réunis chez M. le Délégué de Prusse.

Etaient présents:

M. Jovanovic.
M. Tissot.
Mr. Holmes.
M. Blau.
M. Bezobrazow.

Le Protocole de la séance précédente est lu et adopté.

MM. les Délégués reçoivent la réponse du Prince de Monténégro à leur lettre collective du 14 Juin.

Ils reçoivent également une lettre signée du Voïvode Tarko Lecévich, du Pope Micho Milisar Gagovich, de Dreka Gergorovich, de Gatzko, de Toksim Knejevich de Chara, d'Okitza Vidakovich de Tezero, et de Kalondger Peter, de Dragaï. Il résulte de cette lettre, identique à celle des chefs de Zupci, Banjani, Rudina, et Piva, que les chefs précités confèrent leurs pleins pouvoirs à Jovan Vassiliev Bacevic pour traiter avec la Commission d'Herzégovine.

Son Altesse Omer Pacha donne communication à MM. les Délégués d'une lettre du Prince de Monténégro en date du 5 Juillet, dont copie est annexée au présent Protocole. Son Altesse ayant choisi Jabljak parmi les différents points indiqués par le Prince, comme il résulte de la lettre également annexée au présent Protocole, et comptant partir le lendemain même accompagné de la Commission, MM. les Délégués en informent leurs Ambassades respectives par un télégramme collectif.

MM. les Délégués reçoivent également une lettre de Jovan Vassiliev Bacevic, qui accepte une entrevue avec eux soit à Kossierovo, soit sur tout autre point qu'ils voudront désigner sur le territoire insurgé. MM. les Délégués regardent la Soutorina comme le point le plus convenable pour cette rencontre et invitent M. Markovich à se trouver à Castelnuovo dans le délai de huit jours avec Jovan Vassiliev et tous les autres chefs qui voudront l'accompagner eux-mêmes comptant s'y rendre immédiatement après l'entrevue qui doit avoir lieu à Jabljak.

La séance est levée à une heure.

(Signé) JOVANOVIC, *Major.*
CH. TISSOT.
W. R. HOLMES.
Dr. O. BLAU.
VAL. BEZOBRAZOW.

Inclosure 2 in No. 275.

The Prince of Montenegro to Omer Pasha.

M. le Général-en-chef, *Cettigné, le* $\frac{21 \text{ Juin}}{3 \text{ Juillet}}$, 1861.

M. LE CONSUL de Prusse à Raguse m'a remis la lettre que votre Altesse m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire.

Comme elle, je désire ardemment de voir mettre une terme à l'effusion de sang

qui, depuis longtemps, désole nos frontières, et votre Altesse m'a bien jugé en pensant que je n'hésiterai pas à unir mes efforts aux siens pour venir à une pacification.

J'accepte avec empressement l'entrevue que votre Altesse me propose: je serai fort heureux de m'entretenir avec un général jouissant d'une aussi grande reputation, et je crois que dans les circonstances présentes, il est désirable d'abréger les délais de cette rencontre dont j'espère beaucoup pour le bien de nos pays.

Par suite de l'assassinat de mon bien aimé et bien regretté prédécesseur, frappé, comme vous le savez, au milieu de la ville de Cattaro, les Monténégrins ont décidé que leur Prince ne descendrait plus sur le territoire Autrichien. Cette décision, acceptée par moi lors de mon avénement au pouvoir, me lie des mains et m'empêche d'aller à Klek ou a Gabela, comme le propose votre Altesse, car dans l'état actuel du pays je ne saurai m'y rendre par terre; j'offre donc à votre Altesse de nous rencontrer soit dans la plaine de Nicheich, soit près de Klobuk et Jabljak, ou dans tout autre endroit près de ma frontière. Si cette combinaison convient à votre Altesse, elle n'aura qu'à me faire savoir par le Serdar, Pope Pero Metanovich accompagnant M. Lichtenberg, qui lui remettra cette lettre, soit par le télégraphe, lequel de ces endroits lui convient le mieux et le jour où elle s'y trouvera, afin que je m'y rends de mon côté.

Je prie, &c.
(Signé) NICOLAS.

Inclosure 3 in No. 275.

Omer Pasha to the Prince of Montenegro.

Mostar, le 11 *Juillet*, 1861.

Monseigneur,

LE Serdar Pope Pero Matanovich m'a remis la lettre que votre Altesse a bien voulu m'écrire le $\frac{25 \text{ Juin}}{7 \text{ Juillet}}$, en réponse à celle que j'avais eu précédemment l'honneur de lui adresser. Je suis on ne peut plus heureux d'avoir reçu de votre Altesse l'assurance personnelle des sentiments auxquels je n'avais pas hésité à faire appel, et je la prie d'en agréer tous mes remercîments.

J'apprécie les motifs qui ne permettent point à votre Altesse, Monseigneur, de se rendre soit à Klek, soit à Gabela.

J'accepte donc Jablink parmi les points que votre Altesse a indiqués à son tour. J'aurai l'honneur de la prévenir, par le télégraphe, du jour très prochain où je me mettrai en route pour cette destination, et je m'empresserai en outre, en arrivant à Antivari, d'expédier à votre Altesse un courrier spécial chargé de préciser le jour où je me trouverai à Jabliak.

En me félicitant sincèrement des rapports qu'il me sera permis d'établir prochainement avec votre Altesse, je la prie, &c.

(Signe) OMER.

Inclosure in 4 No. 275.

Protocol of the 20th Conference of the Commission in Herzegovina.

Le 29 *Juillet*, 1861.

LE Lundi, 28 Juillet, 1861, à 3 heures de l'après-midi, MM. les Délégués des cinq Grandes Puissances en Herzégovine se sont réunis à Castelnuovo chez M. le Délégué Britannique.

Etaient présents:—

M. Jovánovic,
M. Tissot,
Mr. Holmes,
M. Blau,
M. Bezobrazow.

MM. les Délégués constatent l'inutilité de leurs efforts dans l'entrevue qu'ils ont eue la veille, dans la Soutorina, avec Souka Voukalovich, pour amener ce chef soit à accepter purement et simplement les conditions de la Proclamation du Serdar Ekrem, soit à se rendre auprès du Serdar lui-même à bord du "Sinope," sous la garantie de la Commission, pour y formuler personnellement certaines demandes accessoires que la Commission se déclarait disposée à appuyer dans le cas où elles lui auraient paru justes.

Rapprochant le refus de Souka Voukalovich de l'absence d'Jovan Vassiliev, et mettant en commun les informations qu'ils ont pu recueillir, MM. les Délégués constatent à regret unis à l'unanimité que, malgré tous leurs efforts, les chefs insurgés leur ont témoigné une défiance trop inexplicable pour qu'elle ne soit pas calculée, que ces mêmes chefs ont en définitive décliné l'intervention de la Commission, qu'abstraction faite d'influences trop probables ces chefs eux-mêmes ne sont pas libres, dominés comme ils le sont, ainsi que la Commission l'a constaté la veille, par les bandes qu'ils prétendent conduire; qu'en présence d'un pareil état de choses et dans l'impossibilité où se trouve la Commission d'agir directement sur les populations des districts insurgés, toute négociation ultérieure n'aurait aucune chance d'aboutir. MM. les Délégués se réservent cependent de ne considérer leur mission comme définitivement accomplie, sous ce rapport, qu'autant qu'Jovan Vassiliev persisterait à ne répondre à l'invitation qui lui a été adressée depuis treize jours.

Il est donné lecture d'une lettre de Souka Voukalovich, en date de ce jour, dont traduction est annexée au présent Protocole, où ce chef se livre à d'injustes recriminations à propos de l'entrevue de la veille, et demande à entrer de nouveau en pourparler avec la Commission. MM. les Délégués déclarent unanimement qu'il n'y a pas lieu d'accueillir ces ouvertures et y répondent par la lettre dont traduction est également annexée sous le No. 2 au présent procès-verbal.

MM. les Délégués expriment en terminant toute leur satisfaction à M. Markovich, Drogman de M. le Délégué de Prusse, pour le zèle avec lequel il a rempli la mission pénible, et souvent dangereuse, qui lui avait été confiée.

La séance est levée à 6 heures.

(Signé) JOVANOVIC, *Major.*
CH. TISSOT.
W. R. HOLMES.
Dr. O. BLAU.
VAL. BEZOBRAZOW.

Inclosure 5 in No. 275.

Louka Voukalovich to the European Commission.

(Traduction.)

A LEURS Altesses les Commissaires des cinq Puissances de France, de Russie, d'Autriche, de Grande Brétagne, et de Prusse.

Nous nous étonnons beaucoup de ce que vous nous avez dit hier, quand nous avons demandé vos Altesses ce que vous nous disiez sur Omer Pacha, espérant que votre équité allait prononcer sur tout, tant pour nous que pour eux, et que nous aurions à remplir comme vous décideriez conformément à la justice pour nous et pour eux. Vous m'avez voulu nous rien répondre si ce n'est que nous allions chez Omer Pacha pour voir ce qu'il dirait. Ceci nous a avant tout touché (piqué) au cœur et effrayé, et il nous parait que pour nous c'est toujours comme nous l'avons eu avec les Turcs, que leurs désirs s'accomplissent. Si nous avions su que vous ne pourrez nous aider en rien sans Omer Pacha, nous aurions pu nous passer ainsi sans vous. Et au surplus, en disant à ce peuple que l'entrevue ne pouvait avoir lieu ailleur qu'à bord du vapeur, vous avez effrayé le plus ce peuple, qui l'ayant entendu, a cru qu'il nous arriverait comme toujours chez les Turcs. Pour cela croyez par Dieu, que je ne lui (au peuple) ni fait aucune leçon, comme vous aviez dit que je leur avais dit de ne pas me laisser aller sur la vapeur. Et en vérité on aurait pu faire autrement comprendre à ce peuple sauvage; si l'entrevue aurait eu lieu à terre, tout aurait été terminé, et j'aurais décidé pour tout l'Herzégovine; j'aurais pu être cet homme et je suis venu à cet effet. A présent je prie vos Seigneuries, desquelles on n'a rien obtenu, si vous avez quelque chose à commander, ordonnez, parceque je pars avec ces gens, vu que ce peuple n'est plus à même (d'attendre) ici; nous nous partons et vous prions si vous avez encore quelque chose à nous faire savoir nous attendons jusqu'à six heures; Omer Pacha nous a déclaré que nous n'avions plus à l'attendre.

Sur cela je suis, &c.
(Signé) LUCA VUKALOVICH, *Voivode.*

Inclosure 6 in No. 275.

The European Commission to Luka Vukalovich.

(Traduction.)

NOUS avons reçu par Spiro votre lettre dont nous avons compris le contenu. Nous n'avons plus rien à vous dire, sinon que nous regrettons beaucoup que vous n'ayez pas su profiter pour le bien de votre peuple des avis que nous vous avons prodigués hier.

Le seul conseil que nous puissions vous donner encore est d'adresser à Omer Pacha d'ici à Dimanche prochain [23 Juillet / 4 Août,] une lettre qui lui témoigne votre désir de vous soumettre et de vous rendre auprès de lui à Mostar où nous nous réunirons de notre côté à la même époque.

Inclosure 7 in No. 275.

Protocol of the 21st Conference of the Commission in Herzegovina.

Le 5 Août, 1861.

LE Lundi, 5 Août, 1861, à 10 heures du matin, MM. les Délégués des cinq Grandes Puissances en Herzégovine se sont réunis à Mostar chez M. Délégué de Prusse.

Etaient présents:

M. Jovanovic,
M. Tissot,
Mr. Holmes,
M. Blau,
M. Bezobrazow.

Les Protocoles des 16e et 20e Conférences sont lus et adoptés.

M. Tissot communique à ses collègues de Prusse et de Russie un télégramme collectif de leurs Ministres à Constantinople en date du 2 Août, d'où il résulte que dans le cas où les négociations avec les insurgés n'aboutiraient point et où son Altesse Omer Pacha se déciderait à recourir à l'emploi de la force, MM. les Commissaires de France, de Prusse, et de Russie devraient considérer leur mission comme provisoirement suspendu, sauf, s'il se présentait ultérieurement quelques chances de négociations utiles, à en référer à Constantinople et à attendre de nouveaux ordres.

MM. Jovanovic, Holmes, Blau et Bezobrazow déclarent avoir reçu des instructions semblables de Vienne et de Constantinople.

Le délai de huit jours dans lequel Luka Vukalovich était admis à témoigner de son intention de se soumettre étant expiré, Jovan Vassiliev n'ayant point répondu à l'appel qui lui a été adressé depuis longtemps, et son Altesse Omer Pacha ayant témoigné à plusieurs des membres de la Commission son intention d'agir militairement dans le plus bref délai, MM. les Délégués regardent comme réalisé la double éventualité prévue par les instructions précitées. Ils adressent en conséquence à leurs Ambassades respectives le télégramme collectif, dont copie est annexée au présent Protocole.

La séance est levée à une heure.

(Signé) JOVANOVIC, *Major.*
CH. TISSOT.
W. R. HOLMES.
Dr. O. BLAU.
VAL. BEZOBRAZOW

Inclosure 8 in No. 275.

The European Delegates to the Ambassadors at Constantinople.

Mostar, le 5 Août, 1861.

(Télégraphique.)

LOUKA pas répondu dans délai fixé. Point de nouvelles d'Iovan Vassiliev. Nous considérons notre intervention comme définitivement déclinée, notre mission comme

provisoirement suspendu—notre séjour à Mostar comme au moins inutile. Nous nous séparerons avec facilité de nous réunir dans un bref délai le cas échéant.

Inclosure 9 in No. 275.

Protocol of the 22nd Conference of the Commission in Herzegovina.

Le 6 Août, 1861.

LE Mardi, 6 Août, 1861, à 5 heures de l'après-midi, MM. les Délégués des cinq Grandes Puissances en Herzégovine se sont réunis à Mostar chez son Altesse Omer Pacha.

Etaient présents:

Son Altesse Omer Pacha.
M. Jovanovic.
M. Tissot.
Mr. Holmes.
M. Blau.
M. Bezobrazow.

MM. les Délégués ont le regret d'informer son Altesse le Serdar Ekrem de l'insuccès de leurs négociations avec les Chefs insurgés.

En présence de ce résultat, et toutes les voies de conciliation lui semblant épuisées, son Altesse Omer Pacha annonce à MM. les Délégués son intention d'agir militairement, dès que les circonstances le lui permettront.

MM. les Délégués, conformément aux instructions qu'ils ont reçu de leurs Gouvernements respectifs, et dont le sens est consigné au vingt-unième Protocole, déclarent à leur tour à son Altesse le Serdar Ekrem, qu'ils considèrent leur mission comme provisoirement suspendu, en se réservant, dans le cas où il s'offrirait quelque chance de négociation utile, d'en informer leurs Gouvernements et d'agir suivant les nouvelles directions, qui pourraient, par suite, leur être adressées.

Son Altesse Omer Pacha, rappelant le sincère désir de conciliation qui l'a constamment animé depuis son arrivée en Herzégovine, déclare que ces sentiments continueront à lui servir de règle de conduite, et qu'il considérera lui-même comme un devoir de prévenir MM. les membres de la Commission des éventualités où leur action pourrait être utilement réclamée. Son Altesse espère que MM. les Délégués lui rendront cette justice, qu'elle n'a rien négligé pour concourir à l'œuvre de pacification qui leur était confié.

MM. les Délégués n'hésitent pas à rendre hommage, sous ce rapport, aux sentiments de loyauté et de modération de son Altesse, qui leur adresse de son côté tous ses remercîments pour le concours aussi actif que sincère qu'ils n'ont cessé de lui prêter pendant toute la durée de leur mission.

La séance est levée à 7 heures.

(Signé) OMER.
JOVANOVIC, *Major.*
CH. TISSOT.
W. R. HOLMES.
Dr. O. BLAU.
VAL. BEZOBRAZOW.

No. 276.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received September 2.)

(No. 19.)

My Lord, *Bosna-Serai, August 16*, 1861.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's information, copy of despatches, with their various inclosures, addressed to Sir Henry Bulwer from Sentari, Mostar, and Serajevo. All these despatches relate to the affairs of the Herzegovina, and will give your Lordship the details of what has taken place, and the situation of affairs at the present moment.

I am sorry to say there has been much delay in making some of these communications to your Lordship; but the constant occupation of attending Conferences and

travelling about, together with the repeated intervals of ill-health, which both my secretary and myself have experienced, will, I am sure, obtain for me your Lordship's indulgence.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure 1 in No. 276.

Consul Holmes to Sir H. Bulwer.

Scutari, July 24, 1861.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that Omer Pasha, accompanied by the European Commission, left Mostar on the 15th instant for Tabliak, on the lake of Scutari, the place fixed upon for the interview between his Highness and the Prince of Montenegro.

On reaching Metcovich, General Rodich presented himself, on the part of the Austrian Government, to receive the Pasha, and accompanied his Highness to Ragusa, where every possible attention was paid to him by the Austrian authorities.

It was remarked, however, with general surprise, that M. Petcovich, the Russian Consul, left Ragusa for Cettigné as soon as he heard that Omer Pasha and the European Commission were about to arrive. The Russian flag was not hoisted, and it was said, on explanation being asked, that the Consul had left special orders to that effect. At the instance of the Russian delegate to the Commission the flag was, however, hoisted on the second day.

We arrived at Scutari on the 20th. The Prince of Montenegro had been already at a place called Dodosh, near Tabliak, for nearly a week previous, having thought proper to start from Cettigné the same day that Omer Pasha left Mostar; and it was stated that His Highness was surprised and annoyed at Omer Pasha's not having reached Tabliak sooner. The Prince seemed, by some extraordinary miscalculation, to have expected that Omer Pasha would arrive at Tabliak the day after he left Mostar, and had hurried down from Cettigné, notwithstanding that the telegrams sent to him from Mostar were clear as to the day of the Pasha's departure, and also informed the Prince that Omer Pasha would fix the day for the interview as soon as he reached Antivari or Scutari. Omer Pasha's journey had been performed as quickly as possible, with the sole delay of a day at Ragusa, on account of a review of the troops there, to which he was invited by General Rodich.

I now beg to inclose copies of the Protocols of our Conferences at Scutari, Nos. 17, 18, and 19, with their respective annexes, which will show your Excellency the result of our labours here; but in order to give further details and information, I will continue my narration of affairs as they occurred.

His Highness had scarcely reached Scutari when a letter from the Prince, copy of which is annexed to Protocol No. 17, was placed in his hands, the style and matter of which occasioned his Highness great annoyance, so much, indeed, that there seemed to be danger that the interview would not take place. To avoid this, the Commission offered to visit the Prince at Dodosh, and to endeavour, by explanation, to remove all difficulties, and to bring back to Omer Pasha a letter which should do away with the unpleasant impression produced by the one under consideration. Omer Pasha accepted with pleasure our offer, and early the following morning we left Scutari for Dodosh.

At our interview with the Prince, we first stated our regret that His Highness should have been kept so long waiting in so inconvenient a place; but we asked why he had left Cettigné when it was evident there was no necessity for doing so until informed that Omer Pasha had arrived, as at any moment he could reach Dodosh in five or six hours after leaving his capital; and Jablink had been chosen precisely as being within such an easy distance from Cettigné, that no inconvenience or mistake could arise. His Highness could give no satisfactory explanation at all as to why he had hurried to Dodosh, and we convinced him that Omer Pasha was in no way to blame for any inconvenience his early arrival had occasioned him.

The Prince, on the passages in his letter which had offended Omer Pasha being pointed out to him, evidently showed that they were not intended by him to have that effect; he expressed his extreme regret that they should have been misunderstood, and immediately ordered an explanatory letter to be addressed to Omer Pasha on the subject, copy of which is annexed to Protocol No. 18.

He said a great deal regarding the confidence he felt in Omer Pasha, and the expectation he had of much good resulting from their interview, and we then began to

speak of the desires of Montenegro and of the best means to insure a permanent pacification of the Herzegovina.

He said that, in the first place, to give him influence and consideration with his people, he desired that the Porte should recognize the independence of Montenegro. In the next place, to ameliorate the condition of his people, who were often placed in a position of the greatest difficulty in providing themselves with the necessaries of life, he wished that the free use of the port of Spitz should be allowed to Montenegro; and, lastly, to avoid a never-ending and unfailing source of difficulty, he begged for a rearrangement of the frontier in the Valley of Moratchka.

He said that if he were sure that these, or some of these, points would be granted him, he would answer for the pacification of the Herzegovina in fifteen days, but he must have some guarantee that what he desired would be accorded before he took active measures in the matter. I remarked that this too much resembled a bargain, and that the Porte might as well ask if what the Prince desired was accorded what guarantee he could offer that the Herzegovina would be permanently pacified through his Highness' intervention; that I thought the European Powers would be much more disposed to counsel the Porte to accede to his wishes if he first rendered the service of successfully using his influence to pacify the Herzegovina; that rewards were usually granted for services rendered, and not for services promised only. Finally, I suggested an arrangement by which, after the interview had taken place, the Prince should immediately use his influence to bring about the complete pacification of the Herzegovina, and Omer Pasha, who had already expressed to us his intention of doing all in his power to content the Montegrins, should transmit the Prince's views and desires to Constantinople, while at the same time the members of the European Commission would transmit to their respective Ambassadors their ideas on the subject.

This was considered to be satisfactory: the Prince seemed much pleased, and matters appeared to be progressing at last most favourably, but having now learnt clearly what the Montenegrins desired from the Porte, I thought it would be as well to ascertain what were the Prince's intentions regarding the place and manner of the interview, which we had already suspected from his letter he did not intend should take place on the Turkish side of the frontier. The subject was, therefore, alluded to, when to our supreme dissatisfaction, if not to our astonishment, the Prince gave us to understand that he expected that Omer Pasha would visit him on Montenegrin territory, and stated he would endeavour to do all the honours to the best of his poor ability. We explained that it was Omer Pasha who had invited the Prince, and that consequently it was for Omer Pasha to do the honours, and that, in fact, his Highness had made every arrangement to receive the Prince in a manner worthy his rank and position, but that he had the special orders of his Government not to enter Montenegro. The Prince, however, declared that he did not so consider the matter, and that he would not put his foot on Turkish territory. He said if he himself felt so disposed, his people would not allow him. The Senators who were with him confirmed this statement, and nothing that we could urge had the slightest effect in altering their determination. I am certain that no possible argument which common sense or ingenuity could suggest as calculated to induce a wiser decision was omitted by us; but the vanity and stolidity of the Montenegrins outweighed all sense of the advantages held out to them, and they positively refused to allow their Prince to go out of Montenegrin territory. We remarked, among other things, that the Prince in his letter to Omer Pasha had accepted the interview in terms which showed that then he without doubt contemplated its taking place on Turkish soil, and that now to refuse to do so, after every arrangement had been made, and Omer Pasha had come so far, was a proceeding which could not fail to be disapproved by the Ambassadors of the European Powers, who had even contemplated His Highness' proceeding to Mostar, and that the whole responsibility of the matter would rest with His Highness. All that we could urge was of no avail, and we returned to make our report to Omer Pasha, as stated in Protocol No. 18. The remainder of our proceedings is stated in Protocol No. 19, and I need not prolong this despatch with further details or explanations. I will add, however, that Omer Pasha attributes what has happened in a great measure to the intrigues and proceedings of M. Petcovich, whose visit to Cettigné was, to say the least, extremely out of place at the present conjuncture.

I have no doubt your Excellency will agree with myself and my colleagues that Omer Pasha has acted admirably. His Highness has not shown the slightest irritation or impatience at the manner in which the Prince has behaved, and the letter which closes the correspondence between himself and the Prince seems to me to be conceived with excellent taste and judgment.

The last chance of succeeding in the task of pacifying the Herzegovina without

bloodshed now rests in the impending interview with the insurgents at Suttorina; and we have not given up all hope of success, notwithstanding all the difficulties which have hitherto seemed to render it doubtful.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure 2 in No. 276.

Protocol of the 17th Conference of the Commission in Herzegovina.

Le 21 Juillet, 1861.

LE Dimanche, 21 Juillet, 1861, à midi, MM. les Délégués des Cinq Grandes Puissances en Herzégovine se sont réunis à Scutari d'Albanie chez son Altesse Omer Pacha, sur l'invitation qui leur en avait été adressée par ce dernier.

Etaient présents:

Son Altesse Omer Pacha,
M. Jovanovic,
M. Tissot,
Mr. Holmes,
M. Blau,
M. Bezobrazow.

Son Altesse Omer Pacha donne lecture à MM. les Délégués d'une lettre qui vient de lui être adressée par Son Altesse le Prince de Monténégro et déclare que plusieurs passages de cette lettre, dont copie est annexée au présent Protocole, l'ont profondément peiné. En premier lieu, aux yeux de son Altesse Omer Pacha, il résulte du quatrième paragraphe de la lettre précitée que le Prince de Monténégro revient sur la parole donnée par lui dans sa précédente lettre du 5 Juillet, de se rendre sur le point précédemment indiqué. En effet, examen fait de la carte, si les tentes doivent être dressées, comme l'annonce le Prince, "sur un point de la plaine également éloigné des deux forteresses," ce point est nécessairement au-delà de la ligne frontière qui passe presque sous la forteresse Turque de Jabliak.

En second lieu le Prince de Monténégro, en déclarant que son peuple s'opposerait formellement en tout cas à ce qu'il se rende à Jabliak, avoue par là même qu'il n'est point libre. Son Altesse Omer Pacha craint dès lors que toute négociation entre le Prince et lui n'aboutisse à aucun résultat du moment où elle peut être contrôlée, désapprouvée et annulée par le Sénat et le peuple Monténégrin.

En troisième lieu le Prince, dans une lettre datée du 19 Juillet, et qui ne pouvait être remise, comme elle l'a été effectivement, que le 20 au soir, fixe l'entrevue pour le 20 avant midi, condition évidemment impossible à remplir.

En quatrième lieu, enfin, la dernière phrase du cinquième alinéa met en doute la loyauté du Gouvernement Ottoman et du Serdar Ekrem lui-même, et trahit d'injustifiables défiances. Son Altesse le Prince de Monténégro, en effet, paraît croire que les conspirateurs qu'il dénonce sont connus du Serdar Ekrem et de nationalité Turque. Son Altesse Omer Pacha en repoussant une pareille supposition, rappelle qu'il a précisément fait arrêter à Antivari le nommé Turo Dragovich, accusé d'un complot contre le Prince de Monténégro. Son Altesse émet, en terminant, la crainte que Son Altesse le Prince de Monténégro n'ait eu définitive la pensée de se soustraire à l'entrevue projetée.

Après une nouvelle lecture de la lettre précitée, MM. les Délégués déclarent qu'elle leur semble indiquer au contraire au fond un sincère désir de la part de Son Altesse le Prince de Monténégro de se rencontrer avec son Altesse le Serdar Ekrem, la forme, à leurs yeux, a seulement trahi la pensée du Prince. Ils reconnaissent néanmoins qu'il y a lieu de douter que le Prince veuille se rendre au-delà de la ligne de démarcation. Quant à la phrase où son Altesse Omer Pacha voit une accusation portée contre la loyauté de ses intentions, MM. les Délégués ne peuvent accepter le sens que lui attribue le Serdar Ekrem, malgré une faute de ponctuation il n'y a point d'équivoque possible: loin de vouloir dire que les conspirateurs qu'il dénonce sont connus de son Altesse Omer Pacha et de nationalité Turque, le Prince de Monténégro rend au contraire un hommage à la loyauté Ottomane en exprimant le désir que les personnes qui accompagneront le Serdar Ekrem soient de nationalité Turque; son Altesse demande seulement qu'elles soient personnellement connus du Commandant-en-chef des troupes Impériales.

Son Altesse Omer Pacha, en admettant que telle soit la pensée du Prince, se déclare néanmoins offensé des défiances qu'implique cette dernière condition; le Prince ne peut supposer en effet que le Serdar Ekrem soit accompagné d'individus dont il ne puisse personnellement répondre. En présence de ces observations, M. Tissot propose à ses collègues de se rendre le plus tôt possible auprès du Prince de Monténégro afin de recueillir de la bouche même de Son Altesse et de rapporter au Serdar Ekrem des explications qui dans sa conviction ne peuvent manquer de mettre fin à ces malentendus; MM. les Délégués d'Autriche, de la Grande Brétagne, de Prusse, et de Russie adhérant à cette proposition, qui est également acceptée par son Altesse Omer Pacha, il est convenu que les membres de la Commission Européenne se transporteront le lendemain matin à Dodoche, où se trouve actuellement Son Altesse le Prince de Monténégro.

D'après le désir qu'en exprime son Altesse le Serdar Ekrem un Protocole de la présente Conférence est rédigé, lu, et signé tant par son Altesse que par MM. les Délégués.

La séance est levée à 3 heures.

(Signé) OMER.
JOVANOVIC, *Major.*
CH. TISSOT.
W. R. HOLMES.
Dr. O. BLAU.
VAL. BEZOBRAZOW.

Inclosure 3 in No. 276.

The Prince of Montenegro to Omer Pasha.

Dodoche, le $\frac{7}{19}$ Juillet, 1861.

M. le Général-en-chef,

M. GILBERT, Consul d'Angleterre à Scutari, me fait savoir à l'instant par dépêche télégraphique que le bruit circulait dans cette ville que je ne me tarderais point à l'entrevue concertée entre votre Altesse et moi. J'ai tout lieu d'être surpris que l'on me prête des intentions qui ont toujours été loin de ma pensée. Je me trouve au contraire depuis deux jours à Dodoche attendant l'arrivée de votre Altesse.

Les tentes seront dressées par mes soins dès 8 heures du matin, demain Samedi le 18 courant, dans la plaine de Jabliak, où j'attends en pleine confiance et animé des meilleurs intentions votre arrivée; je prie votre Altesse, si faire le peut, de ne pas se faire attendre trop longtemps, car nous sommes campés dans une plaine des plus chaudes et fort mal installés.

Bien que dans une de mes précédentes lettres j'ai parlé de Jabliak, je me plais à croire que votre Altesse n'a pas tout entendu par le mot la forteresse de ce nom; eusse-je l'intention de m'y rendre, mon peuple s'y opposerait formellement.

Les tentes se dresseront sur un point de la plaine également éloigné de nos deux forteresses.

Le Chambellan de Madame la Princesse a eu l'honneur de faire connaître à votre Altesse le nom des quarante personnes formant mon escort. Mon désir serait qu'elle fut accompagnée par un même nombre d'individus, et vu des avis surs concernant certain complot contre ma personne, que des gens mal-intentionnés auraient l'intention d'organiser, que ces personnes fussent connues de votre Altesse et de nationalité Turque.

Au surplus, si elle pouvait soupçonner la droiture de nos sentiments, votre Altesse pourrait le faire accompagner par le nombre des troupes qu'elle jugerait convenable, à la seule condition qu'elle s'arrêteraient à une certaine distance de notre frontière. J'espère demain avoir l'honneur avant midi de lui tendre cordialement la main, et la prie d'agréer, &c.

Le Prince de Monténégro,
(Signé) NICOLAS.

Inclosure 4 in No. 276.

Protocol of the 18th Conference of the Commission in Herzegovina.

Le 22 Juillet, 1861.

LE Lundi, 22 Juillet, 1861, à 11 heures du soir, MM. les Délégués des cinq Grandes Puissances en Herzégovine se sont réunis à Scutari d'Albanie chez son Altesse Omer Pacha.

Etaient présents :

Son Altesse Omer Pacha,
M. Jovanovic,
M. Tissot,
Mr. Holmes,
M. Blau,
M. Bezobrazow.

MM. les Délégués rendent compte à son Altesse du résultat de l'entrevue qu'ils ont eue dans la journée avec Son Altesse le Prince de Monténégro. Ainsi qu'ils l'ont prévu le Prince a regretté vivement un malentendu qui n'a d'autre origine qu'un vice de rédaction dans la cinquième phrase du dernier alinéa, et a voulu en donner lui-même l'assurance au Commandant-en-chef des troupes Impériales par une lettre dont MM. les Délégués sont porteurs pour ce dernier et dont copie est annexée sous le No. 1 au présent Protocole.

MM. les Délégués par contre ont le regret d'annoncer à son Altesse Omer Pacha que le Prince, tout en manifestant le plus vif et le plus sincère désir de se rencontrer avec le Commandant-en-chef des troupes Impériales, a déclaré ne pouvoir franchir sa frontière. MM. les Délégués ont vainement représenté à son Altesse qu'elle s'était engagée par sa lettre du 5 Juillet à se rendre au-délà de la ligne de démarcation ; qu'elle ne pouvait dès lors revenir sur cette promesse. Le Prince a déclaré n'avoir jamais voulu s'engager à se rendre sur le territoire Turc ; en acceptant une entrevue dans la plaine de Nichsich près de Klobuk, de Jablink, ou dans tout autre endroit près de sa frontière, Son Altesse a entendu rester en deçà de sa frontière et non la dépasser. Aux instances réitérées de MM. les Délégués, le Prince a répondu que, personnellement disposé à franchir sa frontière, il lui était impossible de le faire en présence de l'opposition formelle des Sénateurs et du peuple Monténégrin, que la seule concession qu'il puisse faire serait que la tente où il recevra le Serdar Ekrem soit dressée sur la frontière même. En aucun cas son Altesse ne pourrait s'avancer au-délà de cette limite.

Son Altesse Omer Pacha fait observer qu'ayant invité le Prince de Monténégro à une entrevue c'est à lui de recevoir le Prince ; que la résolution manifestée par ce dernier de ne point se rendre au-délà de la ligne de démarcation lui semble inconciliable avec l'engagement précédemment pris par Son Altesse dans sa lettre du 5 Juillet, engagement dont les termes ne souffrent, d'ailleurs, aucune équivoque, le Prince ayant déclaré n'avoir d'autre objection contre le choix de Klek ou de Gobela que l'impossibilité où il se trouve de traverser le territoire Autrichien, seul itinéraire possible en ce moment pour se rendre sur l'un de ces deux points ; qu'enfin, les instructions formelles de son Gouvernement ne lui permettent d'accepter l'entrevue qu'en deçà de la ligne de délimitation déterminée par la Commission Européenne de 1859. Son Altesse le Serdar Ekrem se voit dès lors obligé de renoncer, quels qu'en soient ses regrets, à une entrevue pour la réalisation de laquelle il croit n'avoir rien négligé.

MM. les Délégués, en rendant hommage sous ce rapport aux efforts du Serdar Ekrem, reconnaissent avec lui que tous les moyens de réaliser l'entrevue projetée ont été épuisés, tant de leur côté que de sien, et regrettent que Son Altesse le Prince de Monténégro ait cru devoir assumer une responsabilité qu'ils déclinent.

Son Altesse le Prince de Monténégro ayant exprimé, d'ailleurs, le désir d'avoir une réponse le lendemain même, le Commandant-en-chef des troupes Impériales adresse au Prince de Monténégro une lettre dont il donne lecture à MM. les Délégués et dont copie est annexée sous le No. 2 au présent Protocole.

D'après le désir qu'en exprime son Altesse Omer Pacha, un Protocole de la présente Conférence est rédigé, lu, et signé, tant par son Altesse que par MM. les Délégués.

La séance est levée à 1 heure du matin.

(Signé) OMER.
JOVANOVIC, *Major.*
CH. TISSOT.
W. R. HOLMES.
DR. O. BLAU.
VAL. BEZOBRAZOW.

Inclosure 5 in No. 276.

The Prince of Montenegro to Omer Pasha.

M. le Général-en-Chef, *Dodoche, le 22 Juillet*, 1861.

JE regrette infiniment que votre Altesse a pu attribuer à ma dernière lettre une interprétation si peu conforme aux sentiments qui l'avaient inspirée. Je n'ai jamais douté des intentions loyales de votre Altesse. J'ai voulu seulement la mettre en garde contre quelque surprise qui l'aurait, j'en suis sur, desespéré, surprise possible lorsque l'on a vu dans quelles circonstances est mort mon prédécesseur et que l'on sait que des complices de cet assassinat se son réfugiés à Antivari.

J'espère dont que cette loyale explication mettra fin à ces malentendus, car j'ai hâté de rencontrer votre Altesse et de lui prouver combien elle s'est méprise sur mes sentiments à son égard,

Veuillez, &c.
Prince de Monténégro,
(Signé) NICOLAS.

Inclosure 6 in No. 276.

Omer Pasha to the Prince of Montenegro.

Monseigneur, *Scutari, le 23 Juillet*, 1861.

J'AI reçu la lettre que votre Altesse m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser sous la date d'hier ; j'ai été heureux d'y trouver l'assurance de sentiments qui sont également les miens, et j'en suis vivement reconnaissant à votre Altesse.

Je regrette profondément, Monseigneur, que des considérations sur lesquelles votre Altesse n'a pas cru pouvoir passer l'empêchent d'accepter l'entrevue dans les seules conditions où elle serait possible pour moi. Mes instructions ne me permettent pas de franchir la frontière que votre Altesse, de son côté, a déclaré ne pouvoir dépasser. Mais en renonçant, avec une véritable peine, à une rencontre sur laquelle je fondais les meilleures espérances, je serais heureux de pouvoir penser que votre Altesse, Monseigneur, voudra bien conserver avec moi les relations directes que peut exiger l'intérêt de nos deux pays. Votre Altesse me trouvera toujours disposé à concourir loyalement et de tout mon pouvoir, en ce qui me concerne, au maintien de la tranquillité et des bonnes relations sur les frontières respectives, et j'ai la ferme conviction qu'elle voudra bien y contribuer de son côté.

Je prie, &c.
(Signé) OMER.

Inclosure 7 in No. 276.

Protocol of the 19th Conference of the Commission in Herzegovina.

Le 24 Juillet, 1861.

LE Mercredi, 24 Juillet, 1861, à midi, MM. les Délégués des cinq Grandes Puissances en Herzégovine se sont réunis à Scutari d'Albanie chez son Altesse le Serdar Ekrem sur l'invitation que ce dernier leur avait adressée.

Etaient présents :

Son Altesse Omer Pacha.
M. Jovanovic.
M. Tissot.
Mr. Holmes.
M. Blau.
M. Bezobrazow.

Son Altesse Omer Pacha communique à MM. les Délégués un télégramme duquel il résulte que M. Marcovich, chargé d'une mission auprès des chefs de l'insurrection, est arrivé à Castelnuovo accompagné de Jovan Vassiliev et Luka Vukalovich.

Son Altesse propose en conséquence de quitter Scutari aussitôt que faire le pourra,

et engage MM. les Délégués à se rendre avec lui à Castelnuovo pour s'y rencontrer avec les chefs précités.

MM. les Délégués reconnaissant l'urgence de cette entrevue et l'inutilité d'un plus long séjour à Scutari, le départ de son Altesse le Serdar Ekrem ainsi que de la Commission est fixé au lendemain 25.

Son Altesse Omer Pacha ayant mis à la disposition de MM. les Délégués la frégate Impériale le "Chaiki Schadi," M. le Délégué d'Autriche se charge d'obtenir pour ce navire la permission d'entrer les bouches de Cattaro. En même temps M. Blau est chargé d'informer par le télégraphe M. Marcovich de la prochaine arrivée de la Commission à Castelnuovo.

MM. les Délégués décident ensuite qu'il y a lieu de rédiger un télégramme collectif, dont copie sera annexée au présent Protocole, pour informer leurs Ambassades respectives du résultat négatif de leur entrevue avec le Prince de Monténégro, et de leur départ de Scutari.

Le présent Protocole est immédiatement lu et adopté.

La séance est levée à 4 heures.

(Signé) OMER.
JOVANOVIC, *Major.*
CH. TISSOT.
W. R. HOLMES.
Dr. O. BLAU.
VAL. BEZOBRAZOW.

Inclosure 8 in No. 276.

The European Delegates to the Ambassadors at Constantinople.

(Télégraphique.)

ENTREVUE entre Omer Pacha et Prince Nicolas ajournée à cause de prétentions imprévues du Prince. Nous partons avec Omer Pacha pour Castelnuovo où Marcovich nous attend avec les chefs de l'insurrection.

Inclosure 9 in No. 276.

Consul Holmes to Sir H. Bulwer.

Mostar, August 5, 1861.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to announce to your Excellency Omer Pasha's arrival at Mostar, as also my own and that of my Russian, Austrian, and Prussian colleagues. M. Tissot is expected this evening.

I am sorry to say that his Highness is ill, and to add that all the members of the Commission are suffering more or less from the exposure to the unusually intense heat which has prevailed during the last twenty days and still continues.

My last despatch was dated from Scutari the 24th July, and reported all that had occurred up to that date. The following morning, early, we proceeded on our return journey to Castel Nuovo, close to Suttorina, where we hoped to have at last a satisfactory interview with the insurgent leaders, whom M. Marcovich had been instructed to assemble, if possible, at that place. We found M. Marcovich at Castel Nuovo, but though he had been for weeks in the Herzegovina, his efforts had not met with much success. It was hoped only that some of the Chiefs would arrive. One of their agents was found at Castel Nuovo, and we took him to the Pasha, who spoke admirably to him, apparently with much effect, and this man was sent to bring what leaders he could to Suttorina. After we had waited two whole days, Luca Vucalovich, the self-styled Voïvoda of Zupci, and one of the principal Chiefs of the insurgents of the Herzegovina, arrived with, it was said, several other leaders at Suttorina. The European Commission proceeded at once to meet them, and a long conference took place, in which we endeavoured to induce him and his friends to accompany us on board the frigate to see Omer Pasha, and speak freely with his Highness. The insurgent Chief made all kinds of objections, to which we put a stop by declaring that any of our members whom he might choose were willing to remain as hostage with his people until his safe return. He then declared he would go, and we all proceeded towards the beach, when suddenly the ragged crowd of insurgents who accompanied him declared that he should proceed no further, and they

hustled him back. We retraced our steps, and endeavoured, by every possible means, to induce him to proceed with us, but all was useless. The whole affair, in my humble opinion, was a preconcerted farce. There remained no possible reasonable excuse why Luca Vucalovich should have refused to visit the Pasha, but he, in imitation of the Prince of Montenegro, whom, it is said, he had seen at Cettigné just before coming down to Suttorina, said that his people would not let him go, and requested that Omer Pasha would come to see him. In the evening he even wrote a letter to this effect to the Pasha, to which his Highness shortly replied that he regretted extremely to see that he understood so little the true interests of the poor peasantry whom he called his people.

The Pasha left on his return to Mostar that night.

We still hoped that from Jovan Vassiliev, the Voïvode of Bagnani, designed by the population as their representive, would come to Suttorina according to arrangement, and we waited for him another day, but he did not come, and, moreover, did not seem likely to come; and it was then agreed between us that every means in our power for bringing about the pacification of the Herzegovina had been exhausted, and that nothing remained but for Omer Pasha to have recourse to military operations.

It is always an unpleasant task to report failure instead of success, but at least the members of the European Commission have the consolation to know that the negative result of their efforts cannot be attributed to any fault of theirs. They have fulfilled their identic instructions to the letter, and have preserved throughout the whole business the most perfect accord as well between themselves as with Omer Pasha, an accord which in their instructions was presumed to be the most certain means of obtaining success.

I would now beg to make a few remarks concerning what I believe to be the various causes of the failure of our mission of pacification.

Your Excellency will recollect that before quitting Bosnia I intimated in one of my despatches that, seeing how matters had been conducted by the Turkish commanders in the Herzegovina during the last three years, I thought it would probably be found that some preliminary military operations would be indispensable to its pacification; that the officers who have had charge of the province, and I do not hesitate to name Dervish Pasha at their head, have in a most traitorous and shameful manner allowed the insurrection to develop itself for their own private interests when it might have been easily put down, and consequently by losing district after district, and sacrificing their soldiers on every possible occasion, they have produced an impression that the Turkish Government was totally incapable of restoring order, and that the people—or, rather, their leaders—had only to hold out and refuse all terms to become infallibly independent. This idea has been kept up by foreign and native intrigue, and requires to be removed as a preliminary to success.

Secondly, no possible intrigue that private jealousy or supposed national interests could suggest to cause the failure of our efforts has been neglected by unscrupulous agents.

In the third place, there is the difficulty of treating with a Prince who has no real power, whose people are ignorant and barbarous, and who imagine it almost a matter of religion to be at perpetual war with the Turks, and are consequently opposed to every attempt to put an end to the state of brigandage in which they rejoice.

Lastly, though I am convinced that the mass of the poor peasantry of the Herzegovina eagerly desire peace, yet their leaders are not of the same opinion, nor are the bands of Uskoks (refugees, robbers), who in a great measure forced them them to rebel. Their leaders know that, probably, in case of the pacification of the Herzegovina, their occupation would be gone, and for them the occupation of guerilla chiefs has not been unprofitable. Take the example of Luca Vukalovich; a few years ago he was a miserably poor peasant, now his dress is now covered with gold and silver embroidery, and his arms richly mounted in silver. He finds himself a great man, and comparatively rich. He thinks the Turks cannot hurt him, and that therefore being altogether well off, he had better keep so. Others in his position are animated by the same sentiments.

I therefore think that some successful military operations are necessary to bring all parties to a sense of their true position. The military occupation of the country will relieve the mass of the poor peasants from the incubus of their leaders, their Uskok allies, and their Montenegrin friends; and Omer Pasha, as they return to their homes, will take care to assure to them the reforms and concessions necessary for their tranquillity and well-being. Another result would be obtained, and one which is essentially necessary to the effectual pacification of the Herzegovina is, that the brigand bands of Bosnian, Herzegovinian, and Montenegrin outcasts should be extirpated, and for this Montenegro

must be obliged to act in concert with Turkey. Omer Pasha thinks that this will not be a difficult matter if the European Powers will abstain from interfering, and allow both parties fair play, and I am inclined to this opinion myself.

In conclusion, I would observe that, as your Excellency is aware, great efforts have been made in Europe and Constantinople to represent the insurrection in the Herzegovina as the result of a most important and wide-spread Panslavistic movement; whereas, the truth is, without doubt, that it is a purely local affair, which has arrived at a certain importance from the aid afforded by Montenegro, from the difficult nature of the country, but principally from the culpable conduct of the Turkish commanders, who could and ought to have checked it in the commencement. On no occasion has the slightest allusion been made by Montenegrins or insurgents to any idea of Panslavism: the former want their independence acknowledged, and the means of obtaining food and clothing to be left open to them, through the port of Spitz; and the latter (and principal idea of the latter) seems to be freedom from the presence of Turkish zaptiehs in their villages. Efforts have doubtless been made in the Herzegovina to stir up a sentiment of Slave nationality, but I am certain it has proved entirely abortive, and no other idea exists among the mass of the people than to better, if possible, their condition, and to obtain protection from one side or the other for their lives and property.

Omer Pasha, since his return here, has received a letter from the Prince of Montenegro proposing a meeting on Turkish territory, on condition of his independence being acknowledged, and his other requests being complied with. His Highness will, I believe, take no notice of this letter, as, in the first place, he cannot accept such conditions; and, in the next place, there is nothing to prove that the Prince would or could now keep his word any more than before. The acceptance of any such proposals now, it seems to me, would be below the dignity of the Porte, and would only subject Omer Pasha to further disappointment, while valuable time would be lost. If the Prince really desires an interview he should come to Mostar, or within a morning's ride of it.

The papers and letters alluded to in this despatch will accompany the Protocols of our final Conferences, and will be sent as soon as prepared.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure 10 in No. 276.

Consul Holmes to Sir H. Bulwer.

Mostar, August 5, 1861.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge your Excellency's telegram informing me that if Omer Pasha should undertake military matters against the insurgents, I am to consider my mission as temporarily suspended, but should any fresh occasion for negotiation offer, that I am to refer to Constantinople.

I believe the alternative of war is now certain, but Omer Pasha seems to think that, if he is properly supplied with money and troops, the campaign will be neither long nor severe. His Highness imagines it will be more a pursuit after a set of robber bands than anything else, but all depends on his being able to take the field in force, and provided with ample means.

The intense heat and want of funds will necessitate a considerable lapse of time before any operations can be commenced, or any effect produced which would enable us to enter on negotiations with any hope of success, and, as my colleagues will disperse, I shall return to Serajevo until my services here are again demanded, as both Mr. Freeman and myself are ill and exhausted by the heat of this place. My colleagues will probably all be within a few days of Mostar, and I can reach this place from Serajevo in twenty-four hours if necessary, and in the meantime shall take measures to keep your Excellency perfectly informed of everything which may take place here, even in the event of its not being considered necessary to send Mr. Zohrab to his post until the Commission is definitively resolved. My residence at Serajevo during the interval will also for the time put an end to the expense of my establishment here.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure 11 in No. 276.

Consul Holmes to Sir H. Bulwer.

Bosna-Serai, August 13, 1861.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that, in consequence of the temporary suspension of the duties of the European Commission in the Herzegovina, as announced in the collective telegram to the Ambassadors of the Five Great Powers, annexed to Protocol No. 21, it was decided for various reasons that it was advisable during military operations that the Members should separate and quit Mostar, under the condition that they should be able to reassemble at any time within a few days should occasion require.

M. Tissot left for Ragusa on the morning of the 8th instant, and I started for this place on the evening of the same day. The Russian Consul went to Boona, and our Austrian and Prussian colleagues intended shortly to leave for Ragusa.

I have now to announce to your Excellency my arrival here, and to beg instructions as to whether it is advisable at once to resume my duties as Consul here, and send Mr. Zohrab back to his post, or to allow matters to remain under the present arrangement until it is more apparent whether the European Commission is likely to reassemble again within a short period, or whether it will be definitively dissolved. As mentioned in my despatch of the 5th I have made arrangements to be informed of all that passes in the Herzegovina, in anticipation of its being considered expedient that Mr. Zohrab should still remain charged with the Consulate so as to allow me to quit at a moment's notice if required.

Under these circumstances I shall not disturb existing arrangements here until I receive your Excellency's answer to this despatch, when Mr. Zohrab will return to his post or not, as your Excellency shall decide.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 277.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received September 2.)

(No. 266.)

St. Petersburgh, August 24, 1861.

My Lord,

PRINCE GORTCHAKOW has stated to me that subsequently to the dissolution of the Commission in Herzegovina the Chief of the insurgents in that province solicited the mediation of the Russian Commission separately, with a view to coming to a settlement with Omer Pasha. The Pasha, according to Prince Gortchakow, did not seem indisposed to accept the good offices of the Imperial Agent, but some difficulty had afterwards occurred, as, by the last telegraphic accounts, hostilities had broken out. The Prince added that Omer Pasha had been sounded in reference to the future relations of the Prince of Montenegro with the Turkish Government, and that his Excellency was inclined to view with favour a settlement which would involve—

1. The recognition of Montenegro as an independent State.
2. A new delimitation of the land frontier.
3. The cession of a sea-port to the Principality, now excluded from access to the coast.

Prince Gortchakow would himself approve of these terms.

I said to Prince Gortchakow, speculatively, and reserving the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, that I personally saw little objection to the two first stipulations referred to. The recognition of the Prince of Montenegro by the Porte and the European Powers might have the advantage of imposing upon him the duties and obligations of sovereignty, and of putting an end to the lawless and predatory character of his Government or people, while it was obviously the interest of all parties that the limits should be so arranged as to leave the Montenegrins a reasonable area for sustenance and the Turks a defensible and natural frontier. I did not think the Porte would gain anything by pressing the Montenegrins too close, but I conceived that the cession of a sea-port was both impracticable and useless. The mere possession of a port would not give the Montenegrins food or wealth; a port was only a "débouché," and such a "débouché" they might have by right of transit through the territory of Austria or Turkey if they would adopt the customs of a civilized industrious people. Besides,

neither the Turks nor Austrians would ever give up a port to the Montenegrins, and if they did, such a cession would create political apprehensions of a very high order.

Prince Gortchakow contended strongly against the present settlement of the Montenegrin frontier, which, he said, had been founded on mere occupancy, on the *status quo* of the contending parties, without any reference to the natural features of the country or the local wants of the inhabitants, he also considered that to deny or ignore the independence of Montenegro was frivolous, because its independence had been practically recognized by the European Powers in the stipulations which they had embraced for the regulation of its borders. His Excellency also pleaded for the port but without entering upon the political aspect of the question.

The French Ambassador seems to be of the same mind as Prince Gortchakow in this matter. In talking over the Montenegrin question, he advocates recognized independence, enlarged territory, and a seaport.

I think it right to add that the views to which I refer have been expressed in casual, unofficial conversation. They might, however, become the basis of official proposals should opportunity offer itself.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 278.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received September 2.)

(No. 273. Confidential.)
St. Petersburgh, August 26, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAD the pleasure of conversing with General Ignatiew this afternoon, and of hearing some of the impressions which he has brought back from his recent mission to Constantinople. The Russian Envoy speaks in the highest terms of the personal character of the Sultan, to whom he ascribes, without the least reservation, the qualities of candour, energy, courtesy, humanity, and private thrift. He remarked "if the Sultan continues in his present course we shall not have a word to say."

General Ignatiew does not appear in the least to question the sincerity of the Sultan in his benevolent declarations regarding his Christian subjects. He adds, however, that the Mussulmans universally believe that their new Ruler is, in his heart, a faithful and intolerant votary of his religion, and that he will appear in his true colours hereafter. The result of this illusion is an increase of rancour and persecution against the Rayahs, a fact avowed with regret by the Turkish Ministers themselves.

General Ignatiew, while doing justice to the manly and economical disposition of the Sultan, shown in the reduction of vicious or frivolous expenditure, express an apprehension that His Majesty's decided taste for the navy may lead him into ruinous outlay for shipbuilding, and he also describes the Porte as being exhausted by the number of foreign officers who prey upon the resources of the State. The opinion of a Russian in this respect is certainly not above suspicion, and your Lordship has purer sources of information open to you. It is probable, however, that the views of the General may not be entirely without foundation, and it may no doubt be the interest of Mahomet Ali, the all-powerful favourite, to direct the expenses of the Government mainly to his own Department.

The condition of Herzegovina and the relations of the Porte with Montenegro offer, in General Ignatiew's opinion, the capital difficulty at the present time. The terms offered by Omer Pasha are fair, and deserve to be accepted, but the Christians are profoundly incredulous. They fear that they will be deceived and disarmed. The presence and mediation of the European Commissioners give them no security. They regard the Commissioners of the Porte. Even the Russian Commissioner forfeited the confidence of the Orthodox when he repaired to the camp of the Turkish commander. The Commissioners were also divided by personal animosities.

Omer Pasha has 25,000 regulars, the insurgents are not more than 6,000, yet General Ignatiew doubts the power of the Turks to subdue the insurrection in the mountainous parts of the country. A prolonged struggle, and the infliction of sufferings on the Christians, would raise a passionate sympathy for their cause in the mountains, in Bosnia and in Servia. There would be a general conflagration. No one could tell where the flame might extend. Russia herself could hardly fail to express some sympathy for her oppressed coreligionists.

From these reflections General Ignatiew deduced the high expediency of terminating

the conflict by a liberal compromise. He warmly expressed his hope that Omer Pasha would not act with precipitation. With some temporization the Chiefs of the rebels would, perhaps, still come in and accept reasonable terms. He feared, however, that Omer Pasha and other officers of the Porte might be drawn into violent courses by running a race for the favour of the new Sovereign, himself perhaps ambitious of military success.

General Ignatiew added the expression of his hope that Her Majesty's Government might take the same view of the subject, and advise great patience and caution. He repeatedly declared his belief that the Russian and English Embassies might go hand in hand at Constantinople, that nothing need at present divide them.

In replying to these remarks I told the General that I perfectly agreed with him in recommending concession and conciliation in preference to embarking on most expensive dangerous, and protracted hostilities; but I said that the Porte had offered most reasonable conditions to its revolted people, conditions approved by the Russian Minister himself; if these terms were still rejected, and Omer Pasha were driven to measures of repression, I was confident he would have the approval and sympathy of Her Majesty's Government, and if the Russian Government showed an inclination to interfere on behalf of the Christians, it would arouse in England a universal resolution to support the Sultan in the exercise of his legitimate authority. If Russia desired to go along with England in this matter, she ought to use all her influence to induce the people of Herzegovina to submit.

General Ignatiew, with some reserve, substantially agreed that this was the proper course to pursue, and added that when at Corfu he had received visits from two of the Russian Consular functionaries in those quarters, on whom he had strongly impressed the duty of promoting a peaceable settlement by every means in their power.

I wish I had as firm a persuasion of the sincerity of General Ignatiew as I have of his intelligence and activity. It may be feared that his professions of good inclinations towards England are not genuine. He is a subtle, ambitious man, with an exterior of florid, hearty frankness.

After a short absence in the country he will return to the capital, and will be intrusted with the direction of the Oriental Department at the Foreign Office, an employment in which his dispositions towards Her Majesty's Government may be effectually tested.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 279.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received September 2.)

(No. 472. Secret and Confidential.)
Vienna, August 29, 1861.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 198 of the 21st instant, I have stated to Count Rechberg that it would be advisable for his Excellency to inform the Grand Vizier of the cyphered correspondence which is being carried on between the Princes of Servia and Montenegro. He said that he had intended doing so confidentially, but that as yet he was unable to discover the object of these frequent communications.

I asked if the key to the cypher had not been made out. He replied that it was not, and that it had become extremely difficult for the Government to take any steps in such matters, as the employés in these distant parts were no longer to be trusted.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD

No. 280.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(Telegraphic.)
Foreign Office, September 4, 1861.

HER Majesty's Government can interfere no further at present in Montenegro. Your telegram of the 31st has been received.

No. 281.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 917.)
Foreign Office, September 4, 1861.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches on the subject of Montenegrin affairs.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 282.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received September 11.)

(No. 284.)
St. Petersburgh, August 31, 1861.

My Lord,

IN my despatch to your Lordship No. 253 of the 10th instant, I brought under your Lordship's notice a telegraphic instruction addressed by Aali Pasha to the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires at this Court, in which it was affirmed in general terms that the European Commissioners in Herzegovina had recognized the propriety of having recourse to arms for the reduction of the insurgents. Prince Gortchakow at the time expressed his persuasion that the Russian Commissioner had made no such declaration, and Prince Labanoff was instructed to ask the Pasha on what grounds his assertion was founded. Prince Labanoff now reports that the Pasha has not been able to afford any satisfactory explanation of his statement.

The Russian Minister at Constantinople further reports that M. Besobrazoff having been solicited in writing by Luka Voukalovitch, the Chief of the rebels, to grant his mediation with Omer Pasha with a view to the settlement of these disturbances, he had instructed the Commissioner that he might do so, but that he should previously concert with his colleagues on the subject, for the Russian Government would not singly accept the responsibility which would attach to the negotiation and guaranty of engagements for that purpose.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 283.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 555.)
Foreign Office, September 12, 1861.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh † reporting the views entertained by Prince Gortchakow in regard to the manner of settling the Montenegrin question, and the conversation which he had with his Excellency on that subject.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 284.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 556.)
Foreign Office, September 12, 1861.

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, reporting a conversation which he had with General Ignatiew on the affairs of Turkey.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

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* Nos. 274 and 280.

† No. 277.

No. 286.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received September 13.)

(No. 614.)
Constantinople, September 4, 1861.

My Lord,

YOUR Lordship will have read the Reports of Mr. Holmes, who has been acting as Delegate at Mostar. They evince, in my opinion, a great deal of good sense and accurate information, and I should be inclined to agree with him in thinking that though the Russian Consul and the rebels may be disposed to hold out from time to time false hopes of submission, that nothing can be done to re-establish a state of tranquillity until Omer Pasha is in a position to enter the country at the head of a considerable force.

Your Lordship will see the views I entertain by the inclosed letter written to Mr. Holmes, and my opinion is that the people themselves would benefit by the measures which Omer Pasha would adopt, and the tranquillity he would establish. If the troops under his command were sufficient in number and well disciplined, I think that less bloodshed would take place than is likely to occur if things are long left in their present position; but it would be worse than useless were he to attempt any movement in advance without an army sufficient for the purpose he undertook to accomplish.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

Inclosure in No. 286.

Sir H. Bulwer to Consul Holmes.

My dear Sir,
Constantinople, September 3, 1861.

I HAVE received your various communications, public and private, and think you take a sensible and correct view of the state of things about you.

It would of course be very desirable that matters should be settled without the necessity of any military move on the part of Omer Pasha; but I fear the effort now apparently made on the part of the Russian Consul is meant to gain time, if accepted, and accuse the Turks, if rejected, of precipitation. Moreover, an arrangement made solely through the Russian Delegate would not be satisfactory.

My own opinion, therefore, coinciding with yours, is that nothing will be done until Omer Pasha enters the districts in insurrection with a large and overwhelming force.

When there, and having centralized that force in a good position, he should act on the Sultan's Decrees, and carry out the reforms projected, and put them at once in execution in Bosnia. It appears to me that with this mixture of force and conciliation and justice things would eventually fall into their natural condition. If he could gain over any of the Chiefs before his advance it would be well.

In order to guard against any malevolent accusations, he might fix a period up to which he would wait for submission; this would meet the *pourparlers* of the Russian Commissioner, and give the General time to make all his preparations complete. On his advance he should promise pardon to those who laid down their arms, and renew his declaration as to the privileges accorded as the price of loyalty to the people. These at least are the ideas that strike me, but I have great reliance in your judgment, and especially as you are on the spot.

Bloodshed should be avoided if possible, and every pains taken to show that the Turks have done all in their power to avoid it; any acts of cruelty should be punished with the utmost severity. I do not suspect the Austrian Government, but the people on the frontier are all for the rebels, and the Government is too weak to act on them.

Yours sincerely,
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

P.S.—In regard to your own movements, I must rely on your own sense of duty. If you think you can do good, go to Mostar; if not, stay where you are.

H. L. B.

No. 287.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(*Received September* 13.)

(No. 616. Private and Confidential.)

Constantinople, September 4, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAD, by His Majesty's request, a long private interview with the Sultan on the 23rd ultimo, after introducing General Codrington.

His Majesty received me without ceremony, and used his own interpreter, making me sit down by him.

He said he had come into power when the Empire had been brought into a state of the greatest decrepitude and confusion.

He found the army in the most inefficient condition; the finances disordered; questions of all kinds surrounding him; and his Ministers came to him, who had been ignorant of all previous proceedings, to ask him how these things were to be remedied, whereas, they who knew the antecedents ought to be better able to counsel him.

That he wished and was prepared to do what was right "coûte qui coûte," and would not stop at any small impediments, but that it was difficult for him to see all at once what was right.

He then spoke, one by one, of the different questions:—

1st. Of Montenegro. What was he to do there? There were a set of barbarians living in almost inaccessible mountains, who descended into his territory; now kindling insurrection, now ravaging the property of his subjects.

If pursued, they retired into their fastnesses, and he was told Europe would not permit of his pursuing them. Was this so? Was this a right state of things? and what was he to do concerning it?

There were then certain portions of the Herzegovina in revolt. He had offered the fairest conditions to the rebels; they had not accepted them. Was he to shut his eyes to their rebellion or to reduce them to order? and if he did the latter, and blood was spilt, was he to be made responsible for it?

There was also the question of the Syrian indemnities. Was it usual for Sovereigns to indemnify their subjects when they suffered from local disorders? Was this done in Europe? Then as to the amount. He heard that after a sum had been agreed upon by all parties, the Representatives of the Powers now demanded a much larger one, and that this sum was so excessive that the Porte could not pay it, and that if it did it would be making rich men of persons, such as butchers and bakers, who had never lost much, for they never had had much to lose.

That this appeared to him most unjust, and that he did not think the British Government would sanction it.

That he wished at all events to have my opinion, for that he wanted advice, and believed me, as well from personal regard to him as from my position as the Representative of a really friendly Power, desirous to give him good advice.

I said to His Majesty that, in regard to the Herzegovina, the course of the Ottoman Government seemed to me simple and clear. If the rebels remained obstinate, Omer Pasha should enter the country and take up one or two strong positions without disquieting himself at partial forays, and commence immediately by putting into practice the reforms promised to Bosnia in Bosnia, and applying them to the Herzegovina, carrying out thereby the benevolent intentions expressed by His Majesty in his recent Proclamation. That the presence of a large force, too large to be attacked or menaced with attack, and the promulgation at the same time of conciliatory measures, would eventually and ere long produce the natural effect to be expected from such a course. That little by little order would be restored, and the rebels return to their homes and their allegiance. That in this manner also small combats and acts of cruelty on the part of the Ottoman troops would, I trusted, be avoided, but that if the latter took place, they would be most severely punished.

That with respect to Montenegro the case was different.

There were two plans to pursue with the Prince—that of attempting to subdue him or attempting to conciliate him. That the first must depend, first, on His Majesty's Government being able to show a clear case of aggression on the part of Montenegro; and, secondly, on his feeling quite sure that in any conflict he entered upon he would be victorious. These two points granted, he might undoubtedly state his case to Europe, which had not meant, when it interfered to prevent the Turks from attacking Montenegro, that the Montenegrins should attack the Turks and the Turkish provinces with impunity, and that if Europe did not give him redress, he could then seek it by force of arms.

This course, however, though certainly legitimate, was as certainly full of danger. Another would be to attempt to win the Prince from a hostile policy to Turkey by making it his interest to have a friendly one. That the present difficulty was what His Majesty had stated it, viz., that Turkey could not injure Montenegro. Another arose from the fact that the Prince, from want of a regular income, was obliged to receive a pension from Russia and gifts from France.

If the Porte could reverse this order of things, and offer the Prince advantages, which it was always able, in case of need, to withdraw, greater than those given by other Powers, it was possible that the Prince might be gained over and his people civilized and thereby softened; but that the policy of adopting one course or the other must be decided by Aali Pasha, who was perfectly capable of forming an opinion.

That in regard to the Syrian indemnities, His Majesty had been led into error. We had taken every pains to ascertain what would be a fair indemnity to the persons who had suffered, and that what the Powers asked was not more than what they really believed was just. The question was one which it was desirable to settle quickly, but that if the Turkish Government advanced immediately a sum for the objects most desired, further inquiry might take place as to doubtful points. That the Christian Powers did not wish His Majesty to give more than was just, and that I was quite certain His Majesty was most anxious to do what was just.

That as to the practice of persons who had destroyed the property of others being made to pay an indemnity for their outrage to those they had outraged, this practice was a common one in Europe and an ancient one with us, and such as His Majesty would himself see was consistent with the course of justice. He then said that as there was to be a meeting next day of the Representatives, he hoped I would take an interest in the matter and endeavour to bring it to some fair and conciliatory termination; which I promised him I would do. I then took the occasion of saying that, however critical the state of things, none of the other matters that pressed upon him were of more than momentary importance, provided Turkey got its finances into a proper condition. That I wanted to see put in practice the excellent intentions which His Majesty had for the army and navy, but that I knew they could not be so unless the finances were first set straight. The Sultan observed he was now aware of this; that he had spoken to Aali Pasha upon the subject and wished me to do so.

I then said it would be necessary, in order to improve the finances, to improve the internal condition in the provinces; and I related to him two or three anecdotes in order to show him what it then was. His Majesty listened to this very attentively, and told me that he entirely agreed with the views I expressed, and that I should tell Aali Pasha so, and that he would do the same. He then added, "I can't do these things myself. I have not yet sufficiently the habitude of affairs; but I wish what is right to be done, and to assist in doing it. I have taken Aali Pasha as Prime Minister because I heard that he had the best interest in the country. Kibrisli was a madman. If Aali does not succeed, I shall not know what to do."

I shortly afterwards took my leave.

Early in the morning the Sultan sent for Aali Pasha and repeated to him our conversation, as I did myself when I afterwards saw his Highness. Aali Pasha then said to me, with respect to the finances, he was only waiting for Kiani Pasha to have all the papers ready to go into the subject, and that he assured me it should have his early and serious attention. That as to the provinces, he had partly drawn up a plan which was much in accordance with my views. But that he thought it better to finish the financial project first, and that, being alone in the Government, he could not undertake at once all he could desire. I pointed out to him the great advantage there would be in commencing this Sultan's reign with great measures which would fix the attention and gain the goodwill of Europe, and if he allowed time to go on and the present opportunity to pass by, the same things would not produce the same effects. He said he was aware of this, but that he had no one to help him, and that he must have, as soon as possible, Fuad Pasha over there. As there is much truth in this, I could say no more than repeat my former observations.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

No. 288.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received September 16.)

(No. 20.)

Bosna-Serai, August 29, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's information, copy of a letter addressed by me to his Highness Omer Pasha, in consequence of a telegram to that effect received from his Excellency Sir Henry Bulwer. Also copy of my despatch to Her Majesty's Amdassador, inclosing copy of Omer Pasha's reply. The correspondence relates to the affairs of the Herzegovina.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure 1 in No. 288.

Consul Holmes to Omer Pasha.

Bosna-Serai, le 15 Août, 1861.

Altesse,

J'AI l'honneur de vous faire part d'une communication reçue de Sir Henry Bulwer.

Son Excellence est d'opinion que votre Altesse ne devait point penser à la résignation de sa charge en Herzégovine—que sa position demande le succès comme *sine qua non* de la retraite—que la situation étant délicate et difficile il faut exercer une grande prudence et ne pas montrer aucune apparence de doute ou hésitation. L'idée de son Excellence est que votre Altesse devait concentrer ses troupes dans un ou deux positions dans l'Herzégovine, où une attaque de l'ennemi serait difficile ou impossible. Des incursions partiales qui ne pouvaient être empêchées ne pouvaient avoir que des conséquences partiales. Que votre Altesse devait employer autant que possible des troupes régulières plutôt que des Bashi-Bazouks et donner des ordres les plus formels contre des actes de barbarité. Qu'il est nécessaire de tâcher de pacifier le pays par promulgations et par l'introduction partout où il sera possible des mesures justes et conciliantes. Que votre Altesse devait aussi sans délai introduire et mettre en exécution en Bosnie les mesures de réforme promises dans l'Herzégovine. Son Excellence est d'opinion que par une politique semblable les risques à courir sont minimes—le triomphe eventuel certain—et que cet triomphe comblerait la réputation de votre Altesse. Je dois assurer votre Altesse du support cordial de son Excellence à Constantinople.

Je prierais votre Altesse si c'est possible de m'écrire ce que je dois répondre à mon Ambassadeur. Je lui ai déjà dit que je croyais que la résignation de votre Altesse était causée principalement par l'inattention de la Porte à sa demande pour de l'argent, et que, du reste, ses intentions coincidaient exactement avec les idées de son Excellence.

Veuillez, &c.

(Signé) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure 2 in No. 288.

Consul Holmes to Sir H. Bulwer.

Bosna-Serai, August 20, 1861.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a letter which I have just received from his Highness Omer Pasha in reply to the communication which I made to him of the contents of your Excellency's telegram of the 13th instant.

Your Excellency will, I am sure, read his Highness' letter with interest, and will permit me to make a few remarks on its contents.

His Highness attributes his having wished to resign his command entirely to the state of his health. As I informed your Excellency he was indeed very weak and unwell on his return from Scutari, but although he does not probably think it expedient to avow any other motive for the step he took, I have good reason to know that his Highness was far from being content with the manner in which his repeated demands for money and other matters were treated by the Porte.

Your Excellency will remark that Omer Pasha, according to his promise to the European Commission, has been still endeavouring to bring about a pacific solution of

the question in Herzegovine, and believes that the hopes of doing this "n'ont jamais été mieux fondées que dans ce moment." One of the reasons which gave the idea to the European Commission that it would be better to quit Mostar than to remain there was partly inspired by the letter of Luka Vucalovich at Suttorina. Our mission was evidently entirely misunderstood by the insurgents. They expected at first that we had power to grant them everything they wished and to drive the Turks out of the Herzegovina. When they found that we could not do that, but, according to our instructions, were only aiding and supporting Omer Pasha and his Proclamation, they thought, or, in spite of our explanations, pretended to think—as Luka Vucalovich told us—that we were only endeavouring to do the will of the Turks, and to place the Christians in their former position, and that, in that case, they could do very well without us. At the same time it was clear they fancied, as long as the Commission was at Mostar, that they could always gain time when they desired it by addressing letters to it or demanding interviews which they might evade if they pleased. We therefore considered that our quitting Mostar would make them understand that they had lost the aid which they had mistrusted and trifled with, and had now no appeal but to Omer Pasha, while at the same time this would enable his Highness more speedily to bring matters to such a point that either a satisfactory campaign could be made before the winter, or that the insurgents, being convinced of their folly, would sincerely seek to make pacific arrangements with his Highness. This seems to have happened as expected, and may perhaps be the result of alarm at the separation of the European Commission and Omer Pasha's preparations for war, but I am myself very suspicious that the insurgents are not yet sincere, but are still only endeavouring to gain time and keep the Pasha inactive until winter will relieve them from the fear of military operations; as to us, they, or their leaders, have always seemed, for reasons before explained, not to wish for peace. I trust, however, that Omer Pasha will not allow himself to be trifled with; though his great desire to terminate matters otherwise than by the sword rather predisposes him to accept any overtures which seem likely to lead to that result.

I have great pleasure in stating my firm conviction that all his Highness' statements regarding his desire to introduce permanent reforms, and his endeavours to do what is possible at the present moment, as also of the effect of this on the peasantry, are perfectly true. I am at the same time sorry to say that his remarks regarding the difficulties which surround him, and his being "seul, tout seul," as he emphatically says, in the great work before him, are equally true. It is a deplorable fact that if there be in Turkey a few leading men capable of reforming the Administration they are almost alone, few or none can be found to second them; and Omer Pasha probably feels this to be his greatest difficulty. His orders are often unexecuted, and matters are represented as going on well when they are either going on ill, or, or least, not going on at all. I fear this is somewhat the case with Bosnia. His Highness is satisfied because he hears no complaint; care is taken that he should not. The present Vali is, however, a much better Governor than his predecessor, and the present distress and misery is rather occasioned by the demands for money and grain for the Herzegovine in the face of the total failure of the plum crop, and the half failure of the cereals, than by anything else.

Your Excellency will perceive that his Highness complains that he has not the power he ought to have, and also speaks bitterly of the Commission *ad hoc* sent to assist him. I believe he is quite right in his appreciation of their proceedings, but if his Highness had written more precisely, I think his chief objection would have been found to be the head of the Commission, Sheflik Bey. His Highness has often stated to me the impossibility of reforms in favour of Christians making progress in a Commission headed by a fanatic Mussulman like Sheflik Bey—a dervish who spends half his time in howling and working himself into fits, and the other half in recovering from their effects! Such a man is quite sufficient to paralyse the efforts of any Commission of reform even were the others everything that could be desired.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure 3 in No. 288.

Omer Pasha to Consul Holmes.

M. le Consul, *Mostar, le 18 Août*, 1861.

J'AI reçu votre honorée du 16 Août par laquelle vous me donnez connaissance de la communication de Sir H. Bulwer à mon égard. Je suis on ne peut plus flatté de la solicitude de son Excellence envers moi, ainsi que bien reconnaissant des sages conseils qu'elle veut bien me prodiguer. Je suis d'autant plus heureux que mes actes administratifs comme aussi les pensées qui les inspirent coincident avec les opinions et les intentions de son Excellence. Je regrette seulement que ma conduite politique, vue à de si grande distance et souvent faussement interprétée à Constantinople, donne par là lieu à son Excellence de s'inquiéter concernant les conséquences de ma mission. Par contre je me fais toujours un véritable plaisir de lui donner les explications les plus franches comme je le ferai aujourd'hui.

En demandant à la Sublime Porte la permission de résigner mes fonctions, je n'étais inspiré que par l'inquiétude à l'égard de ma santé, et non pas par quelque mésintelligence avec le Ministère, qui fait tous ses efforts pour me seconder, et encore moins par la crainte du succès de ma mission au moment où plus que jamais elle a toutes les chances de reussir. Vous n'ignorez pas, M. le Consul, la mauvaise suite qui résulta pour ma santé de notre courte excursion en Albanie. J'avais donc tout motif plausible d'appréhender les dangers d'une campagne qui se prolongerait en hiver et dans cette prévision je crus de mon devoir sacré d'avertir le Gouvernement de l'Etat de ma santé afin qu'un accident ne vint compromettre le succès de l'armée Impériale. Je me défends donc contre toute supposition que ma résignation ait été dictée par l'hésitation en vue des difficultés, car le Gouvernement ne saurait méconnaître les devoirs sacrés qu'il a à remplir envers moi et ses troupes en Herzégovine, et qu'il devra de toutes ses forces contribuer à un triomphe qui sera aussi le sien.

En réponse le Ministère, tout en connaissant la justesse de ma démarche, a fait appel à mon patriotisme éprouvé, et je me suis d'autant plus empressé d'y répondre en conservant mes fonctions que ma santé s'améliore de jour en jour, ou tant que le permet la chaleur excessive qui nous oppresse.

Bien que la mission de l'honorable Commission Européenne n'ait pas été couronnée de succès et qu'elle nous est dégagé de toute responsabilité, nous n'avons pas regardé tous les moyens de conciliation comme finalement épuisés. Tout en fesant mes préparatifs de campagne j'ai tenté, dans l'intent de l'humanité, une dernière démarche personnelle en envoyant un prêtre influent auprès du Voivode Jovan Vassiliev. Je suis heureux d'apprendre que non seulement notre émissaire conciliateur a été favorablement accueilli, mais que les espérances d'une solution pacifique n'ont jamais été mieux fondées que dans ce moment, ce qui contrariera toutefois quelques hauts employés autour de moi. Lucca Voucalovic lui-même a écrit à M. Bezobrazow pour le prier d'obtenir de moi une entente conciliante. Ce ne sera donc que en cas improbable que ce dernier espoir s'évanuisse encore, que je devrai en appeler au sort des armes.

A cette occasion je ferai remarquer à son Excellence que son conseil d'une attitude expectative n'est plus prudent, ni même praticable. La position de nos troupes est telle que toute tentative des bandes armées est inutile; mais si cette tactique défensive est praticable en été, il n'en sera pas de même en hiver, quand je devrai retirer les troupes dans leurs quartiers d'hiver. Vous savez bien aussi, M. le Consul, que je déteste le corps de Bashi-Bazouks; c'est pour cette raison que je n'employerai qu'un petit nombre de Toskos en qualité d'éclaireurs de nos divers corps d'armée.

Quant à la partie politique de mon programme et de mon administration, j'ose me flatter que son Excellence voudra bien approuver mes efforts de régénérer cette malheureuse province; j'ose dire plus encore, si son Excellence voulait bien envoyer auprès de ces populations un émissaire, elle apprendrait par les rapports, qu'elle n'a pas a se repentir de l'estime et de la sympathie bienveillante et active dont elle veut bien toujours m'honorer. Malgré les préparatifs de campagne que je dois surveiller jusque dans ces derniers détails, je ne me lasse pas de redresser les nombreux torts et de réprimer les abus qui se sont glissé dans l'administration. Journellement je tiens conseil pour faire juger les questions pendantes, ayant soin surtout de leur donner une solution immédiate. Les Chrétiens arrivent des villages les plus éloignés mettre en jugement des causes anciennes et abandonnées, ce qui est la meilleure preuve de la confiance que la population m'accorde, et du bon augure qu'elle tire de ma Proclamation. Des terrains ont été assignés pour la batise d'églises qui se construisent déjà. A Mostar et dans les villages, le son des cloches appelle les Chrétiens au service divin, et je maintiens strictement le respect dû à tous les cultes.

Il est bien vrai que les Musulmans échauffés par les anciens meneurs murmurent, mais convaincus eux-mêmes de leur impuissance ils ne bougeront pas.

Les rapports que je reçois de Bosnie sont toujours satisfaits (*sic*) et je suis autorisé à croire que tout marche dans le sens des réformes prescrites, puisqu'il ne me parvient aucune plainte.

Ce ne sera qu'après la pacification ou plustôt la soumission des districtes insurgés et le règlement des questions pendantes de localité, qu'avec l'approbation de mon Gouvernement, je pourrai poser le fondement d'une organisation essentielle et durable de ces provinces en poursuivant le plan que j'ai à plusieurs fois discuté avec vous, M. le Consul, et que son Excellence connaît de même. Mais en regard de mes vœux sincères pour le bien-être de ces populations et de mes efforts pour le réaliser, vous connaissez, M. le Consul, et son Excellence ne saurait l'ignorer, les difficultés et des entraves de ma mission. En premier lieu je vous rappelerai que je ne possède pas les pouvoirs nécessaires, n'ayant pas voulu les soliciter du Ministère, de sorte que je ne suis qu'un rapporteur officiel. D'autre part je me trouve seul, tout seul, dans la grande tâche de réformer cette province, le Gouvernement a bien envoyé ici une soidisante Commission Politique pour m'assister efficacement dans l'étude et l'examen sérieux des besoins du pays, et concourir à la mise en vigueur des réformes ordonnées par la Sublime Porte. Mais il paraîtrait que le Ministère d'alors avait méconnu l'importance de la question Herzégovinienne en envoyant ici des employés dont on voulait se débarasser à Constantinople, tout en leur accordant des traitements exaggérés qui absorbent les revenus de toute la province; ces messieurs n'ont rien fait avant mon arrivée pour mériter la confiance publique et se rendre digne de la belle mission que la Sublime Porte leur a accordé, et aujourd'hui encore mon exemple ne saurait les stimuler à un travail sérieux.

Telles sont, M. le Consul, les considérations que m'a inspirées la communication de son Excellence Sir Bulwer, et je vous autorise à les lui communiquer.

En vous répétant que je suis toujours imé du désir et de l'espoir d'une solution pacifique, je saisis, &c.

(Signé) OMER.

No. 289.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received September 16.)

(No. 21.)

My Lord, *Bosna-Serai, August 29*, 1861.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that on the 22nd instant I received the following telegram from his Excellency Sir Henry Bulwer:—

"Luca Vucalovich having made fresh pacific overtures to M. Besobrazow, I must request that you will join your late colleagues at Mostar, and concert with them and Omer Pasha as to the best method of effecting an accommodation. M. Hecquard will replace M. Tissot."

My preparations for proceeding to Mostar had been completed when I received information from my Prussian colleague there which induced me to defer my departure until I received fresh instructions from the Ambassador.

I therefore sent a telegram to his Excellency, as seen in inclosure in my despatch to Sir Henry Bulwer, copy of which I now have the honour to transmit to your Lordship.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure 1 in No. 289.

Consul Holmes to Sir H. Bulwer.

Sir, *Bosna-Serai, August 27*, 1861.

I HAVE just addressed to your Excellency the inclosed telegram. I need add little in the way of explanation beyond stating that I think our Russian colleague has not fairly explained the circumstances of Luca Vucalovich's letter to his Ambassador. It was written as stated in my telegram, is full of abuse against the Turks and Omer Pasha, and is addressed solely to Russia, offering submission on condition that the revolted districts shall be in future granted full liberty and independence.

I am entirely of Dr. Blau's opinion that it affords no ground for new or useful negotiation, and I think that any intervention at present will destroy Omer Pasha's chance of successful military operations. I have now no faith in the possibility of pacification until the insurgents are convinced that they can be punished. All their advances are only intended to gain time until it is too late in the season for Omer Pasha to act. If winter sets in early the troops must be withdrawn in October, so that his Highness has no time to lose.

The fire mentioned is supposed to have been the work of incendiaries. Forty shops were destroyed. The flames were driven by the wind in the direction of an old tower used as a powder magazine, containing 1,200 horse loads of powder and an immense quantity of loaded shells. The fire broke out on the morning of the 24th, and was during the day extinguished with the loss above mentioned, and the magazine was supposed to have been saved; but at sunset flames and smoke were seen issuing from the roof and a panic seized the whole town. Soldiers and citizens alike fled in dismay in expectation of an explosion which would have laid Mostar in ruins. Omer Pasha was in bed, suffering from an attack of fever, and was carried out of the town up the side of the adjacent mountain. His family were in the gardens at the time and fled to a neighbouring village. A few soldiers, however, headed by Hafiz Effendi, an Engineer officer, broke into the magazine and courageously extinguised the fire.

I am sorry to hear that the excitement and shock of this affair has had an injurious effect on the Pasha's health.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure 2 in No. 289.

Consul Holmes to Sir H. Bulwer.

(Telegraphic.)

DR. BLAU informs me that Omer Pasha declines fresh negotiations with us until he receives fresh instructions. Omer Pasha ill. Austrian colleague ill at Ragusa. No news from Hecquard. Omer Pasha's last attempt at negotiations failed—prepares to march. The letter of Luca Vucalovitch was written the day after our departure from Castel Novo, and precisely declines the aid of the five delegates—abuses Turks and Omer Pasha—is addressed solely to Russian Consul, and offers no basis for useful intervention. Blau advises me to wait here until notice from him. I think it injudicious to interfere with Omer Pasha's proceedings at present. For these reasons defer my departure until further orders from Embassy. If to proceed, beg urgently for credit on London Correspondent of Mr. Hanson. Greatly embarrassed for funds. Great fire at Mostar, 24th August, supposed work of incendiaries. Magazine containing 1,200 loads of powder ignited, but extinguised.

No. 290.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 969.) *Foreign Office, September* 16, 1861.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copy of a despatch respecting the affairs of the Herzegovina.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 291.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received September 17.)

Vienna, September 17, 1861, 4·45 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

HECQUARD has requested late Austrian Commissioner in the Herzegovina to unite with him in application to Omer Pasha for free passage of Montenegrin emigrants to Servia. Johanovitch, who is at Ragusa, declined without orders from Vienna, and Reehberg has now instructed him to answer that, as the duties of the Commission are suspended, he is not authorized to make any such communication.

* No. 282.

His Excellency considers project to be suggested by Hecquard, with a view of facilitating passage of agitators towards the Danube, and hopes Her Majesty's Government will take similar view of the case.

No. 292.

Consul Sir F. Gilbert to Earl Russell.—(Received September 18.)

(No. 31.)

My Lord, *Scutari, September* 5, 1861.

ONE of those barbarous usages which it was to be hoped had ceased for ever, namely, the cutting off and exposing the heads of enemies, occurred here last Monday.

The facts appear to be the following:—

It is supposed that, under plea of vindicating a blood feud, some people of Gruda, Hotti, Triepci, and Fundina, assembled on the 30th August to the number of 500 guns, and during the night attacked a small village situated within the Montenegro territory, and, it is stated, destroyed every soul that could be found in it—men, women, and children. They also carried off all the sheep, cattle, and domestic utensils, &c. They then cut off the heads of thirty males, among whom were three children, and carried them in triumph into Podgoritza, where they were received by the Governor, and such as had cut off a head or heads were rewarded by packets of cartridges. These mountaineers then proceeded to Scutari, where they arrived on the morning of the 2nd instant, and exposed the putrid heads in the bazaar, and insisted upon the Pasha receiving and exposing them in the castle. They demanded the customary reward, viz., a certain amount of money, and one, two, or more decorations (a small silver band) for their caps, according to the number each had killed. The Pasha refused, and ordered the guns of the castle to be loaded and run out to fire upon the town, which was all in a tumult, the Turkish population having risen *en masse* and threatened to drive him out of the castle by force if he did not accept the heads. The Pasha called his Council, and they advised him to receive them; at the same time they drew up a document to the effect that the Pasha had only yielded to *force majeure*. Eventually the Pasha consented to follow this advice, though much against his will.

The heads were privately buried in the evening by the Greek priest.

The most painful part of this affair is that the fight was between Latin and Greek Christians, both subjects of the Porte, though the latter were at the time of the attack in the Montenegro territory. No Mussulman took any part in the fight. During the night of September the 4th the Montenegrins came in a large body, and attacked the Ottoman Island of Vranina, situated at the head of the Lake of Scutari, which they succeeded in taking after a stout resistance by the Turks, who were finally blown up in their tower, but whether by the Montenegrins or by themselves in despair is not known. It is said 100 Turks were blown up, but I do not think there were more than about thirty in the tower. Unfortunately the water in the lake is so shallow at present that the steamer could not get up near enough to give any assistance. Finding that reinforcements were coming from Scutari (the population having been called to arms), the Montenegrins evacuated the island during the night following, carrying off all they could in the shape of provisions, &c.; and it is said that the people of the island—some thirty families—left with the Montenegrins, having first removed such property as they could, and then burned their houses. These people were, so to say, almost Montenegrins, and I presume they left fearing the vengeance of the Turks.

In ultimately receiving the heads, there is no doubt the Pasha yielded unwillingly, as, though it is true he had guns and a few gunners in the castle, and about 100 cavalry, I doubt whether the troops would have turned out to fight against the Turks of Scutari, as they are now a great many months without pay; moreover, the Turks of the town are ten to one, and, in addition, would have been joined by the tribes from the mountains, consequently, whatever the result might have been, there must have been a great effusion of blood, and the province, if not lost to the Sultan, at least thrown into a state of confusion, which at the present crisis of affairs in the neighbouring countries would have been most embarrassing to the Ottoman Empire and of the greatest advantage to her enemies. There is no doubt that every evening the Turks meet at the different mosques under the presidency of their priest, and are plotting something, very probably the removal of the Pasha, whom they look upon as almost a Christain.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. H. GILBERT.

No. 293.

Earl Cowley to Earl Russell.—(Received September 18.)

(No. 1125.)
Paris, September 17, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to return herewith to your Lordship the despatches of Mr. Holmes, relative to the affairs of Montenegro and the Herzegovina, which were transmitted to me for my perusal in your Lordship's despatch No. 961 of the 14th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 294.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 979.)
Foreign Office, September 18, 1861.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches* relating to the affairs of Montenegro.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 295.

Earl Russell to Lord Napier.

(No. 173.)
Foreign Office, September 18, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 266 of the 24th ultimo, reporting a conversation with Prince Gortchakow upon the affairs of Montenegro, and I have to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government concur in your Excellency's views as reported therein.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 296.

Earl Russell to Lord Napier.

(No. 182.)
Foreign Office, September 18, 1861.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE herewith, for your Excellency's information, copies of a despatch and of its inclosures, from Her Majesty's Consul at Bosna-Serai,† respecting the affairs of the Herzegovina.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 297.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(Telegraphic.)
Foreign Office, September 20, 1861.

I HAVE received the following figures from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna:—

"Heequard has requested the late Austrian Commissioner in the Herzegovina to unite with him in an application to Omer Pasha for free passages of Montenegrin emigrants to Servia. Jolianovitch, who is at Ragusa, declined without orders from Vienna, and has now instructed him to answer that, as the duties of the Commission are suspended, he is not authorized to make any such communication. His Excellency considers the project to be suggested by Heequard with a view to facilitate passage of

* Nos. 291 and 292.

† No. 276 and Inclosures.

agitators upon the Danube, and hopes Her Majesty's Government will take a similar view of the case."

Her Majesty's Government agree with Count Rechberg.

No. 297*.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received September 22.)

(Telegraphic.)
Constantinople, September 22, 1861, 5 P.M.

PRINCE LABANOW made two suggestions: 1st, withdrawal of Omer Pasha from the Herzegovina and employment in Albania; 2nd, the raising of the blockade of Montenegro.

I could not support the first; I agreed to support the second on conditions; and to-day Porte and Representatives decided that if Prince of Montenegro and Senate made a formal declaration in writing that they could prevent their people from troubling the Turkish territory, the Porte would raise the blockade.

Our Consuls at Scutari are ordered to press the Prince to make the required declaration.

No. 298.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received September 23.)

(No. 23.)
Bosna-Serai, September 6, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that, in reply to my telegram to Her Majesty's Ambassador at the Porte, of which copy was inclosed in my despatch to your Lordship, No. 21 of the 29th August, I received, on the 4th instant, the following telegram:—

"I approve the course you have followed with respect to returning to Mostar, and leave it to you to decide when it may be expedient to go there."

I shall therefore await here until my colleagues and myself are agreed as to the proper moment for again meeting. Two conditions, however, seem to me to be indispensable; first, that Omer Pasha consent to a renewal of relations with the Commission, which he at present absolutely declines, on the plea of want of instructions to that effect, and secondly, that the chances of the success of a fresh intervention be at least sufficiently probable.

Sir Henry Bulwer thinks that, for the time being, Mr. Zohrab had better remain in the capacity of Acting Consul here, as circumstances may at any moment call me back to Mostar.

Omer Pasha leaves either to-day or to-morrow for the insurgent frontier, and therefore military operations may be said to have commenced. These may produce a change of circumstances in which the action of the Commission may be useful, but I believe that until Omer Pasha has convinced the insurgents and their friends the Montenegrins that Turkey has the power to punish them, nothing will induce them sincerely to seek a pacific arrangement.

Omer Pasha's last attempt at a peaceful solution of the question, of the success of which he was so sanguine in his letter to me of the 18th August (copy of which was inclosed in my despatch to your Lordship No. 20) has completely failed. I hope soon to be in possession of the report of his Highness' agent, a certain priest called Nicephore. I have heard that it is a sufficiently important document, as showing the disposition of the insurgents and their different Chiefs, and as proving that Montenegro is continually urging them to refuse any arrangement. The conduct ascribed to Luka Vukalovich, I am told, completely justifies the opinion I had formed as to the entire inutility of any further negotiation at present with that individual.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 299.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received September 23.)

(No. 500.)

Vienna, September 19, 1861.

My Lord,

WITH reference to the telegram recorded in my despatch No. 490 of the 17th instant, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that Count Rechberg spoke to me with much earnestness respecting the state of things in the Herzegovina. He said that he had no recent news as to the proceedings of Omer Pasha, but that the spirit of disaffection was spreading, and that the proposal made by M. Hecquard to Colonel Johanovitch to unite with him in an application to the Serdar for the unmolested passage of certain Montenegrins into Servia had filled him with alarm.

His Excellency believes that a perfect understanding exists between Servia and Montenegro as to future plans, but he hopes it is not too late to counteract them. He has directed Colonel Johanovitch to state in reply to M. Hecquard, that the Commission being suspended, he is not to join in the communication proposed by M. Hecquard; and he expressed to me the expectation that Her Majesty's Government would view this affair as he does.

I told his Excellency that I would immediately inform your Lordship of all he had said to me, and I inquired if he possessed any clue as to the object of this passage of Montenegrins into Servia.

His Excellency answered that he had no detailed information on the subject, but that it has been very evident that the two provinces are making common cause against Turkey, and that M. Hecquard is assisting them to the best of his ability. He added that he should forward to the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires in London copies of the reports that had reached him on this affair for communication to your Lordship.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

P.S.—M. Hecquard has lately left his usual residence at Scutari, and established himself with his family at Ragusa, an arrangement which is by no means agreeable to the Austrian Government.

B.

No. 300.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received September 23.)

(No. 504.)

Vienna, September 19, 1861.

My Lord,

MR. DUNLOP has come here for a few days and delivered me the two letters which I have the honour to inclose herewith for your Lordship's information. The one contains an account of the activity of Neapolitan agents in the neighbourhood of Trieste and the shipment of men and arms in support of the Bourbon cause, and also a report of a mutinous spirit said to prevail amongst the sailors of the Austrian navy.

The other letter recounts an interesting conversation which Mr. Dunlop has held with M. Tissot, who was lately employed in the Commission in the Herzegovina, on the state of public feeling in the countries from which he had just come.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure 1 in No. 300.

Mr. Dunlop to Lord Bloomfield.

Trieste, September 14, 1861.

My Lord,

M. TISSOT, the French Commissioner (lately) at Montenegro, called on me whilst at Venice the other day, and during a long conversation informed me that he had been greatly surprised to find in all the ports on the eastern shore of the Adriatic an unexpected "Slavic" movement in full operation, especially at Ragusa and its neighbourhood. This, he said, was with an ultimate view that these populations, in combination with the inhabitants of the Herzegovina, should join the Prince of Montenegro and the Prince of Servia, in the event of any future favourable occasion offering.

He asserted that now there exists a complete secret understanding and "accord" between these two leaders, and that were they to engage in a conjoined form in any active operations against the Turks, that the most of the Bosnians would also join them, and would identify themselves with the movement.

I may here state that this assertion, as regards the Bosnians, is not consistent with information which I received at Pesth from Mr. Longworth in Belgrade.

M. Tissot also stated that the Austrian inhabitants of these coasts (south of Zara) were, in view of the above-mentioned eventualities, becoming, not more loyal to Austria, but more opposed to the spirit of Hungarian politics; and that now they would not under any circumstances join with the Croatians, a majority of whom have all along been favourable to Croatia joining the Diet at Pesth.

M. Tissot adverted to the perpetual intrigues at Montenegro against order, both during peace and war and also "during negotiations," and to the encouragement afforded to their many schemes by the Russian Consul. I asked him afterwards if he was at all aware of the real ultimate views of his own Government in these quarters? but he professed entire ignorance on this head, except (he said) their strong desire to prevent bloodshed "by whatever means would best do it."

He greatly blamed the weakness of the Austrian authorities at Spalatro and Ragusa, and the stupidity of the Austrian Commissioner at Montenegro, whose want of knowledge or instructions had impeded (so he alleged) the action of the Commission.

I was not acquainted with M. Tissot before, nor am I aware how much or how little credence is due to his statements: he appears intelligent and observing. I think he called on me for the purpose of asking some information on the affairs of Hungary, respecting which I avoided expressing any opinion to him.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. GRAHAM DUNLOP.

Inclosure 2 in No. 300.

Mr. Dunlop to Lord Bloomfield.

Trieste, September 13, 1861.

My Lord,

I WAS surprised to be informed yesterday that the real object of Prince Petrulla (Minister of King Francis II of Naples) in residing here at present is surreptitiously to superintend the dispatching of armed men and arms from a point of the coast near this to Bari or Brindisi for the purpose of aiding the Bourbon troops in the Neapolitan territories. I expressed strong doubts as to the accuracy of this statement, and said that I could scarcely believe that the Imperial authorities would either permit or connive at such embarkation.

My informant (who is a German banker of respectability here) reiterated his statement, and said that he knew what he was asserting, and that he obtained the information privately through a clerk, who was generally aware of what was done by the "Neapolitan" Consul here, who (the Consul) is always in attendance on Prince Petrulla; that he (the banker) believes that the Austrian Government at Vienna know probably little (or "nothing") of the matter, either officially or otherwise, and that he also believes that the authorities here know equally little of it, and wink at what they may know; that the men (and arms) are collected in the villages near this, and are shipped in small numbers and quantities at a time in sailing "luggers" at a little fishing station near Nabresina, where bribes are distributed to the coastguard, who make no report of the matter; that some of the men are brought from Italy, and others from Bavaria, or through the Bavarian-Tyrol, but that none came by way of Vienna.

I am without any means here of testing the truth of this information, and do not like to ask the English Vice-Consul or anybody else about it. I give it in the words of my informant.

The Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian has gone to Vienna to-day. He is said to be exceedingly distressed and uneasy at the attempt to create a mutiny which took place lately on board one of the Imperial steamers of war, the majority of the crew of which vessel were Croatians. Several of the officers were said to be implicated, especially a young Count Korinski. The matter turned out to be more serious than was supposed when first discovered, and has, very naturally, been hushed up, and no publicity given to the details. An engineer is said to have betrayed the conspiracy. The intention of the mutineers had been to go to Ancona, and there deliver themselves, and give over the ship to the Italians.

People here seem to suspect a widespread disaffection amongst the sailors in the

Austrian navy, of a similar nature to that which produced the mutiny, and it causes apprehension amongst the military and naval officers in the Imperial service here, some of whom have spoken very gravely respecting it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. GRAHAM DUNLOP.

No. 301.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 996.) *Foreign Office, September 23, 1861.*

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna,* inclosing two letters from Mr. Dunlop upon the Italian question and the Herzegovina.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 302.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received September 23.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 23, 1861.*

RUSSIAN Minister makes two suggestions: first, withdrawal of Omer Pasha from the Herzegovina and employment in Albania; second, the raising of the blockade of Montenegro. I cannot support the first; I agreed to the second condition; and to-day the Porte and Representatives decided that if Prince of Montenegro and Senate made a formal declaration in writing that they could prevent their people from troubling the Turkish territory, then the Porte would raise the blockade.

Our Consuls at Scutari are ordered to press Prince to make required declaration.

No. 303.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 582.) *Foreign Office, September 26, 1861.*

Sir,

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, copies of correspondence† respecting the affairs of Montenegro and the Herzegovina.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 305.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received September 27.)

(No. 639.) *Constantinople, September 18, 1861.*

My Lord,

RESPECTING the affairs of Montenegro and the Herzegovina nothing, further can be said at the present than that by the last advices the Montenegrins have evidently entered the Turkish territory. I allude to the capture by the Montenegrins of Vranina, an island in the Lake of Scutari held by the Turks, of whom about 100 are said to have been killed, and the threatened attack of Lessandra in the same vicinity.

On the other hand, Omer Pasha left Mostar on the 15th instant to take the command of the operations against the insurgents in the Herzegovina.

I am still of opinion that until the Commander of the Turkish forces can enter the insurrectionary districts with an overwhelming force, nothing of a decisive nature can be looked for.

The Austrian Government is quite right in saying that the French accuse it of fostering the rebellion and entertaining desires of invasion and conquest, which are evinced by a large congregation of Austrian troops on the Danube; but my own opinion is that Count Rechberg is sincere in what he stated to Lord Bloomfield.

* No. 300.

† Nos. 282 and 289.

The people bordering on the Herzegovina take a deep interest in the struggle between the Christian races beyond the frontier and the Turkish power; much excitement prevails in these districts, and the Austrian Government is not strong enough to check it, but I believe it would be more inclined to do so than not.

As to the force on the Danube, it is the natural consequence of the state of things in Hungary, Transylvania, and Servia, and I cannot look upon it as menacing to the Ottoman Empire.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

No. 306.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 27, 1861.*

ANSWER to your telegram of 23rd respecting Montenegro. I approve, if Prince will make and keep required declaration.

No. 307.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received September 30.)

(No. 24.)

My Lord, *Bosna-Serai, September 12, 1861.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of a despatch, with its inclosures, which I have this week addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at the Porte, reporting the commencement of military operations in the Herzegovina, and regarding the attitude maintained by Montenegro towards Turkey.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure 1 in No. 307.

Consul Holmes to Sir H. Bulwer.

Sir, *Bosna-Serai, September 10, 1861.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's telegram of the 3rd instant, by which I am happy to see that the course I have followed regarding returning to Mostar has your Excellency's approval. There is as yet no appearance of any useful occasion for the intervention of the European Commission.

Omer Pasha has commenced his operations in the Herzegovina by occupying the districts of Baynani and Zupzi. This movement was effected by Dervish Pasha with 6,000 men between the 3rd and 6th instant. No resistance was made. The insurgents took refuge among the mountains on the approach of the troops, and were followed by the whole population of Grahovo. The property and crops of the inhabitants were not touched by the troops. Omer Pasha is of opinion that this demonstration will prove to the insurgents that the Turkish army is in sufficient force to occupy at pleasure the revolted territories. His Highness, however, has really no such intention, as he is aware that the inaccessible nature of the country, and particularly the want of water, render a permanent military occupation most difficult, if not impossible. The Serdar will, therefore, garrison certain fortified positions, among others Nichsich and Klobuk, and provision them for six or eight months, with a view to winter a sufficient number of good regular troops to hold in awe the adjacent country, and above all to prevent communication between the revolted districts. His Highness thus hopes to extinguish the insurrection without bloodshed. He calls this campaign a simple "mesure militaire et de police." It may, however, be observed that is a very expensive one, and, moreover, only a mere preliminary measure to a probable campaign in 1862. Still it is possible that the rigours of winter, coupled with a strong occupation of the country, may cause the submission of the insurgents; but in any case, the early or late solution of the question will depend in a great measure on the attitude of Montenegro. Omer Pasha was to have left Mostar for Bilekich on the 9th instant.

I have the honour to inclose herein a copy of a letter addressed by the Prince of Montenegro to the European Consuls at Scutari, and also copy of a despatch addressed by M. Blau, Prussian Commissioner, to the Baron de Lichtenberg, Prussian Consul at Ragusa, remarking on certain inaccuracies in the Prince's letter. The Protocols of the transactions of the Commission, together with my reports, place your Excellency also in a position to form an accurate opinion of this letter, and coinciding with the justice of my Prussian colleague's remarks, your Excellency will doubtless arrive at an estimate of the general truthfulness of a document containing such gratuitous mis-statements.

I cannot refrain from observing that, from what I have seen and learnt of the Montenegrins, I have lost all sympathy with them. Instead of the praiseworthy attitude which the Prince claims to have always exhibited to Turkey, there is no doubt that the reality has been quite the reverse, and that, in particular, the part which has been played by Montenegro in the affair of the rebellion of the Herzegovina has been hostile and disingenuous in the extreme.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure 2 in No. 307.

The Prince of Montenegro to Consul Holmes.

Cettigné, le 30 *Juillet*, 1861.

M. le Consul,

A L'OCCASION de la récente et grave mesure prise par la Turquie envers le Monténégro, je crois devoir rompre le silence et faire connaître succinctement à MM. les Consuls des Grandes Puissances quelle a été la conduite tenue depuis un an par le Monténégro vis-à-vis de l'Empire Ottoman.

Depuis mon avénement j'ai employé tout mon pouvoir à maintenir la tranquillité sur les frontières, je n'ai rien négligé pour éloigner tout motif de collision, pour calmer les animosités séculaires qui séparent les deux peuples; en un mot, pour donner à la Turquie les preuves les plus irréfragables de meilleur voisinage.

Dans une occasion toute récente je me suis rendu avec empressement au désir exprimé par les Grandes Puissances de me voir contribuer autant qu'il était en mon pouvoir au soulagement des malheureux enfermés dans la forteresse de Nichsich. J'ai été heureux de pouvoir en pareilles circonstances donner une preuve de déférence aux Grandes Puissances et de pouvoir répondre comme il convenait à un Souverain d'un peuple Chrétien à l'appel fait à ses sentiments d'humanité. Je ne me suis point arrêté devant les considérations d'un intérêt personnel, je n'ai pas craint de compromettre ma popularité vis-à-vis des populations Chrétiennes des environs, je n'ai pas hésité un seul instant devant le sacrifice des juges nationaux, j'ai marché droit au but sans m'occuper des conséquences, heureux que j'étais de contribuer pour ma part à arrêter l'effusion du sang en Herzégovine, et de prouver aux Grandes Puissances qu'il ne sera jamais envani (*sic*) qu'elles feront appel aux sentiments d'humanité et à l'esprit de concorde du peuple Monténégrin.

Dans une circonstance plus récente encore je me suis rendu sur la frontière à l'appel de MM. les Commissaires des Grandes Puissances et là encore je crois avoir donné les meilleures preuves de l'esprit de conciliation qui m'a toujours animé. Si par les circonstances indépendantes de ma volonté cette entrevue n'a pu avoir lieu, autant que personne je l'ai regretté, car pour me servir des expressions mêmes de M. le Général-en-chef Ture, "j'espérais les meilleurs résultats de ce rapprochement."

Je suis resté six jours entiers à la disposition de MM. les Commissaires et de son Altesse Omer Pacha, et n'ai quitté la frontière que lorsque j'ai acquis la conviction que l'entrevue était matériellement et moralement impossible dans les conditions exigées par M. le Général-en-chef Ottoman.

Jusqu'ici, Monsieur, il ne s'agit point de désaccord entre la Turquie et le Monténégro et encore moins de guerre. Quel était le but de cette entrevue? Il s'agissait, vous ne pouvez l'ignorer, Monsieur, de s'entendre directement, et sans intermédiaire aucun, sur les moyens les plus efficaces à employer pour la pacification d'une contrée voisine, sur la population de laquelle on voulait bien me supposer une certaine influence; ce n'était point un armistice qui devait être conclu entre deux Etats belligérants; notre entrevue réussie ou manquée ne devait en aucun cas rendre les relations entre les deux pays plus tendues; le contraire a eu lieu; ma conduite toute sincère, toute conciliatrice a été travestée, et la Turquie a répondu à mes avances par une notification du blocus, c'est-à-dire par une déclaration de guerre.

Cette notification en pleine paix, contraire à tout sentiment d'humanité, contraire aux

sains principes du droit international, est une pure mesure arbitraire, cachant un but perfide et destinée à pousser au bout le peuple Monténégrin. On veut que, poussé par le désespoir et la misère il se [livra?] à quelque acte d'agression; on veut par un artifice astucieux le rendre responsable en face de l'Europe d'une violation qu'il n'aura point commise.

Telle est, Monsieur, la conduite de la Turquie envers moi. Malgré cela même, après un acte pareil de [le?] Monténégro, bien que froissé dans sa dignité, bien que lésé dans ses intérêts, restera calme et impassible et attendra, fort de la sainteté de sa cause; que ses ennemis se déclarent plus ouvertement; il ne se laissera pas prendre d'un piége si grossier et si perfide.

Le Monténégro portera sa cause devant les Grandes Puissances; il leur dira par mon organe: vous qui êtes les protectrices naturelles de tous les peuples opprimés; vous qui êtes accourues en Syrie au cris d'appel des victimes des Druses; vous qui avez été émues à la seule idée du danger couru par la garnison Musulmane de Nichsich—danger conjuré par le Monténégro sur votre simple demande,—resterez-vous impassibles devant la mesure prise par la Turquie; permettez-vous que 200,000 Chrétiens, coupables d'aimer leur nationalité et leur indépendance, doivent être condamnés à périr de misère pendant une année de famine et de maladies, soient mis au ban de la société, soient privé de toute communication avec leurs semblables sur un ordre émané d'une simple autorité militaire Turque?

Je suis assuré que ma plainte sera entendu des Grandes Puissances auxquelles je vous prie de vouloir bien communiquer la présente note. Quant à moi, Monsieur, sûr de la justice de notre cause, convaincu de leur impartialité, j'attendrai avec calme leur décision.

Agréez, &c.
(Signé) NIKOLA.

Inclosure 3 in No. 307.

Dr. Blau to Baron Lichtenberg.

M. le Baron, *Mostar, le* 25 *Août*, 1861.

LA communication que vous m'avez faite en date du 20 du mois courant, de la lettre que Son Altesse le Prince du Monténégro vous a adressée, m'offre l'occasion d'y relever quelques inexactitudes relativement à l'entrevue de Dodoche que je ne saurais passer sous silence parcequ'elles impliquent d'injustes récriminations contre la Commission Européenne, dans laquelle j'ai eu l'honneur de représenter le Gouvernement du Roi.

D'abord il est inexact que le Prince ne serait rendu sur la frontière "à l'appel de MM. les Commissaires," ainsi que Son Altesse voudrait le faire croire à l'Europe dans le quatrième alinéa de sa lettre précitée.

La Commission d'Herzégovine n'a, d'aucune manière, ni appelé, ni engagé, ni invité le Prince à se rendre sur la frontière. Personne ne sera mieux à même de juger la valeur de cette assertion gratuite du Prince que vous, M. le Baron, qui avez bien voulu vous charger de porter en personne à Cettigné la lettre par laquelle Omer Pacha invitait le Prince à une entrevue sur le territoire Ottoman. Nulle invitation de la part de la Commission n'a été adressée à Son Altesse; nul arrangement n'a été par elle pour ménager la rencontre sur la frontière.

Il s'en est suivi de cette première inexactitude dans la lettre de Son Altesse une autre pas moins grave. Ces mots, "Je suis resté six jours entiers à la disposition de MM. les Commissaires," quel sens peuvent-ils avoir, si ce n'est d'accuser MM. les Délégués d'avoir mis à l'épreuve la patience de Son Altesse le Prince pendant si long espace de temps? Je décline formellement cette accusation. Si Son Altesse a jugé à propos de descendre à Dodoche six jours avant notre arrivée, ce n'est certes pas la Commission qui en saurait être responsable, ni coupable d'un retard. Le seul but de notre voyage était d'accompagner Son Altesse le Serdar Ekrem à l'entrevue; nous ne nous étions donnés aucun rendez-vous avec le Prince Nicolas. Si nous nous sommes rendus auprès de lui, seuls et au-devant d'Omer Pacha, c'était uniquement dans le but d'applanir les malentendus imprévus qui s'étaient élevés par suite de la lettre de Son Altesse le Prince du 19 Juillet, retractée, il est vrai, par lui-même dans l'entrevue de Dodoche. D'ailleurs, nous ignorions complètement jusqu'à notre arrivée à Scutari l'endroit où se trouvait le Prince à cette époque. Nous devions supposer ensuite, d'après la lettre du Prince du 19 Juillet, que Son Altesse "se trouvait campée dans une plaine

des plus chaudes," tandis que nous avons dû le chercher le 22 dans le village de Dodoche sur la colline que vous connaissez. Il est, à mon avis, difficile de se dire resté à la disposition de quelqu'un si l'on ne l'a pas même prévenu du lieu, où l'on se trouve, ni du jour où l'on y arrive.

Je m'arrête ici, M. le Baron, et je supprime quelques autres observations que je pourrais avoir le droit de faire en ma qualité de membre de la Commission. Elles ont trouvé leur place, en partie, dans les Protocoles des 17me et 18me Conférences, dont je vous ai laissé copie. La vérité ne manquera pas de se faire jour bientôt; mais je n'ai pas voulu vous laisser ignorer qu'à mes yeux la manière dont Son Altesse le Prince dénature le rôle que la Commission a joué dans l'entrevue projetée, me paraît au moins incompatible avec le désir du Prince de recommander sa cause par son exposé aux cinq Grandes Puissances Européennes.

Je saisis, &c.
(Signé) BLAU.

No. 308.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received September 30.)

(No. 25.)
My Lord, *Bosna-Serai, September 12, 1861.*

WITH reference to my previous despatch, No. 23, I have now the honour to inclose, in translation, copy of the report of Nikifor Doutchitch, igoumen of the Convent of Dougi, the agent employed by Omer Pasha in his last attempt to treat with the insurgents of the Herzegovina, also copy in translation of the letter addressed to the Russian Commissioner, M. Bezobrazow, by Luka Vukalovitch.

Your Lordship will find the former document interesting and important as showing that a great part of the population and some of the Chiefs desire peace and would trust Omer Pasha, but that Montenegro, while endeavouring to obtain credit for friendly conduct towards Turkey, really exerts all her influence to prevent a pacific arrangement. The part attributed to the Russian Consul at Ragusa, and the French Consul at Scutari (now appointed member of the European Commission in the place of M. Tissot) is not without significance. With regard to M. Markovich, he was possibly unintelligible, but I do not believe that, contrary to all his instructions, he advised the insurgents to persist in rebellion.

The letter of Luka Vukalovitch, I need scarcely remark, is full of inconsistencies and falsehood. Your Lordship will perceive that nothing less than complete independence is demanded; but after declaring that the people cannot trust Omer Pasha, and have resolved never to submit to Turkish barbarity while life remains, the writer finishes by begging for the Russian Consul's interference with Omer Pasha—for what is not clear—after having refused at Suttorina the good offices of the whole European Commission.

His statement that "depuis 400 ans aucun des chefs qui fut envoyé auprès des Turcs ne revit plus ses foyers," is a most gratuitous falsehood, and the tyranny of the Turks is as usual most ridiculously exaggerated.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure 1 in No. 308.

Louka Voukalovich to M. Bezobrazow.

(Traduction.)
Monsieur, *Zubtzi, le 18/30 Août, 1861.*

EN nous recommandant à votre bienveillance, nous vous prions de ne pas nous en vouloir à la suite de notre entrevue à Soutorina.

Ayant appris que vous arriviez avec Omer Pacha et les autres Commissaires nous espérions qu'après quatre siècles des ténèbres le soleil allait enfin nous éclairer. Nous pensions qu'avec l'aide de vos Cours Souverains nous allions jouir de la justice souveraine et à l'instar des nations Européennes participer aux droits auxquels toute la population prétend et aspire.

Mais lorsque vous nous déclarâtes que vous ne sauriez sans Omer Pacha nous donner aucune réponse définitive et que nous ne pouvions dans notre détresse attendre aucun secours de vous, vu que tout dépendait du bon plaisir d'Omer Pacha, le peuple fût saisi de tristesse et d'alarme.

Nous connaissons les Turcs et leurs Pachas; la manière dont ils nous ont traité jusqu'aujourd'hui est connue de vous et de l'Europe toute entière. Je pense donc que vous ne m'en voudrez pas de ce que je ne me suis pas fié à la parole d'Omer Pacha et que vous pardonnerez à mon peuple qui s'opposa à mon départ lorsqu'il avait appris que son sort était tout entier entre les mains d'Omer Pacha et cela d'autant plus, que, depuis 400 ans, aucun des chefs qui fût envoyé auprès des Turcs ne revit plus ses foyers.

Il est à votre connaissance et à celle de l'Europe toute entière que c'est l'oppression qui nous a poussée à la révolte. La plume est incapable à retracer les tyrannies et les barbaries de toute espèce dont les Turcs nous ont accablé. Cet état des choses étant devenu insupportable, nous primes les armes avec cette résolution de ne plus rentrer sous la barbarie Turque et cela aucunement et tant qu'il nous restera une goutte de sang.

Nous ne sommes pas du bétail comme les Turcs nous envisagent. Nous sommes une nation comme une autre. Nous voulons jouir de la liberté et des lois Impériales, et nous prions, après Dieu, tout le monde de nous y aider afin qu'il soit mis fin à l'effusion du sang. Nous ne désirons pas que le sang soit versé, et pour preuve que nous voulons la paix avec Omer Pacha nous vous adressons la présente; c'est à dire, si Omer Pacha veut nous faire participer à la justice souveraine, veuillez-vous donner la peine d'intercéder auprès d'Omer Pacha et de vous entendre à ce sujet avec lui.

Votre affectueux,
(Signé) LUKA VUKALOVITCH.

Inclosure 2 in No. 308.

Report of Nikifor Doutchitch, the Agent employed by Omer Pasha in his last attempt to treat with the Insurgents.

(Traduction.)
A son Altesse le Serdar Ekrem, l'illustre Omer Pacha.

LE 1er Août j'arrivai au village de Petrovitchi, dans le Baniani, où le Père Théodore, l'Egumen du Couvent de Kossierovo, et quelques autres personnes, me firent un bon accueil. Jovan Vasilev Bacevitch étant arrivé le lendemain (2 Août), je lui ai remis la lettre de votre Altesse. J'ai ajouté verbalement, en m'adressant à lui et à ceux qui étaient présents, tout dont votre Altesse m'avait chargé.

La lettre, qui fut lue à haute voix, produisit la joie et la satisfaction, qui étaient visibles sur les figures de Jovan Vassilev et de tous les présents. Cependant ils se méfiaient d'abord de la lettre et des paroles que je leur ai dite de la part de votre Altesse. Pour les rassurer je les ai invité de m'accompagner à l'église du village, où j'ai prêté un serment solennel que la lettre et mes paroles étaient authentiques, et ne cachaient aucune supercherie.

Il me crûrent enfin, et Jovan Vassilev expédia immédiatement deux lettres, dont l'une était adressée à Louka Voukalovitch à Zubtzi, l'autre au Pope Tarko de Piva. En leur annonçant mon arrivée et l'objet de ma mission, Jovan Vassilev les invitait de venir à Petrovitchi. Il proclama ensuite dans les Baniani que la paix étant faite, toutes les hostilités avaient à cesser. Cet nouvelle fut reçue avec joie, et tout le monde rentra dans ses foyers.

En attendant, ils envoyaient, sans me le dire, la lettre de votre Altesse à Cettigné, et en rapportant tout ce que s'est passé depuis apparition à Baniani, demande la permission de m'accompagner à Mostar, auprès de votre Altesse. Jovan Vassilev m'en fit la confidence Samedi le 5 Août. La réponse de Louka Voukalovitch arriva le même jour. Louka s'excusait de ne pas pouvoir venir à Petrovitchi à cause de ce qui venait de se passer à Soutorina, où les Duskoks avaient enlevé les chevaux d'Aali Pacha, et provoqué ainsi, sur la frontière, une querelle avec les soldats Autrichiens; il promettait, cependant, de venir Dimanche vers midi à Grahovo, où l'entrevue pourrait avoir lieu. Jovan Vassilev m'engageait de venir à Grahovo en me disant: "Louka ne peut pas venir ici, et tant que je n'aurai des pourparlers avec lui et les autres, il me sera impossible d'aller à Mostar, car quoique investi de leurs pleins pouvoirs, je dois préalablement m'entendre avec eux." Je lui répondis que je n'irai pas à Grahovo, où il sera, d'ailleurs, impossible de traiter l'affaire de la pacification, qu'il fallait donc adresser une nouvelle invitation à Louka de venir nous rejoindre à Petrovitchi. Jovan Vassilev accéda à mon désir, mais Louka refusa de quitter Grahovo.

Considérant que je n'obtiendrai aucun résultat si l'entrevue allait ainsi manquer, et cédant à la pression de Jovan et des gens de Baniani, je me rendis Dimanche soir (le 6 Août) à Grahovo, où la réponse de Piva nous fût remise le même jour.

Les chefs de Piva écrivaient qu'il leur était impossible de traverser le défilé de Douga,

mais qu'ils se remettaient sur Jovan et Louka, dont ils acceptassent d'avance les arrangements. J'ai répété à Louka tout ce que votre Altesse m'avait ordonné de dire verbalement, mais il refusait d'y croire et s'opposait à l'envoi des députés à Mostar.

Après un entretien secret avec Jovan et l'Egoumen Théodore, il se dit cependant prêt d'accéder à l'arrangement. Trois personnes, Jovan Vassilev, le Père Théodore, et Vouk Alexitch, furent, en effet, désignés pour m'accompagner à Mostar, où ils devaient déclarer leur soumission, accepter les concessions proclamées par votre Altesse, et arranger définitivement les affaires.

Mais un ordre de Cettigné survint. Le Prince et le Président du Sénat Mirko défendaient, sous peine de mort, d'aller à Mostar de faire la paix et d'accepter les concessions et promesses de votre Altesse. Cette défense attrista et découragea tout le monde. Je les exhortai en vain de ne pas y faire attention, et de venir, comme c'était d'abord décidé, à Mostar; il n'osaient pas, et me priaient de les attendre pendant quatre jours, afin qu'ils puissent aller à Cettigné, où ils solliciteraient du Prince et de Mirko l'autorisation d'aller avec moi à Mostar.

Pendant que je reprenais avec le Père Théodore le chemin de Petrovitchi, Jovan Vassilev et Louka Voukalovitch, accompagné d'un perianit du Prince, partirent pour Cettigné. Leur peine était inutile, car ils n'obtinrent nullement la permission de m'accompagner auprès de votre Altesse et de faire la paix; au contraire, pour les en détourner plus surement on les décora des croix et des médailles.

Jovan Vassilev m'ayant rejoint Vendredi (11 Août) à Petrovitchi, me déclara qu'il lui a été défendu à Cettigné de m'accompagner à Mostar, et qu'il avait l'ordre de continuer la lutte avec les Turcs; une lettre me fut ensuite remise pour votre Altesse. Le brouillon de cette lettre était apporté de Cettigné. Le contenu en est faux, car le Monténégro ne leur permettra jamais d'accepter une transaction quelconque. Ils écrivirent aussi une lettre à M. Bezobrazow, Consul de Russie à Mostar. Je suppose qu'elle est rédigée dans le même sens que celle adressée à votre Altesse.

Les habitants de Baniani, sincèrement attristés par cette défense qui leur venait du Monténégro, maudissaient les auteurs de ces entraves.

Je partis Vendredi de Petrovitchi, et après avoir passé par Betethsé je me suis présenté devant votre Altesse.

A ce recit de tout ce qui s'en passé lors de la mission dont votre Altesse m'avait chargé, je dois encore ajouter que Louka Voukalovich prétendait avoir reçu des communications du Consul de France à Scutari, Huchard (littéralement), et du Consul de Russie à Raguse, qui lui recommendaient de ne pas aller à Mostar, et de ne pas accepter les concessions contenues dans la Proclamation de votre Altesse. Le drogman de Prusse, Georgi Markovitch, envoyé par la Commission à Baniani, était d'abord inintelligible, mais lui aussi leur conseilla à la fin de ne pas se soumettre, attendu que leur attitude armée les posait davantage.

Ces intrigues étaient la cause que personne ne fut envoyé auprès de votre Altesse.

Je suis, &c.

(Signé) NIKIFOR DOUTCHITCH.

Mostar, le 15 Août (vieux style), 1861.

No. 309.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received September 30.)

(No. 304.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, September* 18, 1861.

THE Russian Ambassador at Constantinople was directed, I believe on the 15th instant, to make, either in concert with his colleagues or apart, a strong representation to the Porte against the blockade of Montenegro by the Turks, and, in general, against the hostile attitude taken up Omer Pasha in regard to the Prince of that country.

A telegraphic reply from Prince Labanoff, just received, announces that he was in correspondence with the other foreign Representatives on the subject, and that he had already obtained from Aali Pasha a declaration that the blockade would be raised in case the Prince of Montenegro should take effectual engagements that his people should not interfere in the struggle prevailing in Herzegovina between the insurgents and the Turkish authorities.

Prince Gortchakow read me the two telegrams and the text of his written instruction, informing me at the same time that his orders, originally dispatched without the authority of the Emperor, had subsequently been fully approved by His Majesty.

The dispatch of the Russian Minister is a laboured, declamatory, and partial apology for the Prince of Montenegro, which would have all the appearance of being destined for the satisfaction of the Russian "Orthodox," and the disturbance of their co-religionists in the Ottoman Empire, if Prince Gortchakow did not disclaim any such intention.

His Excellency draws a flattering picture of the character and policy of the young Prince of the Mountain, asserts the service rendered by him to the Turkish garrison and the European Consuls by escorting provisions to the blockaded town of Nichsich, and points, in animated terms, to the cruelty which the Turks would show in reducing a nation to starvation whose Sovereign had recently hazarded his popularity in carrying them food. The blockade of the Mountain was, in the opinion of Prince Gortchakow, tantamount to a declaration of war, which was not justified by any act on the part of the Montenegrins which he was informed of. His Excellency goes on to point out the formidable dangers to which the Turkish Government might be exposed by an appeal to arms, and directs Prince Labanoff to use the most energetic means to induce the Porte to recede from its present position, and have recourse to measures of conciliation.

After making these communications to me, Prince Gortchakow expressed his hope that he might have the concurrence of Her Majesty's Government in his representations to the Government of the Sultan, and indicated the inconsistencies in which Her Majesty's Government, the conspicuous advocates of nationality and emancipation, would be involved if they countenanced a system of barbarous repression. His Excellency did not disguise that his despatch to Prince Labanoff might probably be published.

I told Prince Gortchakow, in reply, that I regretted the one-sided character of his argument, which, if made public, could not fail to produce a painful impression in England. He did not admit that the Turks could have any shadow of right on their side, or that the Montenegrins could in any particular have offered the least provocation. Yet we have great reason to believe that the Montenegrins had been on many occasions the aggressors. Her Majesty's Government, I said, would not fail to give the Prince of Montenegro due credit for his exertions on behalf of the Consuls and the garrison at Nichsich.

It might be, however, that against his will his people had, before and since, taken an active share in the Herzegovina insurrection, and that they were now in constant correspondence with the rebels. The blockade of the Mountain was probably a most natural and justifiable act of defence on the part of Omer Pasha, who, before attacking the rebels, had found it necessary to cut off their reinforcements and their refuge by surrounding Montenegro. In acting thus, and in proceeding to measures of unavoidable rigour against the parties in arms against the Sultan's authority in his own dominions, I thought the Turks would have the complete sympathy and approval of Her Majesty's Government and the English people, especially as they had offered most generous terms to the insurgents, and would, I make no doubt, continue to do so to the end. While asserting the right of the Porte to defend its territory, punish aggressors, and repress insurrection, I took care to add that Her Majesty's Government would certainly blame any attempt to conquer Montenegro, an enterprise which would certainly be ruinous, even if successful; and that I was convinced your Lordship would gladly avail yourself of any opening to promote the settlement of these conflicts by conciliation and compromise.

Prince Gortchakow does not, in conversation, deny that the Turks may have some ground of complaint against the Montenegrins. I presume that he feels it incumbent on him, as the champion of "oppressed Christians," of whatever quality, to make a sounding protest against Turkish barbarity, which may raise the diminished prestige of Russia in the East without really implying any dangerous design against the Porte. I do not think that his Excellency means any serious mischief; and I hold that the Government of the Sultan, with the counsel of its true allies, may safely persevere in any course which their pecuniary and military resources may enable them to pursue. It may not become me to express an opinion, and I would be the last to offer one pointing to a useless effusion of blood, but I confess I hope the Porte will not shrink at the impotent menace of Russia from defending their territory against patriotic but fanatical and sanguinary savages who enjoy so much solicitude and protection at St. Petersburgh. A temperate but firm vindication from Constantinople, in reply to Prince Gortchakow, setting forth on one side the repeated provocations and atrocities of the Montenegrins and their complicity in the Herzegovina insurrection, and, on the other, the fruitless efforts of the Porte to conciliate its rebellious subjects, would have a good effect, and vindicate the independence of the Sultan's Government. The Russians will be apt to run into their old courses of interference and intimidation unless occasionally arrested by a judicious resistance.

Prince Gortchakow recurred on this occasion to his usual theme of a sympathetic

outbreak in Bosnia and Servia. I treated his Excellency's apprehensions more lightly than perhaps I ought, contending that Bosnia was divided, that Servia was inert, and that the Porte would not fail in case of such a combined movement to make concessions on one side or another which would disperse the danger before it grew to any serious height.

It does not yet appear here how the French Government are disposed towards Montenegro. M. de Montebello usually holds language rather favourable to that country and its Prince; but no official significance need be attached to these casual expressions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 310.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received September 30.)

(No. 512.) *Vienna, September 26, 1861.*

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 500 of the 19th instant, Count Rechberg has again spoken to me on the subject of the affairs of Montenegro, and asked if I had heard from your Lordship on the subject. I replied that it was not likely that Her Majesty's Government would interfere or depart from a policy of neutrality in the question at issue, and that all they could do would be to try and prevent bloodshed, and seek to promote a reconciliation between the parties; that, however, I had not received any instructions whatever as to the intentions of Her Majesty's Government.

His Excellency said that he had hoped your Lordship would have approved of the course pursued by the Austrian Government and of the orders which had been dispatched to Colonel Johanovitch to decline, as the labours of the Commission were suspended, uniting with M. Hecquard in an appeal to Omer Pasha not to move forward. He added that information had just reached him that M. Hecquard and the Prussian Consul at Ragusa had proceeded to Cettigné, with the object of engaging the Prince of Montenegro to give some assurance that would induce the Serdar to stop his operations, and that news had also arrived from Constantinople that Prince Labanoff had been instructed to declare to the Porte that Russia would make her responsible for Omer Pasha's proceedings against Montenegro, and that Aali Pasha was evidently alarmed at the menace, and inclined to order the blockade to be raised.

Count Rechberg has all along been favourable to the expedition of Omer Pasha, and had hoped it would be successful in establishing something like order in the Herzegovina, and that a lesson would, at the same time, be given to the Montenegrins to desist from their forays into their neighbour's country. His Excellency is, therefore, much disappointed at this interference of the Russian Government, and at the effect it appears to have produced.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 311.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received September 30.)

Vienna, October 3, 1861.

(Telegraphic.)

RECHBERG has just received intelligence that Hecquard's offer of mediation with the Porte has been utterly declined by the Prince of Montenegro.

No. 312.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received September 30.)

(No. 517.) *Vienna, September 26, 1861.*

My Lord,

WITH reference to my No. 512, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that Count Moshourg, the French Chargé d'Affaires, has just communicated to Count

Rechberg a despatch from M. Thouvenel on the affairs of Montenegro, according to which it would seem that the Representatives of the Great Powers at Constantinople had urged Aali Pasha to order the suspension of all military operations against Montenegro and the immediate raising of the blockade, upon the understanding that negotiations should be opened with Prince Nicholas, who is to be advised to engage officially through his Senate to prevent future acts of depredation on the Turkish territory.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 313.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received October 2.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 2, 1861.*

THE Prince of Montenegro declines to make required declaration and recriminates. I see nothing to be done till one of the parties requires our interference, since until then nothing we do will have any effect.

No. 314.

Consul Calvert to Earl Russell.—(Received October 4.)

(No. 56.) *Monastir, September 18, 1861.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to state that a battalion of Chasseurs, numbering about 600 men, which has been quartered for some time past at Monastir, has this morning marched for Prishtina. Three batteries of field artillery have accompanied the infantry. The final destination of the artillery is not known. A battalion of the Redifs of the province has been called under arms, and the men who compose it have already commenced to arrive at head-quarters.

The above movements have taken place in consequence of a decision of the Administrative Council of the army of Roumelia, which assembled last week immediately after the receipt of a lengthy telegram from Omer Pasha.

There is a regiment of Turkish cavalry at Prishtina. The Cossacks and dragoons are encamped on the Plain of Cossova, at a distance of about three hours to the west of Prishtina. Their General, Sadyk Pasha, is with them. About 200 of the dragoons who have served their time will shortly receive their discharge, the same number of the Cossacks having been discharged at Monastir only three months ago. The total effective force of the corps will thus be reduced to about 1,000 troopers. The enrolment of new recruits proceeds very slowly, and I hear that many of the officers contemplate leaving the regiment.

A single battalion of regular infantry will remain at Monastir with the Rediffs.

Intelligence has been received here that the Montenegrins having closely invested the small fort of Viranino, on an islet in the Lake of Scutari, in overwhelming numbers, the Lieutenant, Omer Agha Konka, an Albanian, had, after a gallant defence of ten hours, blown up the fort, and sacrificed his own life and the lives of the thirty men who were with him rather than surrender to, or be captured alive by, the besiegers. The dread of the barbarous cruelties which these fierce mountaineers are known to practice on any Turk who falls into their hands is supposed to have induced this desperate act. A large number of the enemy were destroyed by the explosion.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHARLES F. CALVERT.

No. 315.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received October 4.)

(No. 648.) *Constantinople, September 22, 1861.*

My Lord,

I HAVE read with attention Lord Napier's despatch No. 266 of the 24th of August, inclosed in your Lordship's No. 555 of the 12th September.

My own private views as to the policy of the Porte with respect to Montenegro would be favourable to the latter entering into some friendly arrangement with the Prince which would at once civilize his people and place a greater control upon his actions, and with this view I should be disposed to recommend liberal regulations as to the use of the port of Spizza and an increase of territory; His Highness doing homage for that increase, and such territory being easy of access to a Turkish force, so that in case of misbehaviour he would be likely to lose it. An arrangement of this kind, especially if preceded by an interval of peace on the frontier, could in my opinion be made with honour and advantage by the Turkish Government. But at the same time it would be with extreme difficulty that the Ottoman Government could be brought to listen to it.

The hatred in which the Montenegrins are held by the Ottoman population, Christian as well as Turkish, on the frontier, the barbarous atrocities which the Montenegrins have committed, the unjust and partial manner in which they have frequently been protected by the European Powers, have all created so strong a prejudice against them in the minds of the most reasonable and moderate Turks, that everything proposed on their behalf is viewed with extreme prejudice as well as suspicion.

You may judge then how the Turkish Government would view a proposal to recognize the complete independence of Montenegro, giving it a larger territory (defended by a natural frontier) and a seaport. They would say, and not entirely without reason, there is a tribe of bandits who have been invading our lands, mutilating or massacreing our people, to whom we already made various concessions two years ago, declared satisfactory and likely to be conciliatory by all the European Powers, but which have been vain; and now these same European Powers, who cannot feel any great sympathy on the score of civilization and humanity for such a nation, and whom we were counting upon as likely to restrain its Chief from exciting or maintaining insurrection in our country, now come forward and propose to crown his misdeeds, and confirm our humiliation, by advising us to make him a more powerful as well as an independent Power.

With respect to the plan of continued temporisation which Russia would impose upon Omer Pasha, after the rebels have refused to accept conditions which all the Great Powers of Europe considered in every respect satisfactory, and after the Porte has sent its best General, and gone to the expense of collecting a large army for the purpose of enforcing submission should everything save force be unable to procure order, such a course, as it seems to me, would be ruin as well as humiliation. First, it would entail a large and constant expense, which the Porte is unable to bear, upon the Turkish Treasury. Secondly, by persuading the rebels that the Porte can do nothing against them, it would at once encourage their resistance and insurrection in the adjoining provinces.

In short there appears to me no other course for the Ottoman Government now to pursue than that of occupying the country in insurrection, with the strictest injunctions that that occupation should be used for the purpose of carrying out the benevolent intentions which the Sultan lately announced, and convincing those who are now misguided by a few ambitious men who may be able to maintain a state of disorder, but cannot create a Government, that the commander of the Sultan's forces has sufficient power at his disposal to enforce the Sultan's authority, and the most favourable intentions towards employing that power for the benefit of the people whom he was sent rather to conciliate than to subdue.

I cannot close this despatch without taking some notice of the general tendency of Prince Gortchakow's counsels. To leave a province, in spite of the most liberal offers on the part of the legitimate Sovereign, in an unlimited state of rebellion. Is this a course which the Russian Government would itself pursue? and is it not the most clear encouragement to rebellion elsewhere? To make the Prince of Montenegro independent and increase his powers and dominions, what is this but the most decided encouragement to the Princes of Servia and Moldo-Wallachia to claim similar concessions? Indeed, I should convey to your Lordship a remark made to me the other day by Prince Lobanoff on the Constitution for Servia lately published. I said it was contrary to Treaties. His reply was, "But have not concessions contrary to Treaties been made, and are they not likely to be made, with respect to the Principalities?" Thus, the Russian Government first supported the union of the Principalities, then it makes that concession, which its previous conduct has now made necessary, the groundwork for a new condition of things in the Principality of Servia.

Prince Gortchakow at one time accused me of preventing an understanding in the East between Russia and England, on the ground of my prejudices as to Russian

intentions. Now, there is no one, I venture to say, who is more sensible than myself of the advantages to be derived from a complete understanding between Russia and England in regard to the East. But how is it possible to form or maintain this understanding if one Power wishes to maintain an Empire and the other wishes to pull it to pieces, and this insiduously and assiduously day by day; each hour bringing forth new propositions directly opposite to the views we entertain. It would be far easier, in my opinion, to come to an understanding if Russia stated at once what her ultimate intentions were, because we should then at least have a broad and open ground for discussion and decision.

As it is, I regret the necessity of being constantly called upon to oppose the advice which the Russian Government would give; but my doing so proceeds from no hostility to Russia, a Power with which I should wish to see England in the most close and friendly relations, but from the necessity of supporting a policy which our Government has traditionally maintained against one which the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh has traditionally pursued; I shall, however, always be happy when I find any measure respecting which Prince Lobanoff and I can act together.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

No. 316.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 4, 1861.*

I AM not sorry that the Prince of Montenegro declines to make required declaration. He probably would not have observed it if he had made it. We must now not interfere till both parties ask us to do so. All we can ask of the Turks is to exercise the rights of war with the humanity of civilized nations.

No. 317.

Mr. Longworth to Earl Russell.—(Received October 6, 5:30 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Semlin, October 6, 1861, 3 P.M.*

THE Prince of Servia told me that he had sent 6,000 ducats to Montenegro, suffering from a drought.

The French officer, Colonel Mondagna, is made Minister at War.

No. 318.

Consul Sir F. Gilbert to Earl Russell.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 32.)

My Lord, *Scutari, September 23, 1861.*

IN my last despatch I informed your Lordship that the Turks were holding meetings in the mosques, most probably to effect the removal of the Pasha, and on the 15th of this month such proved to be the case, for a most serious revolt against the Pasha and his authority was publicly circulated through the town. The chief complaints appear to be that he has no energy, is inattentive to business, that none of his measures are ever carried out, that affairs which ought to have been terminated long since are still at the same point as when he arrived at Scutari, and that he permits the aggressions of the Montenegrins to be passed over, instead of leading them against Montenegro.

It is a curious fact that all parties, Turks, Greeks, and Latins, are joined against him. Some of the Chiefs paid me a visit and stated that they had drawn up a "Masbata" (an official document) signed by all parties, and intended to telegraph to the Grand Vizier that they wished for the removal of the Pasha, and to state that the masbata containing their grievances would be sent by post. I strongly advised them to say nothing about the removal of the Pasha, but merely to set forth their grievances, and leave the Sultan to decide as to the recall of the Pasha. I fear they did not take my advice. They received for answer that they must remain quiet and orderly, obey the

Pasha, as he enjoyed the confidence of the Sultan, and that the Ottoman Government would give its attention to the affair.

The Pasha sent in his resignation, which was not accepted by the Porte, and he was ordered to employ force if necessary to suppress the revolt. He informed the Consuls that he had not troops enough for such a purpose, but had sent off for two battalions (as at present he had only two weak ones) from Antivari, and added that if he could get five or six more he would recover his authority and awe the town. We (the Consuls) considered it advisable to telegraph the Pasha's communication to our respective Ambassadors at Constantinople, and have learnt that troops will be sent as as quickly as possible; but troops will be of little use unless a large quantity of money is sent with them, if only to buy provisions, there not being a shilling in the Treasury, and the contractors have more than once declined giving any more credit till they receive at least something on account.

A masbata was also sent to Omer Pasha, who, in answer, inquired why the Scutarines had not brought forward their complaints whilst he was at Scutari, he also added that they had done wrong in sending to the Grand Vizier, as he, Omer Pasha, was General-in-chief and alone had the power of removing the Pasha.

For the moment the people are very quite, indeed, too quiet, and appear to be resigned to the rule of the Pasha, but I know that the Turks meet everywhere in numbers, both in the mosques and in the open air, and are preparing another masbata for Omer Pasha in which one of the charges against the Pasha will be that he has not in reality spent as much money in repairing the forts of Lessendra, &c., as he has charged the Government with, and the next will be that there are not nearly as many soldiers in those frontier forts as pay is received for. I do not think the Pasha is guilty of either of the above himself, though the subordinates most probably are.

The Pasha, on his part, is evidently making preparation for action; he has doubled the guard at the telegraph office, has quietly introduced several companies of soldiers into the castle, and has removed some small guns which were in the town; this has given much annoyance to the people, but was a prudent measure, as I suppose as soon as more troops arrive the Pasha will seize the ringleaders and send them off to Constantinople.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. H. GILBERT.

No. 319.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(*Received October 7.*)

(No. 26.)
My Lord, *Bosna-Serai, September 26, 1861.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a despatch I have just addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at the Porte. His Excellency had left it to my sense of duty to proceed to Mostar if I thought I could be of use. Nothing is to be done at present at that place, but as most of the members of the Commission are at Ragusa, and as my Prussian colleague has appealed to me to join them owing to matters relative to Montenegro which are intimately connected with the permanent pacification of the Herzegovina, I have considered it my duty to proceed thither, and shall leave this on or about the 1st of October.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure in No. 319.

Consul Holmes to Sir H. Bulwer.

Sir, *Bosna-Serai, September 24, 1861.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's telegram of the 21st instant, to which I replied that Mr. Zohrab would start for Mostar this week. I have, however, just received intelligence from Dr. Blau which has decided me to leave Serajovo for Ragusa. I have therefore just addressed to your Excellency the following telegram:—

"Dr. Blau leaves Mostar for Ragusa and urgently requests me to proceed thither, as our French and Austrian colleagues being there, and certain overtures being

made by the Prince of Montenegro, he considers my presence necessary. Events also will probably soon take a decisive turn and the action of the Commission be necessary. Under these circumstances I leave this for Ragusa as soon as possible. Zohrab will still remain here. Further explanations by post to-day."

Dr. Blau in his letter to me says that he has been authorized to repair to Ragusa to remain there as long as the Commission does not proceed elsewhere, and he strongly urges me to proceed there at once, in order that the Commission may be able to act together without delay as soon as events may require it, and this he thinks likely to occur very shortly. The Prince of Montenegro has also it appears made certain overtures in a letter addressed to the Consuls of the Five Great Powers through M. Hecquard, but whether to the Consuls composing the Commission of the Herzegovina or the Scutari Consuls is not evident. It is presumed, however, that the letter is addressed to the members of the Commission of Herzegovina, and Dr. Blau considers, with reason I think, that the Commission should be able to discuss together such matters and not leave them to the sole management of M. Hecquard or any other member.

Moreover, as Omer Pasha has occupied some, if not all, of the revolted districts, events must soon take a more decisive turn than they have hitherto done. Montenegro is evidently alarmed at what may be the result to herself of his Highness' movement. It is highly desirable that a conflict between Montenegro and Turkey be prevented, and the moment may be at hand when the Commission should be ready to act collectively and promptly so effect a satisfactory arrangement if possible. Your Excellency will perceive that I consider, as do most of my colleagues—in fact all of them, if they would avow it—that Montenegro is the difficulty of the question of the Herzegovina. Your Excellency will have seen from the letter of Nikifor, inclosed in my despatch No. 29, that most of the Chiefs and people of the revolted districts would have submitted but for the influence of Montenegro, and until some arrangement can be made with Montenegro there will be no peace for the Turkish districts adjacent to the Mountain. It may be doubted whether any perfectly satisfactory arrangement can be made, considering the antecedents and the character of the people, but at all events something better than a constant state of war and bloodshed may be attained.

Considering these circumstances, and the appeal made to me by my Prussian colleague, whom I had requested to inform me when he considered my presence necessary, I think it my duty, and in accordance with your Excellency's instructions, to proceed to Ragusa, where probably all the members of the Commission will shortly be assembled.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 320.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(*Received October 7.*)

(No. 527.)
My Lord, *Vienna, October 3, 1861.*

WITH reference to the telegram recorded in my despatch No. 521 of this day, I am informed that Count Rechberg is greatly annoyed at the failure of the negotiations with the Prince of Montenegro which had been set on foot at the instance of some of the Representatives of the foreign Powers at Constantinople, and that he regrets that orders were sent to Omer Pasha to suspend operations until something had been known as to the chance of the offers of mediation being accepted. The Imperial Government, however, are now of opinion, as I am assured, that the position of the Turkish army would, as the season is advancing, become very critical in the event of complications growing out of the present state of the Christian provinces of the Turkish Empire.

It is here believed that the object which the Prince of Montenegro has most at heart, and in which he is entirely supported by France and Russia, is the acquisition of a strip of sea coast and a port by which he would secure facilities for obtaining grain from abroad, but that this is a mere pretext, and that the real reason is to gain political importance by facilitating the arrival in Montenegro of emigrants from Italy and Hungary, who would then be able the more easily to proceed to Servia and the Principalities through the disaffected districts of the Turkish Empire, and assist in the work of revolution in the Sultan's dominions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 321.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 603.)

Foreign Office, October 8, 1861.

Sir,

MR. CONSUL HOLMES has furnished me with a copy of his despatch to your Excellency, No. 28 of the 10th ultimo, on the subject of the course which has been pursued by the Prince of Montenegro.

I have been very anxious to have some trustworthy opinion on the conduct of the Prince of Montenegro—whether he had performed the part of a good neighbour to the Sultan or the reverse.

The latter is the opinion of Mr. Holmes, a judicious and experienced public servant.

Added to his testimony is that of the Prussian Consul as to His Highness' want of truth.

The Prince of Montenegro, therefore, ought not to receive any support from the British Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 322.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 604.)

Foreign Office, October 8, 1861.

Sir,

I STATED to you, by my telegram of the 30th ultimo, that you must not take upon yourself to decide important questions without reference to Her Majesty's Government.

It is obvious that inconvenience can hardly fail to ensue when a British Representative in a foreign country deals with matters which are under discussion between his own Government and foreign Powers according to his own views, and without waiting for the determination at which Her Majesty's Government may have arrived after hearing and weighing the opinions entertained upon such matters by the Powers with whom they may be desirous of acting as far as possible in concert.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 324.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 1070.)

Foreign Office, October 9, 1861.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches respecting the affairs of Montenegro.*

I likewise transmit, for your Excellency's information, a despatch in original from Mr. Holmes on the same subject, which your Excellency will return at your earliest convenience.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 325.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 617.)

Foreign Office, October 10, 1861.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, the accompanying copy of a letter addressed by Mr. Dunlop to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna† relative to Montenegro, the Herzegovina, and Bosnia.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

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* Nos. 307, 314, and 321.

† Inclosure 1 in No. 309.

No. 326.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received October 11.)

(No. 321. Confidential.)

St. Petersburgh, October 3, 1861.

My Lord,

I THINK it right again to submit to your Lordship my impression that the revolt of the Greek population in Herzegovina, and the corresponding movement of the Montenegrins, continue to possess the warm sympathies of Prince Gortchakow and the Russian Government. I do not expect that this Government will venture to give any direct counsel or assistance to the insurgents through their recognized local agents, or that they will make any abrupt alarming demonstration at Constantinople; they are too weak and too much embarrassed to embark on a hazardous course of policy in the East. I think that the Russian Cabinet will do all it dares to thwart the action of the Porte by hypocritical and reiterated remonstrances, and to discredit its measures throughout Europe by inflammatory descriptions and appeals setting forth the sufferings of the Christians and the cruelties of the Turks addressed to the German and French Government, and disseminated by the Continental newspapers in the Russian interest.

It might, therefore, appear desirable that the Porte should not give any cause of offence to humanity, of which the Russian Government might speciously avail themselves, and that they should from time to time make some public vindication of their proceedings, should the war continue, affirming the provocations which they have endured, the concessions which they have offered, the terms which they still propose, and generally the grounds of justice and of right on which their acts are founded.

We may be assured that the Russian Government have at the present conjuncture no distinct design of territorial extension in Turkey, no expectation that they could derive any direct gain from a successful insurrection in its European Provinces; but they have an undiminished animosity against the Turks and an ardent hope that the Christians may succeed in establishing provincial "autonomies" or independent Governments on the Servian model.

The French Ambassador, in ordinary unofficial discussion, takes the side of the Montenegrins, and reprobates the conduct of the Porte in blockading their frontier, but he expresses himself with moderation. I do not know how far his sentiments are countenanced by the avowed policy of his Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 327.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 11, 1861.

IN reply to your telegram of October 8, it was doubtful whether the Turks ought to have been interfered with regarding the blockade of Montenegro. The proposal to settle to the electoral law of the Principalities at Constantinople was at variance with opinion expressed by Her Majesty's Government at Paris.

No. 328.

Earl Russell to Lord Napier.

(No. 197.)

Foreign Office, October 12, 1861.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE herewith, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople*, respecting the affair of Montenegro.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

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* No. 315.

No. 329.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received October 13.)

Constantinople, October 12, 1861.

(Telegraphic.)

HECQUARD writes to the French Embassy on the 9th from Ragusa that a whole battalion of Turkish riflemen has been destroyed by the insurgents near Beletschje, in the Herzegovina, with the loss of two guns. I have nothing on the subject from Holmes, but the French Chargé believes in the truth of the news.

No. 330.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received October 13.)

Constantinople, October 13, 1861, 6 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

THE Porte has intelligence from Omer Pasha dated Thursday and Friday last, which makes no mention of the serious check reported by Hecquard.

No. 331.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 327. Confidential.)

St. Petersburgh, October 9, 1861.

My Lord,

I THINK it right to state to your Lordship that Prince Gortchakow has expressed his opinion to the Representatives of France and Austria, perhaps not very seriously, that it would be desirable for the Great Powers to make some kind of solemn engagement or declaration asserting their neutrality and disinterestedness in the affairs of Turkey. I heard of this the day before yesterday, and, owing to indisposition which has confined me to the house, I have not been able to see the Prince since. As soon as I can do so, I will speak to his Excellency on the subject, and inform your Lordship exactly of his sentiments.

The Prince is apt to assert that the last days of the Ottoman Empire are at hand, and he believes, or pretends to believe, that the present struggle in the Herzegovina is a crisis from which several of the European provinces of the Empire may emerge free, or in possession, at least, of an administrative independence. His Excellency has also appeared to dread the intervention of Austria in Bosnia, and has more than once alluded to a chimerical project by which Austria should be indemnified for her past and future losses in Italy by the acquisition of territory in the Turkish dominions.

These or similar reflections may have induced Prince Gortchakow to offer at some new engagements by which the Powers should be held to abstain from all interference, and permit the Government of the Porte to go to pieces, without any assistance or intervention whatever, declining, at the same time, any participation in the spoils.

I have, &c.

(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 332.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 1103.)

Foreign Office, October 14, 1861.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches* upon the subject of the affairs of Montenegro.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

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* Nos. 329 and 330.

No. 333.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 1105.)

Foreign Office, October 14, 1861.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, a despatch in original from Her Majesty's Consul at Bosna-Serai upon the subject of the affairs of Montenegro.*

Your Excellency will return this despatch to this Office at your early convenience.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 334.

Earl Russell to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 228.)

Foreign Office, October 16, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE received your despatch No. 527 of the 3rd instant, reporting a conversation which you had held with Count Rechberg relative to the failure of the negociations with the Prince of Montenegro, and I have to inform you in reply that Her Majesty's Government concur with his Excellency as to the strip of land on the sea-coast of which the Prince desires to obtain possession.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 335.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received October 17.)

(No. 232. Confidential.)

St. Petersburgh, October 12, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship, with reference to my despatch No. 327 of the 9th instant, marked Confidential, that the French Ambassador has informed me that Prince Gortchakow has not proposed to him the signature of any new declaration of neutrality or disinterestedness between the Great Powers looking to the disruption of Turkey.

I have this morning afforded the Prince in conversation an opening to express his sentiments on this subject, of which he did not avail himself; I am, therefore, under the impression that his expressions were exaggerated to me, or that they were carelessly used. I did not like to ask the Prince directly whether he had held the language referred to to the Austrian Minister, as he would probably have guessed the quarter from which my information was derived.

I have, &c.

(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 336.

Earl Russell to Lord Bloomfield.†

(No. 231.)

Foreign Office, October 18, 1861.

My Lord,

COUNT Wimpffen came to me yesterday, and read to me a despatch of Count Rechberg relating to Montenegro.

It appeared by this despatch that the Prince of Montenegro had proposed certain conditions upon which he would lend his aid to the pacification of the Herzegovina.

These conditions were to the effect that the independence of Montenegro should be acknowledged, that a seaport should be assigned to the Principality, and that its frontiers should be rectified.

Count Rechberg would not listen to these conditions, nor recommend any terms which have not the sanction of the Porte.

* No. 308.

† A similar despatch was addressed to Earl Cowley and Sir H. Bulwer.

I said that Her Majesty's Government had determined not to interfere unless we should be called upon by both parties to suggest terms of accommodation.

Count Wimpffen repeated what he had communicated to me some days ago, namely, that terms nearly identical with those proposed by the Prince of Montenegro had been recommended by the French Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 338.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 625.)
Foreign Office, October 18, 1861.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency, for your information, a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, reporting his opinion as to Russian policy in the affairs of Montenegro and the Herzegovina.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 340.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received October 19.)

(No. 388. Confidential.)
St. Petersburgh, October 13, 1861.

My Lord,

AN Aide-de-camp of the Prince of Montenegro has arrived at this capital charged with a letter from his Chief to the Emperor of Russia.

Prince Gortchakow had yesterday the goodness to inform me of the objects of this mission. They are twofold. First, the organization of a system of emigration from Montenegro to this Empire, and secondly, the appropriation of funds now deposited with the Russian Government belonging to Montenegro for the benefit of that country.

The Russian Minister had replied, in reference to the first point, that he would place himself in correspondence with the competent departments, with a view to ascertain in what manner and to what extent the surplus population of the Mountain could be transferred to Russia, and settled in its vacant territories. It was, his Excellency observed, a matter demanding much reflection and combination. It could not be arranged in a day. I expressed the satisfaction with which I learned that a scheme of this sort was under consideration, for it could not but tend to the pacification of the Mountain. Prince Gortchakow did not appear to contemplate the project with equal satisfaction, and, in truth, the Montenegrins might prove unruly colonists and uncomfortable neighbours.

It appears, in regard to the second point mentioned above, that the last Vladica, or Ecclesiastical Prince of the Mountain, bequeathed a sum of money, of which the capital was placed under trust in the hands of the Russian Government, but of which the interest might, in case of famine, be employed for the relief and sustenance of the Montenegrin people.

The Montenegrins in their present straits have asked the Emperor to give up the capital of the fund. Prince Gortchakow has declined to do so; but adhering to the wishes of the patriotic testator, he has consented to employ the accumulated interest for the purchase of provisions. An Austrian vessel at Odessa bound for Cattaro has been freighted with maize, and a sum of money has been remitted to the Russian Consular authorities in the Adriatic, to be employed in the same manner. Prince Gortchakow has advised the Cabinet of Vienna of these measures, and expressed his expectation that no impediment will be offered to the transit of this food through the Austrian territory towards the Mountain.

It may be hoped that the Russian authorities at Odessa will prevent the shipment of any other articles which the zeal of Greek partizans might desire to inclose in the sacks of corn.

Prince Gortchakow assured me most emphatically that his conduct in this affair had been solely directed by considerations of humanity, and by the desire to relieve a people whom he believes to be on the verge of starvation.

The French Ambassador, on the other hand, told me incidentally the other day that

Princess Darinka, widow of the last Prince of Montenegro, who is at present on a visit to St. Petersburgh, had informed him that the Montenegrins had laid in a stock of provisions sufficient for their winter consumption. This lady, who receives pensions from the French and Russian Governments, has come here to obtain some augmentation of her allowance from the Imperial Treasury.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 341.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received October 20.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 20, 1861, 11·50 A.M.

THE Porte has received official intelligence, dated Scutari, 17th, that Omer Pasha signally defeated a body of insurgents 3,000 strong near Synchna, a village two leagues from north-western extremity of Montenegro. Although one-half were Montenegrins and escaped into Montenegro, Omer Pasha did not pursue them beyond frontier at Levuka.

He has permanently occupied Piva in order to command the province.

No. 342.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received October 21.)

(No. 543.)
Vienna, October 17, 1861.

My Lord,

AT my last interview with Count Rechberg I mentioned, with reference to your Lordship's despatch No 223 of the 9th ultimo, that Her Majesty's Government concur with the views of the Austrian Government on the subject of the affairs of Montenegro, as they had been explained to me by his Excellency some three weeks ago.

Count Rechberg expressed his satisfaction at hearing this, and told me that Prince Nicholas had lately addressed a letter to the members of the European Commission at Ragusa, in which he offers his assistance in the work of pacification in the Herzegovina, under the three following conditions:—

1. The independence of Montenegro to be recognized by the Porte.
2. The concession of a seaport.
3. The rectification of the frontiers.

Count Rechberg said that such pretensions of the Prince of Montenegro were totally inadmissible, and he entirely approved Major Johanovitch's conduct in refusing to entertain His Highness' proposal.

His Excellency regretted to say that this letter, of which he gave me a copy, and which I have the honour to inclose herewith, inspired anything but confidence as to the object of this communication, and that as to the granting Spizza or some other seaport to Montenegro, Austria could never agree to this, as such a port would be incessantly employed, not for objects of legitimate trade, but in facilitating the passage of emigrants from Italy.

Count Rechberg said that M. Blau, the Prussian Consul, evinced a strong disposition to support the project of the Prince of Montenegro, but that he hoped Her Majesty's Government would decline entertaining it. He added that he had sent the papers connected with this affair to London for communication to your Lordship, and that he should be glad that the policy of the Imperial Government in this question were approved of by Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 342.

The Prince of Montenegro to the European Delegates.

Cettigné, le 18 *Septembre*, 1861.

JE reviens d'une manière tout particulière sur la question qui concerne les affaires de l'Herzégovine. Après ce que j'ai fait dans un but d'humanité et pour complaire aux

Grandes Puissances dans l'épisode de Nichsich et la rémunération que j'en ai obtenue; je désire avant d'entreprendre quoique ce soit être fixé sur les intentions des Grandes Puissances, que j'ai servies de tout mon pouvoir en cette occasion.

Je ne puis voir dans la lettre de MM. les Ambassadeurs que ce qu'elle contient en réalité, c'est à dire, des remercîments adressés sous une forme très courtoise et très polie et rien de plus. Je ne pourrais guère attribuer une plus grande importance à la démarche faite tout récemment dans le but d'obtenir la levée du blocus.

Si j'ai une première fois engagé ma popularité en intervenant d'une manière si désintéressée à Nichsich, si j'en ai été récompensé par la promesse évasive qu'on me tiendrait compte de mes efforts, "Je ne puis d'une manière plus sérieuse dans les affaires de l'Herzégovine, sans obtenir préalablement la garantie ou la promesse explicite de ce qu'on sera disposé à faire en ma faveur, et de la manière dont on voudra reconnaître mes efforts.

Trois choses sont connexes et se tiennent d'une manière presque indissoluble ; ces trois choses sont:—

1. L'indépendance du Monténégro reconnue par la Turquie.
2. L'obtention d'un débouché sur la mer.
3. La rectification de la frontière.

Sans l'indépendance du Monténégro reconnue par la Turquie, il y aura toujours des dissidences, des conflits, et la Turquie élèvera incessamment des prétentions sur le pays.

Sans la possession d'un port de mer le Monténégro se trouvera toujours isolé de la civilisation et son avenir dépendra du bon au du mauvais vouloir de ses voisins.

Enfin, dans la rectification de la frontière du côté de l'Albanie, il y aura perpétuellement des conflits entre deux peuples habitués depuis si longtemps à se traiter en ennemis.

En ce qui me concerne je n'hésiterais pas un seul instant à compromettre ma popularité, à heurter de front les préjugés de ma nation, à briser les espérances plus ou moins fondées de mes coreligionnaires, si je pouvais en guise de compensation offrir à mon peuple un développement matériel et un avenir moins incertain.

Les sacrifices personnels ne me coûteraient rien pour obtenir un semblable résultat.

Voici ce que je désirerais savoir dans le cas où je mettrais tous mes moyens à votre disposition, dans le cas où je ferais usage de toute l'influence dont je puis disposer pour obtenir la pacification de l'Herzégovine, que ferait-on pour moi?

Je ne puis guère dans cette circonstance me contenter d'une simple promesse ne marquant que du bon vouloir, j'ai besoin d'une parole ayant le caractère d'un engagement et qui me mette en position de répondre aux aspirations de mes populations. A ces conditions je ferai tout mon possible pour éviter l'effusion du sang et arriver à cette pacification tant désirée de l'Herzégovine.

A mon avis, et toute idée personnelle d'agrandissement mise à côté, je crois que l'obtention des trois points énoncés plus haut serait indispensables, mais n'ayant nuenement l'intention de poser des conditions absolues, j'ai besoin cependant d'une réponse nette sur le plus ou le moins que l'on serait disposé à m'accorder.

Pour me résumer, je vous prierai donc, Messieurs, de vouloir bien pressentir les intentions de vos Gouvernements, et aussitôt qu'ils vous auraient fait connaître leur pensée là-dessus me faire l'honneur de me la communiquer.

Je vous prierai en outre, si vous le jugez à propos, de poser nettement la question afin que je puisse agir selon tous mes moyens et sans préoccupation de l'avenir.

J'attends votre réponse, Messieurs, et si elle répond à mes désirs, j'aurais l'occasion de vous développer d'une manière plus complète mes intentions et nous pourrons alors nous concerter ensemble sur l'opportunité et la manière de disposer des moyens qui pourraient être en notre pouvoir.

Agréez, &c.
Le Prince du Monténégro,
(Signé) NICOLAS, m.p.

No. 343.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received October 21.)

(No. 28.)
Ragusa, October 12, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's information, copies of despatches, with their respective inclosures, which I have this week addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at the Porte, regarding the affairs of Montenegro.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure 1 in No. 343.

Consul Holmes to Sir H. Bulwer.

Sir, *Ragusa, October 8, 1861.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that I arrived here late last night.

I now inclose copy of a letter of which I had been vaguely informed at Bosna-Seraï, but of which no copy had reached me, from the Prince of Montenegro to the Consuls of the Five Great Powers, intended, it is supposed, for those composing the European Commission. M. Hecquard, however, in the absence of most of the members, thought fit to act alone, although a collective step is requested, and sent the letter to Omer Pasha, copy of whose reply I also transmit herewith.

I would remark that the Pasha's observations are extremely just with regard to the inconsistency of the Prince's request, as most of the inhabitants of the districts now occupied by the Serdar have taken refuge in Montenegro, and it is difficult to conceive how certain Montenegrin families can be starving while food is found for thousands of Turkish revolted subjects.

My own opinion is that the Prince anxiously seeks the means of agitating Servia in favour of Montenegro, and that any such emigration as that in question should be most carefully prevented by Turkey.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure 2 in No. 343.

The Prince of Montenegro to the European Delegates.

Messieurs, *Cettigné, le 1/13 Septembre, 1861.*

L'ETAT de blocus et la récolte tout-à-fait mauvaise ont reduit quelques villages du Monténégro à toute extrémité. Pour échapper à la famine qui les menace quelques familles n'ont d'autres ressources que dans l'émigration ; mais pour quitter le pays, cerné comme il est de toute côté, il faudrait que son Altesse Omer Pacha voulut bien consentir dans un but d'humanité à laisser un chemin ouvert à ces pouvres familles entre le Monténégro et la Servie, seul point où elles pourraient trouver un asile.

A cet effet, Messieurs, j'ai l'honneur de vous prier de vouloir bien venir en aide à ces quelques familles en faisant auprès du Généralissime Turc une démarche collective en leur faveur.

J'ai l'espoir qu'une démarche semblable de votre part sera couronnée de succès et que son Altesse Omer Pacha ne se trouvera pas insensible à la voix d'humanité.

Pour ma part, Messieurs, je vous serais très reconnaissant de tout ce qui vous tenterez en pareille circonstance.

Recevez, &c.
Le Prince du Monténégro,
(Signé) NICOLAS, m.p.

Inclosure 3 in No. 343.

Omer Pasha to M. Hecquard.

(Traduction.)

Mon cher Monsieur,

J'AI reçu la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'expédier ainsi que celle du Prince de Monténégro m'exposant que les céréales manquant dans sons pays quelques familles s'étaient décidées à se rendre en Servie, et me priant de les laisser passer sur le territoire Ottoman. Du moment où ces familles se rendent en Servie pour y chercher des moyens d'existence je ne vois aucun empêchement au passage qu'elles demandent.

Je m'étonne seulement que lorsque les Monténégrins trouvent des vivres pour les sujets Ottomans réfugiés au Monténégro et pour ceux qui s'y retireront encore, des familles Monténégrines soient forcées d'émigrer en Servie par suite de la rareté des céréales. Il en résultera en effet qu'il se trouve des vivres pour les réfugiés et non pour les propres habitants, ce qui donne matière à des soupçons.

Le Prince éprouvant une grande compassion pour ces familles qui veulent émigrer en Servie, j'accède au désir qu'il vous a exprimé à la condition toutefois que parmi l'émigration il ne se trouvera pas des sujets Ottomans revoltés. Veuillez donc, je vous prie, vous informer exactement du nombre de familles Monténégrines voulant émigrer, et de combien d'individus elles se composent et me faire connaître ces renseignements aussitôt que vous les aurez afin que je puisse prendre les dispositions nécessaires.

Agréez, &c.

(Signé) OMER.

Inclosure 4 in No. 343.

Consul Holmes to Sir H. Bulwer.

Ragusa, October 8, 1861.

Sir,

IN consequence of the message sent to the Prince of Montenegro through the Scutari Consuls by the Ambassadors of the Five Great Powers, the former has addressed a letter to the members of the European Commission, copy of which I have the honour to inclose.

Your Excellency will have probably perceived that the Prince always alludes to what he calls the "episode" of Nichsich as if he had rendered an immense service deserving a commensurate remuneration, whereas I am inclined to consider that His Highness did as little as possible on that occasion, and even that little was characterized by a considerable amount of bad faith.

Sir Hastings Gilbert will have communicated to your Excellency the result of his visit, with his colleagues, to Cettigné, at which the Prince declined to sign any document, declaring that he would henceforth abstain from intervention in the affairs of the Herzegovina, as His Highness persists that he never has interfered, and to say he would do so no longer, would be to admit the previous question.

In his present letter to the Commission he sets forth, with a certain degree of pretension which will not escape your Excellency, the terms on which he will endeavour to bring about the pacification of the Herzegovina. He demands a positive engagement or guarantee that his three demands will be accorded to him, or at least that he be informed what portion of them will be granted, in order that he may act accordingly.

It has always been, and still is, my opinion that, without some arrangement which will really content the Montenegrins, the permanent pacification of the Herzegovina is impossible; but after the manner in which the Prince acted toward Omer Pasha on the occasion of his journey to Scutari to meet the Prince at Jabliak, and after the military occupation of the Herzegovina, and all that has subsequently taken place, it is a question as to how far it is compatible with the dignity and interests of the Porte at the present moment to accept a pacification at the hands of the Prince of Montenegro, or to make concessions which will now have the appearance of having been extorted. What guarantee also can the Prince give in return that his people, over whom he seems to possess a most indifferent influence, will abstain from their immemorial prejudices regarding the religious necessity of slaughtering the Turks whenever they can find an opportunity to do so.

These questions I submit to your Excellency's consideration, and I venture to remark that it would be extremely useful to me to be informed, if possible, of your Excellency's ideas, and also those of the Porte, regarding them.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure 5 in No. 343.

The Prince of Montenegro to the European Delegates.

Cettigné, le $\frac{18}{30}$ *Septembre*, 1861.

Messieurs,

JE reviens d'une manière toute particulière sur la question qui concerne les affaires de l'Herzégovine. Après ce que j'ai fait dans un but d'humanité et pour complaire aux Grandes Puissances dans l'épisode de Nichsich, et la rémunération que j'en ai obtenue, je désire avant d'entreprendre quoi que ce soit être fixé sur les intentions des Grandes Puissances, que j'ai servies de tout mon pouvoir en cette occasion.

Je ne puis voir dans la lettre de MM. les Ambassadeurs que ce qu'elle contient en réalité, c'est-à-dire des remercîments adressés sous une forme très courtoise et très polie, et rien de plus. Je ne pourrais guère attribuer une plus grande importance à la démarche faite tout récemment dans le but d'obtenir la levée du blocus, si j'ai une première fois engagé ma popularité en intervenant d'une manière si désintéressée à Nichsich, si j'en ai été récompensé par la promesse évasive qu'on "me tiendrait compte de mes efforts," je ne puis d'une manière avantageuse pour mon peuple et pour moi intervenir une seconde fois, et cette fois d'une manière plus sérieuse, dans les affaires de l'Herzégovine, sans obtenir préalablement la garantie ou la promesse explicite de ce qu'on sera disposé à faire en ma faveur, et de la manière dont on voudra reconnaître mes efforts.

Trois choses sont connexes et se tiennent d'une manière presqu'indissoluble. Ces trois choses sont :—

1. L'indépendance du Monténégro reconnue par la Turquie.
2. L'obtention d'un débouché sur la mer.
3. La rectification de la frontière.

Sans l'indépendance du Monténégro reconnue par la Turquie, il y aura toujours des dissidences, des conflits, et la Turquie élevera incessament des prétentions sur le pays.

Sans la possession d'un port de mer le Monténégro se trouvera toujours isolé de la civilisation, et son avenir dépendra du bon ou du mauvais vouloir de ses voisins.

Enfin sans la rectification de la frontière du côté de l'Albanie, il y aura perpétuellement des conflits entre deux peuples, habitués depuis si longtemps à se traiter en ennemis.

En ce qui me concerne je n'hésiterais pas un seul instant à compromettre ma popularité à heurter de front les préjugés de ma nation, à briser les espérances plus ou moins fondées de mes coreligionnaires, si je pouvais en guise de compensation offrir à mon peuple un développement matériel et un avenir moins incertain.

Les sacrifices personnels ne me coûteraient rien pour obtenir un semblable résultat.

Voici, ce que je désirerais savoir : Dans le cas où je mettrais tous mes moyens à votre disposition, dans le cas où je ferais usage de toute l'influence dont je puis disposer pour obtenir la pacification de l'Herzégovine, que ferait-on pour moi ?

Je ne puis guère dans cette circonstance me contenter d'une simple promesse ne marquant que du bon vouloir, j'ai besoin d'une parole ayant le caractère d'un engagement, et qui me mette en position de répondre aux aspirations de mes populations. A ces conditions je ferais tout mon possible pour éviter l'effusion du sang, et arriver à cette pacification tant désirée de l'Herzégovine. A mon avis, et toute idée personnelle d'agrandissement mise de côté, je crois que l'obtention des trois points énoncés plus haut serait indispensable; mais n'ayant aucunement l'intention de poser des conditions absolues, j'ai besoin cependant d'une réponse nette sur le plus ou le moins qu'on serait disposé à m'accorder.

Pour me résumer, je vous prierais donc, Messieurs, de vouloir bien pressentir les intentions de vos Gouvernements, et aussitôt qu'ils vous aurait fait connaître leur pensée là-dessus me faire l'honneur de me la communiquer.

Je vous prierais en outre, si vous le jugez à propos, de poser nettement la question afin que je puisse agir selon tous mes moyens et sans préoccupation de l'avenir.

J'attends votre réponse, Messieurs, et si elle répond à mes désirs, j'aurais l'occasion de vous développer d'une manière plus complète mes intentions, et nous pourrons alors nous concerter ensemble sur l'opportunité et la manière de disposer des moyens qui pourraient être en notre pouvoir.

Agréez, &c.

Le Prince du Monténégro,

(Signé) NICOLAS, m.p.

No. 344.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(*Received October* 21.)

Constantinople, October 20, 1861.

(Telegraphic.)

THE Porte has received official intelligence, dated Scutari, 18th, that Omer Pasha signally defeated a body of insurgents 3,000 strong near Synchna, a village two leagues from north-western extremity of Montenegro.

Though one-half were Montenegrins, and escaped into Montenegro, Omer Pasha did not pursue them beyond the frontier at Lukava. He has permanently occupied Piva, in order to command the province.

No. 345.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 1132.) *Foreign Office, October 22, 1861.*

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches upon the subject of Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 346.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 29.) *Ragusa, October 15, 1861.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith copy of despatch, which I have just addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at the Porte, reviewing the present position of the Turks and Montenegrins.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure in No. 346.

Consul Holmes to Sir H. Bulwer.

Ragusa, October 14, 1861.

Sir,

IN my despatch of the 8th, I had the honour to remark that, after all that has taken place during the past summer, "it is a question as to how far it is compatible with the dignity and interests of the Porte at the present moment to accept a pacification at the hands of the Prince of Montenegro, or to make concessions which will now have the appearance of having been extorted." Since I have been here I have diligently inquired the opinion of my different colleagues and of those intimately acquainted with the condition of affairs in Montenegro, and I have come to the conclusion that at the present moment it would be unwise to make concessions of any kind whatsoever, but rather to allow matters entirely to take their course during the present winter without interference, unless some extraordinary circumstances should arise to demand it.

In order that your Excellency may be able to judge for yourself as to the correctness of this conclusion, I beg permission to review as briefly as possible the actual position of the Turks and Montenegrins, and what would be the probable result of concessions to the latter on the one hand, or of the maintenance of the present condition of affairs on the other.

I will first take the position of the Turks at the present moment. It is supposed here that Omer Pasha has entirely failed in his campaign, because no battle has been fought and no rebels have been killed, but the fact is that the Serdar has performed, or is in the course of performing, most successfully everything he intended to effect. His Highness proposed to obtain the following results:—first, to show the insurgents that he had the power to send his troops where he pleased in the revolted provinces, and this he accomplished by the march of a body of 6,000 men, under Dervish Pasha, through Bagnani and Piva—the most dangerous districts—without a single rebel daring to oppose him, all having fled to Montenegro. Dervish Pasha was instructed specially to do no harm to any one unless he was attacked, to respect the property of the people, and to proclaim to all who would remain at, or return to, their homes, that they should be protected, and even relieved in case of distress, during the coming winter. These orders, I am assured, were faithfully carried out. The next object was to obtain possession of and reprovision, refortify, and garrison the important military positions which had been abandoned by Dervish Pasha during the last three years, namely, Niehsich and the Dooga Pass, Klobuk, and Koloshin. These are positions which give the Turks the command of the whole of the revolted districts of the Herzegovina; and, moreover, menace Montenegro, and they are all now in Omer Pasha's possession. Powerful garrisons will be posted in them, whence to the right and left strong detachments can

* No. 342.

be sent in case of any movement in their neighbourhood. The Pasha now puts aside the question of whether the people submit or not. He holds the country; he invites them, with every possible promise of protection and reform of abuses, to return to their homes; if they will not do so the distress they must endure in their sojourn in Montenegro is the result of their own acts, and his Highness hopes that they will sooner or later recognize their folly. This position is by no means unsatisfactory, but it is costly, and its ultimate success, of course, will depend on the manner in which the Turkish Government maintains and reinforces its army. The great difficulty is the want of money, and the Porte must absolutely find what is necessary or give up the contest. Now the question arises, would the difficulties of the Turks be removed by the nominal submission of the insurgents or by concessions to Montenegro? I imagine not. Could the Porte withdraw a single battalion of her troops on the faith of the sincerity of the allegiance of her newly-recovered subjects or of the promises of Montenegro? Certainly not. Submission or no submission, peace or war, Turkey will have to maintain for many years strong garrisons at a vast expense in the Herzegovina, until at least she has had time by reform and good government to show the population that their interests and happiness lie rather in a contented submission to her rule than in rebellion. Turkey, then, at the present moment, seems to gain nothing by concessions to Montenegro, but will rather compromise her dignity and afford a proof of her weakness in the eyes of all the Slav populations, which are anxiously fixed on this question of Montenegro. I do not at all retract my opinion that it is necessary to the permanent pacification of the Herzegovina to content Montenegro. This must eventually be done, but I do not think any steps should be taken at present to do so. My reasons will also be better understood by now considering the position of Montenegro. I am assured that affairs in the Mountain are in a terrible condition. Famine is imminent; and there is a deadly political struggle going on between the reasonable and peaceful party (made up of the friends and relatives of the late Prince Danilo) and the fanatical war party headed by the senator Mirko, the father of the Prince. This latter party is accused of bringing about the present state of affairs, and it is generally believed that should the Prince fail in obtaining the removal of the blockade, or other concessions, a revolution is certain. The Prince and his father, conscious of the extreme danger of their present position, are therefore straining every nerve to obtain from Turkey, through the European Powers, what is necessary, as it were, to their political, and perhaps to their actual, existence. If this be granted, the arrogance of Montenegro will know no limits, other concessions will be demanded, and it is the firm opinion of all with whom I have conversed on the subject that a similar triumph of the party now at the head of affairs will not only not put an end to aggression on Turkey, but will encourage revolutionary ideas in all the surrounding Slav countries, and lead to further and more disastrous complications than are at present deplored, and eventually, without a shadow of doubt, to the armed intervention of Austria. On the other hand, by allowing things to take their natural course, and by indicating this intention to Montenegro, and taking away the hope of present intervention, a revolution may take place there which would probably give the supremacy to the reasonable and peaceful party, who would be only too glad to concur in a satisfactory and permanent arrangement of the relations between Turkey and Montenegro.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 347.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 30.) *Ragusa, October 15, 1861.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that last night I received the following telegraphic communication from the Prince of Montenegro, as did all my colleagues at present at Ragusa:—

"Trente Octobre les Turcs ont franchi la frontière, attaqué Loukovo, tué quinze hommes, coupé cinq nez; demande réparation de cet acte barbare s'il a été commis sans ordre d'Omer Pacha."

I would observe that, when the Commission assembled at Mostar, it was agreed that, however much such affairs were to be regretted, they could not be prevented, and were likely to be of continual occurrence until peace was restored to the Herzegovina. The village of Loukovo is situated near Niehsich, exactly on the line of frontier, amongst a

number of villages which are always plundering each other and fighting among themselves, so that there is nothing unusual in the affair to which the Prince alludes. The date is evidently a mistake. The phrase "les Turcs ont franchi la frontière" might be interpreted to mean the Turkish army, but Omer Pasha has not the slightest intention of attacking Montenegro, and if he had done so, the results would have been somewhat more serious. Myself and my Prussian, and, I believe, my Austrian colleague, are agreed that we can do nothing more than communicate the telegram to our respective Ambassadors as simple information. The application of the Prince to the members of the Commission at Ragusa appears to us to be rather superfluous. In the first place, the Commission is not officially reassembled, and Omer Pasha declines any official relations with it. The Prince has constant communication with Omer Pasha, and could with more effect apply directly to him. Lastly, there is no doubt that these affairs are extremely exaggerated, and often, I believe, almost entirely incorrect. Omer Pasha, I am told, would be absolutely inclined to resign were he to receive orders at present to renew his relations with the Commission, so impressed is he with the idea that it can do no good just now, and only serve to give the insurgents and Montenegrins the idea that, in any case, the Christian Powers are determined to encourage and protect them. I am also persuaded that the less intervention, or even appearance of intervention, there be at present, so much the better. The time will come when, perhaps, it will be sought for by both parties, and will be the more efficacious from not having been constantly attempted in vain.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 348.

Earl Russell to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 238.)
Foreign Office, October 23, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 543 of the 17th instant, reporting what had passed at an interview you had held with Count Rechberg on the subject of the proposals of Montenegro to the Porte, at which his Excellency had expressed the hope that Her Majesty's Government would approve of the policy which the Imperial Government intended to pursue, and I have to inform your Excellency, in reply, that Her Majesty's Government entirely concur with Count Rechberg.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 349.

Earl Russell to Consul Holmes.

(No. 2.)
Foreign Office, October 23, 1861.

Sir,

I HAVE received your despatch No. 29 of the 15th instant, and I have to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government approve of the views you have taken of the present state of the Montenegro question, as reported in your despatch to Sir Henry Bulwer No. 35 of the 14th of October.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 350.

Earl Russell to Consul Holmes.

(No. 3.)
Foreign Office, October 24, 1861.

Sir,

IN reply to your despatch No. 30 of the 15th instant, I have to inform you that Her Majesty's Government entirely agree with you in opinion that the European Powers should not interfere, under the present circumstances, between the Turks and Montenegrins.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 351.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 1139.)
Foreign Office, October 24, 1861.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches upon the subject of Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 352.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 638.)
Foreign Office, October 24, 1861.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches relative to the affairs of Montenegro.†

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 353.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received October 25.)

(No. 700.)
Constantinople, October 16, 1861.

My Lord,

WITH respect to your Lordship's telegram of the 11th instant, and with respect to the blockade of Montenegro, as the Prince and some of my colleagues stated the blockade to be one of the grounds which, by exciting the Montenegrins, was calculated to to prevent a peaceable arrangement as to the Herzegovina, and as your Lordship wished that peaceable arrangement to take place, I thought it right to submit the Prince's complaint to the Turkish Government, but declined to press the raising of the blockade upon the Porte unless it obtained from the Prince of Montenegro such conditions and terms as it deemed satisfactory. The counter-conditions then claimed by the Porte were communicated to the Prince, who declined to accede to them unless further demands he made were acquiesced in.

These demands are set forth in a note from the Prince herewith inclosed, and they seem to me to enter into an altogether new subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

Inclosure in No. 353.

The Prince of Montenegro to the European Delegates.

(*No date.*)

Messieurs,

JE reviens d'une manière toute particulière sur la question qui concerne les affaires d'Herzégovine. Après ce que j'ai fait dans un but d'humanité et pour complaire aux Grandes Puissances dans l'épisode de Niehsich et la rémunération que j'en ai obtenue, je désire avant d'entreprendre quoi que ce soit être fixé sur les intentions des Grandes Puissances, que j'ai servies de tout mon pouvoir dans cette occasion.

Je ne puis voir dans la lettre de MM. les Ambassadeurs que ce qu'elle contient en réalité, c'est-à-dire des remercîments adressés sous une forme très courte et très polie et rien de plus. Je ne pourrais guère attribuer une plus grande importance à la démarche récemment faite dans le but d'obtenir la levée du blocus.

Si j'ai une première fois engagé ma popularité en intervenant d'une manière si désintéressée à Niehsich, si j'en ai été récompensé par la promesse évasive qu'on me "tiendrait compte de mes efforts," je ne puis d'une manière avantageuse pour mon peuple et pour moi intervenir une seconde fois, et cette fois d'une manière plus sérieuse, dans les affaires d'Herzégovine, sans obtenir préalablement la garantie et la promesse explicite de

* No. 340.

† Nos. 320, 331, 334, 335, 340, 342.

ce qu'on sera disposé à faire en ma faveur et de la manière dont on voudrait rétribuer mes efforts.

Trois choses sont connexes et se tiennent d'une manière presque indissoluble; ces trois choses sont:—

1. L'indépendance du Monténégro reconnue par la Turquie.
2. L'obtention d'un débouché sur la mer.
3. La rectification de la frontière.

Sans l'indépendance du Monténégro reconnue par la Turquie, il y aura toujours des dissidences et des conflits et la Turquie élèvera toujours des prétentions sur le pays.

Sans la possession d'un port, le Monténégro se trouvera toujours exclue de la civilisation et son avenir dépendra toujours du bon ou du mauvais vouloir de ses voisins; enfin:

Sans la rectification des frontières du côté d'Albanie il y aura perpétuellement des conflits entre deux peuples habitués depuis si longtemps à se traiter en ennemis.

En ce qui me concerne, je n'hésiterai pas un seul instant à compromettre ma popularité, à heurter de front les préjugés de ma nation, à briser les espérances plus ou moins fondées de mes coreligionnaires, si je pouvait en guise de compensation offrir à mon peuple un développement matériel et un avenir moins incertain.

Les sacrifices personnels ne me coûteraient rien pour obtenir un résultat semblable.

Voici ce que je désirerais savoir. Voici le cas où je mettrais tous mes moyens à vos dispositions, dans le cas où je ferai usage de toute influence dont je pourrais user pour obtenir la pacification de l'Herzégovine, que ferait-on pour moi?

Je ne puis guère en cette circonstance me contenter d'une simple promesse ne manquant que du bon vouloir, j'ai besoin d'une parole ayant caractère d'un engagement, et qui me met en position de répondre aux aspirations de mes populations, et ces conditions je ferais tout mon possible pour éviter l'effusion du sang et pour arriver à cette pacification tant désirée de l'Herzégovine.

A mon avis, et toute idée personnelle d'un agrandissement mise de côté, je crois que l'obtention des trois points énoncés plus haut serait indispensable; mais n'ayant aucunement l'intention de poser des conditions absolues, j'ai besoin cependent d'une réponse nette sur le plus ou le moins qu'on serait disposé à m'accorder.

Pour me résumer, je vous prierai donc, Messieurs, de vouloir bien pressentir les intentions de vos Gouvernements, et aussitôt qu'ils vous auraient fait connaître leur pensée là-dessus me faire l'honneur de me la communiquer.

Je vous prierai, en outre, si vous le jugez à propos, de poser nettement la condition afin que je puisse agir selon tous mes moyens et sans préoccupation de l'avenir. J'attend votre réponse, Messieurs, et si elle répond à mes désirs, j'aurai l'occasion de vous développer d'une manière plus complète mes intentions et nous pourrons alors nous concerter ensemble sur l'opportunité et les moyens qui pourraient être en notre pouvoir.

Agréez, &c.
Le Prince de Monténégro,
(Signé) NICHOLAS.

No. 354.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received October 25.)

(No. 701.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, October 16, 1861.*

I WILL endeavour, in as few words as possible, to present you with a general view of the state of affairs here. First, as to the Principalities.

Aali Pasha, it appears, has sent instructions to the Turkish Representatives at the different Courts in respect to the claims he puts forward in return for the concession which he is prepared to make in regard to the union of Moldavia and Wallachia, during the lifetime of Prince Couza. He says he shall await an answer to the communications he has made before again summoning the Representatives to meet him. When we reassemble I shall follow strictly the instructions your Lordship has sent to me, in conformity with the understanding that has been come to with the French Cabinet.

There will then also arise a question as to the Italian Representative, who will insist upon being present at any meeting over which Aali Pasha presides, and I intend, unless otherwise instructed, to support his pretension; but it will be strongly opposed by the Austrian Representative, and not received in a friendly manner by the Representatives of Russia and Prussia.

In the meantime, according to Mr. Green's reports, Prince Couza and his Government seem disposed to take the settlement of their union into their own hands. I do not think, however, notwithstanding their language, they will venture to do so unless secretly or publicly encouraged by one or more of the Great Powers. In regard to Servia there are two questions pending, first, that Concerning the faubourg of Belgrade, and secondly, that touching the recent constitution adopted by Prince Michael and the Skuptchina. With regard to the first question, I see no possibility of arranging it, except by a reference to the Great Powers, and as to the second, the only way I think for the Porte to act is to submit the language and proceedings of Prince Michael to the Guaranteeing Powers, which, having given their consideration thereto, may instruct their Representatives here as to the course they should pursue.

In Montenegro, Prince Nicholas is evidently playing a double game, and is bent upon obtaining great concessions, which the Porte is unwilling and little likely to give, as the price of his neutrality in respect to the insurrection in the Herzegovina, a neutrality, however, which he still professes loosely to observe, but concerning which he will give no positive or binding declaration. Unless Europe can solve this question, it must be left, I fear, to the course of events and the chances of war, whilst the real policy of the different states of Europe with respect to it appears, in reality, so divergent, whatever words they may employ, that I see nothing to rely upon but the prudence and ability of Omer Pasha for bringing matters gradually to a just and pacific termination.

Touching other points of importance, my opinion of the Sultan still remains unchanged. His character is one of activity; his intentions are excellent, but his education has been too confined not to have retained him in ignorance of the affairs of Government. His Ministers, depending for their fortunes and situations entirely on his will, and being also inspired with the strongest traditional respect for his person and authority, have not the courage to give fair and frank advice, and he must acquire the knowledge of the state of things he has to deal with, before he can effect the good which he desires, by gradual observation and experience.

Riza Pasha has been forced to quit the capital for his Government at Smyrna, where it is probable, under existing circumstances, he will do well. I have ordered our Consul to treat him with the respect which is due to his position, and to regard his present conduct with impartiality, and without reference to the past.

Aali Pasha expects the assistance of Rushdi and Fuad Pashas, in order to take a more leading part in the Cabinet, and counterbalance, where it is necessary, the influence of Mehemet Aali Pasha, which is great, not only from his family connection, but likewise from his practical knowledge, as compared with others, of naval details, to which His Majesty is specially devoted, as the sole object probably which had previously occupied his attention. He has, however, lately, partly, I venture to trust, owing to my representations, taken a greater interest in financial affairs. It is, indeed, on some reform and arrangement as to these that the present and future condition of Turkey absolutely depends. I have already written so much to your Lordship on this matter that I fear wearying you by returning to it. It forms, however, the constant subject of my anxious consideration.

There are various plans which may be devised for removing the pressing incumbrance of an outstanding debt, which must constantly interfere as long as it lasts with all order and regularity in the management of the annual income of the Empire. But the basis of all sound improvement must be sought for in the publicity of accounts and the increase of revenue. All the observations I have made on this latter point, and the practical knowledge I have recently acquired during a short tour through the province of Broussa, convinced me that the increase above alluded to must be looked for in, and can easily be obtained by, new arrangements as to the collection of the tax esand a more clear and orderly mode of dealing with them when collected. Without imposing another farthing upon the burdens of the people, and greatly alleviating many of their grievances, I am certain that not only might the present deficit be provided for, but that also a large surplus sufficient to supply an interest for a sum which would meet all the claims of Turkish creditors could be raised if the administrative details to which I have alluded underwent an adequate change. In order to increase my present information on this question, I intend addressing a Circular to our Consuls. At present, all I have been able to effect, which, however, I flatter myself, is not unimportant, is to fix the attention of the Government and the public, as well as that of the Sovereign, on this interesting topic.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

No. 355.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 645.)
Foreign Office, October 26, 1861.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency, for your information, the accompanying copy of a despatch from Lord Napier on the subject of the affairs of Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 356.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 348.)
St. Petersburgh, October 22, 1861.

My Lord,

WHEN the Porte demanded from the Prince of Montenegro and his savage Senators a declaration of non-intervention as the condition of the raising of the blockade of their territory, the Russian Minister at Constantinople recommended the Prince by telegraph to give the assurance required.

Prince Gortchakow has obligingly shown me a telegraphic despatch forwarded from Cettigné by the Russian Consul Soutchenkow, containing the refusal of the Prince, based upon the ground that such a declaration would involve the admission of previous participation in hostilities against the Porte. The Prince affirms his past neutrality, and adduces, as a proof of his humane and friendly disposition, the return to the Turkish authorities of prisoners made by the insurgents of Vranina.

Prince Lobanoff, in his accompanying despatch to Prince Gortchakow of the 1st October, deplores the failure of his efforts to obtain the revocation of the blockade and the suspension of hostilities against the Mountain, but promises to unite his colleagues in renewed representations in this sense, and in placing the conduct of Prince Nicholas in a favourable light before the Porte.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 357.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 553.)
Vienna, October 24, 1861.

My Lord,

HAVING mentioned to Count Rechberg, two days ago, when conversing with his Excellency on the affairs of Montenegro, that Her Majesty's Government had determined not to interfere in them unless called upon by both parties to suggest terms of accommodation, as stated in your Lordship's despatch No. 231 of the 18th instant, he said that, after the late inadmissible propositions of the Prince of Montenegro, he thought the first thing the Powers ought to do would be to dissolve the Commission now assembled at Ragusa, for it, he said, could no longer meet for good, but for evil.

Count Rechberg then said that he had been glad to hear that M. de Thouvenel had expressed his disapproval of the Prince's letter, but he added that he had not heard that the French Government had taken any steps regarding M. Hecquard's proceedings in this matter with a view to preventing his giving encouragement hereafter to the Prince of Montenegro's ambitious projects.

At one time Count Rechberg imagined that the French Consul had been instrumental in inducing the Prince of Montenegro to address the late objectionable letter to the Commissioners at Ragusa, but his Excellency now appeared under the impression that M. Petkovich, the Russian Agent, was the author of it, and he has no doubt that he was at Cettigné when the letter was written.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

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* No. 309.

No. 358.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 1153.)
Foreign Office, October 28, 1861.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, a despatch in original from Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh respecting the blockade of Montenegro.*

Your Excellency will return this despatch at your earliest convenience.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 359.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received October 29.)

(Telegraphic.)
Constantinople, October 29, 1861, 9 P.M.

THE Representatives of Russia, France, Austria, and Prussia think that, in the present position of affairs in the Herzegovina and Montenegro, no good can result from the members of the late Herzegovina Commission remaining at Ragusa, and as I agree in this opinion, I would, with your Lordship's permission, instruct Mr. Holmes to return to his post.

No. 360.

Earl Russell to Lord Napier.

(No. 214.)
Foreign Office, October 29, 1861.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE herewith, for your Excellency's information, copy of a despatch which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris, Vienna, and Constantinople, respecting the affairs of Montenegro.†

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 361.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 1159.)
Foreign Office, October 30, 1861.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches upon the subject of the state of affairs in Montenegro.‡

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 362.

Consul Sir F. Gilbert to Earl Russell.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 34.)
Scutari, October 10, 1861.

My Lord,

On the 24th of last month I received the telegram of which I inclose copy from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, and in obedience thereto I set out next morning with my colleagues for Cettigné, and on the second day arrived at our destination. I inclose, for your Lordship's information—

A copy of the reply of the Prince to our proposal.

A copy of the report of the Consuls to the Ambassadors at Constantinople.

A copy of my own remarks on the above-mentioned report.

* No. 309. † No. 339. ‡ Nos. 346, 347, 356, and 357.

I regret that our mission has failed, but from our personal acquaintance with the Prince and his people we had very slight hopes of succeeding in our object.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. H. GILBERT.

Inclosure 1 in No. 362.

Sir H. Bulwer to Consul Sir F. Gilbert.

Péra, le 23 Septembre, 1861.

(Télégraphique.)

LA Sublime Porte est prête à expédier par télégraphe l'ordre de lever le blocus aussitôt que le Prince et les principaux Sénateurs du Monténégro auront pris par écrit l'engagement formel d'empêcher dorénavant toute incursion et participation aux troubles des districts voisins. Rendez-vous avec vos collègues sans délai à Cettigné, tâchez d'obtenir une pareille déclaration et mandez moi par télégraphe le résultat.

Inclosure 2 in No. 362.

The Prince of Montenegro to the European Delegates.

Cettigné, le 27 Septembre, 1861.

MM. les Consuls,

J'AI été vivement surpris par la teneur de la communication que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de me remettre. Mes notes n'ayant en aucune manière donné lieu à une déclaration de blocus, répondre pour en obtenir la levée par l'engagement formel d'empêcher dorénavant toute incursion, et de ne prendre aucune participation aux troubles des districts voisins, ce serait reconnaître d'avoir prêté la main à ceux qui ont eu lieu, insinuation contre laquelle je proteste de toutes mes forces.

Je ne me suis jamais departi de la modération et des égards qu'on se doit entre nations civilisées, bien que les actes des autorités Turques n'aient pas toujours conservé le caractère.

Je me fais honneur d'avoir répondre aux cruautés commises sur mes sujets, et aux primes accordées à cet effet par l'ordre de respecter la vie des prisonniers, et de les traiter avec les égards dus à des malheureux.

Ces prisonniers vont être en outre délivrés et rendus à leur patrie.

Agréez, &c.
Le Prince du Monténégro,
(Signé) NICOLAS.

Inclosure 3 in No. 362.

The European Delegates to the Ambassadors at Constantinople.

Cettigné, le 27 Septembre, 1861.

MM. les Ambassadeurs,

CONFORMÉMENT aux ordres données par vos Excellences, nous nous sommes rendus à Cettigné. Le Prince Nicholas nous ayant reçus dans la même journée nous lui remîmes copie du télégramme que vos Excellences nous faisaient l'honneur de nous adresser le 23, et nous priâmes Son Altesse de vouloir bien nous donner le plustôt possible une réponse écrite. Aussitôt après avoir pris connaissance de cette note le Prince se récria: "Signer une pareille déclaration serait," nous dit Son Altesse, "donner un démenti à la conduite que j'ai tenue jusqu'ici et aux diverses notes que je vous ai adressées. Ne m'étant jamais ingéré dans les affaires de l'Herzégovine, ayant tout fait, au contraire, pour conserver la tranquillité journellement violée par les Turcs, je ne puis venir déclarer que je ne ferai plus à l'avenir une chose que je n'ai jamais faite."

Nous avouerons franchement à vos Excellences, MM. les Ambassadeurs, que nous avions prévu ce résultat. Il nous était en effet impossible d'espérer que Son Altesse consentît à se donner un semblable démenti. Tout ce que nous pouvions attendre de notre démarche était d'obtenir du Prince une déclaration conçue en termes moins formels et ne paraissant pas contredire ses assertions précédentes. Nous agîmes donc dans ce sens, mais malgré tous nos efforts il nous fût impossible de réussir. Son Altesse, à toutes les observations que nous lui fîmes nous répondit qu'elle n'avait donné à la Porte aucun motif d'établir un blocus autour de provinces qu'elle savait être en proie à la famine. Qu'après s'être prêtée, comme elle l'avait fait à toutes les demandes des Grandes Puissances au sujet du ravitaillement de Nichsich, elle était en droit d'espérer que la Sublime Porte répondrait d'une toute autre manière au service qu'elle lui avait rendu dans cette circonstance; et qu'elle n'admettrait jamais qu'on lui posât des conditions aussi désonorantes qu'un démenti pour la levée d'un blocus immérité.

Son Altesse nous parla ensuite de la situation de l'Albanie et nous dit qu'il ne comprenait pas que lorsque la Sublime Porte n'était pas maîtresse chez elle, lorsque ses Gouverneurs se voyaient forcés, pour complaire à une population fanatique, d'exposer des têtes de femmes et enfants sur les forteresses Impériales, ce Gouvernement ne sentit pas combien il était difficile au Prince du Monténégro d'empêcher quelques mauvais sujets de contrevenir à ses ordres et de passer la frontière pour secourir leurs parents. Enfin Son Altesse prit congé en nous promettant de nous donner le lendemain sa réponse.

Son Altesse nous remit en effet ce matin la déclaration que nous avons eu l'honneur d'expédier aussitôt par le télégraphe à vos Excellences et dont elles trouveront la copie ci annexée.

Le Prince nous parla ensuite de l'affaire de Gobovatz, dans laquelle sa frontière avait été violée, les massacres ayant eu lieu sur son territoire. Son Altesse se défendit aussi de sa participation aux faits de Vranina, qui n'étaient que le résultat des vexations des Turcs; ceux-ci ayant les premiers attaqué les habitants de ce village quelques Monténégrins isolés accoururent pour le secourir. Son Altesse ajouta que, dans cette circonstance, elle avait été assez heureuse pour arracher des mains des insurgés de Vranina retirés sur son territoire les prisonniers qu'elle avait fait soigner, et qu'elle allait nous remettre. Enfin Son Altesse déclara de nouveau qu'elle resterait strictement neutre dans les événements qui se préparaient près de ses frontières et qu'elle n'agirait qu'autant que son territoire serait encore une fois violé mais qu'elle le ferait alors avec vigueur.

Avant de quitter le Prince, nous lui exposâmes la situation de ses malheureux coreligionnaires, leur impossibilité de résister aux forces prépondérantes des Turcs, les embarras qui en découleraient certainement pour le Monténégro, et nous engageames Son Altesse à user de toute son influence pour persuader aux insurgés de faire leur soumission pendant qu'il était temps encore.

Son Altesse sembla gouter ses conseils, les suivra-t-elle et arrêtera-t-elle cette infortunée population sur la pente fatale où elle est lancée? Nous le désirons sans toutefois l'espérer beaucoup.

Agréez, &c.
(Signé) F. H. GILBERT.
R. FRANCESCHI.
HY. HECQUARD.
SOUTCHENKOFF.
LEICHTENBERG.

Inclosure 4 in No. 362.

Consul Sir F. Gilbert to Sir H. Bulwer.

Scutari, October 7, 1861.

Excellency,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith the report of the mission of the Consuls of Scutari to Montenegro, on which I beg leave to make some observations:—

After a tedious journey of nearly two days we arrived at Cettigné, and were received by the Prince without delay, but on stating the object of our visit, he really was, or affected to be, utterly astonished, his colour changed, and considering he is generally so very quiet in his manner, we were astonished at the vehemence with which he uttered the speech which is quoted in the report, and was written down at the moment as nearly as possible word for word. He then complained at some length of the Great Powers permitting the Ottoman Government, without a declaration of war, and without provocation on his part, to blockade Montenegro; he laid special stress upon his conduct with regard to Nichsich. This appeared to me a bad instance to cite, for though some provisions did get in safe, he must be aware that large quantities were waylaid by collusion between the Montenegrins and their neighbours, of which the lion's share was carried off by his father, Mirko. The subject of the heads exposed at the fortress of Scutari is a very sore one with all classes of the Montenegrins, as four of the heads were those of guards who had been sent to protect the Greek Christians who had fled into the Montenegro territory. This afforded the Prince, who was much excited, a great occasion

for comparisons, and being a good French linguist at all times, still I never heard him speak to such advantage.

On going out for a walk we observed a marked change in the manner of those we met, and numbers of people who had hitherto been friendly avoided us.

The next day the Prince gave us his reply in writing, which was duly telegraphed to your Excellency, and of which a copy is inclosed. We again had a long conversation with him, but to all we could say he invariably spoke of the injustice of the blockade. He again mentioned a number of instances in which the Turks invaded his territory, and were not punished for it; he said we must be aware that he did all he could to keep his people within their own bounds; he assured us that the attack on Vranina was only an affair of a few border Montenegrins who had gone to assist their friends, who were being fired upon by the Turks. One can hardly believe that he was totally ignorant of the intended attack, or at least some of his captains must have known of it, for I was informed by a Montenegrin that several attempts had been made to assist the people (some 50 families, who are Montenegrins by origin, religion, and costume) to leave Vranina, but in consequence of some difficulty had repeatedly been postponed. There is no doubt that at least 300 or 400 Montenegrins went to Vranina; the people of the island (the insurgents) saved the prisoners, two Scutarians and eight Bashi-Bazouks, who were called out of the fort under what is called "besa" (truce, or rather, contract of peace), and their lives were saved probably from some acts of kindness they had shown these people, who seem to have been very ill-used by the Turks; the rest of the Bashi-Bazouks perished in the fort. We saw a number of these runaways; with the exception of those who had friends to assist them, they are in a most miserable condition, and living in some abandoned fishing huts on the river side.

Baron Liechtenberg, the Prussian Consul, who has lately been up to the quarters of Omer Pasha and Luko Vukalovich, gives a very pitiable account of the insurgents of Herzegovina, and suggested that we should endeavour to get the Prince to advise their submission, if only for a time, as they were in no position to fight the Turkish army. But to our appeal he would give no answer, indeed, rather hinted that he did not care to interfere, unless his own territory was invaded. I saw some guns tied on to poles for carrying on men's shoulders, so I presume they are preparing for war. Two vessels had arrived at Budua laden with Indian corn which Mirko had bought in Corfu, and he is saving money by cutting down all luxuries in the Palace; and in order that we should pay a good price for our horses, he caused all those at or near Cettigné to be sent to a distance. He is endeavouring in every way to make money, and I cannot help thinking that, from the confident way he and the Prince talk of war, that they must be backed by some powerful influence.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. H. GILBERT.

No. 363.

Consul Sir F. Gilbert to Earl Russell.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 35.)
My Lord,
Scutari, October 14, 1861.

IT appears that the Porte has accepted the resignation of Abdi Pasha, who has left for Monastir (where his family reside), and Djevdet Effendi has arrived from Constantinople; the object of his mission has not transpired, but I presume it is to look into and examine the complaints of the Scutarians. I trust the Porte has some good reason for this step, as these two events have caused much excitement among the Turks, who are becoming very insolent, and fancy they can obtain whatever they desire from the Sultan. They propose to do away with the French and Russian Consulates, and they have already had words with, and given some trouble to, the latter, on account of the Greek church which is being erected under the inspection of the Russian Consul. Two Pashas are also expected, one as Civil, and the other as Military Governor; it is to be hoped that they will arrive soon and bring some troops with them, for affairs look very bad at present in Scutari.

We have received from Berat some fine troops, but I regret to say that numbers are daily sent to the hospital with fever, which is very prevalent at present, and I hear that one or two are dying daily from typhus. Small-pox has, I am happy to say, disappeared, with the exception of a few isolated cases among the Turks.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. H. GILBERT.

No. 364.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 649.)
Sir,
Foreign Office, October 31, 1861.

YOUR despatch No. 701 of the 16th instant, which has been laid before the Queen, contains remarks upon matters of great interest, which deeply concern the fortunes of the Ottoman Empire.

Indeed, it may be said that, if the present Sultan can deal successfully with the difficulties now before him, he will greatly increase his reputation, become personally, as well as by hereditary right, the object of veneration to all Mussulmans, and inspire his Christian subjects at once with respect for his love of justice and awe of his power.

In regard to the Principalities, I have conveyed to you the instructions of Her Majesty's Government, which I believe will be found in conformity with those of France and Russia. If Prince Couza is allowed to form a legislative and administrative union for his life on the one side, the Porte, on the other, preserves all its rights and prerogatives after his death or resignation.

In regard to Servia, it is clear that the laws and resolutions of the Skouptschina imply entire independence. It is obvious that, whatever the Porte might do in other circumstances, she cannot evacuate the suburb of the fortress of Belgrade in face of this pretension. Her Majesty's Government will, however, reserve their final opinion until the time when they shall have received the appeal which it is understood the Sultan is about to address to the Great Powers.

In Montenegro and Herzegovina, as you observe very truly, the Prince of Montenegro is playing a double game. While he professes friendly intentions towards the Porte, he fans the flame of insurrection, with a view to obtain for himself concessions, to be the prelude for further encroachments; for no one can reasonably doubt that, if a seaport were granted to the Prince and his independence acknowledged, he would invite adventurers from all parts to aid him in founding an enlarged independent State in alliance with Servia.

You observe with justice that, in regard to Montenegro, the policy of the Great Powers is divergent one from the other.

You represent the Sultan as both honest and active, but with too little experience to guide himself in difficult matters of policy, and yet as inspiring too much awe in his Councillors to allow on their part of free and independent advice.

The finances, although disordered, seem to want only regularity, punctuality, and honesty in their management, to set them right. But the most elementary maxims of financial administration seem to be either unknown or entirely neglected in Turkey.

The view which you present of the general state of the Empire is not very encouraging. But the position has this advantage, that, although there is a general impression that the decline of Turkey is in progress, and its fall at hand, no Power is at at present prepared to take advantage of its embarrassments.

The late war, and her present internal difficulties, will deter Russia from any such aggression as that perpetrated by the late Emperor Nicolas.

No other Power is disposed to arm alone openly and ostensibly against Turkey. An interval, therefore, is afforded to the Porte, during which she may revive her forces, and strengthen her finances.

It is not to be disguised, however, that her forces must be considerable, and that they cannot be considerable unless her finances are in good order.

She must be prepared to resist the hostility of the Prince of Servia and of the Prince of Montenegro; she must keep Bulgaria in order; she must restrain the fanaticism of the Mahomedans of Damascus, and be prepared to encounter Christian insurgents on the borders of Greece.

She must pay her troops regularly, and at the same time collect the revenue without employing vexatious and rapacious instruments. The Sultan must conciliate his Christian people by an impartial administration of justice, and not alienate the Mahomedan portion of his subjects by any real or apparent weakness of concession.

It has sometimes occurred to me whether, in the face of all these difficulties, the Porte might not do well to alienate some part of its territory.

Whether, for instance, the Herzegovina, or Bosnia and Turkish Croatia, together with Herzegovina, might not be ceded to one of the States of Europe in consideration of a sum which would sweep off the more pressing incumbrances of the Porte, and enable her to start afresh with unembarrassed finances. A sum of this kind might also relieve Turkey from a great part of her military expenditure. She might then have a well-

furnished army, and a well-appointed navy, fit to cope with any enemy who might attack her.

I am aware that many grave objections might be urged against such a plan, and that it would be considered by many as a commencement of the partition of Turkey. But we must look at things as they really are, and not as they may be represented.

I wish you to consider this subject, and let me know your mature opinion before anything further is said about it.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 365.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 1171.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, November 1, 1861.*

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches upon the subject of the affairs of Montenegro and the Herzegovina.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 366.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 561.)
My Lord, *Vienna, October 31, 1861.*

WHEN I was with Count Rechberg yesterday, I read to his Excellency your Lordship's despatch No. 238 of the 23rd instant, in which you state that Her Majesty's Government concur with his Excellency in what he had said to me respecting the affairs of Montenegro, and he appeared much gratified at this intelligence.

Count Rechberg read to me a telegram from Ragusa containing an account of some successes which the insurgents in the Herzegovina, assisted by the Montenegrins, appear to have obtained. His Excellency said that he had also received a communication from the Consul at Trebigné, who fully expected that place to be taken possession of by the insurgents, and had requested instructions as to whether in such an eventuality he should hoist his flag. Count Rechberg had answered that the Consul would receive his instructions from Baron Prokesch at Constantinople, and he observed that he had decided on this answer, because he considered it advisable that the conduct of the Austrian Consul should be in conformity with the wishes of the Porte, and with any decisions that may be taken by the Representatives of the great powers at the seat of Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 367.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 1183.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, November 6, 1861.*

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches upon the subject of Montenegro.†

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

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* No. 359

† No. 362.

No. 368.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 672.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 7, 1861.*

I TRANSMIT for your Excellency's information copies of two despatches relative to the affairs of Montenegro which I have received from Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Vienna and St. Petersburgh.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 369.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received November 8.)

(No. 710.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, October 25, 1861.*

WITH reference to Mr. Consul Holmes' despatches to me, Nos. 33 and 34, of the 8th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship a copy of a despatch I have addressed to Mr. Holmes, stating that I concur in his views as expressed in those despatches.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

Inclosure in No. 369.

Sir H. Bulwer to Consul Holmes.

Sir, *Constantinople, October 25, 1861.*

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your despatches of the 8th instant, inclosing copies of recent correspondence between the Prince of Montenegro and the European Commissioners, and the translation of a letter addressed to M. Hecquard by Omer Pasha.

I have much pleasure in concurring with the views you express in these documents, and am of opinion that Omer Pasha's letter is all that could be desired.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

No. 370.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received November 8.)

(No. 723.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, October 29, 1861.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 603 of the 8th instant, you will have seen, by my despatch No. 710 of the 25th instant, inclosing a copy of my letter to Mr. Consul Holmes on the communications of the Prince of Montenegro to the European Commission at Ragusa, that I share the opinion of Mr. Holmes.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

No. 371.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received November 18.)

(No. 729.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, October 30, 1861.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 604 of October 8, saying that important questions should not be decided without reference home, I need not say how fully I understand this precept, and how much I should regret if I had acted in opposition to it; but I am really not aware of this.

* Nos. 356 and 357.

Some mistake on the part of M. Thouvenel (by this time, I have no doubt, explained) took place in reference to what occurred in regard to Servia.

In regard to the Principalities, I stated my opinion to your Lordship, but never attempted nor thought of deciding anything without reference to you.

In regard to the proposal made with respect to the blockade of Montenegro, most of my colleagues urged me to press the raising of this blockade on the Porte, saying that it was the only course to stop the effusion of blood.

Your Lordship had strongly instructed me to prevent such effusion of blood if possible, and I did not, therefore, like to leave it to others to say that I had refused to do so; but I added that I could not approve of the blockade being raised without satisfactory concessions being made to the Porte by Montenegro in return, and that it was a matter to be left to Aali Pasha.

The proposal, therefore, with which your Lordship is acquainted, was made by Aali Pasha; and its being made has produced, I think, some advantages:—

1. It cannot now be said that any refusal to adopt measures of conciliation originated here.

2. It has been seen clearly what the Prince of Montenegro's views and demands really are.

3. It has become clear that all further intervention in the affairs of the Herzegovina and Montenegro by foreign Powers is at present useless.

It is under this impression that I suggest the recall of Mr. Holmes from Ragusa in my telegram of this day to your Lordship.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

No. 372.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 1213.) *Foreign Office, November 20, 1861.*

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches upon the subject of Servia and Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 373.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 702.) *Foreign Office, November 21, 1861.*

Sir,

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna, reporting a conversation which he had held with Count Rechberg on the affairs of Montenegro and the Herzegovina.†

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 374.

Consul Calvert to Earl Russell.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 62.) *Monastir, November 7, 1861.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the two regiments of cossacks and dragoons have taken up their winter quarters at Useup. They arrived there on the 27th ultimo. The camp at Kossovo has been broken up in consequence of cold and wet weather.

I have been informed, through an indirect but apparently authentic channel, that the Serdar Ekrem Omer Pasha has addressed an instruction to the Kaïmakam of Useup, by which, after expressing his great displeasure at the affray between the Mussulmans

* Nos. 365 and 366.

† No. 366.

and the cossacks which occurred during the passage of the latter through that town on their way to camp last July, his Excellency directs the Kaïmakam, as a just punishment of the Mussulmans for their display of an inimical feeling towards a Christian regiment in the service of the Sultan, to quarter the cossacks in Mussulman houses if there be not room for both regiments in the khans. Omer Pasha threatened, in case of resistance to his orders, to send a regiment of Turkish cavalry to be quartered in the town in addition to the cossacks and dragoons.

The three batteries of artillery and the battalion of chasseurs which left this town in September last did not remain at Prishtina, as was given out at the time. They have gone on to Bosnia.

The Liva Ali Pasha, who commanded a brigade of infantry in the Herzegovina, has lately returned hither. His baggage fell into the hands of the Montenegrins, but as it was found on Austrian territory, it was recovered and restored to him. He, however, lost a mountain gun, which the Montenegrins captured and have kept.

The total artillery force remaining at Monastir at present amounts to sixteen field pieces with men and horses complete.

The enrolment of the battalion of Redifs from the province which was called under arms has been completed. They scarcely number 500 men.

The resignation of the Ferik Abdi Pasha, late Military and Civil Governor of Scutari, having been accepted, he has arrived at Monastir, and has resumed his titular functions as President of the Council of the army of Roumelia, which had been temporarily discharged by Salih Pasha, who has been appointed to the command of the garrison at Widdin.

The Governor-General of Monastir, who went, last week, to Vodena, half the way to Salonica, in order to inspect the road between that place and this town, with the view to having it macadamized, returned to Monastir two days ago.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHARLES C. CALVERT.

No 375.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 768.) *Constantinople, November 11, 1861.*

My Lord,

WITH reference to Mr. Consul Holmes' despatch to me, No. 35 of the 14th ultimo, on the position respectively of the Turks and Montenegrins in Herzegovina, I have the honour to inclose herewith a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to Mr. Holmes.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

Inclosure in No. 375.

Sir H. Bulwer to Consul Holmes.

Sir, *Constantinople, November 11, 1861.*

I HAVE read your despatch of the 14th ultimo with much pleasure. Omer Pasha seems to have followed precisely the plan I ventured to point out, and to have done so with great judgment and success.

I quite agree in the views which you have ably expressed, and deem that matters must be left to take their course until some fitting opportunity arrives for providing for the future in a manner which secures the just rights of the Porte, the peaceful settlement of the Herzegovina, in a manner compatible with the fair claims of its inhabitants, and control of that predatory disposition and unreasonable ambition which the people and Prince of Montenegro seem to have lately manifested.

I am, &c.
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

No. 376.

Mr. Longworth to Earl Russell.—(Received November 25.)

(No. 72.)
My Lord, *Belgrade, November 7, 1861.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit, herewith inclosed to your Lordship, the copy of a despatch, dated October 7, to his Excellency Sir Henry Bulwer, relative to the mission to Belgrade of the Montenegrin Senator Mattanovich, and to the proceedings of the Russian and French Consular Agents at Belgrade.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. A. LONGWORTH.

Inclosure in No. 376.

Mr. Longworth to Sir H. Bulwer.

Sir, *Belgrade, October 7, 1861.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that the Montenegrin Senator Mattanovich, who arrived here on a special mission from Prince Nicholas ten days ago, returned by the way of Vienna and Trieste on the 4th instant. At the former place he had previously made an appeal on behalf of his countrymen to the Austrian Government, but, I am told, could obtain nothing there—not even an audience. But he had better success at Belgrade. Prince Michael informed me that the Servian Government has given 5,000 ducats (to which I hear he added 1,000 from his private purse) for the relief of the Montenegrins, who were exposed to the greatest hardships, not only from the failure of their crops, but in consequence of the drought in those parts. This charitable feeling cannot, I fear, be disconnected from political sympathy, and coincides too manifestly with the rekindled hostility of His Highness to the Porte. The newspapers in the pay of the Government at Belgrade, as well as those similarly influenced in the Slav provinces of Austria, openly advocate an offensive and defensive alliance between Servia and Montenegro; while some assert that it is actually concluded. The Prince, on the other hand, endeavoured to persuade me that the mission of M. Mattanovich was confined to an application on the part of Prince Nicholas for an allotment of lands in Servia to Montenegrin emigrants, as there was no longer room or means of subsistence for the existing population in their own country. But the Prince assured me he would not and could not give his consent, partly on account of the idle and turbulent habits of these people, and also because the Servians, though there was much uncultivated land, laid claim to it all and would not permit strangers to settle among them. It is probable, I think, that some overtures of this nature were really made by M. Mattanovich; but it were too much to suppose that in the present beleagued and critical circumstances of the Montenegrins he came here for this purpose only.

In the course he adopts with reference to Montenegro, Prince Michael will, I should think, be governed by events; if Omer Pasha meet with a serious reverse, we may expect to see him making common cause with Prince Nicholas, which would be a signal also for a general rising in Bosnia, though I doubt whether, if unsupported by foreign invading forces, it would be at all effectual; while in Bulgaria, for reasons I shall presently state to your Excellency, I do not think there would be any movement whatever.

The influence which the French Consulate-General of Belgrade exerts at this conjuncture over the policy of the Servian Government is, I fear, of a dangerous and equivocal tendency.

The French officer, Colonel Mondaine, who was before Minister of Public Works, is now also Minister of War; he holds both appointments, and he will have the organization of the national militia. There is, moreover, at Belgrade, a person of the name of Devaux, the agent of French capitalists, who is in treaty with the Government for the establishment of a national bank. The negotiation has, I believe, the support of the Consulate, but has not yet been brought to a successful bearing; the terms proposed are too hard and monopolizing. Besides a guarantee of 5 per cent. interest on the capital of 2,000,000 fr., the bank is to be the exclusive medium for the negotiation of loans, railways, and other public works. I do not exactly know if the securities offered by the capitalists are altogether satisfactory, but I should question if they be. Another French Company, called the Franco-Serbian Company, which has obtained the concession of the steam navigation of the Save and Danube, together with

the working of the mine of Maden-pek, has failed entirely to fulfil the conditions on which it was granted to them. This should teach the Servian Government to be cautious, putting out of the question the political hazards they incur by the surrender of their finances, in addition to their military system to the control of Frenchmen whose connection with their own Government is in the one case very clear, and in the other open to suspicion, it may possibly be the means of involving Servia in difficulties and responsibilities which they do not anticipate.

More than one dependency of the Ottoman Empire is, I believe, already entangled in a net of this nature.

I should mention, also, a circumstance which leads me to apprehend that the Servian Government may be already compromised in this way. It is certain that their expenditure has greatly increased of late, and this without any visible augmentation of their resources. The interest, at the same time, which the French Consulate takes in Servian affairs is no less remarkable. The Cancellier, M. Dozen, who till lately was Acting Consul here, has just returned from a tour in the interior, where he has been probably to report on the state of the different districts there.

The Russian Consul-General, Colonel Vlangaly, is absent from his post, having been summoned by M. Balabine to Vienna, or, according to another account, to Toplitz. I have to repeat to your Excellency the conviction I entertain that Colonel Vlangaly receives his instructions from Vienna, at least to a much greater extent than he does from Constantinople; and this in some measure accounts for the difference of my impressions as to Russian policy to those of your Excellency.

Colonel Vlangaly informed me before he went that he would return to Belgrade, but only for a few days, as he had obtained leave of absence for a considerable period. The affairs of the Consulate will be intrusted to the charge of Prince Vadbolsky, the Russian Cancellier, an inexperienced young man, in the same manner as those of the French Consulate were left for a year in the hands of M. Dozen. It is evident that the effect of these combinations, whether proceeding from chance or design, must be to prevent everything like rivalry or collision between French and Russian Agents at Belgrade.

I have been the more desirous to explain these particulars to your Excellency that I cannot help thinking them in some way connected with the plans and prospects of insurrection in these provinces. In Bulgaria, however, as I have already intimated, I believe it is not likely there will be any revolt or disturbance whatever. The emigration scheme, which it was calculated would, by the disorder it created on the frontier, materially promote these objects, has had an entirely different effect. Instead of finding Servia the land of milk and honey they had been taught to expect, the emigrants have, in the hardship, ill-treatment, and privation they experienced, found ample reason to be satisfied with their lot in Bulgaria. They have accordingly returned, almost all of them, to their villages in the Pashaliks of Nish and Widdin, and the probability is they will not be easily tempted, after the lesson they have had, either to revolt or emigrate.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. A. LONGWORTH.

No. 377.

Mr. Longworth to Earl Russell.—(Received November 25.)

(No. 73.)
My Lord, *Belgrade, November 7, 1861.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit, herewith inclosed to your Lordship, the copy of a despatch dated October 28, to his Excellency Sir Henry Bulwer, containing observations on the Servian Predstavnik's note relative to the proceedings of the Skuptchina at Kragievitz.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. A. LONGWORTH.

Inclosure in No. 377.

Mr. Longworth to Sir H. Bulwer.

Belgrade, October 28, 1861.

Sir,

YOUR Excellency I presume has been furnished by the Servian Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople with a copy of a note addressed to him, under date of the 22nd ultimo, by the Predstavnik, in which that gentleman endeavours to justify on legal grounds the late proceedings of the Skuptchina at Kragievoitz. A copy in translation of the same document having likewise been communicated to me by M. Christich, I have to observe to your Excellency that as well as I can judge that he has by no means succeeded in his task; he has failed not only to produce anything in the shape of argument, but to take advantage even of the only one which affords a semblance of justification, though on examination it will be found, I believe, to be of no greater validity than the rest—I mean that founded on the XVIIIth Article of the Treaty of Paris, and I deem it necessary to advert to it because, though overlooked by M. Christich, I have heard it repeatedly put forward by my French colleague, M. Tastu. Thus, as indicating perhaps the views and policy of the French Government, it may be considered of some importance.

By a reference to the Article in question, your Excellency will see that in the first paragraph it is declared:—

"The Principality of Servia shall continue to hold of the Sublime Porte, in conformity with the Imperial Hatts, which fix and determine its rights and immunities, placed henceforward under the collective guarantee of the Contracting Powers."

Now the most important of the rights and immunities so fixed is the Servian Constitution established by the Hatti-Sherif of December 1838, described as having the force of an organic statute. The second paragraph of the Article is as follows:—

"In consequence, the said Principality should preserve its independent and national administration, as well as full liberty of worship, of legislation, of commerce and navigation."

It is clear that, if any change and modification in the sense of the Hatti-Sheriffs had been intended, the phrase by which the two paragraphs are connected would have been "notwithstanding," and not "in consequence." The only construction by which they can be reconciled is that by which legislation is interpreted to mean civil and criminal legislation, but not organic. In the same manner the full liberty of commerce stipulated by the same Article can be exercised only within the limits prescribed by the Commercial Treaties of the Porte with foreign Powers.

The organic laws of the Principality form part of the public law of Europe, and are based on the Treaties subsisting between the Porte and the Guaranteeing Powers; they cannot be changed, therefore, without their sanction. The Skuptchina, by means of which the Prince has sought to abrogate them, was in its origin an Elective not a Legislative Assembly. Notwithstanding its incompetence to deal with such matters, it has like other modern agencies been evoked for revolutionary purposes. And these now having been accomplished, the prerogatives of the Porte ignored, and the independence of the Senate by the same instrumentality subverted, the Skuptchina has finished by abjuring, at the bidding of the Prince, the legislative functions it had usurped. Thus His Highness, having disposed of the Porte, the Senate, and the Skuptchina, is the sole depository power in Servia.

"Il y a à peu près trois ans que l'Assemblée de St. Andrée (Skuptchina) avait reporté sur elle-même plusieurs attributions du pouvoir législatif contrairement à l'ordre primitif des choses d'après lequel ce pouvoir appartenait exclusivement au Prince et au Sénat. A présent que les privilèges personnels des Sénateurs ont tombés les causes pour lesquelles l'Assemblée Nationale s'était faite une situation exceptionnelle sont tombées aussi, de sorte que chaque autorité rentre dans la sphère primitive de ses attributions et une époque tout à fait normale recommence pour la Principauté."

The manner in which the pretension to the right of contracting Treaties with foreign Powers, assumed in the law relative to the Senate, is explained away by M. Christich, affords another illustration of the special pleading by which it is imagined all Treaty obligations and international law can be set aside to promote the ambitious designs of the Prince of Servia.

Though Servia, M. Christich admits, can have no Treaties with foreign Powers with reference to political matters, she can, he maintains, in respect to those connected with her internal administration, her right to contract them being a necessary consequence of her autonomy. Before, however, asserting this right, it would have been as well for

him to establish a foundation for it, in that of entertaining relations even with foreign Powers. He must assuredly know that none such exists. All the Consular Agents at Belgrade are accredited, not to the Prince of Servia, but to the Porte, and hold their exequaturs from the latter. It is no more in their power to conclude Treaties and Conventions with the Servian Government than Consuls in other Turkish provinces have with the resident Pashas; their intercourse, moreover, with the Servian authorities, as well as the rights and privileges of their respective subjects, are equally regulated by the Treaties and Capitulations existing between their Governments and that of the Sultan. The only occasion upon which there has been a departure from this rule occurred when Servia was permitted to send an Agent to Vienna (M. Christich himself) to attend at the deliberations of the Mixed Danubian Commission. This proceeding, which was altogether irregular, the Servian Government has since always considered as a precedent.

M. Christich, I observe, reiterates arguments which have been over and over again refuted. It is only surprising how anybody can be found to listen to them. In alluding, for example, to the subject of the removal of the Turks resident outside the fortresses, he refers to the Hatti-Sherif of 1830, which he declares to be guaranteed by the Great Powers, as if the subsequent Hatts, by which the stipulations on this point have in respect to Belgrade been modified, were not placed under similar guarantee, and as if, in a case of discrepancy, the first and not the last of a series of enactments was to be held good.

It will be unnecessary to examine at length what M. Christich urges in defence of the new plan of taxation. This is a branch of internal administration with respect to which they have full latitude to do as they please. It is a subject in which my French colleague takes a much livelier interest than I do, but he agrees with me that all they have done has been to disturb the old system without substituting anything practical in its place. The different districts will have themselves to apportion and adjust the property-tax to the means of the contributors, which is precisely what they did before, only they had then the basis of a general capitation tax of 5 dollars, and this has now been done away with.

The main object for which it is sought to increase the revenue is the creation of an army. The success of the one measure depends entirely on that of the other; so it is probable that neither one nor the other will be carried into effect. Were it possible, however, the organization of such a force would be contrary to the prescriptions of the Hatti-Sherifs. M. Christich, in adverting to the project, would have more effectually served his Government could he have shown how it is conformable to these provisions, than in attempting to excuse it on the idle pretext of the martial spirit and propensities of the Servians, whom it would be prudent, he says, in the interests of the Porte as well as of Servia, to submit to subordination and discipline. No such necessity, he must well know, exists. The Servians are a boastful, but not a warlike race. It is the Government that will not allow them to remain quiet; though whenever it ventures, as in the despatch of M. Christich, to lecture and menace the Porte, it does so in the name of the people, whose indignation it pretends it can no longer control. The people, M. Christich declares, are offended at the presence of the Ottoman troops upon their frontier; but he says nothing of the cause of their being stationed there, at least nothing to the purpose, nor of the disorders and brigandage which have compelled the Porte to takes measures entailing ruinous expense for the protection of his own provinces.

These facts, it is true, are as much and as long as possible denied, or when admitted, which may be sometimes expedient, it is with a view of inculpating the Russian Government, to whose agency they are all attributed. That Russia has been the instigator and the indefatigable promoter of the incendiary attempts on the Servian borders cannot admit of the slightest doubt; nor did I require the testimony of M. Christich, of M. Garashinin, or of the Prince himself, all of which has been obtained, to be convinced of it. The question is how far the Servian Government have been consenting parties to, if not the willing instruments of, such a policy. To a certain extent I know they have been; their complicity is by no means disproved by their disavowal of it, nor by their having now changed it, and adopted another. In so doing, unfortunately, they have only changed their taskmasters; it is idle to suppose that Servia can be independent; her inherent weakness and the crude elements of which society is composed will not allow of it. The best course for the Prince would have been that prescribed by duty, and to have thrown himself unreservedly on the protection least dangerous to him, that of the Sublime Porte. He has preferred, however, being the vassal of Russia or of France, who alternately and by agreement, it would appear, dictate the programme of the measures to be pursued here. We have one year secret machinations, murder, and brigandage; military and financial organization, or the policy of ostentation, the next,—the last more imposing,

but by no means as effectual as the first. One of the measures of M. Mondaine, the new French Minister of War at Belgrade, has been the dispatch of sixteen officers charged with the military survey of the different frontier districts.

If the intelligence lately received from the Herzegovina, and exultingly propagated by all the Slav newspapers, be only half of it true,—if Omer Pasha have recently met with serious checks and disasters, there is every reason to anticipate that the insurrection will spread, and that the Servians, however loth to expose themselves, may at length be drawn or driven into the arena. It has been with a view to such a contingency that all the plans of Prince Michael have been prepared, his immediate object being the conquest and annexation of the whole of northern Albania which is included within the limits of ancient Servia. Entertaining aims and prospects like these, he must feel that in the event of the overthrow of the Ottoman Dominion he will have powerful rivals to contend with. Therefore has he laboured to rally around him all of Servian race, and to concentrate the strength and resources of the Principality in his own hands. For these reasons also has he sought to substantiate the claims of what he designates his dynasty, and to prove the validity of his hereditary title. It is to be feared, however, that if it can be supported by no better arguments than those of M. Christich, it will stand on a very weak foundation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. A. LONGWORTH.

No. 378.

Mr. Longworth to Earl Russell.—(Received November 25.)

(No. 74.)
Belgrade, November 10, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit, herewith inclosed, to your Lordship the copy of a despatch, dated November 7, to his Excellency Sir Henry Bulwer, relative to the effect created in Servia by the protracted struggle in the Herzegovina.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. A. LONGWORTH.

Inclosure in No. 378.

Mr. Longworth to Sir H. Bulwer.

Belgrade, November 7, 1861.

Sir,

AS it might interest your Excellency to know the effect produced in Servia by the protracted struggle going on between the troops of Omer Pasha and the insurgents in Herzegovina and the confines of Montenegro, I shall endeavour to convey to you the result of my observations on this point. The news received here in the form of telegrams or letters reach us, for the most part, through Dalmatia and Croatia, being dated from Ragusa or Agram; they are highly coloured, therefore, by Slavestic views and sympathies, and little to be relied on. They are, however, but faintly contradicted by accounts coming through other channels, and the Turks have for some time past maintained an ominous silence, so that the most favourable construction to be put upon the state of their affairs is not reassuring. It is evident that even if they have suffered no serious check, they have done little to extinguish the insurrection, and the fact that the Porte has put forth her strength and has failed to quell it must have a dangerous influence on the various sections of the fanatic and heterogeneous population of European Turkey.

The manner in which similar movements were brought to a close in Greece and Servia is still fresh in their recollection.

If the desultory fighting can be only kept up for a certain period, the insurgents feel assured it will be finally decided in their favour by foreign intervention. As the period, however, is approaching when such a solution of the difficulties of the Ottoman Empire appears less and less improbable, the anxiety of the Servian Government increases. They seem to apprehend that the crisis may be premature, and find them unprepared to take advantage of it. At first the wildest reports of victories gained by the insurgents obtained immediate currency in the Belgrade journals, which are all in

the pay and under the control of the Government, but their successes are now discredited or positively denied. What the Prince of Servia most dreads is the occupation of Bosnia by the Austrians, and every rumour which seems to give it a colour fills him apparently with alarm; with a view, therefore, of deprecating such a result, it is treated as authentic by the newspapers in question. A few days ago, it was seriously reported by them that England and France had agreed to indemnify Austria for the abandonment of Venetia by the cession to her, at the expense of the Porte, of the Province of Bosnia. Yesterday it was confidently affirmed that a secret Convention had been concluded between Austria and the Porte for the occupation of Bosnia under certain contingencies by a division of the Austrian army.

The importance to be attached to these reports chiefly consists in the evidence they afford of the conviction entertained by those who are so much interested in watching it of the ambitious policy of the Imperial Government. Not that that of the Prince of Servia is in the least degree more disinterested; on the contrary, it is its incompatibility with the supposed views of Austria that has engendered this feeling of fear, jealousy, and, whenever he can venture to show it, of downright hostility; it is this that has caused him to identify his interests with those of revolution in Hungary. Should that prove successful, he has been promised support and countenance against Turkey, but the chief advantage to be derived from its triumph would be the ruin of his fancied and formidable competition. That the Prince is justified in his suspicions as regards Austria I cannot affirm; neither, on the other hand, can I be sure that he has no grounds for them. The Imperial Government professes friendship, and disclaims hostile intentions towards the Ottoman Empire, and your Excellency informed me some time ago that the Government of Her Majesty has its reasons, the validity of which I do not presume to question, to attach credit to these professions and disclaims; more than this, Austria, though she does not directly discourage the prejudices and sympathies of her Slavonic provinces, does not openly countenance them; prudence perhaps forbids a more decided course of action on her part. I mentioned also in my despatch that the Governor of Temesvar has lately dispatched a Circular letter, a copy of which was shown to me by my Austrian colleague, to the military Governors of these provinces, enjoining vigilance with respect to the depôts of arms said to be forming at different places in aid of the insurgents in Turkey. I have not since been able to ascertain that the steps recommended had been attended with any results worth speaking of. Another fact communicated to me by the Austrian Consul-General struck me as no less significant. The Turkish Kaïmakam of Bihash having repeatedly addressed letters to the Governor of Croatia, Baron Sokesevich, complaining that the forest of Kobliak, in Bosnia, was infested by troops of banditti, who, on being pursued, took refuge on the Austrian territory, the latter found himself compelled at last to take some measures with a view of satisfying or, at any rate, affording a semblance of satisfaction to the Turkish authorities. Thirteen of these brigands were seized, as it was reported, in the village of Girovatz; they were all Turkish subjects, natives of Bosnia, though declaring themselves to be Servians. Some, but not all of them, were furnished with Servian passports. Instead of giving them up, however, to their own authorities, Baron Suksevich sent them to Semlin to be delivered to the Servian Government.

On my remarking to Colonel Borowitzka that this proceeding was irregular, he admitted that it was, but he said public opinion in Croatia and the other Slav provinces of Austria would always interfere with an impartial administration of justice where Turks and Christians were concerned. These prejudices were common to all ranks of the people, and even the highest Croatian functionaries, civil and military, were not uninfluenced by them. He added that if the revolt in the Turkish provinces was not speedily suppressed, his Government would find it difficult, if not impossible, to prevent its subjects on the borders, and more particularly the Grenzer regiments, from taking part in the conflict. I have myself small doubt of the secret persuasion existing among them that, whatever may be the complications of her foreign policy or the Treaty engagements of Austria, she, in reality, is by no means adverse to their views and wishes; and, indeed, considering how necessary it is for her to conciliate them and to combat the influences—Servian among the rest—by which it is sought to re-incorporate them with Hungary, it is her interest to encourage this belief. Much still remains to be done both at Agram and at Carlovatz, and she cannot afford to adopt an unpopular policy. Her position in this respect is perfectly appreciated by her Slavonic subjects, and particularly in Croatia, where they begin to think that were they even openly to take the part of the Christian insurgents in Turkey, their Government might disavow but would adopt no serious steps to repress the movement. They have not forgotten that, in the year 1849, the same Government having proclaimed them rebels while

invading Hungary under Ban Jellachich, afterwards gratefully acknowledged that they had been fighting its battles,

I would, moreover, submit to your Excellency whether, allowing even the present disposition of the Imperial Government to be all that Her Majesty's can desire, there might not be inducements powerful enough to change them. It is confidently asserted by some of the Slav journals that there are two parties in the Government at Vienna, the one of which is for reviving the policy in regard to Turkey of the Emperor Joseph II; nor are the arguments by which the adoption of such a course is supported at all wanting in plausibility. The time is come, they say, when the work commenced, but subsequently suspended, of expelling the Turks from Europe can be renewed; the people only desire to be led to victory under the two-headed Eagle as before.

These views, now generally insisted on in the Slav newspapers, cannot but be suggestive to the Austrian Government. It must occur to it that the great confederacy of Danubian races and nations, of which it became the head, was formed with the common object of erecting a bulwark against Mahommedan invasion. This bond of union, together with the fear of the Turk, has been weakened and relaxed, hence also the diminished influence of the central Government; may it not regain its ancient prestige from the hopes excited by a crusade and war of conquest.

There is no disguising the fact that such a war throughout Germany would be hailed with enthusiasm. I know not how far it might fall in with the political views and objects of other Governments. One thing seems certain, that if Omer Pasha cannot put down the insurrection in the Herzegovina, in which case there is every chance of its extending to other provinces, neither can Austrian interposition be long withheld. Humanity will protest against a conflict of indefinite duration between these barbarous and fanatic races. If the Porte cannot, as she has hitherto done, keep the peace among them, some stronger power will, I presume, have to do so for her, and this it behoves her to take into serious and timely consideration.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. A. LONGWORTH.

No. 379.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received November 25.)

(No. 594.)
My Lord, *Vienna, November 21, 1861.*

THE Turkish Minister of War has passed through Vienna on his return from Paris to Constantinople, and had an interview with Count Rechberg.

Prince Callimachi informs me that, on this occasion, Count Rechberg laid much stress on the state of Omer Pasha's army in the Herzegovina, and on the difficulties of his position, surrounded as he was by insurgents and with a force under his orders that was totally inadequate to effect the object in view, and expressed the hope that Ruschdi Pasha would lose no time, on reaching Constantinople, in urging on his Government the absolute necessity of increasing the numbers and efficiency of Omer Pasha's army.

Prince Callimachi observed to me that the earnest manner in which Count Rechberg spoke on this subject, and the satisfaction with which he remarked on some late successes obtained by Omer Pasha, ought, he thought, to remove all doubt as to the anxiety entertained by the Austrian Government on the subject of the restoration of order in the Herzegovina, and as to any serious thought being entertained by them of an annexation of territory in that direction.

The Turkish Ambassador continues to consider the reports circulated at Constantinople on this subject to be totally unfounded and to have been solely and purposely invented by the enemies of Austria in order to arouse suspicions as to her Eastern policy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 380.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 1288.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, November 27, 1861.*

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches upon the subject of the affairs of the Herzegovina.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 381.

Earl Cowley to Earl Russell.—(Received November 30.)

(No. 1375.)
My Lord, *Paris, November 29, 1861.*

A TELEGRAM, dated yesterday, from Ragusa, informs M. Thouvenel that a considerable body of Austrian troops was about to assemble at Cattaro for the purpose of marching, on Monday next, to dislodge the Montenegrins established at Sutorina.

His Excellency stated to me to-day that he had at once written by the telegraph to Vienna to say that although he comprehended the interests which Austria must have in seeing a speedy termination put to the disorders on her frontier, yet that he considered that Austria ought not to have taken the step in question without previous concert with her allies.

Your Lordship will understand from this that France considers Sutorina to be Turkish ground, whereas Austria claims it as hers. The vexed question of Klek and Sutorina is thus again brought into the foreground.

M. Thouvenel has written to M. de Flahault to call your Lordship's attention to this matter.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 382.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 31.)
My Lord, *Bosna-Serai, November 12, 1861.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's information, copy of despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at the Porte, stating the general result of the battle at Piva, and reporting the present satisfactory aspect of affairs in the Herzegovina.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure in No. 382.

Consul Holmes to Sir H. Bulwer.

Sir, *Bosna-Serai, November 9, 1861.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that on Tuesday, the 5th instant, I had a long interview with Omer Pasha at Mostar. His Highness requested me to telegraph to your Excellency the general result of the battle at Piva, which I did in the following terms:—

"October 21, battle fought at Piva. Omer Pasha begs me to telegraph that the insurgents lost 1,000, and the Turks 155 killed and wounded, and all is going on to his Highness' entire satisfaction."

This affair was declared at Ragusa to have been for the Turks another Grahovo; and the papers, I see, report, with their usual inaccuracy, that the insurgents were entirely successful, and that Omer Pasha had taken refuge in a convent, where he was besieged by them.

* No. 379.

Omer Pasha was very well, and appeared in excellent spirits. He said that now provisions and ammunition were arriving in abundance from Constantinople, and that the Porte had promised him the money he had demanded. He admitted that the delay in sending the necessary provisions might have had most serious results if it had not been for the praiseworthy exertions and intelligence of Osman Pasha, of Bosnia, and his Highness requested me particularly to mention to your Excellency how much he was indebted to Osman Pasha for the admirable support and assistance which he had afforded him.

The Serdar assured me that, in his opinion, matters were going on satisfactorily in the Herzegovina. The insurgents had suffered much in the attack on Piva, and are not likely to repeat it. They lost several leaders of note, and, amongst others, the Montenegrin Senator Novitza, and the Captains of Grahovo and Lupovo are said to have been killed.

Omer Pasha is still pursuing his plan of occupation and the fortification of the important points mentioned to your Excellency in a former despatch. The late rains have enabled him to commence the fortification of the famous pass of Douga, and provisions are being sent to Nichsich to assist the population during the winter. His Highness told me that, when his works were complete, he should dispose his troops in such a manner as to be able to concentrate them without difficulty in whatever direction they might be required. Towards the close of the year he intends to march on Zupchi and Sutorina against the insurgents under Luka Vukalovitch. The winter is very mild in those districts, and the lateness of the season will be rather favourable than otherwise to this expedition, as water will be abundant. His Highness said he should quit Mostar for the south of the Herzegovina again within a few days.

His Highness was much pleased that the Mixed Commission, of which Sheffik Boy was the head, had been dissolved, and also glad that the European Commission had dispersed, for the reasons I have already stated to your Excellency.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 383.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received December 3.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, December 3, 1861, 2·45 P.M.*

AUSTRIAN expedition sent from Ragusa to dislodge Luca Vucalovitch, a Chief of the Herzegovinian rebels, from his position on the neutral territory of Sutorina, has returned, after levelling the works, and has brought away the cannons.

The expedition was absent forty-eight hours, and effected its object without firing a shot.

No. 384.

Earl Cowley to Earl Russell.—(Received December 3.)

(No. 1394.) *Paris, December 2, 1861.*

My Lord,

I UNDERSTAND that the explanation given by Prince Metternich of the march of the Austrian corps on Sutorina, to which I had the honour to call your Lordship's attention in my despatch No. 1375 of the 29th ultimo, is, that the Montenegrins had erected a battery covering a road on Turkish ground, forming an *enclave* within Austrian territory, the use of this road being assured to Austria by Treaty. The Montenegrins were summoned by the Austrian authorities to remove this battery by the 30th November. If found there after that period it would be removed by the Austrians themselves. As Prince Metternich has heard nothing further, he concludes that the guns have been taken away by the Montenegrins.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 385.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received December 3.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, December 3, 1861, 3·30 P.M.*

PRINCE GORTCHAKOW has remonstrated against Austrian intervention at Sutorina. French Government have done so also, and say that Her Majesty's Government are of the same opinion.

No. 386.

Earl Cowley to Earl Russell.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 1402.)

My Lord, *Paris, December 3, 1861.*

M. THOUVENEL has received information that the battery raised by the Montenegrins in the vicinity of Sutorina was removed by the Austrians on Sunday without resistance.

Although his Excellency does not seem disposed to push this matter further, he expressed himself as dissatisfied with the proceedings of the Austrian Government. He denies their having the Treaty right which they claim, and maintains that they ought not to have taken the step in question without previous consultation with the other Powers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 387.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received December 4.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December 4, 1861, 6 P.M.*

I AM informed by the Internuncio that an Austrian force entered the Turkish territory of Sutorina and destroyed two batteries erected by the insurgents which threatened the communications of Austria between Ragusa and Cattaro. On the completion of that duty the Austrians evacuated the Turkish territory.

No. 388.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 1334.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, December 4, 1861.*

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Consul at Bosna-Serai respecting the affairs of the Herzegovina.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 389.

Earl Russell to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 257.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, December 4, 1861.*

I INCLOSE, for your information, copies of despatches from Lord Cowley respecting occupation of Sutorina by the Austrians.†

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

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* No. 382.

† Nos. 381 and 384.

No. 390.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 729.)
Foreign Office, December 5, 1861.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information copies of two despatches from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris respecting the movement of a corps of Austrian troops on Sutorina.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 391.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received December 6.)

(No. 610.)
Vienna, December 3, 1861.

My Lord,

WITH reference to the telegram recorded in my despatch No. 609 of this day, I have the honour to inclose translation by Mr. Barrington of an extract from the "Vienna Gazette," stating the object of the late Austrian military expedition into the Sutorina.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 391.

Extract from the Second Edition of the "Vienna Gazette" of December 2, 1861.

(Translation.)

ACCORDING to accounts which have reached the Imperial, Civil, and Military Governor in Dalmatia, the insurgents in the Herzegovina have raised batteries on two different points in the Sutorina, which command both the Imperial military road leading over this Turkish *enclave* and the waters of the Bocche di Cattaro.

As, in accordance with the agreement existing between Austria and the Sublime Porte, no alteration may be made by either side in the *status quo* in the Sutorina, and since, by the works above mentioned, the security of the communication between the province of Ragusa and the district of Cattaro would be endangered, the Imperial Government has found itself under the necessity of demanding from the Chief of the insurgents, Luka Vukalovitch, that the batteries in question be dismantled within a given time, declaring, at the same time, that if this be not effected at the expiration of this period, Imperial troops will be marched in to enforce it. The said Chief of the insurgents refused, however, to accede to this demand.

The term named to Vukalovitch having expired on 30th November, the Imperial Brigadier in Ragusa has received orders to dismantle the batteries and to take a sufficiently large force with him, which will retire across the frontier as soon as ever they have accomplished their work.

No. 392.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received December 6.)

(Telegraphic.)
St. Petersburgh, December 6, 1861, 1 P.M.

PRINCE GORTCHAKOW proposes a contemporaneous remonstrance on the part of all the Powers against the recent intervention of Austria at Sutorina.

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* Nos. 381 and 384.

No. 393.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received December 7.)

(No. 396.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, November 29, 1861.*

PRINCE GORTCHAKOW showed me a despatch yesterday from Prince Lobanoff, under date of the 31st October / 12th November, conveying the opinion that the rebellion in Herzegovina was still attaining more dangerous proportions, and that the forces of Omer Pasha would prove incompetent to resist the movement.

The impressions of Prince Lobanoff are founded on the statements of the Russian Consul at Mostar, and on those of M. Hecquard, the French Commissioner, as related by the former gentleman.

It is affirmed that the successes recently claimed by the Turks were much exaggerated. According to the Russian Consul, what the insurgents most dread is a European intervention.

If left alone, they are confident of triumph.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 393*.

Earl Russell to Lord Napier.

(Telegraphic.)
Foreign Office, December 6, 1861, 6·15 P.M.

IF Prince Gortchakoff repeats his observation about Sutorina, say that no remonstrance appears to be necessary at present.

No. 394.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 1358.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, December 7, 1861.*

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches upon the subject of Austrian intervention at Sutorina.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 395.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 1365.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, December 7, 1861.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 1402 of the 3rd instant, reporting that M. Thouvenel has received information that the battery raised by the Montenegrins in the vicinity of Sutorina had been removed by the Austrians, and that his Excellency had expressed his disapproval of this proceeding.

I have to state to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government require further information than they at present possess before giving an opinion upon this subject.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 396.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 611.)
My Lord, *Vienna, December 3, 1861.*

THE Imperial Government have been greatly annoyed by the establishment, for some time past, of an armed body of rebels from the Herzegovina, headed by Luka

* Nos. 385, 387, and 393*.

Vukalovitch, on the Turkish *enclave* of Sutorina, on which, according to an agreement with Turkey, no fort or military station is to be erected. It would seem that Luka Vukalovitch had taken possession of this *enclave*, and erected a small fort at each end of it; and, as the guns of the forts commanded the passage by sea from Ragusa to Cattaro, as well as the military road to Castelnuovo, the Governor of Dalmatia, acting under the authority of his Government, called on Luka Vukalovitch to retire from his position.

The rebel Chief, not choosing to give any heed to repeated messages sent to him, the Governor of Dalmatia at last informed him that he would be allowed eight days to depart and to leave the works which in defiance of international agreement he had erected on neutral ground, and that, if he prolonged his illegal occupation, force would be employed to remove him. The answer sent to this communication is said to have been to the effect that Luka Vukalovitch's proceedings had met with approval, and that he should not be left without good support. Upon receiving this defiance, preparations were instantly made to march a small force into Sutorina. Major-General Rodich was selected to command the expedition; and when the intelligence became known at Ragusa, M. Reccpard and the Consuls of Prussia and Russia remonstrated with General Mamula, and immediately telegraphed on the subject to their Governments.

The result was that the Duc de Gramont and Baron Werther were instructed to inquire what were the intentions of the Imperial Government. Count Rechberg explained that the Emperor had approved of the expedition, and that it was on the march; and that as soon as the legitimate object for which it had been sent was obtained, it would retire within the Austrian frontier.

The French Ambassador and the Prussian Minister reported this explanation to their Governments, and in writing to M. Thouvenel, the former seems to have attached less importance to the expedition than was agreeable to the French Government, which apparently at the first moment was disposed to consider the case as one of unjustifiable violation of Turkish territory.

I saw Count Rechberg yesterday, when he said he was glad to find that I had not been charged by Her Majesty's Government to speak to him on this Sutorina question, and he then observed that the Prussian Government had taken a prominent part in its representations, and he could only excuse the tone of Count Bernstorff's telegraphic communication by supposing it was based on the Consular report from Ragusa. The French Ambassador, on the contrary, his Excellency added, used very moderate language in speaking on the subject, and the Russian Minister was the most conciliatory of the three.

I told his Excellency that I had not heard from your Lordship, and, therefore, had no opinion to give or communication to make, but that I was glad to learn that the expedition had already returned within the Austrian frontier.

Count Rechberg then explained that it was utterly impossible for the Imperial Government to allow these two forts to remain. It was not, he said, a question of the ulterior destiny of Sutorina, or whether it would continue for ever to be a Turkish *enclave* or not; but whoever it did belong to must accept the conditions agreed to by Turkey, and, therefore, there must be no building erected on this strip of land, and no impediment raised which can threaten the military road from Ragusa to Castelnuovo or the sea communication.

His Excellency had not received, when I saw him yesterday, any written intelligence in connection with this affair, but he seemed to hope that the explanation which the Imperial Government had to offer would remove all doubt as to the existence of any intention on their part to act otherwise than in defence of their well-founded rights.

I gathered further from Count Rechberg that another reason which had impelled the Austrian Government to this step was the conviction that the Herzegovinians are acting in concert with the Italian movement, and that there was danger in postponing the contemplated measure of dislodging the rebel force from their position; and, therefore, when the Consuls at Ragusa were known to be actively appealing to their Governments, the decision was at once taken to dispatch the expedition, so that in the event of explanations being demanded they would be answered by a *fait accompli*.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 397.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(*Received December 9.*)

(No. 614.)
My Lord, *Vienna, December 5*, 1861.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 611 of the 3rd instant, I have the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's information, translation, by Mr. Barrington, of an extract from an article in the "Presse," on the subject of the late Austrian expedition into the Sutorina.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 397.

Extract from the "Presse," December 3, 1861.

(Translation.)

ON any map of Austria is to be found the well-known Turkish *enclave* Sutorina, which, dividing the districts of Ragusa and Cattaro from one another, stretches from Pacho d'Astro and Castelnuovo to the sea-coast. Grahavo being still in the hands of the Herzegovinian insurgents, Luka Vukalovitch is actually master of Sutorina. An imperial, military, and high road leads from Castelnuovo to Sutorina, dividing Sutorina in a north-westerly direction, and then bending away to the westward.

On a point in the Sutorina where a landing can be effected without infringing on Austrian territory, Luka Vukalovitch has had a fort erected which commands the sea, that is, Austrian waters. The second spot that is now in question lies, probably, hard on the Austrian frontier, and the battery is raised there by the insurgents with the probable view of eventually cutting off communication on this military road. The "Vienna Gazette" speaks of an understanding existing between Austria and the Porte by which no change can be made in the *status quo* in Sutorina by either side. This agreement had already been made by the Republic of Venice with the Porte, and when Count Leiningen was sent to Constantinople, in 1854, it was formally renewed. The actual right is indisputable, and it can be easily understood that one will not look quietly on whilst some Luka Vukalovitch threatens to stop intercourse on an important military road joining two Austrian provinces, and, into the bargain, covers a point on the sea-coast with cannon, the range of which includes Austrian waters. The presumption is somewhat strong that Austrian ships are only to be allowed to ply between Pacho d'Ostro and Castelnuovo by the good permission of Montenegrin nose-slitters and scalp-hunters, or perhaps on condition of saluting the batteries of Luka Vukalovitch.

The nuisance must at any rate be put a stop to, and if anything appears strange to us, it is the consideration with which the work is undertaken by Austria. It is sad and bad enough that a Luka Vukalovitch should have dared to push insolence so far as to refuse to dismantle forts and batteries which threaten the safety of Austrian communication by land and sea, that he can force Austria to march down a brigade to protect her rights and interests. The audacity shown in this step by the Chief of the Herzegovina tribe appears to us so tremendous, that we cannot quite rid ourselves of the idea that Luka Vukalovitch has acted on regular instructions, and has received a formal commission to bring about some event which shall enable foreign and inimical influences to openly identify themselves ("ihre Solidarität zu verkündigen") with the affairs of those who were lately overthrown by Omer Pasha at Savitza.

The Commander of the brigade in Ragusa is Major-General von Rodeck, and he no doubt is at the head of the troops who to-day have destroyed the batteries of Luka Vukalovitch in the Sutorina, which work of destruction is the only one in view. This General's brigade consists chiefly of frontier troops and detachments of Chapenos; and as the "Vienna Gazette" particularly declares these troops will, on finishing their work, and destroying the batteries, return immediately on to Austrian ground, that is to say, the operation is, and will continue to be, of exclusively local importance. According to a telegram received here, there was some question on the part of the Austrians as to whether the Montenegrins would attempt a defence of these batteries or not. The refusal on the part of Luka Vukalovitch to listen to the Austrian demands gives rise to the supposition that he is foolhardy enough to imagine that the positions in question can be held by his men. We hear that the Government, to prevent all misunderstanding of the measures taken to-day in the Sutorina, has informed the Cabinet of the Tuileries of the steps which it has resolved on for maintaining the safety of its territory. No sign

was shown in Paris that any great importance was attributed to the affair, and up to the present moment the French Ambassador in Vienna is said to have expressed his complete satisfaction and assent. We can, therefore, take for granted that there is as yet no intention on the side of France to magnify this local incident into an affair of Continental interest. The telegraph will probably inform us in the course of to-morrow of the issue of the operations in the Sutorina, which were begun by our troops to-day, and it is to be hoped were finished before sunset.

No. 398.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 616.)
My Lord,

Vienna, December 5, 1861.

I HAVE the honour to inclose a *précis* by Mr. Barrington of a further article from the "Presse" of this morning on the Sutorina question.

Your Lordship will see in this extract a sample of the feelings with which the Vienna press is animated on this subject, and especially with reference to the hostile spirit which Prussia has displayed in regard to the recent expedition.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 398.

Précis of Article in the "Presse" of December 5, 1861.

CONSIDERABLE excitement has been caused, both in the European press and in European Cabinets, by the march into Sutorina by the Austrian military. Though the Government of the latter took the precaution of informing the Cabinets of Paris, St. Petersburgh, and Berlin of its intended movements, it seems the information was not sufficiently exact; for the Representatives of the three Cabinets were instructed to demand an explanation of Count Rechberg. This explanation was at once given, and the Representatives of the three Powers expressed their complete satisfaction. The incident, however, gives rise to some remarks. To begin with, we might easily be astonished at the Powers requiring communications from the Vienna Foreign Office in order to explain the movements of Austria in the Sutorina, which are justified by Treaty; that they, therefore, whether intentionally or unintentionally we will not inquire, ignore this Treaty. Again, though people might not be surprised at France and Russia—those zealous protectors of Montenegrin "freedom and civilization"—using this opportunity for showing their sympathy with the noble Luka Vukalovitch by reclamations at Vienna, they must be struck at the Prussian Minister thinking it necessary to join in the Franco-Russian reclamations, and at his even receiving instructions from his Government to this effect. One would have thought that Prussia could quite well leave the task of protecting Montenegrin nose-slitters to the Cabinets of Paris and St. Petersburgh. But it seems impossible for people in Berlin to deny themselves the pleasure of making Austria feel the importance of the "Great Power," though their attempt at showing the latter to be a young hand in these matters is, in the present instance, rather clumsily made. Perhaps also Berlin is anxious to get mixed up in an European question in consequence of the military march into the Sutorina, in which case we must close one eye in looking at the concessions and sacrifices with which the politicians of the Spree have rescued us from all our troubles, and, indeed, more than once, if we believe them, from complete ruin. It is, of course, only an act of brotherly love on the part of Prussia, when Herr von Werther, arm-in-arm with the Representatives of France and Russia, puts questions to the Vienna Cabinet about an affair that in reality is nothing more than one in which the interests of Austria and the Porte are exclusively concerned, and with which, according to Treaties, no one has properly the right to meddle. The international importance of the incident consists at most in Luka Vukalovitch and the Herzegovinian insurgents having been prevented from getting a firm foothold on the coast of Sutorina, and by these means establishing direct intercourse with those fanciful politicians in Genoa who now for a year and a day have been pregnant with the project of blowing Austria to the four winds by simply effecting a landing on the coast of Dalmatia. Neither the Berlin Cabinet nor Herr von Werther can have taken it into their heads to further such projects, even in the most indirect manner, when they demanded explanation from Vienna for the destruction of the

batteries of the Southern Slavic Garibaldi, even though we cannot conceal the fact that the Prussian Consuls in European-Turkey are only surpassed in sympathy for the insurgents and in obstreperous importunity by the famous M. Hecquard and other agents of His Majesty the Emperor of the French. Even if Austria does not require any service of love on the part of Prussia, still, for the sake of Germany at least, people in Berlin should not regularly and designedly countermine Austria's Oriental policy. The interests of Austria and Germany in the East are identical and all intrigues made there by Prussian agents in co-operation with Russia and France, are an open prejudice to German prestige and German interests.

No. 399.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 617. Confidential.)
My Lord,

Vienna, December 5, 1861.

IN the course of conversation with Count Rechberg, his Excellency has just told me that he hoped the Sutorina affair would not lead to any further interpellations. He had heard from Prince Metternich that the French Government were now perfectly satisfied with the explanations which had been given to them, and he had reason to believe that the tone in which the first instructions had been addressed to the Duc de Gramont on the subject was the echo of the Consular Reports from Ragusa, strengthened, moreover, by a communication from Count Bernstorff, couched in language of an unfriendly nature to Austria.

Count Rechberg, in announcing to me that the answer from Paris was quite satisfactory, observed that he had written to Count Karolyi at Berlin to remonstrate with the Prussian Government on the tone assumed by them in their communication on this affair, and he added that he could not understand why, in a question in which Prussia could be scarcely said to have an interest, she should violently take up a line of opposition to a proceeding which simply regarded the interpretation of engagements between Austria and Turkey, the nature of which ought to have been perfectly well known to her.

Count Rechberg considers, however, that the question is set at rest, and he is well pleased that it should be so.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 400.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 618. Secret and Confidential.)
My Lord,

Vienna, December 5, 1861.

AT an interview which I have had to-day with Count Rechberg, his Excellency mentioned to me, in strict confidence, that he had just received telegraphic intelligence from Ragusa of the arrest of an agent of Luka Vukalovitch, who was the bearer of a letter desiring him on no account to yield to an Austrian summons, but to maintain his position in the Sutorina so long as he could, and offer all the armed resistance in his power, for it was essential that Austria should appear before Europe as an aggressor in the present instance.

Count Rechberg added that the police were on the trace of two accomplices of this agent.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 401.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 1372.) *Foreign Office, December* 9, 1861.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh on the subject of the rebellion in the Herzegovina.*

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 402.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received December 10.)

(No. 806.) *Constantinople, November* 29, 1861.

My Lord,

IN reply to your Lordship's despatch No. 640 of the 31st ultimo, I beg to state that my opinion as to the good dispositions of the Sultan still remains unchanged.

His Majesty is most anxious to repair the fallen condition of the Empire, to introduce order, and restore authority. He is most desirous, moreover, that changes should be effected at an early period of his reign; but this laudable impatience on his part is unaccompanied, as I have frequently said, by the practical knowledge which is necessary to make, on his own judgment, great changes. He is unacquainted, likewise, with the great difficulties which all such changes encounter; and in wishing to remedy evils, he will be likely, at all events at first, to commit errors in his mode of remedying them. He was originally inclined, after informing his Ministers of his wishes, to leave entirely to them the mode of carrying them out. But seeing that nothing as yet has been done to produce any marked alteration in the state of affairs, he has become lately irritable and distrustful, and taken upon himself, without communication to the Porte, measures and appointments, some to be approved of, but others again to be blamed, all of which have been perhaps too precipitate.

The sudden summoning of Fuad Pasha from Syria, proceeded from the idea that he was a man of action, and that there was no time to lose in reflection and conversations. The great respect he has for Aali Pasha's abilities and moral character has been counter-balanced by the belief that he is too much overawed by obstacles, and that he loses so much time in considering how what must be done can be done in a perfect manner, that he does nothing at all. There may be some justice in this, but, at the same time, the talent of the late Grand Vizier is of so high an order, that I think if Fuad Pasha had been joined to him, and recalled at the earliest opportunity to Constantinople, this would have sufficed, and perhaps prevented that jealousy which now possibly may arise, though there are the closest terms of friendship between these two statesmen. It would have been, moreover, desirable to have weighed more considerately the actual position of Syria, and the consequences that might attend Fuad's abrupt removal, and to have prepared, for the time when he was removed, a plan that would have caused his recall to be less felt. The nomination of Fuad, however, shows that the movement is not in a reactionary sense, for Fuad is even more liberal and European in his policy and views than Aali himself, and stands out as the one man in the Empire who is most disposed to apply the civilization of Europe, as far as it is possible, to Eastern manners and legislation. The appointment of Ahmed Vefik Effendi also to be head at the Department of the Evkaf, a Department corroded by corruption and abuses of every kind —Ahmed Vefik being of all men the one most certain to deal with them boldly and radically—sufficiently indicates His Majesty's views in this respect. On the other hand, various inferior offices have been given away, without consultation with the Porte, in a manner anything but creditable to His Majesty's private advisers. A good Pasha has been removed from Broussa, and a very bad one named. The late Minister of Finance, who is himself no great loss, has been replaced—though this is merely temporary until the arrival of Fuad—by a man whose talents and knowledge are below mediocrity, and whose character is on a still lower level.

A man whom I have always believed most honest, and who also enjoys the best reputation, was likewise peremptorily removed from the head of the Telegraph Department; but as there are different stories as to the cause of his removal, and some connected with intrigues said to be carried on by foreigners in whom he placed too great

* No. 399.

reliance, and who were mixed up in the late affair of Riza, I will not pretend to pass an opinion on this change.

The general belief is that these faults have been committed by the advice and at the instigation of the Capitan Pasha, but I have reason to think that in some instances at least this has not been the case, and that such errors have rather been owing to the advice of inferior persons, one of His Majesty's Chamberlains especially, a young man of great ability but without experience, and who is himself likely to be influenced by persons in a lower grade than himself.

The cause of the Sultan listening to such counsellers is this: the higher Pashas have of late years, by certain combinations amongst themselves, not only managed to retain the great offices amongst themselves, but to fill the subordinate ones with their creatures, from whom far worse selections, within my knowledge, have been made than those I am now complaining of.

The idea of His Majesty is to break through this chain of influence, but he is attempting to do it too rapidly and without sufficient means for knowing that the individuals he selects are not worse than those whom they replace.

This premature effort at independence has naturally created a great and hostile sensation amongst the Pashas, whose vanity is hurt, and whose influence is checked by this line of conduct. Their dependants, also, who thought themselves secure, are alarmed and furious; and as these various parties are connected with Rayah and foreign merchants and bankers, the feeling of anger and consternation is pretty general.

In short, the Sultan's mind wants steadying and his views maturing. It is to be hoped that when Fuad arrives he will by his tact, energy, and agreeable qualities, be able to obtain the Sultan's confidence and control, or modify those defects which I have pointed out. The injunctions which your Lordship gave me have prevented my interfering through the means I could have employed with respect to these matters, but if I see His Majesty within a brief space of time, and he talks to me upon them, I should venture to think it advisable that I reply to him with perfect frankness.

In regard to the Principalities, which is the subject to which your Lordship next alludes, I did whatever was in my power to smooth away difficulties and promote an unanimous assent to the Firman of the Porte, and I am happy to say that these endeavours have at last succeeded. The Firman is now being copied, and will I trust be sent to Bucharest in time to relieve the Prince from the embarrassments by which he would otherwise be surrounded. I am happy to say that both the French Ambassador and myself have urged on His Highness the necessity of avoiding any rash step that may compromise the success of the arrangements now to be accomplished.

With respect to Servia, your Lordship has no doubt received, through the Turkish Embassy in London, a copy of a despatch which the Porte has lately transmitted to its Representatives at the great Courts. I entirely agree with the opinions which your Lordship expresses on this subject.

In Montenegro and the Herzegovina the aspect of affairs, judging from the communications I receive from Mr. Holmes, appears favourable to the Turkish Government. The late victory of Omer Pasha near Piva, falsely represented by some foreign journals as a defeat, appears to have been complete, and together with the measures which Omer Pasha seems to be adopting must, unless some unforeseen event suddenly takes place, end by re-establishing order in the Herzegovina.

In Bosnia an insurrection of some importance, intended probably as a diversion, has broken out, but it does not seem to disquiet the authorities, and will probably from all accounts prove unsuccessful.

Mr. Holmes seems to think that Austria has favoured this movement, but I am inclined to think it has been promoted by Servia, with a view to form a Slavonic Kingdom, which is the dream of Prince Michael, and to which the Cabinet of Vienna cannot but be opposed.

As to Syria, it is difficult to say anything until intelligence arrives from Fuad Pasha. It seems to me very important that the supreme authority, now vested in one man, should not, when he quits the scene where he has so much distinguished himself, be too much divided.

Caboudi Effendi, Under Secretary of the Porte, and brother-in-law of Fuad Pasha, a practical and energetic functionary, and possessed of much good sense and tact, seems to me a good man for various reasons to select as the Political Agent of the Porte during the stay of the Commissioner, but I should unite the Pashalics of Saida and Damascus under one head, and though other persons could be named, and that I am well aware of the defects of Kibrizlee Pasha, now at Adrianople, I am still disposed to think that, looking at his name and authority and other qualities, he would be the best person to

place at this moment at that important post; but I have had no opportunity as yet of ascertaining how the Sultan and the Grand Vizier *ad interim* would look on this appointment, and at all events it would not be made without Fuad's sanction.

As to the financial condition at this moment, it has in somewise been complicated by a sudden and apparently unaccountable rise in the exchange, which the friends of the late Minister of Finance have been anxious to attribute to his fall; but I have ascertained, on the contrary, that it was principally owing to an operation made on the Bourse by this very Minister at the moment of his quitting office; a reaction has consequently taken place, though not as yet to the extent it might have been anticipated. This circumstance, however, is only temporary in its effects. What I think more important is that a proposition has lately been made by a highly respectable house in England for aiding the Turkish Government to extricate itself from its present embarrassments. This proposition takes rather a wide scope and comprehends nearly all the questions it would be desirable to deal with; the paper money, the outstanding debt, the establishment of a bank, and the general organization of the Turkish finances, with some changes of no important nature; I think myself it would be practicable and successful.

Aali Pasha, likewise, approves of it, but of course nothing can be done until the Grand Vizier arrives. If the constant endeavours I have made to establish anything like order and regularity in the Turkish finances should, in spite of all difficulties, at last have a satisfactory result, I feel that I shall have done something, aided by your Lordship's encouragement and assistance, which will be of vital importance to the Ottoman Empire and to the policy which we pursue in maintaining it. But I do not yet venture to be too sanguine; the gap between probability and certainty being in this country too wide and too much encumbered by obstacles of every kind for any one who has had much experience here to count upon his hopes until they are converted into realities.

As to the last question which your Lordship suggests to me, namely, that of the cession of the Herzegovina or Bosnia, &c., to one of the States of Europe in consideration of a sum which would sweep off the more pressing encumbrances of the Porte, this is a subject on which I have already had one or two confidential conversations with Aali Pasha. His Highness objects to this scheme on various grounds; the moral effect it will have on the rest of the Turkish Empire, the encouragement it would give to Servia and the Principalities to throw off the Suzerainty of the Porte, but above all, said His Highness to me one day, is the consideration that we thus open the passes into European Turkey to a European Power; we should not after this be for a moment easy in the capital itself. As the conversations alluded to were perfectly accidental and confidential, and I had no instructions to push the matter further, I did not do so; but knowing Aali Pasha's opinions, knowing, moreover, he would decide nothing during Fuad's absence, and feeling certain that my observations would be misinterpreted, I shall venture to say nothing more at present on the subject. The moment for mooting it would be one in which some momentary difficulty relative to the question alluded to pressed upon the Porte; at any other, it would have no good effect and might have a bad one. Consequently, I hope your Lordship will approve of this exercise of discretion.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

P.S.—I have just heard of an attack by Montenegrins on Turkish territory. The Turks are marching against them.

H. L. B.

No. 403.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 1380.)
Foreign Office, December 11, 1861.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches* upon the subject of the Austrian interference at Sutorina.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

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* No. 396 and 399.

No. 404.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received December 12.)

(No. 405.)
My Lord,
St. Petersburgh, December 3, 1861.

PRINCE GORTCHAKOW showed me this forenoon several telegrams which had passed between Paris, Vienna, and St. Petersburgh, relative to the recent incursion of the Austrian forces on Turkish territory in the neighbourhood of Sutorina for the purpose of destroying the works which had been thrown up by Vukalovitch, the leader of the Herzegovina insurgents.

Prince Gortchakow had directed the Russian Minister to remonstrate against this act, which he qualified as impolitic on the part of Austria in reference to the sentiments of her Slavonic subjects and her relations with foreign States, and as unjustifiable in regard to the spirit of those engagements which forbid any separate and unsanctioned intervention on the part of any Power in the affairs of Turkey.

A telegraphic despatch from M. de Thouvenel to M. Fournier (French Chargé d'Affaires at this Court) stated that the explanations of the Austrian Government were not satisfactory, and that the opinion of Her Majesty's Government coincided with that of France.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 405.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received December 12.)

(No. 412.)
My Lord,
St. Petersburgh, December 5, 1861.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship, with reference to my despatch No. 405 of the 3rd instant, that I saw Prince Gortchakow this forenoon, when his Excellency again adverted to the recent incursion of the Austrian forces at Sutorina. The Prince remarked that the act of the Austrian Government was so contrary to the engagements of 1856 that he thought some further notice of it ought to be taken by the other signitary Powers. He did not say that a collective protest would be necessary, but the other Governments should contemporaneously address such remonstrances to the Cabinet of Vienna as would mark their sense of the irregularity committed, and guard against the repetition of such violations of the common settlement respecting the affairs of Turkey hereafter. His Excellency added that when he invoked the Treaties of 1856 it must be under a strong sense of duty, for certainly he felt no affection towards them, but as they bound Russia they must bind Austria and all the rest alike, and no deviation from them should be permitted in any quarter.

I stated to Prince Gortchakow that I could not defend the course followed by the Austrian Commander in making an armed inroad on Turkish ground without the consent or co-operation of the Turkish Government or local authorities. The Porte was bound by engagements with Austria to maintain the *status quo* on the territory of Sutorina. It was the duty of the Turkish authorities, therefore, to disperse the insurgents who assembled in that quarter and to destroy their works. Austria might have called upon the Porte or its local Representative to do this, and if the Turks had not been able alone to effect the desired result, I thought, if we considered the peculiar character of the engagements respecting that place, the Austrian troops, with the assent of the Turks, might have taken part in that operation without any great offence to the spirit of the engagements of 1856. The object was a limited and local one for the benefit of Turkey as much as for that of Austria. I could not, however, deny that a kind of intervention in Turkish affairs had been exercised by Austria singly. I ought certainly to be the last to extenuate the validity and force of the Treaty of 1856, and I would lose no time in conveying his Excellency's sentiments and his propositions to your Lordship.

Prince Gortchakow, in replying to my remarks, would not allow that the conduct of Austria was in any degree extenuated by the engagements contracted between the Porte and Count Leiningen in 1853. Those engagements, he said, must be enforced in harmony with the stipulations of 1856. Austria had not only erred towards Turkey, but towards Europe also. The assent of Turkey to the intervention of Austria would not have been sufficient. The assent of Europe would still have been requisite to justify such a step.

I did not consider it to be my duty to palliate the conduct of the Austrian

Commander any further, for, though his proceedings may in some degree have been useful to Turkey, inasmuch as he has summarily prevented the communication of the insurgents with the sea, there is much to be reprobated in the recent measure both in regard to the rights of Turkey and to the principles adopted in 1856, which it is our duty and interest to maintain unimpaired.

Your Lordship will judge whether the occasion merits such a general and concerted remonstrance as Prince Gortchakow desires.

In the course of some further conversation on this subject the Russian Minister told me that he believed the Commander of the Austrian forces had been prompted not so much by considerations of general policy as by motives of private animosity against Vukalovitch, with whom he had had some quarrel. His Excellency also commented upon the preposterous display of force made by the Austrians, which was out of all proportion with the object at stake, the works of the insurgents being of the slightest description, and their artillery consisting of a few four-pound guns, two of which had been brought away by the Austrians. The Prince, however, also feared that this demonstration on the part of Austria might have the effect of intimidating the Christian insurgents in arms against Turkish oppression in Herzegovina, and might thus constitute a kind of moral intervention of a more extended kind by impressing the insurgents with the anticipation of Austrian interference hereafter.

I have already submitted to your Lordship that Prince Gortchakow regards the contingency of an Austrian intervention in those parts with great apprehension. He warmly desires, in my opinion, the expansion and triumph of the present insurrection, and the establishment of independent governments in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Any attempt on the part of the Austrian Government to come to the rescue of the Porte would, therefore, meet with as much resistance on the part of Russia as it could offer in its enfeebled condition.

In his present attitude towards Austria, Prince Gortchakow is probably supported, and perhaps instigated, by France. His Excellency informed me that his sentiments were fully shared and sanctioned by His Majesty the Emperor.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 406.

Lord A. Loftus to Earl Russell.—(Received December 12.)

(No. 466. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Berlin, December 10, 1861.*

IN conversation with Count Bernstorff I have abstained from referring in any way to the Austrian intervention in Sutorina (referred to in Lord Napier's despatch No. 412 of the 5th instant, and in Lord Bloomfield's despatch No. 611, transmitted by last messenger), and his Excellency has never mentioned the subject to me.

A greater importance appears to have been given to this affair than it merits, and probably in consequence of the exaggerated nature of the information first transmitted to the French Government by M. Hecquard.

I have reason to believe that Count Bernstorff was instigated to instruct the Prussian Representative at Vienna to ask for an explanation of the conduct of the Austrian Government in this matter by the representations of the French Minister at this Court, who is reported to me to have communicated to Count Bernstorff immediately on its receipt a telegram which he had received from Paris notifying the intelligence forwarded by the French Consul at Ragusa.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 407.

Consul Sir F. Gilbert to Earl Russell.—(Received December 13.)

(No. 38.)
My Lord, *Scutari, November 9, 1861.*

I have the honour to inclose the translation of an extract of a letter I have received from Podgoritza. Your Lordship has probably received information from Her Majesty's Consul either at Mostar or Bosna-Seraï relative to Omer Pasha, but I consider it my duty to send this one in case of a different version having been forwarded to your Lordship, as I fear the state of the Turkish troops in Herzegovina is not so prosperous as people are led to believe, judging from the miserable appearance of the troops here, who are still in camp under bell-tents, with the rain pouring down in torrents upon them, and without shoes or proper clothing, and in long arrears of pay. It is truly painful to learn that such fine men, chiefly from Anatolia, are dying off daily in numbers from fever; they ought to be sent into quarters immediately, but unfortunately the barracks here are situated in the most unhealthy part of the town, and there are no houses to be obtained except one or two which are used as hospitals.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. H. GILBERT.

Inclosure in No. 407.

Extract of a Letter from Podgoritza.

Sir, *Podgoritza, November 5, 1861.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you the following news from Herzegovina, which has come to me by way of Papperi.

A battalion of Nizam troops (regulars) and about 600 of Bashi-Bazouks, with Ded Aga Cenghigh as their Chief, set out for Gatzko to escort provisions for the troops at Piva. About two hours (6 miles) distance from Piva a body of rebels attacked them, and getting the Imperial troops between two fires, totally destroyed the battalion of regulars and all the Bashi-Bazouks, with the exception of Ded Ago Cenghigh and nine of his men, who managed to escape.

Omer Pasha, who was at Piva with a large portion of his army, did not dare to send assistance, fearing an attack from another body of rebels lying in wait in the neighbourhood under the command of Novitza Trerovich; consequently he preferred allowing this one battalion and the Bashi-Bazouks to be killed, rather than expose himself to the risk of a greater loss. The name of the bim-bachi of the battalion of Imperial troops is Hadgi Scereti.

Omer Pasha and his whole army have retreated towards Mostar.

No. 408.

Earl Russell to Lord Napier.

(No. 242.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, December 13, 1861.*

I INCLOSE herewith, for your Excellency's information, copies of two despatches from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna, relative to the recent Austrian expedition to Sutorina.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 409.

Earl Russell to Lord Napier.

(No. 247.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, December 14, 1861.*

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatches Nos. 405 and 412 of the 3rd and 5th instant, I have to state that Great Britain has expressed no opinion on the recent operations in the Sutorina. The act of the Austrian Government does not appear to them to require any formal remonstrance.

Her Majesty's Government have no wish to aid the insurgents in the Herzegovina.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

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* Nos. 396 and 399

No. 410.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 32.)
Bosna-Serai, November 28, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch of the 23rd ultimo, marked No. 2, informing me that my despatch No. 29 had been received, and that Her Majesty's Government approved of my views of the present state of the Montenegrin question, as stated in my despatch No. 35 to Sir Henry Bulwer.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 411.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 33.)
Bosna-Serai, November 28, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch of the 24th October, marked No. 3, informing me, in reply to my despatch of the 15th ultimo, that Her Majesty's Government entirely agree with my opinion that the European Powers should not interfere, under present circumstances, between the Turks and Montenegrins.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 412.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received December 13.)

(No. 4. Political.)
Bosna-Serai, November 28, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that, shortly after I quitted Mostar, the inhabitants of Piva sent a petition to Omer Pasha to the effect that they would make their submission on condition that his Highness would withdraw his troops. The Serdar replied that he was ready to do all he could for them, but that they must come to Mostar if they wished to arrange matters with him.

Since then it is reported that there has been another attack by the insurgents on the entrenched camp at Piva. The particulars are unknown, but the result is said to have been in favour of the Turks.

The convent of Dougi, near Trebigné, is in the possession of the Turks again, and it is hoped that the road from Trebigné to Ragusa, which has for some time been occupied by the insurgents, will soon be open.

An aide-de-camp from Mostar passed by this yesterday on his way to Tashlidjeh, to order three battalions stationed there to proceed to Gasko, which place, it is said, is in danger of an attack by a large body of insurgents.

News has also just arrived of an attack on Kolashin, near Tashlidjeh, by a strong band of Montenegrins and Uskoks, who are said to have been repulsed with considerable loss by the troops and Bashi-Bazouks quartered in that neighbourhood under the Kaïmakam Mahmoud Bey.

We have no account as yet of the details of any of these affairs; but it is satisfactory to know that in every case the result is generally reported as in favour of the Turks.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 413.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 627. Confidential.)
Vienna, December 12, 1861.

My Lord,

PRINCE CALLIMACHI called at Her Majesty's Embassy last week for the purpose of speaking to me respecting the late march of Austrian troops into the Sutorina, and said that he had been directed by Aali Pasha to remark to Count Rechberg that no communication whatever had been made to the Porte respecting the intended military operation.

The Turkish Ambassador added that Count Rechberg had certainly spoken to him on the subject, and that his Excellency had announced the intention of instructing Baron Prokesch to communicate with the Porte, but that it appeared that the Internuncio had taken no steps in the matter.

The Prince went on to say that the Porte had good right to complain of the proceedings of the Austrian Government, and of a want of courtesy on their part in withholding all official communication on the subject, but he does not attempt to call in question the agreement existing between Turkey and Austria, that no fortified buildings should exist on this *enclave* that were likely to threaten or endanger the passage along the military road.

The Turkish Ambassador has since spoken to Count Rechberg in the foregoing sense, and I have inquired of the latter how he explained the omission of any previous communication to the Porte.

His Excellency replied that he had told Prince Callimachi, many weeks ago, that if Luka Vukalovitch was allowed to remain in the position which he had taken up in the Sutorina, the Austrian General would be compelled to remove him, and he begged the Prince to call the attention of his Government to the subject, but he did not add that Baron Prokesch had made any communication to the Porte previous to the expedition.

Prince Callimachi replied to the telegram which he had received from Constantinople, in the sense of Count Rechberg's explanations, which have not proved satisfactory, for his communication has called forth a further instruction, in which Aali Pasha alludes to the late march into the Sutorina as a violation of Turkish territory.

Prince Callimachi mentioned this to me yesterday, observing that the terms of the instructions were so remarkable that he had hesitated acting on them, and had telegraphed back to Aali Pasha in reply, before acting on the orders which he had received.

Prince Callimachi evidently suspects that some foreign influence is at work at Constantinople to establish a case against Austria, and induce a discussion which will not lead to any good or improve the relations of the two countries.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 414.

Consul Sir F. Gilbert to Earl Russell.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 41.)
Scutari, December 2, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE much pleasure in informing your Lordship that the troops which had arrived here from Anatolia, and were losing so many men daily, have been sent away to their former quarters, which circumstance seems to have become known to the Montenegrins, for they have in several instances passed the frontier, and are most daring in their attacks.

About a fortnight since the small Ottoman steam gun-boat "Bojana" was taking up provisions for the forts on the lake, *i.e.*, Lessendra, Vranina, &c., and others on the mainland, and in consequence of the whole of the crew, with the exception of the English engineer, having been changed, some of the people of the town complained that the new captain was not so expert as the last one; the Pasha, therefore, ordered him to take a pilot. Whether this latter, however, was in the pay of the Montenegrins or not it is impossible to say, but in spite of the vehement remonstrances of the captain and the English engineer, he persisted in holding a course which terminated in the steamer running aground. All attempts to get her off were unsuccessful for many hours, and, being asked his advice, the engineer told the captain to send off at once and get some

soldiers from Zabjak or any other place, as he was certain that the Montenegrins would be upon them as soon as it got towards dusk. Luckily the steamer was reinforced by 100 regular troops and 40 Bashi-Bazouks, for as soon as the Montenegrins saw that the steamer was aground, about sixty of their boats started from all sorts of hidden creeks and attacked the steamer. After some severe firing on both sides, it appears that the vibration caused by the discharges of the large pivot-gun forwards gradually backed the steamer off the mud, on seeing which the captain of the Montenegrins called to his men to dash on board on all sides at once. At that moment he was shot dead by a bullet in the forehead, and immediately the Montenegrins disappeared. Five Montenegro boudras (large flat-bottomed boats) were seen to go down, and it is said that two captains were killed, but as to the number of men it is impossible to say, probably about 300. Strange to add, no one was killed on board the steamer, though many were wounded, among others the captain the worst.

The engineer tells me that the wretched Bashi-Bazouks, the greater part without coats or shoes, fought most gallantly, far superior to the regulars, who had both coat, overcoat, and shoes.

Since the above affair, the Montenegrins, on the 27th November, at 4 o'clock in the morning, in number about 600, passed through the village of Seestani to attack the village of Murichi; the Seestani being few in number could not oppose their passage. As soon as the news was received at Scutari, 150 men (Scutarines) were sent off immediately, and next day about 300 more, who got into the houses of Murichi to defend the place. The fight lasted twenty-two hours, after which the Montenegrins retreated to some Greek villages near at hand named Chernitza and Zelze, where they were received. A body of fifty Montenegrins wished to join their comrades, but the Seestani finding themselves superior in numbers attacked them, leaving several dead and wounded on the field, and carrying off nine heads, one prisoner, and a flag to Scutari. The heads were not received by the Pasha, but were exposed for a day near the entrance of the Bazaar. It is reported that a very large force of Montenegrins are on their way from the lake-side to reinforce their troops; these were seen from the steamer yesterday. Several other places have had their houses burnt, and a large force of Montenegrins is making for Spizza, about one hour-and-a-half's walk from Antivari, which port (Spizza) they seem to have made a determination to seize.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. H. GILBERT.

No. 415.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 1407.)
Foreign Office, December 18, 1861.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna upon the subject of the late march of Austrian troops into the Sutorina.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 416.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 758.)
Foreign Office, December 19, 1861.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, the accompanying copies of despatches respecting the late Austrian proceedings at Sutorina.†

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

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* No. 413.

† Nos. 396, 399, 404, 405, 406, and 409.

No. 417.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 761.)
Foreign Office, December 19, 1861.

Sir,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of two despatches from Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Vienna and St. Petersburgh respecting the present state of affairs in the Herzegovina.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 418.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 831.)
Constantinople, December 10, 1861.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 817 of the 4th instant, reporting that an Austrian force had entered the Turkish territory near Suttorina and destroyed two batteries erected by the insurgents, I have now the honour to acquaint your Lordship that Aali Pasha has spoken to me with some displeasure of that step.

On becoming acquainted with what had occurred, the Porte at once directed Prince Callimachi to address a strong remonstrance to the Austrian Cabinet, and no sufficient reason having been assigned to justify the omission of the Austrian authorities to consult the Porte on the intended measure before carrying it into effect, Prince Callimachi has been desired to ask for further explanations.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

No. 419.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 1425.)
Foreign Office, December 21, 1861.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches upon the subject of the recent incursion of Austrian troops into the district of Sutorina.†

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 420.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 5. Political.)
Bosna-Serai, December 4, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's information, copy of a letter addressed to Omer Pasha by the Prince of Montenegro, and also copy of the Serdar's reply.

The Prince Nicholas' letter would no doubt appear a very satisfactory document to persons unacquainted with what has actually taken place during the past summer, but His Highness' reiterated assertions of strict neutrality are simply ridiculous to those who know that the Montenegrins have always attacked, and continue to attack, the Turks, both in Albania and the Herzegovina, whenever they can find an opportunity of doing so, and I have not the slightest doubt that the forces sent to the frontier by the Prince will in reality aid the insurgents in every possible manner, and, should the occasion offer, become themselves active combatants.

Omer Pasha, in his reply, is far too courteous to insinuate the entire disbelief he certainly must entertain of the Prince's assertion, and would even seem to hope that

* Nos. 393 and 397.

† Nos. 404, 405, 406, and 409.

His Highness may be brought to aid sincerely in the pacification of the Herzegovina. Before this can happen, however, a radical change in Montenegrin politics must take place. At any rate the Serdar is adroitly following Sir Henry Bulwer's advice in availing of every occasion to show his desire to settle the Herzegovina question without bloodshed, and in throwing all the responsibility of a contrary result on his opponents.

I learn that an answer to the Serdar's letter has been received from Prince Nicholas, in which the latter accepts conditionally Omer Pasha's proposals. I hope to be able to forward a copy of this document next post.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure 1 in No. 420.

The Prince of Montenegro to Omer Pasha.

Cettigné, le 3 Novembre, 1861.

M. le Général-en-chef,

J'APPRENDS que votre Altesse se propose d'occuper la position de Bagnani, comme elle a déjà occupé Piva.

Bagnani, se trouvant très rapproché de ma frontière, je crois devoir vous prévenir, que dans l'unique but de garantir mes confins et d'éloigner de mon territoire les maux de la guerre je prends la détermination d'envoyer M. Kerso Petrovich, Vice-Président du Sénat, avec des forces suffisantes sur la limite, comme aussi j'enverrai M. mon père à Drobnac.

En agissant ainsi, M. le Général-en-chef, je n'ai d'autre but que de garantir mes intérêts, sans me mêler nullement aux démêlés que votre Altesse peut avoir avec l'Herzégovine, et fais ce que tout état ferait en pareille circonstance, si des masses belligérantes manœuvraient près de ses frontières.

Pour en agir envers votre Altesse avec la plus entière franchise, je ne vous cacherai point, que j'ouvrirai ma frontière aux femmes et aux enfants, qui fuyant les horreurs de la guerre viendraient sur mon territoire chercher un abri momentané.

Bien que cette mesure puisse me coûter bien des embarras, dans un moment surtout où la disette règne parmi mes populations, je n'hésiterai point à l'accomplir, ne pouvant prendre sur moi de laisser à l'abandon et en proie à une mort certaine des malheureux incapables de porter les armes.

Quant aux guerriers de n'importe quelle nationalité qui, contrairement aux ordres les plus sévères se seraient mêlés dans des questions qui leur étaient étrangères, ma frontière leur restera fermée, et comme j'ai eu l'honneur de le dire naguère à votre Altesse, jusqu'à ce que ma frontière soit attaquée, ce qui j'espère n'aura pas lieu, je resterai entièrement neutre et ne prendrai aucun parti dans la question qui se débat entre votre Altesse et les populations de l'Herzégovine.

Agréez, &c.
(Signé) Le Prince du Monténégro.

Inclosure 2 in No. 420.

Omer Pasha to the Prince of Montenegro.

Mostar, le 17 Novembre, 1861.

Monseigneur,

J'AI l'honneur d'accuser réception de la dépêche de votre Altesse du 3 Novembre par laquelle elle m'annonce son dessein d'occuper militairement les frontières du Monténégro, tout en exprimant la résolution d'observer la neutralité dans les affaires de l'Herzégovine.

Je ne puis cacher à votre Altesse que les sentiments de loyauté qu'elle exprime m'inspirent une véritable satisfaction et font renaître une nouvelle espérance d'accomplir ma mission sans effusion de sang ultérieure.

J'ai l'honneur de répondre à votre Altesse que des ordres positifs sont donnés à mes troupes de respecter en tout lieu, et toute occasion, les limites du Monténégro, dans le cas où la nécessité me forcerait d'ouvrir de nouvelles opérations dans l'intérieur des districts insoumis; j'ose croire que votre Altesse ne voudra pas douter de la loyauté de ma parole.

Je ne saurais qu'applaudir à l'intérêt plein d'humanité que votre Altesse prend aux

victimes inoffensives de la rébellion en recueillant et nourissant les femmes et enfants nécessiteux. Si votre Altesse veut bien le permettre, je serai heureux de m'associer à cette œuvre généreuse en mettant une portion de vivres à la disposition de ces familles réfugiées.

En face des mesures loyales que votre Altesse a adoptées, j'ose, avec la plus entière franchise, vous faire la proposition de faire un pas de plus dans cette œuvre d'humanité.

Votre Altesse employant de son côté sur les populations rebelles la voix de la conciliation, moi, de mon côté, faisant encore une fois entendre aussi la même parole, et restant fidèle à la stricte exécution de ma Proclamation, nous aurons la probabilité, Monseigneur, d'achever la pacification de cette province sans autre effusion de sang; et même, dûsseut nos efforts réunis n'être pas couronnés de succès, nous aurons du moins la satisfaction d'avoir rempli nos devoirs sacrés envers l'humanité.

En cas de réussite et par l'œuvre du libre négoce, nous contribuerons à la prospérité matérielle de ces pays et ainsi nous jetterons les fondements de la civilisation nécessaire à cette population, noble tâche dont tout le mérite, ainsi que l'assentiment de l'Europe entière, sera notre partage, quoique pour moi je serais heureux d'avoir mérité l'approbation de mon Gouvernement par la réussite de ma mission.

Daignez, &c.
(Signé) OMER.

No. 421.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(*Received December* 23.)

(No. 6. Political.)

My Lord,

Bosna-Serai, December 4, 1861.

WITH reference to the late affairs at Piva, mentioned in my despatch, Political, No. 4, of the 28th November, I have the honour to state that I have seen a note sent to the authorities here by order of Omer Pasha, in which his Highness relates that a large body of insurgents having collected in the neighbourhood of Piva with a view to attack and destroy the fortifications in progress there, Dervish Pasha left Gasko with eight battalions and four mountain guns to disperse them. While on the road, at a village called Zabirdjeh, he was attacked at eight different points by about 10,000 Montenegrins, Uskoks, and insurgents, whom he thoroughly routed and pursued for two hours' distance, after an engagement which lasted five hours. The loss of the enemy is put down at more than 600 killed and wounded, while that of the Ottoman troops was 16 killed and 80 wounded. Many Montenegrin arms and decorations were found on the field of battle.

The affair at Kolashin, also mentioned by me in the despatch above alluded to, is stated to have cost the rebels more than 500 killed and wounded.

From my experience of the manner in which matters are exaggerated by each party in its own favour, I think it right to add that, to arrive at an approximation to the truth, all the figures relating to the enemy should be reduced to at least one-fourth of what is stated.

The occupation of most of the strong points in the Herzegovina by Omer Pasha is a new and embarrassing circumstance to the insurgents, who, up to the present time, have always been able to pass the winter quietly at home, while the troops were in winter quarters at Mostar. The difficulty of existence in Montenegro at the present moment, and the impossibility of returning to their homes or remaining in the mountains during the winter, has therefore, it would seem, urged them to unusual exertions to drive the Turks from their positions. Hitherto they have been unsuccessful, and should they continue so they will probably soon be reduced by cold and hunger, if by nothing else, to lay down their arms and accept Omer Pasha's Proclamation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 422.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 7. Political.)
Bosna-Serai, December 4, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that a M. Rajat, a French officer of the Imperial Guard, arrived a short time ago at Ragusa. He is now at Mostar on a visit to Omer Pasha, and will, I am told, proceed to Cettigné also to see the Prince of Montenegro. He is supposed to be entrusted with some secret mission.

In conversing on this subject with M Moreau, late French Acting-Consul here, that gentleman told me in confidence that it was not improbable that the French Government desired to obtain some clearer notion of matters in the Herzegovina than it at present possessed, as the difference between the despatches from the Consulate of Scutari, which represented everything as reported through Montenegrin channels, and those from the Consulate of Bosna Serai, which gave the correct version of affairs, must have produced considerable confusion of ideas. The late French Delegate to the European Commission for the affairs of the Herzegovina, M. Tissot, also differed very materially from M. Hecquard, Consul at Scutari, and once told me that his Government had begun to perceive that Montenegro, such as they had hitherto been led to imagine it, was "une invention d'Hecquard." It probably desires, therefore, to know what it really is.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 423.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 636. Confidential.)
Vienna, December 18, 1861.

My Lord,

I INFORMED your Lordship in my despatch No. 627 of the 12th instant that the Turkish Ambassador at this Court had been instructed by Aali Pasha to call the attention of Count Rechberg to the late expedition into the Sutorina as having been effected without previous consultation with the Porte and as constituting a violation of Turkish territory. After Prince Callimachi had telegraphed back to Constantinople, the Porte appears to have reconsidered its original instructions and to have approved the objections advanced by the Turkish Ambassador, for Aali Pasha at once directed him to take no further steps in the matter and to let it drop.

The Turkish Ambassador has told me that his Government are now convinced that although the Austrian Government may have erred in not having previously communicated with the Porte on the subject of the projected military expedition, they nevertheless rendered them good service. The question, his Excellency added, was a simple one. Some rebel subjects of the Sultan had established themselves on Turkish territory over which Austria had certain rights of road; Austria might have called on the Porte to free this land from the occupying force, but the Porte had no means at the time of enforcing the regulation. Being therefore incapable of effecting this, Austria was justified in taking the matter into her own hands, and her proceedings, moreover, have been beneficial to the interests of the Porte, inasmuch as Luka Vukalovitch has been obliged to retreat into the Herzegovina in the face of Omer Pasha's forces.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 424.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 639.)
Vienna, December 18, 1861.

My Lord,

HAVING heard that the Russian Minister had made a communication here by order of his Government on the late military expedition into the Sutorina, I asked Count Rechberg to inform me of the nature of this communication. His Excellency said that

M. Balabine read to him yesterday a despatch from Prince Gortchakow, in which it is set forth that the expedition should not have taken place without previous concert with the Great Powers, and that the omission of this formality constituted an infraction of the Treaty of Paris of 1856. To this Count Rechberg appears to have replied that he apprehended Prince Gortchakow could not, at the time he wrote this despatch, have received the explanation on the subject which had been forwarded to St. Petersburgh; and he hoped, therefore, that, when it reached him, he would be satisfied as to the motives which had compelled the Austrian Government to clear from the Sutorina the Herzegovinian rebels who had established themselves on this Turkish "enclave," and threatened the Austrian military road which crosses it, and constitutes the sole land communication between Ragusa and Cattaro.

His Excellency added that he declined entering into a formal discussion of the question with M. Balabine, because he does not allow that Russia has any basis for interference. Austria, he says, possesses an ancient agreement with Turkey respecting this road, and she cannot admit that Russia is justified in calling these rights in question, and he considers that any other Power in a like position would have acted as Austria has done.

Count Rechberg added that M. de Balabine was surprised to find that the Duc de Gramont had not made a similar communication on the part of the French Government. His Excellency believes that the French Ambassador had received some instructions in this sense, but had not chosen to act upon them, and he evidently seems to consider the whole proceeding as a Russian and French intrigue got up against Austria, and in the interest of the rebellion in the Herzegovina and the movement that is going on amongst the Christian populations of Turkey.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 425.

Earl Russell to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 270.)
Foreign Office, December 23, 1861.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your information, copies of despatches, as mentioned in the margin,* on the subject of the affairs at Sutorina.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 426.

Consul Ricketts to Earl Russell.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 45.)
Scutari, December 16, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith inclosed to your Lordship the copy of a despatch addressed by me to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, and dated Scutari, 16th December, 1861, relating to certain events that have taken place at Sutorina and on the frontier of Montenegro.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

Inclosure in No. 426.

Consul Ricketts to Sir H. Bulwer.

Scutari, December 16, 1861.

Sir,

ON my journey from Trieste to this place I happened to pass by that part of the Sutorina where the Montenegrins had lately erected a battery. The position in question had been occupied by 24 men, and the guns (two only in number, and those of the poorest description) had, I was told, been pointed in the direction of the Austrian guard-house.

* Nos. 404, 405, and 409.

This post was, however, evacuated immediately the Austrian troops made their appearance. The object, no doubt, of this movement on the part of the insurgents was to close the main road leading from Cattaro to Ragusa, and further to prevent the Turks from having a landing-place on this part of the coast. I was informed that the people residing in the vicinity of Cattaro had been subject to much annoyance not only from the incursions of the Montenegrins, but also from those of the Dalmatians living on the Montenegrin frontier. These latter being of the Slav race, are apparently not badly-disposed towards the inhabitants of the Mountian, and being excessively poor, are only too glad to plunder whenever they find the opportunity. The number of Austrian troops now stationed in the Bocca di Cattaro at the present moment amounts to 24 companies of infantry.

M. Hecquard, the French Consul of Scutari, is now residing at Ragusa, where he is likely to remain during the winter. The duties of that Consulate are now carried on by a certain M. Moreau.

As Ragusa is at no great distance from the line of Omer Pasha's operations in the Herzegovina, it is probable that M. Hecquard is remaining there in order that he may be more quickly informed of the course of events in that part of the country.

As far as I am able to learn from my short stay here, the Montenegrins are now beginning to feel seriously the effects of the blockade established by the Turkish army.

The blockade cannot, however, be thoroughly effectual as long as provisions of various descriptions are allowed to be introduced into Montenegro viâ Ragusa and Cattaro.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

No. 427.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 1444.) *Foreign Office, December* 27, 1861.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, original despatches upon the subject of Montenegro.* Your Excellency will return these despatches when done with.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 428.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley

(No. 1447.) *Foreign Office, December* 27, 1861.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches upon the subject of the recent Austrian incursion into the Suttorina.†

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 429.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 841.) *Constantinople, December* 18, 1861.

My Lord,

I RECEIVED a despatch from Her Majesty's Consul in Bosnia expressing the satisfaction he felt at the intelligence which I had conveyed to him that the rumour of Osman Pasha's recall was unfounded, and takes occasion of this circumstance to state his opinion that if that Governor is left in Bosnia a couple of years more the roads of that province will be better than those of any other in Turkey. Osman Pasha has been scarcely a year in Bosnia, and whilst providing, in a manner which excited Omer Pasha's admiration, for the army in the Herzegovina, he was not prevented by his more pressing occupations from making in Bosnia some forty hours of carriageable road, repairing the principal streets

* Nos. 420, 421, and 422.

† Nos. 423 and 424.

of Serajevo, and almost rebuilding six bridges in the town, besides some others in the country.

Mr. Holmes adds that the Pasha is liked by all classes, and is exerting himself in the most praiseworthy manner in improving the province confided to his administration, and, in this respect, he makes a remarkable exception to a long line of predecessors.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

No. 430.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received December 30.)

(No. 416.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December* 12, 1861.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith an extract from the "Official Journal" of yesterday, concerning the recent proceedings of the Austrian forces at Sutorina. This article undoubtedly contains an exact statement of the sentiments of Prince Gortchakow on the question referred to. It was probably dictated by his Excellency in person.

Your Lordship will observe that not a word is said of the offence offered by Austria to the Porte by the invasion of its territory. The interest of the Turkish Government in the matter is not once referred to. The rebels are spoken of as the "population" or the "Christians," and the batteries were raised for their "security." The measures of the Turkish Government for the repression of the insurrection are qualified as an "aggression."

The act of the Austrian Government is condemned as being contrary to the stipulations of Paris, which forbid an isolated interference in Turkish affairs; but it is transparent, from the general complexion of the composition, that the interference offends Prince Gortchakow chiefly because it tends to the discouragement of the revolt.

There is much to be reprobated in the tone of this article, but as the affair is now over, and the malevolence of the Russian Minister will not have any practical results to the prejudice of Turkey, I have not thought it necessary to offer any remarks on the subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

Inclosure in No. 430.

Extract from the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg," November 29 / December 11, 1861.

LES journaux étrangers se préoccupent depuis quelques jours de l'invasion à main armée du territoire de la Suttorina par des troupes Autrichiennes, qui paraissent y avoir fait acte d'hostilité en détruisant des batteries élevées par la population pour sa sécurité.

Bien que ces troupes se soient, dit-on, immédiatement retirées une fois cette œuvre accomplie, quelques organes de la presse étrangère voient néanmoins dans ce fait une intervention que le Gouvernement Autrichien prétendrait exercer contre les Chrétiens de l'Herzégovine.

D'après les renseignements qui nous sont parvenus, il y a dans cet incident deux questions qu'il importe de ne pas confondre.

En 1853 les enclaves de Klek et de Suttorina, qui coupent le territoire Autrichien sur la côte de l'Adriatique, ont fait l'objet d'une Convention conclue avec le Gouvernement Turc par le Comte de Leiningen.

Aux termes de cet acte, le *statu quo* devait être strictement maintenu dans ces enclaves, et il ne devait y être élevé aucune fortification ni ouvrage militaire quelconque.

Les Chrétiens de l'Herzégovine ayant construit quelques batteries sur ce territoire, pour se mettre à couvert contre une agression des Turcs de ce côté, le Gouvernement Autrichien paraît s'être autorisé de la Convention de 1853 pour s'attribuer le droit de les détruire.

Si, depuis l'époque où cette Convention a été conclue, aucune transaction nouvelle

n'était venue modifier la situation de droit, cette affaire aurait pu rester du domaine exclusif des relations particulières de l'Autriche avec la Porte Ottomane.

Mais, depuis lors, l'Autriche a figuré en 1856 au nombre des signataires d'une transaction Européenne aux termes de laquelle les Grandes Puissances se sont interdit toute intervention isolée dans les affaires qui concernent la Turquie.

Il appartient, en conséquence, aux Cours signataires du Traité de 1856, d'apprécier combien le procédé sommaire par lequel le Gouvernement Autrichien vient de se faire lui-même justice, sans aucune entente préalable, est conforme à l'esprit et à la lettre de cette transaction, ainsi qu'aux égards dus aux Puissances qui l'ont signée avec lui.

Quant à une intervention dans les affaires de l'Herzégovine, il ne peut en être question. En présence des stipulations formelles que nous venons de rappeler, une pareille pensée ne pourrait raisonnablement être attribuée à aucun Gouvernement. Les Grandes Puissances sauront assurément faire respecter les principes qu'elles ont posés dans une transaction revêtue de leur garantie et devenue partie intégrante du droit public Européen.

Aussi longtemps du moins que la Russie aura sa voix dans les conseils pacifiques et son poids dans la balance des forces de l'Europe, une pareille intervention n'aura pas lieu.

Les Puissances qui ont garanti aux provinces Chrétiennes de la Turquie le maintien des priviléges qui leur étaient acquis, pourraient sans doute être appelées à les leur assurer par une action collective, si ces priviléges venaient à être enfreints. Mais nous n'avons pas besoin de dire que, dans aucun cas, cette action ne saurait s'exercer au détriment de populations dont le sort intéresse vivement l'Europe, et dont la prospérité est en même temps le meilleur gage de tranquillité et de sécurité pour le Gouvernement Turc.

La politique des Gouvernements civilisés n'admet pas deux poids et deux mesures, et le principe qui a été posé ces temps derniers au profit de l'Italie ne saurait certainement être enfreint, en Orient, par des Etats Chrétiens au préjudice des populations Chrétiennes.

No. 431.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(*Received December* 30.)

(No. 8. Political.) *Bosna-Serai, December* 12, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith copy of a despatch I have received from Mr. Vice-Consul Zohrab, stating that Dervish Pasha has driven a large body of Montenegrins and insurgents from their position in the neighbourhood of Piva, and that Omer Pasha, taking advantage of this success, intends issuing another proclamation inviting the rebels to submit.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure in No. 431.

Vice-Consul Zohrab to Consul Holmes.

Mostar, December 8, 1861.

Sir,

HIS Highness Omer Pasha, having succeeded in concentrating sixteen battalions and a corps of irregulars in the district of Piva, directed the General commanding there, Dervish Pasha, to take advantage of the first favourable opportunity to attack on three points a large body of Montenegrins and rebels who occupied a position in his neighbourhood.

Dervish Pasha, acting on this order, advanced; the rebels, evidently intimidated by their late defeat, did not await the attack, but fled and dispersed. Dervish Pasha, after burning some huts, returned to his former position again, from whence, Piva having been deserted by the insurgents, he has retired to Gasko, leaving in Piva troops sufficient to defend the fortified position which was formed there during the past summer.

Omer Pasha purposes taking advantage of this success to issue another proclamation inviting the rebels to submit, and advising them to be warned by their late reverses of the hopelessness of further resistance, and assuring them that if they submit, even now, he will guarantee their safety and the fulfilment of the promises made by the Porte.

His Highness does not think this proclamation will meet with success, but he remarks it can do no harm, but might do much good.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAS. ZOHRAB.

No. 432.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(*Received December* 30.)

(No. 419.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December* 14, 1861.

PRINCE GORTCHAKOW showed me, this forenoon, an instruction which he had addressed to M. de Balabine, embodying a remonstrance against the recent incursion of the Austrian forces on the Ottoman territory at Sutorina.

The terms of this instruction are moderate and courteous. The Russian Minister bases his objection to the action of the Austrian Government on two grounds: on the engagements of 1856, which forbid the isolated interference of a single Power in the affairs of Turkey; and also, though more feebly, on the reflection that this interference is hostile to the cause of the Christian population struggling against the abuses of Turkish Government.

I asked Prince Gortchakow whether M. de Balabine was ordered to deliver a copy of this despatch to M. de Rechberg. His Excellency replied that he would do so if he thought proper, or if a copy of it were applied for.

Prince Gortchakow shows a good deal of temper in speaking of this matter. I think he is instigated by the French Government, or, at least, by the French Chargé d'Affaires, who probably finds this a good occasion for humouring the Prince and regaining a little of the ground which France has recently lost at the Russian Foreign Office.

The Greek Minister, Prince Soutzo, who enjoys a great familiarity with Prince Gortchakow, has no doubt also been at work with the excitable Minister.

I have, &c,
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 433.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(*Received December* 30.)

(No. 653.)

My Lord, *Vienna, December* 26, 1861.

WITH reference to the late proceedings in the Sutorina, Count Rechberg has informed me that well-founded intelligence has been received from Ragusa, which confirms the suspicions already existing as to the active encouragement given by M. Hecquard and M. Petkovitch, the Russian Consul, to the projects of the Herzegovinian rebels. The last acts of these two Agents, said his Excellency, have been to recommend Luka Vukalovitch not to give up the idea of establishing a footing on the Sutorina, and to assure him that foreign support will not fail later on, and that it, therefore, was expedient to consider the best means of retaking the position which he was forced to abandon by a foreign expedition that had been acting unjustifiably, and in defiance of the opinions of most of the other great Powers.

Count Rechberg said also that Italian agents were actively engaged in these intrigues, and that he understood the Government of King Victor Emanuel were on the eve of appointing a Consular Agent to reside in the neighbourhood of these disturbed districts for the purpose of fomenting rebellion, as they had been doing in the Principalities.

His Excellency added that the last news from Montenegro announced the existence of serious intrigues in the Government, and of quarrels amongst the members of the Prince's family, which might have an important influence on His Highness' future policy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 434.

Earl Cowley to Earl Russell.—(Received December 31.)

(No. 1482.) *Paris, December 29, 1861.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to return herewith to your Lordship the original despatches from Mr. Holmes upon the subject of Montenegro,* which were transmitted to me for my perusal in your Lordship's despatch No. 1,444 of the 27th instant.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 435.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 4.) *Foreign Office, January 2, 1862.*

Sir,

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency, for your information, copies of the despatches† on the subject of the late Austrian military expedition into the Sutorina.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 436.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received January 5, 1862.)

(No. 442.) *St. Petersburgh, December 27, 1861.*

My Lord,

PRINCE GORTCHAKOW having asked me whether I had any communication to make to him on the subject of Austrian intervention at Sutorina, I answered that I learned from your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government did not think that the incident referred to called for any formal remonstrance on the part of the Powers.

His Excellency remarked to me, in reply, that he thought a few words of remonstrance might have been well bestowed on the part of Her Majesty's Government in defence of the stipulations of 1856, which had been violated by the action of the Austrian forces. The Government of Turkey had, he understood, protested at Vienna against an aggression on their territory perpetrated without any warning or explanation. In reply to his own remonstrance, M. de Rechberg had returned an answer disclaiming all intention to infringe the Treaties of Paris and excusing the recent incident on the ground of its exceptional character. The Prince added that as his note to Austria had been referred to in the newspapers of that country in a very unfair spirit, it was his intention to cause that document to be published here, so that its true sense might be understood.

I have, &c.

(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 437.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received January 5, 1862.)

(No. 444.) *St. Petersburgh, December 28, 1861.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith an extract from the "Official Journal" of this morning, containing the instruction addressed by Prince Gortchakow to the Russian Minister at Vienna respecting the intervention of the Austrians at Sutorina.

I have, &c.

(Signed) NAPIER.

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* Nos. 420, 421, and 422.

† Nos. 423, 424, and 433.

Inclosure in No. 437.

Extract from the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" of December $\frac{19}{31}$, 1861.

UNE analyse, publiée par quelques feuilles de Vienne, de la dépêche adressée le 29 Novembre par le Prince Gortchakow à M. de Balabine, fait supposer qu'elles ont eu connaissance de ce document—dont nous allons publier le texte sans nous préoccuper des commentaires dont les journaux Autrichiens accompagnent leur résumé, et qui nous entraîneraient dans une polémique que nous ne voulons pas soulever:—

"Monsieur, "*St. Pétersbourg, le* $\frac{29 \text{ Novembre}}{10 \text{ Décembre}}$, 1861.

"Sa Majesté l'Empereur a appris avec peine la détermination que le Gouvernement Autrichien vient de prendre et d'exécuter dans la Suttorina.

"Notre auguste Maître se plaît à croire qu'en recourant à des mesures d'exécution aussi sommaires, sans s'être préalablement concerté avec les Cours signataires du Traité de Paris, le Cabinet de Vienne n'a pas eu l'intention d'enfreindre les stipulations de ce Traité, par lesquelles les grandes Puissances se sont interdit toute intervention isolée dans les affaires qui concernent la Turquie.

"Cependant, sans révoquer en doute les intentions du Gouvernement Autrichien, il ne saurait échapper à son attention, qu'en s'écartant de cette règle dans la marche qu'il a suivie, il a posé un précédent de nature à affaiblir un principe essentiel entré dans le droit public comme la garantie du repos de l'Orient et de la sécurité de l'Europe. Il n'y a point de faits insignifiants lorsqu'ils peuvent aboutir à un pareil résultat.

"Nous ne pensons pas que les faibles ouvrages de défense élevés sur le territoire de la Suttorina aient pu menacer la sécurité des communications entre les possessions Autrichiennes au point de donner un caractère d'urgence à la mesure prise par le Cabinet de Vienne, et l'effet moral de cette mesure, qui, par les interprétations auxquelles elle donne lieu, affaiblit la position déjà si critique de populations dignes à tous égards de la pitié de l'Europe Chrétienne, nous fait d'autant plus regretter qu'elle ait été prise sans une entente préalable avec les Cabinets, entente qui en eût fixé la véritable signification.

"Vous êtes invité, Monsieur, à ne pas laisser ignorer à M. le Comte de Rechberg cette impression de notre auguste Maître, et à lui déclarer que le Cabinet Impérial n'a pas cessé de se considérer comme solidaire du principe qui exclut toute intervention isolée dans les affaires de la Turquie.

"Recevez, &c.

(Signé) "GORTCHACOW."

No. 438.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received January 6.)

(No. 7.)

My Lord, *Vienna, January 2, 1862.*

THE question of the late Austrian incursion into the Sutorina has been taken up strongly by the Austrian newspapers, and their comments are all directed in support of the Emperor's Government, and with the object of proving the pretensions of Russia to be untenable, and that the Treaty of Paris in 1856, as invoked by Prince Gortchakow, is not applicable to the case. Count Rechberg hopes that as Russia now stands alone in her pretensions she will allow the question to drop, and he attributes much of the ill-humour of Prince Gortchakow to his apprehensions that the expedition may have discouraged the general Slav movement, to which he considers that Russia is giving every encouragement in her power.

Count Rechberg desired also to avoid a written controversy with Russia on this subject, which he supposes Prince Gortchakow to be anxious to enter upon; and as on the 15th ultimo M. Thouvenel had expressed himself to Prince Metternich entirely satisfied with the Austrian explanations, he trusts that Prince Gortchakow, thus finding himself unsupported, will desist from further communications.

His Excellency appears to have told M. Balabine at the last interview that it was perfectly useless to enter into any discussion of the rights of the case. Austria had her opinions and would maintain them. Russia probably had hers, and would do the same; therefore, all discussion was useless.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 439.

Earl Russell to Sir J. Hudson.

(No. 5.)
Foreign Office, January 6, 1862.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT to you, for your information, the accompanying copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna relative to the late proceedings in the Suterion."

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 440.

Earl Russell to Consul Holmes.

(No. 1.)
Foreign Office, January 7, 1862.

Sir,

WITH reference to your despatch No. 7 of the 4th ultimo, I have to acquaint you that the French officer of the Imperial Guard who was at Mostar, and was supposed to be about to visit Cettigné, is not entrusted with any mission by the Government of the Emperor, and that he has been ordered by the French Minister of War to spend his leave of absence elsewhere than in quarters where his language was likely to give offence.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 441.

Consul Ricketts to Earl Russell.—(Received January 9, 1862.)

(No. 46.)
Scutari, December 28, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit, herewith inclosed to your Lordship, the copy of a despatch addressed by me to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, and dated 22nd December, 1861, relative to the necessity of strengthening the garrison of Scutari, and placing in a proper state of defence certain ports on this side of the Montenegrin boundary.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

Inclosure in No. 441.

Consul Ricketts to Sir H. Bulwer.

Scutari, December 22, 1861.

Sir,

I HAVE to inform your Excellency that Ishmael Pasha, the Military Governor, complains of the paucity of troops at present stationed in the fortress of Scutari; it is therefore to be hoped the Porte will not delay in ordering some increase to be made to the forces under his command in this district. The garrison of Scutari is at this moment composed of one company of regulars, and it is difficult to conceive how so few troops can be considered in any way adequate to carry on the manifold duties required of them. In the first place the fortress of Scutari should be considered as a reserve from which troops might at any moment be drawn to relieve or support any of the smaller ports skirting this side of Montenegro between Spitz on the east, and Spitza on the south-west. Should any unforeseen difficulties arise to the garrisons in any of these places, there would be no immediate force at hand capable of rendering them prompt assistance; it is true that the Bashi-Bazouks could be sent to their aid, but some little time would be necessary to collect these irregulars, who are, generally speaking, scattered about the country.

Secondly, the fortress of Scutari is the only place which can be safely used as a general depôt for such stores and provisions as are from time to time required by the outlying garrison of Spitz, Podgoritza, Medun, Yablak, Lessendria, Antivari, and Nalie; but

* No. 433.

important as the fortress of Scutari is in this respect, it would by no means be a prudent measure to furnish it with a large quantity of supplies, and at the same time to leave those supplies totally unprotected; and, lastly, the presence of a moderate force at Scutari would tend more than anything else to strengthen the hands of the Civil Governor, and would enable him to establish some sort of order in a country which has hitherto been the scene of constant disorder and confusion.

Your Excellency is no doubt aware that the great part of the military operations in this country are carried on by means of the irregular troops. There are at the present moment, in addition to the six tabors of regulars, some 4,000 irregulars engaged in guarding the line of the Montenegrin frontier between Spitz on the east and Spitza on the coast; they appear to be the only sort of troops that can be used with any effect in this country, and are in fact capable of rendering good service where the Turkish regular force is next to useless.

Such being the case, the Porte would do well to enter as soon as possible upon some better and more systematic mode of organizing these men. There are, however, some points relative to this organization which should by no means be allowed to escape the notice of the Porte, and which ought not to be neglected, namely, that the provincial authorities should not be permitted to employ more Bashi-Bazouks than they can conveniently find rations for, that a correct account should be kept of those who are actually engaged on service, for it is the habit and custom of their Chiefs to receive pay, say for 1,000 men, while they have perhaps only 300 men with them in the field; and further, if in addition to these things it were possible to have a new pair of sandals issued to them immediately they joined the standard of their Chief, it would be the means of making these men far more willing to take service than they appear to be at present.

Ishmael Pasha also complained to me of the manner in which the Government money had been uselessly squandered in repairing the small fort of Lessendria.

I find that a common mason has been the chief person employed in constructing these works, the consequence of which is that more than four months have been wasted in endeavouring to accomplish what might have been done in two or three weeks, and that the troops stationed there are still exposed to any fire the Montenegrins might choose to direct upon them from the neighbouring heights. The Island of Lessendria, together with that of Uranjina and the port of Yablak, being situated at the head of the lake of Scutari, and dividing as it were in this part the Montenegrin from the Turkish territory, are positions of the greatest importance to the Turks, and are therefore deserving of some care and attention. A simple redoubt, with a block-house in the interior of it, is all that is necessary for the protection of each of these places; there is, I am sorry to say, no one in the country who is capable of devising a plan or constructing any work of such a description. I submit it, therefore, to your Excellency whether it would not be advisable for some engineer officer to be sent to Scutari with instructions to inspect and place in a proper state of defence the whole of the ports situated on this side of the Montenegrin frontier.

Both the Civil and Military Governors seem anxious to carry out some sort of reform in the various departments of their administration; but such are the prejudices of the people of this country of all classes, both Christians and Mussulmans, and such is their attachment to old and deep-rooted abuses, that much care and prudence is necessary in the introduction of any new measures, and much time must elapse before this state of things can receive any radical and beneficial change.

The Montenegrins appear for the present on this frontier to have abstained almost altogether from any aggressive movements; this tranquillity is, however, to be attributed solely to the severity of the weather in the mountains rendering any active operations next to impossible.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

No. 442.

Consul Ricketts to Earl Russell.—(Received January 9, 1862.)

(No. 47.)
Scutari, December 27, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith inclosed to your Lordship the copy of a despatch dated Scutari, December 27, 1861, and addressed by me to Her Majesty's

Ambassador at Constantinople, relative to the importation of provisions viâ Cattaro into Montenegro.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

Inclosure in No. 442.

Consul Ricketts to Sir H. Bulwer.

Scutari, December 27, 1861.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that about 8,000 quarters of Indian corn arrived a few days ago at Cattaro for Montenegro.

This cargo, it appears, was sent there from some port in Russia. I am also given to understand that 50,000 quarters of Indian corn have, within the last few weeks, been imported viâ Cattaro and Budua into the same country. Should this be really the case, the object of Omer Pasha's blockade will be to a great extent nullified, and must be so, as long as provisions continue to be supplied to the besieged from without. It is said that the Prince of Montenegro is now in direct correspondence with Omer Pasha; but I am, of course, entirely ignorant as to what transpires between the parties in question. The Russian Consul, M. Petkovich, at Ragusa, is in constant communication with the Prince, and it is probable that his Highness will not be led to adopt any particular line of policy without having previously taken the opinion of either the French or Russian Agents on the subject. The Prince, being a young and inexperienced person, is to a great extent also under the influence of his father, Mirko, who has the reputation of being crafty, designing, and exceedingly avaricious.

Omer Pasha will, therefore, have to baffle not only the cunning of Mirko, but also the designs of foreign agency. If anybody, however, is likely to succeed in bringing matters to a peaceable arrangement, it is Omer Pasha; but it is to be feared that, although much may be promised on the part of the Prince, little also may be performed, and that the Turkish territory will in the spring be again liable to the incursions of the Montenegrins whenever they have the opportunity of showing themselves without the likelihood of encountering any determined opposition.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

No. 443.

Earl Russell to Lord Napier.

(No. 6.)
Foreign Office, January 10, 1862.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE herewith, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches relative to the recent Austrian expedition to Sutorina.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 444.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(*Received January* 12, 1862.)

(No. 867.)
Constantinople, December 29, 1861.

My Lord,

WITH respect to the entry of the Austrians into the Turkish territory, and the destruction of the forts established by the Montenegrins in the Sutorina, the Internuncio here gave me the following explanations:—

1. That the forts in question commanded a high road between the Austrian and Turkish possessions, which it was absolutely essential for the Austrians to keep open.

2. That the Austrians had announced to the Montenegrins that if the Turks did not dislodge them before the 30th November, and that they did not retire, they should be obliged to destroy these batteries that had been erected, which they did consequently destroy on that day, retiring immediately they had done so.

* Nos. 424 and 436.

Baron de Prokesch added that it was essential for Turkish interests that these forts should not be left too long in the hands of the Montenegrins, since, in that case, as in former cases, when any arrangement was made as to the future limits and rights of Turkey and Montenegro, the fact that the position in question had been held by a Montenegrin force would constitute a right in the Montenegrin's favour.

Aali Pasha, having informed me that the Ottoman Government had made a strong remonstrance to the Austrian Government on the subject, I asked the Baron whether such was the fact, and he informed me that, as far as he was informed, no such remonstrance had been made, and that it certainly had not been made through him; and, in proof of this, he showed me his correspondence with his own Government, from which it would appear that the Ottoman Government made very light of the subject as soon as it understood clearly that the Austrian troops, after having destroyed the positions referred to, had immediately vacated the Turkish territory. There does not appear to have been any question as to the Austrians claiming the Sutorina for themselves.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

No. 445.

Consul Calvert to Earl Russell.—(*Received January* 13, 1862.)

(No. 66.)
Monastir, December 13, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the first Regiment of the Sultan's Cossacks have arrived at Monastir, with General Sadyk Pasha, on the 8th instant.

The Mejlis at Uscup, yielding to the desire of the Mussulman inhabitants of that town, had addressed a Mazbatta to the Kaimakam of the Mushir of the army of Roumelia, requesting that the Cossacks and dragoons should be withdrawn from Uscup, where every arrangement had already been made for their passing the winter. The Military Council at Monastir thereupon decided that the dragoons should winter at Perlépé and the Cossacks in the barracks at this place, where there is an ample store of corn for the horses accruing from the dime paid in kind.

Both these regiments are very short of their full complement of 800, the Cossacks being able to muster scarcely 450, and the dragoons 400 only, men and officers together. In the regiment of Cossacks there are almost 200 horses unmounted, and in the dragoons upwards of 100 men without horses.

The resignations of five or six of the officers, captains, and lieutenants in the Cossacks have been accepted. Many other officers have tendered their resignations, and are awaiting the result. I have heard it stated that the General in command has lost much of the popularity he formerly enjoyed.

Detachments from both regiments have been employed during the summer in escorting convoys of supplies for the army in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Attempts were made while the regiments were encamped at Cossovo-pole last summer to induce young Bulgarians to enlist, but only thirty were recruited, and, not finding the service answer their expectations, the greater part deserted.

General Sadyk Pasha's son-in-law, Fuad Bey (Suchodolsky), has been dispatched a short while since to the Dobrudja, to try and pick up recruits. His two sons, who have just completed their military education at St. Cyr, have entered the Cossacks with the rank of sub-lieutenant.

The regiment of Turkish cavalry styled "the Tartars," although but few real Tartars now belong to it, which was encamped at Cossovo-pole last summer, has taken up its winter quarters at Prishtina. This regiment numbers nearly 800 men and officers. One squadron of it is stationed at Senitza, near the borders of Servia.

A battery of horse artillery, six guns, is also quartered for the winter at Prishtina.

Large supplies of wheat and flour, in addition to warlike stores, have been forwarded during the summer from Monastir and the adjacent districts to the army. The greater part of the wheat has been sent by way of Durazzo. The contract for it was given to Khalyl Bey, one of the members of the provincial Mejlis. It has been mentioned to me, on good authority, that the quality was so inferior, and, from being sold by weight (ninety parts the oke, equal to 15*s.* the cwt., laid down at Durazzo), so largely mixed up with earth as well as with tare seeds, which, when eaten, produce vertigo, as to have provoked a remonstrance from Omer Pasha. The same kind of wheat, nevertheless,

continued to be sent. Great complaints have been made by the Wallachian carriers of the arbitrary manner in which their horses have been made use of for the transport of this grain.

Of 1,100 horses and mules sent from this quarter with supplies for the army, only 200 have returned. The 900 which are missing have, in part, perished through excessive fatigue and neglect, and the others have fallen into the hands of the Montenegrins. Their owners, Wallachians, who depend for their livelihood entirely upon the labour of their animals, are almost ruined, and they do not appear likely to receive any compensation for their losses.

About five weeks ago, 500 conscripts having been required from the whole of Roumelia, the lots which were drawn for the Pashalik of Roumelia (Monastir) fell upon only two men.

Another month's pay was issued about the same period to the troops in garrison here, as well as to the Cossacks and dragoons at Uscup. The former are still twelve months, and the latter ten months, in arrears.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHARLES C. CALVERT.

No. 446.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received January 13, 1862.)

(No. 10. Political.)

Bosna-Serai, December 27, 1861.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of a letter addressed by the Prince Nicholas to his Highness Omer Pasha on the 22nd November, and also copy of the Serdar's reply.

Your Lordship will remark that the Prince of Montenegro obstinately adheres to his former conditions as the price of any co-operation in the work of pacification so much desired, and will probably be of opinion that, as usual, the Serdar's reply is perfectly satisfactory.

This correspondence, if it effects nothing else, establishes, beyond contradiction, the earnest desire of the Turkish Commander-in-chief to act in the most friendly manner towards Montenegro, as well as with the greatest forbearance and humanity towards the insurgents, and also proves that his Highness' praiseworthy endeavours have been invariably nullified by the unseasonable pretensions of the Prince.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure 1 in No. 446.

The Prince of Montenegro to Omer Pasha.

Cettigné, le 22 Novembre, 1861.

M. le Général-en-chef.

J'AI reçu les deux gracieuses lettres que votre Altesse m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser en date du 17 Novembre, et qui m'ont été remises par le Capitaine du Génie Hafiz Ahmed Effendi. Je me fais un devoir d'y répondre immédiatement, et je saisis, avec grand plaisir, une fois de plus, l'occasion de témoigner à votre Altesse mes sentiments de gratitude pour les ordres donnés à Scutari; j'ose espérer que cette fois sa voix sera mieux entendue, et qu'elle parviendra à écarter des complications, ne pouvant qu'envenimer un malentendu, qu'il n'est ni dans vos intentions ni dans les miennes de perpétuer.

Je la remercie également pour la manière simple et naturelle dont elle a interprété mes véritables intentions au sujet des précautions prises sur ma frontière.

Votre Altesse me faisait part des espérances qu'elle nourrit de voir sous peu ses efforts couronnés de succès et d'obtenir, par des concessions équitables et une bonne administration, la pacification de l'Herzégovine, me convie à faire un pas de plus en avant, pour l'aider dans cette œuvre de conciliation, et d'employer au profit de la paix le peu d'influence que je puis exercer sur mes voisins et coreligionnaires.

Je répondrai à votre Altesse avec la franchise dont elle fait preuve dans nos relations, et je lui dirai si dès le commencement j'ai pu voir avec un certain regret un personnage si haut placé et jouissant d'une si brillante réputation militaire engagé dans une affaire aussi scabreuse que paraissait l'être la pacification de l'Herzégovine, aujourd'hui je n'hésiterai pas à reconnaître que votre Altesse, par son nom, par ses hautes capacités, et, avant tout, par cette modération qu'on est si heureux de rencontrer chez un homme qui sait si bien faire la guerre, et qui l'a faite avec tant de succès, est la seule personne qui puisse résoudre cette question, si elle est susceptible de solution.

Je m'associerais de tout mon cœur à votre Altesse, sans conditions d'aucune sorte, sans autre garantie que les intentions sincères qu'elle a déjà manifestées et sa parole franche et loyale, si elle et moi pouvions en réunissant nos efforts conciliateurs arriver à un résultat satisfaisant pour les deux parties, et s'il n'était besoin d'une autre sanction.

La politique devant intervenir, je me vois obligé de dire à votre Altesse, que là où j'aurais co-opéré pour elle et avec elle sans conditions, l'intérêt de mes populations exige que je ne néglige rien qui puisse améliorer leur sort dans l'avenir, et que je stipule par anticipation ce que j'attendrais en retour de la co-opération demandée.

Je n'ajouterai rien à ce qui a été demandé à MM. les Commissaires Européens lors de l'entrevue projetée aux environs de Jablak. Votre Altesse connaît ces désidérata, et sait aussi combien mes prétentions étaient modestes.

Je ne terminerai point sans témoigner à votre Altesse quel haut prix j'attache à sa haute estime, l'assurant que je suis flatté et charmé d'avoir eu avec elle ces relations qu'elle a su rendre si cordiales. Je la prie, &c.,

Le Prince de Monténégro,
(Signé) NICOLAS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 446.

Omer Pasha to the Prince of Montenegro.

Mostar, le 10 Décembre, 1861.

Monseigneur,

J'AI l'honneur d'accuser réception de la réponse dont votre Altesse s'est empressée d'honorer ma dépêche du 17 Novembre dernier. Je suis on ne peut plus heureux d'exprimer ma profonde gratitude pour les gracieux éloges dont votre Altesse veut bien honorer ma personne et ma mission en Herzégovine, mais je ne puis dissimuler à Son Altesse mes sincères regrets de ce que les espérances et les vœux que j'avais conçus et exprimés dans la sus-dite dépêche n'aient pas été entièrement réalisés.

En face de l'assurance positive de votre Altesse d'observer une stricte neutralité dans le conflit Herzégovinien, et pensant donner une juste interprétation aux sentiments de paix et d'humanité exprimés dans sa dépêche du 3 Novembre, je n'ai pas hésité un moment de demander votre influence en faveur de nos sujets égarés et misérables.

Dans le moment où l'insurrection est resserrée dans d'étroites limites et devra plier devant mes troupes, j'ai cru donner une dernière preuve incontestable des intentions aussi généreuses que pacifiques de mon Gouvernement, dont j'ai le bonheur d'être l'interprète, en fesant encore une fois entendre la voix de la concorde, et en confirmant les promesses de réformes contenues dans ma Proclamation, et en mentionnant hautement les avantages que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan dans sa sollicitude paternelle a octroyé à ses sujets Chrétiens et spécialement à ceux de ces provinces.

En offrant à votre Altesse de réunir nos efforts mutuels pour amener la pacification sans autre effusion de sang j'ai été loin de penser que des conditions dûssent être la base de cette enterprise purement philanthropique. Voyant votre Altesse émue de la misère et des malheurs que ces populations s'imposent par une aveugle opiniâtreté j'ai invoqué ces sentiments qui distingnent un jeune Prince.

Une pareille démarche guidée par un noble esprit d'humanité ne saurait manquer de mériter à votre Altesse les applaudissements de l'Europe entière, tandis que son nom sera l'objet des bénédictions de toutes ces populations que votre voix aura sauvées d'une perte immanquable.

Telle est, Monseigneur, l'unique et seule pensée qui a dictée l'appel que j'ai fait aux sentiments de loyauté de votre Altesse.

Daignez, &c.
Le Serdar Ekrem,
(Signé) OMER.

No. 447.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received January 13, 1862.)

(No. 11. Political.) *Bosna-Serai, December 27, 1861.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that I have received from various sources the following items of news:—

Luca Vukalovich is concentrating all the insurgents he can collect in Suttorina and Zupzi, particularly in the latter district. He is also rebuilding the batteries demolished by the Austrians at Suttorina. Omer Pasha intends shortly to occupy Zupzi and leave a strong garrison there, provisions for which are now preparing at Ragusa. Luca Vukalovich, in anticipation of this movement against him, has obtained permission from the Prince Nicholas to retire into Montenegro.

I hear that the greatest disorder reigns at Cettigné. Ivo Rako, a Senator of distinction, who has, I think, on more than one occasion, been sent on foreign missions, and who is represented as a man of much intelligence, has been dismissed with all his brothers from the Senate, and even menaced with death. His son has fled to Ragusa. Several other Senators have been dismissed; among others Noviza Cerovich. There is said also to be great hostility between Mirko, the father of the Prince, and Petro Stephan Vucotich, another very influential Senator. All these facts seem to augur those events mentioned as probable in the concluding paragraph of my despatch to Sir Henry Bulwer, copy of which I transmitted to your Lordship in despatch No. 29, written before leaving Ragusa.

The district and town of Nichsich has been provided with provisions and money. Dervish Pasha was expected at Mostar from Nichsich. He reports that not an insurgent is now to be seen in or near the famous Duga Pass.

The French officer, M. Rayat, alluded to in my despatch Political, No. 7, has proceeded to Cettigné.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 448.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 10.) *Vienna, January 9, 1862.*

My Lord,

YOUR Lordship will have been informed by my despatch No. 7 of the 2nd instant, that Count Rechberg desired to avoid entering into a written controversy with the Russian Government on the Sutorina question. His Excellency persists in this opinion, but he has felt himself called upon to address an instruction to Count Thun on the publication of Prince Gortchakow's despatch to M. de Balabine in the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg."

In this despatch, which however is by no means intended for communication to Prince Gortchakow, but simply for the guidance of the Austrian Minister, I am informed that Count Rechberg expresses regret at the violent articles which have appeared in the Vienna newspapers, but does not admit that they at all justified the publication of the Prince's despatch. His Excellency proclaims his intention to adhere strictly to the principles of the Treaty of Paris of 1856, but denies their being in any way applicable to the special interests of Austria in a right of military road across the Sutorina, concerning which he cannot admit the plea of any interference on the part of the European Powers.

I may add that I believe Count Rechberg only regrets one thing connected with the late military incursion, that General Rodich made such an unnecessary display of force, and took with him nine companies to effect what he could have done equally well with one.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 449.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 20.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 16, 1862.*

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, copies of two despatches from Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Vienna and St. Petersburgh, relative to the proceedings of the Austrians in the Sutorina.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 450.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received January 18.)

(No. 8.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 6, 1862.*

IN conformity with your Lordship's orders conveyed to me by your Circular despatch of the 24th of December, I waited upon Prince Gortchakow this forenoon and informed him that it would not be in my power under your Lordship's instructions to offer my official congratulations to His Majesty the Emperor on New Year's day, in consequence of the mourning for the death of His Royal Highness the Prince Consort, which could not with propriety be put off on that occasion. His Excellency told me that he would explain to the Emperor the motive of my absence, which would be appreciated by His Majesty.

I thought that it would not be inconsistent with my duty to Her Majesty to apply for a private audience of the Emperor at which I might offer His Majesty the good wishes of the season, and convey my thanks to him for the message of condolence which he addressed to the Queen through Her Majesty's Embassy. I therefore requested Prince Gortchakow to submit to the Emperor my desire to be admitted to pay my respects to His Majesty privately, which his Excellency undertook to do.

I may remark that I have not had an opportunity of conversing with the Emperor since His Majesty's return from the southern provinces.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 451.

Consul Ricketts to Earl Russell.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 3.)

My Lord, *Scutari, January 10, 1862.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith inclosed to your Lordship, the copy of a despatch addressed by me to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, dated Scutari, January 7, 1862, relative to a slight skirmish that took place lately between the Turks and Montenegrins in the vicinity of Suzina.

It appears that, by all accounts, the affair was of a very trifling nature.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

Inclosure in No. 451.

Consul Ricketts to Sir H. Bulwer.

Sir, *Scutari, January 7, 1862.*

I HAVE the honour to state, for the information of your Excellency, that the Prince of Montenegro is concentrating his forces on the route leading from Montenegro to Piva; it is, therefore, probable that the Montenegrins are meditating a sudden attack on that post. I communicated this news to Ishmael Pasha; he has telegraphed on the subject to Omer Pasha, who is said to be ready to repel any incursion that might be attempted. I hear also that the Prince has dismissed the whole of his Senators and elected new ones in their stead; these latter are said to be all of them young men.

* Nos. 436, 438, and 448.

Should this be the case, it is evident the intention of the Prince is directed to obtaining complete control over the affairs of the country. Such a scheme might be advantageous to his future policy, supposing the dismissal of the Senate does not create any discontent among that body. As, however, they are a class that enjoy a certain amount of influence in their respective villages, such a policy on the part of the Prince might be the means of creating great internal dissatisfaction. There are a number of Montenegrins congregated in the Greek village of Seltzer, situated on the border of the Lake of Scutari, and in Turkish territory. The Pasha will, as soon as a fitting opportunity presents itself, take the necessary steps for removing them. The permission of these people to remain in a rayah village without any opposition being displayed on the part of the authorities, might be the means of encouraging other villages to become troublesome.

I have also the honour to transmit, herewith inclosed, to your Excellency, the copy of a despatch from Raschid Pasha, the Governor, dated Scutari, 4th January, 1862, by which it appears that a number of Montenegrins were repulsed at Suzina in the district of Spizza.

Your Excellency will no doubt observe that this is not the first time that the Montenegrins have crossed the frontier in this place; the plan generally adopted by them is, first to drive their cattle upon Turkish territory, and then, if possible, to establish themselves in the plains so occupied. Now, in the present instance, if permitted to remain in the vicinity of Suzina, their next manœuvre probably would have been to move down upon Tajaunnul, from which position they might eventually cut off the district of Spizza, and obtain a footing on the sea.

These marauding expeditions, although arising nominally from disputes about pasture, partake in reality much of the nature of previously well-concerted designs, and it is curious to observe that the points attacked are generally of no little importance when regarded in a military point of view.

Ishmael Pasha is, however, taking steps to fortify the height of Tajaunnul; this will probably disconcert materially any future operation on the part of the Montenegrins in that neighbourhood.

My Russian colleague was very desirous that I should join in forwarding a collective telegram to the Ambassadors on this subject. I declined to do so on the plea that these skirmishes were things of daily occurrence, that in this instance I did not attach any vast importance to the matter, and further, that my orders were merely to report on passing events. I do not know how far your Excellency will approve of my conduct in so doing, but I wish to avoid as far as possible establishing a precedent of telegraphing collectively or of writing collectively to the Ambassadors on every minute subject, such a measure appearing to me to lend undue importance to facts and persons. Your Excellency may, however, rest assured that I shall not fail to telegraph to you on any subject that seems to me of sufficient moment to warrant me in so doing.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

No. 452.

Earl Russell to Lord Napier.

(No. 14.)
My Lord,

Foreign Office, January 24, 1862.

I INCLOSE herewith, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a despatch from Lord Bloomfield respecting the late proceedings in the Sutorina.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 453.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 17.)
My Lord,

St. Petersburgh, January 15, 1862.

PRINCE GORTCHAKOW showed me yesterday a despatch from Prince Lobanoff in which his Excellency reports a conversation which he had held with Ali Pasha on the recent intervention of Austria at Sutorina.

* No. 448.

Ali Pasha remarked to the Russian Minister that, while he could not but condemn the conduct of Austria in entering the Turkish territory without the consent of the Porte, yet, as the Porte had plainly benefitted by that act, it would ill become them to complain of it.

Prince Lobanoff, among other reflections, observed to the Pasha that, as the Turkish Government had accepted the combined guarantees of 1856, they were not now, in his opinion, at liberty to solicit or accept the separate armed assistance of any one of the Guaranteeing Powers without the consent of the others while those Powers were at peace with one another.

Prince Gortchakow, or some other person, had written on the margin of the despatch opposite this passage, "Perfectly just."

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 454.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 19.)
My Lord,

St. Petersburgh, January 15, 1862.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship, with reference to my despatch No. 8 of the 6th instant, that His Majesty the Emperor did me the honour to receive me yesterday at a private audience.

The Emperor greeted me very cordially, and expressed the deep regret which he felt for the cause which had prevented me from having the honour of joining the diplomatic circle on the 1st of January. His Majesty charged me anew to convey to the Queen the expression of his sympathy for Her Majesty in her present distress, and he added that he was most sensible of the friendly and gracious attention which Her Majesty had shown to various members of his family in England, and especially to their Imperial Highnesses the Grand Duke and Duchess Constantine on a recent occasion.

His Majesty then reflected with satisfaction on the amicable relations which prevailed between his Government and that of Her Majesty, which he was pleased to refer in part to the conduct of Her Majesty's Embassy here.

After tendering to the Emperor the good wishes of the season, I told His Majesty that I would not fail to submit to the Queen through your Lordship the kind messages which he had entrusted to me, and which would be highly welcome to Her Majesty; and I assured the Emperor that nothing should be wanting on my part, according to my humble powers, in maintaining the friendly correspondence of the two countries. I also thanked His Majesty for the confidence and conciliatory disposition which I experienced on the part of Prince Gortchakow.

The Emperor then passed to several political topics. He said that he had felt it necessary to mark his sense of the conduct pursued by Austria in the recent intervention at Sutorina, for that intervention was inconsistent with the Treaties of 1856. The measure in question might not be in itself of much importance, but the state of Turkey gave rise to serious apprehensions, and events might occur in that quarter which would render it desirable that the engagements implying a community of counsel and action should be strictly adhered to. He assured me again, as he had done before, that Russia had no ambitious views in the East; all he asked for the other Powers was a similar moderation and adherence to international obligations.

I replied to the Emperor that Her Majesty's Government attached no less importance to the maintenance of the engagements having reference to the Ottoman Empire. I felt myself justified in affirming, on the strength of a despatch from Baron Brünnow to Prince Gortchakow, which I had seen that very morning, that your Lordship recognized that Austria would have acted more regularly if she had communicated both with the Porte and the European Powers before proceeding against the insurgents entrenched on the neutralized Turkish ground of Sutorina, but Her Majesty's Government had been sensible that there were peculiar local considerations attached to this incident which deprived it of much gravity, and your Lordship had not deemed it necessary to make any formal remonstrance on the subject. The distinction between His Majesty's views, I said, and those of Her Majesty's Government was rather one of degree than of principle.

The Emperor touched upon the condition of Italy, and remarked that a year had now elapsed since the overthrow of the old Governments of the Peninsula, yet the work of unification was not perfected, and especially in Naples there seemed to be no good

will towards an incorporation with Sardinia. He could not affirm that the Neapolitans had an ardent desire for the restoration of their former Government, but he did not believe that the present settlement was an acceptable or popular one.

I said to the Emperor, as I did a year ago, that I neither defended all the acts of the Revolutionary party, nor all the acts of the Sardinian Government, which had brought about the present union of the Italian States; I believed, however, that union to be definitive—political changes of such magnitude could not be consolidated and bear their full fruits in so short a time, but I felt sure the benefits attending a fusion of the separate territories were incontestable, and would soon be widely felt. The same benefits, or many of them might, as Prince Gortchakow said, have been conferred under the federative system, but that system was impracticable; the old Governments had disappeared for ever. I called the attention of the Emperor to the capacity and dignity of the statesmen who had guided the Italian movement since its commencement, and I remarked that in no previous national revolution had such a leader as Ricasoli succeeded to such a leader as Cavour.

The Emperor did not dispute the ability with which the affairs of the Italian Kingdom are conducted, and he spoke very gently on the subject in general. Perhaps I might have improved this occasion further in the Italian interest, but I am not instructed to press upon the Russian Government the official recognition of the new order of Government in the Peninsula, and I did not think it prudent to urge the Emperor apart from Prince Gortchakow, for His Majesty has no opinion or policy in foreign affairs separate from that of the Minister, and the Minister would probably resent any attempt upon the Sovereign of which he was not previously cognizant.

Before closing this audience the Emperor congratulated me warmly on the pacific issue of our recent controversy with the United States, which led to some conversation respecting the politics and public men of that country, and on the position and sentiments of the British Colonies, with which it is not necessary that I should trouble your Lordship.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 455.

Consul Ricketts to Earl Russell.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 5.)
My Lord, *Scutari, January 18, 1862.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith inclosed to your Lordship the copy of a despatch dated Scutari, January 13th, 1862, and addressed by me to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, relative to the late skirmish at Suzina.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

Inclosure in No. 455.

Consul Ricketts to Sir H. Bulwer.

Sir, *Scutari, January 13, 1862.*

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Excellency that the account of Raschid Pasha relative to the late skirmish in the vicinity of Suzina, a copy of which was forwarded to you in my despatch of the 7th instant, has turned out, to a great extent, exaggerated. The Austrian Agent at Antivari having reported to his Consul here that there was little or no fighting and that some 400 cattle only were taken instead of 1,500, the Pasha immediately sent a confidential person to Suzina to make inquiries as to the merits of the case, and it appears that the Mudir of Antivari, Mahmud Bey, wishing to give himself undue importance, had in his official report to the Pasha, considerably overrated his own achievements. The Pasha has not, however, suffered him to go altogether without punishment, for he has already ordered him to be removed from his Mudirlik. The following facts still remain unchanged, namely, that there were some few Montenegrins with their flocks on this side of the frontier, that they were driven away and their cattle seized, and that the Bashi-Bazouks did not manifest any spirit of plundering, further than taking the 400 sheep to which, under the circumstances, they appear to have been entitled.

In a private conversation which I had with his Excellency relative to this affair, I told him that the fact of his communicating officially this, or any event, at the present moment to the Consular body was, to a certain extent, impolitic, inasmuch as it was a sort of tacit acknowledgment that the Consuls had a right to interfere in the internal affairs of the province, and that it might perhaps be more advisable not to establish a precedent for any future unnecessary interference on their part. His Excellency perfectly agreed with me, and said he would take the opinion of his Government on the subject.

I am informed that M. Hecquard was at Cettigné last week. It is difficult to conceive what object this gentleman can have in visiting the capital of Montenegro during this season.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

No. 456.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 39.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 30, 1862.*

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh respecting the recent intervention of Austria in the Sutorina.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 457.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received January 31.)

(No. 15.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, January 13, 1862.*

WITH reference to Lord Bloomfield's despatch No. 594, inclosed in your Lordship's No. 761 of the 19th ultimo, reporting a conversation between Prince Callimachi and Count Rechberg on the subject of the restoration of order in the Herzegovina, I think it right to state that I am inclined to be of the opinion of Prince Callimachi that there is no truth in the reports in circulation as to a desire on the part of Austria to acquire an increase of territory in that quarter.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

No. 458.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received January 31.)

(No. 18.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, January 20, 1862.*

I HAVE communicated to the Porte the various reports addressed to your Lordship by Lord Napier and Lord Bloomfield respecting the late violation of Turkish territory at Sutorina by an Austrian force.

Aali Pasha admitted that Prince Callimaki had been informed by Count Rechberg that the Austrian Government intended to send an armed force into the Sutorina to destroy the batteries erected by the insurgents, but said that Count Rechberg had assigned as a reason for not making a similar communication through Baron Prokesch here that he was desirous of avoiding the possibility of a premature discovery by the insurgents of the projected attack, and there would not have been sufficient time for an interchange of written communications on the subject with the Porte.

On learning what had occurred Aali Pasha addressed a remonstrance to Prince Callimaki, to whom the above explanation was given by the Austrian Government. His Highness then directed Prince Callimaki to express his regret that this incursion on Turkish territory should have been made without previous concert with the Porte and without obtaining its consent. The Prince was desired to add that the Porte could not

* No. 456.

admit the force of the argument used by the Austrian Government, viz., that the insurgents might have received intelligence of the intended attack, as they were informed by the Austrian authorities of what was going to be done a whole week before the event, which would have afforded time also to concert measures with the Ottoman Government.

Prince Callimáki, however, thought it advisable to withhold this representation until he had again consulted the Porte; and the result was that the Porte determined to allow the matter to drop.

With reference to Prince Gortchakow's theory that the Porte is not entitled to claim the military assistance of any foreign Power without the consent of all the Powers who were parties to the Treaty of Paris, and who have guaranteed the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, Aali Pasha altogether dissented from Prince Gortchakow's views on this subject, asserting that, as an independent Power, Turkey has still the right of calling on any of her allies to assist her in case of necessity.

I have entered into some detail on this head because it is not improbable that, should the same case with respect to the Montenegrins arise at Sutorina, the Porte may this time require the aid of Austria.

Two points would then have to be considered.

First, has the Porte, by its Treaties, deprived itself generally of the right of invoking the aid of any foreign Power without the consent of all the guaranteeing Powers? and,

Secondly, whether, should the general rule be otherwise established, Austria and Turkey might still have, under the peculiar situation of the district in question, a particular right, arising out of a particular joint interest, to keep the military road across Sutorina (which the Montenegrins desire to command) open for their common benefit and necessary convenience.

The first is a very important point to settle.

I do not myself see any prohibition in the Treaties, except in the case of Servia, against the Porte's right to demand or receive the assistance of any State; though such a course might allow any guaranteeing Power to withdraw its guarantee in consequence of such assistance being given.

However, as Russia contends in this matter for one principle and the Porte will probably assert another, it would be desirable that I should know the views of Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

P.S.—I need not say that I think it would always be desirable that the Porte should always, unless under the pressure of some strong necessity, avoid calling in the aid of any one Power without the assent of the others, even if she has the right to do so; but this is a question of policy; whereas if the Russian Minister's view is a correct one this Government is under an obligation which it evidently does not recognize.

H. L. B.

No. 459.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(*Received January* 31.)

(No. 26.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, January* 22, 1862.

IN view of the present state of affairs in the Herzegovina, Montenegro, &c., and also on the information that a volunteer expedition under the command of Garibaldi, or some foreign chief, is likely to assail the Empire and stir up insurrection amongst the Christian populations, the Porte has sent a flotilla consisting of two screw frigates and two corvettes to the coast of Albania to rendezvous at Antivari.

Five battalions of fresh troops are likewise to be despatched to Scutari, two of which left last Saturday, and the remainder will follow in the course of this week.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

No. 460.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(*Received February* 1.)

(No. 29.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January* 20, 1862.

I ASKED Prince Gortchakow yesterday whether there was any foundation for the story that the Herzegovina insurgents had endeavoured to rebuild their works on the neutralized territory of Sutorina.

The Prince replied that he believed the report to be destitute of truth; but as soon as he heard of it he had despatched orders to his Consular Agents in that quarter to advise Vucalovich to attempt nothing of the sort.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 461.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(*Received February* 1.)

(No. 37. Confidential.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January* 24, 1862.

PRINCE GORTCHAKOW took occasion yesterday to inform me again that he had caused advice to be conveyed to the Herzegovina insurgents discouraging the project of a new attempt on the neutralized ground at Sutorina. His Excellency added that "another Power" had done otherwise, or at least the local representative of that Power had encouraged the insurgents to act in defiance of the resolutions of Austria, and recommence operations in the quarter referred to. The Prince did not pronounce the name of France, but he evidently alluded to that Government.

On the same occasion a despatch was shown to me from Prince Labanoff, stating that at a recent Conference of the Representatives at Constantinople, the Austrian Internuncio had brought under their notice the outrages continually perpetrated by the Montenegrins on the Turkish territory, and had proposed that the Representatives should join in a remonstrance to the Prince of that country, and should summon him to put an end to these disorders. The Montenegrins were as usual defended by the Russian Minister in the most unqualified terms, and the proposal fell to the ground.

In the meantime Vucalovitch has been passing some weeks with Prince Danilo, who affects to preserve an attitude of neutrality towards the Porte; but whether this visit has been in the way of an asylum or to arrange a concerted action against Omer Pasha I am not informed.

Prince Gortchakow affirms that the revolt is not at all subdued, and will burst out with fresh violence in spring.

If I may be permitted to speculate on such uncertain issues, I think that the Porte will be able to extinguish this rebellion. The Bosnians will remain quiet unless the Servians move, and the Servians will be restrained by a judicious mixture of concession and control on the part of the Turkish Government, assisted by your Lordship and the Austrian Cabinet. The isolated efforts of the people in Herzegovina will subside before the arms and persuasions of Omer Pasha. This danger will disappear like many others which have arisen elsewhere in the Ottoman provinces, leaving behind it the permanent difficulties and duties of Government. Vucalovitch will remain the hero of the "Orthodox," and perhaps a pensioner of the Russian Emperor.

Should such prove to be the event, would it not be worthy of Her Majesty's Government to take into serious consideration the position of Montenegro in reference to the Porte and the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh? The mischief of the old Russian system of interference and protection is now concentrated there. The Montenegrins have all the privileges and immunities of independence, and none of its responsibilities. They invade and pillage the Turks, the harbour the enemies of the Sultan, they are leagued with insurrection beyond their borders, they practice every description of crime and wrong; but whenever the Porte attempts to vindicate its rights and inflict a deserved punishment on these savages, the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh steps in with pretexts of Turkish oppression, Christian suffering, &c., &c., while the other Governments cannot give the Porte the countenance which the justice of its cause deserves; for the reduction of Montenegro, if it could be effected, would be a remedy ruinous to the Turkish finances, and a serious attempt to that effect would not be carried out without creating dissensions

among the representatives at Constantinople and their Governments, which, for many other reasons, it is most desirable to avoid.

By the Treaty of Paris, the signatary Powers disavow all right of protectorate in Turkey, and engage to use their influence in common for the good of that country. According to the Austrian theory, and perhaps according to that recognized by Her Majesty's Government, Russia has no right of protectorate in Montenegro, for Montenegro is in some sense "de jure" a dependence of the Ottoman Empire. But Russia loudly affirms the absolute independence of the mountain, and continues to assert a right of protectorate over its inhabitants, certainly to exercise that right. The pretension of Russia to exert that protectorate may always have been without any foundation in justice, it now certainly appears highly repugnant to the spirit of the engagements of 1856, but it stands before us as a plain offensive fact, attended by consequences really of a scandalous and pernicious character.

I venture to suggest that it might be alike consistent with the welfare of Turkey and general policy to put an end to this state of things by an arrangement confirming the following provisions:—

1. The recognition of the independence of Montenegro by Turkey and the Great Powers.

2. The delimitation of the territory of Montenegro by a mixed commission with a view both to the sustenance of the people of the mountain, and the due defence of the Ottoman territory.

3. The concession by Turkey and Austria of certain rights of transit to the Montenegrins to specified ports on the Adriatic.

4. The disavowal by Russia of any right of separate protectorate over Montenegro, and an engagement on the part of all the contracting Powers to respect and protect the neutrality of that country.

If these principles should be adopted by the Government of the Sultan and the European Cabinets, and be supported by the constant presence of European Consular Agents at the residence of the Prince of Montenegro, I cannot help thinking that the ancient and obstinate evils attached to the present system would soon disappear. I grant that such a settlement would on the surface have all the appearance of rewarding the aggressor and punishing the offended party. The Montenegrins would indeed be exonerated from the just consequences of their past guilt, but the Turkish Government would substantially find its interest in such terms by the removal of a constant source of anxiety, and the arrest of a constant drain on its pecuniary and military resources.

These suggestions, which I take the liberty of submitting respectfully to the better judgment of Her Majesty's Government, have not been communicated to any other party. I have no reason as yet to believe that they would be acceptable to the Russian Cabinet.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 462.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(*Received February* 3.)

(No. 2. Political.)
My Lord, *Bosna Serai, January* 17, 1862.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that Osman Pasha, Governor-General of Bosnia, returned here from Turkish Croatia on the 9th instant.

His Excellency attributes the disturbance which necessitated his journey to the proceedings of the Austrian authorities on the frontier, who on this occasion, his Excellency declares, told the people that the present Sultan had remitted all their taxes, and that if they paid them they were only enriching the Turkish Pashas and other functionaries. His Excellency states that not only the subordinate authorities, but those of higher grade in Austrian Croatia, are constantly talking of driving the Turks out of Bosnia and occupying the province, and doing all in their power to excite discontent among Turkish subjects.

It is much to be regretted that the Austrian Government cannot prevent anti-Turkish intrigues and demonstrations which it does not approve, at least as far as officers in Government employ are concerned. At the same time, it will not fail to strike your Lordship that it is very convenient for the Turkish authorities to be able on every occasion of disorder (perhaps caused by their own misconduct) to escape responsibility

by throwing the whole onus on Austrian intrigue; and in the very matter in question I have heard that the principal reason of the disturbance was that a certain amount of arrears of taxes had been demanded and paid two or three times over by the unfortunate people during the last three or four years, and they refused to pay any more. It is, however, very difficult to get at the whole truth of these matters, but probably neither statement is incorrect, and the combination of circumstances caused the outbreak.

The Pasha seems to have acted with much consideration towards the malcontents on this occasion, and has restored tranquillity without bloodshed. He has brought here twenty-three of the ringleaders, who are now in confinement at the barracks.

His Excellency states that the distress in the Sandjak of Banialuka is extreme. He ascertained that many of the peasantry subsisted on the bark of trees, which they sent to the mills to be ground into flour, and he took steps to alleviate the misery, as far as possible, by ordering 50,000 okes of grain to be issued from the Government stores to the most needy. The failure of the crops last year, and the unceasing requirements of the army of the Herzegovina, had led his Excellency to foresee that something like famine might occur in certain parts of this province, and he had applied to Constantinople that 1,500,000 okes of grain might be purchased on the Danube, so that it could be sent cheaply to the north of Bosnia in boats for the necessities of the people. The Government approved of the measure, but directed the supply to be furnished from Nisch, which, however, would render the grain so dear, on account of the long land journey, that the end of a cheap supply would be defeated. This was explained by the Pasha in reply, but he has received no further communication on the subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 463.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(*Received February* 3.)

(No. 3. Political.)
My Lord, *Bosna-Serai, January* 17, 1862.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that Dervish Pasha left Mostar on the 12th instant for Trebigne, with orders from Omer Pasha to clear the road between that place and Ragusa of any insurgents who may be still lingering in that direction.

I hear that the leaders of the insurrection are now assembled at Gettigné in consultation, and that M. Hecquard has also repaired thither, probably with a view to bring about, if possible, some kind of pacific arrangement.

It is my humble opinion that the functions of the European Commission having been suspended, it would be much better that the French Commissioner abstained from interference of any kind, leaving the insurgents and the Montenegrins entirely to their own devices until such time as a joint European intervention might be deemed advantageous. I am certain that Omer Pasha would be inclined to look with the greatest suspicion on any arrangement made by one so notoriously in favour of Montenegro as M. Hecquard is supposed to be.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 464.

Earl Russell to Lord Napier.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February* 3, 1862.

MAKE no proposals to Prince Gortchakow respecting Herzegovina in the sense of your Excellency's No. 37 of the 24th ultimo.

No. 465.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 119.) *Foreign Office, February 3, 1862.*

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copy of a despatch upon the subject of the state of affairs in the Herzegovina.*

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 466.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received February 5.)

St. Petersburgh, February 4, 1862, 12·15 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

NO proposals whatever made respecting the Herzegovina.

No. 467.

Earl Russell to Lord Napier.

Foreign Office, February 4, 1862.

(Telegraphic.)

MY telegram of yesterday should have referred to Montenegro, not to the Herzegovina.

No. 468.

Earl Russell to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 46.) *Foreign Office, February 5, 1862.*

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your information, copy of a despatch upon the subject of the state of affairs in the Herzegovina.*

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 469.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 48.) *Foreign Office, February 6, 1862.*

Sir,

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, the accompanying copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh relating to the affairs of Montenegro and the Herzegovina.†

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 470.

Earl Russell to Lord Napier.

(No. 30.) *Foreign Office, February 7, 1862.*

My Lord,

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 37 of the 24th ultimo relative to the state of affairs in the Herzegovina and in Montenegro, and offering some suggestions for the settlement of affairs in the latter country; and I have to repeat to you, as I have already informed you by telegraph, that it is not desirable that you should make any similar proposals to Prince Gortchakow.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

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* No. 469.

† No. 461.

No. 471.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 68.)

My Lord, *Vienna, February 6, 1862.*

COUNT RECHBERG has informed me that he has received a very interesting report from General Mamula, the Governor of Ragusa, of a meeting which has been lately held between the Prince of Montenegro and the Chiefs of the Herzegovinian insurgents, and that he will send a copy of it to Count Apponyi by the present messenger for communication to your Lordship.

His Excellency said that Luka Vukalovitch, one of the rebellious leaders, had fallen into disgrace and been dismissed, and that a fanatic priest, Nicana, had been selected by the Prince to take his place, and was to superintend the revolution in the Herzegovina.

I inclose a telegraphic despatch which has been published here on this subject.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 471.

(Translation.) *Ragusa, January 26, 1862.*

TELEGRAMS and newspapers have probably already informed you of the meeting which was held on the Greek New Year's Day between the Heads of the Montenegrins and those of the insurgents. There is no confirmation of the report that Prince Nicholas, or rather his father Mirko, had had Luka Vukalovich arrested, though the latter has been superseded on account of his "bad administration." Prince Nicholas has of his own sole authority replaced him in his command of the entire forces in the rebellious districts by the Monk Nikanor of Duzi. Under him Zubci, an officer belonging to the district Government of the Montenegrin priest Pero Matanovich, has been appointed, and the Montenegrin law has been formally introduced and sworn to in this district, so that something like an organization or annexation under Montenegrin protection has taken place. Prince Nicholas has already assumed for some time past the right of appointing, replacing, but especially of rewarding Governors of Turkish places with Czernagozian decorations. At his orders the names of those foreign Sovereigns who have furnished assistance, especially in supplies, to the Montenegrins and their coreligionists in the neighbouring districts, have been inserted in the prayers of the Liturgy. This attention has not yet been paid to the Austrian Emperor; but the Prince recommends the inhabitants of the frontier to be most guarded and peaceful in their conduct towards their Austrian neighbours, with whom they had already so often had a chance of taking refuge.

No. 472.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 4. Political.)

My Lord, *Bosna-Serai, January 23, 1862.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith copy of despatch of 21st instant to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, reporting Osman Pasha's intended visit to Mostar to make arrangements with his Highness Omer Pasha to relieve Bosnia from the necessity of contributing provisions and horses for the army of the Herzegovina during the present year.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure in No. 472.

Consul Holmes to Sir H. Bulwer.

Sir, *Bosna-Serai, January 21, 1862.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that his Excellency Osman Pasha leaves this for Mostar to-morrow, with a view to confer with his Highness Omer Pasha on

the necessity of relieving this province from contributing either provisions or horses for the use of the army during the present year.

The extreme destitution of the people witnessed by the Pasha during his late journey through Turkish Croatia and Banialuka has produced a profound impression on his Excellency, and he is convinced that no further assistance can be given by Bosnia in the two above-mentioned items towards supporting the army of the Herzegovina without incurring the most ruinous consequences, as the peasants are now reduced to starvation, and are almost without means of transport to obtain grain from places where it is still to be found. As to iron, shoes, blankets, and articles of that nature, there is no objection, as they are simply matters of commerce.

The Pasha, with great reason, says that it will be too late to represent this critical state of affairs when the army stands in urgent need of transport and provisions, and he, therefore, goes in person, while there is yet time, to urge the Serdar to make arrangements to obtain these necessaries from elsewhere during the ensuing year. His Excellency has begged me to urge your Excellency to represent to the Porte the absolute necessity of accepting and carrying out my suggestions on this subject which may be made by Omer Pasha and himself. He rightly states that he has given good proof of his will to do everything possible to support the army by the manner in which he furnished almost everything demanded by the Serdar last year, but it is impossible to do so this year without entirely ruining this province, and occasioning perhaps disturbances in every quarter which the Government will have no power to quell.

I cannot but extol the praiseworthy activity and foresight which Osman Pasha exhibits in his Government of Bosnia, and the real interest he seems to take in the welfare of the people; and I am sure your Excellency will do all in your power to support and assist him in his humane and praiseworthy endeavours.

I believe that my colleagues, who have long been impressed with the necessity of doing something to relieve this province from the pressure which of late years has brought it to the verge of ruin, have all written in this sense to their respective chiefs at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 473.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 71. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Vienna, February 8, 1862.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 68 of the 6th instant, Count Rechberg has just informed me, in strict confidence, that he had received a communication from Ragusa that the mountain Chief, Luka Vukalovitch, offers to take refuge in Austria provided he is insured protection and the means of subsistence. His Excellency said that he had telegraphed to General Mamula, by the Emperor's orders, to make whatever arrangement he deems advisable to meet Luka Vukalovitch's wishes, and to accept his services, but that he regrets to hear that the General declares he cannot answer for the personal safety of Luka Vukalovitch either at Cattaro or Ragusa, both of which places are filled with partizans of the Prince of Montenegro, and that his life would be in danger at either of them.

Count Rechberg looks upon this proposal as one of the highest importance. He considers Luka Vukalovitch to be the only really intelligent and influential leader in the mountain, and that he might become instrumental in quelling the Herzegovinian rebellion, but he is fearful lest the Russian Minister here should hear of the offer which has been made, and he already knew that he had taken measures to try and prevent Luka Vukalovitch from accepting service in Austria.

I understand from Count Rechberg that the main cause of the quarrel between the Prince of Montenegro and Luka Vukalovitch is the discovery made by the Prince that he was working to promote the interests of Servia in the Herzegovina rather than those of Montenegro.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 474.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 155.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, February 12, 1862.*

I INCLOSE, for Excellency's information, copies of despatches, as marked in the margin, upon the subject of the state of affairs in Bosnia and the Herzegovina.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 475.

Earl Russell to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 54.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, February 12, 1862.*

I INCLOSE, for your information, copy of a despatch respecting Herzegovina.†

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 476.

Earl Russell to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 55.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, February 12, 1862.*

I INCLOSE, for your information, copy of a despatch relating to the proceedings of the Austrians at Sutorina.‡

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 477.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 165.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, February 13, 1862.*

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copy of a despatch, as marked in the margin, upon the subject of Montenegro.§

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 478.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 63.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 13, 1862.*

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency, for your information, copies of two despatches from Her Majesty's Ambassadors at St. Petersburgh and Vienna, respecting the Sutorina.‖

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 479.

Consul Ricketts to Earl Russell.—(Received February 15.)

(No. 7.)
My Lord, *Scutari, February 1, 1862.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith inclosed to your Lordship the copy of a despatch No. 4, dated Scutari, January 28, 1862, and addressed to Her Majesty's

* Nos. 462 and 472. † No. 457. ‡ No. 458.
§ No. 471. ‖ Nos. 460 and 473.

Ambassador at Constantinople, relative to an expedition lately sent from Scutari by the orders of the Governor, for the purpose of subduing the Greek village of Grenitza, which is in revolt, and in the possession of the Montenegrins.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

Inclosure in No. 479.

Consul Ricketts to Sir H. Bulwer.

Sir, *Scutari, January 28, 1862.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that a detachment of irregular troops was sent last night to attack the village of Grenitza. This village, which lies in Turkish territory, and is situated at no great distance from the borders of the Lake of Scutari, is inhabited by Greek rayahs. These villagers have for a long time past refused to submit to the authority of the Porte, and have taken every opportunity of manifesting their sympathy towards their coreligionists the Montenegrins. The Pasha has on more than one occasion made it known to these misguided people that the clemency of the Sultan would be granted to all those who chose to avail themselves of it and give in their submission, yet these generous offers have been in every instance refused.

As, however, the village in question has been for a long time past the rendezvous of a number of Montenegrins, the Governor has been compelled to attack it, with the view of forcing these people to retire within their own boundary. The result of the expedition is not yet known.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

No. 480.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received February 15.)

(No. 51. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February 3, 1862.*

ON the occasion of my interview with Prince Gortchakow yesterday, the conversation having incidentally turned on the affairs of Turkey, I asked the Prince whether it was true that the rebel leader Vucalovitch had quarrelled with the Prince of Montenegro.

Prince Gortchakow replied that he believed that such a misunderstanding had occurred, but they had since become reconciled.

I remarked to Prince Gortchakow that the correspondence of Vucalovitch and other leaders of the insurrection with Prince Danilo was so notorious, that it involved the latter in positive hostility towards the Porte. It was now even said that a meeting of the Herzegovina Chiefs would take place at Cettigné, for the avowed purpose of concerting operations against Omer Pasha. I laboured to prove that the present insurrection must, if the European peace continued, be suppressed, and that the Prince of Montenegro would find himself at length singly exposed to the just reprisals of the Turkish Government. I therefore urged on his Excellency the propriety of using any influence he might possess with the view of drawing off Prince Danilo from this hazardous connection, of keeping his people quiet, and indeed for the purpose of recommending the insurgents of Herzegovina themselves to accept the renewed overtures of the Pasha while it was yet time. I said that by preserving his neutrality Prince Danilo would deserve the goodwill of the Powers, and be enabled to use his resources for introducing amongst his own people that civilization of which they stood so much in need.

Prince Gortchakow demurred to my suggestions. He said that he dared not take the responsibility of pressing upon the people arrayed against Turkish misgovernment the propriety of accepting the overtures of the Pasha. In case they did so, he did not possess the power of enforcing the execution of the promises made to them; they might submit, and be exposed anew to all the abuses which had driven them to arms. It was easy for us from our easy chairs to advise moderation and submission; but these poor people had all at stake, their fortunes, their habitations, their lives, the honour of their wives and daughters. The promises of the Porte were always fair, the Hatti-Humayoum

itself was an admirable charter of toleration, but nothing was executed. His Excellency also qualified Omer Pasha as a man justly stained with the imputation of faithlessness, in whose promises no one would have any confidence.

I defended the Pasha, whose humanity, I observed, was not disputed; and I asked the Prince to name any particular in which he had failed to execute his engagements.

Prince Gortchakow replied that the Pasha had promised to recommend to the Porte the recognition of the independence of Montenegro, and various other stipulations on behalf of that country, but nothing had come of it.

I said that the Porte alone could decide such questions. The Pasha could only offer opinions and advice; and I asked his Excellency whether it was possible for the Porte to negotiate in that view when the Prince of Montenegro was actually abetting the insurrection, and, I might say, in open hostility to the Government of the Sultan.

Prince Gortchakow argued that the attitude of the Prince, who was not recognized by the Porte, and who had so many grounds of natural sympathy with the insurgents, did not amount to actual hostility. If the Montenegrins had really risen and joined their co-religionists, very different results would have appeared. His Excellency observed that I was mistaken if I supposed that Prince Danilo had done nothing for the improvement of the people of Montenegro. The reigning Prince and his predecessors had made considerable progress in introducing a regular civil administration and a code of laws. The small allowance made by the Emperor to the Prince was chiefly expended in maintaining this organization for the payment of the functionaries of Government, especially the Senators, and for useful objects of that character. As for the hostility of the Turks, Prince Gortchakow said the Montenegrins, who had maintained their independence for centuries against the Ottoman Power when it was very differently constituted, would not be conquered now.

I asked Prince Gortchakow how much the Emperor allowed Prince Danilo.

The Prince replied a small pittance—100,000 fr. (4,000*l.*) annually, or thereabouts, he believed.

I remarked that if the stipend of the Prince did not exceed that sum, it would not go far to wage war upon the Turks; but, if wisely applied in pensioning and controlling the local Chiefs of the Montenegrin territory, it might be rendered instrumental in tranquillizing the country. I hoped it might be employed for such good purpose. I again expressed my opinion that the insurrection in Herzegovina would be subdued unless there was some great disturbance of the European peace, of which I said there was no prospect at present.

The Prince replied, "You are sanguine as a speech of the French Emperor." His Excellency does not take so favourable a view of the future.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 481.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received February 15.)

(No. 59.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February 4, 1862.*

I HAD the honour to receive last night a telegraphic despatch from your Lordship, directing me to make no proposals to Prince Gortchakow respecting the Herzegovina or Montenegro in the sense of my despatch No. 37 of the 24th ultimo.

The considerations which I took the liberty of submitting to your Lordship's judgment had reference to an uncertain contingency, the suppression of the present revolt. They were prompted by the recent course of affairs in that quarter and the views of the Russian Government.

I have made no proposals whatever to Prince Gortchakow, nor had I any view of doing so without the orders of Her Majesty's Government, which will be my guide in this matter.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 482.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received February 6.)

(No. 41.) *Constantinople, February 1, 1862.*

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 26 of the 22nd ultimo, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that, on the 30th ultimo, the three additional battalions mentioned in that despatch left for Scutari on board the paddle-steamer "Tail" and two screw corvettes, which are to remain on the Albanian station.

Another frigate will follow as soon as possible.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

No. 483.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received February 16.)

(No. 44.) *Constantinople, February 2, 1862.*

My Lord,

UNDER the impression that at this season one of those periodical Reports on the state of the provinces of Turkey, which I have at times addressed to your Lordship, might not be unwelcome, I venture to pass rapidly in review the principal points of interest which have lately occupied my attention.

Notwithstanding the various successes of Omer Pasha in the Herzegovina, the spirit of rebellion in the neighbouring districts, though repressed, is not yet extinct.

The affected apprehension of a Turkish onslaught against the Christians has passed away. Such a pretence seemed at the time to suit the enemies of the Porte; but, although it failed to produce the desired effect, the policy which suggested it is still being pursued with undiminished tenacity, and the means now employed are perhaps more likely to succeed from being kept in a certain degree out of sight.

The Hellenic party in Southern Albania seem to have taken a lesson from the experience of the last few years, and, instructed by the failure of open attempts, are now trying the more wary course of secret combination and correspondence. The time for action, they now see, has not yet arrived, but they believe, almost to conviction, that events are hurrying on with a rapidity which will soon bring it about; and, animated by this persuasion, they are actively organizing their measures, so as to be prepared for any favourable opportunity that may offer.

The Hellenic Consul at Janina, knowing, both from experience and personal sagacity, that the cause to which he is devoted would only suffer from premature attempts, is a strenuous advocate for caution and well-measured proceedings. In the full persuasion that the Mussulman element is daily losing ground in Epirus and the Christian is advancing, he recommends patience, watchfulness, and a state of combined readiness; that the Greeks must hold themselves independent of Russian influence; and that as they are not strong enough to act by themselves, at least so long as England gives her support to Turkey, they must wait either until that support is withdrawn, or until the march of events offers an occasion when they may strike with success in spite of it.

The object of the Russian policy of the day is, it would seem, to excite the Albanians—both Christians and Mussulmans—against the Turks, and bring them over to the Slave party, for Russia seems fully to appreciate the importance of the Albanians in regard to the future of Roumelia, and in order to strengthen its prestige, it has established at Janina a first-class Consulate, though there are only two or three persons who claim its protection, and the business of the Chancellerie is next to nothing.

The accounts from Scutari of the 22nd December state that in that quarter the Montenegrins appear to have abstained from any aggressive movements. This forbearance is, however, attributable to the severity of the weather in the mountains, which renders any active operation next to impossible.

I have thought it right to call the Porte's attention to the weakness of the garrison in the fortress of Scutari, which at this moment appears to be composed of a simple company of regulars, as that garrison ought to be considered as a reserve for the eventual relief or support of the smaller forts skirting this side of Montenegro.

I have also advised that a proper engineer should be dispatched from Constantinople to inspect and place in a state of efficiency the whole line of the forts situated on the Turkish side of the Montenegrin frontier.

Luca Vukalovich is concentrating all the insurgents he can collect in Suttorina and Zupzi, particularly in the latter place. He is also rebuilding the batteries demolished by the Austrians at Suttorina. Omer Pasha intends shortly to occupy Zupzi, and have a strong garrison there, provisions for which are now preparing at Ragusa.

Mr. Holmes states that the greatest disorder reigns at Cettigné. Ivo Rako, a Senator of distinction, who has on more than one occasion been sent on foreign missions, and who is represented as a man of much intelligence, has been dismissed, with all his brothers, from the Senate, and even menaced with death. Several other Senators have been dismissed, amongst others, Noviza Cerovitch. There is also, it is said, great hostility between Mirko, the father of the Prince, and Petro Stefan Vucovich, another influential Senator.

The district and town of Nichsich has been provided with provisions and money. Dervish Pasha was expected at Mostar from Nichsich. He reports that not an insurgent is now to be seen in or near the famous Douga Pass.

On the 3rd ultimo intelligence reached the Porte of a sharp engagement having taken place between the Turks and a body of insurgents (Montenegrins) at Suzina. The latter were defeated with great loss.

In a letter from the Prince of Montenegro to Omer Pasha, of which a copy has been forwarded to your Lordship by Mr. Holmes, the former obstinately adheres to the conditions put forward some months ago, as the price of any co-operation on his part in the work of pacification. The Serdar's reply establishes beyond contradiction his earnest wish to act in the most friendly manner towards Montenegro, as well as with the greatest forbearance and humanity towards the insurgents in the Herzegovina, and proves at the same time his endeavours to have been invariably frustrated by the preposterous pretensions of the Chief of Montenegro.

In Servia the appointment of M. Garachanine as Foreign Minister, and the arbitrary removal of M. Stevtcha from the Presidency of the Senate, are favourable to the cause of order. The former is undoubtedly possessed of some statesmanlike qualities. M. Marinovitch, the successor of Stevtcha, has weight, tact, and experience. Like his predecessor, though a Russian partizan, he is not the blind instrument of an incendiary policy. His very appointment may be regarded as a proof that this policy has been modified, though I should be as loth to say, as I should be desirous to believe, that it is abandoned.

If, indeed, the usurpations of the Prince are tolerated by the Guaranteeing Powers, and a virtual independence is thus secured to Servia, and she can place her finances in order, and establish her military organization on a formidable footing, she will practically become the head of a South Slavonic movement, which sooner or later will have to be expected. The appointment of a French officer, Colonel Mondaine, as Minister of War in Servia, at the very moment when, among other unjustifiable innovations, the Prince had determined upon the formation of a national militia, warrant the suspicion that the French Government can neither be ignorant of, nor averse to, the Prince's ambitious projects, and it is no mystery that France and Russia seem of late to have but one policy in the East.

But the strength of the Ottoman Dominion is yet greater than these Powers believe, and the difficulty of maintaining a large standing army or even a large militia in a country unaccustomed to heavy taxation, will render the Prince's views impracticable until some great prospect of success or some strong motive for national enthusiasm creates a feeling which, under ordinary circumstances, does not exist.

The union of the Moldo-Wallachian Principalities was announced to the Chamber of Deputies at Jassy by a message from Prince Couza, dated the 24th December. The Convocation of the two Assemblies at Bucharest was fixed for the 24th ultimo.

In the Proclamation addressed to the people, Prince Couza informs the multitude that the union has been recognized by the Porte in conjunction with the Powers, whilst in the Message to the Deputies he states that the document by which the Union is recognized by the Sublime Porte and the Great Powers having arrived, he convokes the Chambers at Bucharest for the 24th of January. In neither of the documents does the Prince say that the union he has proclaimed is the union that has been granted to the country by the Sultan's Firman; and the Legislative Chambers in reply to His Highness' opening speech and to the last message combined, clearly show that their interpretation of the Message differs widely from the sense of the Firman that has been received by Prince Couza. In those addresses the Chambers speak of the definitive union of the Rouman provinces and of nothing else; whereas the Firman limits the union to the lifetime of Prince Couza.

There appears to be even something more in the Moldavian address, for, in one

part of it, it betrays the conviction of an approaching independence, as the whole struggle in these countries is at present for power, each is guided by this consideration alone.

The Prince seems doubtful whether he should offend the Porte by not publishing the Firman, or offend the public in the Principalities by publishing it.

The Democrats desire its publication as a means of assailing the Government, and the Government talks more loudly against admitting its validity than its opponents, in order to avoid the accusation of being less patriotic. The whole of this violence and irregularity is the offspring of that confusion which has been permitted to get possession of the Moldo-Wallachian mind, wherein there exists no longer any obligations either to Europe or the Sultan, and unless suitable measures are adopted for making it clear to the Principalities that they have a particular part assigned to them beyond which no usurpation will be allowed, the notions at present existing must continue to gain force, and the eventual result must be before any great lapse of time the re-agitation of a question by which so much time has been already occupied.

On the departure of Fuad Pasha from Damascus, the Seraskier, Heleni Pasha, was entrusted with the temporary government of the country and invested with the same functions with which Fuad Pasha had been charged, including the power of administering capital punishment. But the want of an efficient successor to Fuad Pasha in all his attributions renders an early selection of such a functionary imperative.

The person whose appointment to the post in question is the most probable is Cabouli Effendi, but I am afraid that this Government would lose an efficient Under-Secretary of State and obtain but an indifferent Governor-General of Syria, since Cabouli is not to go out in a rank which will give him a predominant position over the other Turkish functionaries in the Province. He is, however, a very able man.

Daoud Pasha's essay at Government is pronounced by many to have been a failure.

The continued unsettled state of the Mountain proves either incapacity or weakness, whilst his nominations to the subordinate offices of his Administration display a want of that independence which his position peculiarly requires.

In order to prevent any further opposition to the local authorities and to the collection of taxes on the part of the Maronites of the Kesrawan, Fuad Pasha took advantage of the opportunity afforded by the late disturbances for putting in force that portion of the new regulations for the Mountain which admits of the Turkish troops occupying the high road between Beyrout and Tripoli. One battalion has accordingly been stationed between these points in three detachments, and a second battalion quartered in the town of Tripoli, from which about 200 men have been detached to a point just without the northern border of the Mountain territory, thus occupying a chain of posts extending the whole length of the recently disturbed districts.

These measures are likely to prevent any recurrence of disorder, and in the meantime the taxes at the old rate of 3,500 purses per annum have been collected from the Kesrawan, where there has been no further show of opposition.

The question of indemnities is still a subject of difficulty, but the Representatives are endeavouring to devize some plan of a settlement with Fuad Pasha which will take as much as possible into consideration the views of the different Commissioners—trying to reconcile their differences.

Bagdad and the vicinity may now be pronounced free from cholera, occasional cases only having been reported during the month of December, but the epidemic travelling westward is said to be occasioning considerable mortality at Nizzeff and Kerbella.

The Porte's rejection of the proposal of the commercial community of Bagdad to substitute a free contribution for the proposed forced loan, provided the issue of a paper currency were cancelled, has produced the effects that were to be anticipated.

Discontent is general, and business is suspended, and the value of the lira has increased to 130 piastres, a rate hitherto unprecedented at Bagdad.

The interregnum preceding the arrival of Namik Pasha—for already the authority of Ahmed Pasha is thwarted by the intrigues of Mustapha Pasha's party, including many of the Ulema—has been marked by several murders, no less than five instances having occurred during the month of December. Among the victims is the son of one of the most respectable Jew merchants of the place, by name Jussuff Yahooda, who was decoyed into the house (taking with him the bonds) of Rufnat Bey, one of his debtors, and here made away with. The circumstances of this case are well known to the police and, indeed, are sufficiently patent to general observation, but evidently no serious intention existed to bring the murderers to justice.

We have accounts of Namik Pasha's arrival at Diarbekir on the 10th December,

and as he is armed with extensive power, even with that of life and death, it is to be hoped that this lamentable state of things will cease.

The newly-discovered track of fresh water in the intended Suez Canal induced the Pasha of Egypt to visit that spot in person. He thus seems to identify himself with this scheme and to exhibit the interest he feels in its success. An English engineer, who has lately been over the line, reports that from 8,000 to 10,000 Fellah labourers were at work, advancing as fast as possible the progress of the sweet-water canal which is now made as far as Mougfar to the east of the Ruins of Rhamses, and that he calculates that by the end of February it will reach Senib-el-Guisr, and that then every attempt will be made to quadruple the number of Fellah workmen.

It is well for M. de Lesseps and his organs to declare that these workmen are volunteers, they are to all intents forced labourers, collected by authority of the various Mudirs, and sent in gangs for one month to the desert; true there is no written order from the Viceroy, but verbal ones are given; it is true also these labourers receive a certain amount of pay, but they are carried most unwillingly to the desert, and in no instance do they remain over their month, which they naturally would do were their labours voluntary and the pay they receive remunerative.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

No. 484.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(*Received February* 16.)

(No. 50.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, February* 5, 1862.

HAVING communicated to Aali Pasha Mr. Consul Holmes' despatch to me No. 5, of the 14th ultimo, respecting M. Hecquard's interference in the affairs of Montenegro, his Highness desired M. Pisani to state to me in reply, that in his opinion the object sought by the French Government in permitting that interference is to provoke the appointment of an European Commission for the purpose of settling this question in favour of the Montenegrins.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

No. 485.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 178.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 17, 1862.

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copy of a despatch upon the subject of Montenegro and the Herzegovina.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 486.

Earl Russell to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 66.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 19, 1862.

I INCLOSE, for your information, copies of despatches respecting Montenegro and Herzegovina,†

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

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* No. 480.

† Nos. 460 and 482.

No. 487.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 72.)

Foreign Office, February 21, 1862.

Sir,

I HAVE received from Mr. Consul Holmes a copy of his despatch of the 21st ultimo to your Excellency, reporting that Osman Pasha intended to proceed to Mostar in order to arrange with Omar Pasha that Bosnia should be relieved from contributing provisions and horses for the army of the Herzegovina during the present year; and I have to instruct your Excellency to urge the necessity of this measure upon the Turkish Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 488.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 5. Political.)

Bosna-Serai, February 5, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 1 of the 7th January, informing me that the French officer of the Imperial Guard, who was reported by me in my despatch marked "Political," No. 7 of the 4th December, to have been at Mostar, was not entrusted with any mission by the Government of the Emperor, and that he has been ordered by the French Minister of War to spend his leave of absence elsewhere.

In my despatch marked "Political," No. 11 of the 27th December, I informed your Lordship that this officer, after visiting Omer Pasha, had proceeded to Cettigné, since when I have heard nothing more regarding him.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 489.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 6. Political.)

Bosna-Serai, February 6, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a despatch just received from Mr. Vice-Consul Zohrab, announcing the re-opening of the road between Trebigné and Ragusa, and remarking on various other matters connected with the affairs of Montenegro and the Herzegovina.

Your Lordship is quite aware that the great difficulty of restoring order in the Herzegovina is owing to the neighbourhood of States, of Montenegro in particular, which afford asylum to the insurgents when pursued, and which permit them at their own convenience, to molest the peaceable inhabitants, or attack the Turkish troops whenever they can be taken at a disadvantage, and also give them every possible aid and encouragement to do so.

That such asylum and such encouragement is given to the insurgents, both by Montenegro and Austria, the former with the consent of its Government, and the latter, probably, in spite of its Government, there cannot be the slightest doubt, though, I believe, the fact is continually denied by both parties, and while this state of affairs is permitted to continue, it is difficult to see how Omer Pasha can possibly bring matters to a satisfactory conclusion.

The necessity of an appeal to the Austrian Government to remove those persons to whom asylum is afforded, to such a position as will prevent them from taking any further active part against the Turks, is evident, and it is also quite clear that if Montenegro persists in the course of conduct she has hitherto pursued, friendly in word, but most hostile in deed, Turkey, having exhausted other means, will have no alternative but that of force.

With regard to the supplies of grain made to Montenegro by France, Russia, and

Austria, none of these Powers are at war with the former State, and in some cases, these supplies are said to be simple commercial transactions, and in others, matters of charity towards a starving Christian people. The two vessels laden with grain from Odessa are said to have been sent as charity to the Montenegrins by the Emperor of Russia.

How these matters can be objected to I know not, but it is certain that they encourage the belief in Montenegro, and hence among the insurgents, that the three above-mentioned Powers approve their conduct, and will not fail to ensure for them eventual success.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure in No. 489.

Vice-Consul Zohrab to Consul Holmes.

Mostar, January 31, 1862.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform you that Dervish Pasha has succeeded in reopening the road between Tribigné and Ragusa without the effusion of blood.

A portion of the rebels who held the country through which this road runs fled at the approach of the troops into Dalmatia, whither they had some time previously conveyed their families and properties.

Omer Pasha intends, he tells me, to apply to the Porte to demand from the Government of Austria the immediate removal of the people who have thus sought refuge on the Austrian territory to some point sufficiently distant to render their further co-operation in the revolt impossible.

The rebels, as you are aware, have nothing to lose; their houses are but miserable huts, which, if destroyed, could be rebuilt in a few hours; their wealth consists of flocks and herds, which, at the first alarm, can be easily removed. Thus the temporary occupation of their villages by the military is a matter of perfect indifference to them as long as they can obtain shelter in the Austrian territory or in Montenegro, and their subjugation becomes very difficult, if not almost impossible.

To induce the Prince of Montenegro to refuse the rebels an asylum, or when granting it, to compel them to remain quietly within his territories, is, I think, at present out of the question. The Austrian Government, however, might issue strict orders to their officials in Dalmatia, who appear to be ardent sympathisers with the insurgents, in this sense, and this would greatly assist the work of pacification by showing them that one of the Great Powers is opposed to their course of proceeding.

I must here remark that it is natural to suppose that whoever assists the Montenegrins must be viewed by the rebels as their own well-wishers and protectors. France, Russia and Austria hold this position; France by purchasing, through the agency of the Consul to Scutari, grain at Ragusa for Montenegro; Russia by sending one or two vessels laden with grain from Odessa to Risano, in the Bocche di Cattaro, where their cargoes are at this moment being consigned to Montenegrin agents; and Austria by permitting these transactions to take place in her own ports, and by permitting the rebels to cross her frontiers for safety, as well as to purchase ammunition.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAS. ZOHRAB.

No. 490.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 85.)

Vienna, February 20, 1862.

My Lord,

THE Turkish Ambassador called on me a few days ago with the object of informing me that Omer Pasha had obtained some important successes in the Herzegovina, and that in consequence of them several powerful tribes had made their submission to the Porte's authority, and that altogether the influence of Turkey in the mountain district was advancing.

I inclose, for your Lordship's information, a telegram on the subject, together with a translation by Mr. Dering, which has been published here.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 490.

Extract from the "Presse" of February 19, 1862.

(Translation.) *Ragusa, February* 18.

NEWS from the head-quarters of Omer Pasha at Mostar of the 16th instant contain the following information:—

"The position taken up at Poglitza by the Turkish troops having entirely cut off all communications between the insurgent 'Nahis' of Schuma and Possowo and those of Zubci, the former were compelled to capitulate. Envoys accordingly arrived this morning (16th) from Schuma and Possowo at the head-quarters of the Serdar at Mostar to announce, in the name of all the above-mentioned 'Nahis' their submission.

"Omer Pasha conceded to them a full amnesty. Every 'Gaptan' was to choose a 'Knes,' and every village a 'Muktar' to represent and manage the affairs of their fellow citizens at Trebigné.

"At the same time twelve Albanian mountaineers, led by Abderaman Bey, arrived at Mostar. When the district of Zubci does not immediately offer its submission in like manner it will be attacked in the course of to-morrow. The preparatory arrangements for this attack have already been made.

"*Ragusa, February* 18.

"The Turkish frontier Custom-house at Jursna was yesterday evening occupied by a battalion of riflemen."

No. 491.

Mr. Dunlop to Mr. Layard.—(Received February 26.)

Dear Sir, *Trieste, January* 9, 1862.

I HAD this morning a private interview, through the Greek professor here, with a Christian subject of Turkey, who is on his way from Mostar to Paris, and who asked to see me.

He was communicative, and seemed desirous to impress me with the truth and impartiality of his assertions, respecting some of which I questioned him at length, for information's sake; his purpose was evidently to imbue me with a belief in the extent and importance of the insurrectionary movement in Servia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Montenegro, and in the complicity of the Dalmatians and Ragusans in it. He spoke to the following effect:—

"The result of the year's proceedings has been favourable to the Christian and anti-Turkish insurgents throughout the whole of the disturbed provinces, and our understanding with Russia is now on a better and more distinct footing than formerly.

"I am not at liberty to explain the terms of that understanding, but its effect will be to insure success to our efforts sooner than we had expected. We have held our own, in spite of many accidental advantages in his favour, against Omer Pasha (and the other Turkish leaders) ever since October. The famine, and a want of tact on the part of the French Consuls (who have latterly disappointed us) operated to our injury. The Russians assisted us against the famine, which is now ceasing to pinch us in Montenegro, and I am on my way to Paris to clear up matters there.

"The Turkish rule in Bosnia, &c., has received a severe moral blow by the non-success of their arms; and circumstances have lately taken place, not only in our neighbourhood, but in the Principalities and in Greece, which will enable the Montenegrins and ourselves to do great things (*sic*) before or during next summer. Nothing is settled by all that has happened, and we shall take care that nothing shall be settled until we are free in some shape from Turkish rule, with ports on the Adriatic."

I inquired what part the Austrian Consuls took in these questions. He replied:—

"The Austrian Consuls all over this part of the world are mere puppets; they act exactly as the telegraphic wire from Vienna orders, and now they are seldom bribed. The Austrian policy as regards Turkey is, and has been for years, one of change and duplicity; and, indeed, so is their conduct towards us. They alter it from day to day. They are actuated generally by fear, but also, since the success of Prince Couza in the Principalities, by their direct or indirect future designs on Turkish Croatia, Bosnia, and the Herzegovina. This explains much apparent inconsistency in the policy of Austria towards Turkey and towards these disturbed districts, especially to those nearest to her

frontiers. We have agents in Vienna, and spies even in Count Rechberg's office. If you were on any individual day to read his despatches to St. Petersburgh, Constantinople, Paris, and London, and compare them together, or with those sent to Belgrade, Bucharest, and Mostar, the greatest discrepancies would be remarked. I have told you why. Just now, for their own reasons, and for fear of our getting assistance through Ancona. They are currying favour with the Turkish authorities in Bosnia, &c.; and M. Balabine in Austria is deceiving them by his friendly bearing; but wait a little, and you will see how Russia will make the Austrians her tools."

I asked respecting the views of the people at Cattaro and Ragusa, &c., he answered, "They and all the Dalmatians are complaining of their present position. They have no back-country for legitimate trade; their inland commerce is dependent on smuggling and bribing; the most of the imports into Bosnia, Turkish Croatia, the Herzegovinia, &c., are landed in coasting vessels from this port (Trieste), and smuggled across the hills; this restricts and circumscribes trade, and acts as a discouragement to merchants of all grades. In the old days, when protected by Turkey, Ragusa traded largely with the interior, and bridle-roads inland were secure. Now, they are not so, for what between douaniers, smugglers, and thieves, constant pillage attends the transport of goods."

"Austria is wrong in regarding her Dalmatian strip of shore-territory merely as a military and strategic possession. She plays with the loyalty of all her outlying populations. The Turks are awake to her schemes on Bosnia, and discourage any real freedom of trade or of intercourse there, even bribery is difficult, and thus we all suffer."

I asked, "Suppose the Turks had open free ports at Klek, and at the Sutorina, which belong to them?"

He said, "Both would be of great material benefit to the interior, whoever may rule there; but there ought also to be freedom of access from Zara, or some point near it, into the north of Bosnia."

I endeavoured to discover if the present views of the insurrectionary party in Bosnia, Servia, Herzegovina, and Montenegro, were subservient or auxiliary to a more extended Sclavic movement? but on this point my informant was peculiarly reticent and "boutonné;" my impression is, that as regards him, and as regards any appeal to Paris which he may make, he is empowered merely to feel his way, and endeavour to stimulate sympathy there, rather than to lay before the French Government any project of action.

He is a man of education and influence, possessing considerable wealth and property near Bosna-Serai, with nothing of the demagogue or "oppressed-nationality" man about him; but of course full of exaggerated views respecting the importance, in an European point of view, of his cause. He alluded frequently to the weakness of Turkish rule in her outlying provinces, and to the inefficiency, corruptness, and incorrigibleness of all Ottoman dominion and authority. I inquired about the party of insurgents led by Luka Vukalovich, who are now dispersed for the time.

He said, "Vukalovich is a mere petty instrument in the hands of others; he is at present quieted by some money, which will last him till the spring; he will then be made use of, if necessary."

I asked, "Have then the affairs in these districts assumed a definite form of organized revolution?"

He replied, "No, there is no organization as yet, but we are now certain that we shall be assisted in what is before us."

He would not speak distinctly as to the action of the French and Russian Agents, or as to the promises of the latter; but he alluded in an irritated tone to what the French had of late not done, which left on my mind the impression that for some time the Russian and French Agents have been pulling against each other, and that the insurgents throughout the whole of these disturbed districts are now trusting more to Russian than to French aid.

I relate this conversation to you (merely for what it is worth, and) as a supplement to remarks in a former letter which I had the honour of addressing to you. I write again now because I have just received orders to proceed to Constantinople, and shall leave this on an early day, and probably not have an opportunity or occasion for a long time of addressing you. My duties at Pera will be laborious, and connected solely with mercantile shipping and the Vice-Consular occupations.

The remarks of the Bosnian (which I have mentioned) on the Austrian Eastern policy recall to my mind a curious observation made to me three years ago at Vienna by the late Baron Brück: we were conversing on Servia and on Turkey, and, in allusion to the general English Oriental policy, he said "Austria has really no policy east of her

own frontiers. To us the Oriental questions are ever those of present preservation of our boundaries, or extension of them when opportunity offers."

The state of affairs in Hungary is calculated to give uneasiness at Vienna. I do not know that it does so, because of late a strange infatuation has prevailed there that Imperial interests are in an improved position in Venetia and in Hungary.

The Venetian question is precisely where it has been since Solferino, except that more of the inhabitants have left the province. "Separation" is the only solution of difficulties there. In Hungary the separatists have of late again increased. "Complete tranquillity pervades the land," say Count Rechberg and the Vienna press; and if by "tranquillity" is the meant the forced submission to present circumstances, they say what is true. But they say more, and have been of late asserting that many of the magnates are trying to bring over the nation to the plan of Empire centralization at Vienna. Such is not the case; they are not doing so; they know that it is useless to think of doing so. Prince Paul Esterhazy, Count George Festitits, old Count Andrassy, Count Edmond Zichy, &c., (men who with many virtues and good qualities have been political waverers and "rats" all their lives,) are often at Vienna, and say that they personally would gladly join the "Reichsrath," but are afraid to do so, &c.: this is all. It is not for me to judge whether the Hungarians are right in not joining the Vienna "Reichsrath;" but whether right or wrong, the feeling of opposition to joining it is strong as ever, and pervades the whole population high and low, in spite of the partial success of the Government among some of the Croatian and Transylvanian communes at some late sham elections. I greatly doubt now if Hungarian affairs can be settled without war. Last year they might have been settled, and had any inclination been evinced at Vienna to compromise and meet half-way, the Hungarians would under good advice have given in to every reasonable demand, and by this time all difficulties would have been smoothed over.

The Austrian "Reichsrath" and "Verfassung" (Constitution) is even now becoming more and more unpopular at Vienna itself; indeed, should "days of worse omen" arrive in the Empire, the dynasty will find suddenly that the greatest difficulties for them exist at Vienna. They would still be an "Imperial reigning family" without Venetia, and there exist even yet the smouldering, though dying, embers of much loyal fire in Hungary; but in Vienna, in Bohemia, in Moravia, the Emperor is (I grieve to say) not only unpopular, but hated. I have only to deal with facts, and such is the case.

As to the Reichsrath, it contains as yet representatives of only 13,000,000 out of the 36,000,000 ruled by Francis-Joseph. The Herren Haus (First Chamber) have openly shown themselves sincerely opposed to the operation of the "Constitution," and indirectly their "mission" has been to prevent the machine from working sweetly, and to oil it as often as they can with bad oil. There is an almost total absence of aristocratic element in the Lower House; therefore (sometimes more and sometimes less, but continuously and injuriously) they pull against the Upper House, and there is no understood honest policy before the Reichsrath. Some speakers in the Herren Haus distinctly avowed that since their "Verfassung" was granted, nothing more was left to be done; that because they had a "Constitution," it was the end worked for. They renounced the idea of its being the means of improving and of elevating. In fact, as at present worked, the new Constitution of Vienna will not offer results very different from what Schwarzenberg's, Thun's, and Bach's policy offered with less pretence.

As regards Hungary, the great difficulty now is the utter want of confidence (which cannot be overcome) in all proposals or plans emanating from Vienna. I would hesitate to recommend the Emperor to go to Hungary in spring, which some of his military court have been counselling him to do. A letter reached me very lately from Hungary, of which the following is a literal translation:—

"Political matters are in as bad a state here as it is possible for them to be; in fact, martial law reigns throughout the land. In Veszprim, when I was there, the bishop had fifty soldiers quartered upon him, because he refused to pay some extra taxes. I inquired of his secretary how long he would keep them. 'Oh,' replied he, 'probably some weeks; they are all Italians, our friends; we shall board and lodge them well until they have become attached to us, and whenever the struggle comes, they will not forget the kindness they have received at the hands of the Hungarians.'"

I regret to say that my views on the scheme of centralization at Vienna remain unfavourable. The fact is that centralization is purely a German plan, not unsuitable for the Germans in and around Vienna; but the German is not the dominant race in the present very heterogeneous Austrian Empire, either as regards numerical strength or intellectual activity. I have reason also to know that the stiff dull military mind of the unfortunate Emperor is now awakening to a sense of the injudiciousness of forcing this

centralization on his various peoples; it is strange that his Ministers persist so very obstinately in support of it.

The expenses of the Austrian army have been very great during the last year (1861), amounting to about 24,000,000*l.* sterling, not including the cost of the additional fortresses in Venetia. I have carefully made calculations from good data, and cannot make out the cost to be less, though M. Plener's one-sided budget does. They have no more money. The Government have borrowed paper (in bank-notes) to an enormous amount from the Bank; it has been deposited in Plener's hands, ready prepared, numbered and stamped. This they do not denominate "notes issued" until the mass of paper is all expended, nor do they accept the debit of the bank, *i.e.*, credit the bank the sum, until all the notes are out! The Departments receive large sums of these notes "to account." Therefore, as long as any of the said mass of paper lasts in the Minister's hands, and is not utterly expended, nobody knows exactly what amount of paper-money is really "out." They acknowledged this to me the last time I was at Vienna. Plener doesn't know, the Bank doesn't know, and the Departments can't know! How long this is to go on no one can say, but financially, at least, Austria is swimming for her life. Her fleet is demanding serious attention, and a large outlay, now that the Adriatic questions are likely to come up; and how she is to meet such expenditure I cannot see, for her credit is bad. I lately read the following remarks:—"La question de la marine est une question d'existence pour l'Autriche; autant qu'elle veut conserver le rang de Grand Puissance; ne pourrait-on dire autant, et avec plus de raison, de la question des finances, et ne serait-il pas sage de reconnaître que si l'Autriche ne parvient pas à mettre bon ordre à ses finances, ni son armée, ni sa marine, quelle que soit leur force, ne pourront la maintenir à ce rang de Grande Puissance auquel elle attache un si grand et si juste prix?"

I greatly fear that virtually Austria is fast ceasing to possess the attributes of a great Power, for her army now constitutes her sole title to such rank, and I cannot be at all sure that she ought to depend on the fidelity of her whole army, which, *au reste*, has often failed her ignominiously in the field. The men drill and parade beautifully, but never fight otherwise than badly. They are well clothed, well housed, armed, drilled, but they are otherwise uninstructed in the duties of campaigning, and can do nothing for themselves without the word of command. They are inefficiently fed on weak, soft, filling food, viz., sour bread, cabbage, watery soup (not broth), poor acid wine, and very young veal, served twice a week. Thus, when not exposed, and not hard worked, they do not look amiss; but their "condition" when worked is soft, and not muscular, and then a large proportion are always in hospital.

It seems that the Emperor has again, within a few weeks, suddenly taken his military following into his intimate counsels—Prince Wasa, Counts Grünne and Coronini, and Marshal Benedict, &c.—and whispers are abroad of an address being got up by the whole army for "revenge on Italy!" This is of course denied at Vienna; and it is besides doubtful if a quarter of the army (officers and men) really desire war with any one, but no doubt considerable martial excitement is being nurtured and encouraged at Verona and Vicenza, and a few weeks may show the direction it will take.

That Austria may still weather these storms, and come triumphantly out of her difficulties, is possible. "The end may not be yet"—and extended disruption of her border provinces may be once again postponed, or altogether averted by a prompt, straightforward, and frank alteration of system and of Ministers.

Great public and national changes frequently cast their shadows very long before their advent. But the present Austrian Government is doing absolutely nothing to settle or remove her difficulties. The crushing and depressing presence of large battalions in Venetia and Hungary will not accomplish this, but will, on the contrary, from day to day increase the likelihood that the fearful storm of revolutionary war alone will clear the heavy air.

The position of Austria was far better in all respects—but especially financial, in spite of their many faults of policy and of politics—under Count Buol, Baron Brück, and Baron Bach, than under the injudicious guidance of Count Rechberg, M. Plener, and M. Schmerling. They have not made any step in the right direction, which some people erroneously suppose that the "Reichsrath" and "Verfassung" indicate. These measures are steps of a very stumbling and shuffling character, nor have they been taken heartily and earnestly, and no real material advance has ensued. They resemble the paces of a colt in the Prussian *manège*, 3 feet deep with straw and saw-dust; he raises his legs, and exhibits show of action, but makes little movement forward, for his hoofs descend almost on the very spot from which they are raised.

Syra (Greek Islands), January 16, 1862.

I had no means of sending this letter by private hand previous to leaving Austria, and shall give it to the Consul here for transmission by the French post. We go on to-night to Constantinople, having sailed on the 11th from Trieste, and touched at Corfu. Whilst there several Turkish officers came on board, *en route* for Constantinople, on leave of absence from the Bosnian army. Two of them were intelligent men from the Turkish head-quarters, and one was Aide-de-camp to Omer Pasha, and spoke a little Italian.

We conversed together respecting the affairs in Herzegovina, &c.

He said that the real misfortune for them was that the Turkish troops were so useless in a hill country; that they would fight well and in earnest only on the plains, whilst their opponents preferred skirmishing among mountains: that unless full powers of extermination were accorded to the Turkish Commander, the troubles would be endlessly prolonged; that the Muscovites would never permit this; and that, whenever Omer Pasha or any of the Ottoman leaders decided to act courageously (*sic*), he or they were always impeded and prevented by a telegram dictated by the Russian Envoy at Stamboul, or by means of the many Muscovite agents interfering *sub rosa*. I asked if the French acted thus also, and if they bribed? He replied, "No; they are opposed to our exterminating the rebels, and they protect all Christians hereabouts in some way or other, but they do not intrigue. They are open, true men."

He went on to talk of what had been done during the last five months both by the Turkish forces and by the insurgents, and seemed to think that all the reports and telegrams sent to Trieste and Vienna from Ragusa, &c., had been coloured and exaggerated in favour of the successes of the insurgents, and that equally incorrect statements respecting Turkish "victories" and their present position had probably reached Constantinople. He repeatedly said, "We have not yet gained victories;" and he mentioned that the Turkish troops were ill fed and poorly clad; that about eight months' pay was due to himself; and that the pay was distributed very irregularly, and was always in arrear. He added, however, that there was no discontent in the army, nor any disloyalty towards the Sultan.

I beg leave to apologize for this hurried and desultory letter, and am encouraged to send it to you solely by the hope that you will indulgently overlook its hasty compilation, and that perhaps some of the details and remarks contained in it may not be altogether devoid of interest at the present moment.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. GRAHAM DUNLOP.

No. 492.

Earl Russell to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 75.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 26, 1862.

I INCLOSE a copy of a despatch and of its inclosure from Her Majesty's Consul at Bosna-Serai,* relative to the assistance afforded to the Montenegrins by Russia in supplying them with grain, and by Austria in affording them an asylum in her territory.

Her Majesty's Government consider that it is not possible to object to supplies of grain to a starving people, but they think that the Austrian Government ought to disarm the insurgents who take refuge in the Imperial territory, and prevent their return to the Herzegovina.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 493.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 82.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 27, 1862.

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a despatch from Lord Napier, respecting the affairs of Montenegro.†

* No. 489. † No. 469.

I likewise inclose to you a translation of a report of Baron Mamula on those affairs, which has been communicated to me by Count Apponyi.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

Inclosure in No. 493.

Baron von Mamula to Count Apponyi.

(Translation.) *Zara, January* 30, 1862.

THE meeting of the Montenegrins and insurgent Chiefs, intimated in my report of the 11th ultimo, actually took place at Cettigné on the Greek New Year's Day, viz., the 13th January.

Luka Vukalovich must have been convinced, as soon as he arrived at Montenegro, that he was no longer in favour with the Prince and his father Mirko. When, on New Year's Day, he went, in company with the Chiefs of Zubzi, Krusevize, and Dracevize, to the Prince, the latter reproached him with his bad conduct before all the persons present, declared him unworthy of the post of leader, took away from him his command, and gave it to the monk Nicanov of Duzi, who was immediately proclaimed chief commander of the whole body of insurgents. At the same time the Chiefs of Zubzi, Krusevize, and Dracevize, who had previously obeyed Vukalovich, received a new Voivode in the person of the Montenegrin ecclesiastic Pero Matanovich, and, taking the book of Montenegrin law, bound themselves to administer and pronounce judgment in accordance therewith, and also to be obedient to the Prince generally.

When the Chiefs of the Dracevize mentioned that we had called upon them to abstain from all participation in the establishment of any new fortification works in the Sutorina, the Prince appeased them by the assurance that the respective claims for compensation had already been brought forward against the Austrian Government, recommended them to live in good harmony with subjects of Austria, and, on the other hand, to employ all their strength against the chief enemy of Christendom.

He ordered, further, that the Emperor Napoleon should be prayed for in the Liturgies immediately after the Emperor of Russia; and as the unhappy condition of those countries, in consequence of the prevailing famine, was talked of, he communicated to the assembly that the Consuls of the friendly Powers (Russia and France) had already provided for the alleviation of the distress by furnishing provisions which would be distributed to the necessitous; and in the meantime he called upon the heads of the insurgents to lead their bands, as a preliminary measure, to Suma, in order to seize some provisions which are said to be coming from the Turks from Ragusa by that road.

According to more recent information, it is very probable that, in consequence of the intercession of many distinguished Montenegrins, Vukalovich will again receive, if not his former post, at least a command in the insurgent territory.

No. 494.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 223.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 27, 1862.

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copy of a despatch upon the subject of the state of affairs in Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 495.

Consul Ricketts to Earl Russell.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 8.)
My Lord, *Scutari, February* 8, 1862.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, inclosed to your Lordship, the copy of a despatch dated Scutari, February 4th, 1862, and addressed by me to Her Majesty's

* No. 489.

Ambassador at Constantinople, in which I inform him of the state of affairs at the present moment at Scutari. Since writing, however, the inclosed despatch, I am happy to be enabled to acquaint your Lordship that Bib Dodo Pasha, the Prince of Mirditia, has been prevailed upon to take part in the expedition against the village of Grenitza, where the Montenegrins are said to be assembled to the number of 5,000.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

Inclosure in No. 495.

Consul Ricketts to Sir H. Bulwer.

Scutari, February 4, 1862.

Sir,

IN a former despatch I informed your Excellency there were certain differences existing among some of the hill tribes of Scutari. Raschid Pasha has, however, so far succeeded that the people of the Castrati, Klementi, and Hobli, have been induced to come to Scutari to submit their complaints to the consideration of the Council of Elders; whether the matter in dispute will be arranged amicably or not it is difficult to say.

The Skreli, who are still on hostile terms with the Mirdites, have not as yet made their appearance, and I am given to understand that Hassan Hotti is doing all he possibly can to prevent the dispute between these two tribes being brought to a speedy and peaceful termination; trivial as the causes of these differences generally are, they are often productive of serious consequences, for as long as they remain unsettled, the people of the one tribe are in duty bound to attack and shoot those of the other where and whenever they happen to meet them. This state of things, if allowed to continue without restraint, will be the means of raising great obstacles in the way of the pacification of this country.

In the first place, the people themselves are kept in constant alarm and suspense; and in the next, should these disputes be greatly augmented, the people of the hills would become so absorbed in their own troubles that they would with difficulty be enabled to lend their assistance in any military operations that might be required to be carried on against the Montenegrins. The Porte would then be required to draw her troops for this service from other places at a greater expense. Although Bib Dodo Pasha, the Prince of Mirditia, is anxious for the settlement of this dispute, yet Hassan Hotti, on his part, appears desirous that the matter, for some reason or other, should still remain an open question. This person, as I observed to your Excellency in a previous despatch, loses no opportunity whatever of intriguing against the authorities, and the other day he told Ishmael Pasha that in future he should take no instructions from Raschid Pasha, as he was only the Civil Governor; that he was willing to obey his Excellency Ishmael Pasha, and he thought that was sufficient. As, however, Hassan Hotti is subject immediately to the civil authority, such language was significative of a refusal on his part to obey the orders given him by his superiors. Your Excellency would naturally suppose that this insolence would have met with its reward and that he would have been immediately arrested. Since Hassan Hotti, however, has been sent back from exile, and Jewdat Effendi, the Commissioner, has decided that this man rebel, as he is, can do no wrong, the Pasha is powerless, and dares not adopt any energetic measures to insure his punishment without the express permission of his Government. Hassan Hotti is not void of tact and shrewdness. He knows perfectly well the position in which the Pasha is placed and shapes his conduct accordingly.

The aspect of affairs at Scutari may be summed up shortly as follows. On the one hand there is a Governor willing to establish order and law in the province but hitherto unaided by his Government, on the other hand there is a faction who try to thwart him in all his projects. This party, who have been accustomed to live in a state of anarchy, are now averse to the introduction of the mildest measures of reform; they see that with a change in the administration there will be an end also of their rule, and hence is in a great measure to be assigned the motives that prompt them personally to create disturbances and to oppose the authority of the Pasha. It is, in fact, the struggle of the spirit of feudalism against the introduction of civilization.

It is greatly to be deplored that Jewdat Effendi should have misrepresented to the Porte (whether designedly or not one cannot say) the real state of affairs at Scutari, for by such a proceeding the Government has been led to neglect taking the necessary steps for asserting its power and authority. The probable consequence of such a policy if

suffered to continue much longer is, that the conspiracy against the Pasha, which is so to say in its infancy, might be hatched at an unfavourable moment, it might break forth at that very time when the attention of his Excellency ought to be particularly directed to frontier events; his power would then be paralyzed, the Beys would then refuse to send any irregulars to the army, and all operations on this side of Montenegro would be completely hampered. Indeed, if the Porte desires to insure the tranquillity of this frontier she must, among other things, not neglect to weed out some of those spirits who are the authors of all mischief and trouble in the interior of this province; for it must be borne in mind that the greater the internal disturbances the greater will be the embarrassment of the Government, the less will be its capability of action, and the more remote will be its chance of success in curbing the pretensions of the inhabitants of Montenegro. Hassan Hotti has within the last few days spared no trouble to prevent if possible the mountaineer irregulars from coming to Scutari, where they were ordered by the Pasha to assemble previously to taking part in the attack on the Montenegrins at Grenitza. Hassan Hotti being therefore evidently engaged in opposing the wishes of the Porte, is indirectly instrumental in furthering the wishes of those foreign Powers who wish the Montenegrin question to remain unsettled. Now I have been lately informed that Hassan Hotti is in indirect communication with the Russian Consul, and further, that the Russian and French Consuls had formerly exerted their influence at Constantinople to obtain the return of this person from exile. If this be really the case, and your Excellency might probably be enabled to obtain some more accurate information on this subject at Constantinople, the removal of this person from Scutari would not only tend to strengthen the hands of the local authorities, but it would act as a wholesome check upon foreign intrigues in this province.

The Montenegrins are still in possession of the village of Grenitza on the Lake of Scutari. They have one or two small cannon with them and are apparently in some force there.

The chief difficulties which his Excellency Ishmael Pasha, the military Governor, has to deal with in carrying into effect any military operations, proceed from the uncertain supply of money, and the insubordinate spirit of Hassan Hotti, Bib Dodo Pasha, and one or two others. Bib Dodo Pasha, the Prince of Mirditia, when ordered the other day to bring down 500 Mirdites and to march to the attack of Grenitza in company with 500 people of the town and 500 of the mountains of Scutari, refused to do so.

He said: "If the conduct of the expedition be confided entirely to me I will carry it out with my people alone, but I will not be mixed up with the people of Scutari." In this he might be partly right, as no dependance whatever can be placed on the courage of the people of this town; but on the other hand, had the Pasha intrusted the management of the whole of this affair to him it would have created no small jealousy among the inhabitants of Scutari, whom he is anxious to conciliate as far as lies in his power. Whether Bib Dodo Pasha is influenced by foreign agency in refusing to comply with the wishes of the military Governor it is difficult to assert, but I am informed that he paid a visit to M. Hecquard immediately on his arrival here, and when asked by that gentleman if he meant to send any of his people to Grenitza, he replied he should not. So much for the loyalty of Bib Dodo Pasha, who receives an annual salary from the Porte of 180,000 piastres.

In a previous despatch I had the honour to inform your Excellency that 4,000 irregular troops were engaged in service on this frontier. I have, however, since obtained more accurate information on this subject. It appears that the number paid for by the Porte is in reality 3,000; but 1,500 only of this number are actually employed. Reckoning the pay and rations of each irregular soldier at 2 piastres, the annual loss to the Porte may be estimated at 1,080,000 piastres.

This is a point which requires the particular attention of the Government, and if the Porte could be prevailed upon to take some steps for the proper organization of an irregular force especially recruited for permanent frontier service it would be the means of contributing in no small extent to the permanent security of the frontier.

Indeed, the delay which has arisen in the operations now going on at Grenitza, although occasioned as I said before partly by the intrigues of Hassan Hotti, has been also augmented from this circumstance, that as there are no irregular troops ready at hand, and the people of Scutari cannot be relied on, the Pasha is compelled to send for the Bashi-Bazouks from the hills.

Thus, much time is wasted before a few hundred men can be collected together. Such being the case, I submit it to the consideration of your Excellency whether it would not be better for the Porte to issue the necessary instructions to Ishmael Pasha for the promotion of a moveable column to be encamped at Scutari and to be composed

of some 1,200 mountaineers and 500 regulars; with a force of this description, and ready to march at a moment's notice, the Montenegrins might be attacked whenever they cross the frontier before they have time to take up any position.

The French Consul, M. Hecquard, has been lately at Cettigné; he himself told Raschid Pasha that he had just advised Prince Nikola to guard his frontier with the greatest caution; yet immediately after and about the time this kind advice was given to the Prince, we find the Montenegrins appearing in greater numbers on Turkish territory than they have for a long time past. Although there is no proof of the fact, it might be that this gentleman was the cause of the Prince being led to encourage this late aggressive movement; indeed, it has been generally speaking observed, that whenever M. Hecquard went to Cettigné, the Montenegrins invariably made an attack on some part or other of the Turkish frontier.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

No. 496.

Consul Ricketts to Earl Russell.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 9.) *Scutari, February 15, 1862.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith inclosed to your Lordship the copy of a despatch dated Scutari, February 8th, 1862, and addressed by me to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, transmitting to his Excellency a report relative to the political state of the Province of Scutari and the Principality of Montenegro; a copy of which, bearing date February 8th, is also inclosed herewith.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 496.

Consul Ricketts to Sir H. Bulwer.

Scutari, February 8, 1862.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith inclosed to your Excellency a report relative to the political state of the Principality of Montenegro and the Province of Scutari.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 496.

Report by Consul Ricketts.

IT is not an easy matter to obtain any accurate information relative to such a country as Montenegro, but one may assume that it contains a population of about 120,000 inhabitants. The general aspect of the country is rocky and mountainous; cultivation is found there merely in patches, agriculture is still in the rudest state it is possible to imagine, and its industry is confined solely to the necessaries of life.

Skins, sheep, and dried fish form the chief articles of its export. Large towns are nowhere to be seen, its capital, Cettigné, being composed of some forty houses only, and those, too, of the meanest description. Its total revenue is reckoned at 40,000 florins (about 4,000*l.*), yet notwithstanding the smallness of this sum the taxation is said to be burdensome inasmuch as it falls chiefly on those who happen to be industrious. Some few of its inhabitants are in the habit of leaving their country and going to Constantinople, where they pass their time chiefly as gardeners, many live in excessive idleness, and many are more or less given to brigandage; and indeed, when we consider the little resources which the country affords, it is by no means astonishing that such should be their mode of living. Blood feuds are by no means uncommon, and the murder of one person is often productive of consequences fatal to a large community.

Montenegro is divided into eight nahias, each of which is governed by a Voivod or Capitano, and the military and civil offices of each district are entrusted entirely to the care of this personage.

A Council or Senate sits at Cettigné for the purpose of the general administration of the country; it is composed of twelve Senators, each of whom receives a very trifling pay as a remuneration for his services. The Senate is called together and dismissed according to the whim of the Prince, and as the Senators, together with the Captains of the districts, are especially nominated by him, it is evident he is invested with no ordinary authority.

In order to promote a more regular system of judicial administration, a code of laws, founded upon the traditional customs and usages of the country, were compiled by the late Prince Danilo; this is, however, seldom referred to; trials are carried on with the greatest carelessness, and little trouble is taken to sift evidence or examine witnesses. The court is held, generally speaking, in the street, and judgment is delivered in the most summary manner possible.

The present Prince is a young man, about 22 years of age; he received his education at Paris, but is little suited to conduct the Government of the Principality of Montenegro. The Government, such as it is, is in reality carried on by Mirko, the father of the Prince, who enjoys the reputation of being scheming and avaricious; he is noted for his fanaticism and hatred of the Turks. Montenegro is so strongly fortified by nature that it might be easily defended against any attack from without, but it has this disadvantage, that being cut off from the sea its inhabitants might at any time be reduced to a state of starvation were Austria able to act in concert with the Porte, and to prohibit the importation of supplies into Montenegro through her territory.

The number of Montenegrins capable of bearing arms is said to be 20,000, but when we consider this to be nearly one-sixth of the population, it must be admitted that this amount is rather over than underrated. Such, then, is a slight sketch of the country and people on the other side of this frontier; what—may it be asked—is the state of things on this side? The Province of Scutari is said to contain a population of 250,000 souls, 150,000 of whom are Mussulmans. 20,000 irregulars, if required, can be procured from the above-mentioned population.

The town of Scutari, which is situated at no great distance from the Montenegrin frontier, is inhabited by some 20,000 Mussulmans, 10,000 Latins, and 500 Greeks. The character of this people generally, whether Mussulmans or Christians, is stubborn and ferocious. The Government seems to have had little control over its subjects, and the country hitherto has been more or less ruled by the Beys, who have always availed themselves of frontier troubles to manifest their own importance and to intimidate the local authority. Whenever they found a Governor inclined to check their pretentions they stirred up a revolt against him and occasioned his dismissal: repeated successes of this sort have so far emboldened them that they now begin to dispute the authority of the Pasha in everything. Under such circumstances the maintenance of order and the execution of the law are things by no means easily effected. The present Governor, Raschid Pasha, is doing all he can to remodel this state of things; how far he will succeed it is impossible to foresee. In this sandjak (province) commerce and agriculture have made as yet but little progress; civilization has not yet shed its light upon the inhabitants and all classes of society are still living in the most profound ignorance.

While on one side of the Montenegrin frontier line the Greek religion is universal, immediately on the other side a large portion of the population are Mussulmans; interspersed, however, here and there, we find Greek villages and Greek tribes, such as the Kutchi and the Wassevitch, the former amounting to 4,000, the latter to about 6,000 inhabitants.

The Kutchi tribe are at the present moment well disposed to the Porte, but no great reliance is to be placed on their conduct; their pretended loyalty is alone to be ascribed to the following circumstances: that their main stronghold, the fortress of Medun, is in the hands of the Turks; and, further, that several of their notables receive an annual stipend from the Government; the love of money is probably the strongest tie that binds these notables for the moment to the Porte.

The Wassevitch have for some time past been in a state of insurrection, and have refused to pay any tribute; an expedition is, therefore, contemplated to be undertaken against them in the early part of this year. This tribe, it must be observed, has invariably taken part with the Montenegrins in all border disputes. Whether their friendship for the Montenegrins proceeds from any sympathy they may entertain towards them as their co-religionists, or whether the oppression which they are said to have undergone at times from the Mussulmans in their vicinity has been the means of estranging them from Turkish rule, it is difficult to say, yet it is curious to observe that such is by no means the case with the Latin tribes who inhabit the hills immediately to the east of this frontier; on the contrary, they live on familiar terms with the Turks, and

are perfectly willing to take up arms against the Montenegrins whenever required. The Latin tribes in this sandjak may be divided into those who inhabit the mountains of Scutari and those who dwell in the districts of Miridit and Dukajin.

The former are computed to consist of some twenty different tribes, having a population of some 35,000 Latins and 8,000 Mussulmans; the latter number about 22,000 Latins and 3,000 Mussulmans. Some of the Scutari tribes, namely, the Rioli, the Kastrati, the Skreli, the Hotti, and Prokletji inhabit that part of the mountains which is parallel to, and at no very great distance from, the Montenegrin frontier, between Scutari on the south and Gusinjé on the north-east. They dwell in the immediate vicinity of those points which are most exposed to the attacks of the Montenegrins, and thus the Porte has always at hand an ample source from which to draw a number of irregular troops, who, at the shortest notice, might be brought together, and used either for defensive or offensive operations. In short, these hill tribes present a formidable barrier to any great encroachment on the part of the Montenegrins on Turkish territory.

These tribes are governed by their own unwritten maxims and customs, and live in a state bordering on independence. Now when we take into consideration the character and state of the people dwelling on each side of this practically undefined frontier line, we are by no means astonished to hear that disputes and quarrels are continually arising; to blame the Mussulmans on all occasions, or even the Montenegrins, would be to betray a lamentable ignorance of the manners and customs of this people; nor is it likely that border feuds which have existed for centuries can be wiped away in a day.

To remedy this state of things, and to settle outstanding differences, a Mixed Commission was appointed, with the right of reference to the Consuls and the Pasha, and it was hoped by this means the various disputes would have been investigated with impartiality, and matters would have been brought to a peaceful termination; to what then must we attribute the unfavourable result of such a plan? to the simple fact that both the Montenegrins and a certain portion of the Consuls were unwilling for these affairs to be settled too easily. The Prince of Montenegro, on his part, was shrewd enough to understand that if the rights of property were once settled and a proper boundary line marked out on the ground and not only on the map, his chance of any increase of territory would be but limited.

The Consuls, on their part, found themselves suddenly formed into a European Commission residing in the province, and endued with the means of interfering in its internal administration; as this authority lent no small importance to their position they became very unwilling to abandon it; it was in many instances greatly abused, and the power of the Governor was thereby rendered, in reality, of a secondary consideration. So inflated were some of these personages with their own importance that one of them—I mean M. Hecquard—took it upon himself to write a letter to Raschid Pasha, on his arrival at Scutari, laying down certain rules and instructions for his guidance in the future government of the country. Under such circumstances it would be useless to look for any material assistance on the part of the Consular body at Scutari for the purpose of bringing frontier disputes at any time to a speedy and equitable arrangement. Be this as it may, when we regard the hatred which exists between the Montenegrins on one side and the Latins and Mussulmans on the other side of this frontier, together with the gross ignorance and fanaticism which prevails among all classes, and further, that the people of Montenegro are the blind instruments of the caprice of the Prince or his father, might we not assume that the limitation of a boundary line, and the settlement of the rights of property, are not remedies sufficiently effectual to prevent the recurrence of future disorders.

If such be the case, if this people and their Prince be unable to appreciate and observe the ways marked out by civilized nations for the purpose of settling disputes, and as, moreover, their attacks on Turkish territory for some time past have not arisen through any local disputes, but have been clearly organized and preconcerted expeditions, it is evident that the presence of a strong military force is the only means of permanently insuring, if such a thing be possible, the tranquillity of the frontier and the country. The Porte should not, therefore, neglect to see its line of frontier properly defended, nor should it delay in devising and carrying out some system for the organization of a force especially adapted to frontier service. Perhaps the same plan which Austria adopted on her Grenze to protect herself against the invasion of the Turks, might, in a more modified form, and having regard more especially to the manners and customs of this country, be also carried out against the Montenegrins.

Had the Prince of Montenegro taken as urgent measures to calm the spirit of his people as he seems to have done to excite them, there is no doubt whatever that beyond a few local quarrels, the country would have been in a state of comparative tranquillity.

As, however, he has on several occasions, and he is at the present moment, bold enough to authorize attacks on the Turkish territory, it might not be foreign to our purpose to trace, as well as we are able, how far he has been encouraged and countenanced in his conduct by external agency. In the first place, it is an ascertained fact that the Prince of Montenegro receives two annual subsidies—one from Russia, and the other from France; the former country paying him 8,000 ducats, the latter 50,000 fr. per annum.

The Emperor of Russia has, it is true, been in the habit of paying this sum for many years past, and it is given on the plea of certain services formerly rendered by the Montenegrins to Russia. Whether this is in reality the case or not, the sympathy which Russia manifests to her co-religionists in the East might have prompted her to perform such an act of charity. But on what ostensible ground the French Government is led to bestow so much liberality on the Prince it is not easy to imagine. Secondly, the Russian and French Agents at Scutari have on all occasions supported the Montenegrin cause with great warmth and energy, to say the very least of it, and the French Agent has, I am told, gone so far as to make the people of Montenegro believe that a port would be positively granted them in the Adriatic—at all events, such is the report circulated in that country. Thirdly, the Russian Consuls at this place and Ragusa are in continual correspondence with the Prince. Fourthly, the French Consul, M. Hecquard, while at Ragusa, has been in communication both with the Prince and with Luka Vukalovich, and as a proof of this, I have merely to state that M. Hecquard has just returned from Ragusa viâ Cettigné to Scutari; and further, that a little while ago a letter, written by Luka Vukalovitch, and addressed to that gentleman, was intercepted by the Austrians near Ragusa. And, lastly, I am assured that M. Hecquard was in the habit of carrying on the greatest part of the Prince's correspondence with the Pasha and the Consuls of Scutari. Now this is a point which requires the most serious consideration, and my informant on this point, a person of the highest integrity, assures me he received the following information in writing from the Private Secretary of the Prince himself, namely, that the despatch dated Cettigné, the 30th July, 1861, and addressed by the Prince to the Consuls at Scutari, was first composed by M. Hecquard at Scutari, sent to Cettigné for signature, and then returned by the Prince to the Consuls at Scutari as a pure and original production.

On perusing this document, one cannot greatly err in saying that it resembles far more the composition of a French declaimer than it does that of an inhabitant of the Black Mountain; nor must we altogether pass over unobserved the strong appeal which is made in the despatch above alluded to, to the sympathy of those foreign Powers who lent their assistance to the Christians in Syria, and who are again called on to prevent, if possible, the blockade of Montenegro. Anxious as the Prince must have been to prevent any blockade being in reality carried into effect, we find him nevertheless rejecting the the only condition which could have relieved his country from such a calamity. He refused to comply with the wishes of the Powers, and take any responsibility on himself for the calming the rebellion in his vicinity. He must, therefore, have been previously assured of receiving external aid in the shape of money and provisions, or he never would have been induced to have followed a policy that seemed in every respect so dangerous to the interests of his country; and the result certainly leads us to arrive at such a conclusion, for supplies of both money and grain have been forwarded to him at different times by Russia.

Nor can it, on the other hand, be urged in his favour that a fear of responsibility prevented his consenting to the conditions proposed to him relative to the withdrawal of the blockade, because, in his speech to the Consuls at Cettigné relative to the blockade of Nichsich, and which is reported by them in their collective despatch on that subject, and dated Scutari, 26th April, 1861, he says, "I am certain that they (alluding to the people of the Herzegovina) will acknowledge my authority, and that this would soon put an end to the rebellion," thereby admitting, if any reliance is to be placed in his words, his power and influence with the rebels. In short, it would, indeed, appear from the foregoing, that the Prince of Montenegro had been to a great extent countenanced, and even guided in his proceedings, by the Agents of Russia and France. Detrimental as the policy of France and Russia has been for a long time past to the interests of the Porte, the actions of their agents have not been solely confined to raising up difficulties on the Montenegrin frontier. A revolution among the Latin tribes of these hills was a scheme also apparently contemplated by the French agent. None of the Scutari tribes, however, being individually powerful enough to take the lead in such a movement, and the game being hopeless unless the Prince of Miridit could be prevailed on to throw his weight into the balance, it was absolutely necessary, as a preliminary step to the accomplishment of such a project, to secure if possible the services and assistance of Bib Doda

Pasha, the Prince of Miridit. It was to this end M. Hecquard seems at various periods to have directed his particular attention. Thus at one time we find him presenting the Prince with a handsome sword, the gift of the Emperor of France, and at another a certain M. Krasnik, a native of Djakova, was, through the recommendation of M. Hecquard, installed as Abbé Mitré at Orosch, the capital of Miridit, with a salary from the French Government of 20,000 frs. per annum. These gifts, insignificant perhaps in themselves, have still their significance in a country like this, where no present is ever made without an equivalent being expected in some shape or other in return. Now, I am assured by a certain gentleman here—but it must be observed I have only his word for proof—that the French Consul endeavoured to persuade Bib Doda Pasha to declare himself independent of the Porte. The advice of the Consul was not taken, but still Bib Doda Pasha has continued to assume a very reserved manner in all his dealings with the Government during the last twelve months. Rashid Pasha, however, immediately on his arrival at Scutari ordered the greatest part of his arrears of salary to be paid up to him, and this timely justice has no doubt been the means of nullifying the influence of the Consul and securing his services at the present moment against the Montenegrins. Let us now examine some of the reasons that have induced Bib Doda Pasha hitherto to remain faithful to the Porte.

In the first place, such is the cunning and avarice of Bib Doda Pasha, that he would not venture upon any scheme where there was no chance of his being reimbursed for any risk he might incur. Now, the greatest advantage he could hope to gain by heading any insurrectionary movement would be a slight extension of territory, and this he could only obtain supposing some of the Scutari tribes were willing to give up a portion of their territory; but if even they did consent to be annexed to Miridit, they would not in any way augment the revenue of that country, as they are excessively poor, and their country hardly suffices to support its present number of inhabitants; nor is it likely that they who have hitherto been accustomed to live in a state bordering on independence, and have been subject to no direct taxation at the hands of the Porte, would now feel inclined to submit to the rule of the Miridits. To dream of an increase of territory from any other quarter would be absurd, for the tribes immediately to the north of Miridit, namely, the Klementi and Hotti, are hemmed in by Montenegro, whose population, being Greek, would never amalgamate with the Latins. On the south, Miridite is bounded by the Toscas; on the north-east, by the Mussulmans of Djakova and Prisren; and on the east, by the Dibdrintes, the most savage of the Mussulman Albanians.

2. The people of Miridit, having never been interfered with or molested by the Turkish authorities, being subject to the payment of no direct taxes, and being alone compelled to render military service in cases of emergency, have no just cause of complaint to induce them to become rebels to the Porte. Bib Doda Pasha himself receives an annual salary of 180,000 frs. It does not seem probable, therefore, that he would wish to endanger these advantages by setting himself at the head of a movement from which he could reap little or no benefit, and hence is in a great measure to be attributed the failure of the design of the French Consul to create a general insurrection among the Latin tribes in this sandjak. A love of gain rather than any sentiments of loyalty or attachment to the Government is the most likely motive to influence Bib Doda Pasha in all his actions, and if the Porte be desirous to retain his services and assistance, care must be taken that his salary be not suffered to remain too much in arrears.

A short time ago, the Kutchi Chiefs came to Scutari for the purpose of receiving a portion of their annual salary from the Governor.

On their arrival at this town, they paid a visit to the Russian Consul, who endeavoured to impress upon their minds that there was no chance of their being paid, even if they demanded it. The gentleman in question thought, no doubt, that his kind advice would be followed; that these simple people would neglect to ask for their pay, and would be compelled to return home discontented and ripe for revolt. The Pasha, however, ordered them to receive their salary, and the petty intrigue of the Consul produced little or no effect.

Whether we regard the Province of Scutari or the Principality of Montenegro, we must admit that French and Russian agency have been for a long time past employed in meddling in the affairs of the country; and, as the actions of the agents before mentioned have invariably tended to augment the pretensions of the Prince of Montenegro, it is clear that the interests of the Porte have, to say the very least of it, not benefitted by the presence of these gentlemen at Scutari. Whether M. Hecquard has acted up to the instructions of his Government or exceeded them, it is difficult to say, but a Government cannot be altogether ignorant of the character and acts of its employés.

I am informed that this gentleman is about to proceed to Damascus, and that he is

to be replaced here by M. Wiett. M. Hecquard was, I hear, withdrawn from Ragusa on a representation having been made by the Austrian authorities of that place to the effect that M. Hecquard was in continual correspondence with the emissaries of Luka Vukalovitch and the insurgents. If this be true, and the letter which was intercepted be of a compromising nature, might not the Porte be justified in refusing him an exequatur for Damascus? But we must not imagine because M. Hecquard is about to be removed from this place that foreign policy will cease to use its baneful influence on the people of Montenegro, on the Greek tribes in this district, and on the discontented spirit of the Mussulmans of Scutari.

The Russian Consul, who has resided here for the last five years, and who, up to the present moment, has been eclipsed by the activity and energy of the French Consul, will soon begin to find more scope for his craft; and I have every reason to believe, from the little I have seen of him, he will not neglect to carry out the traditional policy of his Government.

Internal disorders, augmented by external intrigues, have been the means by which the Prince of Montenegro has hitherto hoped to acquire an enlargement of his territory, and also an acknowledgment of his independence. Now, no one will assert that an addition of territory would not be a boon to the inhabitants of Montenegro; but the question is, whether an additional extension of territory to that province might not in many respects be highly prejudicial to the interests of the Porte. Supposing, then, the Montenegrins were permitted to extend their boundary to the coast in the district of Spizza on the south-west, and that their line of frontier in the east was advanced as far as the River Moratscha, what, may it be asked, would be the effect produced on the neighbouring provinces?

In the first place, the petty commerce of Montenegro would be benefitted, and greater facility afforded to its trade; but, at the same time, we may rest assured that no small quantity of arms and powder would be also introduced into that country, and would be far more easily procured than they are at present; political refugees would assemble there without any difficulty, and the means of fomenting insurrection both in the Austrian and Turkish provinces would be materially augmented.

In the second place, by increasing their frontier to the east as far as the Moratscha, the forts of Spuz and Jablak would then have to be ceded to the Montenegrins, or at all events the sites on which they stand; the town of Podgoritza would be left entirely exposed to attack, the ports of Lessendria and Uranjina would be threatened, and the high road to Scutari thrown open. The Montenegrins would, in reality, obtain a strong military position, from which they would be enabled to carry on their incursions far easier than they do at present. Were the inhabitants of Montenegro an industrious and inoffensive race, matters might be easily arranged, or were the finances of the Porte in a flourishing condition, a strong line of works might be constructed along the Moratscha, and their frontier extended to the line of that river, but it would be highly unjust to deprive the Turkish inhabitants of their property without previously indemnifying them for their losses.

Nor can one see in what way the acknowledgment of the independence of Montenegro would tend to add to the prosperity of its inhabitants. They are already *de facto* independent, are ruled by their own Chief, governed by their own laws, and pay no taxes whatever to the Porte. Such a measure, therefore, could only contribute to increase to an exorbitant degree the pretensions of the Prince and his family, and pave the way for further intrigues.

The incorporation of the Herzegovina with Montenegro, which he seems also so anxious to bring about, would not only increase his power, but it would bring him into more immediate contact with the Rayahs of Bosnia and Servia; it would assist the cause of the south Schavonic movement, and add vigour to the spirit of revolution. In short, fresh demands would only follow on fresh concessions. The late rectification of the boundary added considerably to the size of the Montenegrin territory, but did it content the avarice of its Ruler, or the rapacity of its people? Far from it. Since that time they have been more bent than ever on usurping the lands of their neighbours.

(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

Scutari, February 8, 1862.

No. 497.

Consul Ricketts to Earl Russell.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 10.) *Scutari, February 15, 1862.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit, herewith inclosed to your Lordship, the copy of a despatch dated Scutari, February 11, 1862, and addressed by me to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, relative to the necessity of certain precautionary measures being taken for the more effectual protection of the Montenegrin frontier.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

Inclosure in No. 497.

Consul Ricketts to Sir H. Bulwer.

Scutari, February 11, 1862.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that the Prince of Miridit has been prevailed upon to alter his intentions, and to take part in the expedition against the village of Grenitza, where the Montenegrins are said to be assembled to the number of 5,000.

The reasons that prevented Bib Dodo Pasha from complying in the first place with the wishes of the Governor may, in a great measure, be attributed to the fact that Bib Dodo Pasha was unwilling for the Miridites to serve at a lower rate of pay than they had hitherto been accustomed to receive. The Civil Governor on his part objected to the Miridites receiving a higher rate than the other Bashi-Bazouks. But as it appears the Miridites have in reality been in the habit of receiving a few piastres a month more than the others, the Government have agreed to the request of the Prince, namely, that each Miridit should receive 50 piastres a-month and his rations, and he, in return, has promised to bring into the field 3,000 men whenever required.

The force likely to be engaged in the attack of Grenitza will not be much short of 6,000 men.

All operations are, however, for the moment suspended, owing to the sudden severity of the weather. The last demonstration on the part of the Montenegrins at Grenitza seems to betoken an intention on their part of concentrating their people in large numbers on one point, and if this be the case, the Turks will find themselves some day placed in a critical position, unless they take very urgent measures to defeat this object. Your Excellency will bear in mind that the Turkish army is reduced strictly to the defensive, while the Montenegrins are permitted to act on the offensive and defensive as they think proper. The consequence of this is that the latter are enabled to concentrate their power upon any one point they choose, knowing full well they are not likely to be attacked at that same moment upon any other part of their territory; were they, on the contrary, obliged to protect themselves at all points against any sudden invasion, they could not possibly assemble in great numbers upon any one part of the frontier without leaving their other positions exposed to attack.

Thus, if the Turks were allowed to cross the frontier at Antivari, which is no great distance in a direct line from Grenitza, the Montenegrins would be immediately compelled to vacate their present position, but as long as the Turks are restricted solely to the defensive, they labour under the greatest disadvantages. They must either withdraw their troops from the defence of other parts in order to reinforce the one attacked, or they must increase considerably their present defensive force. The only remedy for this state of things, as long as the present regulation exists of confining the Turkish army strictly to the defensive, is to strengthen their present force on the frontier. Such a plan will naturally entail extraordinary expenses. Indeed, the Turkish army seems to be placed in a false position—a position which, it is to be hoped, will ere long be altered.

There is this to be said in favour of the Turks, that, as long as I have been here, I have not heard of one instance in which they have crossed the frontier, although this is a thing of daily occurrence with the Montenegrins, and if perchance the Turks have done so, the most that could be said is that the trespass was a local affair and totally insignificant. But one can hardly say so much for the Montenegrins; they are now assembled in great numbers on Turkish territory, and as the district of Montenegro bordering on the point attacked is by no means thickly populated, these people must

have been collected there from other parts of that country; indeed, the collection of so large a force could not well have taken place unless provisions had been previously supplied for it, and unless express instructions had been issued to that effect by the Prince. Such a movement cannot, therefore, be looked upon as arising from any local dispute. This being the case, and an act of hostility again proved against the Montenegrins, it is difficult to understand on what just grounds the Porte is prevented from acting on the offensive.

Be this as it may, I have to bring the following points to the consideration of your Excellency:—

That as the Government pays for 3,000 Bashi-Bazouks, and 1,500 only are employed, this number be increased up to the amount paid for.

That if the Porte be not permitted to act on the offensive, a reinforcement of some 3,000 irregulars be posted at such places along the frontier as the General may think fit.

That blockhouses be erected at various places between Gusinje, on the north-east, and Spizza, on the sea-coast, and that an irregular force be especially organized for the protection of this boundary. By the proper organization of a force of Bashi-Bazouks, many of the disadvantages arising from the present want of order and system in the raising and support of these troops might be done away with.

Such being the case, I shall bring to the notice of your Excellency a few of those evils which have hitherto prevailed in this irregular service, which call for immediate remedies and demand the serious attention of the Porte.

In the first place, no check whatever being used to insure the employment of the number of men actually paid for, the Government is subjected to severe annual losses; many positions are left totally undefended, and the enemy is tempted to continue his invasions.

In the second place, as the people of the town cannot be depended upon, recourse is invariably had to those of the hills, and much delay and loss of time is occasioned before the necessary number can be assembled to take the field. In the meanwhile the Montenegrins are enabled to plunder the country.

Thirdly, intrigues are constantly set on foot to prevent the hill tribes from lending their assistance at the moment required; thus many difficulties are thrown in the way of the authorities and military operations are greatly hampered.

And lastly, as the recruitment of these irregulars is a source of revenue to two or three of the chief Beys who supply them, they are by no means likely to use their influence to see peace established on the frontier, for the greater the disturbances the greater the number of irregulars called out, and the greater their profit. In short, as long as the present state of things exists, the Government will be compelled to sustain heavy pecuniary losses, and all military operations will be carried on with great difficulty.

Now the force at present stationed between Gusinje on the north-east, and Spizza on the coast, consists of 10 battalions of regular infantry, 3 companies of artillery, and 1,500 Bashi-Bazouks. If, however, blockhouses were erected at different places along this line, 5 battalions of regulars, 4 companies of artillery, and 6,000 Bashi-Bazouks would be sufficient to protect it; the other 5 battalions could then be employed upon other service.

Although the number of soldiers by this means would be slightly increased, the Government would still, in a pecuniary point of view, be the gainer, for an irregular soldier is not half the expense of a regular; further, a number of Nizam troops would not be continually required to be sent here from other places at an enormous expense; nor would an additional number of Bashi-Bazouks be obliged to be called out every moment to quell every petty disturbance that arose on the frontier.

The question then to be especially considered is how to induce these Bashi-Bazouks to undergo some sort of discipline. This might be done by holding out to them better terms for their services; at present they receive but 1 piaster per diem and their rations. Let their pay be doubled, give them their rations and a suit of clothes once a year; many will be induced to take longer service, and by this means they will become more amenable to discipline.

The force in question should be divided into two to three frontier regiments, each having its complement of officers, the whole to be recruited without any regard to religion, and to be employed especially on this frontier, the command of these regiments to be entrusted to some competent person. Were some such plan carried into effect, many of the evils above alluded to might be eradicated.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

No. 498.

Consul Ricketts to Earl Russell.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 11.)
Scutari, February 18, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit, herewith inclosed to your Lordship, the copy of a despatch addressed by me to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, dated Scutari, February 18, 1862, relative to French intrigues in the Principality of Montenegro.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

Inclosure in No. 498.

Consul Ricketts to Sir H. Bulwer.

Scutari, February 18, 1862.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Excellency with the following circumstances, which, if true, leave very little room for doubt that the French Government is in reality not only aiding and encouraging the Montenegrins in their insurrectionary movements, but also conniving at the fomentation of disturbances in the territory of the Porte. It is now two or three days ago since I was positively assured that the French Government had telegraphed to their Consul, M. Hecquard, requesting him to inform them what port on this coast he considered the most convenient for forwarding a cargo of grain for the use of the people of Montenegro. M. Hecquard replied Perasto. Perasto is situated in the Bocca di Cattaro, and is without doubt the place the most convenient for transmitting provisions to the troops quartered on the north-west frontier of Montenegro. As long as the Montenegrins can obtain provisions from without, the blockade of that country by the Turks is to a great extent nullified. Such being the case, it is by no means an easy matter to explain the principles of that policy which, on the one hand, agreed to the establishment of the blockade by the Turkish force, and on the other is taking indirect measures to defeat its object. I shall not, however, neglect to inform your Excellency as soon as I hear of the arrival of the cargo above alluded to at the port in question.

In my despatch dated February 4, I acquainted your Excellency that M. Hecquard had just paid a visit to Cettigné. This journey was undertaken, as far as I am able to learn, with the object of encouraging the Prince to persist in his hostilities to the Porte; and, as a proof of this, I have to state that while at Cettigné some four or five of the notables of the village of Shistan, a village lying on Turkish territory, and situated at no great distance from the Montenegrin frontier, were summoned to his presence. He advised them to follow the example of the people of Grenitza, and to declare themselves in favour of the Montenegrins, and he admonished them not to be afraid, telling them that the Principality of Montenegro was in reality under French protection. The people in question being of the Greek religion, and not being over well-disposed to the Turks, fully coincided in his views, and promised their assistance to the Montenegrins. These notables have not since returned to Shistan, and it is not likely they will be inclined to return there as long as it is occupied by Turkish troops.

Although the village of Shistan is inhabited chiefly by people professing the Greek religion, there are, however, some few Latin families residing there, and it was through these people the Governor was made acquainted with the circumstances which I have just related. To this it might be answered that no great reliance can generally be placed on the stories of villagers; but the Governor assures me that the villagers have been examined, and there is no doubt whatever of the truth of their statement. Now, when it is considered that M. Hecquard is a warm supporter of the Montenegrin cause, that his Government aids the Prince of that country by money and supplies, and that M. Hecquard happened to be as usual at Cettigné at the very moment the Montenegrins appeared in force on Turkish territory, there is every reason to induce one to believe that the report of the Latin villagers is not without some foundation.

The village of Shistan is situated at no great distance from the village of Grenitza, where the Montenegrins are still in no small force, and where they expected, sooner or later, to be attacked by the Turkish troops. Had the people of Shistan risen at the same time as the people of Grenitza, the difficulty of carrying on any military operations against Grenitza would have been greatly increased. This did not escape the observation of the French Consul, and hence his object in persuading them to revolt.

It is, however, most probable that this is merely the commencement of a manœuvre on a larger scale, and that it is intended to excite all the Greek villages on the frontier to insurrection. The Montenegrins would then be able to take advantage of any disturbances that may arise to extend if possible the boundary of their own territory. Whether such a movement is likely to be accompanied by any attempt on the part of the followers of Garibaldi to land on this coast it is difficult to say. My Austrian colleague is of opinion that a descent on this coast by the followers of Garibaldi is by no means an improbable event; and a report has certainly been circulated here for some short time past to that effect.

Saturday, the Archduke Rénier, accompanied by General Rodich, arrived at Antivari, and, after having reconnoitred the country for a short time, they took their departure for Cattaro. It would seem, therefore, as if the Austrians really anticipated some such manœuvre. The Austrians here tell me that in case any landing should be attempted on Turkish territory, their troops would be immediately marched across the Turkish frontier. Any unnecessary interference, however, on the part of a neighbouring Power might be easily avoided by taking a few precautionary measures; and if the force on the coast between Nahie and Antivari be strengthened, and a respectable garrison be stationed at Scutari (where, by-the-bye, there is still but one company of regulars), a landing on any part of this coast might be easily repelled. Immediately after the Archduke Rénier took his departure, M. Moreau, the French Dragoman Chancellier, was dispatched viâ Antivari to Cattaro.

I imagine this gentleman was sent expressly by the French Consul to discover, if possible, the object of the Archduke's mission to Antivari.

M. Wiett has arrived at Scutari from Paris, and M. Hecquard is supposed to start to-morrow for Damascus; but I understand he has taken apartments at Corfu. Now it is very possible that, as this gentleman was compelled to leave Ragusa, he will stop for some time at Corfu, in order to be more or less in communication with the Prince of Montenegro and the insurgents, or he will take the first opportunity of going from Corfu to Montenegro. I have written a despatch on this subject to his Excellency Major-General Sir W. Storks, a copy of which is inclosed herewith.

If it is the intention of the Turkish Government to commence offensive operations this spring against Montenegro, it is to be hoped that the necessary supplies will be forwarded to Antivari and Scutari, for the use of the troops who are likely to be engaged in these districts. Should the supplies, by any means, be suffered to fall short, the irregulars would desert, and the safety of the whole army would be endangered, for it must be borne in mind that the resources of this country do not suffice for the maintenance even of its own inhabitants. Owing to the very heavy fall of snow, the greatest part of the troops sent out lately to the attack of Grenitza have been withdrawn, some 1,500 having, however, been left in possession of the village of Shistan.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

No. 499.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 71.)
Constantinople, February 19, 1862.

My Lord,

LORD NAPIER'S despatch No. 37 of the 24th ultimo, relating a conversation with Prince Gortchakow, and transmitting to me a copy of your Lordship's No. 48 of the 6th instant, alludes to two subjects:—

1st. A Conference on the affairs of Montenegro, in which Prince Labanow distinguished himself by crushing a proposition of the Austrian Minister; and,

2ndly. A project suggested by Lord Napier for pacifying Montenegro.

In regard to the first, Prince Labanow has, I think, rather exaggerated facts, for there has been no serious Conference on the subject of Montenegro, and no proposal of the Internuncio to interfere against the Montenegrins.

I think I remember that Baron Prokesh on one occasion, when all the Representatives were present, inveighed against the acts of the Montenegrins, and that Prince Labanow defended them; but I certainly took no part in such conversation, and deemed it useless, as well because I think it is for the interest of the Turks to keep all questions quiet until they have arranged their finances, as because I see nothing for the Powers to do at this time in the question of Montenegro.

In regard to the pacification scheme, I do not quite agree with Lord Napier as to

the details of his project, but, as your Lordship is aware, I agree in the view that some plan for putting Montenegro and Turkey in different relations towards each other would be desirable, if practicable; but, for it to be practicable, both parties must desire and solicit our interference.

As to simply recognizing the independence of Montenegro, and sending Consuls there, I do not see how this would alter the present state of the case. The Montenegrins would still make frontier incursions into Turkish territory, and the Turks would still be prohibited from entering Montenegro by the state of European opinion on the subject, and Russia would still be the protectress of Montenegro, in spite of any assurance to the contrary, as she is now the enemy of the Ottoman Empire, though nominally its guardian, and one of the Powers guaranteeing its existence.

As to the limits of Montenegro, they were lately settled on the precise principles Lord Napier lays down.

If we are to change the position of Montenegro to any purpose, we must alter the habits of the Montenegrin people, the interests of the Montenegrin Ruler, and the general habit of looking at things now prevalent with both Prince and people.

The Montenegrins are robbers and bandits because shut up in inaccessible fastnesses, and being unable to live by commerce and agriculture, they are tempted to do so by plunder.

The interests of the Prince are not to conciliate the Sultan, for he is safe from his attacks, and has nothing to lose from, and something to gain by, his own aggressions, whilst the general feeling of both Prince and people are hostile to the Turkish authorities.

Were the Turks to grant the Montenegrins a considerable extent of cultivable territory, which territory being so exposed to the attacks of a Turkish force that any insult or assault could be punished by a Turkish army, were the Prince to do homage for that territory, and were also some suitable provisions made for the communication of Montenegro with the sea-coast, it is possible that the Montenegrins, becoming more wealthy and more civilized, having to dread the hostility of the Porte, and the Montenegrin Ruler being bound by certain ties of fealty to the Ottoman Sovereign, another order of things and ideas might spring up; and to this project—a project not for making Montenegro independent of Turkey, but for rendering Montenegro, for its own advantage, more dependent on Turkey—not for exciting other Principalities to look after independence as a consequence of rapine and insolence, but to look after solid benefits, as the consequence of nominal submission, I should myself be well disposed. But I look upon this also at the present moment as a mere speculation, and that affairs must be brought by the parties themselves into our hands before we can set about arranging them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

No. 500.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 98.)
My Lord,

Vienna, February 27, 1862.

COUNT RECHBERG has mentioned to me that an agent of the Prince of Montenegro has been here for some days, and lately called upon him and made the strongest professions of goodwill and friendship for Austria in the name of his Prince; assurances to which, however, his Excellency does not seem to attach the least importance.

His Excellency told me that the avowed object of this Montenegrin agent's journey is to establish some means of telegraphic communication with Paris.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 501.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 8. Political.)
My Lord,

Bosna-Serai, February 11, 1862.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that a body of 850 Albanian irregulars from the neighbourhood of Dibra passed through this place yesterday on their way to Mostar. They are to be followed by 1,150 more, making altogether 2,000.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 502.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 10. Political.)
My Lord,

Bosna-Serai, February 11, 1862.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a despatch received to-day from Mr. Vice-Consul Zohrab relating to the conduct of Alauddin Pasha, of Mostar.

I think it highly desirable that at the present moment the Porte should endeavour to place at Mostar a Governor with liberal ideas, and one who would aid Omer Pasha in his difficult task, instead of a fanatic imbued with the ideas of the old Mussulman school.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure in No. 502.

Vice-Consul Zohrab to Consul Holmes

Sir,

Mostar, February 9, 1862.

I HAVE refrained hitherto from making any comments on the administrative ability of Alauddin Pasha from a wish on my part not to draw my conclusions from the reports which preceded his arrival, nor merely from his first acts.

I regret to state that Alauddin Pasha has shown himself quite unfit to govern this Province, indeed I can safely say he is unworthy of any appointment of responsibility. He is ignorant, very fanatic, and retrograde in his ideas. Incapable of understanding the requirements of this Province, he thwarts the efforts of Omer Pasha to content and tranquillize the population.

Omer Pasha has frequently spoken to him, and even reprimanded him severely on his bad administration, but unfortunately his Highness' advice and reproofs have fallen on deaf ears, and at last Omer Pasha has been compelled to telegraph to the Porte requesting his immediate removal.

I do not believe Alauddin Pasha to be guilty of peculation or cruelty, but he cannot be cleared of the charge of putting aside the few reforms introduced here by the Porte whenever it has been in his power to do so, and of reverting to the old system of fanaticism.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAS. ZOHRAB.

No. 503.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 11. Political.)
My Lord,

Bosna-Serai, February 13, 1862.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's information, copy of a despatch from Mr. Vice-Consul Zohrab relating to affairs in the Herzegovina.

With regard to the paragraph at the close of this despatch, it is necessary to inform your Lordship that the message relating to Pero Mattanovich was caused by

the Prince of Montenegro having apparently assumed jurisdiction in the Herzegovina. It would appear that a brother of Luka Vukalovitch shot a person for robbery, for which he was tried at Cettigné and condemned to three years' imprisonment and a fine. Luka Vukalovitch is said to have retired in disgust, on which the Prince sent Pero Mattanovich and another Montenegrin to take the command in Zupzi and Suttorina.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure in No. 503.

Vice-Consul Zohrab to Consul Holmes.

Mostar, February 9, 1862.

Sir,

I HAVE to report that his Highness Omer Pasha is concentrating troops at Trébigné, under Dervish Pasha, for the purpose of marching into Zupzi. In a few days fifteen battalions and some guns will be collected there for this purpose.

It is his Highness' intention to establish, as he has already done at Piva, fortified points at Zupzi and Bagnani.

This line of posts once firmly established, the rebels will be reduced to the alternative of submitting, or of seeking refuge in Montenegro and Dalmatia, from whence they may make raids into this province in small bands if they persist in fighting. Omer Pasha expects this result, and intends forming flying columns of mixed troops to protect the country.

Omer Pasha was led to understand that it was the intention of the Austrian Government to have the rebels seeking refuge in Dalmatia conveyed to the island of Curzola; it is now, however, said that they will be sent to Stagno, on the Sabbioncello, close to Klek. If this is true the refugees will experience no difficulty in returning to the Herzegovina whenever they like, as Sabbioncello borders on this province.

A telegraphic correspondence has been carried on lately between Omer Pasha and Prince Nicholas, of which the following is an epitome:

Prince Nicholas notifies to Omer Pasha that he intends to build a fort in the vicinity of the Turkish fort of Allessandra on the lake of Scutari. To this communication Omer Pasha replied that by the law of nations His Highness could not construct fortifications within gun-shot of Allessandra, and that if he did, he alone must be held responsible for the consequences.

In another telegram the Prince expresses his dissatisfaction at the vicinity of the Turkish troops to his frontiers on the side of Albania, and requests that they may be withdrawn. To this Omer Pasha replied that the troops occupied their present positions for the protection of the Albanian villages from Montenegrin incursions, that he was ready to withdraw them, but he must first possess guarantees that Montenegro will not interfere in the revolt, and that no more raids will be made into Albania.

To a message demanding by what right Pero Mattanovich and another Montenegrin officer led the rebels of Zupzi, the Prince replied that these officers had fled from Montenegro.

The winter has set in with intense severity again.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAS. ZOHRAB.

No. 504.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 90.)

Foreign Office, March 3, 1862.

Sir,

I HAVE to state to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government concur in the views which you have expressed respecting the affairs of Montenegro in your despatch No. 71 of the 19th ultimo.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 505.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received March 4.)

(No. 12. Political.)

My Lord,

Bosna-Serai, February 20, 1862.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's information, copy of despatch of the 12th February, received from Mr. Vice-Consul Zohrab, reporting that some arrangements are likely to be made by Omer Pasha by which the claims of the peasants employed in the Government service will at last be liquidated. If this be carried out it will doubtless produce considerable satisfaction, and be an inducement to the people to engage in the Government service with more alacrity than they have hitherto exhibited.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure in No. 505.

Vice-Consul Zohrab to Consul Holmes.

Mostar, February 12, 1862.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that the Accountant-General of Bosnia arrived here yesterday.

The services of this officer are required by Omer Pasha to audit the accounts of this province, which have got into almost inextricable confusion.

During the past four years the peasants have furnished supplies to the military, and done considerable service as the transport corps of the army. In return the peasants have received senets (drafts) payable by the military chests of Mostar, but with rare exceptions they remain unpaid. The civil authorities, on the other hand, will not accept these senets in part payment of taxes due by the holders; thus the peasants have their capital—*i.e.* their time and produce—taken from them by one branch of the Government, while the other branch still insists upon demanding the full interest on that capital which no longer exists.

Alauddin Pasha, instead of viewing this difficulty in an impartial manner and endeavouring to help the peasants out of their embarrassments, tried to enforce payment of the taxes by imprisoning the imaginary debtors, for so they must be termed.

Omer Pasha pointed out to the civil authorities the course they ought to pursue, but his Highness' advice and instructions are alike unheeded by an incapable Governor and equally incapable subordinates; he has, consequently, called to his aid the Accountant-General of Bosnia, who has, I am told, already rendered good service in that province.

This officer will proceed from district to district and audit the accounts of the past seven years, accepting as cash payments the receipts held by the peasants from the military.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAS. ZOHRAB.

No. 506.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received March 4.)

(No. 13. Political.)

My Lord,

Bosna-Serai, February 21, 1862.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's information, copy of despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at the Porte regarding the hostility to Turkey evinced by the subaltern Austrian Agents on the frontier of Croatia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure in No. 506.

Consul Holmes to Sir H. Bulwer.

Bosna-Serai, February 17, 1862.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's despatch of the 21st January, informing me that your Excellency had communicated with the Internuncio regarding the hostility to Turkey evinced by the subaltern Austrian agents on the frontier of Crotia, and that his Excellency, while deploring the political excitement which exists in the Slav provinces, had denied that his Government had encouraged or even connived at the secret assistance alleged to have been given to the insurgents in Turkish Crotia, Bosnia, and the Herzegovina, and had requested your Excellency to furnish him with any information which might enable his Government to put a stop to the machinations I had pointed out. Your Excellency, therefore, instructs me to endeavour to procure some more precise account of the proceedings in question, and to transmit, if possible, the names of the subaltern Austrian agents implicated in them.

Your Excellency is aware that, without entering into details, I have endeavoured to give the impression produced on the Turkish authorities and the people at large by the general conduct and demeanour of the various Austrian authorities in Crotia, and I may add also in Dalmatia. In endeavouring to ascertain particulars, it soon appears that the effect is produced, not so much by any one act to which importance could be attributed, as to a thousand insignificant hints, sayings, and doings which, separately, seem unworthy of notice, but which, altogether, make a strong impression on the people, and lead them to acts hostile to the Turkish Government and fatal to themselves. After the receipt of your Excellency's despatch, I requested the Pasha to inform me, if possible, of any particular acts of hostility or unfriendliness committed by any individual Austrian officer in Crotia.

His Excellency replied that, during his late visit to Turkish Crotia, the people, in excuse for their attitude, named almost every authority along the frontiers as in one form or another urging them, more or less directly, to throw off the Turkish yoke, but that he could not give any particular name as connected with any particular act. His Excellency admitted that it was difficult to find anything tangible in what was complained of, but persisted that the animus displayed by all the authorities in Crotia was unmistakably hostile to Turkey.

I may mention to your Excellency that in the spring, when an Austrian force was concentrated on the frontiers of Crotia, two travellers arrived here, an Englishman and a Frenchman, who had both passed a few days among the Austrian officers, and both declared that their whole conversation was the invasion and occupation of Bosnia, which appeared in their minds, to be a settled matter, contingent on a revolt of the Christians, which was daily expected by them to take place. Of course the Turkish authorities were not ignorant of the language held in the Austrian camp, and the impression produced can be imagined.

About the end of August last, the authorities at Ragusa undertook to escort Aly Pasha's horses across Sutorina, and to deliver them safe at a given place in the Herzegovina. A party of thirty-six soldiers was detailed for this service, who allowed the horses to be taken by the rebels without the slightest resistance. On the other hand, the Prussian Commissioner's horses, escorted by only two soldiers, about the same time, though demanded by the insurgents, were not given up. The Turks came to the conclusion that Aly Pasha's horses were given up because they belonged to a Turk.

I would also call your Excellency's attention to the paragraph in Mr. Zohrab's despatch of the 9th February, inclosed in my despatch of the 13th February:—

"Omer Pasha was led to understand that it was the intention of the Austrian Government to have the rebels seeking refuge in Dalmatia conveyed to the island of Curzola; it is now, however, said that they will be sent to Stagno on the Sabbioncello, close to Klek. If this is true, the refugees will experience no difficulty in returning to the Herzegovina whenever they like, as the Sabbioncello borders on this province."

This is considered as done in a spirit unfriendly to Turkey, as from Stagno the insurgents may march to the Herzegovina in an hour at any moment, whereas the object of the arrangement with Austria was to put it out of their power to take any further part in the revolt.

While the European Commission was at Ragusa and Castelnuovo last summer, the spirit of the population and petty authorities was evidently strongly in favour of the insurgents, and hostile to the Turks, and it was remarked that, if the Austrian Government disapproved of this feeling, how did it happen that nearly all the authorities, from General Rodich downwards, were of the Greek persuasion and of Slav origin, whose sympathies, both of religion and race, could only lead to the obvious result?

In conclusion, I can assure your Excellency it is a fact of which there can be no doubt, that a personal feeling of sympathy with the Christians, and hatred to the Turks, urges the Austrian officers on the frontiers to such expression of their sentiments, as, without implicating them in any particular way, keeps up a certain irritation among the neighbouring Turkish populations most inconvenient to the Turkish Government, and annoying to the Turkish local authorities, who, unfortunately, imagine that they are not deceived in attributing all the difficulty to the secret hostility of the Austrian Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 507.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 92.)

Foreign Office, March 4, 1862.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Consul at Bosna-Serai,* inclosing a report from Vice-Consul Zohrab, pointing out the unfitness of Alauddin Pasha to govern the Province of Mostar.

I should wish to know what steps you have taken with the Porte regarding this Pasha's misconduct; and I have to instruct you to press the Porte to appoint good Governors everywhere, but more especially in its European provinces.

I inclose copy of a despatch from Lord Bloomfield on the subject.†

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 508.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 93.)

Foreign Office, March 4, 1862.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT, for your information, a copy of a despatch from Mr. Consul Holmes,‡ inclosing a report from Vice-Consul Zohrab, on the present state of affairs in the Herzegovina, from which it would appear that Omer Pasha is acting with judgment and vigour.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 509.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 244.)

Foreign Office, March 5, 1862.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches upon the subject of Montenegro and the Herzegovina.§

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 510.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 96.)

Foreign Office, March 6, 1862.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna on the subject of the affairs of Montenegro.‖

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

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* No. 502. † No. . ‡ No. 503. § Nos. 500 and 506. ‖ No. 506.

No. 511.

Consul Stuart to Earl Russell.—(Received March 7.)

(No. 3.)
Janina, February 22, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship copy of a despatch which I have addressed to his Excellency Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, in respect to rumoured movements threatening these portions of the Sultan's dominions.

A report has just reached Janina that the garrison of Nauplia has mutinied, and seized the castle, with shouts of "Long live the King's nephew," and "Let us be off to Montenegro." This report obtains credit; and the Pasha has assured me that he will at once dispatch 100 men of the rural force to Mezzovo, and 50 to the pass of the "Five Wells," midway between Janina and Arta.

A visit to Prevesa and the Gulf of Arta from one of Her Majesty's steamers would at this time produce a good effect.

I have, &c.
(Signed) R. STUART.

Inclosure in No. 511.

Consul Stuart to Sir H. Bulwer.

Janina, February 20, 1862.

Sir,

IN several despatches which I have had the honour to address to your Excellency from this place, I have endeavoured to point out the disaffection of the Rayahs towards the Ottoman Government, their impatience of Mussulman rule, their hopes of independence, and their activity in planning measures for the attainment of it. I have now to state to your Excellency that, from information which has lately reached me from various quarters, I am inclined to believe that the time is near at hand when an attempt may be made to carry those measures into effect.

It has been reported to me that an arrangement has been made between the Servians and the "Etairia," as the organ and representative of the Hellenic race, according to which, unless immediate success crowns the Turkish arms in Herzegovina, Servia is to rise as soon as spring sets in, and a corresponding movement is immediately after to be made by the Greeks of Macedonia, Epirus, and Thessaly, free Greece furnishing leaders and every assistance short of open war against Turkey. The proposed end is to expel the Turks from Western and Southern Roumelia, to establish a Slavic Empire in the north, and to incorporate Macedonia, Epirus, and Thessaly with Greece. Albania is to be subdued by force or persuasion and annexed to Greece.

This scheme has, it is said, been hatched in Athens, under the auspices of the Queen and some of the leading members of the Government together with the Director of the Government Bank, who is also head of the "Etairia." It is encouraged by France and Russia, and money, as required, will be supplied in abundance from various quarters, but chiefly from Russia, where Etairists, Philhellens, and sympathisers form a numerous body. It is said that some of the best Guerilla leaders in Greece are to lend their services, and to several of them frontier-posts have already been assigned; for instance, Theodore Griva is at Beratia, opposite to Santa Maura; Souten-Stratos at Valto; Papacostos at Lamia. In the concluding part of my Report No. 3 of the 8th January, I mentioned that one Jouga, well-known in these parts as an active officer of Grivas, was then in Janina. He is here still, keeps very quiet, and seldom leaves his house, unless to call at the Greek Consulate. It is said that emissaries of the "Etairia" in unusual numbers are now traversing Epirus and the adjacent provinces. Here their principal attention is directed to Souli Radovitsi and Chimouri, which places are expected to furnish the fighting men. As to the other districts and the large towns, it is well-known that their inhabitants are of a peaceful turn; they will, therefore, be dispensed from military service; but they are, it is said, ready to contribute in any other way, according to their means, to the common cause. I have on former occasions reported to your Excellency that all the Christians of this country are in possession of firearms.

The principal agency of the "Etairia" for Epirus and Thessaly is at Janina. The Etairists here are numerous, active, and intelligent, and conspicuous among them are several British-protected subjects. Their correspondence has, I am told, been very active of late, chiefly with Athens and the superior agency established at Corfu.

Your Excellency has already been informed of the close intimacy subsisting between the French and Hellenic Consulates here; that intimacy still continues. Almost every day long Conferences take place between M. Wiet and the Hellenic Cancellier, who, for the last two months, has been acting as Consul in the absence on leave of Mr. Packmore. It is also to be noticed that the Russian Consul has resumed his visits to the Hellenic Consulate. They had been interrupted by the conflicting tendency of their political views, and this renewal of intercourse at the present time is the more significant, as the Russian and Hellenic Consuls at Janina may be said respectively to represent the Slavic and Greek interests in Roumelia.

Yesterday I had a long conversation with the Pasha in reference to the foregoing matters; his information, though less full, tallies with mine. For a week or ten days reports had been reaching him from various quarters in respect to the movement in question, and his impression is that danger is impending, and that strong preventive measures should be promptly taken. He stated that without instructions from the Porte he can do nothing. The military force at present in Epirus and Thessaly, sufficient, perhaps, for ordinary times, is, he knows, quite inadequate in presence of the above-sketched combination; and though the Albanians are near at hand, he dare not summon a man of them, either Redif or irregulars, without express permission, so stringent are the orders against expenditure. All that he can do is to apprize the Albanian Beys of the apprehended danger, and to warn them to hold their contingents in readiness. This he has promised to do; and my conviction is that by thus appealing to the Albanians, a force could readily be obtained sufficient to keep Epirus and Thessaly in order, if not to defeat altogether the contemplated scheme.

There are now two battalions of infantry at Arta, and one battalion at Prevesa, with a war steamer. But the Thessalian frontier is, I believe, quite unprotected. There ought, in my opinion, to be two squadrons of cavalry, two field guns, and 300 infantry at Dhomoco; the same, or nearly the same, at Armiro; and a steamer in the Gulf of Volo, which should carefully observe Ameliopolis. It would moreover be well to use the services of the Turkish peasants who inhabit the mountains at the back of the plain of Armiro. They could muster some 300 men, the very best, perhaps, in the Empire. I should also recommend attention to the Gulf of Salonica. The twenty-four villages of Pelion are loudest in the cry for independence. The inhabitants are all provided with arms, and there is reason to believe that large supplies of ammunition are being constantly smuggled ashore along the eastern foot of the Mountain.

I shall endeavour to furnish your Excellency with early information of the progress of this movement, and I need scarcely add that I am entirely at your disposal for any extra duties that the present state of matters may seem to you to call for.

I have, &c.
(Signed) R. STUART.

No. 512.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received March 7.)

(No. 80.)
Constantinople, February 26, 1862.

My Lord,

WITH reference to Mr. Consul Holmes' despatch to me, No. 8 of the 4th instant, a copy of which has been transmitted to your Lordship, I deem it my duty to state that my attention has been called to a conversation recently held by the French Ambassador with Aali Pasha on the affairs of Montenegro.

I learn that M. de Moustier commenced by acquainting his Highness with the intention of France to supply the Montenegrins with a few shiploads of grain, a measure which the Porte holds tantamount to rendering the blockade inoperative. He then adverted, as a means of pacification, to the recognition of the independence of Montenegro, or to the cession of the territory intervening between Montenegro and Spizza, inclusive of that Harbour, to be held by Montenegro under the Suzerainty of the Porte.

To this overture Aali Pasha replied that the Porte was by no means disposed to acquiesce in, as long as it had the power to resist it.

The French Ambassador says, "I understand that his Government has proposed at Vienna that the Montenegrins should be permitted to purchase grain at Trieste;" but the Internuncio has not yet received any intimation of this proposal.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

No. 513.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 100.)

Foreign Office, March 8, 1862.

Sir,

WITH reference to what is contained in your Excellency's despatch No. 80 of the 26th ultimo, I have to inform you that Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the acknowledgment by the Porte of the independence of Montenegro and the grant of the Port of Spizza would only lead to fresh aggressions on the part of the Montenegrins.

Montenegro, however, might be allowed to communicate with the sea through the Austrian territory, if Austria would grant facilities for that purpose.

I have to instruct your Excellency to speak to Baron Prokesch on this subject.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 514.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 265.)

Foreign Office, March 8, 1862.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches on the subject of the state of affairs in Montenegro and the Herzegovina.*

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 515.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received March 10.)

(No. 110.)

Vienna, March 5, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE read to Count Rechberg your Lordship's despatch No. 75 of the 26th ultimo, relative to the assistance afforded to the Montenegrins by Russia in supplying them with grain, and by Austria in procuring them an asylum in her territory.

His Excellency said that some months ago an agreement had been entered into with Omer Pasha by which the Imperial Government engaged to disarm all insurgents who sought refuge on Austrian territory and arrived at the frontier in arms, and to move them to a place of safety from which they were not permitted to go back to the Herzegovina. Those who presented themselves at the Austrian frontier and sought refuge from persecution, and were not in arms, were allowed to remain for a time and then to return home.

This, his Excellency said, was the outline of the agreement between the two Governments on this subject, and he believed that it had been strictly adhered to.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 516.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received March 10.)

(No. 117. Confidential.)

Vienna, March 6, 1862.

My Lord,

IN my despatch No. 71 of the 8th ultimo, I informed your Lordship of the expectations of the Imperial Government that Luka Vukalovitch would take service in Austria, and of the orders on the subject that had been sent to General Mamula at Ragusa. It appears that the plan has failed, and that General Mamula, finding that he had little chance of succeeding in gaining over Luka Vukalovitch to the interests of Austria, suggested that Omer Pasha should endeavour to obtain his services for Turkey.

Negotiations were carried on for some time with Luka Vukalovitch through an Austrian Consular Agent, but the conditions demanded by him were such that Omer Pasha could not agree to them, and Count Rechberg fears that through the assistance

* No. 491.

of foreign agents a reconciliation may be effected between the Prince of Montenegro and Luka Vukalovitch.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 517.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received March 11.)

(No. 14. Political.)

Bosna-Serai, February 28, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a despatch from Mr. Vice-Consul Zohrab, of the 12th February, relating to a supposed intention of the Turkish Government to introduce paper money into the Herzegovina.

With regard to this matter, Osman Pasha declares that as far as Bosnia is concerned he has had no intimation whatever of such an intention, which he seems to admit would complete the ruin of this country.

My own ideas coincide with Mr. Zohrab's remarks, which equally apply to this province, and I must sincerely trust that the Porte will take into consideration the peculiar circumstances of the trade of Bosnia and the Herzegovina being entirely with Austria, of the cash balance being greatly in favour of that country, and the necessity of its being liquidated in Austrian gold, and consequently will not attempt to carry out so fatal a measure as that supposed to be in contemplation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure in No. 517.

Vice-Consul Zohrab to Consul Holmes.

Mostar, February 12, 1862.

Sir,

I AM led to believe that it is the intention of the Turkish Government to introduce into this province, at the commencement of the financial year, paper currency.

In the hope that my representations may aid in inducing the Porte to reconsider its intention, I hasten to lay before you the disastrous consequences which must follow such a measure both to the people and to the Government.

Prior to 1859 the coins current in these provinces were the Austrian ducat bearing value against Turkish coin at 56 piastres, zwanzigers, half-zwanzigers, and six-kreuzer pieces; Turkish coins were rarely met with. The want of small coins for local circulation was severely felt.

In 1859 large sums in beshliks and small Turkish coins were brought in for the use of the army, and the importation has since continued. These, during 1859-60 and part of 1861, were at a premium of about $5\frac{5}{8}$ per cent. against the Austrian ducat; but, at the same time, the ducat rose in value to 60 piastres. As the quantity of Turkish coin increased the premium fell, and now $1\frac{3}{4}$ per cent. is the highest per centage obtainable; the ducat, however, maintains its value at 60 piastres, therefore, in reality, Turkish coin is already at a slight discount.

This evidently shows that the quantity of small Turkish coin introduced has equalled the demand, and I have no doubt that if further large importations are made they will be at a heavy discount.

The larger Turkish coins, such as the mejidieh, gold or silver, do not enjoy any premium, and they are not sought after.

In giving this sketch of the value of Turkish against Austrian coin in this portion of the Empire, my purpose is to show that the smaller Turkish coins only are favourably received, for the reason that a small coinage is wanted for local purposes, and now that the want is satisfied their value declines and the ducat rises.

The ducat is the standard coin of the country; the reason of this is evident: trade is carried on almost entirely with Austria, the imports exceed the exports in the proportion of about four to one, the difference must, therefore, be made up in gold, and that gold must be Austrian gold, for Turkish coins are not current in Austria. The internal

trade cannot be taken into account because it is small, consisting of but a few necessaries; it may be said to be dependent on the Austrian trade.

It may be asked how in a Turkish province Turkish coins are almost expelled from the market, and the coinage of a foreign State accepted? The reason of this is obvious. Remote from the capital, these provinces have for two centuries enjoyed autonomy, they have taken nothing from the capital, but have yearly sent money thither, while from remote times their commercial transactions have been conducted with the Trans-Danubian countries and with the Venetian States, thus it has naturally followed that the coins of the countries with which they have traded have become the current coins of this country, the causes have not changed with the lapse of time, the sources of trade being the same, the means for carrying on that trade must consequently remain the same—that is, Austrian money must be the medium of commercial transactions because Austria is the trader, and Turkish coins will only hold a very subordinate position.

Of these circumstances the Turkish Government ought to be aware, and knowing that to substitute Turkish coins possessing intrinsic value for the current coin would be very difficult if not impossible, they should well weigh the consequences before attempting to enforce on the country a currency whose only value rests on the estimation in which the Government is held.

The entire trade of the province is carried on on credit, the credits varying from three to six months. The larger traders proceed to Austria, make their purchases, calculating their prices in ducats; the goods brought to Mostar are distributed to the smaller traders, always on credit. In this manner there is now a capital laid out in the Herzegovina, which cannot be estimated at less than 200,000*l*. Of this sum about two-thirds are due to Austrian merchants, who must be paid in Austrian coins. But now there appears to be every chance that the traders will encash their debts in caimés, for a doubt cannot for a moment be entertained that with the appearance of the paper money gold will disappear and payments will be made entirely in paper. How then are the merchants to obtain metallic for their remittances? The discount houses at the capital will be their only resource, and there they will have to pay, if we take the Constantinople rates of exchange as our guide, nearly 100 per cent. premium for gold. Thus, in the first remittance to Austria after the appearance of the caimés, the capital and profit of the traders will be swallowed up, and the commercial community will be ruined. Trade will cease, or will only be carried on to the extent or value of the exports, for the people could not purchase at the prices at which the few who may be able to withstand this crisis would be obliged to sell.

To the army twenty-four months' pay is now due, this debt would probably be swept off by payments in caimés; the soldiers, long deprived of every comfort, would hasten to the bazar to make their small purchases, they would tender in payment for an article worth 1 piastre a 10-piastre caimé, demanding the balance in metallic; in this case the shopkeeper must either refuse to sell, or give the soldier what he requires without taking payment. In either case rows and probably crime will result, for the soldier will insist on getting 10 piastres for the piece of paper which the Government assures him is worth 10 piastres, while the shopkeeper will struggle before paying 10 piastres for a piece of paper which will only produce him 5 piastres.

I could add yet many examples of the evils which will attend the introduction of the caimés; but I trust what I have already said will be sufficient to show that instead of relief the Government will greatly add to their difficulties by attempting to put into circulation a currency of fictitious value. I dare not assert that the measure will raise the whole population in arms, but I fear such would be the result; I, therefore, venture to hope that the Porte will at least put off this evil; I will yet add, better for the Sultan to give up these provinces than to resort to means which will entail difficulty, danger, and expense without ultimate benefit, but perhaps the forcible loss of these countries.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAS. ZOHRAB.

No. 518.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(*Received March* 11.)

(No. 15. Political.)
My Lord, *Bosna-Serai, February* 28, 1862.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that more than ordinary preparations are being made here to meet eventualities during the current year. Besides organised bodies of militia along the frontiers of Servia and Croatia, every Mussulman family is to be prepared to furnish one man perfectly equipped and ready to march at a moment's notice.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HOLMES.

No. 519.

Consul Ricketts to Earl Russell.—(*Received March* 12.)

(No. 12.)
My Lord, *Scutari, March* 1, 1862.

I HAVE the honour to transmit, herewith inclosed to your Lordship, the copy of a despatch dated February 27, 1862, and addressed by me to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, in which I report the arrival of four battalions of Turkish regular infantry at Antivari.

In the above-mentioned despatch I have alluded to a conversation between myself and my Italian colleague relative to M. Moreau's mission to Montenegro. It appears, however, from the information which I have since obtained from undoubted authority, that M. Wiett, the French Consul at Scutari, had, while at Trieste, purchased three shiploads of grain on the part of the French Government for the benefit and use of the people of Montenegro, and that M. Moreau had been lately sent by M. Wiett to Cattaro and Cettigné to make the necessary arrangements with the Prince as to the landing and distribution of the supplies in question.

M. Moreau will, I believe, not return to Scutari until the provisions have been landed at some place in Bocca di Cattaro. The three ships have not as yet arrived from Trieste, but are expected daily.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

Inclosure in No. 519.

Consul Ricketts to Sir H. Bulwer.

Sir, *Scutari, February* 27, 1862.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that four battalions of infantry and 150 sappers and miners, under the command of Mehemet Pasha, have arrived at Antivari. The present force at that place consists of five battalions of Nizam, besides Bashi-Bazouks, whose numbers are continually varying.

The engineers will proceed to erect fortifications on such parts of the coast as are considered most necessary to be defended against any sudden attack.

Four battalions will, I believe, remain at Antivari and one will be ordered up to Scutari. Ishmael Pasha is very anxious to have a body of some 1,200 mountaineers stationed regularly at this place, and has written several times to his Government on this subject. The answer invariably given is that such a thing is not necessary, inasmuch as all the townspeople are said to be soldiers. I need hardly mention to your Excellency that it is in vain for the Porte to expect any effective military service to be performed by a lot of grocers and tailors, who, although accustomed to walk about with arms, are by no means inclined or willing to leave their business for days together, and are certainly unable to endure the hardships of a campaign in the mountains of this country.

The fortress of Scutari is situated in a strong position commanding the main road from Antivari to Prisrend; it is, so to say, the key to the north-west provinces of Roumelia, and yet, notwithstanding its importance, it is in a bad state of repair, and without a competent garrison. It is, therefore, to be hoped that the Porte will not delay in acceding to the wishes of the military Governor.

In my last despatch to your Excellency I mentioned that the Austrians here entertained the opinion that Garibaldi and his followers would most probably attempt a landing on some part of this coast. I must, however, admit that as yet I have been able to obtain no proofs whatever which would warrant me in arriving at such a conclusion. Nor is it easy to understand why Garibaldi would attempt to pass into Hungary viâ Montenegro (for is it to be supposed that the object of such an expedition is, if possible, to create disturbances in Hungary) when the most direct line would be Zengg, between Zara and Fiume. But supposing a landing were in reality effected on this part of the coast, the great difficulty which the revolutionists would have to contend with would be to force the position taken up by Omer Pasha's army, and if unsuccessful in their endeavours to accomplish this, or if by any chance a delay was occasioned, the whole of the party engaged would be subjected to the greatest privations, and would most probably die from starvation, for we must not forget how exceedingly difficult it is to obtain provisions in Montenegro, and Austria would not certainly allow any supplies under such circumstances to pass through her territory into Montenegro.

Such being the case, I cannot believe that Garibaldi would be led to embark in any such scheme; still, the sphere from which I am able to form an opinion is but limited, and your Excellency is, without doubt, far more capable of arriving at the solution of such a question than I am. It is, however, certain that these constant alarms tend to buoy up the spirit of the Montenegrins and the discontented Rayahs, and, I must say, the weakness which the Porte has so long continued to manifest as regards making the necessary preparations for the defence of this coast, has rather invited than discouraged a landing on her territory. Be this as it may, the precautionary measures being now taken by the Porte for the defence of the line of coast between Antivari and Spizza will most probably not only prevent any landing being attempted, but it will tend to discourage the expectation of the Montenegrins, and those who have been taught to look for the arrival of aid and assistance from without.

In a conversation with M. Dario, my Italian colleague, he told me he had been acquainted by the Russian Consul of the following circumstance, that M. Moreau was sent to Cattaro for the purpose of forwarding 5,000 napoleons to Cettigné—that this sum had been lately sent by the French Government for the purpose of enabling the Montenegrins to carry on hostilities against the Turks. As I obtained the same information from another source, I conclude it is correct. My Austrian colleague has telegraphed to the authorities at Cattaro, and it is probable that we shall obtain further and more accurate information on the subject. M. Hequard left yesterday for Corfu. Before taking his departure he paid a visit to Bib Dodo Pasha, and, on bidding him adieu, he advised him strongly to take no steps whatever in his future relations with the Porte without previously consulting the opinion of his successor, M. Wiett. Your Excellency will observe from this that the policy of M. Wiett is not likely to differ materially from that pursued by his predecessor.

The Shistan Chiefs, who are eight in number, and not five, as I mentioned in my last despatch to your Excellency, having returned again to Shistan, have been induced to make their appearance at Scutari, where they are under the surveillance of the authorities. The Kadi has been ordered to leave Scutari.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

No. 520.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 271.) *Foreign Office, March* 12, 1862.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches upon the subject of Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

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* No. 513.

No. 521.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 108.) *Foreign Office, March* 13, 1862.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a despatch from Mr. Consul Holmes,* inclosing a report from Vice-Consul Zohrab, showing the disastrous consequences which would result from the introduction of Turkish paper currency into the Herzegovina.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 522.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 109.) *Foreign Office, March* 13, 1862.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, copies of three despatches from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna,† relating to the affairs of the Herzegovina and Bosnia.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 523.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received March 13, *at night.)*

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, March* 13, 1862, 11·30 P.M.

DERVISH PASHA has entered Zupzi with fourteen battalions, and Luka Vukalovitch and Yovan Voivode of Bagnani have surrendered.

No. 524.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 131. Confidential.) *Vienna, March* 13, 1862.

My Lord,

THE Imperial Government have received from Constantinople an account of endeavours which have been made by the French Ambassador to obtain from the Turkish Government the concession of a port for the use of Montenegrins.

Aali Pasha seems to have peremptorily declined entertaining the project, but this continued return to the subject by the French Government, and the tone in which it has been again brought forward, causes much anxiety here, for the Austrian Government persists in viewing every concession of this nature to the Montenegrins as a facility granted to the cause of revolution, and they are as firmly convinced as ever that a port given to Montenegro would be simply supplying means for the more easy disembarkation of anarchists and of persons whose designs are to act injuriously to the interests of Austria as well as of Turkey.

For some time past, as your Lordship is aware, negotiations have been carried on between Omer Pasha and Luka Vukalovitch with very doubtful success, and the Turkish Government have acquired the conviction that their most active opponent in the affair has been M. Petkovich, the Russian Consul at Ragusa, acting under instructions sent from here by M. Balabine.

* No. 517. † Nos. 515, 516, and

The Turkish Ambassador, in consequence of information received from Omer Pasha, has now brought the subject to the notice of Count Rechberg, and proposed that the Austrian Government should withdraw the exequatur granted to M. Petkovich. Count Rechberg has replied that, though M. Petkovich's proceedings at Ragusa are entirely opposed to the wishes and interests of the Imperial Government, he does not see in them a sufficient cause for the step which he has suggested, and that he should advise the Porte to lay the case before the Russian Government as the natural course to be pursued under the circumstances.

Count Rechberg may be willing to support any Turkish representations made in this sense at St. Petersburgh, but he does not anticipate that they would be productive of much real or lasting benefit, for even if M. Petkovich were removed from Ragusa, another Consul would probably be appointed who would carry out the policy of Russia in the same spirit and with equal vigour.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 526.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 299.) *Foreign Office, March* 17, 1862.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches upon the subject of Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 527.

Consul Ricketts to Earl Russell.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 13.) *Scutari, March* 7, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit, herewith inclosed to your Lordship, the copy of a despatch dated Scutari, March 4, 1862, and addressed by me to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, relative to M. Moreau's residence at Ragusa.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

Inclosure in No. 527.

Consul Ricketts to Sir H. Bulwer.

Scutari, March 4, 1862.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit, herewith inclosed to your Excellency, the copy of a despatch addressed by me to Earl Russell, from which your Excellency will observe that three cargoes of grain have been lately purchased at Trieste by M. Wiett, the French Consul, for the use of the inhabitants of Montenegro.

M. Moreau, the French Chancellier, is at the present moment at Ragusa, from which place I suppose, like M. Hecquard, he has established a means of communicating with the emissaries of the insurgents. How long he is likely to reside there it is difficult to say.

I am also informed that provisions are constantly sent from Corfu to Montenegro by a certain merchant named Pasquale.

M. Pasquale was commissioned last year by General Ignatiew to forward such supplies as may from time to time be required by the Montenegrins.

* No. 524.

The expenses of the same are defrayed by the Russian Government.

The Bishop of Alessio, an Albanian and one of the chief revolutionists of this country, is endeavouring to persuade the people of Miridit to abstain from taking any part in the expected campaign against the Montenegrins; whether or how far he is likely to succeed in such a scheme I have as yet had no opportunity of judging. The Abbé Brusuk has been lately dismissed from Miridit for preaching against Bib Dodo Pasha. Not being allowed to return to Miridit he is now residing at Scutari, and is engaged in carrying on an active propaganda against the Turkish authorities. This person, like all the native priesthood of Albania, is a notedly bad character. His time is passed in drunkenness, debauchery, and intrigue; he is paid, as I mentioned to your Excellency in a previous despatch, by the French Government, and is apparently one of the instruments employed by that Government in stirring up strife and dissension among the Latin tribes. He is in constant communication with M. Wiett.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

No. 528.

Mr. Oliphant to Earl Russell.—(Received March 21.)

Ancona, March 16, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith a report upon the present state of Dalmatia and Albania. I regret that the uncertainty attending the arrivals and departures of the steamboats on the Adriatic should have delayed my arrival at this place until now.

I have, &c.
(Signed) S. OLIPHANT.

Inclosure in No. 528.

Mr. Oliphant to Earl Russell.

Corfu, March 13, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that, in compliance with the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch of the 27th January, marked Secret, I proceeded to Corfu, with the view, in the first instance, of endeavouring to ascertain "whether any plans were in agitation for disturbing the state of territorial possession on the coast of Dalmatia." On my way thither, I visited Trieste, Venice, Pola, Spalatro, Ragusa, and Cattaro, and was enabled at the two first-mentioned places to obtain information with reference to the Committee presided over by the Neapolitan Prince Petruka, which has been formed for the purpose of organizing expeditions to co-operate with the reactionary movement in Southern Italy. The aspect of affairs in Dalmatia itself had to some extent changed since my visit to that province in September 1860. The continued agitation in the Herzegovina was at last making itself felt among the peasantry of the interior, and I was informed, as a proof of the sympathy which existed between the Slavonic populations on either side of the frontier, that the Dalmatians were in the habit of conveying the provisions and supplies destined for the Turkish army to the insurgents.

It is worthy of remark that while the rural or Slavonic portion of the population of Dalmatia are strongly disposed to make common cause with their brethren in the disaffected districts of Turkey, the inhabitants of the sea-board towns of the same province, who are of mixed Slavonic and Italian origin, and amongst whom the traditions and associations of the Republics of Venice and Ragusa still survive to enlist the sympathies in the cause of Italian independence, are watching with eagerness the progress of events in the Peninsula. Dalmatia thus becomes the link which connects the fate of Italy with that of Turkey, and which renders the completion of Italian unity contingent upon the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. I trust shortly to be able to obtain at Ancona full particulars concerning the expedition, which, I was informed by the Austrian Consul at Scutari, is now being organized at that place for the purpose probably of invading Turkey at some point in the northern part of Albania, with the view of operating upon the Dalmatian and Croatian frontiers of Austria, information which has been in some degree corroborated by the Turkish officials with whom I have come in contact, as well as by the preparations which have been made both by the Austrian and Turkish Governments for the defence of the coast-line.

In the meantime, in consequence of information which I received at Corfu with regard to the sympathies manifested by the Greek population in Lower Albania in favour of the revolution which has just broken out in Greece, I believed I should best carry out your Lordship's wishes by proceeding to Scutari, the capital of the Northern Division of the same province, for the purpose, in the first place, of ascertaining the state of public feeling in that district with reference to the questions which are now pending in Greece and Italy respectively; and, in the second, of obtaining information as to the steps taken by the Turkish Government to meet the contingencies by which it seems to be more immediately threatened. I was in hopes that my previous acquaintance with three of the foreign Consuls now at Scutari might the better enable me to succeed in this attempt.

Before proceeding to record the result of my observations during a week's residence at Scutari, I would beg leave to advert briefly to the different national and religious elements which exist in the adjacent districts.

The provinces of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Albania contain four different races:—viz., the Greek, the Latin, the Mussulman, and the Slav, though the Hellenic and Slav races are members of the same Church, the differences which exist in the details of their observances have up to the present time widely estranged them in sympathy.

The large majority of the population in Herzegovina is Slav, and the minority Mussulman. Bosnia is nearly equally divided between the two races; in Albania there are no Slavs; the Mussulmen are in a majority, the Greeks are next in importance, while the Latin tribes do not number 100,000 souls. The Mussulmen chiefly occupy the eastern or interior portion of the province, the Greeks the southern, and the Latin tribes extend from the frontiers of Montenegro as far south as Durazzo. Formerly no bond of union existed strong enough to subdue the natural antipathies which have always, to a greater or less extent, served to alienate from each other these diverse creeds and nationalities and render them amenable to the Government of the Porte.

Recent events in Europe, however, combined with unsuccessful attempts at reform in Turkey, and the active propaganda by means of the clergy and other agents of the nationality "idea," have combined to effect of late an important change in the public feeling of the entire population from the Gulf of Corinth to the banks of the Save, and an element of cohesion has been introduced which is every day becoming stronger in proportion as the *prestige* of the Turkish Government is weakened by the interference of foreign Powers, and its resources crippled by the embarrassed state of its finances. Hitherto the Slavs of Bosnia and Herzegovina have not found in Montenegro or Servia allies sufficiently powerful to be depended upon, while the revolution in Epirus in 1853 proved to the Greeks the impossibility of a successful movement, unless it be widely extended and supported from without. The revolution in Greece, the fermenting state of Hungary and Croatia, and the prospect of a landing of Italians in Albania, suggest a political complication of so advantageous character that the whole Christian population of the provinces are—so the accounts I have received lead me to believe—prepared to avail themselves of it. The Turkish authorities at Janina have obtained information, which has been confirmed by hints I have myself gathered from other than Turkish sources, of an understanding existing between the once hostile Slav and Greek races to rise as soon as the roads are clear of snow.

The new tone of conciliation held by the Russian agents towards the Hellenic party seems to imply a desire to unite it with the Slavs of the north; while the disaffected condition of the Latin tribes around Scutari at this critical moment, as well as of a section of the Mussulman population, can be traced distinctly to French agency.

Although I am not in a position to furnish absolute proof of the fact, I cannot resist the conclusion, when considering the present attitude of the population of these provinces and the reports which have reached me in connection with the agents employed here in intrigue, that a gigantic conspiracy exists, whose members in Italy, Hungary, Servia, and Greece, are only waiting for the signal to be made in Paris when the spark will be thrown amid the combustible materials which have here been so carefully prepared. The liberation of Venetia and the Ionian Isles, the dismemberment at a blow of both Austria and Turkey, and the constitution of Hungarian, Slavonic, and Greek Empires, are regarded as the inevitable result of such a conflagration; and I was assured lately by a prominent Hungarian, until quite recently a strong supporter of the Ottoman Power in Europe, that he had been compelled to abandon his former political views, and to admit that the freedom of his country could not now be obtained without the sacrifice of Turkey.

I will now proceed to give your Lordship a more specific account of the nature of the information which has led me to form this general conclusion. It is unnecessary for me to allude to the character of the late French Consul at Scutari, M. Hecquard, whose

arrival at Corfu took place the day before I left, and who was then on his way to Damascus, but had determined to delay for an indefinite period at Corfu. The proximity of the Ionian Islands to the coast has long rendered them a principal centre for the nationality agitation, and at a crisis like the present there is no point where intrigue can be carried on with greater safety or effect. The object of M. Hecquard's residence at Corfu, therefore, need not remain matter for speculation, the more especially as his proceedings at Ragusa were so obnoxious to the Austrian Government that he was compelled to leave that place, and the agitation of Dalmatia and the Herzegovina is now intrusted to M. Moreau, the Chancellier of the French Consulate at Scutari, who has recently proceeded thither.

Unhappily, the injury which so unscrupulous an agent as M. Hecquard has worked throughout these provinces is not to be remedied by his absence, and the effects are at this moment being painfully felt by the Turkish authorities.

I was informed by Ismail Pasha, the General commanding this division of the Turkish army, that he was in possession of written proof to the effect that shortly previous to his departure M. Hecquard had summoned eight Chiefs of the tribes in the neighbourhood of Shistan to that village, and recommended them openly to assist the Montenegrins by a revolutionary movement against the Turks. I might multiply instances of similar proceedings on the part of M. Hecquard, but I merely allude to this his last act for the purpose of connecting it with other incidents which may justify the conclusion that the French Government are chiefly responsible for the difficulties with which the Porte has to contend in these provinces.

When at Trieste I was informed upon good authority that three shiploads of corn had been purchased by the French Consul on behalf of the Montenegrins, who are said to be storing up provisions in anticipation of an accession to their army from Italy, and this I found fully corroborated by the Austrian Consul and the Bishop of Scutari, who possessed proofs of the transaction.

When at Cettinge in 1860, Mirko, the father of the present Prince of Montenegro, admitted to me that he received arms and money from France, and since that period, the action of the French Government has been less disguised. Perhaps the most glaring instance of the prejudicial interference of its agents occurred while I was at Scutari, when Ismail Pasha expressed to me the strong doubts he entertained of being able to induce the Miridites, the most important, and hitherto loyal, of the Latin hill tribes, to furnish their usual contingent to assist him in his operations against the Montenegrins, in consequence of the recent visit of the Abbé Krasnich to their country. This able intrigiter, who possesses talents of a far superior order to those of his coadjutor, M. Hecquard, is a Slav by origin, and is an active propagandist of the Slavonic nationality idea; he is in the direct receipt of a salary from the French Government of 20,000 fr. a year, and has doubtless funds to a considerable amount at his disposal. He possesses great influence among the Latin clergy notwithstanding his notoriously bad character, and was expelled the district by the Lieutenant of the Prince of the Miridites—who was himself absent at the time—a few days prior to my arrival at Scutari, ostensibly in consequence of having assembled the inhabitants of the country by ringing the great bell, and openly urged them to refuse to comply with the requisition of Ismail Pasha to furnish the usual contingent. He even went further, and called upon the people to raise the standard of revolt, on which he found himself obliged to leave the district, and he is now engaged in carrying on his intrigues among the Mussulman as well as the Christian population of Scutari. In spite of the professions of loyalty on the part of Bib Dodo Pasha, the Prince of the Miridites, this Chief is not to be depended upon where money is in question, and his subjects, equally venal, are less afraid of embroiling themselves with the Turkish Government. That the dismissal of the Abbé Krasnich from Miridicia is no proof of the fidelity of the Chief, may be inferred from the fact of his distinctly refusing, though he holds the rank of general in the Turkish army, to obey an order from Ismail Pasha to furnish 1,000 men at once, and 2,000 at a later period, to carry on the war against the Montenegrins. Bib Dodo Pasha replied that he would not act unless the 3,000 men required were ordered out *en masse*, their pay to begin from the date of the order. In a conversation which I had with this Chief, he reiterated his determination not to comply with the order of his superior, in the first place, he said, because he was only wanted to hold a position, and not to act upon the offensive; and in the second, because it was a disgrace for an officer of his rank to bring only 1,000 men into the field; both these reasons are so puerile, that they seem rather to indicate bad faith than any inability on the part of Bib Dodo Pasha to carry out his instructions.

A worthy colleague of the Abbé Krasnich is the Roman Catholic Bishop of Alessio, a town situated near the coast, about a day's journey to the south of Scutari, whose

opposition to the Turkish Government is no less open, whose character is equally notorious, who derives his income partly from the Propagandist Mission at Lyons, and whose efforts to undermine the allegiance of the Latin tribes seem to have been most successful. As a proof of this I may mention a circumstance narrated to me by the Bishop of Scutari, who is benefieed by the Austrian Government, and who informed me that not long since, when at Alessio, two of the Chiefs of the Latin tribes in the neighbourhood paid him a visit, and after assuring themselves of privacy and freedom from interruption, asked him confidentially when Garibaldi was expected to arrive. On the Bishop professing his ignorance on the subject, the Chiefs went on to state that they had determined, in the event of his landing and making the sign of the cross in the Roman Catholic, and not the Greek manner, to join his standard, and they said the same determination had been arrived at by the other tribes.

The Bishop of Scutari expressed his belief in the possibility of a union between the Hellenic and Slav nationalities for a common object, notwithstanding their traditional jealousies, and although it is possible that it would be difficult to induce the Latin tribes to join such a combination, they would probably be ready to revolt independently, and without any definite view beyond upsetting the existing Government. It must be remarked that, inasmuch as the Turkish Government has never attempted to introduce reforms among them, these tribes have no cause of complaint; they are naturally well affected, live on terms of perfect amity with the Mussulman population, and have only been made rebellious by the expenditure of money, the promise of more, and the constant agitation of the clergy. The favourable disposition of the Latin tribes of Albania towards their Government has thus proved one of the greatest obstacles with which foreign intrigue has had to contend, hence the amount of energy which has been expended to disunite them from the Mussulmans of the hills, with whom they are connected by the ties of friendship, and, in some instances, even of relationship. Should these endeavours to raise the Latin tribes at last prove successful, and they were to break out in revolt, the next stage of proceeding on the part of certain foreign Governments is to denounce any attempt made by the Turks to reduce them to order as an act of persecution, and thus to fetter the action of the authorities.

As an illustration of this, I was informed by Ismail Pasha that the Greek tribe of Vassievitch, on the frontier of Montenegro, was constantly in a state of revolt, owing to foreign instigation, and that he had received orders to cause them to be attacked by Turkish levies from the neighbouring hills. He stated, however, that he felt some difficulty in complying with his instructions, as, while he was enjoined to quell the rebellion with irregular troops, these latter were on no account to be allowed to destroy any houses, to kill any people, or to take any property. As he could not flatter himself that there was any chance of this order being complied with, he anticipated the strongest opposition from the French and Russian Consuls, who would doubtless report this fresh case of persecution of Christians.

Unfortunately, this system of tampering with the allegiance of the population is not confined to the Christians alone. The causes of complaint which, with more or less reason, the Mussulman inhabitants have against their Government, have been no less artfully worked upon, and the disaffection of the Mussulmans is certainly equal to, if not more widely spread, than that of the Latins. A certain Mussulman Chief, named Hassan Hotti, who, though professing a contrary religion, is chief over a number of Latin tribes, exercises an important influence over the Mahommedan population, and although the Pasha is compelled to employ him in the present war, he is known to have sold his allegiance, and is in constant communication with French and Russian agents.

It should not be forgotten, however, that while the refractory spirit of the Mahommedans in these provinces constitute an element of weakness, they would be found, in the event of a general rising, to side with the Government against the Christians; and while the schemes at present on foot to subvert the Ottoman Empire may ultimately be successful, there can be no doubt that this consummation would be preceded by tragedies as fearful as those already enacted in the mountains of the Lebanon, but on a much larger scale.

In the course of a former visit I paid to Bosnia and Herzegovina, I found the Mussulman population universally animated by the determination to die sword in hand rather than submit to Christian preponderance, and the same spirit extends throughout Albania; hence the spread of a Greek revolution or a landing of Italians in Turkey would be the signal for a war of extermination, which could probably only be put a stop to by the occupation of the country by a foreign army, similar to that which has already, under the same circumstances, taken place recently in Syria. Russia and France would thus find themselves compelled to protect their respective co-religionists, and it is scarcely

necessary, with the evidence of so many facts to prove the French policy in this respect, to state that I have found a cordial co-operation with it on the part of Russian agents. I was assured at Cattaro last month by a Montenegrin that his countrymen received supplies through that port from Russia. We have proof that General Ignatiew—lately from China—opened an account a short time since with the house of Pasquale, at Corfu, to supply grain to Montenegro, while the Russian Consul at Mostar, on being taxed with furnishing grain and provisions to the insurgents of Herzergovina, did not attempt to deny the charge. The Russian Consul at Scutari, whom I had formerly met in Montenegro, found it was useless to deny to me the probable accuracy of the report which I had received from Ismail Pasha of the intention of the Servians and Montenegrins to commence combined operations at an early period, though he alluded at first to the attitude which both Princes have quite lately adopted towards the Porte, manifestly with the view of lulling suspicion by a tone of conciliation. M. Viet, the French Consul, whom I had also known at Bosna-Serai, and whose brother is Consul at Janina, stated it as his opinion that the object of the Greek revolution was designed rather to raise Hellenic Turkey than with any merely local view, while both the Turks and Austrians with whom I have conversed have expressed to me their conviction of the proximity of a catastrophe such as I have endeavoured to portray. The recent nomination of a Consul for Italy to Scutari, where there is not an Italian subject, is a fact of some significance, and although this gentleman is not of an active or intriguing disposition, it is difficult to conceive why he should have been sent here, unless in anticipation of events occurring in which Italy is likely to be interested.

Assuming, then, that the above considerations, when taken together with the information which I am assured the Austrian Government has secretly received, that an expedition is now in process of organization at Ancona, are sufficient to justify the belief that a descent by Garibaldians is contemplated somewhere on the shores of the Adriatic, I venture to think that a point on the coast of Albania is more likely to be chosen than one in Dalmatia, first, because without it there could be no sufficient guarantee for the rising of the Greek and Latin tribes, and the creation of that diversion along the whole length of the Austrian south-eastern frontier which would be necessary to success; secondly, because the Austrian coast is better defended than the Turkish; thirdly, because the population of Dalmatia, though disaffected, could not be counted upon to join the movement by themselves; and fourthly, because a landing in Dalmatia would not supply any base of operations.

The whole coast of Albania, on the other hand, from Greece to Montenegro, is exposed to invasion with the exception of Antivari, where three Turkish frigates and three gun-boats are at anchor, and five battalions of regular troops, numbering about 4,000 men, are now encamped. About ten miles to the north lies Spizza, a small bay commanded by the fort of Nabic, at present garrisoned by four companies of regular, besides irregular troops, and fortifications, one about to be erected so as to command the few miles of coast which intervene between this point and the Austrian frontier, and which is within an hour's climb of Montenegro.

To the south of Antivari a landing might be effected almost anywhere, and, in the present disposition of the country people, the invaders would be likely to meet with a cordial reception. If unencumbered by guns, and befriended by the tribes, they might attempt with some chance of success to pass through the heart of Albania into Montenegro in rear of Scutari. Indeed, at present the fortress at that place, although an impregnable position and of the utmost strategic importance, is totally undefended, every man at the disposition of the Pasha is employed either on the frontier of Montenegro or on the seaboard, and in the event of a reverse he is left entirely without reserves.

The population of the city of Scutari itself is so disaffected that some garrison should be maintained there to overawe it. Supposing these provinces in revolt, and a body of Garibaldians in Montenegro, three courses are open to them: they might either descend from that country upon Dalmatia, or they might force the lines of Omer Pasha at Trebigné, which I have heard strongly condemned in a military point of view both by French and Turks, and so pass into Turkish Croatia, where they would find a sympathizing population, and, leaving a revolted country behind them to protect their rear, operate upon the Austrian frontier which would lie open to them from Hungary to Italy, defended only by an army of disaffected Grenzers; or they might adopt a third course, and crossing from the Montenegrin to the Servian frontier—a distance of only 30 miles—take that country as a new base of operations.

I think it right to mention here a report which reached me through an Austrian source, that that Government has received information of treacherous designs on the

part of Omer Pasha, in the event of this occurrence taking place. My former acquaintance with Omer Pasha would not lead me to place any reliance on his good faith; indeed, his position, surrounded by a fanatic army, is the best guarantee for his fidelity. Still it is to be remembered that he is by birth a Croat, and that he is sufficiently ambitious and unscrupulous to attempt anything, more especially when treachery for the sake of his country towards a Government which has on many occasions treated him with great injustice is all that could be charged against him.

In Raschid Pasha, the present Governor of Scutari, and Ismail Pasha, the Commander-in-Chief, the Turkish Government possesses able and zealous servants, and at the present crisis it is most fortunate that these high officials occupy their respective positions.

This fact renders them unusually obnoxious to the Consuls of those Powers interested in fomenting revolution, and no effort will be spared to have them removed. Raschid Pasha is not the less determined to hold his own and to rid the country, if possible, of those of its subjects who are most actively engaged in spreading rebellion. He informed me confidentially that he had already decided on the expulsion of Hassan Hotti, but although proofs are not wanting against the Abbé Krasniel and the Bishop of Alessio, the fact that they are actually in the pay of France causes him to hesitate before proceeding to extremities.

As it is evident that the imminence of a common danger must tend to draw together the Austrian and Turkish Governments, I was anxious, considering the complicated nature of their frontier relations, to discover whether any secret understanding existed between them as to the course to be pursued in the event of a descent taking place upon these shores of the Adriatic.

Beyond the fact, however, that overtures had been made by the Austrian Government to the Porte upon the subject of Klek and Suttorina, which do not seem to have been acceded to by the latter Government, and that Austria had expressed her determination at all hazards to preserve her right of way, I was unable to obtain anything definite upon the subject. In the event of her own frontier being threatened, those Austrians with whom I have conversed expressed their conviction that her armies would cross it to co-operate with the Turks, and that she would not consider herself bound to act merely on the defensive.

Being desirous before leaving Albania of judging of the state of affairs upon the frontier from personal observations, I proceeded to the head of the Lake of Scutari in a small steamer mounting four guns. Ismail Pasha kindly furnished me with a company of rifles as a guard. In the course of this trip I visited Shistan, the village to which I have already alluded, which now forms the frontier post of the Turkish army on the western shore of the Lake; at this point 800 regular troops are posted, and four gunboats cut off the communication along the banks of the Lake. About a month previously the Turks had lost fifty men here in repelling an attack of the Montenegrins. As the country between this point and the Montenegrin frontier was said to be occupied by 5,000 of the enemy, who were in the habit of firing upon the steamer, as she was obliged on account of the shallowness of the water to run the gauntlet for a mile within pistol shot of the rocky shore, the guns were run out and the men stood to their rifles; the hull of the steamer, riddled with the balls she had received at this place, seemed to justify this precaution, but to our astonishment not a Montenegrin was to be seen, and the village of Ghanitza, which two days before had been in their possession, was now deserted. Fort Lessandria, the last Turkish post in this direction, is a small fortified island within a few hundred yards of the Montenegrin shore, from whence I could see several of the Turkish frontier posts, throughout which an army consisting of 5,000 regular troops, three batteries of artillery, and 2,500 irregulars are distributed.

On my return to Scutari, I ascertained from Raschid Pasha that on the previous evening an Envoy had arrived with a letter from the Prince of Montenegro announcing that he had withdrawn his men from Granitza, and proposing a cessation of hostilities. I found it difficult at the time to account for this unexpected overture otherwise than by the supposition that the necessity of planting the crops for the year had induced the Montenegrins to return to their agricultural operations; two days after, however, I met M. Moreau, the French Chancellier at Antivari, who after some hesitation admitted to me that he had just returned from a visit to the Prince of Montenegro, and from the extreme reserve which, although I was an old acquaintance, he manifested on the subject of the probable intentions of the Prince, I was led to counsel the letter of the latter with the opportune visit of M. Moreau to Cettigné.

This gentleman informed me that the Turkish Consul at Cattaro had just proceeded to Sutorina for the purpose of meeting Luka Vukalovitch, and inducing him either by

bribes or threats to make terms with Omer Pasha. M. Moreau seemed to expect that some arrangement would be come to. The Russian Consul at Mostar, however, with whom I chanced to be a fellow-passenger a few hours later, held a different tone, and anticipated the continuance of hostilities. It is significant that this gentleman, whose brother is Consul at Janina, is on his way to that place, and then proposes visiting Athens and Salonica.

Should Omer Pasha, from motives of personal convenience or political expediency, patch up a hollow place at this juncture, it will only have the effect of allowing the elements, which will every day be gathering force, to burst with irresistible violence at last.

I would here venture to suggest whether, as the French maintain from time to time an Agent at Ragusa, and as both Russia and Prussia have Consuls there, it might not be desirable to establish a temporary Agent at that place, either recognized or not as your Lordship should deem expedient, as its proximity to Montenegro, to the Turkish army, and the neutral frontier, renders it a place of some political importance.

It is also of the utmost consequence that the Consul at Scutari should be conversant with the Turkish language, as the interpreters at that place are not to be trusted, and I would here beg to bear my testimony to the ability in this and other respects of Mr. Ricketts, at present Acting Consul, who has, during his short stay, succeeded in making himself thoroughly acquainted with the state of the country, and whose former military experience has enabled him to furnish the Pasha with some valuable hints for the defence of the country.

On my return to Corfu, I found that, in addition to the Russian Consul from Janina, who had arrived to meet his brother from Mostar, there was also staying in the same hotel the Russian Councillor of State, De Legowski. This gathering of Russians may have been accidental, but there can be no doubt that unusual activity has been observed among the Etairists of the Ionian Islands generally. An unwary admission of the Russian Consul proved to me that the disaffection of the Miridits was looked upon as an established fact. The names of the leaders of the nationality movement in Lower Albania are Thelio Delios, Ghikas Delios, both of Liapovo; Brachichas, of Delvino; and Sliambuy, of Janina. At Corfu, Paramythioles, the Pasquales, and Lombardo are among the most notorious. With reference to the Pasquales, I may mention that Sir Henry Storks has confirmed, through the Custom-house, the fact of the export of corn by them to Budua for the use of the Montenegrins. Lombardo has recently returned from Italy, where he had an interview with Garibaldi upon the subject of the Greek nationality. The latter, however, is reported to have told him that he could only hope for success by making a friend of England. It is worthy of note that there is a constant intercourse maintained between these islands and Naples. It is rumoured that a secret society exists in Cephalonia, which is affiliated to a parent society said to have been formed at Naples in connection with the Greek populations in Calabria. Although this has reached me from more than one source, I only mention it now as a vague rumour, the truth of which I shall endeavour to investigate at Naples.

I would wish, my Lord, before concluding this Report, to observe that if I have dwelt somewhat strongly on the disaffected condition of Western Turkey, and may be found to be premature in my anticipation of events which, sooner or later, seem inevitable, I have been led to do so by the marked difference which I observed since my last visit to this country only fifteen months ago. In one regard alone have I found no change, whatever may have been the effects which foreign intrigue and foreign gold may have worked; they have been powerless in so far as the prestige and popularity of England is concerned. The men who composed the Turkish contingent have acted as our missionaries in every village throughout European Turkey, while our straightforward policy has gained us universal respect, and Christians, no less than Turks, regard England as the chief arbiter of their destinies; nor could any other Power ever exercise the same influence either for the tranquilization of the country or the subversion of the existing régime, and the establishment of a new order of things.

I have, &c.
(Signed) S. OLIPHANT.

No. 529.

Earl Cowley to Earl Russell.—(Received March 21.)

(No. 373.)
Paris, March 20, 1862.

My Lord,

IT APPEARS that in consequence of the apprehensions expressed by the Austrian Government to that of the Emperor of the encouragement given by the Italian Government to expeditions destined for the coast of Dalmatia, M. Thouvenel desired M. Benedetti to speak very seriously upon the subject to M. Ratazzi, in consequence of which the Chevalier Nigra has been instructed to give the most formal assurances to M. Thouvenel that no designs of the kind will receive any countenance from the Italian Government; that M. Ratazzi had seen General Garibaldi, who had admitted that he had entertained a plan of endeavouring to penetrate into the Tyrol, but declared that he had abandoned it, because he found that it would involve him in complications with the Mazzinists, with whom he would have nothing to do. The General had promised to remain quiet. M. Ratazzi adds further that his Government is prepared to prevent the departure of any expedition by force if necessary.

I had just perused Mr. Oliphant's interesting account of his journey through Dalmatia and Western Turkey to Corfu, when M. Thouvenel gave me the above information, and I asked him what was the nature of the reports which reached him of the state of feeling in those countries, and whether he did not think it probable that an attempt might be made to revolutionize those countries by expeditions sent from Italy or elsewhere, in the hope of the revolution spreading to Croatia and Hungary.

M. Thouvenel replied that there was, no doubt, great agitation among the populations I had mentioned, but that it could have the effect at which I had hinted he did not believe. It would be next to impossible, in his opinion, to induce races of different blood, interests, and religion so to unite as to render an insurrection formidable. If, indeed, Hungary were to establish her independence, and be followed by other States of Austria bordering on Turkey, he thought it possible, nay, even probable, that the Turkish provinces might follow the example and proclaim their independence, but the converse of the picture, to insurrectionize Hungary by means of Turkey, he did not think likely. There might certainly be disturbances in Albania and other places, but he was convinced they would be but local.

It is curious that while Russian agents appear to be busy, as well as French, in promoting disaffection in the countries which I have mentioned, General Kisselef should have addressed himself both to M. Thouvenel and to me, stating that there was no doubt that the events now passing in Greece were the work of Italian adventurers, as the first steps towards revolutionizing Turkey, and exposing the danger to which the peace of Europe would be subjected, should Italy be permitted to fit out expeditions for that purpose. To me General Kisselef made no scruple in asserting that the "mot d'ordre" went from Paris. On my asking him whether he had any proof, he replied he had a moral conviction, founded on various circumstances, that what he affirmed was true.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 530.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received March 24.)

(No. 140.
Vienna, March 20, 1862.

My Lord,

IN my despatch No. 131 of the 13th instant I informed your Lordship of a communication which Count Rechberg had received from Constantinople, reporting that renewed attempts have been made in the interests of Montenegro by the French Ambassador at that Court, and I understand that his Excellency purposes sending Count Apponyi a copy of Baron Prokesch's despatch on this subject for communication to your Lordship.

Count Rechberg spoke to me yesterday of a despatch from the Porte on Montenegro, apparently a Circular to the Great Courts, which has been left with him by Prince Callimachi. He said it was well drawn up, and he hoped that Her Majesty's Government will approve of the position assumed by the Porte on this question, and be disposed to act in concert with Austria in furtherance of the interests of Turkey.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 531.

Consul Ricketts to Earl Russell.—(Received March 26.)

(No. 14.)
Scutari, March 15, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith inclosed to your Lordship the copy of a despatch addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, and dated Scutari, March, 10, 1862, in which I inform his Excellency that the Prince of Montenegro is desirous of establishing peaceful relations with the Porte. I have also to inform your Lordship that the three cargoes of grain alluded to in my despatch No. 12 as having been purchased by the French Consul, M. Wiet, for the use of the Montenegrins, have arrived in the Bocca di Cattaro, and that M. Moreau, the French Chancellier, who was sent there for the purpose of consigning the provisions in question to the Montenegrin authorities, has returned to Scutari.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

Inclosure in No. 531.

Consul Ricketts to Sir H. Bulwer.

Sir,

Scutari, March 10, 1862.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that the Montenegrins have been withdrawn from the village of Grenitza, and that the Pasha has received a letter from the Prince, expressing a wish that hostilities may cease, that past differences be forgotten, and that the people of Albania and Montenegro may in future live together on terms of friendship and intimacy.

It is not an easy matter to discover the reason of this sudden change in the policy of the Prince.

Perhaps he is desirous of causing the Turks to desist from pursuing any active operations, in order that his people may be enabled to direct their attention more particularly to sowing their crops of grain, the neglect of which at this moment would eventually reduce them to the greatest difficulties, and compel them to rely entirely upon assistance from without. Such is the character, however, of the Prince and his father, that little confidence can be placed in any of their promises, and if they have in reality ordered the Montenegrins to remain tranquil at present, we may rest assured they will avail themselves of the first opportunity that presents itself of again commencing hostilities. One cannot, therefore, suppose the Porte will be desirous of acceding to the request of the Prince, and of bringing about a state of things which could only result in adding to the resources of the Montenegrins, in augmenting their power of resistance, and in delaying the operations of the army.

Yesterday, in a tour up the lake, I passed by the village of Grenitza, from which the Montenegrins appear to have retired. It remains, however, to be seen whether the Pasha will avail himself of this occasion to seize the villages of Grenitza and Selza, and reduce the inhabitants of those places to obedience, who have caused so much trouble and annoyance during the winter months.

Ishmael Pasha tells me he has received orders from Omer Pasha to pass the frontier and attack the Montenegrins in their own territory whenever they happen to invade the territory of the Turks. I am also acquainted that an order has been sent by Omer Pasha to the Governor of Scutari to the following effect, that the Prince of Miridit be prepared to take the field immediately with 3,000 men. Bib Doda Pasha has assured the Governor he will be able to make his appearance at Scutari with the number of troops required in the course of a few days.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

No. 532.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received March 21.)

(No. 102.) *Constantinople, March 12, 1862.*

My Lord,

AS I perceive by Lord Napier's despatch No. 57 (inclosed in your Lordship's No. 82 of the 27th ultimo, that Prince Gortchakow is under the impression "that Omer Pasha had promised to recommend to the Porte the recognition of the independence of Montenegro," I think it right to state that I am not aware that his Highness has undertaken to recommend anything of the sort.

On my mentioning the subject to Aali Pasha, His Highness assured me that no such promise had been given by Omer Pasha. All that he undertook to do was to forward to the Porte a letter from the Prince of Montenegro offering to co-operate in the pacification of the Herzegovina, provided the Porte would recognize the Prince's independence, would grant him an increase of territory, and would add the port of Spizza to Montenegro.

It was clearly the duty of Omer Pasha to acquaint his Government with the Prince of Montenegro's proposals, but it is most improbable that he should have recommended their acceptance.

I have, &c.
(For Sir H. Bulwer),
(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

No. 533.

Earl Russell to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 94.) *Foreign Office, March 26, 1862.*

My Lord,

I INCLOSE for your information copy of a despatch respecting Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 534.

Earl Russell to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 95.) *Foreign Office, March 26, 1862.*

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your information, copies of despatches respecting revolutionary movements in the European provinces of Turkey.†

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 535.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 327.) *Foreign Office, March 26, 1862.*

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches‡ upon the subject of Montenegro.§

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

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* No. 532. † Nos. 511, 527, and 529. ‡ Nos. 527, 530, and 532.

No. 536.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 135.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, March 27, 1862.*

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a report from Mr. Oliphant, respecting the state of affairs in Dalmatia and the Herzegovina.*

I also inclose a copy of a despatch from Earl Cowley, reporting a conversation which he had with M. Thouvenel upon the same subject.†

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 537.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 137.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, March 27, 1862.*

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, copies of two despatches from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna,‡ respecting the alleged endeavours of the French Ambassador at Constantinople to obtain from the Turkish Government the cession of a port for the use of the Montenegrins.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 538.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received March 27.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, March 27, 1862, 1·30 P.M.*

WE heard from Ricketts some few days since that the Montenegrins had withdrawn from Grenitza, and were desirous for peace. Consuls of Russia, France, and Austria, however, write from Scutari that on the 23rd Turks were beaten by Montenegrins in attempt to rescue Bashi-Bazouks surrounded at Grenitza. Their loss estimated at some hundreds, and condition of beleaguered considered hopeless.

It is difficult to estimate the relative value of conflicting statements, but Porte has also received news of defeat at Grenitza, and orders are sent to make every effort for relief of besieged.

No. 540.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 129.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, March 21, 1862.*

BELIEVING that I acted in conformity with your Lordship's wishes, I have again drawn the attention of Prince Gortchakow to the affairs of the Herzegovina.

I said that Her Majesty's Government had seen the decline of the insurrection in that province with satisfaction, but that they apprehended the return of summer might produce a renewal of disorders. I added that I felt confident that Her Majesty's Government would highly value the use of any influence which his Excellency would exert in maintaining tranquillity.

The Prince replied that the counsels of Russia had always been for the preservation of peace; "We tell them," he said, "remain quiet, remain quiet, (calmez vous, calmez vous);" but there were great difficulties which prevented the submission of the population now in arms. Among these difficulties, the chief one was the want of confidence inspired by Omer Pasha, and Prince Gortchakow qualified the Pasha as a man entirely without morality and faith. If the Porte, he said, employed another Pasha, and there were good Pashas to be found, the insurgents would be more easily conciliated.

I asked Prince Gortchakow to what terms he thought the insurgents would accede?

* Inclosure in No. 527. † No. 529. ‡ Nos. 524 and 530.

He said they stood for a local administrative independence, extending to three tribes in contact with Montenegro, subject to a tribute to the Porte. Omer Pasha had made to Vukalovitch high pecuniary offers which that primitive man had rejected; the Pasha had also proposed to make him Governor of the tribes on the territory referred to, but those overtures had not been acceptable, probably on account of the deep distrust attached to the promises of the Turkish Commander.

Prince Gortchakow could not name or define the tribes and districts alluded to above, nor did he seem to be at all accurately informed either of the late negotiations between the Pasha and the rebels, or of the topographical and social conditions of the country.

One of the difficulties belonging to a discussion with Prince Gortchakow on Eastern affairs is his want of exact knowledge in those matters. His study of the East is recent and hasty; his predictions are usually refuted by the result. He certainly thought the withdrawal of the French troops from Syria would be followed by a new massacre of the Christians, but the Lebanon has remained perfectly quiet. He has certainly held that the outbreak in Herzegovina would extend to Bosnia, Servia, and Bulgaria, and be the signal of a general Christian revolt, but the insurrection has dwindled to a local discontent. He still believes that Turkey is on the eve of dissolution. If the European peace be preserved, the event will prove, as after 1832 and 1840, that it has the elements of recovery and consolidation.

The conversation degenerated into a desultory dispute respecting the condition of the Christians, and the part which the several Governments of Europe have taken in protecting them and improving their condition, the Prince naturally claiming the first place for Russia, and I contending for Her Majesty's Government, and under it for the long, zealous, and humane exertions of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

In the course of this controversy I remarked upon the inconsistency which the Government of Russia would exhibit should it encourage attempts at political regeneration in Turkey by revolution and violence, when it advocated patience and subjection elsewhere under established authority.

The Prince took up this warmly. He said that there were extremities of tyranny which justified resistance. When all is at stake, he said, wife, child, house, faith,—when the first conditions of social existence are violated,—then men find a courage and a duty in despair, and are bound to make every sacrifice to recover the rights which belong to human nature.

I said to the Prince that I heartily concurred with him in that opinion, and that the right of popular resistance was a question of fact, degree, and prudence. Into the provocations offered by the Turkish authority in past times on the scene of the present insurrection I was not qualified to enter, but that I held no rebellion was justifiable which was not warranted both by commensurate wrongs and by a prospect of success. In the present case the wrongs could be corrected by pacific remedies, and the success was impossible. I was no doubt deeply interested in the preservation of Turkey, and I believed in it, but I spoke to him now, not as the friend of Turkey, but as the friend of the Christians of Herzegovina, who were embarked in a hopeless and disastrous enterprise; and not only so, but as the true friend of Montenegro too, which would soon be exposed to the just resentment of the Sultan and to the attack of his victorious forces.

I cannot flatter myself that I produced much impression on Prince Gortchakow, but the course of events has, I think, produced some impression on him. He is evidently becoming concerned for the fate of his coreligionists in Herzegovina, and he must deplore a movement which is destined to be quenched in their ruin and blood.

The animosity which Prince Gortchakow betrays towards Omer Pasha places us on our guard against some movement at the Porte to the prejudice of that officer. Whatever the moral character of the Pasha may be (and it is certainly not unreproached) he is an able, prudent, humane administrator and commander.

The Porte will, no doubt, see in the jealousy of Russia a motive for maintaining the Pasha in his present arduous position.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 541.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received March 29.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, March 29, 1862, 6 P.M.*

I FIND it very difficult to give a clear account of the state of things on the Montenegrin frontier. But the story of the Turks is that the Montenegrins at one or two places passed the border, and that the Turks will consequently attack the Montenegrins at any place they judge proper, not to alter ultimately the limits assigned to Montenegro, but to create a diversion in favour of those places attacked by the Montenegrins, and as the natural consequence of the war begun by the latter.

I shall see the Representatives this evening, and Fuad Pasha to-morrow, on the subject.

No. 542.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received March 31.)

(No. 130.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, March 22, 1862.*

THE Turkish Minister has received a despatch from his Government under date of the 5th of March, respecting the participation of the Montenegrins in the insurrection of Herzegovina.

It would appear from the statement of the Porte that in a convention of the insurgent and Montenegrin Chiefs held at Cettigné, Vukalovitch had been formally deposed, and that a certain Duzi, a priest, had been elected leader of the rebellion. At the same time three districts—Zubzi, Causevic, and Drazovic—had been placed under the authority of Pero Matovitch, a Montenegrin monk, and had promised allegiance to the Prince of the Mountain and obedience to the Montenegrin laws. From these incidents the Turkish Government demonstrate the duplicity of the Prince and his real hostility to the Porte. They express their confidence that such conduct will deserve the reprobation of all the Cabinets friendly to the Sultan, and they declare that they are exonerated from that consideration (*ménagements*) for the Prince of Montenegro which they had hitherto practised.

This despatch Halil Bey has imparted to Prince Gortchakow and has held up to his Excellency the prospect that Omer Pasha might be prompted to march against Montenegro, which was constantly and actively fomenting the insurrection in the adjoining territory of the Sultan. He stated, however, that it was no part of the policy of the Porte to do so except as a matter of unavoidable necessity; he took it upon himself to engage that, if the Russian Government would guarantee the absolute tranquillity and neutrality of Montenegro, the Porte would abstain from making war against that country.

Prince Gortchakow having replied that he could not offer such a guarantee, Halil Bey declared that even if the Emperor would engage to use all his influence to keep the Prince of Montenegro quiet, the Porte would suspend operations, under the condition, however, that should the Montenegrins hereafter give new cause of offence, the action of the Porte should not be embarrassed by any remonstrances on the part of Russia.

This overture was also unsatisfactory to Prince Gortchakow. His Excellency, however, stated to Halil Bey that the Turkish forces having now got the decided upper hand, might be contented with suppressing the insurrection with as little effusion of blood as possible, and might abstain from attacking the Montenegrins, whose conduct he extenuated on the ground of the ungovernable sympathy which they naturally entertained for their co-religionists in arms against the oppressive Government of the Turks.

The Turkish Minister having obligingly imparted these particulars to me, and having consulted me as to any further steps which he might take in the interest of his Government, I submitted to him my impression that he should not accept any promises or engagements of any sort on the part of the Russian Government at present without the orders of the Porte, but preserve for his Government an absolute liberty of action

against Montenegro; the overtures which he had made to Prince Gortchakow could, however, I said, do no harm, but the reverse, as they had been guarded, and had proved his conciliatory views and his desire by every means to avoid the effusion of blood. It was not, I added, that I advised the Porte to attempt the reduction of Montenegro; I was, on the contrary, under a personal impression (which might be erroneous) that the Porte would do well, with the mediation of the Powers, to enter into regular relations of pacific correspondence with Montenegro; but the conduct of the Montenegrins had been so offensive and the pretensions of the Russians to the protection of that country so exorbitant, that the Porte should in absolute freedom calmly consider their duty and their power in this matter, and without any spirit of vengeance or irritation deliberate whether to make war or not, taking the advice of Her Majesty's Government and Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

Halil Bey then showed me a telegram which he had just received from the Turkish Minister at Vienna reporting that Omer Pasha had occupied Zubzi, but that all attempts to arrest the effusion of blood had been frustrated by the intrigues of the Russian Consul at Ragusa.

Halil Bey asked me whether I thought he ought to lay this complaint before Prince Gortchakow.

I replied that I thought not without the orders of his Government. The imputation was a serious one; it was not supported by any proofs. Prince Gortchakow might resent it and fix some disagreeable correspondence on him with reference to it. I thought it was better to wait for written information and the instructions of his Government.

The Turkish Minister, who has a great sense of the dignity and rights of his Government, is, I think, favourable to the notion of inflicting a serious lesson on the Montenegrins and taking guarantees from them of better behaviour in future. His Excellency holds that the disorders in Herzegovina cannot be thoroughly eradicated without striking at the source and head of the movement in the Mountain. I am no competent judge of this matter. No dispassionate observer can dispute the right of the Sultan to chastise the Montenegrins, but as soon as Omer Pasha moves in that direction, we may be prepared to hear from the Russian and French Embassies at Constantinople a concert of expostulations and apologies to which the Porte will bend as usual, unless vigorously supported by your Lordship and the Government of Austria.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 544.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

Foreign Office, March 31, 1862.

(Telegraphic.)

YOU will take care not to interfere about Montenegro, unless the Sultan and the Prince both wish it. The Prince has now made open war, and ought to be made to receive a Turkish garrison at Cettigné; but to that neither France nor Russia will consent.

No. 545.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 347.)

Foreign Office, March 31, 1862.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches upon the subject of the state of affairs in Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 546.

Consul Ricketts to Earl Russell.—(Received April 2.)

(No. 16.)

My Lord,

Scutari, March 21, 1862.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, inclosed to your Lordship, the copy of a despatch dated Scutari, March 17, 1862, and addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, relative to the intrigues of the clergy in this province.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS

Inclosure in No. 546.

Consul Ricketts to Sir H. Bulwer.

Sir,

Scutari, March 17, 1862.

IN a former despatch to your Excellency I mentioned that the Abbé Krasnik and the Bishop of Allessio were endeavouring to create disaffection among some of the Latin tribes.

A few remarks relative to the conduct of these personages will suffice to show your Excellency that their presence, like that of Hassan Hotti, is by no means conducive to the tranquillity of this province.

The Bishop of Allessio has, during the last five years, prevented the inhabitants of the village of Kalmet from paying any taxes whatever to the Government; he patronizes brigandage in his district, and has lately endeavoured to persuade the people of Miridit to remain neutral in the forthcoming campaign against the Montenegrins. But notwithstanding the earnestness displayed by the clergy to subvert the people from their allegiance to their Sovereign, it is curious to observe that the Latin population are by no means evilly disposed to the Government, and that they live on terms, so to say, of friendship with the Mussulmans.

I must here remark that the Prince of Miridit was for a long time past considered as the stanch friend and ally of the Abbé and the Bishop. Had he continued to act in accordance with the views of these persons, one may rest assured that the Porte would have been deprived of the services of the Miridits at the present moment.

As soon as Rashid Pasha had succeeded in establishing more friendly relations with Bib Dodo Pasha by ordering him to receive a portion of his arrears of salary, these two dignitaries of the church began to fear their cause would be deserted by the Prince, that their influence would decline, and their projects of revolution fall to the ground. They soon perceived that the Prince had become favourably disposed to the Turks, and the only chance of success left to them for the accomplishment of their schemes seemed to be to embroil, if possible, the Prince with his subjects. Accordingly the Abbé Krasnik had the people summoned together at the village of Spatz, and he there exerted his powers of oratory in trying to excite these simple mountaineers to revolt against their Chief. This plan proved unsuccessful, and the Abbé was himself dismissed from his diocese. Thus the Prince of Miridit was brought into collision with the clergy; and thus this revolutionary club, which had flourished so long under the auspices of M. Hecquard, has now been partly broken up and its power of effecting evil greatly diminished.

About a month ago the Governor of Scutari requested Bib Dodo Pasha to supply him with 3,000 irregular troops; Bib Dodo Pasha then assured the Governor that he was perfectly ready to bring this number of men into the field whenever required; but when the moment arrived, and the Pasha requested him to occupy a post on the frontier with 1,000 men, he objected to obey the orders of the Governor, and it was only after he had received the whole of his arrears of salary that he was finally prevailed upon to fulfil the promises which he had previously made. Be this as it may, since the receipt of his salary he appears to be on the best of terms with the authorities, and has now taken his departure for Miridit for the purpose of executing the orders of the Governor.

As soon as it was known that the Prince of Miridit had finally determined to co-operate with the Turkish forces, M. Slubani, the French Interpreter, called on his

* Nos. 541 and 544.

Excellency; he recommended him to take care how he offended the Prince of Montenegro, and assured him that the latter would not easily pardon such an act of hostility. This attempt on the part of the French Interpreter to intimidate the Prince, and thus prevent his entering on the campaign against the Montenegrins (whether made in pursuance of instructions from M. Wiet it is not easy to say), does not quite correspond with the language held by the French Consul on other occasions; for, in a conversation with my Austrian colleague, he assured him only the other day that he had received the strictest injunctions from M. Thouvenel not to interfere in any way whatever either with the Turks or Montenegrins.

The fact, however, of his having purchased three cargoes of grain for the use of the people of the Mountain is not altogether in accordance with the principles of non-intervention which his Government pretends to advocate.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

No. 547.

Consul Ricketts to Earl Russell.—(*Received April 2.*)

(No. 17.) *Scutari, March* 21, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, inclosed to your Lordship, the copy of a despatch, dated Scutari, March 17, 1862, and addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, in which I inform his Excellency that certain preparations are being made at Ancona and Brindisi with a view of effecting a landing on some portion of this coast; and further, that an expedition is about to be undertaken against the tribe of the Wassovitch.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

Inclosure in No. 547.

Consul Ricketts to Sir H. Bulwer.

Scutari, March 17, 1862.

Sir,

HIS Excellency Ishmael Pasha left the day before yesterday for Antivari, where he will inspect the works now going on for the defence of that part of the frontier. I hear from my Austrian colleague that preparations are being carried on at Ancona and Brindisi with the view of making a descent on this coast. I am, however, enabled to obtain no information whatever relative to the number of men or ships collected at these places for this object—yet these are matters which deserve the serious attention of the Austrian and Turkish Governments. Under the circumstances it would be advisable for a gun-boat to remain stationed at Antivari.

I am further informed that 10,000 irregular troops will in a few days be called out for service on this frontier, and that operations will be commenced against the tribe of the Wassovitch.

Hussein Pasha will be intrusted with the command of this expedition.

Any movement, however, against the Wassovitch will require to be undertaken with the greatest caution, inasmuch as they are almost certain to be assisted by their neighbours the Montenegrins. Should it so happen that the Montenegrins go to the rescue of the Wassovitch, the Turks will then be compelled to enter Montenegro.

Omer Pasha has no doubt foreseen these consequences, and hence his instructions for assembling so large a force on this frontier. Large quantities of provisions will be necessarily required for the use of the troops who are likely to be engaged on this expedition, but how the provisions will be conveyed from the borders of the Lake of Scutari to the interior in a country, which is by no means bountiful in the means of transport, it is difficult to say. The organization of a land transport corps would certainly enable Omer Pasha's army to be rendered far more mobile than it is at present.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

No. 548.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 356.) *Foreign Office, April* 2, 1862.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches upon the subject of Montenegro and the Herzegovina.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 549.

Consul Stuart to Earl Russell.—(*Received April* 4.)

(No. 6.) *Janina, March* 20, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship copy of a despatch dated 20th March, that I have addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
(Signed) R. STUART.

Inclosure in No. 549.

Consul Stuart to Sir H. Bulwer.

Janina, March 20, 1862.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that Ferik (Cherkess) Ali Pasha arrived here on the 16th instant, to take command of the troops in Epirus. Ali Pasha is in the prime of life, appears to be intelligent, and is reputed to be an honest man. He is married to a Turkish lady of Janina, and has already served in this country. Thus far, therefore, a judicious selection has been made. On the same day, Lieutenant-Colonel Mehmet Bey arrived here, having been sent expressly by the Sadrazam to examine and report upon the military defences of the country. On the 17th instant I called on the Governor of the Province, who told me that orders had been given to embody four battalions of Albanian Redif, and that 1,000 irregulars from Delvins were on the road for Janina. He further told me that he was in communication with six of the most influential Beys of Lower Albania with regard to contingents of men; he wants them to raise each 1,000, who are to be held in readiness for immediate service in the province. Some difficulties have arisen on this subject in respect to pay and allowances; they have not yet been settled, and the measure is still under consideration.

Within the last few days considerable quantities of corn have been bought on Government account and stored in the fort. There is an ample supply of ammunition in the central magazine as well as at Arta and Prevesa. I have heard that orders have been given to improve the state of the forts at the "Five Wells" and at Souli, and that three additional guns are to be sent to the latter place. Mezzovo is to be occupied by an adequate force of Albanians, as also the other important passes of the country, and the districts whence danger is apprehended are to be narrowly observed. If these measures be carried out the safety of this part of the country may, for the present, be ensured. At the same time I cannot but regret that 1,000 of the Albanian Bashi-Bazouks should so soon have been called upon to serve. Those men are amenable to no discipline; military service is considered by them as little else than an occasion for violence, outrage, and exaction; and though their presence in the country may awe the disaffected, it is likely to prove a fertile source of gratuitous evil. When I suggested

* No. 540 and 542.

to the Pasha that they should be assembled, I told him plainly that they ought not to be actually employed unless as a last resource. Now that four battalions of Redifs, say 4,000 men, are to be called out, it would, I think, be sufficient for the present, at least if they were to remain in readiness in their own districts.

The popular mind here is at present absorbed in the Greek movement, and sways with the varying intelligence that comes from that country. Yesterday the news of successes against the insurgents produced a general depression, on the other hand reports of military disaffection at Patras, Vostitza, Lamia, and other places have been received with avidity. I should also add that the Mirdites are spoken of as showing a disposition hostile to the Porte; and I am not disposed to disregard this rumour, from what I have lately heard of the activity of Russian and Greek emissaries in that quarter; and here I would take leave to remark upon the difficulties I have to contend with in not receiving authentic information of what is passing in Northern Albania and the disturbed provinces. Northern Albania is the keystone of Ottoman sovereignty in Europe, while Janina is one of its most important political positions. It was not, therefore, without good reason that they were originally united as one Consular jurisdiction; and I now feel the disadvantage of their separation. As yet the tranquillity of this country has not been disturbed. It is reported that numerous Greek agents are traversing the province, and that the robber chiefs of the border are again on the alert. The Etairists of Janina do not relax in their activity; they hold long conferences every night, and it is worthy of remark that they are in frequent communication with both the French and Russian Consulates. The question of greatest interest with both Turks and Christians at this moment is, "Will England interfere in the event of an insurrection in Western Roumelia?" I have told the Pasha that on that point I had received no instructions, but that in my private opinion the Porte ought not to count upon the aid of Her Majesty's Government in repressing domestic troubles.

I have, &c.

(Signed) R. STUART.

P.S.—It is reported that 600 of the Albanian irregulars have arrived at Janina.

R. S

No. 559.

Consul Ricketts to Earl Russell.—(Received April 4.)

(No. 18.) *Scutari, March 25, 1862.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit, herewith inclosed to your Lordship, the copy of a despatch addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, and dated Scutari, March 25, 1862, relative to the defeat of the Turks at the village of Grenitza and French intrigue in this province.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 559.

Consul Ricketts to Sir H. Bulwer.

Scutari, March 25, 1862.

Sir,

IN my despatch to your Excellency dated March 10, I alluded to the fact of the Prince Nikola having addressed a letter to the Pasha of Scutari, expressing an earnest desire for the establishment of peaceful relations with the Turks.

Before, however, the Pasha had returned an answer to this communication, the Turkish territory was again invaded by several thousand Montenegrins. One may therefore infer that the Prince himself had never the slightest intention of adhering to his promises, and that the letter in question was framed solely with the design of deception.

The result of this last invasion has proved most disastrous to the Turks. The

following is about as accurate an account of the events as I am enabled to obtain. It having been reported to the Governor, Raschid Pasha, that the Montenegrins had evacuated the village of Grenitza, Hassan Hotti, who was stationed at Shistan, was entrusted by the Civil Governor with the duty of reconnoitring the village above-mentioned. He was also instructed on no account to enter Grenitza until he had received orders to that effect. Contrary, however, to the instructions given him, he took it, apparently, upon himself to occupy that place with some 600 mountaineers. No sooner had he done this than fires were lighted on the hills as a signal for the attack, and in a short time Hassan Hotti and his band were surrounded by some 5,000 Montenegrins.

As soon as the danger of their position was made known at Scutari, numerous detachments of Bashi-Bazouks were sent off (in all, as far as I am able to learn, to the number of some 2,500 men) to the relief of the besieged. But as there were no officers to lead them, and there was a want of concert and combination in their movements, they were beaten in detail, some 300 of them were slain, and the remainder saved themselves by flight. Thus the besieged were left unrelieved, and their ammunition and provisions being expended, they were compelled to render themselves prisoners to the Montenegrins. These transactions took place during Ismail Pasha's absence. The expedition in question seems to have been conducted carelessly and slovenly; the cause of the misfortune must be attributed as much to the paucity of troops engaged on the part of the Turks as to the disobedience of orders committed by Hassan Hotti; and while the military administration at Scutari remains in its present disorganized and confused state, it will be next to impossible for any military operations to be conducted either with credit to the General, or advantage to the Government. The Porte will begin to see, but probably when it is too late, the necessity there is that some arrangements should be made for the organization of its irregular troops in this province.

How far Raschid Pasha, in this instance, trespassed on the authority of the military Governor, I am not prepared to say, but it would appear to be far more beneficial to the interests of the Porte if the Civil Pasha were not entrusted with the power of interference in any way whatever with military transactions; and, if Omer Pasha is desirous that his own plans should be carried out with some chance of success, he must also insist that no offensive operations shall be undertaken without the express order and sanction of the General commanding on this frontier.

According to the system existing at Scutari, the Civil Governor is compelled to attend to many of those duties from which he ought to be entirely exempt. For instance, he is answerable for the payment and rationing of the Bashi-Bazouks, it is through his orders also they are summoned out for the defence of the frontier; thus most of his time is wasted in attending to things with which he ought not to be concerned, the civil and political affairs are more or less subject to be neglected, and the business of one department is so inextricably involved with the business of the other that an indescribable confusion prevails in every part of the administration. Your Excellency will observe that the system which has hitherto existed of intrusting military affairs in the hands of the civil authority is an evil which must sooner or later be remedied, but how or by what means such a change can be brought about is a subject for the serious consideration of the Porte.

The Montenegrins have now burnt the village of Shistan; Scutari is still without any troops, and there is nothing as far as I can see to prevent the Montenegrins, if they had the courage, from marching upon Scutari and taking possession of the fortress.

French agency has apparently taken advantage of the defeat of the Turks at the present moment to foment intrigues among the Latin population; and the Pasha told me to day that M. Slubani, the Interpreter of the French Consulate, has been actively engaged in encouraging the Latin mountaineers not to fight against the Montenegrins. The Austrian Consul also tells me that the Abbé Krasnik has been lately exhorting his congregation to remain in their mountains and not to fight on the side of the Turks; he implored them to follow his advice, and persuaded them they would be aided and assisted by France.

Your Excellency will, therefore, observe that there is a great external pressure acting at this moment upon this population, and everything tends to show that the tranquillity of the country will not be easily maintained.

I have also been informed that 5,000 revolutionists were supposed to have embarked on the 14th of this month at Ancona, with a view of attempting a landing on some portion of the coast of Albania. Eleven days have now elapsed and yet no information has been received relative to the route which this expedition has taken; the report might be false, but if not, and if it has in reality left Ancona, I should be inclined to believe

it had been directed towards the coast of Greece, in order to strengthen the hands of the insurgents in that country.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

No. 551.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received April 7.)

(No. 16. Political.) *Bosna-Serai, March* 21, 1862.

My Lord,

MR. ZOHRAB informs me that for some time past the Austrian Consul at Mostar, M. Martyrt, has been in such constant communication with his Highness Omer Pasha as to excite the attention of the other Consuls, particularly as his Highness appears to have pleaded indisposition as an excuse for refusing to see them when the Austrian Consul was admitted.

These consultations appear to have terminated in the expedition from Mostar of the Austrian Consular dragoman, M. Marco Marcovitch, to Piva and Cristatz, and of the Austrian Consular Agent at Trebigné to Zupzi, to communicate with the rebel Chiefs. Their mission has apparently terminated unfortunately. The Austrian Consular Agent has returned to Mostar; but M. Marcovitch, it is stated, died suddenly in the house of a priest at a village near Cristatz, under rather mysterious circumstances. No investigation, however, has been instituted, and the matter seems to have terminated with the celebration of a mass for the deceased at the Austrian Consulate.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 552.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received April 7.)

(No. 17. Political.) *Bosna-Serai, March* 21, 1862.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 11, Political, of the 13th February, inclosing copy of despatch from Mr. Vice-Consul Zohrab, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that Dervish Pasha has entered Zupzi with fourteen battalions, and is fortifying his position there.

In connection with this affair his Highness Omer Pasha telegraphed on the 13th instant to Osman Pasha that Luka Vukalovitch and Yovan Vassilier had surrendered; but this is contradicted by later news from Mostar.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 553.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received April 7.)

(No. 158.) *Vienna, April* 3, 1862.

My Lord,

COUNT RECHBERG continues to be anxious for news from Albania and Greece; but he seems rather more hopeful than he was as to the success of Omer Pasha in the Herzegovina; and he certainly places more confidence in him than in any other Commander to whom the Ottoman Government could have confided a task of pacification. His Excellency would, however, have entertained better hopes of his success if the negotiations with Luka Vukalovitch had not failed; and I regret to say that the latest reports which have reached him go to confirm the opinion which he has long entertained that a complete understanding is established between Paris and St. Petersburgh on the Montenegrin question, and that the efforts of the French and Russian Governments

are unremittingly directed to obtain from the Porte the cession of the harbour of Spizza.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 554.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 382.) *Foreign Office, April* 9, 1862.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches upon the subject of Montenegro and the Herzegovina.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 555.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received April 10.)

(No. 150. Confidential.) *St. Petersburgh, April* 3, 1862.

My Lord,

IN conformity with what I believe to be your Lordship's wishes, I stated to Prince Gortchakow unofficially yesterday that impressions reached Her Majesty's Government from various quarters that the Russian Agents in the Turkish provinces on the Adriatic had evinced sympathies for the insurgents now in arms, and for Christian discontents generally, which operated to the prejudice of the Porte and the maintenance of tranquillity. I said that I had faithfully reported to your Lordship that his Excellency had assured me that the language held by Russia in those parts was now, and had ever been, on behalf of moderation (calmez vous, calmez vous); but I feared the attitude of the Consul did not always respond to the wishes of the Minister. I was not directed by your Lordship to make any distinct complaint, or to name any one; but from other sources I heard that the Consul at Ragusa was most obnoxious to this imputation. I then said that an opportunity was now afforded in which his Excellency might use his good offices in the cause of humanity and peace. It was reported that a large force of Bashi-Bazouks had been taken prisoners at Grenitza by the Montenegrins, and sent up to Cettigné. This was a plain act of hostility which would alone justify reprisals on the part of the Porte; but if those people were put to death by the Montenegrins, such a proceeding would cover his co-religionists with disgrace, and would almost impose on the Turks the duty of avenging their fate. The Russian Government might now interfere, and, by advising the humane treatment and release of the captives, do both the Porte and the Montenegrins an essential service.

Prince Gortchakow stated in reply that it was true his advice to the insurgent Christians had been in favour of moderation; but making this recommendation he had also bid them trust in the efforts which the Representatives would make at Constantinople on their behalf. He did not believe that the agents of Russia could be charged with any other bias on behalf of the Christians than a sincere sympathy for their sufferings and a desire to see their condition improved; in those sentiments he himself heartily concurred. In regard to the recent incident at Grenitza, he said that it must not be confounded with the affairs to the north of Montenegro, in the Herzegovina. Grenitza was a village situated in the debatable borders of Montenegro and Albania; it was inhabited entirely by a Montenegrin orthodox population, though excluded by the last arrangement from the territory of the Prince; of the nature of the reported incident he had no exact information; he did not know whether the so-called Bashi-Bazouks were Albanians acting for themselves, or irregulars in the pay of Turkey; when better advised of the particulars of the case he would take his resolution, and he desired that it might be to mediate with the Prince of Montenegro on behalf of those people for their humane treatment and even for their liberation.

A great deal of desultory conversation ensued, in the course of which his Excellency informed me that as a practical remedy for the reigning disorders he had recommended two suggestions to the consideration of Halil Bey, the Turkish Minister here:

* Nos. 551 and 553, and Inclosures in Nos. 549 and 550.

first, that the Porte should in the parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina now tranquil introduce such reforms as might inspire the people still in arms with confidence and justify their submission; and, secondly, that Omer Pasha should be superseded, as he inspired a profound distrust, or rather, if the Porte could not dispense with his military services, that he should have at his side a Civil Commissioner charged with the pacification of the country.

To the removal of Omer Pasha I demurred, and, indeed, the Prince did not insist on it; and to the division of his functions, I objected the disadvantages and jealousies of separate and conflicting authorities.

In the course of the discussion I stated emphatically to Prince Gortchakow that should any disorders occur, as was anticipated, on the Adriatic and Austrian frontiers of Turkey in the coming spring, I was confident that Her Majesty's Government, in conjunction with the Porte and the Government of Vienna, would make every exertion in the limits of their rights and their power to maintain order, and that should the European peace continue I made not the least doubt of our eventual success. I also stated to his Excellency my impression that if the territory of the Porte were again disturbed by unprovoked attacks from Montenegro, the Porte might be moved as a matter of dignity and necessity to take serious measures to curb the aggressors, and that if the Russian Government continued to offer their intervention under these circumstances on behalf of Montenegro, both Her Majesty's Government and the English nation would end by seeing in this course of policy the renewal of a sort of protectorate dangerous and obnoxious to the Porte, and would stand by the latter in the vindication of its rights and honour. I recalled to the memory of the Prince the spirit which was aroused in Parliament at the time of the occupation of Syria by the French forces, and by these and other arguments I endeavoured to persuade the Prince that it was his interest and duty to discourage any attempts at Christian revolt, and to promote the establishment of honest and pacific relations between Montenegro and the Porte.

Prince Gortchakow warmly repudiated the right of England and Austria to interfere in the internal affairs of Turkey in the case of an insurrection, alleging the stipulations of Paris on behalf of his views, and contended that while he would not deny the theoretic claim of the Porte to make war on Montenegro, he could not see with indifference the oppression of that primitive Christian people, and that he, too, would find means—not violent or forbidden means—to mediate in its favour.

I learn this morning that after I left the Prince the Turkish Minister saw his Excellency, and made such cogent representations to him that he telegraphed last night to Vienna desiring that a message might be conveyed by the shortest channel advising the Prince of Montenegro to treat his captives with humanity.

I have also reason to believe that Prince Gortchakow has solicited the assistance of the French Government in arresting any serious attempt of the Turks against the Montenegrins.

Your Lordship is best informed of the views of the French Cabinet on that subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 556.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received April 10.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, April 3, 1862.*

A TELEGRAM has been forwarded by Prince Gortchakow to Montenegro requesting the Turkish prisoners may be well treated.

No. 557.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received April 10.)

(No. 152.) *St. Petersburgh, April 3, 1862.*

My Lord,

THE Turkish Minister informed me a few days since that he had received orders from his Government to state to Prince Gortchakow that they had no present intention of attacking Montenegro, and Prince Gortchakow told me that he appreciated this mark of good-will on the part of the Porte.

The position of the Porte has, however, been radically altered by the recent act of hostility on the part of the Government or people of Montenegro in capturing on Turkish ground, and carrying to Cettigné, a large force of Bashi-Bazouks treacherously allured to the village of Krinitza.

Halil Bey considers that his Government is no longer bound by their previous declaration, and that the ulterior action of the Porte will be determined by the conduct of Prince Danielo in connection with this incident.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 558.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 165.) *Foreign Office, April 10, 1862.*

Sir,

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches* from Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, on the subject of the affairs of the Herzegovina and of Montenegro.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 559.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received April 11.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, April 11, 1862, 7·30 P.M.*

A CIRCULAR dated the 9th instant will be communicated to your Lordship by the Turkish Ambassador as to Montenegro. Five days are given the Prince to assent to the following terms: not to assist the insurgents, to withdraw his people from Turkish territory, and to surrender unharmed the irregulars taken prisoners at Grenitza.

Should these terms be rejected, Omer Pasha is authorized to adopt such measures as may be necessary to obtain redress by force of arms without disturbing the existing state of things.

No. 560.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received April 12.)

(No. 148. Confidential.) *Constantinople, March 31, 1862.*

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 100 of the 8th instant, I had some conversation with Baron Prokesch on the subject of opening a communication with the sea to Montenegro through the Austrian territory.

The position of Austria as to Montenegro is very clear. It considers that, if Montenegro could, as an independent Power, reach the sea-coast, it would afford the means to Italy of revolutionizing Hungary and the Austrian provinces as well as those of Turkey, through which such a revolutionary movement would have to pass.

It would never willingly consent, therefore, to the port of Spitz being placed in the hands of the Montenegrins.

With regard to a communication with Montenegro through Austria, the case is of course different. This communication it now, in fact, encourages; arms, munitions, grain, all pass through Cattaro into Montenegro, and but recently the Austrians allowed the French to supply the Montenegrins in this manner.

But though Austria does this *proprio motu* and for her own interests, she would not very probably bind herself to do so through any engagement with a foreign Power, or especially through any engagement with the five Powers.

Could she and the Porte agree to any plan, there might be an understanding as to

* No. 540 and 542.

Montenegro between Austria and Turkey which might embrace different questions as to Montenegro, and the line of conduct to be pursued towards her. But I am not quite certain whether the Turkish Government would not entertain some jealousy with respect to linking Montenegro and Austria more closely together, nor what latitude the other Powers would allow the Porte in making separate arrangements with Austria.

If such separate arrangements would not be elsewhere objected to, and in a manner to render such a project as I am speaking of impossible, then, I think, the Cabinet of Vienna might be sounded on the subject, and if its views seemed practical, the Internuncio and I could support them here.

It is certain that a complete understanding between Austria and the Porte as to Montenegro would be most desirable for both parties, inasmuch as that Austria is placed in a false position by the continuance of the present struggle; her border population being all in favour of the insurrectionary party in the Herzegovina, and being generally animated by a deadly hatred to the Turks; whereas the general policy of Austria is to maintain firmly the Ottoman Empire.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

No. 562.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received April 12.)

(No. 157.) *Constantinople, April 2, 1862.*

My Lord,

THE accounts from Montenegro and the adjoining provinces as to the present struggle still continue so contradictory and confused that I hardly know what to state. We shortly since heard that the rebels in the Herzegovina had completely given over the contest, and that the Montenegrins themselves were desirous of peace.

The first news yet wants confirmation; and as to the second, the very reverse of what was at first said appears to be the truth.

As far, indeed, as I can learn as to this matter, the following would seem to be what has occurred:

By the arrangement made by the recent frontier delimitation, a large portion of the territory inhabited by the Vassovitchs was ceded to Turkey, but the people of that district have never accepted the stipulation. After long negotiations, Omer Pasha prepared a force to send into the country, but whilst a portion of this force was marched towards the territory in question another portion was brought to the frontier on the lower part of the lake, to prevent the Montenegrins attacking the Turkish territory in that quarter during the expedition. It was here, however, and at a small town, Grenitza, on a height above the lake, that the Montenegrins made their assault, passing into Turkey and taking prisoners 600 Albanians, who had been stationed in the village above-mentioned. The Montenegrins having thus clearly entered the Ottoman dominions, and made war on the Sultan, are exposed to the consequences of such an act.

It would appear, however, that the Turkish forces pursued their object with regard to the Vassovitchs, and gained a victory over them. This is the last intelligence.

Now hitherto the Turks have contented themselves with pursuing the Montenegrins when these have made inroads across their frontier as far as that frontier, and there leaving them; but it seems impossible to carry on a conflict, incessantly renewed by Montenegro, in this manner.

Moreover, the Montenegrins, able to choose their ground of attack, and perfectly free from any apprehension of assault themselves, have collected such forces in the quarter where the Turks are weakest, that it is said they may be able at this time to get possession of Spizza and Antivari.

The Ottoman Government, therefore, considers itself, not only justified, but, if necessary, called upon to reply to the aggressions of the Montenegrins on one side by attacking them on the other, and thus causing a natural diversion in favour of the places which, if they are left exposed to the whole force of Montenegro, as the Prince thinks proper to direct it, now on one side of the mountain, now on the other, to slaughter, ravage, and incendiarism, calamities from which it is the duty of a Government which has to provide for the security of its subjects to defend them.

My advice to the Ottoman Government will be to send a considerable force to Antivari, and to build works of some solidity on that strip of land which extends

between the sea and the lake, and which it is so important to this Government to keep possession of.

In the meantime I inclose to your Lordship, confidentially, the Porte's despatch to Rashid Pasha, communicated to me, confidentially, by Aali Pasha.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

Inclosure in No. 562.

The Grand Vizier to the Governor of Scutari (Albania).

(Telegram.) *March 25, 1862.*

YOUR three telegrams dated 24th March, N.S., have been received.

The unsatisfactory conclusion of the affairs of Grenitza is a subject of regret. The Seraskier has this evening written to the General of Brigade, Ahmed Pasha, directing him to assume the command himself, to collect some more troops from the neighbourhood, and to put himself in motion for the purpose of raising the siege in which the troops at Grenitza are placed. Should this measure be sufficient to dislodge the insurgents from Grenitza, and should it not become necessary to pass the frontier of the Mountain, we shall be very glad. But should a direct movement on Grenitza be insufficient for the purpose of dislodging the insurgents from Grenitza, and should the necessity and, indeed, obligation arise, as has been foreshadowed in one of your telegrams, of threatening a simultaneous attack on several points at once, as well as of harassing several villages near the frontier line of the Mountain, you will inform the Chief of the Mountain of his aggressive acts, and tell him in writing that, as he has openly sided with the rebels and passed our border, he will be attacked wherever it may appear necessary, even if the villages which have assisted the rebels are situated within the circle of the Mountain, not for the purpose of altering the arrangement which has been come to respecting the mountain, but as a natural consequence of the war he has himself declared. You will, at the same time, communicate this measure to the Consuls at Scutari, and thus proceed to the coercive measures contemplated against such villages of the Mountain as it may appear advisable; but the troops which will be directed against these villages must be regular troops or else Christians, and they must abstain from anything like pillage. It is most essential that such measures be adopted as will preserve these several divisions from danger on their respective marches.

You will show this telegram to Ahmed Pasha, and you will discuss the matter with him. As funds sufficient to meet the requirements of these measures will be sent to you, you may incur the necessary outlay.

No. 563.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 397.) *Foreign Office, April 12, 1862.*

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of two despatches* upon the subject of the state of affairs in Montenegro.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 564.

Consul Ricketts to Earl Russell.—(Received April 16.)

(No. 20.) *Scutari, April 4, 1862.*

My Lord.

I HAVE the honour to forward, herewith inclosed to your Lordship, the copy of a despatch dated Scutari, April 1, 1862, and addressed by me to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, relative to military operations on the Montenegrin frontier.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

Inclosure in No. 564.

Consul Ricketts to Sir H. Bulwer.

Scutari, April 1, 1862.

Sir,

THE defeat lately sustained by the Turkish irregulars at Grenitza has had for its result that the Montenegrins have slightly extended their territory; that the village of Shistan has been burnt; that Grenitza is still in their possession; and that the Turks have retired upon the village of Morik. This place, from its situation on the Lake of Scutari, is said to be easy of defence, inasmuch as the fire of the guns from the steamers can be brought to bear on the approaches to it.

Morik is now protected by two battalions of regular infantry, who were moved up there from Antivari to reinforce the irregular troops; these latter, both townspeople and mountaineers, have, however, deserted their post, and returned to their homes. Knowing that the Montenegrins were in some force at no great distance from Morik, and being aware that, if in possession of this place, the road to Scutari would be left entirely open to them, I drew the attention of the Governor to the necessity which there was of having it immediately placed in a state of defence, and I believe my recommendation has not been altogether neglected.

This village in question was also threatened by an attack from the Montenegrins, who withdrew from the neighbourhood as soon as the Turks had passed the frontier at Spuz. Had the Turks been reduced solely to the defensive, the Montenegrins would have been enabled to have continued their ravages to a far greater extent in this direction than they have done, and it would have been almost impossible to have impeded their movements, inasmuch as there were no reserves stationed at Scutari.

In my despatch dated March 10, I informed your Excellency that Omer Pasha had issued orders to Ishmail Pasha to the effect that the Turkish troops should be permitted to enter Montenegro if the Montenegrins happened to invade the Turkish territory. Such being the case, it is difficult to understand on what grounds the Porte deemed it advisable to rescind the order in question. The Governor, seeing the danger to which the country would be exposed if the counter-orders were carried into execution, called upon me, and asked my advice upon the subject. I begged him to refer the matter again to his Government, and promised him that I would telegraph to your Excellency.

I then called on the Austrian Consul, and persuaded him to telegraph to his Embassy

* No. 557 and 559.

on the subject. I am now happy to state that the counter-orders of the Porte have been cancelled, and I conclude your Excellency has been the means of inducing the Porte to alter its previously inopportune decision. There is also another point which I wish to bring to the consideration of your Excellency, and that is the necessity of a moveable column being stationed at Scutari or Antivari. This is a subject which has been repeatedly brought to the notice of the Porte by Ishmail Pasha, but which seems so far to have met with little attention.

Now, I have every reason to believe that the neglect of this measure will be the means of creating no little delay and embarrassment to the operations contemplated by Omer Pasha. A slight explanation of the intended movements of Omer Pasha, together with a knowledge of the preparations made by the Montenegrins, will be sufficient to show that these observations are not altogether without some foundation.

As far as I am able to learn, the intention of Omer Pasha is to attack the Montenegrins on the side of the Herzegovina, while Hussein Pasha occupies their attention on the east near the district of the Wassevitch.

In order to facilitate these manœuvres it is necessary for a serious diversion to be created also on this line of frontier; for if this could be effected, the Montenegrins, being compelled to keep their forces divided, would not be able to concentrate their entire strength either against Omer Pasha or Hussein Pasha's divisions. In short, the success of Omer Pasha's movements depends greatly on the manner in which military operations are conducted at Scutari.

Now I have just heard that the Montenegrin army, consisting of some 20,000 men, is divided into three divisions, one of which is to act against Omer Pasha, one is to assist the Wassevitch against Hussein Pasha, and a third is employed on the south against any attack from the side of Scutari. There is, therefore, some system in the movements of these mountaineers; they are not scattered about the country in detached parties, but they move in masses, and have this advantage in their favour, that they are enabled, owing to the shape of the country and the contour of its hills, to concentrate their forces with the greatest rapidity on any point which may be threatened. These arrangements are also superintended more or less by a Russian officer of Engineers—a certain Colonel Bikoff, who has resided for some time past in Montenegro. Now, if the Montenegrins begin to discover that there is no danger to be apprehended from the side of Scutari, their forces in the south will be most probably united with those in the east, and Hussein Pasha will find that he has to deal with 12,000 Montenegrins in addition to the tribe of the Wassevitch. Hence the necessity of a moveable column of some 8,000 men being stationed at some place on this frontier. Whether, however, Scutari or Antivari would be the most suitable station for such a corps is a matter for the consideration of the General commanding. Still the fortress of Scutari ought not to be left without a competent garrison, and we may therefore reckon that an additional force of some 10,000 men is required for the prosecution of military operations on this side of Montenegro.

The next point to be regarded is whether the Porte could rely on the goodwill and services of the inhabitants of Scutari and its mountains for the formation of such a force. To this it may be answered that these irregular troops, in their present state of disorganization, are of very little utility to the Government; and here I must observe that, although previously to the defeat at Grenitza they obeyed the summons of the Governor, and took the field without manifesting any signs of discontent, yet, terrified by a slight reverse, and encouraged by the intrigues of foreign emissaries, they have now retired to their mountains, and it remains to be seen whether they will be easily induced to take up arms again in defence of their country. As with the people of Scutari, so it is with the people of Miridit. A faction has been apparently raised against the Prince of that district by the Abbé Krasnik, who has been again permitted to return to his diocese; and although Bib Dodo Pasha seems desirous of assisting the Turkish Government in the present crisis, he has not as yet been able to overcome the rebellious spirit of a portion of his subjects. He has, however, written a letter to the Governer, explanatory of his conduct, and accusing the Abbé of intriguing and exciting the people to revolt against his authority; but he has not as yet made his appearance at Scutari. Under the circumstances, the Pasha would be hardly justified in depending any longer on the promises of Bib Dodo Pasha or in waiting until the differences are settled between him and the Abbé. He has already communicated his opinion on this subject to his Government, and he tells me that a number of troops will ere long arrive here from other places. He has also ordered the Prince to investigate thoroughly the conduct of the Abbé, and to report to him immediately on the matter. Foreign influence has so far obtained its object that disturbances have been set on foot in the district of Miridit, and

these people have been prevented, at all events for the moment, lending their services to the Sultan, which they are bound to do according to the laws of the country; the consequence of which is that the Porte is now compelled to draw its troops from other places for the defence of this part of its territory. The Russian Consul seems to take an especial interest in the fate of Hassan Hotti. He has written to the Prince Nikola, requesting him to take the greatest care of that rebel; and I should not be surprised if he did not exert his influence at Constantinople to get him sent back to Scutari.

The party of Hassan Hotti have, I am happy to say, lost all their influence in the Council. The Pasha and the Porte have been opportunely relieved from a dangerous enemy, and the present would therefore seem to be a not unfavourable moment for the Government to assert its authority over the people of this province. The Montenegrins have lately burnt three villages in the district of Sputz.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

No. 565.

Earl Russell to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 112.) *Foreign Office, April* 16, 1862.
My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your information, copies of despatches respecting Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 566.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 408.) *Foreign Office, April* 16, 1862.
My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches upon the subject of Montenegro and the Herzegovina.†

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 567.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 176.) *Foreign Office, April* 16, 1862.
Sir,

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 148 of the 31st ultimo, suggesting that an arrangement might possibly be come to between Austria and the Porte by which a communication with the sea should be granted to Montenegro; and I have to instruct you to communicate confidentially with the Internuncio upon this matter and to report to me the result.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 568.

Earl Russell to Lord Napier.

(No. 72.) *Foreign Office, April* 16, 1862.
My Lord,

WITH reference to your Excellency's conversation with Prince Gortchakow, reported in your despatch No. 150 of the 3rd instant, on the subject of the policy of Russia in the Turkish provinces on the Adriatic, I have to remark that, with regard to any internal disorders of Turkey, Her Majesty will always consult with her allies as to any step to be taken.

But with reference to foreign expeditions from without to disturb Turkey and aid the Sultan's rebellious subjects, Her Majesty's Government will consider themselves

* Nos. 560 and 561.

† Nos. 555 and 568.

authorized, if they should so think fit, to act singly and to intercept them and drive them back.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 569.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received April 19.)

(No. 172.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, April* 9, 1862.

THERE have been for some days past some rather violent and menacing articles in the "Journal de Constantinople" (a Government paper) concerning the intentions of Turkey as to Montenegro and the preparations making against it.

I cannot say I saw any advantage in these articles, which provoke comments and misinterpretations abroad—articles which, if the Ottoman Government does not act up to them, are mere braggadocio, and which, if it does, are not required.

I stated this opinion to Aali Pasha, who quite agreed with me; but, as they have continued, I presume they are agreeable to the Sultan, who is exceedingly indignant at the recent defeat of the Turkish troops.

Agreeing with M. de Moustier about these articles, I did not agree with him as to the policy or the advisability of giving counsel to the Porte as to how it should proceed at the present juncture.

When it was understsod that the insurgents in the Herzegovina were about to lay down their arms—which it is said, justly or unjustly, that they did not do on account of the representations of the Russian Consul, and when the Montenegrins, as it was also asserted, were about to evacuate the positions they occupied on the Turkish territory and seemed desirous of peace—then, indeed, if such reports had been true, and the Ottoman Government had insisted on war and vengeance, I could, I think, with propriety have advised a course of conciliation and moderation. But directly after the Montenegrins have attacked and burnt Turkish villages and carried off as prisoners Turkish troops who were in those villages, it seems to me difficult to tell the Turkish Government—which is bound to protect its troops and its people—to be particularly peaceful and good-natured. On the other hand, I should not wish to take the responsibility of urging the Porte to adopt hostile measures.

I have carefully abstained, therefore, from giving any advice on the subject.

The French Ambassador asked me if I had no instructions, and seemed to think I had been instructed to advise the Turks to enter into some plan of pacification with Montenegro. Had I even received such instructions previous to recent events, it is doubtful whether I should still have considered them applicable; but I told M. de Moustier the truth, that I had received no other instructions than to abstain altogether from interfering in Montenegrin affairs until both the Prince and the Sultan should desire such interference, before which time, indeed, all interference would be useless. M. de Moustier told me that M. de Thouvenel had recently advised Prince Nicholas to abstain from all acts of aggression, and that in the same spirit he should now advise the Turks to be cautious before bringing matters to extremities.

Had the Montenegrins listened to M. de Thouvenel's wise and impartial advice, I certainly think the French Government would have been in no small degree bound to insist on pressing similar advice on the Porte, and that the Porte would have been bound to listen to it. But if the French Government tells Prince Nicholas to be peaceful, and he replies by burning hamlets, taking prisoners, and cutting throats, the fact that such advice was vainly given to one party is unfortunately no argument for its being accepted by the other.

As the matter now stands, Omer Pasha has required—

1. That the Montenegrins should withdraw from all places within the Turkish limits; and

2. Give adequate satisfaction and explanations as to the violations of the Turkish territory that have recently taken place.

If the answer of the Prince is sufficient to explain or atone for what has occurred, and furnishes some security against similar outrages, all will end quietly; if not, I expect that the Turks, who are preparing forces for the purpose, will attack Montenegro at different points, but that they will declare they do not intend to subjugate Montenegro nor increase their own territory, but simply to place some check on the aggressions they

have been subject to, and force the Montenegrins to withdraw within their own frontiers.

I am, of course, in favour of peaceable arrangements, but I think these cannot take place till both parties desire it and the Montenegrins adopt a different line of conduct.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

No. 570.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received April 18.)

(No. 173. Confidential.)
Constantinople, April 9, 1862.

My Lord,

AALI PASHA has informed me that the Russian Envoy, in the course of a visit he paid his Highness on the 5th instant, took occasion to refer to the state of things in Montenegro, and endeavoured, as far as possible, to palliate the course pursued by Prince Nicholas.

His Highness stated, in reply, that things had now come to such a pass that the Porte could no longer tolerate the repeated aggressions committed by the Montenegrins; either it must declare war against Montenegro as an independent State, or it must proceed to coerce its rebellious vassal; but without sacrificing its dignity and honour the Porte could not remain a passive spectator of these outrages.

"We have no intention," said His Highness, "of making any change in the existing position of Montenegro, or to encroach in any way upon its territory; our sole object is to put a stop to the cold-blooded outrages daily committed by the mountaineers and to secure the safety and quiet of the inhabitants of the villages within our frontier. Under these circumstances he felt no doubt that the Porte would, in the eyes of Europe, be justified in having recourse to extreme measures against Montenegro."

The Prince, he considered, was very ill-advised by his friends, and if these friends were really interested on his behalf they would do well to urge the Prince not to persist in the dangerous policy he had hitherto followed.

Prince Labanoff made no reply to these remarks beyond stating that he was confident the Prince of Montenegro would do his utmost to prevent his people from making incursions on Turkish territory, and his Excellency expressed a hope that the Porte would eventually come to an understanding with the Prince.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

No. 571.

Earl Russell to Lord Napier.

(No. 79.)
Foreign Office, April 10, 1862.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE herewith, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches* relative to the state of affairs in the Herzegovina.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 572.

Earl Russell to Lord Napier.

(No. 83.)
Foreign Office, April 19, 1862.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE herewith, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a despatch† from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople on the state of affairs in Montenegro.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

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* Nos. 558 and 562.

† No. 570.

No. 573.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 427.)
Foreign Office, April 19, 1862.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copy of a despatch* upon the subject of Montenegro.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 574.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received April 20.)

(Telegraphic.)
Constantinople, April 20, 1862, 2 P.M.

INTERNUNCIO has intelligence of engagement on 17th in Duga Pass, near Nichsich, in which Turks completely defeated insurgents and Montenegrins, killing 500 and capturing quantity of arms.

No. 575.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 18. Political.)
Bosna Serai, April 4, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch of the 29th March, from Mr. Vice-Consul Zohrab, regarding a skirmish which lately occurred in the district of Zupzi between the Turkish troops and the rebels, and terminated in favour of the former.

As yet matters in the Herzegovina appear to be progressing very quietly, but the Turks evidently gain ground, and the rebels seem proportionately disheartened.

Your Lordship will remark that the fortifications in Zupzi are nearly completed; thus this district, which has for a long time been entirely in the hands of the rebels, may now be considered as permanently occupied by the Sultan's troops.

These successes are doubtless satisfactory to a certain extent, but, unless the Porte contemplates the indefinite occupation of the Herzegovina in an uninhabited and unproductive condition at an enormous expense, and the further ruin of Bosnia and the surrounding provinces, it must address itself most speedily and earnestly to the real question, its relations with Montenegro; for until that country is either induced or compelled to respect the Turkish frontiers, and become, if not a friendly, at least a peaceable neighbour, I see no probability of any reduction of the forces now in the Herzegovina, or any mitigation of the burdens attending actual warfare.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure in No. 575.

Vice-Consul Zohrab to Consul Holmes.

Mostar, March 29, 1862.

Sir,

I HAVE to report that on the 24th instant a body of Bashi-Bazouks, while out foraging in the rebel district of Zupzi, were attacked by a band of insurgents and Montenegrins. Three battalions of infantry, under the command of Colonel Mahmood Bey (Friand), an officer who is, I believe, well known to his Excellency Sir Henry Bulwer and to yourself, were concealed in the neighbourhood behind some hillocks, ready to support the foragers; these troops, on hearing the firing, advanced, and attacking the rebels in rear repulsed them after a few minutes sharp fighting, but a desultory combat was kept up for five hours.

* No. 570.

The insurgents left more than sixty of their number on the field; the Turkish loss was eight Bashi-Bazouks killed and six wounded.

The fortifications in Zupzi have nearly reached completion.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAS. ZOHRAB.

No. 576.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 19. Political.)
My Lord, *Bosna Serai, April 4, 1862.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of despatch of the 30th March, from Mr. Vice-Consul Zohrab, reporting the arrival at Mostar of Reshid Pasha, the newly-appointed Governor for the Herzegovina.

The opinion of the Turkish officials here decidedly seems to be that Reshid Pasha is not fitted for the post assigned to him; he appears, however, as your Lordship will see by the inclosed despatch, to have made a favourable impression at Mostar.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure in No. 576.

Vice-Consul Zohrab to Consul Holmes.

Sir, *Mostar, March 30, 1862.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that Reshid Pasha, the newly-appointed Governor for the Herzegovina, arrived here on the 22nd instant.

His Excellency seems to be intelligent and active, and by his courteous behaviour he appears to wish to gain the good opinion of all classes; but his reputation is, unfortunately, rather under a cloud, his conduct while holding the post of military Governor of Belgrade having been very unsatisfactory and open to censure, I am told; it, however, yet remains to be seen whether he is worthy to hold the important trust confided to his keeping.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAS. ZOHRAB.

No. 577.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 161.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, April 8, 1862.*

PRINCE GORTCHAKOW has received intelligence that the Bashi-Bazouks made prisoners by the Montenegrins at Grenitza have been treated with unusual humanity, and that their officers have been allowed to retain their arms.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 578.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 170.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, April 12, 1862.*

HALIL BEY has stated to Prince Gortchakow, as a proof of the complicity of the Russian agents in the recent disorders in Herzegovina, that the Russian Consul at Ragusa went up to Cettigné and negociated a reconciliation between the Prince of Montenegro and the rebel leader Vukalovitch.

Prince Gortchakow admitted that the Consul had gone to Cettigné, and had been

partly instrumental in effecting the reconciliation referred to, but disputed that this constituted an offence against the Porte.

The conduct of the Russian Consul might, perhaps, be made a matter of complaint both on the part of the Austrian and Turkish Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 579.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 171.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, April 12, 1862.*

ON the 10th instant Prince Gortchakow informed the Turkish Minister that he had learned from Prince Labanoff that the Porte had directed Omer Pasha to send in an ultimatum to the Prince of Montenegro, and had ordered him in case of its rejection to commence hostilities. This course of proceeding, the Prince said, was not consistent with the recent assurances of the Porte.

Halil Bey pointed out to Prince Gortchakow that circumstances were changed; the Montenegrins had invaded the Turkish territory and captured a large detachment of the Sultan's troops.

Prince Gortchakow then ran into a discursive complaint of the conduct of the Turkish Government in Herzegovina and in regard to Montenegro, and suggested various proposals with a view to putting an end to this state of things, but in a manner so precipitate and confused that Halil Bey could not draw from his words any distinct impression of his meaning. The Turkish Minister requested Prince Gortchakow to make a more deliberate statement of his wishes, if possible in writing, and offered to wait on his Excellency again on the following day.

Yesterday Halil Bey had another interview with the Prince, when the latter showed him a Memorandum embodying the suggestions of the Russian Government for the maintenance of peace between Montenegro and Turkey. The document was reserved for the consideration of the Emperor; it was conceived, according to Halil Bey, in the following sense:—

1. The recognition of the independence of Montenegro by the Porte.

2. The addition of some territory to Montenegro, for which addition the Montenegrins should pay a tribute to the Porte.

2. The promise, on the part of the Porte, of a better system of government in Herzegovina, and the nomination of an agent to carry the desired improvements into effect.

On these conditions, in the opinion of Prince Gortchakow, pacific relations could be established between Montenegro and Turkey, and the good offices of Russia would be employed in preserving them.

Halil Bey, in replying to the Prince, remarked that he could not give Prince Gortchakow the least assurance that these terms would be acceptable at Constantinople. They appeared in the light of concessions on the part of the Porte, to which no equivalent was offered whatever. For his own part, speaking on his private judgment, and reserving an absolute liberty of decision for his Government, he could not conceive any overtures for the recognition of the Prince of Montenegro being entertained except with the following stipulations —

1. That Montenegro should be placed under the collective control of the Powers.

2. That the Porte and the Powers should have liberty to have agents at Cettigné.

3. That the Powers should make a declaration that Montenegro in obtaining the general recognition of its independence became subject to all the responsibilities and obligations of an independent State, and that in case the Montenegrin Government should be guilty of aggressive acts against the territories of the Sultan, it would forfeit the favour of the Powers, which would no longer interfere to protect it.

The Turkish Minister added that, in speaking of additional territory, he hoped no allusion even would be made to a port, for that was out of the question.

Prince Gortchakow replied that if the Turkish Government would grant a seaport, so much the better; but he did not insist on that point. He objected to the notion of a collective control or protection.

After consulting the Emperor, Prince Gortchakow will see the Turkish Minister again on this subject.

I think it right to remark that, in making the foregoing observations to Prince

Gortchakow, Halil Bey did not follow any advice on my part. Your Lordship is aware that as a matter of private opinion I have admitted to Prince Gortchakow, and submitted to Her Majesty's Government, that I thought the Porte might, with certain stipulations, benefit by the recognition of the independence of Montenegro, but I have taken the liberty of suggesting to Halil Bey that, in dealing with Prince Gortchakow on this subject, he would do well to accept and transmit to Constantinople the overtures of Russia with as few remarks and admissions as possible. Halil Bey assures me, however, that he has made every reservation for the free action of his Government. The feelings of the Turkish Minister would lead him to desire the chastisement of the Montenegrins, but he anticipates not only the remonstrances of Russia, which he does not rank very highly, but the opposition of France, which is more important. Halil Bey is not informed of the terms of the ultimatum sent in by Omer Pasha. The Bashi-Bazouks recently made prisoners by the Montenegrins are for the most part liberated, the officers only being retained. This, however, still constitutes an act of hostility.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 580.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 430.) *Foreign Office, April* 21, 1862.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE for your Excellency's information copies of despatches* upon the subject of Montenegro and the Herzegovina.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 581.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 186.) *Foreign Office, April* 21, 1862.

Sir,

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 172 of the 9th instant, I have to inform you that Her Majesty's Government approve of the opinion you expressed to Aali Pasha respecting articles relating to Montenegro which have lately appeared in the "Journal de Constantinople."

Her Majesty's Government also approve of your having abstained from giving advice to the Porte regarding its proceedings towards Montenegro at the present juncture.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 582.

Consul Ricketts to Earl Russell.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 22.) *Scutari, April* 12, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit, herewith inclosed to your Lordship, the copy of a despatch dated Scutari, April 7, 1862, and addressed by me to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, relative to a telegraphic despatch forwarded by Prince Nicholas to Omer Pasha, stating that the Montenegrins had not plundered the Albanian territory.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

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* Inclosure in No. 564 and No. 578.

Inclosure in No. 582.

Consul Ricketts to Sir H. Bulwer.

Sir, *Scutari, April* 7, 1862.

I HAVE the honour to transmit, herewith inclosed, the copy of a telegraphic despatch addressed by Prince Nicolas to Omer Pasha, together with the reply of the same to the Prince. The remark of the Prince of Montenegro that the Montenegrins did not plunder Albanian territory, has merely added another falsehood to the tissue of falsehoods with which he has so long attempted to deceive the Porte. Now I beg to observe that the Montenegrins not only attacked the Turks who were sent to Grenitza, but they destroyed the village of Shistan, a village lying some two hours distance from the Montenegrin border within Turkish territory; they burnt the church belonging to the Latin community of that place, they stripped it of its relics and ornaments, and the whole of its population, penniless and destitute, have now taken refuge at Scutari, where they have been assisted and succoured by the Turkish Pasha. As to the observations of the Prince that the Montenegrins merely went to the assistance of an oppressed population, I must remark that six of the villagers of Grenitza were beheaded by the Montenegrins because they would not espouse their cause. But even supposing that a certain portion of the inhabitants of this village had manifested any sympathy for their co-religionists, this does not certainly alter the matter in favour of the Prince.

He was perfectly well aware that the village of Grenitza does not form any part or parcel of Montenegro, he knew he had no right to allow his troops to pass the boundary, and he is thoroughly able to restrain his people within bounds if he chooses. It would seem to me to be but a loss of time and a compromise of dignity for the Sirdar Ikram to enter into any further correspondence with a person who manifests no shame in purposely misrepresenting the clearest and most unmistakable facts.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

No. 583.

Consul Ricketts to Earl Russell.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 23.) *Scutari, April* 12, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit, herewith inclosed to your Lordship, the copy of a despatch dated Scutari, April 6, 1862, and addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, relative to the release of the prisoners taken at Grenitza by the Montenegrins, and other events.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

Inclosure in No. 583.

Consul Ricketts to Sir H. Bulwer.

Sir, *Scutari, April* 6, 1862.

I HAVE to inform your Excellency that immediately after the Chief of the Bashi Bazouks, Hassan Hotti, had been taken prisoner, his servant, who was also a prisoner with him, was sent to Scutari.

Soon after his arrival at this place he proceeded to the mountains of Pirstrate and Hotti, where he summoned together the notables, and begged them in the name of his master not to take up arms against the Montenegrins. I should imagine that some arrangement, therefore, had been entered into between Hassan Hotti and the Prince, by which the former would be enabled to obtain his liberty provided he succeeded in inducing the mountaineers to remain passive spectators of events at the present moment. As soon as the Pasha discovered that various hostile influences were labouring to foment disorders in the country, he ordered a Circular to be written to each of the Bishops acquainting them that many evilly-disposed persons were engaged in circulating reports prejudicial to the interests of the Government; he said he trusted these reports would be treated with the contempt they merited, and hoped they would not fail to exhort the Christian part of the population not to swerve from the fidelity which they had hitherto manifested towards the Sultan. The Circular in question appears to have been well

received by the clergy generally, and all but the Bishop of Alessio, Jodmasei, have returned satisfactory answers to the same. I have, however, little confidence in the promises or fidelity of this priesthood.

Last week the village of Yenikoi, near Sputz, was attacked three times by the Montenegrins; the latter were, they say, beaten off with considerable loss.

Disputes have again commenced in the hills between the Mirdites and the Skreli; as soon as I have been able to unravel the intrigues in Mirdite I shall report to your Excellency on the subject. I hear that all those who were taken prisoners at Grenitza, with the exception of forty, have been released, and will arrive at Scutari this evening. The release of these people and their treatment after capture will by many be regarded as an act of clemency on the part of the Prince, and will no doubt be held up to the world in this light by his supppriers. But when we consider how anxious the Prince is to disseminate discord between the Mussulmans and the Latins, that on Hassan Hotti and his followers being taken prisoners, they were told the Montenegrins did not make war against the Latins but only against the Turks, and further, that the greatest part of the prisoners in question are Latin, we are led to the conclusion that this action of the Prince proceeded rather from a wish on his part to conciliate the Latin tribes and prevent their acting against him in the expected campaign than from any real feelings or sentiments of humanity.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

No. 584.

Earl Russell to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 123.) *Foreign Office, April 23, 1862.*

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your information, copies of despatches relating to the affairs of Montenegro and the Herzegovina.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 585.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 197.) *Foreign Office, April 24, 1862.*

Sir,

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, copies of five despatches from Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh respecting the affairs of Montenegro.†

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 586.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 175. Confidential.) *St. Petersburgh, April 15, 1862.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship a copy of the Memorandum respecting the affairs of Montenegro presented by Prince Gortchakow to the Turkish Minister at this Court.

This document has been confidentially communicated to me by Halil Bey.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

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* No. 555 and 578.

† Nos. 556, 557, 577, 578, and 579.

Inclosure in No. 586.

Pro-Memorid.

LA persistance des collisions entre la Porte et le Monténégro malgré l'intérêt évident que les deux pays auraient à y mettre un terme et malgré les efforts qui ont été tentés dans ce but, indique qu'il y a là non pas un fait accidentel, mais des causes profondes et permanentes.

Ces causes doivent être déduites de la situation politique et géographique faite au Monténégro.

Politiquement les doutes que la Porte continue à laisser planer sur les droits de ce pays à l'indépendance y entretiennent un état de malaise incessant. Les Monténégrins sont en possession d'une indépendance de fait qui a la sanction des siècles. Comme ils se sentent continuellement menacés, ils sont obligés d'être constamment sous les armes, cette nécessité entretient chez eux des dispositions belliqueuses inconciliables avec l'établissement d'un ordre de choses régulier, d'habitudes pacifiques, et de relations établis.

Non seulement ils vivent dans l'attente perpétuelle d'une attaque chez eux, et s'y préparent, mais chaque fois que la Porte se croit obligée d'agir militairement dans leur voisinage, ils voient dans ces démonstrations une menace éventuelle. Leurs montagnes sont comme une forteresse dont les contreforts, situés dans la plaine, figurent les ouvrages avancés. Ils craignent, par conséquent, que si les forces Turques s'y établissent, ce ne soit dans l'intention d'affaiblir leur propre position, afin de pénétrer plus facilement ensuite dans le cœur du pays.

De leur côté les Chrétiens de l'Herzégovine désespérant d'obtenir les améliorations sérieuses que réclame leur condition actuelle, sont portés à chercher dans des soulèvements le redressement de leurs griefs, en comptant sur l'assistance des Monténégrins auxquelles ils sont unis par les triples liens de la foi, de la langue, et de la race.

Géographiquement l'incertitude des frontières, le mélange des races et les contestations pour la possession de certaines territoires compliquent encore cette situation.

Si l'on y ajoute les haines séculaires, l'usage des vendetas et des représailles qui perpétuent de sanglantes traditions, on aura le secret d'un état de choses aussi préjudiciable au bien-être de ces contrées qu'aux intérêts de la Porte et à ceux de la paix générale.

Si l'on veut sérieusement y mettre un terme, il faut en chercher la solution non pas dans des expédients diplomatiques ou militaires, qui ne peuvent qu'ajourner ou agraver les difficultés, mais dans un système largement conçu, loyalement exécuté.

Voici sur quelles bases il pourrait être fondé :

1. Tant que les Monténégrins se croient menacés dans leur indépendance, on ne saurait s'attendre à les voir poser les armes, renoncer à leurs habitudes guerriers, et se livrer aux travaux de la paix.

Mais si la Porte se décide à reconnaitre leur indépendance, si elle abandonne toute l'idée de revendiquer à leur égard des droits de suzeraineté, elle facilitera entre les deux pays l'établissement de bons rapports qui rejailleront favorablement sur la situation de ses provinces Chrétiennes voisines.

2. Pour régulariser et consolider ces relations il serait essentiel de faire disparaître aussi les motifs de collisions qui découlent des prétentions réciproques à la possession des territoires contestés.

A cet effet, ces territoires dont les dimensions sont fort restreintes, pourraient être réunis au Monténégro, qui payerait à la Porte pour ses territoires une redevance annuelle réglée sur les sommes qui entrent effectivement de ce chef dans le Trésor Ottoman, et qui seraient définies une fois pour toutes.

3. Enfin, pour compléter cette œuvre de conciliation, le Gouvernement Turc mettrait, sans retard, en pratique, dans les parties soumises de l'Herzégovine, les améliorations qui, nous le savons, sont dans les intentions de Sa Majesté le Sultan, et dont l'application immédiate consoliderait la tranquillité en même temps qu'elle servirait à calmer les districts insurgés.

Quand à ceux là, la Porte aviserait à y introduire les mêmes mesures d'amélioration, et chargerait de leur exécution le fonctionnaire qu'elle jugerait le plus capable d'offrir par son caractère les garanties nécessaires pour se concilier les confidences des populations.

Cette voie, si la Porte y entre franchement et résolument, conduirait à notre avis à une pacification solide et durable de ces contrées, et fermerait la plaie qui les épuise au détriment des intérêts de tous.

Nous aimons à croire que les Grandes Puissances ne refuseraient pas leurs concours

à un arrangement aussi mutuellement avantageuse pour les deux parties qui conforme aux besoins de la paix générale.

Pour sa part, le Gouvernement Impérial s'y associerait de tous ses vœux, et s'y contribuerait de tous ses efforts.

St. Pétersbourg, le 30 Mars, 1862.

No. 587.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.——(*Received April 25.*)

(No. 176. Confidential.)

St. Petersburgh, April 15, 1862.

My Lord,

THE Russian Government are embarrassed by their position in reference to Herzegovina and Montenegro. After giving some degree of encouragement to the discontents of the Christian population and to the sympathetic action of Prince Danielo, they now see the insurgents crushed by Omer Pasha, and the Mountain exposed to the just vengeance of the Porte.

A mere intervention at Constantinople to avert the threatening danger by remonstrance or menace might not succeed; something more specious must be attempted. Prince Gortchakow has therefore opened proposals for a durable settlement between the Government of the Sultan and that of Montenegro, founded on the recognition of the latter. His Excellency this morning read me a short Memorandum embodying his views, which will be communicated to your Lordship by Baron Brunnow.

Your Lordship has already been made acquainted with the substance of these overtures by my despatch No. 171 of the 12th instant.

A copy of the Memorandum has been placed in the hands of the Turkish Minister here, and it has also been transmitted to Prince Labanow.

I remarked to Prince Gortchakow that, with a view to the reception of his suggestions at Constantinople, I regretted that the opening remarks were conceived in a sense which could hardly be agreeable to the Government of the Sultan, for they seemed to ascribe the whole responsibility of the acts of violence and hostility which had so long existed in those quarters to the policy and attitude of the Porte. I was also, I said, concerned that he should have mixed up the question of Herzegovina with that of Montenegro, and, on the whole, I conceived that the terms he suggested were entirely in the interest of Montenegro, and offered no equivalent advantage to Turkey. If the Porte should simply recognize the independence of Montenegro according to his plan, they would recognize the independence of a Government which openly claimed a foreign protectorate, a protectorate which was also openly asserted and granted by Russia.

Prince Gortchakow combated these views. He denied that there was anything in his language offensive to the Porte; he contended that the question of Montenegrin independence, the peace of the Montenegrin frontier, and the good government of Herzegovina, were intimately connected, and could not be separated; and he argued that the so-called protectorate of Russia belonged rather to the region of sentiment and of historical and religious sympathy than to that of policy or practical interest. It was a protectorate by which Russia gained nothing and Montenegro little, and by which Turkey was in no wise injured. By his scheme Turkey would benefit, for it would obtain peace and the assistance of Russia in preserving it, and the proposed revenue or tribute for the lands to be ceded. His Excellency also claimed my personal support on the ground that I was favourable to the recognition of Montenegro.

I admitted to Prince Gortchakow that, as a matter of private opinion, I had always been, in the interest of the Porte, inclined, with certain stipulations, to the recognition of Montenegro, for I thought by that means Montenegro might be withdrawn from the single protectorate of Russia and the hostility of Turkey, and be brought under the collective civilizing influence and control of Europe. Those impressions were personal, and I could not assure him that they were sanctioned by the better judgment of Her Majesty's Government, but I would submit them to your Lordship in connection with the proposals of his Excellency, which I thought stopped short of what was desirable.

In referring to the recent ultimatum sent in by Omer Pasha by order of the Porte, the Prince remarked that in case the Montenegrin Government should fail to comply with that summons, the Pasha threatened after five days to advance to the frontier, but without any present intention of serious occupation or invasion.

The Porte had shown a prudent and temperate disposition in this matter. With the exact terms of the ultimatum the Prince was not acquainted from official sources. He presumed that they comprised the liberation of the prisoners and some assurance of a pacific attitude in future.

I have, &c.

(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 588.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.——(*Received April 25.*)

(No. 178. Confidential.)

St. Petersburgh, April 16, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE asked the Turkish Minister here what his own opinion is about the proposed settlement with Montenegro. His Excellency thinks Prince Gortchakow's terms insufficient, and that the Sultan would very reluctantly assent to the recognition of the independence of Montenegro, which His Majesty might consider inconsistent with the integrity of his Empire; still the Sultan might consent, with certain safeguards, if it can be well explained to him that the independency of that region is a "fait accompli" which can hardly be altered. As the French Government always side with Russia in this matter, and as the Porte, in addition to all its other embarrassments, is threatened, as many think, with new disorders this summer, Halil Bey concludes that it would be politic to close this source of mischief by some permanent arrangement. ("Firmer la plaie du Monténégro.")

I have, &c.

(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 589.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(*Received April 28.*)

(No. 20. Political.)

Bosna Serai, April 8, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of despatch of the 5th April, received to-day from Mr. Vice-Consul Zohrab, relating to the failure of Omer Pasha's latest attempt to induce the rebel leaders to submit through the mediation of the Austrian Consul at Mostar.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure in No. 589.

Vice-Consul Zohrab to Consul Holmes.

Mostar, April 5, 1862.

Sir,

THE missions with which the Austrian Consular Agent of Trebigné, and the Dragoman of the Austrian Consulate here, were charged by Omer Pasha to the rebel Chiefs of Zupzi and Piva, having failed in their object, *i.e.*, in inducing the rebels to accept the terms of the Porte, Omer Pasha made a second attempt to bring the Chiefs to reason through the mediation of M. Martyrt, the Austrian Consul here.

This attempt, like all preceding attempts, has failed.

M. Martyrt, who returned from his mission two days since, went to Suttorina and had interviews with Luka Vukalovitch, Yovan Vasiliev, and other leaders. The usual exaggerated complaints, the usual false statements, were brought forward to justify the revolt; numberless excuses were made for their continued rejection of the liberal terms of the Government, which now extend to autonomy for the districts hitherto in rebellion, and to the recognition of the rebel leaders as Voïvodes of the districts they belong to.

These conditions are considered as very liberal even by the rebels, but the leaders assert that they will not and cannot accept them unless the Porte consents to prohibit the entry of any Mussulman into the districts hitherto in rebellion, and till the Turkish troops are withdrawn from Zupzi, Piva, &c. M. Martyrt told them that such demands were absurd; that if they were permitted to govern themselves it was the greatest boon

they could ask for or obtain; but to say that a certain class of the Sultan's subjects must not be seen in their districts; that his troops must not occupy positions within their governments, and that the corps now at Zupzi and Piva must retire immediately, these were pretensions which Omer Pasha could not for a moment entertain, and that as long as they entertained such ideas any attempt to assist them would be impossible.

M. Martyrt is of opinion that the rebels generally are anxious to submit, but that they are restrained by the Montenegrins, whose vengeance they dread, and by their leaders, who, in spite of the misery they have brought on their followers, are still very influential. He, however, expects that the people, being now reduced to great misery, will soon seek the clemency of their Sovereign in spite of their Chiefs. I must confess I am not so sanguine, and I am led to believe that no pacification can take place unless the Montenegrins are taught by severe chastisement to respect the power of the Turks.

M. Martyrt distributed a considerable sum of money amongst the most necessitous of the rebels with whom he came in contact.

I am informed that immediately after the departure of M. Martyrt from Suttorina, M. Petcovich, the Russian Consul at Ragusa, proceeded thither, and communicated with the rebels; he also handed to Luka Vukalovitch a large sum of money. This is denied by the Russian Consul here.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAS. ZOHRAB.

No. 590.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received April 28.)

(No. 21. Political.)
Bosna-Serai, April 8, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herein copy of a despatch just received from Mr. Vice-Consul Zohrab of the 5th April. This despatch is in accordance with the idea expressed in my despatch No. 18, Political, of the 4th April, that it is of the utmost importance to settle without delay the question of the relations of Montenegro with the Porte. I lately saw a statement in the newspapers that the Porte had addressed a note to the Representatives of the European Powers at Constantinople to the effect that it was about to declare war on Montenegro, and I was in hopes that it had been decided to bring matters to a crisis. It seems evident that persuasion is ineffectual, and if it be true that the Porte will not permit the Serdar to act against Montenegro, then it is clear that it accepts the indefinite prolongation of a most costly military occupation of the Herzegovina, ruinous to the surrounding provinces. This state of things, however, cannot be much longer endured, and must eventuate either in the surrender of Bosnia and the Herzegovina or in a war with Montenegro. It appears to me that if the Porte refuses to contemplate the former alternative, it is for her interest to accept the latter with the least possible delay.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure in No. 590.

Vice-Consul Zohrab to Consul Holmes.

(Confidential.)
Mostar, April 5, 1862.

Sir,

DURING an interview I had with Omer Pasha on the 2nd instant, I alluded to the unsuccessful mission of the Austrian Consul, referred to in my despatch of this day's date. His Highness explained that as the Porte had determined to pursue a conciliatory course towards the rebels, and would not permit the invasion of Montenegro, whence all these disturbances had their origin, he had thought it advisable to again attempt to induce the insurgents to accept the terms of the Porte, and supposing that this could be best effected by Austrian agents, he commissioned the Austrian Consul here to negotiate with the leaders. The results of these efforts leave his Highness no hope that matters can be amicably settled, and as long as he is prevented from attacking Montenegro, he feels that it will be impossible to reduce the rebels to submission by merely advancing

against them as far as the Montenegrin frontier, and all his movements can only tend to keep the revolt from spreading further perhaps.

His Highness could not openly acquiesce in my opinion, but he clearly showed me that he quite agreed with me that the course hitherto pursued and still maintained by the Porte is full of weakness, irresolution, and tending to ruin, and, if not soon changed, will lead to disgrace and loss. Each attempt to conciliate the rebels only makes them believe the Turks more incapable of overcoming them, and naturally exalts them in their own estimation. It will only be when the Montenegrins shall have been thoroughly beaten in the field that they will awake to their delusions, and submit to the clemency of their Sovereign.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAS. ZOHRAB.

No. 591.

Consul-General Perry to Earl Russell.—(Received April 28.)

(No. 7. Political.)
Venice, April 17, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship extract of a letter which I have received from Her Majesty's Vice-Consul at Trieste, respecting the reported movements in that quarter in connection with a conspiracy against Turkey:—

"Since the commencement of hostilities in the Herzegovina, and more particularly since the late insurrectionary movement in Greece, I have directed my attention to the subject, with a view to ascertain the feelings of the Greek, Selav, and Ionian residents in this city, keeping a strict watch upon their proceedings. Although there is no doubt that all the Greek and Selavs entertain a bitter enmity against the Turks, and would, as they have done on former occasions, afford pecuniary aid towards the furtherance of any conspiracy having for its object the liberation of the Turkish Empire from Ottoman sway, still I have every reason to believe that up to the present moment no steps have been taken here in that direction.

"I am perfectly persuaded that the Ionians residing in this city, with few exceptions, are annexationists, being under the impression that sooner or later the Greek population in the Turkish provinces will succeed in throwing off the yoke which will lead to the establishment of a Byzantine Empire, resulting in the annexation of their islands."

I have, &c.
(Signed) WILLIAM PERRY.

No. 592.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received April 28.)

(No. 188.)
Vienna, April 21, 1862.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram of the 22nd instant, respecting a communication of the Turkish Ambassador on the supposed intended movements of armed bands organized in Servia, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that Count Rechberg is disinclined to place implicit reliance on the accuracy of the intelligence received from Constantinople, or to believe that there is any immediate danger likely to result from what is passing in Servia. He is, however, by no means disposed to undervalue the preparations going on in the Principality with the object of undermining the power of the Porte, and he is, therefore, most desirous to concert with Her Majesty's Government as to the measures which it may be advisable to adopt in support of Turkish interests.

I inquired of his Excellency how it came that he treated this intelligence so lightly. He replied that, so long as Omer Pasha was able to keep the Herzegovina in subjection, there was no danger of any serious movement in Servia or in the neighbourhood; that, as yet, his successes against the insurgents may have been doubtful, but he maintained his ground. Were he no longer able to do so, we might then expect a combined and serious movement amongst the Christian subjects of the Porte. His defeat, Count Rechberg apprehends, would be the signal for a general rising amongst the disaffected.

His Excellency said that, according to intelligence from Galatz, many Hungarian and Polish emigrants residing there had left suddenly for Constantinople, funds having been supplied by the Sardinian Consul there, and that, according to reports from Athens, several emigrants were expected there from Constantinople. He added, also, that it was reported to him from a credible source that all such persons readily obtained means of subsistence from M. Mawiani, the Sardinian Minister at Athens, at whose disposal large sums of money were said to be placed for this purpose.

His Excellency evidently mentioned all this with a view of confirming the general impression that the Italian Government is actively engaged in fomenting the insurrectionary movements which are directed against the Ottoman Empire.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 593.

Lord A. Loftus to Earl Russell.—(Received April 28.)

(No. 267.)

My Lord, *Berlin, April 26, 1862.*

I TOOK the opportunity, when conversing with Count Bernstorff on Thursday last, to inquire whether any proposals had been submitted to him from St. Petersburgh on the subject of an arrangement of the differences between the Porte and the Prince of Montenegro.

His Excellency replied that he had received despatches from M. de Bismarck on this subject, the general nature of which, from what his Excellency said, completely tallied with the reports addressed to your Lordship by Lord Napier, but that no formal proposals had been addressed to him by the Russian Government. He also stated that no communication had been made to him on the subject of Montenegro by the French Minister at this Court.

I have since seen the Turkish Minister at this Court, who informs me that he had an interview with Count Bernstorff yesterday, when he communicated to him the instructions lately addressed by the Porte to Omer Pasha.

M. d'Aristarchi informed Count Bernstorff of the proposals of Prince Gortchakow, adding as his opinion that before any measures of conciliation could be attempted, the Prince of Montenegro should fulfil the late demands of Omer Pasha, namely:—1st, to liberate the Turkish subjects made prisoners at Grenitza by the Montenegrins on Turkish soil; and, 2ndly, that the Montenegrins should withdraw their troops within the limits of the territory accorded to Montenegro by the European Commission. He then expressed his opinion that if these conditions were complied with, the European Powers might advantageously to both parties interpose their good offices for an arrangement, the *sine qua non* of which should be the acknowledgment of the suzeraineté of the Porte.

Count Bernstorff expressed a wish to be informed of the opinions of the Porte, and finally promised M. d'Aristarchi that he would enter into no engagements and would accept no proposals with respect to these affairs until he should be made acquainted with the views and wishes of his Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 594.

Mr. Longworth to Earl Russell.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 16.)

My Lord, *Belgrade, April 21, 1862.*

THE accounts received here from Nisch, in Bulgaria, though through suspicious channels, still deserve some attention, inasmuch as they leave little doubt as to the agitation and discontent still prevailing among the Bulgarian population. The means by which it is excited are also intelligible enough. Agents and emissaries are, of course, as busy as ever, but their work is now rendered comparatively easy by the growing disaffection of the people to the Government, arising from the hardships and burdens imposed upon them by the military preparations which the events of the Herzegovina and the attitude of Servia have rendered indispensable. Their cattle has been temporarily taken from them, or nominally hired for the transport service; they have been

compelled to work for low wages at the fortifications and the construction of new barracks.

The report is that a force of 15,000 regulars (Nizam) is to be quartered at Nisch, which is regarded as the principal stronghold and defensive bulwark on that side against Servia. The peasants also are required to contribute their labour gratuitously towards the making of roads; but as this will be in great measure for their own benefit, it can scarcely be called a *corvée*. Claiming exemption on these accounts, the villagers had very generally refused to pay their taxes, so that the Government had to raise them by force. Many persons, it is said, had been driven to Nisch handcuffed, and in this state exposed to the extremes of heat and cold; it is evidently sought to make out a case of torture against the Pasha and his Kinyah. The former, by name Mihtad Pasha, is declared to be a monster of cruelty, like his predecessor Zeinel, but there are no grounds, I believe, for the statement; he is on the contrary a zealous and upright Governor, disposed to act fairly by the Christians, but setting his face steadily against seditious clamour and intrigue.

The Church movement, having for its object the substitution of a Bulgarian Bishop devoted to the interests of Russia for the one appointed by the Greek Patriarch, is prosecuted with the greatest inveteracy. The latter, for a long time, owing to the conspiracy against him, and the threats of personal violence, could not show himself at Nisch, but remained at Leskovatz, and in the meanwhile the people, instigated thereto, refused to pay the accustomed dues to his deacon.

The Pasha at length, by the orders of the Porte, took measures to repress these disorders, and, all other means having failed, arrested the ringleaders, and sent them to Constantinople.

Their plans being thus frustrated, an outcry was raised that the Pasha was interfering in Church affairs. The charge is a serious one, involving an infraction of the Hatti-Houmayoun, but I am convinced there is no foundation for it. But besides the circumstances above related, there is another affair of some standing which serves to give a colour to it.

Some years ago the Christians of Nisch began building a church, but, when nearly finished, it was discovered that the superstructure, together with the cupola, was much too heavy for the foundation. The Metropolitan declaring the building to be unsafe, would not consecrate or permit it to be completed. Hence the discord between him and his flock, which the Grand Vizier, Kuprisly Pasha, while visiting Nisch on his tour of investigation, two years ago, wishing to pacify, sent for an architect from Constantinople. But his decision, confirming that of his subordinate, has only tended to embitter the dispute. The Pasha is now an object of popular displeasure, and is accused, as I have already said, of persecuting the Christians and intermeddling with the affairs of the Church.

From the above statement of facts, meagre as it necessarily must be, your Lordship may in some measure see what are the grounds of the discontent existing at Nisch. I doubt not, for my part, that it has been designedly fomented, for what purpose the course of events will probably ere long demonstrate.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. A. LONGWORTH.

No. 595.

Earl Cowley to Earl Russell.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 547.)

My Lord, *Paris, April 28, 1862.*

M. THOUVENEL spoke to me this afternoon of a Memorandum emanating from the Russian Government upon the present state of affairs in Montenegro and the neighbouring provinces of Turkey, which he presumed had also been communicated to Her Majesty's Government. I asked the object of it, and M. Thouvenel replied that it called attention to passing events, but hardly suggested a remedy for them.

His Excellency went on to say that he had just seen the Turkish Ambassador, and had told him that he could not dispute the right of the Porte to coerce the Montenegrins to submission. They had been the aggressors, and whether the aggressions committed were to be looked upon as the acts of rebellious subjects or of an independent country, the right to repel and punish them could not be called in question. But he had reminded the Ambassador that to possess a right was one thing, to exercise it another; that conciliatory measures were sometimes more efficacious than violence; that great as

were the resources of Turkey compared with those of Montenegro, the battle was not always in favour of the strong; that the military occupation of Montenegro would be a work of extreme difficulty; that in the defiles of that mountainous country no force could be deployed, and that no Turkish soldier would be able to quit his post without the certainty of being shot; that in the meantime the neighbouring provinces were suffering from the drain imposed upon them by the presence of so large a Turkish army; that horses and cattle were failing in Bosnia, while the Herzegovina was little better than a desert; that although it must be admitted that there was little choice to be made between Turks and Christians, whether Greek or Catholics, who inhabited those regions, and who were all robbers, yet that the denomination of Christian naturally excited a sympathy in Europe which told when Christians were punished, however justly; that under these circumstances it would be prudent in the Porte to consider whether it would not be wiser to offer advantages to the Prince of Montenegro which would inculcate habits of industry among his people, rather than try to shut them up in fortresses, where they must have recourse to depredation if they were to live.

M. Thouvenel then reverted to the old scheme of giving a certain portion of the plain which is recognized as belonging to the Porte in fief to the Prince of Montenegro.

I merely observed, as I have often done before, that no dependence could be placed on the Prince of Montenegro, or in any of his people; give them a portion of the plain to-day, they would want more to-morrow, and would, as heretofore, be supported probably in their pretensions both by France and Russia. The evil of the present state of things was no doubt great, but it could hardly be expected that the Porte would make concessions to remedy it, unless she had some guarantee that the granting such concessions was not to lead to the demand for others.

Although M. Thouvenel does not contest the justice of these observations, he does not think them of sufficient importance to be weighed with the temporary advantage of a pacification, however short. In a word, his sympathies are with the Montenegrins, and although his sense of equity tells him that they are in the wrong, he would yet save them from the punishment which the perpetration of those wrongs justly entail.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 596.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 468.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, April 30, 1862.*

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches upon the subject of Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 597.

Earl Russell to Lord Napier.

(No. 86.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, May 1, 1862.*

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 171 of the 12th instant, reporting what had passed between Prince Gortchakow and the Turkish Minister at St. Petersburgh on the question of the declaration of hostilities by the Porte against Montenegro, I have to observe that it is quite obvious that the Turkish Government cannot allow the Montenegrins to attack Turkish troops and violate Turkish territory and at the same time to be unmolested on the territory of Montenegro. The Prince of Montenegro, even if he were independent, must be confined to his own territory.

It seems quite certain that the Prince of Montenegro, unless compelled, will never observe any conditions which he may sign.

The Russian Consul ought not to foment insurrections against the Porte. An Agent of the Porte at Warsaw would not be allowed to promote rebellion against the Emperor of Russia.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

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* Nos. 579, 586, 587, 588, and 593.

No. 598.

Earl Russell to Lord Napier.

(No. 97.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, May 2, 1862.*

I HAVE to inform your Excellency that Baron Brunnow has read to me the Memorandum referred to in your despatch No. 176 of the 15th instant.

I did not make any remarks further than to say that Her Majesty's Government had determined not to interfere unless they were called upon by both parties to do so.

It is obvious, however, that the advantages promised to Turkey in this Memorandum are quite illusory. If the Porte were to recognize the independence of Montenegro, the Montenegrins might the very next day surprise and slaughter a Turkish detachment in Turkish territory, and they might rely on Prince Gortchakow's sympathies and commiseration.

Even if it were advisable to acknowledge Montenegro an independent State, on which point it is not necessary at present to give an opinion, the Porte would require some security that Turkish territory would be respected, and that rebellious Turkish subjects would not be assisted by the Prince of Montenegro.

But an assurance to this effect, if given by the Prince of Montenegro alone, or by him supported by Russia only, would be of no value; such are the prejudices against Turkish authority which prevail at St. Petersburgh, and so evident is it that the systematic policy of Montenegro with respect to Turkey is aggressive and encroaching.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 599.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 481.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, May 3, 1862.*

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches upon the subject of Montenegro and the Herzegovina.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 600.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 198.)
My Lord, *Vienna, May 1, 1862.*

THE French Ambassador has proposed to the Imperial Government that they should urge on the consideration of the Porte the propriety of her making certain territorial concessions to the Montenegrins with a view to facilitate the means of transport through that half-starved country. Count Rechberg described this communication to me as a mere renewal of one which had been made in 1858, when the same question was raised as to Spitza, and he read me a despatch addressed by the Internuncio to Count Buol in November of that year, combating the project, and showing, moreover, that the harbour of Spitza was unsafe and would be almost useless to Montenegro for purposes of commerce, as it would be utterly impossible for a country without resources of her own to run a convenient road into the interior through the steep rocky mountains which lie between Spitza and the interior of Montenegro. In this despatch the Internuncio goes on to show that the Porte had suggested the construction of a road which could be made at comparatively small expense, from the Herzegovina on one side, and from Albania on the other, and that by these routes supplies and provisions could conveniently pass into Montenegro.

The object of Count Rechberg in bringing forward this communication of 1858 was to show that the French and Russian Governments in those days were equally pressing in favour of a concession to the Montenegrins of the harbour of Spitza, and that the Porte could do no better at the present moment than repeat the same reasons for declining to entertain the question.

* Nos. 589 and 590.

It appears that his Excellency replied to the Duc de Gramont that the decision of the Turkish Government on this subject, which has just been made known to him by Prince Callimachi, was decisive, and precluded the necessity of his saying anything. He then explained that the Turkish Government, on being informed a few days ago by Halil Bey of a conversation which he had had with Prince Gortchakow, in which the Russian Minister urged on the consideration of the Porte the necessity of making concessions to Montenegro and the advisability of declaring her independence, had at once telegraphed to St. Petersburgh that the Porte would willingly entertain the question of granting commercial facilities to Montenegro when she recognized the suzerainty of the Porte.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 601.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 199.)

Vienna, May 1, 1862.

My Lord.

WHEN I was with Count Rechberg to day his Excellency told me that the Russian Minister had made repeated representations to him in favour of two Greek priests who had taken part with the rebels in the Herzegovina, and who, in order to escape being made prisoners by Omer Pasha's troops, had retired into the neutral territory of Austria. Not being found in arms they were allowed to remain at Ragusa, but as it appeared subsequently from incontrovertible evidence that they continued to be actively engaged in the interests of the rebels, Omer Pasha applied to have them removed to some distant place, and General Mamula was instructed to send them to Zara. They resisted and declared that they would not leave Ragusa unless compelled to do so by force. Consequently, the orders have been repeated, and whatever steps are necessary will be taken by the Austrian authorities to prevent these priests from carrying on their intrigues and machinations against the Porte.

The Russian Minister on learning the nature of the instructions sent from here to Ragusa has again applied to Count Rechberg on the subject, and has sought to obtain their release, but his representations are not likely to produce any alteration in the determination of the Imperial Government, and they will be kept under strict surveillance.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 602.

Lord A. Loftus to Earl Russell.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 276. Confidential.)

Berlin, May 3, 1862.

My Lord,

COUNT BERNSTORFF informed me last evening that the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at this Court had officially communicated to him the proposals lately made by Prince Gortchakow for a settlement of the differences between the Porte and the Prince of Montenegro, copy of which was transmitted to your Lordship by Lord Napier, in his despatch No. 175 of April 15.

His Excellency further stated that the French Minister at this Court had likewise made a communication to him in support of these proposals.

Count Bernstorff said that he had observed to M. de Mohrenheim and to Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne, with reference to Prince Gortchakow's proposals, that it could not be expected that they could be accepted by the Porte, for that they would impose sacrifices on Turkey, with no compensation to her in return. In his opinion they were entirely to the advantage of Montenegro, whilst the rights and interests of the Sultan were overlooked.

His Excellency observed to me that the French Minister did not combat or refute the arguments he had brought forward, and did not appear to hold with any great pertinacity to the Russian view, whilst M. de Morenheim defended with ardour the proposals of his Government and maintained them with much persistency.

Count Bernstorff said that he was anxious to know the opinion of Her Majesty's

Government on this question, and had instructed the Prussian Chargé d'Affaires in London to confer with your Lordship on this subject.

Count Bernstorff remarked to me that the apparent object of Russia and France was to acquire for Montenegro a seaport in the Adriatic, and he specially mentioned the port of Spizza as being the object in view.

I had the honour to report to your Lordship in a previous despatch, No. 267 of April 26, that M. d'Aristarchi, the Turkish Minister at this Court, had spoken to Count Bernstorff on the subject of the Russian proposals, with a view to guard his Excellency against being led into taking any engagement on this question, either with Russia or France, without previous concert with the Porte.

M. d'Aristarchi has since conferred with his Excellency, and has submitted to his Government the following points, which he considers might form the basis of an understanding and final arrangement between the Porte and the Prince of Montenegro, and of which Count Bernstorff has expressed his approval :—

1. Withdrawal of the Montenegrins within their frontiers, and restoration of all prisoners made at Krinitza.

2. Acknowledgment of the suzeraineté of the Porte, and the grant thereupon by the Porte of certain arable lands adjacent to Montenegro.

3. Acknowledgment by the Porte of the autonomy of Montenegro under the guarantee of the Great Powers.

4. Free transit through the Ottoman territory of articles of primary necessity from Montenegro to the sea, arms and munitions of war being expressly excluded.

Count Bernstorff, in the course of our conversation, referred to these points as comprising, in his opinion, what would be a fair and honourable arrangement to both parties; and he informed me that he should address instructions to the Prussian Minister at Constantinople in their general sense.

He should, however, take no engagements without a previous knowledge of the views and opinions of Her Majesty's Government and of the Cabinet of Vienna.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 603.

Lord A. Loftus to Earl Russell.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 277. Most Confidential.)

Berlin, May 3, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE reason to think, although I cannot affirm it with any degree of certainty, that if the four points mentioned in my despatch No. 276 of this date should be accepted by the Porte, and should meet with the approval of Her Majesty's Government and of the Cabinet of Vienna, the Prussian Government would be then disposed to submit them officially as the basis of an arrangement of the differences between the Porte and Montenegro.

It is of great importance to Turkey that tranquillity should be restored in these portions of her Empire : and it is no less a matter of moment that Prussia should not be drawn into the wake of Russia and France in support of the ambitious views of the Prince of Montenegro. It therefore appears to me that Prussia might be utilized advantageously as a mediator, and that proposals initiated by her would offer the best chance of success, and facilitate an harmonious understanding between the Powers concerned, on a question which may later become one of some difficulty and danger to Europe.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 604.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 494.)

Foreign Office, May 5, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 547 of the 29th ultimo, reporting the substance of M. Thouvenel's observations to your Excellency and to the Turkish

Ambassador, with reference to a Memorandum, emanating from the Russian Government, respecting the affairs of Montenegro and the neighbouring provinces of Turkey.

I quite agree with M. Thouvenel that the name "Christian" inspires much sympathy in Europe, especially in Russia. Yet a people whose Decalogue seems to comprise, as its chief Articles, "Thou shalt steal," and "Thou shalt commit murder," and whose precepts of morals inculcate hatred to their neighbour, and a full indulgence to the passion of revenge, seem hardly entitled to the denomination of Christians.

If the Prince of Montenegro were to have more land, he would probably exterminate the Turkish inhabitants of the villages, and thus give rise to a fresh civil war.

A strong Turkish garrison on the frontier, and, if necessary, in Cettigné itself, would probably be the best security for peace. But Her Majesty's Government, unless called on to do so by both parties, will not interfere.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 605.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 499.) *Foreign Office, May 6, 1862.*

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches, as marked in the margin,* upon the subject of Montenegro and the Herzegovina.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 606.

Earl Russell to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 135.) *Foreign Office, May 7, 1862.*

My Lord,

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 198 of the 1st instant, relative to a communication made to the Austrian Government by France relative to a proposed cession of territory to Montenegro by the Porte; and I have to state to you that Her Majesty's Government concur in the reply given by Count Rechberg to the Duc de Gramont on this subject.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 607.

Earl Russell to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 138.) *Foreign Office, May 7, 1862.*

My Lord,

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, copy of a despatch respecting the state of the Pashalick of Nisch.†

(Signed) RUSSELL.
I am, &c.

No. 608.

Earl Russell to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 140.) *Foreign Office, May 7, 1862.*

My Lord,

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches respecting the affairs of Montenegro.‡

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

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* Nos. 600, 601, 602, and 603. † No. 594. ‡ Nos. 579, 586, 587, 595, 597, 598, and 604.

No. 609.

Consul Ricketts to Earl Russell.—(Received May 8.)

(No. 25.) *Scutari, April 21, 1862.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith inclosed to your Lordship the copy of a despatch dated April 21, 1862, and addressed by me to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, relative to an attempt on the part of the Prince of Montenegro to enter into direct correspondence with the Consuls of Scutari.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

Inclosure in No. 609.

Consul Ricketts to Sir H. Bulwer.

Scutari, April 21, 1862.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit, herewith inclosed to your Excellency, the copy of a telegraphic despatch signed by the Prince Nicholas, dated Cettigné, April 16, 1862, and addressed to M. Wiet, the French Consul, requesting him to communicate the same to the Governor of Scutari, and also the Consuls of the different Powers at that place. From this your Excellency will observe that the Prince is again endeavouring to enter into direct relations with the Consuls of Scutari, and especially the French Consul; this is, however, by no means surprising when it is known that the Prince has adopted this course at the recommendation of M. Wiet. Indeed, M. Wiet himself told the Austrian Consul that he had recommended the Prince to keep him informed of passing events. The telegraphic despatch in question was also communicated by the French Consul to the Governor at Scutari.

Trifling as this circumstance may appear in itself, it is not altogether without its importance; for if the French Consul is made the channel of communication from the Prince to the Governor, the authority of the Governor becomes thereby questioned, and the Prince of Montenegro is brought into direct relations with the agents of foreign Powers, a measure which the Prince and his supporters are, no doubt, anxious to accomplish, but which the Porte is no doubt anxious to avoid. If M. Wiet is desirous of corresponding with the Prince for his own benefit, of course nothing could be said to the contrary, but it would by no means be a politic measure to permit him to transmit telegraphic despatches to the Consuls of the other Powers as well as to the Governor.

It is, therefore, to be hoped that this conduct on the part of the French Consul will not be countenanced by the authorities at Constantinople. Although I have inclosed to your Excellency a copy of the despatch in question, yet I took no notice of M. Wiet's communication. Indeed, if the French Consul, or any other Consul, is to be set up as the means of communicating the correspondence of the Prince, there would be little need of a person like Omer Pasha being nominated by the Porte as Commissioner for the settlement of the affairs of Montenegro.

I have been informed to-day that M. Wiet will ere long make a tour through a part of this province. His interpreter, M. Slubani, a native of Scutari, a great intriguer, and the former factotum of M. Hecquard, called on the Pasha yesterday; he said that the Bashi-Bazouks under Hussein Pasha had been pillaging the country, and that M. Wiet would most probably ere long pay a visit to the district of the Wassovitch. Whether the Bashi-Bazouks have been guilty of plundering the country or not it is impossible to say, but as Hussein Pasha is entrusted with the duty of putting down the revolt in those parts one must expect that he will be compelled to act as every soldier in his position would be obliged to do if the rebellion is to be quenched, and if he does not administer a severe lesson to the insurgents we may rest assured that the rebellion will take still wider dimensions than it hitherto has done.

As far as I can learn, Hussein Pasha has gained some advantages over the Wassovitch, and if this prove to be true, foreign agency will immediately endeavour to throw obstacles in the way of his further progress, and hence, most probably, the object of the French Consul's intended journey to the tribe of the Wassovitch. The French Consul has informed the Pasha that he will instruct the Abbé Krasnik to leave Miridit immediately.

Hussein Pasha is now at Plava.

The Montenegrins have burnt two Latin villages between Shistan and Antivari.

Ahmet Pasha has gone to Yablak in order to make preparations for driving off a body of Montenegrins who have lately made their appearance at Panari.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

No. 610.

Consul Ricketts to Earl Russell.—(Received May 8.)

(No. 26.) *Scutari, April 26, 1862.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit, herewith inclosed to your Lordship, the copy of a despatch dated Scutari, April 22nd, 1862, and addressed by me to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, relative to the state of the military and civil affairs at the present moment at Scutari.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

Inclosure in No. 610.

Consul Ricketts to Sir H. Bulwer.

Scutari, April 22, 1862.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that a revolt has broken out among the Greek tribe of the Kutchi.

These people have now declared themselves in favour of their brethren and coreligionists the Kutchi of Montenegro.

The fortress of Medun, in the centre, so to say, of the Kutchi country, and garrisoned by 250 regular troops, is now cut off from its communications with Podgoritza. It has, however, provisions sufficient for one month, and it is to be hoped it will be able to be relieved before the expiration of that time. The Fundina, the key to the Kutchi country, has also been seized by the insurgents, and the Latin tribe of the Triepschi are menaced with an attack. Orders have been issued to all the mountaineers to go to the assistance of the Triepschi. Three watch-towers, built for the purpose of protecting the road leading to the fortress of Medun, have been burnt, and several days will elapse before a sufficient number of Bashi-Bazouks will be able to be collected together for the relief of the garrison.

I have mentioned this circumstance in order to show your Excellency the difficulties which attend any military movements in this country through want of a proper organization; indeed, the more I see of things the more I feel convinced that it is to the benefit of the Porte to have a large force of regular troops stationed here, and if measures be not speedily taken to this effect, I am inclined to think the disturbances on this side, instead of being curtailed, will assume still wider dimensions. The Kutchi have, in reality, no grievances whatever against the Government; they were never molested by the Turkish authorities; and the cause of their insurrection at the present moment may be chiefly attributed to the intrigues of Montenegrin and Russian agents.

Although in my despatch dated the 1st of April, I mentioned that measures were being taken to assemble a numerous force at Scutari, yet to-day the Governor assures me that the Bashi-Bazouks who were expected from Dibbra do not seem inclined to leave their homes, and that he entertains little hopes as to the arrival of any more regular troops. Ishmael Pasha has telegraphed several times to the Porte on this subject, but his applications have had no effect.

Ishmael Pasha is a far more able and energetic person than Rashid Pasha, but he certainly does not receive that support which he is entitled to from his Government. The answer invariably given to Ishmael Pasha's demands for more troops to be sent to Scutari is, there are plenty of irregular troops at Scutari.

It is true there is no lack of material, but, in the first place, these people are without organization; and, in the next, it being the object of each Chief to bring with him as few soldiers as possible, and to obtain payment for four times the actual number employed by him, the strength of the military part of the population on this border lies dormant and undeveloped. The Prince of Montenegro, on the contrary, has subjected the whole of his country during the last four or five years to a certain system of military organization,

and has many foreign officers (Poles and Italians) employed in his service. In short, in Albania, as regards its irregular troops, there is no system and no unity of action, and in Montenegro there is unity of action and some sort of system. The following it a list of the stations and the number of regular troops engaged in protecting the frontier between Spuz and Spizza:—

Garrisons.	Infantry.	Men.
Spuz	1 tabur	500
Podgoritza	6 "	3,000
Medun	½ "	250
Yablak	1½ "	750
Lessendria	2 companies ..	200
Morik	2 tabors ..	1,000
Antivari and Spizza	3 "	1,500
Scutari	1 company ..	100
Total	.. ..	7,300

In addition to this may be reckoned some 2,000 irregulars, giving a daily total of 9,300 men. Although this force is more or less scattered about the country, yet it would be very difficult to make any other disposition of them at present, as any of the places above mentioned, if left unoccupied, would be exposed to the ravages of the Montenegrins.

There are, therefore, no troops (Nizam) at hand to enable the General to act on the offensive on an extended scale; his movements are necessarily confined; he has neither the means of reinforcing his garrisons if attacked, or of properly protecting his convoy of provisions.

The fortress of Scutari is also entirely unprotected. Now, as any operations here, to be effectual, must be based on a combination of offensive and defensive manœuvres, and as little dependence can be placed on the present utility of the Bashi-Bazouks, it is perfectly evident that the present force is by no means adequate to the contingencies of the occasion. If the Porte is desirous of obtaining any signal success on this frontier, an additional force of fifteen battalions of infantry and two field batteries ought to be assembled at Scutari with as little delay as possible.

One or even two more steamers are also absolutely necessary for service on the lake, for if unfortunately either of the present steamers happen to get out of order, the troops at Gablak, Podgoritza, Lessendria, &c., would run the risk of being left without provisions.

The steamers ought to be flat-bottomed, and should not draw more that 3½ feet of water.

So much for the state of the military affairs. I shall now for a moment draw the attention of your Excellency to the manner in which the civil affairs appear to be carried on at Scutari.

In the middle of the general confusion which reigns in every branch of the Administration, we find the members of the Medjlis-i-Kabir bent upon plundering the Government. To give your Excellency an idea of the extent to which this robbery is carried on, I have to state that during the last fifty days some 300,000 rations, supposed to have been issued to the troops stationed at Morik, have been paid for by the Government; according to this calculation 6,000 rations have been daily expended at Morik, but the number of troops actually employed there have never exceeded 2,500 men, and hence there is a daily loss experienced by the Government in the rationing of the troops at one station of 5,250 piastres.

This fraud is the work of two of the members of the Medjliss, who are intrusted with the superintendence of the commissariat. The money thus squandered would be sufficient to supply nearly three times the number of troops employed; it is, therefore, time that such a state of things should be put a stop to, that some of the delinquents should be punished, and a control placed over this reckless expenditure. Rashid Pasha, who is anxious to quit Scutari, seems to take little interest in the affairs of the government of this place; he is also in bad health, and is totally unable to conduct the administration of such a province. The Medjliss is composed of a number of ignorant people, but this cannot well be otherwise in a country where ignorance is universal; many of the members are even spies of the Consuls, and yet the Vali will not move without the consent of this Council; the consequence of this is that nothing is done to remedy the abuses which I have just spoken of. In short, the Vali has no authority or

control over the people, he does not act with sufficient firmness and energy, and if he be suffered to remain here much longer the whole machinery will come to a standstill.

Among such a population and in the midst of such disorder the civil power should not be divided, it ought to be centred as far as possible in the hands of the Governor; he alone ought to be held responsible, and the Council should only exist *pro formâ*. Without this everything will remain in a state of anarchy, and the Government will cease in reality to exist.

But the influence of the Government is not becoming less only in the plains; it is also declining daily in the hills. Although Hassan Hotti is now no longer here to dispute the authority of the Pasha, yet no attempt is made to organize the government of the mountains.

The Buluk Bashi, or chief, still continues to be nominated by the Medjlis of Scutari, instead of by the people of the tribe; the inhabitants of the mountains have not their Chiefs or elders chosen by themselves to represent their interests with the Governor, and consequently the Government, having no relations with the mountaineers, excepting through a person a stranger, so to say, to their customs, possesses in reality but little influence among them; and here it might be remarked, that it is not necessary to introduce any new policy into the government of the Mountain, it is merely necessary to adopt those rules which were laid down by Melemenlu Mustapha Pasha, the best Governor that ever ruled at Scutari, which were carried into execution by him, which have been unhappily neglected by succeeding Governors, and the object of which was to bring the Government into direct instead of indirect relations with its subjects.

From the foregoing your Excellency will observe there are several changes which seem to be absolutely necessary for the better administration of this province; necessary, however, as it is that something should be done to bring about a more salutary state of things, to augment the authority and influence of the Government, and to develop the military resources of this province, we may rest assured that nothing can or will be done by the present Vali.

A Civil Commissioner, chosen for the occasion, invested with extraordinary powers, and entrusted with the mission of reforming abuses, might be enabled to place matters on a better and more stable footing.

But will the Porte think it advisable to make any such appointment?

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

No. 611.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received May 8.)

Constantinople, May 8, 1862.

(Telegraphic.)

OMER PASHA informs the Porte that the Prince of Montenegro has accepted the ultimatum which he was ordered to communicate to him, but adds that the Prince's conduct continues to be far from satisfactory.

No. 612.

Earl Russell to Lord Napier.

(No. 98.)
Foreign Office, May 8, 1862.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE herewith, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna, respecting the state of affairs in the Herzegovina.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

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* No. 601.

No. 613.

Earl Russell to Lord Napier.

(No. 100.)
Foreign Office, May 8, 1862.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE herewith, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches respecting the affairs of Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 614.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 224.)
Foreign Office, May 8, 1862.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 176 of the 16th ultimo, I transmit, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a report from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna relating to the question of a communication with the sea being granted to Montenegro.†

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 615.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 225.)
Foreign Office, May 8, 1862.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches from Lord Bloomfield and Mr. Perry relating to insurrectionary plots against the Ottoman Empire.‡

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 616.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 226.)
Foreign Office, May 8, 1862.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency, for your information, copies of despatches* respecting the affairs of Montenegro and the Herzegovina.§

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 617.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received May 9.)

(No. 215. Confidential.)
Constantinople, April 27, 1862.

My Lord,

AALI PASHA yesterday showed Mr. Pisani, confidentially, a despatch from Halil Bey, the Turkish Minister at St. Petersburgh, reporting a conversation he had had with Prince Gortchakow on the affairs of Montenegro.

The Emperor, said his Excellency, was much concerned to find that Omer Pasha was about to address Prince Nicholas in terms of menace. His Majesty had always hoped the Porte would one day make concessions to the Montenegrins calculated to promote a better understanding hereafter. The Sultan, if well advised, ought not any longer to defer recognizing the independence of Montenegro, accompanied by such an increase of their territory as would enable the inhabitants to earn a livelihood by honest

* Nos. 595, 600, and 604. † No. 600. ‡ Nos. 591 and 592.
§ Nos. 586, 587, 588, 593, 595, 598, 601, and 604.

means. And finally, the Prince told Halil Bey that he was communicating on this subject with other Powers, and hoped to induce them to act in concert with Russia.

I am not aware to what extent the French Government shares these views; hitherto the French Ambassador has contented himself with deprecating a resort to hostilities, and has even admitted that the Turks have received such provocation from the Montenegrins as would fully justify them in reprisals. But his Excellency is so anxious to warn the Porte against possible danger and so apprehensive that the Servians would take part in the quarrel were the Turks to invade Montenegro, that I am disposed to think the Emperor Napoleon—whose personal sympathies are said to be warmly enlisted in favour of the Montenegrins, is only seeking some fair pretext for assuming a more decided tone on this question, and joining Russia in her resistance to the impending attack.

The Abbé Krasnich, a mischievous French agent at Scutari, frequently mentioned by Mr. Acting-Consul Ricketts, is about to be expelled the country by order of the Porte, and M. de Moustier has hitherto refrained from interfering in his behalf.

Hassan Hotti, a turbulent Albanian Chief, now in captivity in Cettigné, whose presence at Scutari is also considered by Mr. Ricketts as most injurious, will, on his release by the Montenegrins, be exiled to some place in the interior of Asia Minor.

I have, &c.
(For Sir H. Bulwer),
(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

No. 618.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received May 9.)

(No. 224.) *Constantinople, April 30, 1862.*

My Lord,

I HAVE read with great interest an able report of Mr. Oliphant, dated Corfu, March 13.

It resembles many documents of the same kind written by clever travellers in European Turkey. All people in these countries are great talkers, great intriguers, great speculators on events, and though there is always some truth in what they say, it is generally exaggerated; a man of ability, and particularly a good writer, brings all the stories he hears together (these becoming by their very connection more exaggerated than before), and thus the picture represented to us is far more formidable in its aspect than the reality generally proves to be. No doubt the French and Russians in different degrees encourage the Montenegrins. No doubt the French intrigue with the Latin tribes, and these might under certain circumstances declare against the Turks. No doubt the Servians, if opportunity favoured them, would throw off their allegiance to the Sultan and head a Selavonic movement. No doubt the Greeks prognosticate the downfall of the Ottoman Empire and the approaching extension of their own sway over Thessaly and Epirus. The number of politic makers in all these parts are always at work to weave up tales, prophecies, and systems out of these materials, and any little event in Europe immediately puts in movement that atmosphere of rumours which is for the last twenty years at least the breath of the East. Mr. Oliphant observes on the difference he marked in his journey fifteen months ago and that he has now made. Just so the insurrection in Greece, and the report as to the enterprize of Garibaldi, have set all the newsmongers at work. In another three months he might pass the same way and find the state of agitation and expectations he describes almost wholly passed away. It constantly, indeed, happens to me to read despatches from some Consul in whose ability I have confidence, but whose mind working on these topics almost necessarily overexcites itself, which would induce one to imagine (if one's judgment was not bridled by experience) that a general catastrophe was approaching. A month afterwards the Consul in question does not perhaps even allude to any of the calamities a short time since so confidently predicted. I will not say that some day or other they who are for ever prophesying revolution may not be right; a man has only always to be predicting rain and some day or other it rains; but though it is quite natural for Mr. Oliphant to write as he does, his writing does not give me that alarm which if I were not used to such reports it would inspire me with. Your Lordship may possibly remember I said the same thing of my nephew's able reports from Belgrade. They could not be better written; they could not be more plausible; they were not by any means destitute of foundation; but upon the whole they were fallacies, and anyone who had trusted to them would have been deceived. It cannot be denied that were Garibaldi to land on the Turkish coast with any number of bold adventurers, and meet on landing with any successes, these would produce a very serious impression and lead to partial movements; but I do not think it probable that Garibaldi will effect such a landing; I think it questionable if he would so easily succeed, and I do not, even if he did, see Omer Pasha's lines forced, Turkish Croatia raised, or Servia entered, nor should I anticipate that immediate massacre of Christians which Mr. Oliphant expects.

In short, I wish your Lordship to bear in mind that the varied character of the population in European Turkey, the hereditary habit of indulging a sort of political gossip which extends throughout it, the constant effort of the different European agents to give themselves importance by political combinations, presumptions, and prognostications, have made, do make, and will, whatever the nature of the Ottoman Government, make European Turkey, as long as the Turkish Empire exists, the field for reports, conjectures, and anticipations, plausible, supported by a certain number of facts, but which, in most cases, will be unsubstantiated, and which a person long acquainted with affairs, though he should not treat them with indifference, will give limited credit to.

If any great European Power declares openly in favour of the Christian population as against the Mussulman rule, and has an army ready to support its doctrines, then the Empire would be in some danger of a Christian rising; but even under such circumstances the danger would not be imminent if the rest of Christendom did not share the opinion of that Power, or if England vigorously opposed them.

There is an inherent strength in the Turkish race, when roused, which is usually in its ordinary state of apathy underrated, and with which a Government that had confidence in itself could do wonders.

But it is to be remembered that the Porte is nearly always suppressing rather than calling into action this resource; it is oppressed by the sense that, as a Mussulman Power, it could not stand against Christendom, and would only feel the courage requisite for a great occasion if it had a Christian Power by its side.

As to the likelihood of Omer Pasha's turning traitor at the head of a Mussulman army, a person must be ignorant of his position here to consider this seriously—I mean, of course, unless some great European State offered him an equivalent position, and then, his habits, his Mussulman connections, and his large property would be great impediments. At present I hold this suspicion as utterly visionary.

As to Rechid Pasha at Scutari, he is a good man; but all my reports lead me to think him deficient in energy.

Ismail, the military Commander, is a very intelligent person, who has always done well where he has been placed in time of peace. I have heard persons question his personal bravery, but I do not know on what foundation.

With regard to Austria and any secret foregone understanding between her and the Porte, I do not believe it; neither Government would wish to compromise itself to eventualities; but I have no doubt, in the event of troubles on the Austro-Turkish frontier, some agreement would instantly be made.

At present, what the Turks, in my opinion, have to do is to confirm their prestige by resolutely banishing the Abbey Krisnik in the first place, and by assuming a decided attitude as to the Prince of Montenegro on the other. To say that it should listen to no advances on the part of this Prince, but resolutely crush him, is well in theory, and would be so in practice, if we were not aware that some of the great Governments in Europe would not, and could not, after the course they have pursued, allow it.

That matter is one which probably must and can only be patched up, leaving future evils to future times; but, at all events, the Prince's humiliation is now a possibility, and may be justified by the course he has pursued; and were he so humbled, things would remain for some time quiet in that quarter, which is all, I fear, one can reasonably bargain for.

It must not be presumed, from what I have said, that I treat lightly the very able document I have been reading, and which evidently shows the person who composed it to be a man of considerable observation, activity, and talent; but it would be wrong in me not to state frankly the impression it produced on me, and, in order to show how easy it is for persons to be deceived by reports in those countries Mr. Oliphant visited, Baron Prokesch was led, from various sources of information, to consider this gentleman (Mr. Oliphant) a confederate of Garibaldi, and employed in preparing for the expected Italian movement.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

No. 619.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received May 8.)

Constantinople, May 8, 1862.

(Telegraphic.)
OMER PASHA informs the Porte that the Prince of Montenegro has accepted the ultimatum which he was ordered to communicate to him, but adds that the Prince's conduct continues to be far from satisfactory.

No. 620.

Earl Russell to Lord Napier.

Foreign Office, May 10, 1862.

(No. 101.)
My Lord,
I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Minister at Berlin,* reporting a conversation which he has had with Count Bernstorff respecting the affairs of Montenegro; but Her Majesty's Government have no intention of suggesting to the Porte any arrangement of these affairs till called upon to do so by both parties.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 621.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received May 11.)

St. Petersburgh, April 30, 1862.

(No. 189. Confidential.)
My Lord,
ALTHOUGH Her Majesty's Government have probably been placed in possession of the papers forwarded herewith by Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople,† I think it right to transmit them to your Lordship, as they have been obligingly confided to me by my Turkish colleague at this Court.

The accompanying instruction, under date of the 9th instant, from Aali Pasha to Khalil Bey, contains a copy of the orders issued by the Grand Vizier to Omer Pasha comprising the terms of a summons to be addressed by his Excellency to the Montenegrins.

This document was laid before Prince Gortchakow by the Turkish Minister. The Prince at first endeavoured to evade any expression of opinion on the subject, but on being pressed by Khalil Bey admitted the moderation of the Porte in not directing their commander to cross the Montenegrin frontier. Prince Gortchakow, however, declined to give positive advice to the Prince of Montenegro to accede in full to the demands of the Porte without further information.

Khalil Bey informed me yesterday that he had intelligence that the Porte had absolutely declined to entertain the terms contained in the Memorandum drawn up by Prince Gortchakow, and forwarded to your Lordship in my despatch marked Confidential, No. 175, of the 15th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 622.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received May 11.)

St. Petersburgh, May 1, 1862.

(No. 194.)
My Lord,
PRINCE GORTCHAKOW stated to me yesterday that Baron Brünnow had informed him by telegraph that your Lordship had received his Memorandum respecting Montenegro in a favourable manner, but that before acting on these impressions your Lordship awaited an appeal from the Porte and the Prince of Montenegro, the parties

* No. 602.

† Inclosure 1 in No. 622.

chiefly concerned. The Prince observed that there was little chance that the Porte would make such an appeal unless prompted from without.

I allowed that such was the case, and that confidential representation at the Porte from influential quarters might be requisite to move it to invoke the mediation of the Powers for the pacific settlement of its relations with Montenegro, but I added that the very first indispensable step to any arrangement would be the restoration of peace and the retreat of the Montenegrin forces within their boundaries. I asked the Prince whether he would not undertake to offer Prince Nicholas a decided expression of opinion that he should draw off his people within the frontiers settled by the European Commission, and accede generally to the terms proposed by Omer Pasha.

Prince Gortchakow replied to me, as he had previously done to Khalil Bey, that he could not undertake to do so without some better guarantee for the execution of the promises of the Porte than had hitherto been given. He could not take a step which would amount to a condemnation of people in arms against Turkish oppression; what assurance could he have that after the withdrawal of the Montenegrins the Turks would adhere to their promises for the better government of the population of Herzegovina?

I asked Prince Gortchakow whether it was true that he, in combination with France, had pressed on the Government of the Sultan the cession of the port of Spizza to Montenegro.*

His Excellency replied that he had not done so; that I might observe in his Memorandum that all mention of a port was omitted; if the Turkish Government chose to make that concession he would certainly approve and accept it; but he had not urged a point which he conceived would have added to the difficulties of an arrangement.

The Prince said that he feared that his overtures had been rejected at Constantinople, but this did not materially discourage him; the Porte might see fit to reconsider its decision. His Excellency had received an impression that the last engagements on the Montenegrin borders had been decidedly unfavourable to the Turkish forces, although Omer Pasha had endeavoured to disguise his defeat by specious telegraphic reports.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 622.

Aali Pasha to Khalil Bey.

Le 9 Avril, 1862.

M. l'Envoyé,
J'AI l'honneur de vous envoyer ci-joint la traduction Française des nouvelles instructions adressées en dernier lieu à Omer Pacha.

Vous savez combien a été grande et même trop grande la longanimité dont le Gouvernement Impérial a usé dans cette question. Mais le moment est arrivé où il lui devient impossible de rester plus longtemps inactif sans manquer à ses devoirs, à ses droits les plus sacrés, et à sa dignité. Les Monténégrins ont jeté le masque. Ils occupent à l'heure qu'il est plusieurs villages de Scutari. Sûrs de ne pas être poursuivis dans leur intérieur, ils concentrent toutes leurs forces partout où ils voient des forces inférieures et ils les attaquent libres de tout souci d'être attaqués chez eux. Un pareil état de choses, qu'on peut dire sans exemple dans les annales du monde, ne peut et ne doit pas se prolonger. Des deux choses l'une, ou le Monténégro est un Etat indépendant, ou il est un pays vassal. S'il est indépendant, il nous a déclaré la guerre et nous devons agir comme on agit entre belligérants; s'il est vassal, il s'est révolté contre son Suzerain, et le premier devoir comme le premier droit du Suzerain est de réprimer la révolte. Malgré tout cela et le désir de notre auguste Souverain d'empêcher l'effusion du sang humain l'emportant sur toute autre considération, nous ne demandons aux Monténégrins que de rester tranquille chez eux. Vous verrez par les instructions susmentionnées la modération on ne peut plus grande que nous y mettons. Nous ne voulons rien changer aux conditions existantes de la Montagne. Nous n'avons en vue que la pacification et le rétablissement de la tranquillité de ces pays.

Nous espérons encore que les Chefs montagnards seront assez raisonnables pour saisir l'occasion que nous leur offrons. Mais si contre toute attente ils persistent dans leur conduite hostile et subversive, notre Général-en-chef est autorisé à prendre les

* See No.

mesures qu'il croira les plus propres à obtenir par les armes ce qu'il nous a été impossible d'atteindre par les voies de conciliation.

Agréez, &c.
(Signé) AALI.

Inclosure 2 in No. 622.

The Grand Vizier to Omer Pasha.

Le 9 Chéval, 1278.

(Traduction.)

NOUS avons pris connaissance des dépêches télégraphiques échangées entre votre Altesse et le Prince Nicolas concernant les nouveaux empiétements des Monténégrins. L'un des motifs allégués par ces derniers à l'appui de leurs agressions c'est que malgré la publication de l'amnistie accordée aux populations des villages de Karnitcha et Selteha, sis dans le cercle de Scutari, qui s'étaient déclarées pour les Monténégrins, des troupes ont été expédiées dans ces localités; l'autre motif c'est que l'exportation des céréales a été prohibée, il y a six mois, dans ces mêmes localités pour cause de disette, et que des mesures défensives ont été prises pour arrêter les incursions des Monténégrins.

D'abord, lorsque une population insurgée demande grâce, personne n'a ouï dire jusqu'à ce jour qu'il existe en principe une loi quelconque énonçant que "du moment où l'amnistie serait accordée pour les fautes précédentes de cette population, il n'y ait plus dès lors nécessité d'envoyer des troupes sur les lieux." Si l'autorité, après avoir promis le pardon, tentait de punir les amnistiés, elle pourrait être comme de droit répréhensible, attendu qu'elle aurait dans ce cas violé ses engagements; mais le Gouvernement Impérial n'a eu en aucun temps l'habitude de recourir à un moyen si déloyal. En outre c'est un fait connu et constaté que les habitants du dit village de Barnitza avaient spécialement délégué leurs primats auprès du Commandant des troupes irrégulières en garnison à Chistan pour le prier d'envoyer un poste à leur village dans le but de les défendre contre les montagnards, que les troupes qui ne s'étaient rendues sur les lieux qu'à la suite de cette demande et ce désir n'ont commis aucun acte contraire à l'amnistie et que les Monténégrins ont surpris le village en grand nombre.

Le Monténégro n'ayant aucune garantie, aucune protection à exercer vis-à-vis de ces localités, n'est-il pas très surprenant de le voir soutenir que l'établissement d'un poste porte atteinte à son honneur? Il est donc évident qu'une prétention de cette nature ne peut suivant la raison et le droit être discutée ni admise; aussi les réponses de votre Altesse à ce qui a été dit sur les questions des mesures défensives et de la prohibition de l'exportation des céréales ont-elles été trouvées conformes à la vérité et à la justice.

Faire rentrer à l'obéissance les insurgés de certains districts de l'Herzégovine et défendre Scutari, telle est, votre Altesse ne l'ignore pas, la ligne de conduite que le Gouvernement Impérial s'est tracée par rapport à ce pays. Or, au moment où les populations ont plusieurs fois penché vers cette obéissance, et que l'affaire a été sur le point d'être résolue, les Monténégrins en ont empêché la réalisation par leurs instigations et menaces occultes ou publiques. Ce sont encore eux qui ont en particulier amené l'insuccès de la Proclamation publiée par votre Altesse au début de sa mission dans l'Herzégovine, Proclamation concernant les concessions à toutes les demandes exposées antérieurement par les habitants, Proclamation dont la teneur avait été appuyé par les délégués des Puissances amies alliées de la Sublime Porte.

Le Gouvernement Impérial tolère, enfin, depuis plus de cinq ans, les empiétements journaliers ainsi que les instigations publiques ou secrètes des Monténégrins, supporte des dépenses considérables, et ferme les yeux sur les actes trop connus commis par eux sur les soldats et autres individus qu'ils rencontrent isolément.

Néanmoins, tout le monde se rappèle combien la Sublime Porte malgré cet état de choses a fait preuve de conciliation en voulant élargir le cercle de la Montagne et en déterminer les limites de concert avec les Puissances amies.

En présence de cet état de choses les Monténégrins rompent aujourd'hui la visière en basant sur les susdits motifs, dénués de fondement, leurs actes agressifs que jusqu'à ce jour ils commettaient d'une manière officieuse et les niaient au besoin et en leur donnant de la sorte un caractère officiel. Ils se permettent, d'un côté, d'envahir les villages en question et de porter secours publiquement et en masse aux habitants de Wassovitch, et continuent de l'autre à intervenir ostensiblement dans les affaires des districts de l'Herzégovine. Dans cette circonstance le Gouvernement Impérial ne saurait plus garder le silence et voir d'un œil indifférent l'effusion prolongé du sang de

tant de créatures humaines Musulmanes et Chrétiennes; il ne peut non plus tolérer le pillage de leurs biens, l'incendie de leurs propriétés, et laisser ses soldats l'arme au bras spectateurs de ces méfaits. On a mille fois eu la preuve qu'il n'a jamais outre-passé jusqu'ici la ligne de démarcation et que l'agression a toujours eu lieu du côté des Monténégrins; entre autre, leur présence à l'heure qu'il est dans les localités situées en deçà des limites, vient à l'appui de cette assertion.

En conséquence le Gouvernement Impérial croit avant tout de son devoir d'exiger de l'Administration du Monténégro l'engagement péremptoire et officiel avec les garanties suffisantes:—

1. De ne plus aider en aucune manière les habitants du district de Wassovitch et de s'abstenir totalement de leur prêter le concours actif qu'ils préparent actuellement.
2. De se retirer immédiatement des villages de Karnitza et de Selteché, ainsi que des autres endroits qui se trouvent en dehors des parties délimitées.
3. De restituer, sains et saufs, et sans retard, les soldats irréguliers et leurs officiers se trouvant à Karnitcha qu'ils avaient transférés à Cettigné.
4. De s'abstenir de toute assistance matérielle et morale aux districts précités de l'Herzégovine et d'en retirer, sous le plus bref délai, les Monténégrins qui s'y trouvent.
5. De ne plus désormais se permettre des actes d'agression.

Vous voudrez bien porter officiellement ce qui précède à la connaissance du Prince Nicholas en lui communiquant une copie de cette dépêche. J'ai en même temps l'honneur de vous faire part que si dans un délai de cinq jours, à partir de la notification de la présente, vous ne recevez pas une réponse contenant la pleine adhésion du Prince à cet égard, d'ordre Impérial votre Altesse est entièrement autorisée à prendre toutes les mesures que vous croirez nécessaires uniquement pour repousser les agressions sus-mentionnées en deçà des limites tracées et pour rétablir l'ordre et la sécurité des habitants, sans aucune intention tendant à modifier le *statu quo* de la Montagne par rapport à sa position administrative et territoriale.

No. 623.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received May 11.)

(No. 201. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, May 5*, 1862.

THE Porte has rejected the overtures of Prince Gortchakow for the settlement of Montenegro.

The decision of the Turkish Government is embodied in the inclosed telegram, the substance of which has been imparted by Khalil Bey to the Russian Minister.

Prince Gortchakow remarked that the language of the Porte was proud.

It is the language, replied Khalil Bey, of an independent Government on a footing of equality with that of Russia.

The Prince remarked that independence was the dearest possession of a people. The Montenegrins had preserved that independence for a hundred-and-fifty years; he could never advise them to surrender it. Nor was the fate of the other Christian races under the Turkish rule calculated to induce the Montenegrins voluntarily to place themselves under the suzerainty of the Porte. He trusted the Porte had not said its last word.

Khalil Bey expects a more detailed communication.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

Inclosure in No. 623.

Aali Pasha to Khalil Bey.

(Télégraphique.) *Le 27 Avril*, 1862.

REÇU votre rapport du 14. Je vous exposerai en détail par le prochain courrier les motifs très puissants qui nous obligent à décliner les propositions du Prince Gortchakow. Nous eussions été très mauvais ministres si nous avions conseillé à un Souverain nouvellement monté sur le Trône d'inaugurer son règne par la reconnaissance de l'indépendance du Monténégro et par une nouvelle cession de territoire à cette population armée et systématiquement hostile. Au lieu d'un tel plan M. le Ministre des Affaires

Etrangères de Russie aurait fait un acte de justice s'il avait bien voulu engager les Monténégrins à reconnaître, sous la garantie des cinq Puissances, la suzeraineté du Sultan. Sur une base pareille nous leur accorderons des facilités qui les empêcheraient de mourir de faim comme on le prétend. Quant au troisième point du plan dont il s'agit vous pouvez assurer le Prince Gortchakow que nous avons depuis longtemps décidé à étendre sur les autres parties de l'Herzégovine tout ce qui a été promis aux Consuls Commissaires par la Proclamation d'Omer Pacha. Mais son Excellence concevra aisément que nous ne pouvons admettre aucune intervention étrangère à cet égard.

No. 624.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(*Received May* 11.)

Dardanelles, May 11, 1862.

(Telegraphic.)

TELEGRAM about health of King of the Belgians received. Prince of Wales has not yet arrived. Engagement took place on 8th instant, near Cotich, between Turks, under Ferik Omer Pasha, and 3,000 Montenegrins, the latter completely defeated.

No. 625.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(*Received May* 12.)

(No. 22. Political.)

Bosna-Serai, April 22, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a late telegraphic correspondence between his Highness Omer Pasha and the Prince of Montenegro, just received from Mostar, which your Lordship will doubtless read with interest.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure in No. 625.

Telegraphic Correspondence between Omer Pasha and the Prince of Montenegro.

(No. 1.)

A Son Altesse le Prince du Monténégro.

D'APRES des rapports parvenus les Monténégrins continuent sans relâche leurs invasions sur le territoire d'Albanie, brûlant les villages et ravageant les campagnes. Ces actes déplorables ne justifiant nullement vos protestations réitérées, d'observer une stricte neutralité, je m'adresse pour une dernière fois à la loyauté de votre Altesse en la priant de me donner des explications précises et formelles de ces incursions journalières, afin que je puisse en aviser mon Gouvernement et en demander les instructions nécessaires.

Le Serdar Ekrem,
(Signé) OMER.

Mostar, le $\frac{16}{28}$ *Mars*, 1862.

(No. 2.)

A Son Altesse le Serdar Ekrem à Mostar.

J'aurai l'honneur de faire remarquer à votre Altesse que la neutralité que je m'étais imposée a toujours été strictement observée. Votre Altesse, mieux informée, guidée par l'équité et sa haute raison, verra, j'en ai la conviction, que les Monténégrins n'ont nullement dans cette circonstance envahi ni saccagé le territoire Albanais. Je ne nierai point qu'ils ne se soient rendus au secours des populations récemment amnistiées et qui avaient le droit de compter sur un pardon généreux, exempt de toute rancune et de

velléités de représailles. Cependant ils ne l'ont fait que sur l'appel pressant de ces populations envahies à main armée par des bandes nombreuses, animées d'un esprit de vengeance manifeste et les menaçant d'une destruction complète. Le caractère profondement hostile de cette occupation ne peut être nié. Si je devais m'en rapporter au dire de quelques prisonniers, les ordres reçus par eux remonteraient à votre Altesse. Voilà les faits dépouillés de tout artifice. Ma position vis-à-vis de la Turquie reste la même; mes sentiments de modération et de conciliation n'ont pas varié.

Le Prince du Monténégro,
(Signé) NICOLAS.

Cettigné, le 29 *Mars*, 1862.

(No. 3.)

A Son Altesse le Prince du Monténégro.

En réponse à votre télégramme d'hier j'ai l'honneur d'exposer à votre Altesse que dans ma dépêche du 26 Mars je n'ai pas demandé des explications sur la récente expédition Monténégrine chez les Kruitschano seulement, mais bien sur les invasions hostiles en Albanie en général, lesquelles se succèdent depuis quelque temps. Votre Altesse passant sous silence toute la série de ces violations de notre frontière, s'efforce uniquement de justifier l'intervention armée à Kruitschané. Je dois donc encore une fois énumérer sommairement tous les faits déplorables qui ne sont guère en harmonie avec les protestations de conciliation de votre Altesse. Avant les événements récents les Monténégrins ont attaqué les villages de Schestan et de Mirik, d'où ils ne sortirent qu'après un combat sanglant; puis ils envahirent les villages de Kernitza et de Seltzé, qu'ils occupèrent même quelque temps jusqu'à l'arrivée de nos troupes. Avant ces faits eut lieu l'attaque contre le bateau à vapeur sur le Lac de Scodra ainsi que mainte aggression contre les villages de Podgoritza et de Spuzza. Je citerai ici la part que prirent les Monténégrins dans les événements de Piva et de Kolaschin, votre Altesse elle-même ayant avoué avoir donné l'ordre à Iwo Rako de les faire rentrer dans leur pays. Récemment, non-seulement les Monténégrins ont, sans motif aucun, et contre tout droit des gens, attaqué le village de Kernitza, mais ils ont encore à cette occasion brûlé le village de Schestan, et attaqué celui de Mirik. En même temps les Monténégrins ont fait une nouvelle tentative contre Spuzza, et en ont profité pour incendier les villages de Dahliau, Graba et Veranié. Sous la date du 20 Mars, j'avais prié votre Altesse de m'expliquer le sens de l'envoi de munitions à Vassovich, je n'eus pas de réponse, et aujourd'hui vous y envoyez des troupes. Je m'adresse donc encore une fois à votre Altesse avec la prière de bien vouloir me communiquer des explications détaillées sur les motifs qui ont provoqué ces faits, ainsi que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous le dire dans ma dernière dépêche.

Le Serdar Ekrem,
(Signé) OMER.

Mostar, le 1 *Avril*, 1862.

(No. 4.)

A Son Altesse le Serdar Ekrem à Mostar.

La cause première et unique de tout ce qui est arrivé est la mesure intempestive prise par votre Altesse d'interrompre toute communication avec le Monténégro, sans que le dernier pays eut fourni le moindre prétexte pour une mesure si rigoureuse. Je pourrais répondre point par point à votre Altesse, et lui prouver que jamais les Monténégrins n'ont rien entrepris qu'après avoir été provoqués violemment. Je suis prêt à lui donner toutes les explications qu'elle peut désirer pour cela. Elle n'a qu'à m'envoyer une personne de confiance.

Le Prince du Monténégro,
(Signé) NICOLAS.

Cettigné, le 1 *Avril*, 1862.

(No. 5.)

A Son Altesse le Prince du Monténégro.

Je vois, d'après votre dépêche d'hier, que votre Altesse voudrait me donner confidentiellement des explications que j'ai demandées par voie officielle, devant les soumettre à l'appréciation de la Sublime Porte. En attendant donc que vous voudrez bien accéder à ma demande, j'ai l'honneur de réfuter le motif premier et unique que votre Altesse allègue pour justifier les hostilités Monténégrines. Le manque de récoltes m'avait dicté le devoir et donné le droit, commun à tous lest Etats, de prohiber l'exportation de toutes provisions, mais ne donnait certes à personne celui de violer cette mesure de sûreté publique, et encore moins de porter le meurtre et l'incendie dans les villages limitrophes. En outre je ferai remarquer à votre Altesse que déjà avant cette prohibition les Monténégrins s'étaient rendus coupables de pareils actes agressifs. Enfin, j'ai l'honneur de vous inviter, au nom du droit, de cesser vos hostilités contre l'Albanie, et de retirer vos troupes de la Nahia de Vassovich.

Le Serdar Ekrem,
(Signé) OMER.

Mostar, le 2 Avril, 1862.

(No. 6.)

A Son Altesse le Serdar Ekrem à Mostar.

La mesure décrétée par votre Altesse n'est pas une précaution administrative défendant l'exportation de denrées alimentaires. C'est un blocus, et des plus sévères; je persiste à le connaître comme la cause unique des hostilités. Votre Altesse s'est mépris sur le sens de ma dépêche du 1er Avril. Je ne refusais point les explications qu'elle demandait, seulement ne pouvant le faire par télégraphe, je la priais, si cela lui convenait, de m'envoyer une personne. Je n'avais point l'idée pour cela de faire des communications confidentielles.

Le Prince du Monténégro,
(Signé) NICOLAS.

Cettigné, le 2 Avril, 1862.

(No. 7.)

A Son Altesse le Prince du Monténégro.

Votre Altesse persiste à reconnaître la cause unique des invasions Monténégrines dans la prohibition d'exportation émanée de motifs purement administratifs. Cet aveu même qui suit un peu tard les faits accomplis est déjà une preuve éclatante du manque de fondement de ce prétexte, d'autant plus que votre promesse solennelle d'observer une stricte neutralité retombe dans une époque où depuis longtemps déjà existait la défense d'exportation. Comme enfin ces invasions ont été signalées par des violences sanglantes contre des paisibles villageois et par l'incendie d'églises Catholiques, il ne me reste qu'à citer ces faits au tribunal de l'opinion Européenne, et d'en abandonner toute la responsabilité à votre charge. Votre Altesse voyant néanmoins l'impossibilité de me communiquer les explications désirées au moyen du télégraphe, je la prie de bien vouloir me les faire parvenir par personne de confiance.

Le Serdar Ekrem,
(Signé) OMER.

Mostar, le 6 Avril, 1862.

No. 626.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received May 12.)

(No. 23. Political.)

My Lord, *Bosna-Serai, April 22*, 1862.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a despatch received this morning from Mr. Vice-Consul Zohrab, regarding a rather serious engagement which took place near Cristatz on the 15th instant, in which the Turks were victorious.

I think it right to state, however, that Mr. Zohrab's account of the action is derived from Turkish official sources, and must be regarded with suspicion, particularly as I now hear rumours to the effect that the Turkish troops, far from having obtained a victory, were thoroughly beaten. The facts of the loss of 170 horses laden with provisions and ammunition, admitted in Mr. Zohrab's account, and of the rebels, notwithstanding the severe losses attributed to them, again concentrating, I suppose, in the Douga Pass, coupled with Dervish Pasha's retreat to Cristatz, would not seem to argue a very complete victory on the part of the Turks, even if they do not indicate something very different.

A little later I shall probably either be able to confirm Mr. Zohrab's account or to furnish your Lordship with the real facts. In the meantime, whatever has been the true result of this action, it can only be considered as one of the skirmishes of constant occurrence in the Herzegovina, more important perhaps than usual on account of the numbers engaged, but by no means affecting decisively the situation of either of the hostile parties.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure in No. 626.

Vice-Consul Zohrab to Consul Holmes

Sir, *Mostar, April 20*, 1862.

ON the 18th instant, I had the honour to forward to you the following telegram:—

"Two hundred and fifty horses laden with provision and ammunitions, while proceeding from Cristatz to a position held by Dervish Pasha in Douga defile, have been captured by the rebels. The loss in men is not yet known; it is, I expect, severe, but not equal to the statements circulated. Rebels and Montenegrins concentrated in Douga. Reinforcements have marched to Dervish Pasha."

A few days since, Dervish Pasha entered the Douga Defile, and took up a position at a point called Noshdra, about midway between Cristatz and the plain of Nichsich, where he commenced the construction of three small forts. From Noshdra Dervish Pasha dispatched a large convoy of provisions to Nichsich. This convoy reached its destination, but, while returning, the escort which accompanied it was attacked soon after re-entering the defile by a band of rebels. A sharp fight took place, in which the ingurgents lost about 100 men, and the Turks 25 men and 2 officers killed and 28 wounded.

On the 15th instant the action, of which I sent you the following notice by telegraph yesterday, was fought. It is to this action that my telegram of the 18th refers:—

"Last Tuesday a convoy passing from Cristatz to Douga was attacked by Montenegrins and rebels. The battle lasted five hours. Montenegrins defeated; they left 630 dead and a large quantity of arms. Turkish loss 352, including 21 officers; wounded, 77. Turks lost 170 loads of provisions, not 250, as stated in my last telegram."

The following details of the action have been given me by Omer Pasha:—

On the morning of the 15th a convey left Cristatz for Noshdra. About one hour from Cristatz the advanced guard, consisting of one battalion (about 400 strong) was attacked by a large band of Montenegrins; the battalion immediately wheeled to the left, and took up a strong position on a rocky eminence, from whence the enemy vainly attempted to dislodge it. The rear guard, consisting of six companies of infantry, was also at the same time attacked, but, being too weak to hold its ground, retired in order to Cristatz, fighting its way back. The convoy being to a certain extent deserted, the enemy succeeded in leading off about 170 horses.

Simultaneous with the departure of the convoy from Cristatz, five battalions, under Colonel Izzet Bey, left Noshdra to meet it and to relieve the first escort. These battalions arrived in time to prevent the entire loss of the convoy; they hastened to the assistance of their comrades, and a sanguinary hand-to-hand conflict ensued, which was terminated by the arrival of Dervish Pasha from Noshdra with two battalions and a supply of ammunition. This reinforcement seems to have intimidated the enemy, who immediately retired, leaving on the field 630 bodies and a large quantity of arms, more than 400 rifles and guns alone having been collected. The Turkish loss was, in killed, 332 men and 21 officers; in wounded, 75 men and 2 officers. Colonel Izzet Bey was wounded.

From a reliable source, I hear that the Montenegrins lost many Chiefs, the following being the most noted:—

Senator Stepan Radovich, Serdar Milosch Boyovich, and Capitan Ilia Jucanovich.

The entire Montenegrin loss may be estimated at 1,500.

Colonel Izzet Bey and Hussein Effendi, of the staff, are spoken of in terms of the highest praise for the coolness and ability they exhibited in this action.

Information having been received here that the Montenegrins are again concentrating, orders were sent to Dervish Pasha to destroy the works constructed at Noshdra, and to retire to Cristatz, where he is to remain on the defensive till all the reinforcements on their way to him join.

It is reported that the rebels and Montenegrins engaged in this action numbered about 11,000, being 3,000 of the former and 8,000 of the latter.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAS. ZOHRAB.

No. 629.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received May 12.)

(No. 24. Political.)
Bosna-Serai, April 22, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose copies of despatches, just received from Mr. Vice-Consul Zohrab, regarding the state of affairs in Zupzi.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure 1 in No. 629.

Vice-Consul Zohrab to Consul Holmes.

Mostar, April 18, 1862.

Sir,

ON the 16th instant I had the honour to transmit to you the folowing telegram:—

"Vukalovitch compelled to escape to Grahovo. He was nearly murdered by his people. Signs of submission in Zupzi."

Mihael Spohich, who was formerly Chief of Zupzi, but who was displaced by Luka Vukalovitch, and who escaped to Dalmatia, where he has since resided, has been named Voivode of Zupzi by Omer Pasha. He arrived here two or three days since, and he is to proceed to his post shortly. It is said that the people of Zupzi have received the news of the nomination of Mihael Spohich with marks of satisfaction.

The intelligence contained in my telegram and what is stated above I learnt from Omer Pasha, by whom I was shown letters and telegrams on the subject; but I have since received from persons who, I regret to say, are too interested in the course of events in this province to leave me room to hope that their intelligence is incorrect, information that Luka Vukalovitch has not lost power, and that the rebels of Zupzi do not intend to submit; that Mihael Spohich will not dare to proceed to Zupzi; that, in fact, the whole thing is a get-up to lull the Turks into a sense of security.

The events in Donga appear to confirm this.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAS. ZOHRAB.

Inclosure 2 in No. 629.

Vice-Consul Zohrab to Consul Holmes.

(Confidential.)
Sir,
Mostar, April 20, 1862.

IN regard to my despatch of the 18th instant, I have to add that the three villages of Crushevitza, Drachevitza, and Suttorina, situated at the extremity of Zupzi, near the Austrian frontier, have tendered their submission to the Porte through the Austrian authorities at Castelnuovo.

On the other hand, I also hear that, though these villages have returned to their allegiance, it is not the intention of Zupzi generally to follow their example. It is said that the Chiefs of these villages have been bought over with the money given by M. Martyrt on the part of Omer Pasha and with that given by the authorities in Dalmatia, and that the submission of these villages will only last till they are convinced of the venality of their leaders. To this end Luka Vukalovitch is now working hard, and I am assured he will succeed.

These statements are so opposed to each other that it is impossible without further evidence to come to any conclusion as to which is really true; but I must confess that, from knowledge of the people, and the source of my information, I am inclined to give more credit to the assurance of continued revolt than to the statement of submission.

The defeat of the 15th instant will, it is to be hoped, influence the people in their choice.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAS. ZOHRAB.

No. 630.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received May 12.)

(No. 25. Political.)
My Lord,
Bosna-Serai, April 23, 1862.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that Osman Pasha informed me a few days ago that he had received a telegram from his Highness Omer Pasha announcing that permission had been received by him from the Porte to attack Montenegro, the five Powers having consented to this measure; also that the Serdar had ordered all the disposable troops in Bosnia to be sent to Mostar. These consist of two companies of regulars from this place, four from Vishegrad, and about a thousand Bashi-Bazouks. The two companies from Seragevo left three days ago for Mostar.

This morning I have received a despatch from Mr. Vice-Consul Zohrab, copy of which I inclose, informing me that the permission to his Highness is only of a partial nature. I think it is to be regretted that the Serdar has not full power to act in any way he may think necessary to bring about a termination of the present state of affairs in the shortest possible time, reserving the final settlement of the relations between Turkey and Montenegro to be arranged between the Porte and the European Powers. The permission in question, however limited though it be, vastly improves the Serdar's position, and I imagine that his Highness will not fail to profit by it. I am not yet informed as to his intentions, but, as far as I can judge from the orders which have lately been issued, it would seem that his Highness is aware of the necessity of prompt and vigorous action. I trust that this may be the case, as in a couple of months hence the heat and want of water will prevent warlike operations, and unless something decisive be accomplished this spring serious consequences may be apprehended in Bosnia. The people are in despair at the constant requisitions made for the exigencies of the prolonged state of war in the Herzegovina. Osman Pasha's proposals for exempting the province from furnishing animals for the use of the army, alluded to in my despatch No. 6, have not been carried out. Horses have comparatively disappeared from this province; not only are what are left insufficient for the diminished commerce that still exists, but even the supply of the different towns and villages with the necessaries of life is accomplished with difficulty. At the request of Omer Pasha 226 horses have been contributed by the Governor and the rich inhabitants, both Mussulman and Christian, and sent down to the Herzegovina as a gift. Five hundred more are to be purchased for the Government, if they can be found. This will still further reduce the number left for the use of the province, and it is to be feared that it will not be the last demand. No horses ever return from the Herzegovina; the negligence of the officers who have the care of them is

incredible, and they die by hundreds, or are allowed to stray and fall into the hands of the insurgents. Losses of fifty and sixty at a time were constantly reported last summer, and I am not aware that the Serdar has yet succeeded in organizing more satisfactorily the transport service of the army.

In contemplation of the poverty and misery which reigns in Bosnia, I am at all events happy to state that up to the present moment appearances are in favour of a good harvest and abundance of fruit. The plum crop is of great importance to this province, as there is a very large exportation of the dried fruit.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure in No. 630.

Vice-Consul Zohrab to Consul Holmes.

Mostar, April 20, 1862.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that Livaï Rifaat Pasha has arrived here from Constantinople with instructions for Omer Pasha on the 17th instant.

These instructions give his Highness full powers to act on any side of Montenegro without previous reference to the capital. He is authorized to attack Montenegro if the Montenegrins persist in attacking the Turks in Albania or the Herzegovina; these attacks, however, are to be confined to reprisals, and not to occupation of any portion of the Montenegrin territory.

His Highness's secretary, Dr. Kœtschet, quitted this on the 18th instant for Cettigné; he is probably the bearer to the Prince of the decision of the Porte, and I believe he is also to receive the explanations which the Prince offered in his telegram of the 1st April, copy of which is inclosed in my despatch No. 12, to make to any confidential person who might be sent.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAS. ZOHRAB.

No. 631.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received May 12.)

(No. 26. Political.)
Bosna-Serai, April 24, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the Ferik Hussein Pasha, lately arrived from Constantinople, has entered and established a position in the Vassovic country with six battalions of regulars and Bashi-Bazouks, amounting altogether to about 15,000 men.

The Vassovic district is adjacent to the frontier of Montenegro, where it approaches nearest to Servia, and has been in rebellion, aided by Montenegro, for some time past. It produces about 6,000 armed men. If this expedition prove entirely successful, it will be of immense importance to Omer Pasha in ulterior proceedings against Montenegro, as communication with Scutari in that direction will be opened, and the Montenegrin frontier made more accessible.

Further information regarding Hussein Pasha's proceedings, which I will communicate by next post, is daily expected.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 632.

Consul Stuart to Earl Russell.—(Received May 12.)

(No. 14.)
My Lord,

Janina, April 30, 1862.

I HAVE the honour to send to your Lordship herewith inclosed copy of despatch of the present date which I have addressed to his Excellency Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
(Signed) R. STUART.

Inclosure in No. 632.

Consul Stuart to Sir H. Bulwer.

Sir,

Janina, April 30, 1862.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that the Ferik Ali Pasha started hence on the 28th instant for Prevesa, for the purpose, it is said, of dispatching the battalion stationed there to the seat of war. At the same time the Kinja Bey (chief officer of the Serai) left for Berat with instructions, it is also said, to assemble in that district a body of irregulars, and send them off, with the least possible delay, to the same destination. These movements have been called for by intelligence from the North of fresh disasters to the Turkish arms: and this intelligence, combined with the promised organisation of a National Guard in Greece, has had the effect of raising to a high pitch the hopes of the disaffected in this country. The independence to which they have long aspired is to be achieved, they believe, by the union of the Greek and Slavic races for common action against the Turks; and the course of events, both north and south, seems now, they fancy, to promise an early consummation of such union.

I have been careful to keep your Excellency informed of what is passing in this province; it is my duty now to state that I am far from satisfied with its administration, either civil or military. The Vaalé has given general dissatisfaction by his arbitrary and dilatory conduct. His unnecessary harshness towards the Vallachs has done much to alienate an important section of the population which rendered faithful service to the Porte in 1854; and if there be a discontented spirit among the Albanians, it is in great part to be charged to him. The truth is, the Pasha, being an utter stranger in this country, has no sympathies with any class of the inhabitants; and, being chiefly intent on personal interest, he has not even tried to conciliate their affections or good will. Like all Ottoman authorities with whom I have had to deal, while warm in friendly professions towards England, he is studious to withhold from me information on local subjects, as well as intelligence in respect to other parts of the Empire. On some rare occasions he has applied to me for counsel on matters of secondary importance, less, I believe, with a view of seeking guidance than to lull me with a semblance of confidence. And yet, while thus reserved towards me, he is said to be on terms of intimacy at another Consulate, where a policy is advocated avowedly in favour of the enemies of Turkey. His visits there are frequent and prolonged, his communications ample; and he even goes the length, as I have heard, of taking advice in the same quarter as to the mode of dealing with questions referred to him in the ordinary course of business by this Consulate. The fact is, even-handed justice is an unprofitable thing in this country; and those who endeavour to exact it cannot expect to win confidence with any party; while private interest is here but too generally a stronger motive than public duty. Epirus has suffered much under the administration of its present Governor, and everywhere throughout the province there are complaints of commercial stagnation, scarcity of money, increasing distress, and declining activity.

The military administration of the province has been on a par with the civil. On several occasions I have called the attention of the local authorities to the inadequate state of its defences, and have always been met with assurances that measures were in progress to put them on a proper footing; and even Ferik Ali Pasha, whose arrival here was preceded by a high reputation, has held to me the same language. But comparatively nothing has yet been done. Early in February two battalions of Redif were sent from here to Herzegovina, leaving about 2,000 men for the whole province: 1,000 Albanian irregulars were collected last month, and are now detached through the country. Of these, it should be observed, some 250 are Christians from Kinarra, and their fidelity to the Porte is, at the best, it is said, very doubtful. Finally, one company of Redif, fifty-five strong, marched in here on the 19th instant, so that the fruit of three months'

exertions amounts to nothing more than one battalion of irregulars and a weak company of Redif. Still, the authorities continue to speak in confident anticipation of several thousand irregulars, of three or four battalions of Redif, and of strong reinforcements of Nizam.

I shall not fail to report to your Excellency every arrival of troops that takes place. I am unwilling to lend credit to the report which is industriously circulated, that the Albanians refuse to serve. If such were the case, the consequences might be serious in the present state of Western Roumelia. It is not, however, to be expected that they can have much attachment to a service, the terms of which are so hard. In 1860 the Redif here was disbanded after five months service and had to return to their homes in rags, and many of them barefoot. Such treatment as this is not easily forgotten by a proud and vindictive people. There is now twenty-two months' pay due to the Nizam stationed in this country. They were lately given to understand that all their arrears were about to be paid up. A portion of them is now told off for active service; yet such is the spirit of subordination in the Moslem soldier, that I do not think that a sense of his wrongs will for a moment be allowed to interfere with the calls of duty.

Deducting the 500 men about to leave Prevesa, there will remain in Epirus about 1,500 Nizams, a handful of Redifs, and 1,000 irregulars. The irregulars do not count for much, and it will soon appear how far the expectations of reinforcements are to be realized. Meanwhile, looking to what is passing in the northern provinces and in Greece, it cannot be disguised that this province is in a very exposed state. From the inhabitants I do not yet apprehend much. The bulk of them have been so crushed by long oppression that their feelings and desires have sunk to the low level of their accustomed existence; and even if they aspired to anything higher they could have but little confidence in those who, heretofore their hard task-masters, now appeal to them in the character of patriots and deliverers; for the rayah peasant of the present day experiences harder usage from those of his own race and religion than from the Mussulman.

Amongst those who are agitating the question of independence, there is unity of purpose on one point, namely, to get rid of the Turk. Supposing this end attained, diversity of views would then appear, from which a new series of difficulties would arise. There would be one party for annexation to Greece, another for the reconstruction of a Greek Empire, of which the dominions of King Otho would form a province. There is what is called a Russian party, though what its distinguishing views are the members of it themselves would find it difficult to define; and there may possibly be other minor sections which, owing their existence to transient circumstances, would in time disappear and be merged with the others.

In the first-named of these parties are to be found most of the educated Christians in the country, all those who have formed their principles in the schools of Athens or thence imbibed them second-hand. It is less numerous but more influential than the second, which, without any precise views, delights in visionary projects and wild dreams of the future greatness of the Hellenic race.

It is unquestionable that Russian influence predominates just now with the Christians in these parts. The Russian Consulate here openly espouses their pretensions and lends its authority to the exaggerated rumours which are constantly in circulation to the prejudice of Turkey and to the advantage of her enemies. It strives to work on the popular mind through the instrumentality of the lower clergy, who are entirely at its command—poor discontented men, who, hopeless of improvement under the existing régime, grasp with avidity at any prospect of change. As to the higher order of ecclesiastics, having much to lose, they are, with a few exceptions, stanch in their loyalty to the Porte, as, under its indulgent rule, they are enabled to amass wealth and exercise almost irresponsible power; for this reason there is at present but little sympathy in secular matters between them and those over whom they are placed.

In addition to Russian support the Christians believe that, in their projects of independence, they can reckon on the countenance, either secret or declared, of France. They affirm that the Slavic struggle is favoured by the same Power, and I am bound to state that much passes under my own observation which seems to warrant such notions. Such being the case it can be no matter of surprise if the Christians are at present filled with hopes of early independence. They hear of Turkish defeats in the north, of projected military organization among their kindred of the south. They witness inefficiency —I may add, apathy— on the part of their rulers; foreign encouragement is held out to them, and money in abundance will, it is said, be ready when required. Animated by this conjunction of favouring circumstances, they are, it is said, organizing a plan for action. The brigandage which is on the increase in the neighbouring province is said to form part of it, and may any day be expected to extend to Epirus. In fact, a strong

band is, I have heard, now formed in the Agrafa mountains under a notorious leader named Shem Erghili; and yet the Derbent Agha force is left in a very inefficient state, and the presence of so many irregulars in the country will, I fear, prove a stimulant rather than a check to brigand operations.

In thus writing I beg to assure your Excellency that I am no alarmist and that I am totally free from personal feeling. There is reason to believe that partial or exaggerated accounts are sent from here to suit particular views, and I am anxious that your Excellency should be rightly informed of the real state of matters.

I have, &c.
(Signed) R. STUART.

No. 633.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received May 12.)

(No. 212.)
My Lord, *Vienna, May 8, 1862.*

COUNT RECHBERG has inquired if I had heard anything of the intended arrival of a French and Russian man-of-war in the Adriatic. He said that he had received a telegram from General Mamula stating that a report, apparently from a credible source, had reached him, to the effect that Grovosa was likely to be visited shortly by men-of-war as stated above, and that General Mamula was alarmed lest the appearance of these vessels should add to the excitement among the rebellious population in the Herzegovina.

I replied to his Excellency that I had heard nothing on the subject of these two expected men-of-war.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 634.

Lord A. Loftus to Earl Russell.—(Received May 12.)

(No. 288.)
My Lord, *Berlin, May 10, 1862.*

THE Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne, the French Minister at this Court, has informed me that he communicated lately to Count Bernstorff a despatch from M. de Thouvenel on the affairs of Montenegro. In this despatch was inclosed a Memoir written in 1858 by M. de Thouvenel on the state of that province, which contained suggestions for placing the relations between the Porte and the Prince of Montenegro on a better footing, and proposed certain plans for ameliorating the condition of the Montenegrins.

Prince La Tour said that he had some conversation with Count Bernstorff on the subject of the proposals of Prince Gortchakow, but he expressly stated that he had received no instructions to support them. He stated that Count Bernstorff had offered the objections (reported in my despatch No. 276 of May 3) to Russian proposals which he had submitted to his Government, and that he had since received a letter from M. de Thouvenel, in which he had sought to overrule those objections.

The language held by Prince de La Tour on the occasion was very conciliatory and moderate. It does not appear that he was authorised to support the proposals of Prince Gortchakow, although in many respects his views and opinions coincided with their general purport.

On the question of the independence of Montenegro, Prince de la Tour maintained that Montenegro could not be considered in the light of a Turkish province; that its independence was a "fait" which could not be contested, and that its subjugation by the Porte was not in accordance with the spirit of the present age.

I did not think it advisable to discuss the question of the independence, as it is a very contestable point; but I expressed an opinion that it was most desirable in the interests of all parties that an end should be put to the sanguinary contest which was continually raging between the Turks and the mountaineers, and that with a view to bring the two parties into an harmonious understanding, it would be advisable to avoid raising any needless points of dispute. If, therefore, an arrangement could be entered into by which the Sultan should concede to the Prince of Montenegro some additional arable and pasture lands to prevent his population from living on the spoil of their neighbour, and that the Prince of Montenegro should pay a tribute for these lands, the

question of the suzeraineté of the Porte might thus be established without needlessly raising a question as to the present or past independence of Montenegro.

I observed that when difficulties (and the recognition of the independence of Montenegro would be one of great difficulty with Turkey) opposed the settlement of a dispute, it was always advisable to endeavour to turn them rather than to face them.

Although Prince de La Tour did not mention it to me, I am informed that in M. de Thouvenel's Memoir there is a proposal that the port of Spizza should be ceded to Montenegro.

I merely observed to the Prince de La Tour (as if in ignorance of this proposal in M. de Thouvenel's Memoir) that the mountaineers could be in no want of a port, as they had no objects to export, but that a free transit might be accorded to the Montenegrins for the import of all necessaries of life, with the exception of arms and munitions. I finally stated to Prince de la Tour that I had received no instruction from your Lordship on this subject, but that I had merely expressed my own personal opinions, which were dictated by a feeling of humanity and a desire that by an amicable arrangement between the Porte and the Prince of Montenegro, an end might be put to the savage warfare which had been so long carried on between the Turks and Montenegrins.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 635.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 523.) *Foreign Office, May 12, 1862.*

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches upon the subject of Montenegro and the Herzegovina.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 636.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 542.) *Foreign Office, May 15, 1862.*

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches upon the subject of Montenegro and the Herzegovina.†

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 637.

Earl Russell to Lord Napier.

(No. 194.) *Foreign Office, May 15, 1862.*

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 176 of the 15th ultimo, reporting a conversation with Prince Gortchakow respecting affairs in the Herzegovina and Montenegro, I have to observe that Her Majesty's Government would see no advantage to the Porte in recognizing the independence of Montenegro merely as a reward for the promotion of insurrection by the Prince in the Herzegovina.

Your Excellency will do well to confine yourself, in conversation with Prince Gortchakow, to giving expression to the opinions of Her Majesty's Government, reporting faithfully at all times those of Prince Gortchakow as representing the views of the Russian Government and their interests in the East.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

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* Nos. 621, 622, and 623.

† Inclosure in No. 632 and Nos. 633 and 634.

No. 638.

Earl Russell to Lord Napier.

(No. 107.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, May 15, 1862.*

WITH reference to the assurance given to your Excellency by Prince Gortchakow, as reported in your despatch No. 194 of the 1st instant, that he had not pressed on the Turkish Government the cession of a port to Montenegro, I have to remark that Prince Gortchakow ought not to encourage any transfer of Turkish territory to the Prince of Montenegro inconsistent with the integrity of Turkey.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 639.

Earl Russell to Lord Napier.

(No. 109.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, May 15, 1862.*

I HAVE to observe, in reply to your Excellency's despatch No. 201 of the 5th instant, that the Turkish Government are quite right in rejecting Prince Gortchakow's proposals for the settlement of affairs between the Porte and Montenegro. They cannot be expected to reward insurrection.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 640.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received May 16.)

(No. 238.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, May 5, 1862.*

AALI PASHA has showed me his reply to the Russian propositions respecting Montenegro, which are in the shape of rather a dignified remonstrance against Prince Gortchakow's partiality.

As to the propositions themselves, they are declined; and the Porte considers the declaration of Montenegrin independence impossible.

It seems, however, disposed, if the Prince will acknowledge the sovereignty of the Porte, to make him concessions both as to territory and commerce.

With a good feeling on both sides and the aid of the European Powers, some arrangement would be practicable; but as there is a bad feeling, and both parties seem to attach greater importance to a point of national vanity than to any of more solid interest, I do not see my way at the present time to any composition.

In the meantime the Montenegrins are in the Turkish territory, and the Turks are evidently in a condition to treat Montenegro as a hostile State, if not as a rebellious province.

Some changes have been made in the Government of Scutari, in conformity with Omer Pasha's desire. Reschid Pasha is replaced by Abdi; and Ismail, whom the Commander-in-chief considers a better talker than soldier, and who has resigned, is set aside.

I stated to the Grand Vizier the opinion of our agents as to the two functionaries who are displaced; but after all, the Ottoman Government must be held the best judge as to the qualification of its officers.

The main point, however, in the proposed changes is to have two Lieutenant-Generals, one for Scutari and one for the Herzegovina, so as to leave the Serdar himself more free in his movements.

It is said his health is much shattered, and that he even has the seeds of a mortal complaint in his constitution, which would be a great calamity.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

No. 641.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 236.) *Foreign Office, May 16, 1862.*

Sir,

WITH reference to Acting Consul Rickett's despatch to your Excellency, No. 22 of the 22nd ultimo, I have to instruct you to report to me whether the Porte has taken or intends to take any steps to remedy the defective state of the administration both of military and civil affairs in the Pashalic of Scutari.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 643.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 557.) *Foreign Office, May 17, 1862.*

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches upon the subject of Montenegro and the Herzegovina.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 644.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 27. Political.) *Bosna-Serai, May 1, 1862.*

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 26, it would appear that Hussein Pasha has not as yet made good his footing in the Vassovic country, but has been obliged to retire to a position on its border, where he is awaiting reinforcements from Monastir. These are on their way, and on their arrival it is thought that he will, without much difficulty, be able to establish himself in the heart of the country, and ensure its submission.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 645.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 28. Political.) *Bosna-Serai, May 1, 1862.*

My Lord,

I AM sorry to have to report that I have been informed that Omer Pasha experiences great inconvenience on account of the irregular manner in which supplies are sent to him from Constantinople. It would seem that his Highness is often informed from the capital that such and such a vessel is to sail on a certain day; he takes his measures accordingly, and when the vessel is due he finds she has not even started. I am told that he will with difficulty find provender for the last small batch of horses sent to his Highness from Bosnia on account of these disappointments.

It is in vain to look for success in the Herzegovina if the authorities in the capital thus fail in the punctual execution of what they announce to their Commander-in-chief.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

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* Nos. 623 and 640.

No. 646.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 29. Political.)

My Lord, *Bosna-Serai, May 1, 1862.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 2 of the 31st March, informing me that a conspiracy, having extensive ramifications, is being carried on in the different States adjacent to the Ionian Islands, with the object of uniting the Sclave and Greek races against Turkey, and, as it appears likely that the Ionian Islands may become the centre of operations for this conspiracy, instructing me to keep the Lord High Commissioner informed of any circumstances and proceedings bearing upon this matter which may come to my knowledge.

I have now the honour to transmit to your Lordship copy of a letter on this subject which I have addressed to Sir Henry Storks.

I shall be careful to refuse aid and protection to British protected subjects who may be concerned in plots against the Turkish Empire.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure in No. 646.

Consul Holmes to Sir H. Storks.

Sir, *Bosna-Serai, April 25, 1862.*

I HAVE been apprised by Earl Russell that a conspiracy, having extensive ramifications, is being carried on in the different States adjacent to the Ionian Islands with the object of uniting the Sclave and Greek races against Turkey, and his Lordship has instructed me to keep your Excellency informed of any circumstances and proceedings bearing on this matter which may come to my knowledge, as it appears likely that the Ionian Islands may become the centre of operations for this conspiracy.

The authorities here are aware that for some time past efforts have been made to excite the Sclave race against the Turkish Government, but these efforts have been attended with little or no success, as the mass of the people have exhibited no inclination to risk life and property in any movement the advantage of which they do not clearly understand. Interested parties and certain public journals have often endeavoured to show that the insurrection in the Herzegovina and the hostility of Montenegro to Turkey were the first movements of a general struggle for Sclave nationality and independence, and were to have been followed by risings in Bosnia, and by assistance from Servia, but it was perfectly clear last year to the European Commission for the pacification of the Herzegovina that the people of that province neither understood nor cared for the idea of Sclave nationality and independence, but merely aimed at the amelioration of their own social position, and that the Montenegrins were more inspired by a natural disposition to brigandage, and a religiously cherished hatred of the Turks, than by anything else. If there were partial disturbances in Bosnia they were made with the same object, and without any combination, and were easily suppressed; and Servia has hitherto remained, and, from all I hear, is likely to remain, perfectly quiet, unless the Turkish arms meet with signal reverses.

In speaking with the Governor of Bosnia on this subject to-day, his Excellency said that there are without doubt a number of persons of more or less education, principally natives of Austria and Russia, to whom the idea of a Sclave kingdom and Sclave independence was to be attributed, who diligently make use of the press and of secret agents to endeavour to excite the people, and instil into them ideas and inspirations similar to their own, but generally without effect. His Excellency, when at Belgrade, was aware that the chief seat of their operations was Odessa; they established agents also at Bucharest and other places, and he imagines that what Earl Russell alludes to as going on in the different States adjacent to the Ionian Islands proceeds from the same source. His Excellency is also of opinion, as I am myself, that could tranquillity be restored to these provinces by a termination of the present condition of affairs between Turkey and Montenegro, the machinations in question would naturally cease. I am happy to add that, Omer Pasha having lately been permitted greater liberty of action with regard to Montenegro, there is at least some hope that this desirable result may be obtained.

Should I at any time hear of any circumstances and proceedings bearing on the subject of this despatch, I shall not fail to communicate them to your Excellency.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 647.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 30. Political.)
Bosna-Serai, May 1, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that Omer Pasha, having ordered all the troops in the neighbourhood of Senitza and Yeni Bazar to proceed to Mostar, his Highness has directed the Governor of Bosnia to start for the former place, and the Pasha of Prisrend, in Albania, for the latter, with as many Bashi-Bazouks as they can collect. They are to remain at these important positions on the Constantinople road until, I suppose, regular troops can again be spared to garrison them. It would seem, therefore, that his Highness is losing no time in making the necessary dispositions for acting against Montenegro.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 648.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 231.)
Vienna, May 15, 1862.

My Lord,

COUNT RECHBERG has received accounts from Constantinople of the great supineness of the Porte in sending reinforcements and provisions to Omer Pasha, and he mentioned to me yesterday that Baron Prokesch had been in communication with Sir Henry Bulwer, and that Her Majesty's Ambassador had authorized him, at the moment of his departure for the Dardanelles, to meet His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, to make a representation on the subject in his name as well as his own to Fuad Pasha, and to call the attention of the Ottoman Government to the absolute necessity of devoting the best energies to put down the insurrection in the Herzegovina.

Count Rechberg's latest accounts, as well as those received here by the Turkish Ambassador, are more favourable than what appear to have arrived at Constantinople, but he requested me to draw your Lordship's attention to the hopelessness of expecting Omer Pasha to quell the combined movements of the rebels and the Montenegrins if the force at his disposal were not rendered more effective. What, he said, was most necessary was the organization of a better transport service, and he thought that with this, and facilities for supplying provisions, in which he thought England and Austria might in some way render assistance, the condition of the Turkish army would be greatly improved.

His Excellency gave a most deplorable account of their condition, and of that of the Herzegovina, and of the complete exhaustion of that province from the devastating influence of the civil war and the incursions of the Montenegrins, and he said that if aid were not promptly afforded from abroad, he hardly expected a successful termination of the present Turkish campaign.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 649.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 232.)
Vienna, May 15, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE read to Count Rechberg your Lordship's despatch No. 135 of the 7th instant, stating that Her Majesty's Government concur in the opinions of Count Rechberg respecting a cession of territory to Montenegro which had been proposed by the French Government, and his Excellency is well pleased to find that the two Governments are so perfectly agreed in this question.

I have also read to him your Lordship's despatch to Earl Cowley, No. 494, of the 5th instant (copy of which was inclosed in your No. 140), in answer to one from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris reporting the substance of M. Thouvenel's observations with reference to a Memorandum emanating from the Russian Government respecting the affairs of Montenegro and the neighbouring provinces of Turkey.

His Excellency said that he entirely approved of every word of this despatch.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 650.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 565.)
Foreign Office, May 21, 1862.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, original despatches* upon the subject of Montenegro and the Herzegovina.

Your Excellency will return these despatches when read.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 651.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 566.)
Foreign Office, May 21, 1862.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches upon the subject of Montenegro and the Herzegovina.†

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 652.

Consul Ricketts to Earl Russell.—(Received May 22.)

(No. 27.)
Scutari, May 10, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith inclosed to your Lordship the copy of a despatch dated Scutari, April 28, 1862, and addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, relating to late aggressions on the part of the Montenegrins in Turkish territory.

Since writing the inclosed despatch I am happy to be able to inform your Lordship that the fortress of Medun has been relieved and the Montenegrins completely routed. They lost two cannons and ten standards.

In the inclosed despatch I have also alluded to the fact of 800 barrels of gunpowder having passed through Austrian into Montenegrin territory. Anxious as the Cabinet of Vienna may be to act with a spirit of fairness and impartiality towards the Porte, yet it is much to be feared that the greatest part of the Austrian employés, who are Sclavs, and entertain no small sympathy towards the Montenegrin cause, are acting in direct opposition to the orders of their Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKEETS.

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* Nos. 625, 626, 629, 630, and 631.
† Nos. 648 and 649.

Inclosure in No. 652.

Consul Ricketts to Sir H. Bulwer.

Scutari, April 28, 1862.

Sir,

IN my last despatch I reported to your Excellency that the Latin tribe of the Triepschi were menaced with an attack from the Montenegrins. I am now happy to inform your Excellency that many of the mountaineers have gone to the assistance of the Triepschi, and there is no danger to be apprehended from that quarter.

The Montenegrins have taken possession of the Greek villages of Panari and Gurjevi, lying on the right bank of the Moratcha; they are also in no small force on a height near Yablak. The garrison of this fortress has been lately reinforced, and a detachment of two-and-a-half battalions of infantry patrol the road leading from Planitza to Podgoritza. By these timely measures of the General, the object of the Montenegrins, namely, the cutting off all communication between Planitza and Podgoritza, together with the seizure of the fortress of Yablak, will, it is to be hoped, be entirely defeated.

The other day a deputation of the inhabitants of Selza and Grenitza, who, by-the-bye, farm lands in the plain of Yablak, paid a visit to the Prince at Cettigné; they there informed him that unless he could get possession of the fortress of Yablak, and drive out the Turks, they should be compelled to tender their submission to the Turkish authorities. The villagers in question now find themselves in this dilemma, that they will not be able to sow any crops during the present season; and thus they will most probably be induced through want to desert the Montenegrin cause. Should this really happen to be the case, it might not be impolitic to give them lands in some other part of the Empire, and to remove them from this frontier; for, although they pass their time in agriculture in the summer, they assist the Montenegrins in their invasions on Turkish territory in the winter.

As to the people of Panari who dwell in the plains, and whose village is now occupied by the Montenegrins, one cannot say they have hitherto manifested any symptoms of discontent towards the Government, but as two of their houses have been burnt, and two of their notables sent as prisoners to Cettigné because they ventured to remonstrate against the violence of the Montenegrins, we must expect they will be obliged, at all events for the moment, to declare themselves in favour of the revolutionists.

Your Excellency will, therefore, observe that the present policy of the Prince Nicholas is to strike terror into the minds of those who have hitherto remained neutral, and force the whole of the Greek population dwelling on the frontier to take up arms against the Porte.

Omer Pasha has given orders for the assembly of a large force at Scutari.

The Dibbriotes have at last commenced to make their appearance. Ismail Pasha will start for Podgoritza on Thursday, and will, in co-operation with Osman Pasha, attempt to relieve the fortress of Medun.

This fortress was attacked the other day by a large body of Montenegrins and insurgents; they were, however, beaten off with considerable loss. Two villages in the Fundina, the key to the country of the Kutchi, have been burnt by the rebels. The Porte will therefore be fully justified in punishing this tribe for its treachery.

Mehemet Pasha has, I hear, merely received orders to put in a proper state of defence the line of coast between Antivari and Spizza. He might, however, be most profitably employed in constructing fortifications on some other parts of this frontier. The fortress of Yablak requires reparation; the heights around it should not be left unprotected.

The position at Morik should be strengthened; the forts of Podgoritza and Spuiz are in a state of ruin. Blockhouses should be built on the road to Medun if it be considered necessary to retain this fortress any longer; in short, the Porte would do well to place the whole of this frontier, and not a small portion of it only, in a proper state of defence.

The construction of forts without a force sufficient to protect the workmen is a task by no means easy of accomplishment, and as a large force is about to be assembled here, there could not be a moment more favourable than the present for the execution of such a project.

The Governor assures me that 800 barrels, nominally containing sugar, but in reality filled with gunpowder, have lately passed through Austrian territory into Montenegro.

It is rather contradictory that the Austrian Custom-house officers, who are on most occasions so severe, and so eager to detect the passage of contraband goods, should have been guilty of such negligence on this occasion.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

No. 653.

Consul Ricketts to Earl Russell.—(Received May 22.)

(No. 28.)

My Lord, *Scutari, May 10, 1862.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith inclosed to your Lordship the copy of a despatch dated Scutari, April 28, 1862, and addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, relative to the conduct of the Bishop of Alessio, Todmasci.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

Inclosure in No. 653.

Consul Ricketts to Sir H. Bulwer.

Sir, *Scutari, April 28, 1862.*

IN a despatch dated March 4, 1862, and addressed by me to your Excellency, I stated "that the Bishop of Alessio, Todmasci, an Albanian, and one of the chief revolutionists of this country, was endeavouring to persuade the people of Mirdite to abstain from taking any part in the expected campaign against the Montenegrins." There would now appear to be little doubt as to the truth of this statement, inasmuch as the Bishop himself, in a conversation with the Austrian Consul, in the presence of several people, said, "I am sorry I am not going to remain here much longer," (alluding to his intended journey to Rome,) "for I would take good care that not a single Mirdite should lend his assistance to the Porte against the Montenegrins." He broke out also into the most violent invectives against the Austrian and Turkish Governments. In my despatch of March 17 I have already alluded to the conduct of this personage, and I feel convinced if he be permitted to reside in these districts and preach the doctrine of revolution, that, sooner or later, the Christians will be brought into collision with the Mussulmans.

The Austrian Consul has, I must say, not lent any countenance to these proceedings of the Bishop, but has written to the Archbishop of Antivari requesting the Bishop may be removed from his post, and sent to Durazzo or some other place. This will be, however, but an insufficient remedy for so great an evil. As far as I am able to learn, the Abbé Krasnik, the Bishop Todmasci, and a rayah priest, by name Marco Galata, are actively engaged in endeavouring to bring about a revolution among the Latin tribes. The future tranquillity, therefore, of this province depends in a great degree upon the measures which the Porte may think fitting to adopt towards these people.

I must, however, here remark that, although the Bishop Todmasci has done all in his power to produce discord, the Bishop of Scutari, Signor Cucci, has laboured, on the other hand, to maintain peace and tranquillity among all classes, and his just and equitable conduct merit the favourable consideration of the Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

No. 654.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 577.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, May 22, 1862.*

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches upon the subject of Montenegro and the Herzegovina.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

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* Nos. 644, 645, 646, and 647.

No. 655.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

Foreign Office, May 22, 1862.

(Telegraphic.)

IF, on conversing with Aali Pasha, you shall perceive any prospect of good to be effected in Montenegro by good offices without giving the Prince any more territory, you are authorized to use your good offices either alone or in concert with other Powers.

No. 656.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 259.)

Foreign Office, May 22, 1862.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches relating to the affairs of Montenegro.*

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 657.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 261.)

Foreign Office, May 22, 1862.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a despatch from Mr. Consul Holmes on the subject of the irregular manner in which supplies are furnished to Omer Pasha from Constantinople;† and I have to instruct your Excellency to inquire into the facts which Mr. Holmes reports.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 658.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received May 23.)

Constantinople, May 23, 1862, 12 A.M.

(Telegraphic.)

THE Porte had consented to accept the reply, though by no means satisfactory, of Prince of Montenegro to its ultimatum, but fresh acts of aggression made the Turkish Government aware that the insincerity of the Prince left nothing for the Sultan's Government to do but to resort to arms.

Dervish Pasha marched consequently to the rescue of Nichsich, and, according to accounts received, beat the Montenegrins in two battles, and relieved the town.

No. 659.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received May 24.)

(No. 214.)

St. Petersburgh, May 13, 1862.

My Lord,

WHEN I waited upon Prince Gortchakow this forenoon, his Excellency opened at once, with considerable animation, on the affairs of Montenegro, in the presence of M. de Budberg and M. Jomini, an able and confidential Secretary in the Department.

The Prince, after some remarks, read aloud a despatch from Prince Lebanow, which reports the refusal of the Turkish Government to negotiate on the basis of the Memorandum imparted to your Lordship by Baron Brünnow.

He then hurried M. de Budberg and M. Jomini out of the room, so that these gentlemen remained uninformed of the views of Her Majesty's Government on this question, which I thought rather unfair.

The despatch of Prince Lebanow is drawn in rather high terms, and puts a colour

* Nos. 632, 634, 638, 646, and 649.

† No. 645.

on the relations of the Turks and the Montenegrins which, in my humble opinion, is very far from being faithful, for the Turks figure in it as aggressors, and the Montenegrins as victims. Some irritability on the part of Prince Lebanow may, however, be excused, as he holds a very false position in this matter, and has a very disagreeable part to play in consequence of the errors of his Government.

Among other things, Prince Lebanow states that in his conversation with Ali Pasha on this subject, he had told the Pasha that if the Turks attempted to subdue and exterminate the Montenegrins, the Russian Government would never "tolerate" it.

I could not but protest against the hypothesis put forward by Prince Lebanow, and I reminded Prince Gortchakow, in the most emphatic manner, of the repeated provocations offered to the Porte, and of the moderate and defensive attitude observed hitherto by the Government of the Sultan, which, far from threatening the subjugation of Montenegro, had repeatedly disavowed any such project, and had even recently expressed its intention not to invade the territory of the Mountain.

Prince Gortchakow then read me a long report from Baron Brünnow, containing the substance of his conversation with your Lordship respecting the overtures made by the Russian Government for the adjustment of the relations between Montenegro and Turkey.

In your Lordship's despatch No. 97 of the 2nd instant referring to this interview, your Lordship says that you restricted yourself to the declaration that you would not interfere unless called upon by both parties to do so.

Baron Brünnow reports this expression of opinion, but records some other reflections on your Lordship's part of a general nature, such as these, that the mere recognition of the independence of Montenegro could not extinguish in a moment hereditary animosities of an ancient date, and that this measure might excite hopes among the Christian population in the neighbouring provinces of Turkey. Baron Brünnow, however, adds inferences and expectations of his own which concur to form a rather hopeful picture, and to leave the impression that your Lordship is not, on the whole, unfavourably inclined to the proposals of Prince Gortchakow.

Under these circumstances I thought it best to make a distinct declaration of your Lordship's sentiments founded on your despatches to this Embassy, in order to preclude all misunderstanding hereafter, and I was the more moved to this course by the consideration that the Turkish Minister was engaged to make a peremptory communication to Prince Gortchakow on the same afternoon of an unpalatable character. I thought it would afford my Turkish colleague some support if the views of Her Majesty's Government on behalf of the Government of the Sultan were first expressed, and that I might thus temper the feelings with which that communication would be received.

I therefore stated to Prince Gortchakow that your Lordship did not find in the terms suggested by his Excellency any guarantee for the Porte, any security that the aggressions of which it complained would not be repeated, and that your Lordship recognized the right of the Porte not only to repel the attacks of the Montenegrins, but to pursue them on their own territory and chastise them there. I added that should the Porte determine to do so, and should the rights of the Sultan be disputed or the action of his Government be thwarted by the representations of any Power at Constantinople, I made no doubt Her Majesty's Government would give their countenance and support to the Sultan; but I felt sure that Her Majesty's Government would never urge the Porte to any hazardous course.

In confirmation of these statements I read to Prince Gortchakow the passages from your Lordship's despatch No. 97 of the 2nd instant, which are inclosed herewith.

Prince Gortchakow acknowledged theoretically in the most explicit terms the right of the Turkish Government to make war, with all its legitimate consequences, against Montenegro, but contended that Her Majesty's Government would ill-serve the interests of Turkey by encouraging it in such an extravagant and ruinous policy, and that I would do well to infuse sentiments of moderation rather than of violence into my Turkish colleague.

In replying to these remarks I reminded Prince Gortchakow of the sentiments which I had always possessed on this subject, which no one would justly qualify as violent, and I assured him that I had always spoken in the same strain to Halil Bey, who was himself enlightened and temperate in his judgments.

In the course of this conversation Prince Gortchakow more than once emphatically stated that there was nothing final in the overtures made by him for the settlement of Montenegro. He was open to receive suggestions from other quarters; if guarantees were required on behalf of the Porte, let them be proposed, and he would give his best consideration to the subject.

I find Prince Gortchakow convinced that the bulletins put forth by the Turkish Commanders in Herzegovina are entirely devoid of truth, and that the news spread of the triumph of the insurgents and the discomfiture of the Turks by the Austrian newspapers in the Sclavonic interest are entitled to credit.

In this conflict of asseveration I cannot discover the true facts of the case. It is apparent, however, that the Porte is engaged in a very arduous struggle, and that any expedient for its termination which the allies and well-wishers of the Sultan could now devise would be useful and well-timed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

Inclosure in No. 659.

Earl Russell to Lord Napier.

Foreign Office, May 2, 1862.

(Extract.)

I HAVE to inform your Excellency that Baron Brünnow has read to me the Memorandum referred to in your despatch of the 15th instant. I did not make any remarks further than to say that Her Majesty's Government had determined not to interfere unless they were called upon by both parties to do so.

It is obvious, however, that the advantages promised to Turkey in the Memorandum are quite illusory. If the Porte were to recognize the independence of Montenegro, the Montenegrins might the very next day surprise and slaughter a Turkish detachment in Turkish territory.

Even if it were advisable to acknowledge Montenegro as an independent State, on which point it is not necessary at present to give an opinion, the Porte would require some security that Turkish territory would be respected, and that rebellious Turkish subjects would not be assisted by the Prince of Montenegro.

It is evident that the systematic policy of Montenegro with respect to Turkey is aggressive and encroaching.

No 660.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received May 24.)

(No. 218. Confidential.)

St. Petersburgh, May 16, 1862.

My Lord,

THE Turkish Minister communicated a despatch from Ali Pasha on the afternoon of the 13th instant to Prince Gortchakow, embodying a peremptory rejection of the overtures made by his Excellency for the settlement of Montenegro.

The despatch is conceived in more confident terms than the Russians are used to hear from the Turks, and the Prince listened at first with frequent marks of impatience. Ali Pasha had, however, interspersed some personal compliments to the Russian Minister very highly seasoned, which appeased his Excellency, and the interview passed off more quietly than would otherwise have been the case.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 661.

Earl Cowley to Earl Russell.—(Received May 24.)

(No. 672.)

Paris, May 23, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to return herewith to your Lordship the original despatches on the affairs of Montenegro and the Herzegovina from Mr. Holmes,* which were transmitted to me for my perusal in your Lordship's despatch No. 565 of the 21st instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

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* Nos. 625, 626, 629, 630, and 631.

Inclosure in No. 661.

Omer Pasha to Prince Callimaki.

(Télégraphique.)

Scutari, le 23 Mai, 1862.

VOTRE Excellence aura appris par télégrammes de notre Consul à Raguse que deux attaques de Luka Vukalovitch contre forts de Zubzi furent repoussées avec grandes pertes, que poudre et instruments pour miner nos sources restèrent entre nos mains. Monténégrins, après avoir inutilement pris et brûlé quelques maisons de Nichsich, tentèrent assaut général sur la ville, mais furent repoussées par la garnison et les habitants, laissant 424 morts sur place.

Le 18 Dervish Pacha battit les Monténégrins dans la Douga; le lendemain l'ennemi, encouragé par des renforts considérables, accepta un nouveau combat, mais fut entièrement défait, en laissant plusieurs drapeaux et une foule d'armes au pouvoir de nos troupes.

Le 19 Hussein Pacha, ayant occupé sans coup férir tout le territoire situé sur la rive droite de la Limm, jeta pont sur ce fleuve, le 20 passa ce fleuve avec 7 bataillons infanterie et 4,000 irréguliers, attaqua village et couvent Bérané, position forte de nature et augmentée d'ouvrages récents par l'ennemi. Après les premières décharges, nos troupes se lancent à la baïonnette sur tous les ouvrages, jettent Monténégrins et insurgés hors leur position. L'ennemi s'enfuit poursuivis pendant trois heures par nos soldats; les pertes sont estimées très grandes, les nôtres minimes.

Ainsi tout district Vassovitch entre nos mains, et les habitants, cachés dans les gorges des montagnes, n'ont d'autre refuge que dans la soumission.

Aujourd'hui nos troupes, fortes de 14 bataillons complets et de 3,000 irréguliers, entrent sur territoire Monténégrin du côté de Spuz. Tout fait présumer une grande bataille décisive sous peu.

No. 662.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received May 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, May 24, 1862, 3·15 P.M.

TURKISH Ambassador has received from Omer Pasha telegram dated yesterday from Scutari, of which following is substance:—

"Luka Vukalovitch has been twice repulsed by Turks from fort of Zubzi with great loss of men and munitions.

"Montenegrins made general assault upon Nichsich, but were repulsed by garrison.

"Dervisch Pasha obtained two complete victories over Montenegrins on 18th and 19th, taking several standards and a quantity of arms.

"Hussein Pasha occupied whole territory on right bank of the Limm on 19th, crossed river on 20th with seven battalions infantry and 4,000 irregular troops, and took village and convent of Bérané from insurgents.

"Pursuit of enemy by Turks lasted three hours, and loss of the former estimated very large.

"Whole district of Vassovitch is in the hands of Turks. Insurgents driven to mountains.

"Turkish troops were to enter Montenegrin territory on 23rd in force near Spuz. Decisive battle soon expected."

No. 663.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 24, 1862.

WAS the town of Nichsich ever taken by the insurgents and Montenegrins?

No. 664.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 31. Political.)
Bosna-Serai, May 9, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that Omer Pasha left Mostar for Scutari on the 3rd instant, and that Dervish Pasha, who has lately been made Mushir, has remained for the present in command of the troops in the Herzegovina. Now that the question of commencing hostilities against Montenegro becomes daily more and more pressing, Omer Pasha probably considers that Scutari is a more convenient point than Mostar from whence to direct his operations.

With regard to the action mentioned in my despatch No. 23, Political, my opinion is confirmed by intelligence confidentially communicated to me by officers who were actually engaged; that though, with regard to killed and wounded, both parties suffered pretty nearly alike, and that, though the Turks kept their ground and were not routed, yet they lost all their baggage and the convoy they were escorting, amounting to some 250 horses. Each party is so interested in deceiving the other and the public as to the results of the various skirmishes which take place in the Herzegovina that it is almost impossible to arrive at the truth until long after first accounts have been received.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 665.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received May 26.)

(Telegraphic.)
Constantinople, May 25, 1862, 11·30 P.M.

GENERAL BRUCE was seized on arriving here with intermittent fever. The illness not dangerous, but has kept him in bed two or three days, and leaves him weak. He hopes, however, to leave with Prince of Wales on Tuesday for Athens.

The General's illness is very unfortunate, but Prince Leiningen seems very sensible and to have great weight with His Royal Highness.

The French had spread report of Nichsich being taken. My telegram said it has been in danger, but was relieved.

No. 666.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 603.)
Foreign Office, May 26, 1862.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of three despatches on the subject of Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 667.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received May 27.)

(No. 240.)
Vienna, May 24, 1862.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 248 of this day, in which I record a telegram containing an account of the latest operations of Omer Pasha's armies on the north and south of Montenegro, I have the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's more complete information, a copy of the Serdar's report, which has been obligingly communicated to me by Prince Callimachi.

These successes of the Turks, and their advance into the Montenegrin territory, are important events.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

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* Inclosures in Nos. 652 and 653; and No. 660.

No. 668.

Earl Cowley to Earl Russell.—(Received May 27.)

(No. 688.)
Paris, May 26, 1862.

My Lord,

I FOUND M. Thouvenel this afternoon much preoccupied by a series of telegraphic despatches which he had received respecting the defeat of Dervish Pasha in an attempt to pass the defile of Douga, leading from the Herzegovina into Montenegro.

His Excellency had also received a direct appeal from the Prince of Montenegro, protesting against the aggressive movements of Omer Pasha, and denying that they had been provoked by any attack on his part.

On my observing to M. Thouvenel that there could be little doubt that the aggressions of the Montenegrins had led to the advance of the Turks, his Excellency admitted that this was true, and for his part, he said, if the Turks had been victorious, he should not have been disposed to interfere. But it appeared that what he had always predicted had happened, viz., that the Porte would not be able to prosecute a successful war against the Mountaineers, and the consequences might become very serious in the known disaffected state of the Herzegovina and neighbouring provinces. He was led, therefore, to ask himself whether some proposals might not be made for the conclusion of an armistice between the combatants, with a view of further proceedings for some arrangement of the whole question respecting Montenegro. France would certainly not interfere alone, but she would be ready to consult with the other Powers. It seemed to him that the time had arrived when, if only from motives of humanity, some attempt should be made to put an end to the atrocities which marked this warfare. It was a disgrace to the age that, in the very middle of Europe, heads should be cut off by forties and fifties in cold blood.

I said to M. Thouvenel that I would report his observations to your Lordship, though, as far as I knew, the horrors to which he had adverted had only been perpetrated by the Montenegrins.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 669.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received May 27.)

(Telegraphic.)
Constantinople, May 27, 1862, 4 P.M.

FOLLOWING telegram just received from Mr. Ricketts:—

"Revolt in Wassewitch put down. Montenegrins beaten at Zuptzi, Trebigné, Nichsich, and in the Dooga. Their loss 1,000 in killed and wounded. Turkish forces now moving upon Montenegro."

No. 670.

Earl Russell to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 147.)
Foreign Office, May 28, 1862.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Acting Consul at Scutari on the subject of the present state of affairs in Montenegro,* in order that your Excellency may call the attention of the Imperial Government to the report mentioned by Mr. Ricketts, that gunpowder is at present being sent in sugar-barrels into Montenegro through the Austrian Custom-house.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

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* No. 653.

No. 671.

Consul Ricketts to Earl Russell.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 30.)
Scutari, May 17, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit, herewith inclosed to your Lordship, the copy of a despatch, dated Scutari, May 13, 1862, and addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, relative to the relief of the fortress of Medun, and the defeat of the Montenegrins.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

Inclosure in No. 671.

Consul Ricketts to Sir H. Bulwer.

Scutari, May 13, 1862.

Sir,

IN my despatch dated Scutari, April 28, I remarked "that some of my colleagues had reported that 2,000 Bashi-Bazouks had been cut up by the Montenegrins in the Wassewitch." Now I have since obtained further information relative to this affair. It would appear that there had been a skirmish with the Montenegrins at a place called Lozina, by the 3rd battalion of Chasseurs and some 800 Bashi-Bazouks under the command of a colonel. The force in question was detached from the army of Hussein Pasha, the loss of the regular troops being estimated at 1 officer and 20 men, that of the Bashi-Bazouks at 80 men in killed and wounded. Such is the official information which I have obtained here, and of the truth of which there is but little doubt. This statement is also corroborated by the report of an officer who was there at the time, and who is now in Scutari. The information obtained by my Austrian colleague is framed on the reports of some priests, and of a certain Doctor Petelens, who is stationed at Prisrend as an Austrian agent, in whose reports, however, judging from the character which he enjoys here, little reliance can be placed.

The story circulated at Prisrend, which place, by-the-bye, is further from the scene of action than Scutari, that 2,000 Bashi-Bazouks had been killed by the Montenegrins, was most probably the work of the Bashi-Bazouks, who had taken the first opportunity of leaving the camp, who are seldom to be depended upon, and who are with difficulty compelled, unless paid, to remain more than three or four days in the service.

In my despatch dated April 22, I informed your Excellency that the fortress of Medun was surrounded by the Montenegrins, and that measures were about to be taken to relieve the besieged. I have now the honour to acquaint your Excellency that on Wednesday last three columns left Podgoritza for this purpose, the main column, consisting of five battalions of Nizams, under the command of Osman Pasha. The plan of attack was arranged by Ishmael Pasha, and it certainly does him no little credit. Each column was directed to move by a different route, and the whole of the force arrived about the same time at or near Medun. The Montenegrins, who were assembled there to the number of 3,000, were defeated without any difficulty; 2 guns and 2 standards were taken, and 3 Chiefs and 400 Montenegrins are also reported to have been killed. In addition to this, the Montenegrins lost 150 men in killed during the siege. During this affair at Medun a body of some 800 Montenegrins attempted to pass by Spuiz to the relief of their comrades. They were, however, attacked by the 1st battalion of Chasseurs, commanded by Selim Effendi, and completely routed, leaving some 80 in killed and wounded on the field. The loss of the Turks in both these affairs, and during siege, did not exceed 40 men. Had this expedition been delayed two days longer the garrison of Medun, consisting of 220 men, must have surrendered themselves prisoners to the Montenegrins, for the walls of the fortress, which had been constructed by a Greek carpenter, instead of being built under the direction of an officer of engineers, had been knocked to pieces, and every possibility of retreat had been cut off. The garrison behaved very gallantly during a siege of nineteen days, and as a reward for their services the whole of the officers engaged there have been promoted. Five villages are said to have been burnt in the Kutchi.

Reinforcements are continually arriving here from Dibbra and other places. Two extra steamers for service on the lake are also daily expected.

In my despatch of April 28, I acquainted your Excellency that 800 barrels of gunpowder had passed through Austrian territory into Montenegro. I have now to observe that one of the guns taken at Medun was of Austrian manufacture.

From these circumstances it is evident that the Austrian employés, who are Slavs, and

are as a class favourable to the Montenegrin cause, connive at and assist the passage of contraband goods into Montenegro.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

No. 672.

Consul Stuart to Earl Russell.—(Received May 30.)

(No. 16.)
Janina, May 19, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship copy of a despatch of the 17th instant, addressed by me to his Excellency Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
(Signed) R. STUART.

Inclosure 1 in No. 672.

Consul Stuart to Sir H. Bulwer.

Janina, May 17, 1862.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that, in conformity with a telegraphic communication received from the Foreign Office on the 3rd instant, I left this on the 4th instant, and arrived in Corfu on the following day, so as to be in time to meet Mr. Elliot, who, according to the telegram, might be expected there on the 6th, *en route* for Athens. His Excellency arrived at Corfu on the morning of the 10th, and in the course of that day I had the honour of a lengthened interview with him, in presence of the Lord High Commissioner, in which I endeavoured to sketch the political condition of this province, the general conduct of the local authorities, the disaffected feelings of the rayahs, and the prevailing expectation of their being ere long delivered from Ottoman rule; the secret relations existing between certain parties in Greece and the rayahs of this country were touched upon, as well as the reported union of the Sclav and Greek races against Turkey.

Mr. Elliot left Corfu for Athens on the 11th, and on the 15th I returned to Janina, having on my way back visited the Vice-Consulate of Sayada and the Consular Agency of Santé Quaranta.

I have, &c.
(Signed) R. STUART.

Inclosure 2 in No. 672.

Consul Stuart to Sir H. Bulwer.

Janina, May 17, 1862.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that two merchant vessels laden with war stores for this province arrived at Prevesa from Constantinople on the 5th instant, and that on the 8th instant a battalion of Redifs from Smyrna arrived at the same port, to replace the battalion of Nizam in garrison there, which left on the following day for Montenegro.

Two battalions of Albanian Redifs, numbering 1,370 men, have already been assembled in this province, and are now encamped close to Janina. Contracts have not yet been closed in respect to their rations, and nothing but bread and country cheese is for the present served out to the men. In the same way no steps were taken to provide clothing for them; they are obliged to wear the cast-off rags that were taken from them when disbanded in 1860, and many of them have to go barefoot. It is to be hoped that these deficiencies will in time be supplied. At the same time I think it right to state to your Excellency that no intention seems to exist of carrying out the change notified in your despatch of the 29th December, 1861, namely, "that the Albanian troops in the Sultan's army would probably be allowed to wear the national costume."

On the 15th instant, six horse-loads of treasure, 350,000 piastres, were dispatched from here for Scutari; and it may be taken as a proof either of the tranquillity of the country or timidity of the insurrectionary party that the only escort deemed necessary for

the security of the convoy was a single mounted policeman. As regards the tranquillity of the country, it still continues undisturbed, although brigandage, accompanied with murder, is said to be rife in the adjoining provinces.

I have, &c.
(Signed) R. STUART.

No. 673.

Consul Ricketts to Earl Russell.—(Received May 31.)

(No. 33.) *Scutari, May 20, 1862.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, inclosed to your Lordship, the copy of a despatch dated Scutari, May 20, 1862, and addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, relative to events on the frontier of Montenegro.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

Inclosure in No. 673.

Consul Ricketts to Sir H. Bulwer.

Scutari, May 20, 1862.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's despatch dated April 27, 1862, informing me that the Porte had issued peremptory orders to the authorities at Scutari relative to the removal of the Abbé Krasnik from Miridit. The Abbé was summoned to Scutari, as I informed your Excellency in a previous despatch, but owing to the negligence of the Governor, Raschid Pasha, he was again suffered to depart to the Mountain.

Omer Pasha is, however, well acquainted with the character and transactions of this personage, and it is to be hoped he will avail himself of the first opportunity of carrying into execution the orders of his Government on this subject.

I have further the honour to inform your Excellency that the Montenegrins who had occupied the village of Bunar, on the River Moratscha, have been driven out of that place by a column sent from Podgoritza.

Several villages and two Greek churches are said to have been burnt by the Turkish troops in the district of the Kutchi. Those villages, however, which were set fire to appear to have been the rendezvous of those rebels who were unwilling to submit to the authority of the Turkish Government. Some of the Kutchi have now taken refuge in Montenegro, while others have sent to tender their submission to the Turkish authorities. The rebellion in the district of the Kutchi may, therefore, be said to be extinguished for the moment; and the Turkish troops who were lately employed against the rebels in that quarter have now moved down upon Podgoritza, where Omer Pasha is assembling a large force. The Sirdar Ikrem will most probably make the country between Spuz and Podgoritza the basis of his future operations against the Montenegrins. From Spuz he will be able to march either upon Cettigné or against the Bjelopolovich, and if he can obtain possession of the district of the Bjelopolovich, which is in reality the granary of Montenegro, he might perhaps compel its inhabitants to submit to any terms of peace which he may think fit to dictate.

I am, of course, ignorant of the plan of campaign likely to be adopted by the Sirdar Ikrem; but I feel convinced that the great difficulty which he will have to contend with will be to bring the marauders to an engagement.

Abdi Pasha has been sent to Podgoritza, and Ishmael Pasha in the meantime conducts the administration of affairs at Scutari. Ishmael Pasha is an able and energetic Governor, and commands the respect and obedience of all classes.

A report has been lately circulated at Scutari, through the Russian and Prussian Consulates at Ragusa, that the town and fortress of Nichsich had been taken by the Montenegrins, and that the whole of the inhabitants had been sent as prisoners to Cettigné.

I beg, however, to observe that although the Montenegrins did on the 13th instant attack the outskirts of Nichsich, they were immediately attacked by the garrison and the inhabitants and forced to leave the town two or three peasants were murdered by the Montenegrins, but beyond this no loss whatever seemed to have been sustained by the

inhabitants or the troops of that place. The town of Ragusa seems famous for the circulation of false reports.

The Austrian Consular Agent at Antivari, M. Bradhas, a Sclave, has just received the Russian order of St. Stanislaus.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

No. 674.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received May 31.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, May 30, 1862, 11·30 P.M.*

CONSUL HOLMES telegraphs that the Turks were defeated in marching on Nichsich, but this is evidently a mistake; they seem to have been generally victorious, and the Prince of Montenegro has, I understand, written to the French Consul at Scutari requesting European intervention to protect his inoffensive nation against unprovoked aggression. Aali Pasha, whom I sounded, according to your Lordship's wishes, as to the advisability of our friendly interference, said it would not do to check the Turks in their first successes and before the Montenegrins clearly felt that they were the weakest, and would not be allowed perfect impunity, after which he thought it "might be of great utility."

No. 675.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received June 1.)

(No. 243.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, May 20, 1862.*

AFTER a variety of conflicting reports, by which the hopes of the ardent Panslavists of the Russian Foreign Office were for a time sustained, it appears undeniable that the Turks have forced the defiles of Duga and relieved Nichsich, while another and a larger body of the Sultan's forces have invaded the territory of Montenegro.

Prince Gortchakow has received a telegram to that effect, which he did not show me, but which he had placed in the hands of the French Chargé d'Affaires, whom I met on the stairs. Khalil Bey had a message from Omer Pasha to the same effect.

The Montenegrins are now about to feel the sharpness of a just retaliation; the Russian Minister may regret the erroneous policy which has led him to countenance, or at least permit, the aggressive course of their Prince.

Prince Nicholas in his necessity has addressed an appeal to the Great Powers, stating that, "though he is not in a state of war with the Porte," the Turkish troops have invaded his country and overturned the frontier marks set up by the European Commissioners.

Prince Gortchakow is in no small perplexity. The Montenegrins are so completely in the wrong that he cannot defend them with any colour of justice. He indeed confessed to me this morning that he fully allowed the right of the Porte to make war on Montenegro, whether that country was considered in the light of an independent State or a rebellious vassal, and he could only oppose the prosecution of hostilities on the ground of policy and humanity. His Excellency then drew rather an exaggerated picture of the heroic virtues of the Montenegrins, describing them as men of gigantic stature fighting with rocks, and ready to be exterminated rather than yield. Without disputing the savage courage of the Montenegrins, we may conclude, I think, that they must retire before the superior discipline and improved fire-arms of the Turks. The struggle must be a most costly one to the Porte, but the proximate result ought to be favourable to its arms.

The suppression of the revolt in Herzegovina, and the repulse of the Montenegrins, are new proofs that the Turkish Government is capable of suppressing, by its own power, any attempts at rebellion on the part of its subjects. Since the Greek revolution, which succeeded by foreign intervention, the attempts of the Egyptians, urged by foreign influence, have alone been formidable to the Government of the Sultan. The happy settlement of 1841 has arrested that danger. Subsequent revolts in Bosnia, Albania, Kurdistan, Syria, and other provinces have been, with more or less sacrifice and difficulty, extinguished. The extirpation of the native Mahommedan aristocracy, the centralization

of authority in Constantinople, the moderating influence of the Consular body, the introduction of European order in the army, and the construction of a steam fleet, which enables the Porte to strike with celerity from one extremity of the Empire to another, have all combined to give the Sultan more strength in his own dominions than he possessed in the last century. In the absence of a European convulsion, the Porte can maintain its ground, but the Russians are blind to this truth. They still repeat the deceptive formula of the "sick man," and eagerly expect the remote contingency of the disruption of the hated Muhoummedan power. This delusion is the more to be deplored, because it prevents the Russian Government co-operating with Her Majesty's Government for the practical improvement of the Christian population.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 676.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 32. Political.)
Bosna-Serai, May 12, 1862.
My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that Lieutenant-Colonel Jovanovich, Austrian Delegate to the European Commission for the pacification of the Herzegovina, and lately appointed Austrian Consul-General in Bosnia, arrived here yesterday.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 677.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 33. Political.)
Bosna-Serai, May 13, 1862.
My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the rebels and Montenegrins having a few days ago made an inroad into Nevessin, Dervish Pasha quitted Mostar in pursuit of them. They retired, but in so doing carried off 350 baggage horses belonging to the army at a place called Zaloom, between Nevessin and Gasko. They are also said to have killed two zaptiehs and burnt three villages.

It seems perfectly inconceivable that the horses belonging to the army are not better looked after, considering the extreme difficulty of procuring these animals, and the distress caused in Bosnia by the constant requisitions for them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 678.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 250.)
Vienna, May 27, 1862.
My Lord,

THERE have been so many attempts here to cast doubts on the truth of the accounts of the late successes of the Turkish force in Montenegro and the Herzegovina which have been officially reported by Omer Pasha, that I yesterday inquired of Count Rechberg if his Excellency had any power of verifying the conflicting rumours that were in circulation at Vienna.

His Excellency replied that he had no means of obtaining more accurate information than had been received by Prince Callimachi, and that as to the telegrams from Ragusa, they were chiefly manufactured there under the superintendence of the Russian Consul, and with the assistance of French and Montenegrin agents, for the purpose of placing the events that were taking place in a view favourable to the cause they were defending.

I then told Count Rechberg that the report which he had mentioned to me three weeks ago, that a French and a Russian man-of-war were expected to visit Gravosa, was apparently unfounded, and that nothing, at all events, was known on the subject at Paris,

according to inquiries which had been made by Her Majesty's Ambassador, as stated in Earl Cowley's despatch No. 643 of the 18th instant.

His Excellency was only too willing to believe in this assurance, for no visitors would be more unwelcome at any Austrian port than Russian or French men-of-war, and he is evidently under the impression that this last false rumour has also been the work of foreign agency at Ragusa, its object being to encourage the rebels in their resistance, and to hold forth the expectation that aid was arriving to them from abroad.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 679.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 251.)
Vienna, May 29, 1862.
My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 249 of the 24th instant, I have the honour to inclose a further telegram, dated Scutari, May 27, which has been received by the Turkish Ambassador from Omer Pasha, giving an account of the success which appears to attend the advance of the Turkish troops into Montenegro.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 679.

Omer Pasha to Prince Callimachi.

(Telegraphic.)
(Translation.)
Scutari, May 27, 1862.

I HAVE already informed your Excellency that our troops had marched into the Montenegrin province of Bielopavlovich and that a battle was anticipated. On the 24th our troops, after a two hours' march, came upon the enemy, who were about 6,000 strong, and had taken up a good position on rocky ground. Two of our columns immediately attacked them, and being driven from their position, the inhabitants of the Mountain retreated through the villages of Upper and Lower Martinich, Revina, Choupina, Gliziza, Porsiezi, and Glivitza. The large stones of which the houses and courts of these villages are built were used by the enemy to throw up entrenchments, which, however, were all stormed by our brave soldiers, notwithstanding the fire which was spread in every direction by the retreating enemy. Although the Montenegrins had been in the meantime reinforced by eleven companies, each of 100 men, they were obliged to leave our troops masters of the field, and were pursued by them as far as the mountains.

The enemy left 500 dead on the field, besides those they took away with them. The number of wounded must be double. Our loss was 57 killed and 136 wounded, among the latter Staff-Colonel Mustapha Bey. The number of houses and courts burnt is about 800, of which 400 huts. On the 25th May our troops rested quietly after the victory, and on the 26th they continued their march.

No. 680.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 262.)
Vienna, May 29, 1862.
My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatches to No. 145 inclusive of the 17th and 21st instant, and I beg to transmit herewith despatches which I have received under flying seal from Her Majesty's Agents at Bosna-Serai, Bucharest, and Jassy.*

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

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* Nos. 676, 677, , and .

No. 681.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 253.)
My Lord, *Vienna, May 29, 1862.*

COUNT RECHBERG informed me yesterday that the French Ambassador had read to him a despatch from M. Thouvenel on the subject of the great efforts which were being made by Turkey at the present moment to reduce the Prince of Montenegro to terms, and directed him to call the attention of the Austrian Government to the propriety of inviting the Porte to put an end to the frightful warfare which is going on, and to make such concessions to Montenegro as would enable that country to remain at peace.

His Excellency appears to have replied to the Duc de Gramont that after long forbearance the Porte was at last compelled to adopt effectual measures that would coerce the Montenegrins to retire from Turkish territory of which they had taken forcible possession, and to obtain guarantees that they would desist hereafter from fomenting discord and aiding insurrection in the Herzegovina. In his conversation with the French Ambassador, Count Rechberg sought to justify the invasion of Montenegro, and observed that when the country had submitted, it would be time enough to treat, that it would be useless to make any appeal to the Porte in favour of the independence of the Principality, for their answer could be foreseen, and, moreover, he did not admit that the Powers had any just plea for interference under existing circumstances.

Count Rechberg said to me that he should certainly not consent to any vague or general proposal for improving the condition of the Montenegrins that came from Russia or France; that they had their ulterior objects in view which were in direct opposition to the interests of Austria, and he believed also to those of England, and that he should require that the projects of these Governments, if they ever were to be considered, must be clearly specified, and that no loop-hole be allowed for their extension.

I must not omit to inform your Lordship that before the Duc de Gramont left Count Rechberg, the latter remarked that the proceedings of several French agents in the Herzegovina and elsewhere were not calculated to induce the Porte to listen to any suggestions from Paris; and he then instanced the negotiations that had been undertaken some months ago by Omer Pasha, through Austrian agency, with the object of conciliating Luka Vukalovitch, and which would have succeeded and ended in the submission of that rebel Chief, had it not been for the exertions of the French Consul at Mostar, combined with the active interference of M. Petkovitch, the Russian Consul at Ragusa.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 682.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received June 3.)

(No. 34. Political.)
My Lord, *Bosna-Serai, May 23, 1862.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of a despatch which I have this week addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at the Porte, reporting the town of Nichsich to be attacked, and regarding the present unsatisfactory aspect of affairs in the Herzegovina.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure in No. 682.

Consul Holmes to Sir H. Bulwer.

Sir, *Bosna-Serai, May 20, 1862.*

I HAVE the honour to state that on the 17th instant I forwarded to your Excellency the following telegram:—

"Despatch from Mostar that Nichsich is attacked; provisions exhausted; houses outside fortress burned; women fled. Dervish Pasha hurried to Cristatz. Turks have armed the Christians at Mostar. Matters in the Herzegovina look bad. If Omer Pasha

be prevented from acting immediately against Montenegro disasters may be expected, and affairs become worse."

The post from Mostar to-day brings no positive information. There are all kinds of contradictory reports abroad, and at present it is quite impossible to ascertain the truth.

Since Omer Pasha left Mostar affairs do not progress satisfactorily. Dervish Pasha is a clever man, and a tolerable officer when under command; but as chief he shrinks from the smallest responsibility—dares nothing, and consequently achieves nothing. He is always too late. In spite of his known abilities, he has the ominous reputation of being unlucky, clearly because he neither knows how to make an opportunity, nor to profit by one when it happens to occur. The arming of the Christians appears to me to be an injudicious measure, and to have excited extreme discontent at Mostar. The Greek and Catholic Bishops were applied to by the authorities to urge their different congregations to volunteer as Bashi-Bazouks, to be armed by the Turks. They refused to do so on the ground that the askerich, or contribution paid in lieu of military service, had been already paid twice this year—that the peasants had lost more than 800 horses in the service of the Government without the smallest indemnity; and, also, that they were now engaged in their cultivation, and would be totally ruined if taken from this occupation. Khoorshi Pasha, however, sent orders to the Mudirs to collect Christian Bashi-Bazouks. From Konitza a few have already been sent by force, who, having been furnished with useless weapons, were despatched towards the frontier.

From what I see in the public journals, it would seem that Omer Pasha will not be allowed to pass the Montenegrin frontier, or do more than act on the defensive. In this case I consider the Herzegovina as virtually lost to Turkey, and what may follow this loss it would be difficult to predict. The expense and difficulty of maintaining an army in the Herzegovina, sufficient to preserve the Turkish frontiers from Montenegrin hostilities, is as utterly beyond the capabilities of the Turkish Exchequer as it is beyond the reach of Turkish Commissariat organization. A prolongation of the actual state of affairs also must be, sooner or later, the total ruin of Bosnia, the probable revolt of which province would serve to complicate the situation in a hopeless manner. After the preparations which the Serdar has made a short delay may compromise everything, as the Bashi-Bazouks, who cannot be kept together in activity, will disband, and it will be no easy matter to collect them again.

The Herzegovina would be an invaluable possession for Turkey, were the port of Klek opened to commerce; but if this port is always to remain, as hitherto, closed at the pleasure of Austria, and the Montenegrins are to be allowed to continue their hostilities on the frontiers, and to afford encouragement and asylum to rebels while the Turks are forbidden to do more than defend themselves, the possession of this province seems to be hardly worth the sacrifices which must be made to preserve it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 683.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 633.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, June 3, 1862.*

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches upon the subject of Montenegro and the Herzegovina.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 684.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 638.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, June 5, 1862.*

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copy of a despatch upon the subject of Montenegro.†

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

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* Nos. 678 and 681.

† No. 675.

No. 685.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 298.) *Foreign Office, June 5, 1862.*

Sir,

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, copies of three despatches which I have received from Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, relating to the affairs of Montenegro.*

I am, &c

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 686.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received June 5.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, June 5, 1862, 3 P.M.*

OMER PASHA reports that Turks under Abdi Pasha completely defeated Montenegrins under Nicholas and Mirko on 1st June in Nahya of Katonaska, in Montenegro. Enemy fled, after several hours fighting, with a loss in killed and wounded of 600. Turkish loss 140.

No. 687.

Earl Cowley to Earl Russell.—(Received June 6.)

(No. 748.) *Paris, June 5, 1862.*

My Lord,

WHILE I was with M. Thouvenel this afternoon, his Excellency again adverted to the hostilities going on in Montenegro. His Excellency said that he must admit that the Montenegrins had brought their present troubles upon themselves, but still it was in the interests of humanity that these scenes of bloodshed should cease, and indeed it would be for the advantage of the Porte, whose financial resources could ill bear the drain caused by the maintenance of a large army in an impoverished country. Guided by these feelings M. Thouvenel said that he had addressed himself lately to the Cabinet of Vienna as the Power most interested in the restoration of peace in provinces bordering on Austria, to ask whether the Austrian Government would not take the initiative in proposing an armistice based on the fact that Prince Nicholas' letter of the contained, if not an explicit, at all events an indirect acquiescence in the conditions of the Porte's ultimatum of the

Count Rechberg, M. Thouvenel added, had entertained this suggestion favourably, but had said that he must require a more unequivocal declaration of the acceptance by the Prince of Montenegro of the Porte's ultimatum before he could undertake to interfere. Could this be obtained he would not be indisposed to attempt the establishment of an armistice between the contending parties, when, said M. Thouvenel, the Great Powers might use their influence to obtain some definitive arrangement.

As the language of Count Rechberg thus reported by M. Thouvenel differs considerably, to judge from Lord Bloomfield's despatches of the 20th ultimo, from the accounts given by the Austrian Minister to his lordship, of his conversations with the Duc de Grammont, I asked M. Thouvenel when this communication with Vienna had taken place, and his Excellency replied that he had written to Vienna about a week ago, and had received the Austrian reply yesterday. His Excellency added that he was now about to address himself in a similar sense to the Cabinets of London, St. Petersburgh, and Berlin.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

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* Nos. 659, 660, and 675.

No. 688.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received June 6.)

(No. 297.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, May 28, 1862.*

MR. ACTING-CONSUL RICKETTS has reported to me by telegraph that the revolt in the Wassewitch district in northern Albania has been put down, that the Montenegrins have been defeated at Zubci, Trebigné, Nichsich, and in the Duga Pass in the Herzegovina with a loss in killed and wounded of 1,000 men, and that the Turkish forces were moving upon Montenegro.

In repeating the above intelligence, which I had the honour of communicating to your Lordship in my telegram of yesterday's date, I may as well notice Mr. Holmes' despatch No. 40 of the 18th instant, and the information he says he derived from an European officer as to the bad behaviour of the Ottoman troops.

One must be cautious in hastily crediting these stories; but I shall inquire into the grounds for them. In the meantime, if the victories reported are true, they give the best answer to the accusations referred to.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

No. 689.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received June 6.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, June 6, 1862, 5:30 P.M.*

THE French Government request the Austrian Government to recommend at Constantinople an armistice between the Turks and Montenegrins. Austria disposed to assent if the Prince of Montenegro will accept the five points of Omar Pasha's ultimatum.

The overture of the French Government is supported at Vienna and Constantinople by Prince Gortchakow.

No. 690.

Consul Ricketts to Earl Russell.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 31.)

My Lord, *Scutari, May 27, 1862.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith inclosed to your Lordship the copy of a despatch dated Scutari, May 27, and addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, relative to the occupation of the Wassewitch by Hussein Pasha, the defeat of the Montenegrins by Dervish Pasha in the Duga gorge, the present state of Montenegro, and the entry of the Turkish forces into that country.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

Inclosure 1 in No 690.

Consul Ricketts to Sir H. Bulwer.

Sir, *Scutari, May 27, 1862.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that the Montenegrins, since the 13th of the month, have suffered several defeats on the frontier of the Herzegovina; they were repulsed at Zubci, at Trebigné, at Nichsich, as I mentioned in my last despatch to your Excellency, and they have since then been beaten twice in the Duga gorge by Dervish Pasha; their loss in killed and wounded in the actions in the Duga amounted to 1,000 men, while the loss of the Turks in killed and wounded did not exceed 300.

I have further the honour to acquaint your Excellency that Hussein Pasha having thrown a bridge over the Lim, and having constructed a tête-de-pont for the protection of the bridge over which he must necessarily have returned in case of any reverse, marched with six battalions of Nizam, some 3,000 Bashi-Bazouks, and a battery of guns against the Montenegrins, who, together with the insurgents, had taken up a position in the fortified village of Branrsi. This stronghold was, however, soon captured, the rebels put to

flight, and thus the country of the Wassevitch is now completely in the hands of Hussein Pasha. Many of the inhabitants have escaped into Montenegro, and many have sent to tender their submission.

By the occupation of the Wassevitch, the limits of the rebellion, which was gradually extending towards the frontier of Servia, have been reduced, all possibility of a union with the Servians has been impeded, and Hussein Pasha is now able to act in concert with the other divisions of the army.

By the occupation of the Kutchi district Abdi Pasha is relieved from the presence of an enemy who might otherwise have harassed his right flank; a communication has been opened between Abdi Pasha and Hussein Pasha's corps; the Latin tribes of the Hotti and Triepschi, who, fearing they would have been overpowered by the Montenegrins, were on the eve of declaring in favour of the rebels, have now declared themselves willing to give their services to the Government, and the rebellion, which at one time bid fair to extend even among the tribes of Scutari, is now alone confined to the country of Montenegro.

By the position lately taken up by Abdi Pasha's divison on the heights near Sputz, the Montenegrins have not only been compelled to evacuate the village of Bunar, as I mentioned to your Excellency in my last dispatch, but they have also been forced to quit the heights near Dodosch, from which they had been firing for several weeks past upon the fortress of Yablak. Thus it may be said that the Montenegrins have at last been driven within the limits of their own territory; and here it is worthy of remark that all these movements have been carried out chiefly by means of the regular troops. The regular troops have, it is true, been assisted by the Dibbra irregulars, but there is not one single instance in which the people of Scutari or its mountains (whether Latins or Mussulmans) have been employed against the Montenegrins, that they have offered the slightest resistance to them, they have invariably run away immediately the first shot was fired. The Porte would therefore act advisedly in future in not depending solely upon the services of this part of its population.

I have already drawn this circumstance to the attention of the Serdar Ikrem, who is of opinion that in the formation of any corps for the protection of this frontier, the soldiers should be volunteers selected from Bosnia, Dibbra, and other places, the officers should be furnished from the regular army.

The greatest disorder is now said to prevail in Montenegro, the women are driven by force to carry provisions to the troops; all people between the age of 15 and 60 are summoned to take up arms, and the cultivation of the land is neglected.

The Prince is beginning to become unpopular, and a party, instigated by some of the members of the family of Radovich, is said to be conspiring against him. In short, general dissatisfaction exists among all classes, and a revolution would appear to be imminent.

Omer Pasha having therefore perceived that the moment is favourable for an invasion, has given orders to the Mushir Derwisch Pasha to enter Montenegro by the road leading from Bilekschje and Nichsich.

The Mushir Abdi Pasha, accompanied by twelve battalions of Nizam, 4,000 Dibbra irregulars and two batteries of guns, has also advanced some three hours distance from Spuz upon the high road leading to Nichsich. This part of the country is by no means difficult of access, and the result of this movement will propably be that the districts of the Bjelopolovich, Piperi, and Wassevitch being cut off from the western districts will be compelled to withdraw from the combat. Attacked on all sides, deserted by Prince Michael of Servia, from whom it appears he was led to expect no little assistance, unable to extricate himself from his present dilemma, and prompted by Russian agency, Prince Nikola has again appealed to the Powers for their advice, hoping, no doubt, they will come to his assistance at the last moment; at least such is the construction which I am led to place upon his telegraphic despatch to M. Wiet and to M. Souschinkoff, a copy of which is herein inclosed to your Excellency. The telegraphic despatch in question was communicated unofficially by M. Wiet to myself, the Austrian and Italian Consuls, and also to the Sirdar Ikrem. In this despatch it is stated "that the Prince is not at war with Turkey, and that his territory ought to be respected."

But, after that the Montenegrins have burnt and sacked the village of Shistan, which is situated at some two hours distance within Turkish territory; after having attempted to destroy the steamboat on the lake; after having occupied the villages of Grenitza and Selza during the last five months and taken several Albanians from Turkish territory as prisoners to Cettigné; after having occupied the village of Bunar for the space of three weeks with a force of 2,000 men and two guns, and attempted to cut off the communications between Planitza and Podgoritza; after having besieged the garrison of Medun during a period of nineteen days with a force of 3,000 men and two guns, and ordered the

chief of the Piperi to be shot because he did not succeed in taking the fortress; after having attacked the town of Nichsich and murdered some of the inhabitants; after having killed some of the people of the village of Grenitza and sent two of the notables of the village of Bunar as prisoners to Cettigné because they refused to declare themselves enemies to the Porte; after having attempted to create rebellion in the whole of the provinces adjoining Montenegro, it is difficult to conceive on what just grounds the Prince can pretend to assert that he has not been acting in a manner hostile to the Government of the Sultan; or in what respect he or his people can call their cause the cause of civilization.

Such being the case one can hardly imagine that the present application of the Prince Nikola will be taken into consideration by the Great Powers; and here, I beg to observe, that if the Turkish forces be ordered to retire from Montenegro before the inhabitants of that country have been defeated and discomfited, not only will there be no possibility of obtaining any satisfactory guarantee for the future tranquillity of the frontier, but the Montenegrins themselves, the insurgents of the Herzegovina, the Wassevitch, the Kutchi, and the discontented part of the population in other parts of European Turkey will be emboldened to carry on the work of disorder and agitation. If, however, it be once demonstrated that the Sultan really commands in his own kingdom, and that he possesses both the right and the power to punish those who attempt to rebel against his authority, that very foreign influence which has hitherto supported and encouraged these insurrectionary movements will receive a severe blow, and the people of Montenegro being disheartened will most probably desert the cause of the Prince. The Montenegrin question might then be brought to a more speedy solution than was at first anticipated. Indeed, justice and policy would seem to demand that the Turkish forces should act with the greatest vigour and energy against the Montenegrins.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

P.S.—Yesterday an engagement took place between the Montenegrins and Abdi Pasha's division near Sputz. The Montenegrins were defeated, and the village of Martinitch was taken possession of by the Turks.

Inclosure 2 in No. 690.

The Prince of Montenegro to M. Wiet.

(Télégraphique.) *Cettigné, le 24 Mai*, 1862.

LES Turcs ont envahi le territoire Monténégrin, abattu les pyramides de la délimitation élevées par la Commission Européenne, brûlé et détruit les villages de Bruéha et Vinitza. N'étant pas en guerre avec la Turquie, je comptais que mon territoire serait respecté et que les actes des Grandes Puissances ne seraient pas foulés aux pieds par les Turcs.

En présence de ce mépris pour ce qui est juste, je dénonce aux hautes Puissances les faits des Turcs, leur recommande les Chrétiens de ce pays, les supplie de protéger la cause de la civilisation contre la barbarie, et les supplie de vouloir me dire ce que je puis et dois faire dans une occasion si difficile.

No. 691.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 650.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, June 7*, 1862.

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches upon the subject of Montenegro.*

Your Excellency will return Mr. Ricketts' despatch to this office when read.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

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* Nos. 689 and 690.

No. 692

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

Foreign Office, June 7, 1862.

(Telegraphic.)
ASCERTAIN if you can the present positions held by the Turks and Montenegrins, and report to me by telegraph.

No. 693.

Earl Cowley to Earl Russell.—(Received June 7.)

Paris, June 7, 1862, 4·45 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)
WITH reference to my despatch No. 748, M. Thouvenel informs me that the Austrian Government is about to take steps to propose an armistice between the Turks and the Montenegrins.

No. 693*.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received June 7.)

Vienna, June 7, 1862, 6 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)
COUNT RECHBERG has telegraphed this day to Count Apponyi respecting a communication from Paris on Montenegro. The French Government express their desire to bring about a suspension of hostilities, and propose to Austria to open a negotiation in this sense; Austria is willing to do so on the basis of the Porte's ultimatum and the assurance that Turkish Government have no wish to interfere with the hitherto-enjoyed advantages of the Principality.

Count Rechberg hopes Her Majesty's Government will be the more disposed to agree to join in a proposition of armistice as Omer Pasha's successes render the moment favourable for commencing negotiations, whereas a possible reverse might be seriously injurious to the interests of the Porte.

The Turkish Ambassador has expressed his satisfaction at the projected negotiation, and at the idea of placing Montenegro under the guarantee of the five Powers.

Count Rechberg understands that the French Government have made similar communications to London, Berlin, and St. Petersburgh, and hopes no time may be lost in considering the question.

No. 694.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received June 9.)

(No. 267.)
Vienna, June 5, 1862.

My Lord,
WITH reference to my despatch No. 251 of the 29th ultimo, on the subject of the proceedings of the Turkish troops in Montenegro, I have the honour to inclose some further telegrams that have been sent from Scutari, in the course of the week, from Omer Pasha to the Turkish Ambassador at this Court.

Your Lordship will perceive from these official accounts that the Turkish advance into the Montenegrin territory continues to be attended with success.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 694.

Further Telegrams from Omer Pasha to Prince Cattimaki.

Scutari, May 30.

(Translation.)
THE Montenegrins had thrown up some works round a tower in the neighbourhood of Jenikoi, in order to cut off the communication of our army with Spuzza. On

Wednesday, the 28th, Abdi Pasha attacked this position with 6 battalions and 500 irregulars. The Montenegrins did not accept battle, but left their works, which, together with the tower, were destroyed by our troops. The enemy having taken up fresh ground in the villages of Pilana and Kopovilok, our soldiers attacked him there also. After a short resistance, the Montenegrins fired the village, and retired into the mountains. Our only loss consisted in the Albanian Chief Hotts Bey being slightly wounded. The loss of the enemy is unknown.

Scutari, May 31.

On Thursday, the 29th, a brigade, under the command of Osman Pasha, attacked the large village of Tcherniza, which was occupied by 2,000 Montenegrins. After a short resistance, the enemy set fire to the houses, and fled to the mountains. Osman Pasha had the five towers demolished, and then retired again to his camp.

Scutari, June 1.

As the Vassowitch had submitted, Hussein Pasha sent six Christains to name his conditions. The next day, the 29th of May, 3,000 Montenegrins from Boratza, Rovza, and Pratanvich, attacked Berane, which was occupied by 2,000 irregular troops. Hussein Pasha sent help to them. In consequence of this the Montenegrins were obliged to act on the defensive; they retired in disorder, and gained the mountains, pursued by our troops. We had 27 killed and 40 wounded. The enemy left 57 dead on the field, besides a standard; and the six Christians who are returned to the camp declare the Montenegrins had 200 killed and wounded.

Scutari, June 3.

A certain number of Montenegrins had collected in the village of Musterovici, situated in the Montenegrin province of Kalmuska, which lies to the eastward of our camp. On Sunday, the 1st, Dervish Pasha ordered Brigadier General Osman Pasha to attack with 6 battalions, 4 guns, and with the irregulars under Djelal Bey, and to drive the enemy out. Osman Pasha made a vigorous attack; the enemy fired the village, and took to flight. At the same time Abdi Pasha observed from his position at Bielopavlevics from 8,000 to 10,000 Montenegrins, led by the Prince and his father in person, hurrying up against Osman Pasha. Abdi Pasha immediately advanced 2 battalions, 2 guns, and some irregulars, bringing up the rear with 1 battalion, 1 gun, and some Bashi-Bazouks. Before the Montenegrins could get up, Abdi Pasha was able to occupy the heights near the right wing of Osman Pacha, and behind the village of Yeni Kani, where a few days before a Montenegrin tower had been demolished. This position had been scarcely taken up before the Montenegrins, making a vigorous attack in two divisions, advanced to within 150 paces, and received the heavy fire opened on them by our infantry. The attack was courageously renewed on both sides; but although at one moment the Montenegrins succeeded in driving in our irregulars, they could yet not stand against the charge of our line, and were forced to beat a retreat, which, as our soldiers pursued hotly, soon became a complete rout. The panic of the enemy was such that they forgot their usual custom of showing a front from time to time in the course of their retreat. The loss of the Montenegrins amounts to about 500 or 600 killed, of which they were able to carry off 230. On our side 3 soldiers of the line and 23 of the irregulars were killed, and 48 of the former and 65 of the latter wounded. A large quantity of fire-locks and ammunition, 2 horses, and 1 small piece of hill-ordnance, fell into our hands.

No. 695.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received June 9.)

(No. 269.)
Vienna, June 5, 1862.

My Lord,
WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 147 of the 28th ultimo, inclosing a copy of one from Her Majesty's Acting Consul at Scutari, on the subject of the present state of affairs in Montenegro, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that I have stated to Count Rechberg the substance of this communication, and drawn his Excellency's attention to the report mentioned by Mr. Ricketts, that gunpowder was being sent in sugar barrels into Montenegro through the Austrian Custom-house.

I added that it was believed by the Governor of Scutari that 800 sugar barrels containing gunpowder had lately passed into the Mountain through Austrian territory.

Count Rechberg asked if I could furnish him with any detailed information by which

it would be possible to trace this gunpowder, for he should do all in his power to discover the truth of this report.

I replied that I possessed nothing beyond the Vice-Consul's statement.

His Excellency seemed to think the quantity exaggerated.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 696.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received June 9.)

(No. 275.) *Vienna, June 5, 1862.*

My Lord,

COUNT RECHBERG has informed me that, in the absence of the Duc de Grammont, who is gone to Carlsbad for a month, M. de Bonnières, the Second Secretary to the French Embassy, had communicated to him a despatch from M. Thouvenel on the affairs of Montenegro, proposing that joint measures should be adopted to prevent the further effusion of blood in the Principality, and that if Austria would take the initiative at Constantinople, France would gladly act with her in this sense. M. Thouvenel appears also to have observed in his despatch, that after the acceptance by Prince Nicholas of the Porte's ultimatum, he was surprised at the state of warfare which was going on.

I understood Count Rechberg to say that he had replied to M. de Bonnières, and requested him to report to his Government that Austria willingly accepts the assurance of M. Thouvenel, that Prince Nicholas agrees to the terms of the Porte's ultimatum, and is ready to take this acceptance as a point of departure for negotiations at Constantinople, but that up to the present moment the Austrian Government was under the impression that the Prince had refused the ultimatum, and that nothing was consequently left for Omer Pasha but to commence hostilities.

Count Rechberg has directed Prince Metternich to state to M. Thouvenel that Austria is disposed to enter into negotiations at Constantinople on the basis of the Turkish ultimatum, and on the condition that in whatever arrangement may be concluded with the Porte as to Montenegro, it shall be stipulated that that Principality is hereafter placed under the joint guarantee of the five Powers.

This Count Rechberg considers should be a condition *sine qua non*, and be taken as the basis of the negotiations.

His Excellency added, that a copy of his instructions to the Austrian Ambassador had been forwarded to Count Apponyi for communication to your Lordship.

I believe that a rumour which has been in circulation here, that the Russian Minister has been instructed to represent to Count Rechberg the injustice of the war in Montenegro is unfounded. Nothing in this sense appears, at all events, to have been said by M. de Balabine up to the present moment.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 697.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 660.) *Foreign Office, June 9, 1862.*

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches upon the subject of Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 698.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

Foreign Office, June 9, 1862.

(Telegraphic.)

FRANCE and Austria propose to ask the Porte to consent to an immediate armistice with the Prince of Montenegro, on condition of the Prince's accepting the Turkish

* Nos. 693* and

ultimatum. Ask Aali Pasha what he thinks of this proposition. We shall consult the views and interests of the Porte.

No. 699.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received June 10.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, June 10, 1862, 6 P.M.*

THE Sultan is still prepared to abide by the ultimatum; but the Prince of Montenegro, having accepted it, and afterwards committed fresh incursions, the Porte cannot now agree to an armistice on that basis without first knowing what solid and direct guarantees the Montenegrins propose, that the ultimatum will not be again violated.

No. 700.

Earl Cowley to Earl Russell.—(Received June 11.)

(No. 775.)

My Lord,

Paris, June 10, 1862.

I HAD the honour to inform your Lordship by telegram on the 7th instant that the Austrian Government had informed the French Government of their willingness to undertake to propose an armistice between the Turks and Montenegrins, provided the latter bound themselves to agree to the conditions of the Porte's ultimatum. M. Thouvenel at once telegraphed this intelligence to Constantinople and to Scutari, with instructions to the French Agents to support the proposals of Austria.

I am informed that the Russian Government appears, and also supports the Austrian proposals.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 701.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 665.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, June 11, 1862.

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches upon the subject of Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 702.

Earl Russell to Lord Napier.

(No. 133.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, June 11, 1862.

I INCLOSE herewith, for your information, copies of despatches from and to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna respecting the state of affairs between Montenegro and the Porte.†

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 703.

Earl Russell to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 154.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, June 11, 1862.

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your Lordship's despatches to No. 275 of the 5th instant inclusive. I have also received your Lordship's telegram of the

* Nos. 696, 699.

† Nos. 696 and 703.

7th instant, and a note from Count Apponyi stating that the suggestions of the Austrian Government had been favourably viewed at Paris, and that the Internuncio at Constantinople was to be instructed to ask the Porte to grant an armistice to the Prince of Montenegro.

Her Majesty's Government regret these transactions.

The Prince of Montenegro was undisturbed in his mountain fortresses, and uninterrupted in the exercise of his control over Montenegro, when he thought proper to interfere in the troubles of the Herzegovina.

Assuming that the Christians of Herzegovina had just grounds of discontent, and even provocations to resistance against the Porte, it was known that the Turkish Government were prepared to consider their grievances and make large concessions in their behalf.

When the Prince of Montenegro, therefore, allowed his people to join the insurgents, the Porte naturally asked him to desist. In reply, the Prince Nicholas answered at one time that the Sultan had no business to send troops into a district after granting an amnesty to its inhabitants, and at another that it was the custom of the Montenegrin peasants to possess arms, and that the Prince could not prevent their using those arms in aid of the revolted subjects of the Sultan.

Such replies being rather a mockery than a satisfaction to the just demands of the Porte, Turkish troops were sent to oppose force by force, and to enter the territory of Montenegro.

But no sooner have these troops by their valour and their numbers made an impression on their enemies than some of the Courts of Europe are filled with a misplaced compassion, and endeavour to save the Prince from the natural consequences of his bad faith and of the unprovoked war he has waged against the Sultan.

It appears to Her Majesty's Government that this intervention, if effectual, will only serve to encourage the Prince to repeat his hostile incursions whenever he shall be strong enough to do so.

But a still more serious proposal is put forward by Count Rechberg; it is that of placing the Principality of Montenegro under the guarantee of the five Powers.

Count Rechberg knows very well that the provisions favourable to the Danubian Principalities and to Servia, contained in the Treaty of Paris, have been construed at Bucharest and at Belgrade in a manner to cover pretensions of entire independence. The Austrian Government knows also that those pretensions have not been altogether discouraged by some of the Courts of Europe.

If, therefore, Montenegro is now to be protected by a guarantee, the Prince, it may be taken for granted, will every year put forward some new claim, and the European guarantee will serve, not for the security of the Sultan, but for the impunity of his bitter, ambitious, and persevering foe.

Nay, larger interests are involved. It cannot be disguised that the weakness of the late Sultan, the disorder of his finances, and the corruption of his Court, weakened the Ottoman Empire during his reign to such a degree that every vassal chief upon the frontiers looked to the approach of the day when he should become an independent Sovereign.

To repel any violent attempt to subvert her integrity, and to find palliatives for disorders and misgovernment, were then the utmost hopes of the friends of Turkey. But now that a Sultan of energy and integrity is endeavouring by slow but sound measures to inaugurate a healthy system of finance, and to create a well organized army, it is surely not the moment for the Powers of Europe by untimely interference to paralyze his efforts. The friends of Turkey, and there can be no doubt that Austria holds a principal place among them, should rather endeavour to leave the Sultan free to put down rebellion, free to discipline his army, and rather aid him with friendly counsel in remedying those abuses which ate like a canker into the heart of his Empire, than to weaken him by putting his authority aside in favour of his constant enemies.

It will be for the Porte to grant or to refuse the armistice which is proposed; but it will be for Her Majesty's Government to consider whether, with any regard for the welfare of the Porte, or, indeed, without avoiding serious complications, they can be parties to a guarantee of the Prince of Montenegro and his territories. Such a guarantee, it appears to Her Majesty's Government, would either cripple the Sultan in his own dominions, or lead to the necessity of defending the Porte in an unequal struggle against some of the Great Powers.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 704.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received June 11.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, June 11, 1862, 2 P.M.*

PORTE by a telegram of 10th received news of a victory gained by Dervish Pasha over Prince Nicholas in person. Stroko, where the battle was fought, remains in possession of Sultan and facilitates junction between Dervish and Abdi Pashas. Omer Pasha hopes that ere long the Imperial troops will enter Cettigné.

No. 705.

Earl Russell to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 156.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, June 11, 1862.*

I TRANSMIT, for your information, copy of a despatch relating to the affairs of Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 706.

Consul Ricketts to Earl Russell.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 35.)
My Lord, *Scutari, May 31, 1862.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith inclosed to your Lordship the copy of a despatch, dated Scutari, May 27th, 1862, and addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, relative to the defeat of the Montenegrins near the village of Martinitch by the Turkish forces under the command of the Mushir Abdi Pasha.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

Inclosure in No. 706.

Consul Ricketts to Sir H. Bulwer.

Sir, *Scutari, May 27, 1862.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that I have this moment received the following information from the Sirdar Ikrem:—

That some 6,000 Montenegrins occupied a position near the village of Martinitch, situated about two hours' distance from Sputz within that province of Montenegro; that being attacked by two columns belonging to Abdi Pasha's divisions, they retreated upon the villages of Revina, Choupina, Gliziza, Persizi, and Glaritza. The whole of these places, together with the villages of Upper and Lower Martinitch, were taken by assault. Notwithstanding the Montenegrins received a reinforcement of some 1,100 men, they were compelled to retreat into the hills, leaving some 500 dead on the field and also a large number of wounded. The loss of the Turkish troops in this affair was 57 killed and 136 wounded. The Montenegrins set fire to the villages previously to their being compelled to evacuate them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

No. 707.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, June 12, 1862.*

THE Sultan may fairly in our opinion ask for some guarantees from the Prince of Montenegro that he will keep his engagements.

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* No. 687.

No. 708.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received June 13.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, June* 12, 1862, 11·20 P.M.

IT seems to me that if the Powers were to interfere directly in favour of an armistice, they would encourage Montenegro in the thought she would always be protected, but that if they told the Prince that, as he had placed himself in the wrong with the Turks, he must first make the *amende* to them, after which the Powers would support him in any reasonable proposals, this would much facilitate an arrangement.

What Turkey wants is that Montenegro should sue for peace. The Porte might then take guarantees from her or from Europe.

No. 709.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received June 13.)

(No. 304.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, May* 31, 1862.

I HAVE the honour to state, in reply to your Lordship's despatch No. 261 of the 22nd instant, that Mr. Consul Holmes' report on the imperfect manner in which Omer Pasha receives his supplies from Constantinople was brought under the notice of the Porte on the 12th instant.

Aali Pasha did not deny that some irregularity may have occurred in this respect, but he desired Mr. Pisani to assure me that provisions are now sent from hence to the seat of war with as much regularity as is practicable.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

No. 710.

Mr. Erskine to Earl Russell.—(Received June 13.)

(No. 315.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, June* 5, 1862.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a translation of a telegram received by the Porte from Omer Pasha, announcing that on the 1st instant the Turkish troops, under the command of Abdi Pasha, defeated a large force of Montenegrins commanded by Prince Nicholas, in person, and his father, Mirko, in the Nahya of Katounska, to the north of Spusz, on the Montenegrin territory.

I have, &c.

(For Sir H. Bulwer),

(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

Inclosure in No. 710.

Omer Pasha to the Grand Vizier.

(Telegraphic.)

(Translation.) *Scutari, June* 23, 1862.

ON Sunday, the 1st of June, at break of day, six battalions of infantry, with four guns, under the command of Brigadier-General Osman Pasha, and a sufficient number of irregulars, under Jelal Bey, were sent against the village of Mitronikiva, in the Nahya of Katounska, within the Montenegrin frontier, towards the north of Spusz; that village was burnt, and the Montenegrins there, amounting to several hundred, were dispersed. At that moment 8,000 or 10,000 Montenegrins were seen to advance rapidly against our troops under the command of the Chief of the mountain, Nicholas, and of his father, Mirko, from the village Plava, which we attacked the other day. Abdi Pasha immediately sent two guns, two battalions, and some irregulars, under the command of Colonel Osman Bey, who took up a position on the right wing, and on some hills adjoining a tower over the village of Novoselo, destroyed on a former occasion. Abdi Pasha followed himself with one gun, one battalion, and a portion of irregulars. He had no sooner got there than the Montenegrins also divided themselves into two columns, one of whom attacked,

with great impetuosity, Abdi Pasha, and the other Osman Pasha's division; but, with the assistance of the Almighty, our regulars and irregulars commenced with firmness and steadfastness a heavy fire. For three hours fierce attacks took place on either side, and with the exertions of Prince Nicholas and his father, the Montenegrins succeeded in planting more than seventy of their standards within 150 paces of His Majesty's troops. Abdi Pasha then assumed the command himself. The fight lasted for three hours (more?), but the Montenegrins could not resist the brave onslaught of our troops, and fled in great disorder. They were pursued for some time, and made for Sokol. It is an ancient practice with them, when retreating, for a portion of them to face about whilst the others are going, but they had not strength enough to do it this time, so that our troops returned victorious, having taken possession of abundance of arms, ammunition, or effects abandoned by the enemy in his flight. The regular troops had three killed and forty-eight wounded. The irregulars twenty-three killed and sixty-five wounded. The enemy had more than 600 killed and wounded. They left more than 200 slain, whose decorations have been taken. It is a subject of thanksgiving that the Prince and his father have had an opportunity of witnessing the victory of our troops whilst they commanded in person, because this circumstance cannot fail to have a beneficial effect on future battles.

No. 711.

Consul Ricketts to Earl Russell.—(Received June 14.)

(No. 38.)

My Lord, *Scutari, June* 3, 1862.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith inclosed to your Lordship the copy of a despatch dated the 3rd instant, and addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople relative to military operations on the Montenegrin frontier.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

Inclosure in No. 711.

Consul Ricketts to Sir H. Bulwer.

Sir, *Scutari, June* 3, 1862.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that a skirmish took place last Thursday near Spuz in which the Montenegrins were again defeated. The Montenegrins are now fortifying Cettigné and also a portion of the road leading to that place from Rjeka; whether the Sirdar Ekrem will think it advisable or not to march upon Cettigné it is difficult to say. Further operations are prevented for the moment on this side owing to the want of transport.

The Wali of Monastir, Abdul Kurrim Pasha, has some time since received orders to forward the necessary transport to this place, but through his negligence and inactivity the transport in question has not as yet arrived, and two weeks must certainly elapse before Abdi Pasha's corps can so to say be rendered mobile. In the meantime the force now encamped at Spuz and consisting of 16 battalions of Nizam and 6,000 Bashi-Bazouks, giving a total of 16,000 men, is employed in reconnoitring the country. A large body of Montenegrins is said to have assembled at or near Ostrog to prevent if possible the passage of Dervisch Pasha by the Banja into Montenegro. Hussein Pasha is now employed in fortifying those places in the Wassevitch which must necessarily be occupied by permanent garrisons. After the late action on the Lim, it having been notified by many that they were anxious to tender their submission, it was made known by Hussein Pasha to the inhabitants of the Wassevitch that their wishes would be acceded to provided that they agreed to fulfil such conditions and stipulations as he should think fitting to propose to them.

A day was fixed for bringing matters to a final arrangement, but instead of treating peaceably with the Pasha as they had promised, they attacked his camp with a large force of Montenegrins.

The Turks were, however, on their guard, and the rebels were completely defeated and routed. Be this as it may, as Hussein Pasha is completely master of the country, I have every reason to believe that the want of provisions will ere long compel the inhabitants of the Wassevitch who have again retired to the mountains, to withdraw from the combat and to tender their submission to the Government.

The Abbé Krasnik, after having refused to acknowledge the authority of the Government, and objected to come to Scutari to answer the accusations brought against him by Bib Doda Pasha, was compelled, by the orders of Sirdar Ekrem, to be brought to Scutari accompanied by an escort of police. A Court of Inquiry has also been assembled at Scutari, consisting of Ishmael Pasha, Ahmet Pasha, and the Sirdar Ekrem, for the purpose of investigating the conduct of the Abbé in question.

The Court has, however, not as yet terminated its proceedings.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

No. 712.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 310.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, June 14, 1862.*

I HAD some conversation yesterday at the Foreign Office with Count de Flahaut, Count Apponyi, and Baron Brunnow on the affairs of Montenegro. They all wished that, on the ground of humanity, the Great Powers should interfere, not by force of arms, but by concurrent advice, to obtain an armistice in Montenegro.

Count Apponyi added that the Turkish arms hitherto crowned with success might meet with reverses, and that the continuance of war in these parts might tempt the Italian and Hungarian revolutionists to make a descent in Turkish territory.

I replied by referring to the repeated incursions of the Montenegrins on the territory of the Sultan, and said I thought it but reasonable that the Porte should require guarantees for the future.

When asked by Count Flahaut what guarantees? I said it was not for Her Majesty's Government to prescribe the nature of the securities which the Porte might think fit to require.

I told Count Apponyi that Her Majesty's Government would by no means be a party to a new guarantee of the Five Powers that the Prince of Montenegro would execute faithfully the conditions of the ultimatum proposed by the Porte.

For our own parts we are not disposed to punish the Prince of Montenegro if he should violate those conditions; and Her Majesty's Government considered that the extension to Montenegro of the right of intervention on the part of the Five Powers would prove a source of embarrassment to the Porte. The Danubian Principalities and Servia, in their constant efforts to make themselves independent, were but little restrained by the interference of the Five Powers, and afforded no encouragement to the Porte to set up a similar Principality in Montenegro.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 713.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 678.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, June 14, 1862.*

I TRANSMIT herewith to your Excellency a copy of a despatch addressed by Mr. Ricketts* to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople upon the subject of the relations between Montenegro and the Porte; and I have to instruct you to communicate to the French Government the substance of Mr. Ricketts' despatch.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 714.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 682.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, June 14, 1862.*

I HAD some conversation yesterday at the Foreign Office with Count de Flahaut, Count Apponyi, and Baron Brunnow on the affairs of Montenegro. They all wished that,

* No. 690.

on the ground of humanity, the Great Powers should interfere, not by force of arms, but by concurrent advice, to obtain an armistice in Montenegro.

Count Apponyi added that the Turkish arms, hitherto crowned with success, might meet with adverses, and that the continuance of war in these parts might tempt the Italian and Hungarian revolutionists to make a descent in Turkish territory.

I replied by referring to the repeated incursions of the Montenegrins on the territory of the Sultan, and said I thought it reasonable that the Porte should require guarantees for the future.

When asked by Count Flahaut what guarantees? I said it was not for Her Majesty's Government to prescribe the nature of the securities which the Porte might think fit to require.

I told Count Apponyi that Her Majesty's Government would by no means be a party to a new guarantee of the Five Powers that the Prince of Montenegro would execute faithfully the conditions of the ultimatum proposed by the Porte.

For our own parts we were not disposed to punish the Prince of Montenegro if he should violate those conditions; and Her Majesty's Government considered that the extension to Montenegro of the right of intervention on the part of the Five Powers would prove a source of embarrassment to the Porte. The Danubian Principalities and Servia, in their constant efforts to make themselves independent, were but little restrained by the interference of the Five Powers, and afforded no encouragement to the Porte to set up a similar Principality in Montenegro.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 715.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 35. Political.)
My Lord, *Bosna-Serai, May 30, 1862.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herein, for your Lordship's information, copy of my despatch of the 27th instant to Sir Henry Bulwer regarding a defeat sustained by Dervish Pasha in the Douga Pass while attempting to succour Nichsich, and reporting the successful occupation of the Vassovich district by the troops under Hussein Pasha.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure in No. 715.

Consul Holmes to Sir H. Bulwer.

Sir, *Bosna-Serai, May 27, 1862.*

I HAVE the honour to state that I have just telegraphed to your Excellency as follows:—

"Dervish Pasha defeated with great loss in Douga, 21st May, while attempting to succour Nichsich; six bimbashis of Bashi-Bazouks killed. Dervish Pasha has retired to Bilekia. Vassovich is occupied by the troops under Hussein Pasha."

It would appear that Dervish Pasha marched on the 21st to relieve Nichsich. His advance was composed of Bashi-Bazouks in considerable force, followed by several battalions of regulars, he himself bringing up the rear. On issuing from the Douga Pass into the plain of Nichsich, the Bashi-Bazouks were attacked by a large body of Montenegrins and insurgents, and, after an obstinate combat, were totally routed with great loss. Six of their bimbashis were killed, namely, Mollah Mustafa, of Nichsich, Mehmet Bey, of Bihach, Aslan Bey Arnavot, Karaman Bey, his brother, Mohamed Bey Chengitch, and Abdullah Bey. It is now said that another Bimbashi from Travnik, whose name is not known, was also killed. The regulars retired fighting, and reached Cristatz, whence Dervish Pasha proceeded to Bilekia.

The insurgents and Montenegrins have also made an attack on the Turkish positions in Zupzi, but, as far as I can learn, were repulsed.

It is said that of the town of Nichsich nothing remains but the fortress, all buildings outside having been burnt. The Turks declare that the place will hold out to the last, and

be blown up rather than surrender. The French and Russian Consulates here declare that it is already in the hands of the Montenegrins, but my own information is to the contrary. It is reported, I cannot say with what truth, that the Mudir and 800 men, having made a sally against the besiegers, were all taken prisoners and sent to Cettigné.

In the face of these reverses I am happy to report that the Turks have successfully occupied the Vassovich district. Osman Pasha has forwarded to the Kaimakam here a letter from Hussein Pasha on this subject, stating that, on the 19th instant, having constructed a bridge over the River Lym, he entered the plain of Brannn, and arrived before the monastery therein situated, where he found that the insurgents and Montenegrins had fortified themselves. He immediately commenced the assault, and, after a combat of five hours, the enemy fled. He does not state either his own or their loss, but he declares that the Vassovich district is now totally cleared of insurgents, and completely occupied by his troops, who are sufficient to hold it against any bands which may hereafter venture to enter it. I trust events will confirm the latter assertion, only remarking that many of the Turkish Commanders, after any success, seem too hastily to conclude that all is finished, and abandon themselves to a careless sense of security which is often most unpleasantly and disastrously disturbed when they least expect it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 716.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 36. Political.)
My Lord, *Bosna-Serai, May 30, 1862.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that a telegram was last night received by the authorities here from Omer Pasha, of which the following is a translation :—

"On Saturday the 24th, after two hours' march in the Montenegrin district Bielopavlovich, our troops encountered the enemy 6,000 strong, in an advantageous position. Immediately attacked by two columns the Montenegrins gave way, and retired by the following villages: Upper and Lower Martinich, Revina, Choupina, Glizica, Persiczi, Glavitza. The houses and stone towers were successively taken by assault by our brave soldiers in the midst of the flames of the conflagration. The Montenegrins, reinforced by 11 standards, of 100 men each, were forced to give way before our troops, who pursued them to the mountains. The enemy left 500 dead on the field, without counting those whom they carried off. The number of wounded must be double. We had 57 killed, and 136 wounded, among whom Mustafa Bey, Colonel of the Staff. 890 houses and towers burnt. On the 25th the troops celebrated their victory, and the 26th continued their march."

The villages mentioned in this telegram are in the neighbourhood of Spuz. Doubtless this affair will cause the absence of numbers of Montenegrins, who will hasten to resist Omer Pasha's advance from the side of the Herzegovina, and, if Dervish Pasha is wise enough and energetic enough to take advantage of the diversion, the Turks may recover the checks they have lately received in the neighbourhood of Niehsich.

I have not telegraphed either to your Lordship or to Sir Henry Bulwer the important news contained in the above-mentioned telegram, because I assume that this will certainly have been done by our Consul at Scutari.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 717.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 281.)
My Lord, *Vienna, June 12, 1862.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 275 of the 5th instant, and to the telegram recorded in my despatch No. 276 of the 7th instant, on the project of the French Government to promote a negotiation at Constantinople for the purpose of effecting an armistice between the Porte and Montenegro, Count Rechberg informs me that the Internuncio has telegraphed that the Turkish Government seem disposed to treat on the subject, and he

therefore now hopes, as he has heard from Count Apponyi, that your Lordship was indisposed to take any step in the matter until you were aware of the opinions of the Porte respecting the projected armistice, that Her Majesty's Government will give their powerful support to the negotiation which may be opened; and he trusted that nothing would occur to prevent the cordial co-operation of England and Austria in this affair.

Count Rechberg said that he was now waiting to hear the result of an instruction which had been sent by M. Thouvenel to the French Consul at Scutari, to repair to the head-quarters of the Prince of Montenegro, and advise His Highness to agree to an armistice, and as the success of the Turkish troops continues, he considers the moment very favourable for commencing a negotiation.

His Excellency has not given me any further explanation as to his views respecting the bases of a future arrangement between the Porte and Montenegro, but as far as I can learn, they seem to be comprised in the following points :—

Security against the participation of Montenegro in rebellious proceedings in the Herzegovina and neighbouring Turkish provinces.

Maintenance of the present territorial circumscription of the Principality.

Acknowledgment by the Porte of the *status quo ante* in Montenegro.

The Five Powers to guarantee the new arrangement.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 718.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 286.)
My Lord, *Vienna, June 12, 1862.*

THE following telegram, communicated by the Turkish Ambassador, appears in the evening edition of the "Presse" newspaper :—

"Omer Pacha to the Turkish Ambassador at Vienna,—

"On Saturday, May 31, Derwish Pasha left Bileke with eighteen battalions, 2,000 irregulars, and a large quantity of transport waggons for provisions.

"On Sunday, June 1, he bivouacked in Vatnica. The next day he attacked the Montenegrins at Kitta, and after two bloody fights drove them out of all their fortified places; and on Tuesday he entered Niehsich, and rested his troops.

"On Thursday, 5th, Derwish Pasha came upon a strong body of Montenegrins, commanded by the Prince himself in the Pass of Uskok, on the road from Niehsich to Spuz, which had taken up a strong position surrounded by triple fortifications. The troops of Derwish Pasha attacked them immediately, drove the Prince and his troops out of all their entrenchments, and pursued the fugitives as far as the Convent of Ostrog.

"More than 1,000 Montenegrins fell in this encounter, and the battle-field was covered with muskets, yatughans, and knapsacks. Sulih Pasha and two lieutenant-colonels, in all 300, fell on the Turkish side.

"On the arrival of draught horses, the two divisions under Abdi Pasha have been rendered mobile. They are now enabled to leave the magazines and march forward."

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 719.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received June 16.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, June 16, 1862.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 154, which I have just read to Count Rechberg, and to the idea of placing Montenegro under the guarantees of the five Powers. His Excellency requests me to explain that his meaning was that Montenegro should take the engagement to the five Powers to accept and to execute frankly and loyally the ultimatum proposed by the Porte as to security for Turkey, but not for the advantage of Montenegro.

No. 720.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received June 17.)

(No. 37. Political.)

Bosna-Serai, June 7, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of a despatch I have this week addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at the Porte, inclosing copy of despatch of 1st instant, from Mr. Vice-Consul Zohrab, regarding movements on the Montenegro-Herzegovinian frontier, and on other matters connected with the war in the Herzegovina.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure 1 in No. 720.

Consul Holmes to Sir H. Bulwer.

Bosna-Serai, June 3, 1862.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of despatch of 1st instant which I have just received from Mr. Vice-Consul Zohrab.

A telegram from the authorities at Mostar to the Kaimakam here a day or two ago stated that Dervish Pasha had obtained complete possession of Banjani, the inhabitants of which had fled to Montenegro, and that he had succoured Nichsich and entered the Montenegrin territory. Little reliance can be placed on any statement from Dervisch Pasha, as I know from experience last year, that his accounts of his own proceedings last year, that his accounts of his own proceedings are always of the most exaggerated or fictitious description.

During the past week there have been some skirmishes in the Vassovich district, which, according to telegrams received here by the authorities, have resulted favourably to the Turks.

Some of the newspapers, in reporting the imaginary critical position of the Turks in the Herzegovina, add that Bosnia is in a state of revolt. Nothing can be more incorrect; the province is perfectly tranquil, and is, I hope, likely to remain so.

I have lately seen some intelligent officers attached to the army of the Herzegovina, and they insist that one of the first and most important measures for the reduction and preservation of that province is the construction of carriageable roads. No engineering difficulties exist, and they ought to have been made long ago. The Porte really seems quite insensible of the value of roads in any point of view. Would it not be possible for your Excellency to urge that serious attention be given to this necessity both in Bosnia as well as the Herzegovina. Some progress has already been made here, but more is necessary to turn to account what has already been done. It is impossible to over-estimate the importance to this country of good carriageable roads, and I consider many of the difficulties of the State to have arisen directly and indirectly from their non-existence throughout the Empire.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure 2 in No. 720.

Vice-Consul Zohrab to Consul Holmes.

Mostar, June 1, 1862.

Sir,

EVENTS have succeeded each other so rapidly of late on the Montenegro-Herzegovinian frontier, and the reports brought hither have been so conflicting, that I have abstained from reporting on them in detail, having found it impossible, with the means at my disposal, to speedily unravel the truth from the tissue of falsehood and exaggeration with which the intelligence of each movement reaches this. I have, therefore, delayed so as to enable me to collect information which may be depended upon, instead of having to contradict in one despatch the statements I may have made in a previous despatch.

The telegrams issuing from Ragusa purporting to report the course of events in this province, and which obtain a large circulation through the various newspapers are, with

rare exceptions, either pure inventions or gross exaggerations. This, however, is easily accounted for. At Ragusa exists a very strong party-feeling, which can only see in every action, in every movement, a Montenegrin or rebel success. On the other hand, there is a small section who hold to the reverse side; both sides exaggerate and invent, and the statements of neither can be depended on.

Skirmishes are events of daily occurrence now along the frontier; the success of the Turks in these is various—successful one day, they are repulsed with heavy loss the next. I feel no hesitation in saying that, had Omer Pasha acted with less energy on the side of Scutari, Dervish Pasha would now be struggling to maintain his positions, not at Gasko and Trebigné, but at Nevessin and Stolatz, that is, instead of confining the revolt within the frontier districts, he would have been combating it within eighteen miles of Mostar.

Omer Pasha's advance into Montenegro, and Hussein Pasha's occupation of Vassovich, have naturally compelled the Montenegrins to divide their forces to defend their own country; and Dervish Pasha's column, which I feel no doubt would have been utterly destroyed in the Douga Pass on the 19th instant, had the Montenegrins been free to bring against it all their strength, escaped with comparatively small loss.

The fights of the 17th and 19th ultimo, of which you have received a general report, resulted in defeat to the Turks. The loss in killed and wounded, as reported by the authorities, is much understated; they represent it at something like 300, whereas in reality they must have had more than 1,200 men put *hors de combat*. The Montenegrins have also, I hear, to deplore a heavy list in killed.

It is, I fear, difficult to say what object Dervish Pasha had in view in attempting again to force the Douga with a corps not superior to the one with which he ineffectually attempted to force it on two previous occasions. If his intention was the relief of Nichsich, it is natural to suppose that his first thought would have been to convey provisions thither, but the attempt was made without any provisions being taken, and even if he had succeeded in reaching the beleagured town he could have rendered it no service. It is certain that had he been victorious in the Douga Pass the Montenegrins would have retired from before Nichsich, but only to return the instant he retired. Thus affairs would not have been improved, while the inhabitants would have found themselves still more straitened through the loss of a certain number of animals which would probably have been slaughtered for the use of the troops.

On his retreat from the Douga Pass Dervish Pasha retired to Gasko, from whence he immediately proceeded to Belikieh, where he has concentrated his forces and collected provisions for the purpose of relieving Nichsich by way of Bugnani. A few days since he made a raid into Bugnani, burnt some rebel villages, crossed the Montenegrin frontier, burnt a few houses, and returned to Belikieh, bringing with him some hundreds of cattle and sheep.

I now hear that he started yesterday for Nichsich.

Dervish Pasha, in attempting the relief of Nichsich by way of Bugnani, will have to proceed a portion of the way through Montenegro.

Nichsich still holds out, and I learn that the people have provisions to last them from forty to sixty days. I am told that the inhabitants defend themselves admirably, even the women have gained celebrity in arms. Of the portion of the town without the fortress little now remains, the quarters having been burnt in the different assaults.

The efforts to persuade Zupzi into submission have, as I expected, failed. Luca Vucalovich is still at the head of the insurgents of that district: he has, I hear from a good source, received another subsidy of 1,000 ducats, 500 from Russia and 500 from Servia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAS. ZOHRAB.

No. 721.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 693.)

Foreign Office, June 17, 1862.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copy of a despatch upon the subject of Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

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* No. 717.

No. 722.

Earl Russell to Mr. Paton.

(No. 2. Confidential.)

Foreign Office, June 17, 1862.

Sir,

THE important political events which have of late taken place on the western shores of the Adriatic, and in the Turkish provinces bordering on Dalmatia, have mainly induced Her Majesty's Government to revive the Consulate at Ragusa. In selecting you for the post of Consul, I have put reliance upon your judgment and prudence, and upon your knowledge of the people and countries with which you will have to deal. It will be your duty to keep me informed, as far as you may be able, with regard to the condition of the populations of the Herzegovina and Montenegro, to any political movements that may be contemplated or may be taking place amongst them, and to any intrigues that may come to your knowledge, between political parties in Italy and the inhabitants of the Austrian and Turkish provinces, for the purpose of inciting them to insurrection.

In carrying out these instructions, you will be very guarded in your conduct, and will take especial care not to give any reasonable grounds for suspicions which may be entertained by the Austrian authorities at the presence of a foreign Agent at Ragusa. You will communicate directly with this Office, sending your despatches under flying seal through Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna. You will also place yourself in direct communication with Her Majesty's Consul-General at Venice, and will furnish him with such information as it may be desirable that he should receive.

You will send copies of your political reports to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople and to the Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands, and you will endeavour to keep Her Majesty's Consuls in your neighbourhood well informed of matters of interest.

In sending despatches of any importance you will take care to select some sure mode of conveyance, so as to prevent their contents being known to foreign authorities. Should you have a safe opportunity of communicating directly with me you will avail yourself of it.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 723.

Earl Russell to Lord Bloomfield.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, June* 17, 1862.

HER Majesty's Government cannot be parties to any guarantee of Montenegro, whether in favour of Turkey or Montenegro.

No. 724.

Consul Stuart to Earl Russell.—(Received June 18.)

(No. 19.)

Janina, June 2, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith to your Lordship copy of despatch of the 30th May, with inclosure, which I have addressed to his Excellency Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

I have, &c.

(Signed) R. STUART.

Inclosure 1 in No. 724.

Consul Stuart to Sir H. Bulwer.

Janina, May 30, 1862.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Excellency copy of a communication which the Governor-General of the province sent to me on the 28th instant, saying that it had just arrived by express from Avlona, where it was received by telegraph. A copy of it was likewise sent to the French Consul, who is staying at present near Arta.

Although since the commencement of military operations in the north numerous reports of Turkish successes have emanated from the Serai here, this is the first time that the Mushir has, of his own accord, communicated to me any intelligence from the seat of war; and while I am disposed to believe that, on the occasion referred to, some advantage has been gained by the Imperial troops, I cannot help thinking that it has been embellished in the usual style of eastern bulletins; at all events, the report has obtained but partial credit here. The Ottoman party is not much elated by it nor the Christian much depressed, both looking forward with impatience for further information, and, pending its arrival, they maintain a cautious reserve. The levy of redif has now been completed in this province; two battalions, each 800 strong, are encamped here outside the town; one battalion was, I understand, sent direct from Berat to Scutari about ten days ago, and seventy-two redif gunners from here to Monastir on the 26th instant; four cases of desertion have been reported to me, and some eight or ten men have been discharged. Shoes have, I hear, been issued to the men; if their clothing is bad the weather is warm; their rations are abundant and of good quality, so that as much has, perhaps, been done for them as the limited means at hand admit of, or as the Turkish soldier is accustomed to expect.

As regards discharges, your Excellency is aware that considerable sums are often paid to secure exemption from military service. If I am rightly informed there are numbers among those lately enrolled here who would gladly pay from 5*l.* to 20*l.* to get off, and even more, according to the means of the parties. In the Ottoman army there is no scale of prices for discharge as in the British service, nor is the system of substitutes allowed in the Redif. The money received for discharges is not carried to the account of Government, but is shared by those through whose favour or connivance the desired exemption is obtained. In disputed cases the fitness or unfitness of the recruits is settled by a Medjliss, whose decision has to be ratified by the signature of the Governor. It is said that, as regards the late enrolment, both the Medjliss and Governor have exhibited much leniency in dealing with applications for discharge, and mercenary motives have been hinted at by persons who pretend to good information. Now the Ferik Ali Pasha has strongly set his face against all this, and in opposing the discharge of some whom he considered fit for service he has, I am told, exchanged strong language with the Governor and others. He is, I believe, acting faithfully according to his sense of military duty; but his rigour in rejecting applications, even in apparently reasonable cases, may produce a feeling of irritation amongst the Albanians at a time when everything possible ought to be done to conciliate them.

The Etairists, though busy as ever in talking and corresponding, have not yet ventured on any active measures. The Slavs are, it is said, indignant at this backwardness, and are urging them to make some movement that may create a diversion and distract the attention now concentrated on them. But I do not think that the time has yet come for the Rayah of Epirus to take up arms in the cause of independence. He hates the Mussulman, he curses him, he affects to despise what he calls his brutal nature and intelligence, but he holds back from fighting him. The Rayah himself says that he is biding his time, that he is organizing his forces and perfecting his arrangements so as to strike with certainty when the right time arrives. But the Slav replies that the moment has already arrived; that the Greek Rayah has not performed his part of the engagement entered into last winter; that he wants to shift all the fighting upon others, to share the advantages of the compact without incurring its dangers.

The Etairists still continue, I hear, to smuggle large quantities of ammunition into this country by way of the Gulf of Arta; and an invitation has, it is said, been sent to the famous Calzo Sanides to come to the robber district of Radovitzi and organize a system of guerilla brigandage. This has hitherto been a favourite system with the insurrectionary party in these provinces.

If conducted with skill and boldness it might be made a powerful weapon, especially in a country like Epirus of mountains and defiles. But even in 1854 nothing worth mention was done with it, although it was then worked by better men than would now perhaps be forthcoming.

Some cases of brigandage have lately been reported in this province. A band of some twenty-five men from Colonia, in Macedonia, has twice made a raid across the border, carrying off each time sheep and cattle, together with a shepherd or two, for whom ransom is demanded.

Another band has shown itself in the district of Delvino; and a man was struck dead the other day near Souli by an Albanian, to whom he refused to give up a few piastres. None of these cases, however, possess anything of a political character, the brigands being chiefly Mussulman Albanians, who are driven by distress to the road.

While on this subject, I may mention that the new rural police, the "gendarmerie," seems now to be succeeding here very fairly; at first it was viewed with suspicion by the Albanians, but by degrees it is gaining in their favour. Some 300 men are already enrolled, and others are daily offering themselves. The tunic of thick blue serge seems to be an appropriate and comfortable dress.

The military force at present in this province consists of—

1 battalion Nizam, say	750
1 ,, Redif (Anatolians)	750
2 ,, ,, (Albanians)	1,500
Gunners	150
	3,150
Bashi-Bazouks	1,000
	4,150

I have, &c.
(Signed) R. STUART.

Inclosure 2 in No. 724.

Telegram received by Mushir Mehmet Akiff on the 28th May, 1862.

Scutari, le 23 Mai, 1862.

DEUX attaques de Lucen Voukalovitch contre forts Zoubzi repoussées avec grandes pertes; poudre et instruments pour mines restèrent entre nos mains.

Monténégrins, après avoir inutilement pris et brûlé quelques maisons de Nichsich, tentèrent assaut général sur la ville, mais furent repoussés par la garnison et par les habitants, laissant 524 morts sur place.

Le 18 Mai Dervish Pacha battit les Monténégrins dans la Douga; le lendemain, l'ennemi, encouragé par des renforts considérables, accepta un nouveau combat, mais fut entièrement défait, en laissant plusieurs drapeaux et une foule d'armes au pouvoir des troupes.

Le 19 Hussein Pacha, ayant occupé, sans coup férir, tout le territoire situé sur la rive droite de la Zinna (?), jeta pont sur ce fleuve.

Le 20 passa le fleuve avec sept bataillons infanterie, attaqua village et couvent Béranć. Après la première décharge nos troupes se lancent à la baïonnette sur tous ouvrages, jetant Monténégrins et insurgés hors leur position; leur perte arrive jusqu'à 1,800 morts; l'ennemi s'enfuit, poursuivi pendant sept heures par nos soldats.

Ainsi tout le district de Vassovich entre nos mains; aujourd'hui nos troupes, fortes de 14 bataillons complets et 3,000 irréguliers, entrent sur territoire Monténégrin du côté de Spouz, tout fait présumer une grande bataille décisive dans peu.

No. 725.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 704.) *Foreign Office, June 18, 1862.*

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copy of a despatch upon the subject of Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 726

Earl Russell to Lord Bloomfield.†

(No. 161.) *Foreign Office, June 18, 1862.*

My Lord,

I HAD some conversation yesterday at the Foreign Office with Count de Flahault, Count Apponyi, and Baron Brunnow on the affairs of Montenegro. They all wished that,

* No. 719.

† A similar despatch was addressed to Earl Cowley, Lord Napier, and Sir H. Bulwer.

on the ground of humanity, the Great Powers should interfere, not by force of arms, but by concurrent advice, to obtain an armistice in Montenegro.

Count Apponyi added that the Turkish arms, hitherto crowned with success, might meet with reverses, and that the continuance of war in these parts might tempt the Italian and Hungarian revolutionists to make a descent in Turkish territory.

I replied by referring to the repeated incursions of the Montenegrins on the territory of the Sultan, and said I thought it but reasonable that the Porte should require guarantees for the future.

When asked by Count Flahault what guarantees, I said it was not for Her Majesty's Government to prescribe the nature of the securities which the Porte might think fit to require.

I told Count Apponyi that Her Majesty's Government would by no means be a party to a new guarantee of the five Powers that the Prince of Montenegro would execute faithfully the conditions of the ultimatum proposed by the Porte.

For our own part we were not disposed to punish the Prince of Montenegro if he should violate those conditions; and Her Majesty's Government considered that the extension to Montenegro of the right of intervention on the part of the five Powers would prove a source of embarrassment to the Porte. The Danubian Principalities and Servia, in their constant efforts to make themselves independent, were but little restrained by the interference of the five Powers, and afforded no encouragement to the Porte to set up a similar Principality in Montenegro.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 727.

Earl Russell to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 166.) *Foreign Office, June 18, 1862.*

My Lord,

I TRANSMIT, for your information, copy of a despatch relating to the state of affairs in Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 728.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received June 19.)

(No. 263.) *St. Petersburgh, June 6, 1862.*

My Lord,

PRINCE GORTCHAKOW informed me this forenoon that M. de Thouvenel had made an overture to M. de Reehberg with a view to an armistice between the Turks and Montenegrins.

The Austrian Minister seemed disposed to advise the Porte to that effect on the condition, however, of the preliminary acceptance by the Prince of Montenegro of the demands of the Porte embodied in the five points of the ultimatum recently presented by Omer Pasha.

The reply of the Prince of Montenegro to that ultimatum seemed, in the opinion of Prince Gortchakow, to justify an expectation that he would accept that basis.

Should such prove to be the case, and should the armistice be recommended to the Porte by the Internuncio, Prince Labanow would support the proposal at Constantinople.

M. de Balabine was ordered to do so at Vienna.

I have asked my French colleague whether these overtures really proceed from Paris spontaneously, or from M. de Thouvenel, prompted by the Russian Government. M. Fournier replied that to the best of his belief they originated with M. de Thouvenel, who had selected Austria as his channel, Austria being a conterminous Power most interested materially in the re-establishment of tranquillity on its borders.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

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* No. 690.

No. 729.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received June 19.)

(No. 278.)
My Lord,

St. Petersburgh, June 13, 1862.

I ASKED Prince Gortchakow this afternoon whether any intelligence had been received up to the present time of the intention of the Prince of Montenegro to adhere to the terms contained in the ultimatum of Omer Pasha, the condition required by Austria in order to enable her to recommend an armistice to the Porte.

His Excellency told me that no intelligence of the assent of Prince Nicholas had reached him. He had conveyed his advice that the Prince should accept a pacific solution of the present controversy, but he could not peremptorily recommend the acceptance of conditions so repugnant to the national and religious sympathies of the Montenegrins.

The Prince, if I am not mistaken, still flatters himself with the expectation that the Turks will meet with some signal reverse in the mountain, and he is incredulous of the Turkish despatches reporting the success of Dervish Pasha in relieving Nichsich and making his way towards the Sultan's forces operating from Albania.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 730.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 324.)
Sir,

Foreign Office, June 19, 1862.

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency, for your information, copies of despatches on the subject of the affairs of Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 731.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received June 20.)

(No. 326.)
My Lord,

Constantinople, June 10, 1862.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 325 of this date, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a copy of the *procès-verbal* of a Cabinet Council held this day at the palace to deliberate upon the French and Austrian proposal for an armistice in Montenegro.

This paper was sent to me by Aali Pasha, through Mr. Pisani, after receiving the Sultan's assent, as the answer the Porte is desirous of making to your Lordship's communication of the 8th instant.

It strikes me that if the Powers, who never interfered when the Montenegrins were attacking Turkey, interfere directly Turkey is punishing those bandits, the Montenegrins will still think they can act as hitherto with impunity, but that a different effect would be produced if the Powers were now to tell the Montenegrins that, as they were the aggressors, Europe cannot in the first instance interfere on their behalf, but that if they acknowledge their fault and ask the Sultan for peace, the Powers will intercede for them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

Inclosure in No. 731.

Procès-Verbal of a Meeting of the Council of Ministers, held June 10, 1862.

LE Sultan ne veut autant que qui que ce soit verser du sang. C'est pour éviter cette fâcheuse alternative que la Porte a enduré depuis plusieurs années des barbaries intolérables de la part des habitants d'un territoire qui fait partie de cet Empire. Nous ne

* Nos. 717, 703, and 687.

pouvons pas consentir à cesser nos opérations militaires quand même il serait basé sur l'acceptation de notre ultimatum. Car le Chef de la Montagne, après avoir déclaré par écrit vouloir exécuter les conditions imposées, a fait de nouvelles incursions et a continué d'agir comme par le passé. Il nous faut donc des garanties solides et capables à empêcher le renouvellement d'un état de choses qui nous oblige à de si grands sacrifices. Nous maintenons les dites conditions, qui n'ont au fond d'autre but que rendre impossible les incursions et les méfaits incessants des montagnards; mais avant de pouvoir accepter ou rejeter une suspension d'armes, nous devons connaître quelles sont les garanties que les Monténégrins nous offrent directement.

Dictated to me by Mr. Pisani, June 10, 5·30 P.M., from the original, written in French by Aali Pasha.

(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

No. 732.

Consul Ricketts to Earl Russell.—(Received June 21.)

(No. 40.)
My Lord,

Scutari, June 10, 1862.

I HAVE the honour to transmit, herewith inclosed to your Lordship, the copy of a despatch dated June 10, 1862, and addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, relative to the defeat of the Montenegrins in the Nahia of Katunska by Abdi Pasha, and also relative to their defeat at the Ostrog Gorge by Derwisch Pasha.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

Inclosure in No. 732.

Consul Ricketts to Sir H. Bulwer.

Sir,

Scutari, June 10, 1862.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that on the 1st of this month, a number of Montenegrins having assembled in the village of Musterovitch, in the Nahia of Katunska, Osman Pasha was ordered to clear the village in question with some six battalions of infantry and four guns. No sooner, however, had the Montenegrins been driven out of this place than a large body of the insurgents commanded by Mirko were observed advancing upon the right flank of Osman Pasha's brigade.

Abdi Pasha, on perceiving this movement, immediately occupied with three battalions of infantry and three guns the heights to the right of Osman Pasha, behind the village of Yeni Koi.

The Montenegrin rebels, numbering from 6,000 to 8,000 strong, attacked the Turks with great vigour, but were beaten back and completely defeated. And here it is worthy of remark that, during the retreat the Montenegrins did not attempt, as they usually do, to defend themselves; they threw away their guns and moved with great rapidity to the rear. It is evident, therefore, from this that the rebels are now becoming greatly demoralized.

Their loss in this engagement is estimated from 500 to 600 in killed and 700 to 800 in wounded, while that of the Turks did not exceed 26 killed and 109 wounded.

Transport has now arrived for the army, and the Mushir Abdi Pasha has received instructions to effect a junction with Derwisch Pasha's corps, which has now entered Montenegro by the Ostrog Gorge, defeated the rebels, and taken possession of the fortified monastery of Ostrog. Much ammunition is said to have fallen into the hands of the Turks, but I have not as yet obtained the details of Derwisch Pasha's success.

Ostrog itself, the most important monastery in Montenegro, is situated on a commanding height about one hour's distance within Montenegrin territory on the road leading from Nichsich to Spuz. The distance from Ostrog to Spuz is about seven hours' march, the road by no means difficult for the movement of troops, and thus, it is to be hoped, that Derwisch Pasha, after clearing the villages of the rebels, will be enabled to carry into execution the plan as designed by the Sirdar Ikrem.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

No. 733.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 718.) *Foreign Office, June* 21, 1862.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of two despatches upon the subject of Montenegro.*

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 734.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received June 23.)

(No. 201.) *Vienna, June* 17, 1862.

My Lord,

IN Earl Cowley's despatch No. 748 of the 5th instant, on the subject of hostilities in Montenegro, a copy of which reached me by the last messenger, I observe that his Excellency was struck by the difference which existed in the account given to him by M. Thouvenel of the language held by Count Rechberg in his conversation with the Duc de Gramont and that reported in my despatch No. 253 of the 29th ultimo, and I have the honour to submit to your Lordship the following explanation as to this difference:—

On the 28th of May, the French Ambassador, who was on the eve of departure for Carlsbad, spoke in general terms to Count Rechberg of the war in Montenegro, possibly with a view of sounding the Austrian Minister as to his willingness to entertain a project of armistice. The Duc de Gramont no doubt reported the impression he had received from his conversation with Count Rechberg, and I apprehend that M. Thouvenel hereupon telegraphed to Vienna in the sense of my despatch No. 275 of the 5th instant, whereas my No. 253 of the 28th of May related to the first preliminary communication made here, and when the French Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke to Lord Cowley on the 5th instant, he must have alluded to the responsive telegram of M. de Bonnières, and not to the despatch of the Duc de Gramont.

My despatch No. 275 relates to the communication that passed between Count Rechberg and M. de Bonnières, and was written from here on the same day that Lord Cowley held his conversation with M. Thouvenel, reported in his No. 748.

I cannot think that there has been any desire here or at Paris to clothe the proceedings in mystery. The French Government foresaw the chance of Omer Pasha's success, and wished to effect an armistice on advantageous terms for Prince Nicholas; and the Austrian Government considered the moment favourable for negotiation, as they apprehended that the successes of the Turkish army might not be long-lived, and, therefore, they thought it would be prudent for the Porte to listen to any just proposal that might be made for an armistice, based on the acceptance of the Turkish ultimatum, by the Prince of Montenegro.

Count Rechberg continues to doubt, I am sorry to say, the permanent successes of Omer Pasha, and the Turkish Ambassador has not received any official account of the movement of troops for several days. Telegrams, on the other hand, from Ragusa are more favourable to the position of the Montenegrins.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 735.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received June 23.)

(No. 207.) *Vienna, June* 19, 1862.

My Lord,

IN obedience to your Lordship's instructions, I have read to Count Rechberg your despatch No. 154 of the 11th instant, which expresses the regret of Her Majesty's Government at the communications which have lately taken place between Vienna and Paris respecting the propriety of aiding a negotiation at Constantinople for an armistice between Omer Pasha and the Montenegrins.

His Excellency requested me to say in reply to this communication that he entirely agreed with every word, and every opinion contained in this despatch, and that nothing

* Nos. 728 and 729.

could be further from his wishes than to do more than aid in putting a stop to hostilities in which he feared success might not be always on the side of Turkey; that he disapproved as much as Her Majesty's Government could do, of the conduct of the Montenegrins in fomenting and supporting the insurrection in the Herzegovina, whilst, on the other hand, he equally admired the energy displayed by the Sultan in his efforts to restore order in his dominions, and to instil vigour and new life to the public Administration.

As to the idea of placing the Principality of Montenegro under the guarantee of the five Powers, his Excellency declared that there must be a misunderstanding on this point, for he had never desired such an arrangement.

I replied that such was the impression made on me by his conversation, but that if it were otherwise, the sooner the idea was rectified the better, and he then explained that what he meant to convey to me was that Montenegro should engage herself to the five Powers to accept and execute frankly and loyally the ultimatum proposed by the Porte. It was not, his Excellency added, with a view to do anything advantageous to Montenegro, and the Porte had herself declared in the ultimatum that she was indisposed to interfere in any way with the *status quo ante*, but on the contrary to obtain better security for the Porte against future incursions, therefore he could not have desired to improve the position of Montenegro, and obtain for her the guarantee of the five Powers by which it would be greatly ameliorated. He would be, on the contrary, as much disinclined to such a project as Her Majesty's Government could be.

I much regret that Count Rechberg should not have expressed himself with sufficient clearness in our conversation on this subject, but I certainly understood him to say what I have had the honour to report to your Lordship, and I may observe that it is a strange coincidence that Baron Werther, the Prussian Minister at this Court, was similarly impressed by his conversations with Count Rechberg on this subject, and had reported them to his Government in the same sense as that conveyed by my despatches. He has also had to communicate to Count Rechberg the opinion of the Prussian Government on the question of an European guarantee, and they agree entirely with those of Her Majesty's Government.

On the other hand, I must say that in Count Rechberg's instructions to Prince Metternich and to Count Apponyi, copies of which I have only now seen, he does not speak of any guarantee, but of an engagement into which it is proposed that the Prince of Montenegro should enter with the Great Powers, the object of this engagement naturally being to deter His Highness from breaking the conditions of the ultimatum.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 736.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received June 23.)

(No. 303.) *Vienna, June* 19, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the translation of a letter addressed to Baron Werther by the Prussian Consul at Ragusa, which his Excellency has had the courtesy to send me.

The communication appears to be conceived in a very anti-Turkish spirit.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 736.

M. Lichtenberg to Baron Werther.

(Translation.) *Ragusa, June* 15, 1862.

THE intelligence, especially that which has been lately published, concerning the events taking place at the seat of the Turkish-Montenegrin war, must have produced a singular effect. The struggle between the Turkish giant and the Montenegrin dwarf, in which the former is always victorious, at least, so he informs the spectators, and, nevertheless, has not yet been able to subdue his puny antagonist, offers a most incomprehensible spectacle.

The position of Ostrog is again in the hands of the Montenegrins. Derwisch, with his whole corps, has again retired from Nichsich to Bilkić. It seems incredible, but so it is.

Both Turks and Montenegrins, from the highest to the lowest, lie with such audacity that, in spite of the proximity of the scene of operations, it is most difficult to arrive at the truth.

I have received such contradictory and absurd communications respecting the latest events that I am obliged to arrange that which seems to me the most probable in the following résumé:—

On the 6th instant, when Prince Nicholas commenced operations, he left his position of Ostrog in a very thoughtless manner, and came upon the Turks at Povia.

That his bellicose propensities were not rewarded is certain; he was repulsed and driven to the monastery situated in the defiles of Ostrog. Here it appears that his uncle (on the maternal side), Marco Dracow, who held the monastery, rallied the fugitives, formed them, and, as the Voivode Jno Krokov appeared at the same moment from Planiniza on the Turkish flank, led them forward and repulsed the enemy. It is certain that the Turks, on the evening of the 5th, withdrew themselves to the plains of Nichsich, and that on the 6th all the positions on this side previously held by the Montenegrins were again occupied by them.

The Montenegrins represent the affair, which it is impossible entirely to deny, as unimportant, on account of the not very brilliant début of their Prince, and as a mere reconnaissance on the part of the Turks, since there was but a small combat at Povia with the division Marco Dracow, in which they (what modesty!) affirm to have cut off but twenty heads.

They entirely deny all participation of the Prince in this fight.

The storming of triple intrenchments, of which the Turks boast in this affair, is pure imagination. In the meantime the Prince seems to have followed the advice of his father, Mirko, to proceed to Cettigné and there to remain, as he is said to have arrived there already the day before yesterday.

Dervisch Pasha, who might easily have foreseen that Abdi Pasha, in Bielopavlic, was in a position to make important progress, that he could effect a junction with him, and draw his provisions from Albania, seems to have concluded that some time must elapse before this junction could be effected, and that he might find himself in great difficulties with respect to the provisions which he had brought with him, and which were only intended for a few days' supply.

He therefore conceived another plan.

The Montenegrins posted at Hano had gone to Kionge—the passage to Rudine was open. He therefore set out with his corps on the 7th, and retired quickly from Nichsich through Rudiné Banjani to Bilékie, where he arrived on the 10th without encountering the slightest obstacle on the way.

From thence he is said to be disposed to return to Nichsich in three days by the same route with a new provision transport.

The chief difficulty is, however, the want of draught horses, and the transport may therefore again turn out insufficient. It is reckoned that of the horses required from the different provinces by the Rajas, about 33,000 have perished since the commencement of Omar's operations. These marches and counter-marches will certainly afford a remarkable contribution to the history of war, with reference to the difficulties attending the transport of supplies.

Dervish Pasha demanded yesterday by courier from the Turkish Consul in this place, thirty horse-loads of sugar, since he wishes to give his soldiers a fête for their victories before his return march to Nichsich, on which occasion they are to be regaled with a plât doux. For the many bitter pills which the poor devils have been obliged to swallow, this is quite fair.

Abdi Pasha is not making very good progress in Albania, and the defeat which Hussein Pasha is said to have suffered in Vassojevic, and which I had the honour to report on the 8th instant, is confirmed.

In all attacks proceeding from Albania against Montenegro the Turkish troops have not much distinguished themselves, excepting that they burnt everything and utterly destroyed fields and plantations.

The Miridites have not yet allowed themselves to be persuaded by their Prince, whom Omar again sent for that purpose from Scutari into his mountain fortresses, to engage in the contest for the Porte.

(Signed) LICHTENBERG.

No. 737.

Lord A. Loftus to Earl Russell.—(Received June 23.)

(No. 379.)

My Lord, *Berlin, June 21, 1862.*

COUNT BERNSTORFF informs me with reference to the proposed armistice between the Porte and Montenegro that a communication has been made to him by the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, in which Prince Gortchakow states that, in his opinion, an armistice should be effected between the litigants without attaching to it conditions which bear the character of a definitive arrangement.

The terms of an arrangement should be, in his opinion, the matter of negotiation during the continuance of the armistice, but that it ought not to be the necessary condition of an armistice.

Count Bernstorff appears to partake of this opinion, and considers that the first object is to arrest hostilities.

I took this opportunity to read to his Excellency your Lordship's despatch No. 140 of the 18th instant, having previously read to him my despatch No. 367 of the 14th instant to which it referred, and to the correctness of which his Excellency bore testimony.

In the course of our conversation on this question I could perceive that Count Bernstorff does not place any great confidence in the reported victories of the Turkish troops, and considers that they have lately rather lost than gained ground.

He does not think that final success will attend the military operations directed against Montenegro, and is of opinion that the natural defences of the country render it almost impregnable.

He therefore considers that an armistice is as much to the advantage of Turkey as of Montenegro, and he thinks that the present moment, when the Turkish troops may have gained somewhat of ascendancy, should be profited of by the Porte to come to an arrangement which would be honourable and advantageous to both parties. He fears that later the tide of war may turn, and reverses may destroy the prestige which the Turkish arms may now possess.

I further read to his Excellency your Lordship's despatch No. 161 addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna, which had reached me that morning under flying seal. His Excellency made no special remark thereon further than to repeat that in the cause of humanity he was in favour of an armistice.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 738.

Earl Russell to Mr. Churchill.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, June 23, 1862.*

PROCEED immediately to Vienna and await further orders.

Report that you have received this telegram, and on what day you reach Vienna.

No. 739.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received June 25.)

(No. 38. Political.)

My Lord, *Bosna-Serai, June 14, 1862.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the authorities here have received a telegram from Mostar to the effect that Dervish Pasha left Bilekia on the 5th instant to relieve Nichsich; that he had divided his forces into two divisions, one of which under Salih Pasha (the person who was accused of the murder of a girl at Varna) proceeded by way of Banjani, and the other under his own command passed through the defile of Douga. No opposition was encountered until Salih Pasha reached a small stream about two hours from Nichsich, where he was attacked and killed at the first fire. Dervish Pasha, who had arrived in the plain of Nichsich at

this conjuncture, joined his division to that of Salih Pasha, the garrison of Nichsich also made a sortie, and the battle which ensued resulted entirely in favour of the Turks, who, having thrown a quantity of provisions into Nichsich, proceeded towards Ostrog on the 6th. Another severe conflict took place at Jupa, at the mouth of the defile of Ostrog, when the Montenegrins were again routed. This account purports to have been sent by Dervish Pasha from Ostrog, whence he was to have pushed forward on the 7th, and effect a junction with Abdi Pasha's division, advancing from Spuz, with which, he states, communication has been already established.

If all this be true, the Turks are making most satisfactory progress; but as Mr. Vice-Consul Zohrab has not yet sent me the least information on the subject, the report, though officially communicated to the authorities here, may prove to be immensely exaggerated. I think it certain, however, from other information, that Nichsich has been relieved.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 740.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 739.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, June 25, 1862.*

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna upon the subject of Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 741.

Earl Russell to Mr. Churchill.

(No. 8.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, June 25, 1862.*

I HAVE received your telegram of the 24th instant, and I have to instruct you to remain a week at Vienna, and then, if no instructions are sent to you, you will be at liberty to take your leave of absence, or if you wish first to return to Jassy you may do so.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 742.

Earl Russell to Lord Napier.

(No. 142.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, June 25, 1862.*

I HAD some conversation yesterday at the Foreign Office with Count de Flahault, Count Apponyi, and Baron Brunnow on the affairs of Montenegro. They all wished that on the ground of humanity the Great Powers should interfere, not by force of arms, but by concurrent advice, to obtain an armistice in Montenegro.

Count Apponyi added that the Turkish arms, hitherto crowned with success, might meet with reverses, and that the continuance of war in these parts might tempt the Italian and Hungarian revolutionists to make a descent on Turkish territory.

I replied by referring to the repeated incursions of the Montenegrins on the territory of the Sultan, and said I thought it reasonable that the Porte should require guarantees for the future. When asked by Count Flahault what guarantees? I said it was not for Her Majesty's Government to prescribe the nature of the securities which the Porte might think fit to require.

I told Count Apponyi that Her Majesty's Government would by no means be a party to a new guarantee of the five Powers that the Prince of Montenegro would execute faithfully the conditions of the ultimatum proposed by the Porte.

* No. 734.

For our own part we were not disposed to punish the Prince of Montenegro if he should violate those conditions, and Her Majesty's Government considered that the extension to Montenegro of the right of intervention on the part of the five Powers would prove a source of embarrassment to the Porte. The Danubian Principalities and Servia, in their constant efforts to make themselves independent, were but little restrained by the interference of the five Powers, and afforded no encouragement to the Porte to set up a similar Principality in Montenegro.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 743.

Earl Russell to Lord Napier.

(No. 146.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, June 25, 1862.*

I INCLOSE to your Excellency herewith copies of a despatch and of its inclosure from Mr. Consul Ricketts relative to the state of affairs in Montenegro;* and I have to instruct your Excellency to communicate the substance of these papers to the Russian Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 744.

Earl Russell to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 170.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, June 25, 1862.*

I TRANSMIT, for your information, copy of a despatch which I have received from Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh on the subject of the proposed armistice between Turkey and Montenegro.†

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 745.

Earl Russell to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 181.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, June 25, 1862.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 297 of the 19th instant, reporting a conversation you had held with Count Rechberg on the subject of the affairs of Montenegro.

If the Prince of Montenegro is to engage to the five Powers to observe the ultimatum proposed by the Porte, those Powers must enforce it upon him, which Great Britain as one of those Powers is not prepared to do.

But, besides this objection, some of the Powers will argue that in fairness they must prevent any infraction of the terms of the ultimatum on the Turkish side; and thus the three Powers, if they entered into any such course, might be led into a system of interference between the Porte and the Chief of Montenegro, which might involve action on their part entirely inconsistent with their general policy and with their specific engagements relative to the Turkish Empire.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

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* No. 690. † No. 728.

No. 746.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 346.)
Foreign Office, June 26, 1862.

Sir,

I HAVE observed that some of Mr. Zohrab's statements respecting the contests between the Turks and Montenegrins are not borne out by the intelligence which I have received from other quarters, and I have consequently to instruct your Excellency to desire Mr. Zohrab to take care for the future to send true information, and not vague reports upon the military events now passing in and near his district.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 747.

Earl Russell to Sir J. Hudson.

Foreign Office, June 26, 1862.

(Telegraphic.)

HER Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna reports that the Austrian Government have received intelligence that one Spiridion Sassella has lately passed Cattaro on his way to Cettigné, and that he is employed in communicating between Montenegro and the movement party in Italy.

Austrian Government fear that the insurrection in the Herzegovina, thus indirectly supported, will increase in magnitude.

Do you know anything of this?

No. 748.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received June 28.)

(No. 311.)
Vienna, June 21, 1862.

My Lord,

THE Austrian Government have received intelligence from Ragusa that a person called Spiridion Sassella, coming from Corfu, has lately passed from Cattaro to Montenegro, and they have good reason to believe that he is the channel of constant communications with the movement party in Italy.

Count Rechberg considers the insurrection in the Herzegovina to be thus indirectly supported, and the difficulties of the Porte thereby seriously increased, and at his Excellency's request I have this day sent a telegram to the Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands, of which I have the honour to inclose a copy for your Lordship's information.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 748.

Lord Bloomfield to Sir H. Storks.

Vienna, June 21, 1862.

(Telegraphic.)

THE Austrian Government have received intelligence that one Spiridion Sassella has lately passed Cattaro on his way from Corfu to Cettigné, and that he is employed in communicating between Montenegro and the movement party in Italy.

Count Rechberg apprehends that the insurrection in the Herzegovina, thus indirectly supported, will increase in magnitude.

His Excellency thinks you might throw some light on the frequent visits which this individual makes to the Ionian Islands, and I shall be much obliged for any information you can send me.

No. 749.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received June 28.)

(No. 312.)
Vienna, June 21, 1862.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 303 of the 19th instant, in which I forwarded to your Lordship the translation of a letter from the Prussian Consul at Ragusa, confidentially communicated to me by Baron Werther, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that a further communication has been received from this Agent, reporting that the Turkish army in Montenegro was suffering greatly from privation, and especially from the want of a sufficient supply of water. He also reports that on hearing of the French overture of mediation, and the project of an armistice, Prince Nicholas had instantly sent for the Russian Consul at Ragusa, M. Petkovitch, in order that he might assist him personally with his advice.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 750.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 752.)
Foreign Office, June 28, 1862.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches upon the subject of Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 751.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 350.)
Foreign Office, June 28, 1862.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, copies of the despatches marked in the margin† relating to the affairs of Montenegro.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 752.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received June 28.)

(No. 322.)
Vienna, June 25, 1862.

My Lord,

COUNT RECHBERG mentioned to me yesterday that he had lately received a letter from the Prince of Montenegro, couched in the most friendly and engaging language, requesting the Imperial Government to facilitate his obtaining provisions; and he informed me that it was his intention to reply that the usual sources are always open to His Highness at Cattaro.

His Excellency, after saying this, observed that he understood the Prince had replied to the overtures respecting an armistice, that he was ready to agree to one provided the *status quo*, according to the then existing territorial occupation (for he was still in possession of the Douga Pass, and other land that did not belong to him), were taken as a basis; but that His Highness was by no means willing to accept the delimitation of frontier, as marked out by the Commission.

Count Rechberg has been lately in frequent communication with M. de Bonnières, in the absence of the Duc de Gramont, and is under the impression that the French Government continue to give their undivided support to the Montenegrin cause, and are unceasing in their efforts to obtain an addition of territory to this Principality.

His Excellency holds to his original declaration on the subject, and desires to have the question in the hands of the Turkish Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

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* Nos. 737, 748, and 749.

† Nos. 728, 729, 737, 748, and 749.

No. 753.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 758.)
Foreign Office, June 28, 1862.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches upon the subject of Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 754.

Sir J. Hudson to Earl Russell.—(Received June 29.)

Turin, June 29, 1862.

(Telegraphic.)

THERE are three men of the name of Sassella who communicate between Montenegro and Garibaldi. I have no doubt they communicate with him now; and that Garibaldi will not long remain quiet at Caprera, but will join this Servian movement if it is not speedily checked by somebody.

No. 755.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received June 30.)

(No. 325.)
Vienna, June 26, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose the copy of a telegram from Omer Pasha, dated Scutari, June 25, which was received to-day by the Turkish Ambassador. Your Lordship will perceive that Abdi Pasha has made a successful advance, and that on the 24th instant the whole Montenegrin force, which was concentrated behind the village of Jenikoi, on the right bank of the Cetta, was defeated after great slaughter, and that two cannons were taken by the Turks.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 755.

Omer Pasha to Prince Callimachi.

(Télégraphique.)
Scutari, le 25 Juin, 1862, 8·15 P.M.

HIER 24 Juin Abdi Pacha a battu toute la force Monténégrine concentrée derrière le village de Jenikoi, rive droite de la Cetta. Dès la première attaque, les troupes Impériales entrèrent dans les ouvrages des Monténégrins, et en rejétèrent ceux-ci après grand carnage; plusieurs centaines Monténégrins restèrent sur place; deux canons enlevés à l'ennemi; détails suivront.

Mercredi soir, 6 heures.

No. 756.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received June 30.)

(No. 329. Confidential.)
Vienna, June 26, 1862.

My Lord,

THE Turkish Ambassador has been to see me to-day, and, in the course of conversation, he mentioned, as a proof of the open and unblushing manner in which the Russian Government supported the insurrections in the Herzegovina, that the Turkish Consul at Ragusa had just reported to him that Luka Vukalovitch had received some days ago from M. de Balabine, the Russian Minister at this Court,

* Nos. 735 and 745.

the sum of 2,000 ducats, and that the Russian Consul at Belgrade had also forwarded to him the sum of 1,000 ducats.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 757.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received July 1.)

(No. 40. Political.)
Bosna-Serai, June 20, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a despatch lately received from Mr. Vice-Consul Zohrab, relating to the affair which formed the subject of my despatch No. 38, Political.

Your Lordship will observe that Dervish Pasha's account, sent to the authorities here, was somewhat different from what he sent to Mostar, which Mr. Zohrab gives, and which appears the correct one. It is said here that the cause of his retreat to Bilekia was that the Montenegrins and insurgents had occupied the road in his rear, cutting off all his supplies, and he had to fight his way back to Bilekia. It is supposed that, as soon as he can make arrangements for free communication in his rear, he will again advance on Ostrog, and endeavour to effect a junction with Abdi Pasha's division.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure in No. 757.

Vice-Consul Zohrab to Consul Holmes.

Mostar, June 15, 1862.

Sir,

ON the 10th instant I informed you by telegraph that the neighbourhood of Nichsich had been the scene of some fighting between the Turks and rebels, in which Ferik Salih Pasha had been killed. A letter to the Governor here from Dervish Pasha gives the following details of events:—

On the 30th May the corps which Dervish Pasha commands, consisting of eighteen battalions, and a considerable body of irregulars, quitted Bilekia with a large convoy of provisions for Nichsich, taking the route through Bagnani. The march occupied three days, and was opposed at two points by the Montenegrins and rebels. In the first skirmish, at a place called Gomela, the enemy was repulsed with facility; in the second engagement, which took place at a point where the road descends a very rocky hill to the plain of Nichsich, it appears the Turks were taken by surprise, and, though the fact is concealed, I suspect sustained heavy loss. Of superior officers alone, Salih Pasha, two Lieutenant-Colonels, and a Major, fell here. Dervish Pasha states that Salih Pasha acted without judgment in this fight, and was the cause of a much heavier loss than would have been experienced had he acted with prudence. The Turks were, however, victorious, and succeeded in reaching Nichsich on the 1st June.

On the 3rd June Dervish Pasha crossed the Montenegrin frontier in the direction of Bielopovlovich, and carried by assault a fortified position in the Ustrog valley, where the Prince Nicholas commanded in person. After this success he returned to Nichsich; but hearing that the enemy had once more occupied the position he had attacked, he returned and took it a second time by assault. He then retired to Bilekia, meeting with but slight opposition on his march back.

In a private note he addressed me on the 13th instant Dervish Pasha tells me that Nichsich is now amply provided with provisions.

Reports have just reached this that Nichsich is again surrounded by Montenegrins, and that three guns have been brought to bear against the fortress. This rather proves that Dervish Pasha's successes in the Ustrog valley have not been very decisive.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAS. ZOHRAB.

No. 758.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received July 4.)

(No. 41. Political.) *Bosna-Serai, June 20, 1862.*

My Lord,

A TELEGRAM was yesterday received here, three days after date, however, stating that grave events were occurring at Belgrade. It would appear that the Turkish fortress had been attacked by the Servian troops and populace, and that fighting was going on when the message was sent. The Prince was absent. The "varoosh," or suburb, was said to have been entirely destroyed. Whether this means that the Servian portion of the town, as suburb to the fortress, has been destroyed by the artillery of the garrison, I am not in a position to state; but the authorities here seem to think so, and if so, the affair may have the most serious consequences, and affect the present tranquil aspect of Bosnia. Your Lordship will have doubtless received ample information of what is passing at Belgrade from Mr. Consul-General Longworth, and I only refer to the matter as affecting affairs here.

News has also just come in from Ahmet Pasha at Belina that there is a Servian movement towards the Turkish frontier. Whether this be true, or merely an expression of the Pasha's apprehensions, I know not, but all has been telegraphed to his Highness Omer Pasha, and without waiting his reply orders have been issued to concentrate the available troops in Bosnia, about four or five battalions, at Belina and Svornik.

If this movement be really taking place in connection with the outbreak at Belgrade, it is extremely fortunate that it did not occur a few months ago, when a junction with the Montenegrins in the neighbourhood of the district of Vassovich would have been comparatively easy, and the troops in the Herzegovina were far inferior in number to what they are now. Vassovich is occupied by some 15,000 men, under Hussein Pasha, who, I hear, is fortifying the central position he has occupied. The Serdar, I believe, with the reinforcements which are constantly arriving, can spare troops to guard the Bosnia-Servian frontier, and the Mussulman inhabitants of this province will not hesitate to act as Bashi-Bazouks against Servia as they do against Montenegro, as they believe there is plenty of plunder in the former country, and it is far more easy of access than the latter, while the Serbes are not held in the same terror as the Montenegrin mountaineers.

A few days more will probably indicate the turn this matter will take. Some persons consider the absence of Prince Michel intentional, and declare that the whole affair is connected with arrangements previously made with Italy and Hungary, which have failed indeed in execution, but of which this Servian explosion is a consequence.

May it not also have occurred at the prompting of the Powers which have protested against the Sultan's proceedings against Montenegro, by way of complicating matters and securing an acceptance of their intervention?

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 759.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 339.) *Constantinople, June 15, 1862.*

My Lord,

I HAVE spoken very seriously to the Porte about the deficient means of transport available for the armies of the Herzegovina and Albania, referred to in Lord Bloomfield's despatch to your Lordship No. 231 of the 15th ultimo.

Both the Grand Vizier and Minister of War informed me that the service in question had quite recently been reorganized; that a large number of horses and mules, accompanied by competent drivers, had been sent from Constantinople specially for this branch of the service; and that by the last accounts from Omer Pasha it would appear that the transport service is now placed on an efficient and regular footing, and the army will be supplied with everything requisite.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

No. 760.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received July 2.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, July 2, 1862, 1 A.M.*

REASON for Austria listening to French proposals as to limiting Turkish action in Montenegro was anti-Turkish feeling in her border provinces; but she has now, I hear, given up this idea.

The Turks continue to have the best, but don't gain the decided advantage required.

The mission of French Consul to Cettigné does not seem to have been successful.

No. 761.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 775.) *Foreign Office, July 2, 1862.*

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copy of a despatch upon the subject of Montenegro.*

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 762.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 376.) *Foreign Office, July 3, 1862.*

Sir,

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, copies of correspondence as noted in the margin,† respecting the affairs of Montenegro and the Herzegovina.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 763.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July 4, 1862.*

HER Majesty's Government think the Turkish Government might now repeat their ultimatum to Montenegro, and, if refused, place a cordon of troops round Montenegro.

No. 764.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received July 5.)

(No. 370.) *Constantinople, June 25, 1862.*

My Lord,

SOME explanation seems necessary for the apparently unaccountable conduct of the Turks in Montenegro. It is perfectly true that on the 9th they gained a great victory at Ostrog, and that a junction of the forces of Abdi and Dervisch Pashas seemed to render an immediate and successful march on Cettigné as probable. Since this, nothing positive has been heard, or, at least, announced. But I have reason to believe that Dervisch Pasha, subsequent to the affair I have mentioned, retired from the post he occupied, and that a combination, which was to have resulted in a great battle some days ago, was never carried out. I find, on inquiring into the causes of these delays, that they proceed from Omer and Abdi Pashas being, and having long been, on bad terms.

* No. 756. † Nos. 735, 745, and 756.

The appointment of Abdi Pasha appears, indeed, to have been in pique against Omer Pasha, with whom some persons at the Porte are always inclined to quarrel, partly on account of his independent character, partly on account of his not being a regular Turk, and partly because he is often disposed to be over prudent.

This inopportune division, however, about which I am going to speak to Fuad Pasha, has paralyzed, apparently, everything, and I suspect that the Government, which has just sent a special commissioner to Scutari, is disposed to find in his report grounds for removing Omer Pasha, which, I think, would have a bad effect, if it were only on account of his reputation and name. But if employed he should be fully trusted and made responsible.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

P.S.—Since writing the above I have had some conversation with Aali Pasha, and it seems that my conjecture as to the differences between Omer and Abdi Pashas is correct; but the Ottoman Government has decided, according to the view I have expressed, Omer Pasha will be maintained, Abdi removed, and Omer allowed to name a new general in his room, becoming thus invested with the supreme command and bearing the whole responsibility.

H. L. B.

No. 765.

Consul Ricketts to Earl Russell.—(Received July 5.)

(No. 42.) *Scutari, June 21, 1862.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith inclosed to your Lordship the copy of a despatch dated Scutari, June 17, 1862, and addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, relative to the movements of the Turkish forces and other events. Since writing the inclosed despatch, I beg to acquaint your Lordship that I have received the following information, namely, that the corps d'armée commanded by Abdi Pasha has, in reality, advanced but one and a half hour's distance only from Spuz, and that the Montenegrins have taken up a strong position across the line of route which Abdi Pasha must necessarily pass in order to effect a junction with Dervisch Pasha. It is much to be lamented that Dervisch Pasha should have attempted to pass by the Ostrog gorge until he was perfectly ready to carry into execution such a movement, inasmuch as the Montenegrins have now become thoroughly acquainted with the object which the Turkish general has in view, and will no doubt avail themselves of every means they are able to defeat it. Had also Abdi Pasha displayed a little more energy and activity, there is every reason to believe that the Montenegrins would not have been able to take up the fortified position which I hear they have done.

Dervisch Pasha is now waiting for the advance of Abdi Pasha, while the latter is waiting also for the advance of Dervisch Pasha, and so matters rest.

The greatest force of the Montenegrins is said, by competent judges, to be now concentrated against Abdi Pasha's corps, so that the present would appear to be most favourable to a forward movement on the part of Dervisch Pasha. Others are, however, of opinion that the mass of the Montenegrin force are stationed near Ostrog, ready to dispute the advance of Dervisch Pasha; and hence it is evident that the present delay proceeds to a great extent from the want of good generalship and also from the want of good and accurate intelligence.

And here I might remark that, although the Turks have the greatest difficulty in obtaining any reliable information of the movements of the Montenegrins, yet the Montenegrins, on the other hand, know everything that passes in the Turkish camp, for not only do the people of Podgoritza, Spuz, and Scutari furnish daily information to the Montenegrins, but the Russian Consul, from all I am able to learn, is indefatigable in keeping the Prince duly acquainted with everything that passes on the frontier.

Ishmail Pasha has been sent to the camp, and it is to be hoped he will display a little more energy than Abdi Pasha has done for some short time past.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

Inclosure in No. 765.

Consul Ricketts to Sir H. Bulwer.

Sir, *Scutari, June 17, 1862.*

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Excellency that the information furnished in my despatch dated June 19, 1862, relative to Derwish Pasha having taken possession of the Monastery of Ostrog, would appear to be untrue. Derwish Pasha had, it is true, entered the Ostrog Gorge, defeated the Montenegrins, and taken one of their villages, consisting of some 300 houses, but, owing to want of provisions and water, was again compelled to return to Bilektjhi. The Serdar Ikrem tells me that as soon as Derwish Pasha has made the necessary arrangements for his commissariat he will again return by Ostrog, to unite his force with that under the command of the Mushir Abdi Pasha. The latter General has now advanced to a distance of two-and-a-half hours from Spuz, within Montenegrin territory. He is engaged in clearing a forest which lies on his road and affords shelter to the rebels; in building bridges over the Zeta, which, although now nearly void of water, yet after a little rain becomes flooded and difficult of transit; and, in short, in securing those points on his line of march through which the convoys of provisions must necessarily pass and which are most exposed to a sudden attack. There is, I hear, a large body of Montenegrins at no great distance from Abdi Pasha's camp. They retire, however, as the Turks advance, and seem unwilling to risk an engagement; if, therefore, Derwish Pasha's movement be well-timed, it is not improbable that the Montenegrins may find themselves placed in a difficult position, and that they will be simultaneously attacked in front and rear by the divisions belonging to Derwish and Abdi Pasha.

Eleven hundred Zebecs have just arrived here from Smyrna, and the corps d'armée commanded by Abdi Pasha is now composed of sixteen battalions of regular troops and 9,000 Bashi-Bazouks. The whole of this force is said to be in good health and well provisioned.

I have further to inform your Excellency that a courier was sent from Scutari on Thursday last by the French Consul at Cettigné, with despatches containing certain propositions for the acceptation of Prince Nicholas. I have not as yet learnt the exact tendency of these propositions, but I am led to believe that the French Government, having taken into consideration the telegram of the Prince, a copy of which was transmitted to your Excellency in a despatch dated May 27, 1862, has requested M. Wiet to inform Prince Nicholas that if he will agree to the conditions mentioned in the despatch addressed by the Grand Vizier to his Highness Omer Pasha, dated April 9, 1862, and submitted by his Highness Omer Pasha to him, the French Government will in that case undertake to procure a cessation of hostilities. Whether Prince Nicholas will accept these conditions or not it is difficult to say; on the one hand, from the amount of distress which appears to exist among the inhabitants of the mountain one would be led to suppose that out of a consideration to alleviate the sufferings of his people the Prince would be prudent enough to accept the terms offered him by the Porte; but, on the other hand, although he might be led to promise much both on behalf of himself and his people, with a view to procure the withdrawal of the Turkish troops from his country, yet as long as the Porte is unable to obtain an effectual guarantee for the fulfilment of any agreement that may be entered into with him, so long will it be useless to place any reliance in his promises, or to expect that any agreement will be honestly carried into execution by him. What sort of guarantees the Porte may hereafter think fitting to demand, or what they may be able to obtain, it is impossible for me to say. But his Highness the Serdar Ikrem is of opinion that neither the surrender of hostages, nor even a formally written engagement on the part of the Prince and his Senators to abstain from intriguing and creating disturbances in the Provinces of Herzegovina and Albania, would be conditions sufficiently binding on them to prevent their raising the standard of revolt whenever a fitting opportunity presented itself.

It is, however, worthy of remark that had the Porte the right of erecting and garrisoning fortresses on the confines of Austrian and Montenegrin territory on those points which lead from Cattaro and Budua into Montenegro, and through which supplies can alone be introduced into that country, Montenegro would then be effectually blockaded by the Turkish forces, and the Porte would then have it in its power to cut off the means of subsistence from its inhabitants.

Being thus deprived of the means of procuring from without supplies of ammunition and provisions, the Montenegrins would be rendered incapable of conducting any organized or extensive rebellion.

Some such arrangement as the above, unpalatable as it might appear to be to the Prince of Montenegro and his supporters, yet if carried into effect would perhaps tend more than anything else to compel the Montenegrins to adhere to any engagement which they may enter into with the Porte, and prevent the latter from being exposed to the proverbially bad faith and perfidy of the former.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. T. RICKETTS.

No. 766.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received July 7.)

(No. 343.) *Vienna, July 3, 1862.*

My Lord,

I HAVE read to Count Rechberg your Lordship's despatch No. 181 of the 25th ultimo on the affairs of Montenegro.

His Excellency said that he agreed with your Lordship's observations respecting the engagement which it was proposed the Prince of Montenegro should take to the five Powers, and seemed fully to appreciate the objections entertained by Her Majesty's Government on this subject. He added that as the Prince of Montenegro had refused to accept the Porte's ultimatum, any renewal of the discussions was useless.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 767.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received July 7.)

(No. 348.) *Vienna, July 3, 1862.*

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 322 of the 25th ultimo, in which I reported that the Prince of Montenegro had made an application to the Austrian Government for facilities to obtain provisions and that Count Rechberg had mentioned to me his intention of answering that the usual sources were open to him at Cattaro, I have now the honour to inform your Lordship that his Excellency has told me that, in his reply to the Prince of Montenegro, he stated that the market of Cattaro was open to him as usual, but that so long as His Highness continued at war with Turkey the Austrian Government must refuse to give him any other facility.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 768.

Earl Russell to Lord Bloomfield.

Foreign Office, July 7, 1862.

(Telegraphic.)

ASCERTAIN if you can through Churchill, from Austrian Government or otherwise, the present positions held by Turks and Montenegro, and report to me by telegram.

No. 769.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 384.) *Foreign Office, July 7, 1862.*

Sir,

I HAVE to inform your Excellency that in the present state of Montenegrin affairs Her Majesty's Government consider that the Porte might repeat its ultimatum to the Prince of Montenegro, and, if it should be refused by him, place a cordon of troops round the Principality.

I conveyed this opinion to your Excellency by telegraph on the 4th instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 770.

Mr. Layard to Consul Holmes.

Foreign Office, July 7, 1862.

Sir,

I AM directed by Earl Russell to instruct you to draw up and send home as soon as you can a connected and, as far as possible, an accurate narrative of the events which have passed in Montenegro and the Herzegovina from the commencement of May up to the latest date after you receive the present despatch.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 771.

Earl Russell to Sir J. Hudson.

Foreign Office, July 8, 1862.

(Telegraphic.)

THE Turkish Ambassador has received a telegram from his Court complaining of the departure of Garibaldian officers and the intended departure of some hundreds of Hungarians from the Italian and Sicilian coast with the view, it is presumed, of joining the Montenegrin insurgents, or otherwise disturbing the Empire. Speak seriously on this subject to Signor Ratazzi, and say that Her Majesty's Government expect such proceedings to be stopped by the Government of the King of Italy.

No. 772.

Mr. Fane to Earl Russell.—(Received July 8.)

Vienna, July 8, 1862, 3·45 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

THE Austrian Government have no accurate information of position of Turks and Montenegrins. They complain that their Agent at Trebigné can tell them nothing. Any information they may get will be communicated to me, and I will forward it by telegraph.

Churchill left this for Albania on Sunday evening.

No. 773.

Mr. Fane to Earl Russell.—(Received July 8.)

Vienna, July 8, 1862, 7·30 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

A DESPATCH from Mostar of the 6th states that Dervish Pasha in the Herzegovina and Abdi Pasha from Monastir have recommenced operations, but gives no details.

Rechberg asserts that the *status quo*, which the Prince of Montenegro was willing to accept, implied the possession by him of the Douga Pass and of the

Sutorina, to which neither Turkey nor Austria could consent. He thinks accurate information of the position of both armies can only be obtained on the spot, and is glad of Churchill's mission.

No. 774.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 794.) *Foreign Office, July 8, 1862.*

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copy of a telegraphic despatch from Her Majesty's Minister at Turin, reporting that a communication is kept up between Garibaldi and the Montenegrins.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 775.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 802.) *Foreign Office, July 9, 1862.*

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copy of a despatch upon the subject of Montenegro.†

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 776.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 395.) *Foreign Office, July 9, 1862.*

Sir,

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 370 of the 25th of June, reporting that you had spoken to Aali Pasha on the subject of the evils which had arisen from differences between Omer and Abdi Pashas in Montenegro, and that the Porte had determined on removing the last-named officer from his command; and I have to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve your proceedings in this matter.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 777.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 398.) *Foreign Office, July 10, 1862.*

Sir,

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency, for your information, copies of despatches relating to the affairs of Montenegro.‡

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 778.

Earl Russell to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 198.) *Foreign Office, July 10, 1862.*

My Lord,

I TRANSMIT, for your information, copy of a despatch relating to the affairs of Montenegro.§

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

* No. 754. † No. 767. ‡ Nos. 767 and 754. § No. 764.

No. 779.

Earl Russell to Lord Napier.

(No. 159.) *Foreign Office, July 10, 1862.*

My Lord,

I INCLOSE herewith, for your information, copies of despatches from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna and the British Vice-Consul at Mostar, respecting the insurrection in the Herzegovina.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 780.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received July 10.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, July 10, 1862, 8 P.M.*

LATEST intelligence from Montenegro is that Dervish Pasha is advancing from Nichsich by Ostrog Pass to form junction with Abdi Pasha at Ragnatch. From sound of guns heard, it is supposed Dervish was at no great distance.

Abdi Pasha had carried fortified position of Ragnatch defended by 15,000 Montenegrins after much resistance and bloodshed. Enemy then retired on Blana, another fortified position which was carried also.

Montenegrins are now concentrating near Cettigné and on junction of Abdi and Dervish Pashas, they will march on that place.

No. 781.

Mr. Churchill to Earl Russell.—(Received July 12.)

(No. 15. Diplomatic.) *Vienna, July 3, 1862.*

My Lord,

IN compliance with your Lordship's instructions I quitted Jassy on the 25th ultimo, and arrived at Vienna on the 30th.

I subsequently received your Lordship's despatch No. 8 of the 25th June, desiring me to remain a week at Vienna, and then, if no instructions are sent to me, to take my leave of absence. I have likewise been made acquainted with your Lordship's further pleasure, which has been communicated to me by Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna, to proceed to Omer Pasha's head-quarters.

I have made all the preparations necessary for the journey, and shall proceed as early as I possibly can to Scutari, where I understand Omer Pasha has established his head-quarters. I have my cypher with me.

I have hitherto been drawing on my own resources for the expenses of my journey to Vienna and for the outfit I shall require to fulfil, in an adequate manner, your Lordship's wishes, and I shall draw on the Chief Clerk of the Foreign Office as soon as I receive your Lordship's authority to do so, to cover these expenses and those that I shall be called upon to incur in the execution of your Lordship's instructions.

Your Lordship may, perhaps, deem it expedient to instruct Her Majesty's Consular Officers at Bosna Serai, Mostar, and Scutari to afford me every assistance in their power during the time I shall be employed in this mission.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY A. CHURCHILL.

* Nos. 735, 756, and

No. 782.

Earl Russell to Mr. Fane.

(No. 9.) *Foreign Office, July* 12, 1862.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT, for your information, copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, reporting a conversation which he had the honour to hold with the Emperor Alexander on the affairs of Turkey.*

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 783.

Mr. Churchill to Earl Russell.—(Received July 12, 7 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Ragusa, July* 12, 1862, 9 A.M.

A VIGOROUS attempt is being made by Dervish and Abdi Pasha's forces to force passage through the valley of Zetta. Both armies had, according to latest accounts, crossed frontier, yet a march of six hours still separated Turks. Losses on both sides up to the 8th inclusive were equally limited, but hard fighting is expected.

No. 784.

Mr. Churchill to Earl Russell.—(Received July 13.)

(Telegraphic.) *Ragusa, July* 13, 1862.

YESTERDAY the two Turkish armies penetrating into the heart of Montenegro joined in Bielopavlici.

No. 785.

Mr. Elliot to Mr. Hammond.—(Received July 14.)

Downing Street, July 11, 1862.

Sir,

WITH reference to my letter of the 9th ultimo, I am directed by the Duke of Newcastle to transmit to you, for the information of Earl Russell, a copy of a despatch from the Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands reporting the progress of the Association which has been formed at Corfu for the purpose of assisting the Montenegrins with money and provisions.

I am, &c.

(Signed) T. FREDK. ELLIOT.

Inclosure in No. 785.

Sir H. Storks to the Duke of Newcastle.

(Confidential.) *Zante, June* 23, 1862.

My Lord Duke,

WITH reference to my despatch of the 15th ultimo, in which I reporte to your Grace that an Association had been formed in Corfu for the purpose of assisting the Montenegrins with money and provisions, I have the honour to acquaint your Grace that this association has made considerable progress since I last wrote on the subject.

2. The Archbishop of Corfu is at the head of the society, which is divided into sections, and solicits the contributions of the faithful to help Orthodox Christians, who are threatened by the Turks.

3. All classes of society in Corfu seem inclined to contribute, and it is reported that the society has already collected 1,000 dollars, and hope to realize 2,000 dollars in addition.

* No. .

4. Biscuit is made in Corfu and exported to Montenegro by the agent, Mr. Pasquale, whose proceedings I have referred to in my former despatches; 10,188 pounds of biscuits were exported by this gentleman on the 18th instant from Corfu for Montenegro viâ Antivari. Mr. Padoôan and his colleagues are active promoters of the Montenegrin cause, and hope by this means to reacquire the popularity they have lost by their factious opposition during the late Session of Parliament.

5. Mr. Valaorite is said to have collected 500 dollars with the same object in Santa Maura. I am also informed that the Austrian steamer which arrived at Corfu from Trieste and Ancona on the 21st instant, brought bills to Mr. Jerostati, an Ionian banker, to the amount of 19,000 dollars in aid of Montenegrins. It is reported that 15,000 dollars are from St. Petersburgh, and 4,000 from the Garibaldian Association in Italy. The latter contribution is said to have been attained through the influence of Mr. Lombardo.

6. I cannot vouch for the accuracy of the latter part of this report, which I give to your Grace for as much as it is worth.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. K. STORKS.

No. 786.

Mr. Fane to Earl Russell.—(Received July 14.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July* 14, 1862, 1·45 P.M.

THE following is an abridgment of a telegram from Omer Pasha to Turkish Embassy here:—

"Muschir Abdi Pasha succeeded Abdi Pasha in the command of the southern army. On the 6th instant, the position held by Montenegrins on south side of the village Plava was taken by Turkish artillery; towards evening 15,000 Montenegrins stormed the position of the Turks, and were repulsed. On the 8th, the Turks attacked fortified position on the heights of Plava, important as the key to the Cettigné road and the line of communications between Jenikoi and Oralucca, near Ostrog. They drove the Montenegrins back on every side, and captured arms and trophies. The Montenegrins lost 600 killed; the Turks 103 killed, 263 wounded, among whom 16 officers. Dervish Pasha, on his side, attacked and took on the 7th instant the fortified position of the enemy at Ostrog (Slivja Pass). On the 11th, he advanced again, meeting with faint opposition. On the 12th, Abdi Pasha had also advanced to the right bank of the Cetta, by Oviahucca, and the junction of the two armies—that of the north from the Herzegovina, that of the south from Albania—was effected in the heart of Montenegro."

No. 787.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received July 14.)

(No. 337.) *St. Petersburgh, July* 5, 1862.

My Lord,

IN conformity with the sense of your Lordship's instructions No. 146 of June 26, I this forenoon communicated to Prince Gortchakow the substance of the despatch from Her Majesty's Consul at Scutari, respecting the state of Montenegro, marked No. 34 of the 27th May.

As Prince Gortchakow is often hurried, and is not very patient of long readings and explanations, I had prepared an extract of that despatch for his Excellency, which contained all that seemed essential for him to know, and which I left in his Excellency's hands.

I called the attention of the Prince to that passage of the despatch particularly in which it is reported that, in addition to all the sufferings of war and invasion, the Montenegrins were now menaced with internal dissensions. A domestic faction —the family or party of Radowitz—had arisen against the Prince, which threatened to create a revolution.

I pointed out the calamitous consequences which had thus ensued on the unprovoked aggressions of the Montenegrins, and how powerful the motives were which should prompt them to submission and adjustment.

Prince Gortchakow said that his accounts did not tally with those of Her Majesty's Consul. He derived the impression that the contest was pretty equally supported on both sides, and the Montenegrins were not reduced to extremity. The intrigue which I alluded to was known to him. The family of Radowitz had been exiled. Omer Pasha was using them as a means of creating dissension in the Mountain. He had furnished them with money and support. He did not think, however, that this manœuvre would have much success. The Prince of Montenegro had endeared himself to his subjects by appearing with them on the field of battle.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 788.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(*Received July* 14.)

(No. 349.) *St. Petersburgh, July* 6, 1862.

My Lord,

HIS Majesty the Emperor was so good as to grant me an audience yesterday at Tzarskoe Selo on the occasion of my quitting my post on a short leave of absence.

I offered to the Emperor my congratulations on the providential escape of the Grand Duke Constantine from the recent attempt upon His Imperial Highness's life.

The Emperor spoke with much feeling on the subject, and in terms of warm affection for the Grand Duke. He said that we lived in bad times, "when nothing was respected." His Majesty added, however, that, even from so great a misfortune some good might be drawn. The ultra-revolutionary party stood unmasked in their true colours; such a crime must inspire horror in every honest mind, and draw well-intentioned persons of every class to the side of Government.

The Emperor then proceeded to speak on the condition of Turkey. He remarked that the aspect of affairs in that quarter was very threatening. It was of great importance that the Great Powers should hold the same language at Constantinople. The Ottoman Empire was threatened with disturbance and revolt in every quarter, but the most pressing motives for solicitude were connected with Montenegro and Servia. In Montenegro His Majesty desired an armistice to avoid further effusion of blood, and an ulterior settlement which should procure a more tolerable existence for the people of that country. Among the conditions desirable for the welfare of Montenegro, the Emperor specified the extension of its territory, and the acquisition of a port on the Adriatic; but, in exchange for such concessions, the Prince would, in reference to the territory and the port, recognize the sovereignty of the Sultan, and pay a tribute. In regard to the sufferings of the Christian subjects of the Porte, the Emperor expressed himself warmly.

He asked me whether I could conscientiously assert that the declarations of the Porte had produced any practical result; whether there was any improvement in the condition of the Christians, and reminding me that I had on a former occasion expressed an opinion that the rights and aspirations of a people must have some weight in their political status. He inquired how I could consistently sympathize with the Italians, and turn a deaf ear to the wrongs and hopes of the Christian population of the East.

In regard to Servia, the Emperor remarked that the Austrian offer of armed intervention was inadmissible. No separate intervention on the part of any Power could take place, save with the concurrence of all. The Powers had no legitimate means of assisting the Porte except by counsel.

In replying to these reflections, more than once repeated, I submitted to the Emperor my conviction that the condition of Turkey was far from being so critical as His Majesty imagined. I said that, in my humble judgment, the Porte was able, if left alone, to repress all attempts at revolt on the part of its subjects. In the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, the Montenegrins had made most unjustifiable aggression on the Sultan's territory. They were now experiencing a deserved punishment for these excesses. An armistice might have been procured at an earlier period on the temperate conditions contained in the ultimatum of Omer Pasha. That overture had been rejected.

I apprehended that there was little prospect that the Porte would make such

concessions as those which His Majesty alluded to. In regard to the Christian subjects of the Porte, I said that what they suffered from was not so much from bad laws (for they had sufficient rights and liberties), but from a bad administration. The new Sultan was a man of native intelligence and energy; let us procure him a few years' peace and repose; he might yet be the author of great improvements in the condition of his dominions. I could not say that the condition of the Christian subjects of the Porte was everywhere improved, but I did believe that on the coasts of the Mediterranean, wherever the benefits of commerce and European influence were felt, there was a development in which the Christians had the greatest share.

"The only development," said the Emperor, "is that of discontent."

In reply to the personal imputation of inconsistency which the Emperor addressed to me, I remarked that I had never been insensible to the condition of the Christian inhabitants of Turkey.

In my humble judgment, the people of every country had a claim, in the bounds of practicability, to share in the benefits, the honours, and the functions of Government. I hoped that the Christians in Turkey might hereafter attain such a condition. In regard to the Government of Italy and the Government of Turkey, there was an essential distinction to be made. Her Majesty's Government had been on terms of amicable correspondence with the former Governments of Italy, and had Treaties with them, but there was no guarantee nor obligation to support them. With the Government of Turkey we had peculiar engagements. We had guaranteed the integrity of its territory; we were in a manner morally bound to support it, at least by counsel and influence. In reference to the interference of Austria in Servia, I submitted to the Emperor that it could hardly be fairly called an Austrian proposal. The first overture to that effect had, I believed, proceeded from Paris, and the same suggestion had been made here by Her Majesty's Government, who had in view not a political intervention, but merely the suspension of hostilities. If that interference had taken place, Her Majesty's Government had always desired that the Austrians should act with the concert and as the agents of all the Powers.

The Emperor stated to me, with the greatest earnestness, and with every appearance of sincerity, that he had no design of aggression or acquisition in the East. He harboured no thoughts of hostility to the Porte. He desired the duration of the Sultan's authority. Her Majesty's Government had the same wish, he felt sure. He earnestly desired that we could act together. The only external quarter from which the territory of the Sultan could be threatened was from the side of Greece, where a Government, discredited at home, might not be able to prevent the action of popular and national sympathies, or wink at them. For his part, he did not desire the expansion of the Hellenic Kingdom, nor, he supposed, could we see with satisfaction the establishment of a Byzantine Empire.

I said that Her Majesty's Government certainly desired nothing of that sort. We had no other desire, that I knew of, but the maintenance of the existing Treaties, the duration of the Sultan's Government, and the improvement of his subjects.

The Emperor asked me what I thought we could do at present to remedy the existing state of things.

I replied that I thought we should let the Sultan's forces and the Montenegrins alone for the present; that we should advise the Porte to be conciliatory to the Servians, and the Servians to be moderate in their demands on the Porte. I had heard, I said, from Prince Gortchakow, that there was a probability that an overture might be made to the Porte to give up the citadel of Belgrade. Such a proposal, I thought, was quite inadmissible. I hoped it might not be put forward. Far from thinking of the evacuation of Belgrade, I observed that Her Majesty's Government were of opinion that in any concessions which the Porte might be advised to make elsewhere, stipulations should be made to confirm the Government of the Sultan in the possession of that fortress.

The Emperor contended that the possession of the citadel of Belgrade was useless to Turkey, and that its evacuation would be advantageous to the Porte, as that measure would remove a cause of collision with the Servian people.

In going over the same ground again, the Emperor allowed that the Montenegrins had been guilty of aggression in attempting to prevent the Turkish Government restoring order in their own territory, but he extenuated the conduct of the people of Montenegro by urging the irresistible sympathies which united them to the

kindred people of Herzegovina. The position of the Prince of Montenegro was a very difficult one.

I remarked that duty was often difficult, but it was in this case plain, and the Prince might be reminded of it.

In repudiating with warmth the imputation of desiring or of prompting disorder in Turkey, the Emperor declared that all his agents had one instruction, to counsel moderation. His Majesty added that none of us had any motive to desire excitement or disturbance. There was too much of that already abroad. He felt the evil himself as well as others.

I remarked to the Emperor, as the conversation was drawing to an end, that we unhappily started from different points of view. Prince Gortchakow said His Majesty himself appeared to hold that the Turkish power was about to fall, that it was decrepit and decayed, and could not be made the instrument of improvement. Her Majesty's Government, on the other hand, thought that the Government of the Sultan was destined to endure, and that it could be made the vehicle of benefits to its people. With this discrepancy of views, a beneficial co-operation was difficult, but if His Majesty could not change his opinions, he could at least at present act upon those of others; he could assume that the Turkish power was destined to last. Let us give, I said, peace and strength and credit to the Sultan's Government; let us give to the new Sovereign that repose which was absolutely indispensable to any improvement. If that state of things should be brought about, I thought Her Majesty's Government would be found most willing to co-operate with the Government of Russia for the welfare of the Christian subjects of the Porte. In that cause we had never been lukewarm. No one knew it better than I. For four years I had been the spectator of the incessant efforts of Her Majesty's Representatives at Constantinople for the good of the Sultan's subjects.

The Emperor said there was indeed a diversity in our respective appreciations of the state of the Turkish Government and the disposition of its subjects, but that difference ought not to prevent our attempts to do good. For his part he would not absolutely affirm that the Government of the Sultan could not be made the instrument of good. He might not have much expectation of a favourable result, but he would hope for the best.

His Majesty then passed to other topics. He stated his satisfaction that the marriage of Her Royal Highness the Princess Alice had been solemnized with the Prince of Hesse, and his hope that this event might be productive of happiness to Her Majesty the Queen and the Royal Family of England. His Majesty requested me to offer to Her Majesty the Queen the renewed assurances of his sympathy and esteem, and expressed his deep interest in all that concerned Her Majesty's welfare.

The Emperor spoke throughout this conversation with animation, but with his usual benevolence. He appeared rather pale. His Majesty had evidently been harrassed with mental anxiety, contingent on the late deplorable incidents at Warsaw.

He did not allude to the recognition of Italy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER

No. 789.

Mr. Fane to Earl Russell.—(*Received July* 14.)

(No. 9.)
My Lord,

Vienna, July 10, 1862.

I REGRET that the information furnished to the Austrian Government respecting the movements of the Turkish and Montenegrin troops should be altogether inadequate to define the respective positions at present held by the contending forces. The Imperial Foreign Office complain of the meagre and indistinct character of the reports furnished by its Agents, and Count Rechberg expressed to me the conviction that accurate information could only be procured from some person present at the scene of action. He took the opportunity of saying that, whatever might be the present position held by the troops of the Prince of Montenegro, he had reason to believe that the *status quo* which the Prince had expressed his willingness to accept, involved the possession by him of the Douga Pass and of the Sutorina, although he thought it possible that the French Government, who had shown a disposition to support the proposal, were not aware

of the ambitious views of the Prince in suggesting an arrangement which could not be sanctioned either by the Porte or by Austria. His Excellency added that he thought we could hardly expect to receive any definitive report on the subject until Mr. Churchill, of whose mission he highly approves, has reached his destination.

I regret also the absence from Vienna at this moment of Prince Callimachi, whose intimate relations with Omer Pasha might have enabled him to obtain from the latter an accurate account of the relative positions held by his own troops and those of his adversary.

As these sources of information failed me, I telegraphed in cypher to Mr. Churchill at Corfu (where he intended to touch on his way to Albania), acquainting him with the information which your Lordship desired to obtain, and instructing him to furnish it as speedily as possible.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JULIAN FANE.

No. 790.

Mr. Fane to Earl Russell.—(*Received July* 14.)

(No. 11.)
My Lord,

Vienna, July 10, 1862.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith a translation by Lord Sudley of a letter published in the "Wanderer" newspaper from its correspondent at Ragusa on the movements of the Turkish and Montenegrin troops.

The writer is obviously hostile to the Turks, but as he appears to write from the scene of operations his local information is probably correct.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JULIAN FANE.

Inclosure in No. 790.

Extract from the "Wanderer" of July 8, 1862.

(Translation.)

FROM THE SEAT OF THE TURKISH AND MONTENEGRIN WAR. *Ragusa, July* 2. After Mirko, the Prince's father, had repulsed the corps d'armée under the command of Abdi Pasha and Mahomed Bey in the affair of Erthovnica on the 24th instant, he judged the moment favourable for an attack on the enemy's entrenchments at Printenaglavitza and Bisocice, and directed the troops to attack. The entrenchments were occupied by three battalions of regular troops, belonging to the corps of Hussein Pasha, who commands at Bassovici. After a brief but sanguinary contest, the whole position was stormed by the Montenegrins, and Mirko in one day had obtained a double victory—a fact which is confirmed by all communications from the Consulates as well as by all private accounts—the Turks and their friends alone endeavouring to throw doubt on it. If consolation can be drawn from a subversion of the truth, we must not find fault with the Turkish Pashas and authorities for making use of this means to alleviate their position, only it would be desirable that their reporters should make use of rather more moderate language.

The Turks affirm that they have taken two mountain guns from the Montenegrins at Ecthovnica. I perceived in the long train of wounded two horses with pack-saddles, which represented the trophies, but of cannon there was no trace. Sickness is beginning to decimate the Turkish army, and it is feared that the approaching warm season will generate epidemics. The last rains have washed away the two bridges built by Abdi Pasha over the Zeuta, by which the Turkish operations are rendered all the more difficult.

Dervish Pasha has, as I mentioned in my last accounts, returned to Biela from his excursion, where he awaits the auspicious moment for his advance. Dervish is indubitably a good tactician; and he managed, in his last advance, to deceive the Montenegrins as to his real purpose. He made a demonstration on the side of Grahovo, while he advanced in force on Kiba. The Montenegrins, deceived by his manœuvres, remained at Grahovo. Dervish Pasha arrived at Kitta without opposi-

tion, but was forced to retire without having effected his object, as he found the road barricaded in such a manner as to render further advance impossible, the Montenegrins having erected barricades of enormous trunks of trees on all sides. On the retreat, Dervish lost some hundred horses with provisions which were driven away from him by the Montenegrins.

No. 791.

Mr. Fane to Earl Russell.—(Received July 15.)

Vienna, July 14, 1862, 10·45 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

I HAVE just received following telegram from Churchill, dated from Ragusa this day:—

"Turkish forces 35,000 strong are now united at Orieluka on Zetta, four miles from Spuz and six from Ostrog. Montenegrins are in Bielopavlici. French Consul, Scutari, in consequence of controversy with Omer regarding protection of Bishop Abbé Krasnik, of Miridits, has lowered his flag. Send this on."

No. 792.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received July 15.)

Constantinople, July 14, 1862, 11 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

TWO bodies of Turkish forces, one from Albania, one from Herzegovina, united at Aria Luca, and appear to have gained a great victory.

Turks, however, wait two days for provisions and ammunition before advancing on Cettigné.

No. 793.

Earl Russell to Mr. Grey.

(No. 3.)

Foreign Office, July 16, 1862.

Sir,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copy of a despatch on the subject of Montenegro.*

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 794.

Earl Russell to Mr. Fane.

(No. 3.)

Foreign Office, July 16, 1862.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT, for your information, copy of a letter from the Colonial Office relative to the proceedings of an Association which has been formed at Corfu for the purpose of assisting the Montenegrins with money and provisions.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 795.

Earl Russell to Mr. Fane.

(No. 6.)

Foreign Office, July 16, 1862.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT, for your information, copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople relating to the state of the Turkish army in the Herzegovina.†

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

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* No. 792.

† No. 759.

No. 796.

Acting Consul Cortazzi to Earl Russell.—(Received July 17.)

(No. 47.)

Scutari, July 1, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith to your Lordship copy of a despatch dated the 1st instant, which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Consul at Janina.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK A. CORTAZZI.

Inclosure in No. 796.

Acting Consul Cortazzi to Consul Stuart.

Scutari, July 1, 1862.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that on the 24th ultimo an engagement took place at the small village of Nouvasella between Abdi Pasha's corps d'armée and the Montenegrins, Prince Mirka commanding in person.

The object of Abdi Pasha's attack was to drive the Montenegrins from the entrenchments which the latter were endeavouring to throw up, so as to intercept his line of communication with Podgoritza. Abdi Pasha's attack has proved successful, but to judge from the number of wounded that are being brought into Scutari (more than 150 have already arrived) the engagement must have been severe. I abstain from giving any approximate return of the killed and wounded, as the statements on this head are of too conflicting a nature, and my so doing might only serve to mislead. It is currently reported that Abdi Pasha has captured two guns; this report, however, is unfounded. Abdi Pasha has moved his camp from half an hour's distance from Spuz in Montenegro country to a quarter of an hour's distance this side of Spuz in Turkish territory.

The Serdar Ekrem, Omer Pasha, has been informed, through the Austrian Consulate here, that it is impossible for him to purchase provisions for account of the Ottoman Government at Cattaro or in its vicinity, owing, it is alleged, to their extreme scarcity. So little doubt, it appears, existed in the mind of Dervish Pasha of such an occurrence, that he had already left his position near Astrog to march on Grahovo with a view of protecting the transit of provisions viâ Risano. In consequence, however, of instructions received from the Serdar Ekrem, he has given up this idea, and at the present moment is stationed at Bocanaca, two hours distance from Astrog, between that place and Grahovo. It appears to me that had Dervish Pasha, instead of drawing towards Grahovo, pushed on through the Ostrog gorge, he might ere this have been enabled to effect a junction with Abdi Pasha's corps. If, on the other hand, Dervish Pasha did not consider himself at the time he attempted to do so sufficiently prepared to carry into execution such a plan, it surely was an act of folly to undertake it at all. The Montenegrins have evidently seen through the intended manœuvre of the Turkish General, and it is hardly to be doubted that they will employ every means at their disposal to frustrate its being carried into effect. As I am credibly informed, the Montenegrins are concentrating their forces near Astrog, probably with this object in view.

It is worthy of remark, that while the Montenegrins are perfectly well aware of what is passing in the Ottoman camp, the Turkish Generals are in a great measure ignorant of the intentions of the Montenegrins. This may be attributed to the activity of Russian and French agents, who do not fail to keep the Chief of Montenegro informed of everything that passes on this side of the frontier, and who with pertinacity are spreading disaffection in the already ill-disposed provinces.

His Excellency Hadji Raschid Pasha, President of the Council of War at Constantinople, arrived here on special mission on the 26th ultimo. His Excellency, accompanied by Ismail Pasha, the Civil Governor of the Province, left on the 27th ultimo for Spuz, and returned on the 29th ultimo, and both are now here.

His Excellency Raschid Pasha, formerly Civil Governor of the Province, has been, on the recommendation of the Serdar Ekrem, appointed Governor-General of Belgrade.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK A. CORTAZZI.

No. 797.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 417.)

Foreign Office, July 17, 1862.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, copies of a letter and of its inclosure, from the Colonial Office, relating to an Association which has been formed at Corfu to assist the Montenegrins with money and provisions.

I have caused an inquiry to be made whether there are any Ionian laws giving powers to stop the proceedings of this Association.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 798.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received July 18.)

(No. 421.)

Constantinople, July 8, 1862.

My Lord,

PRINCE NICHOLAS has refused the conditions offered by the Porte for the adjustment of the pending differences with Montenegro, and the Porte is now waiting the return of the President of the Military Council, who has already left Albania in order to determine on the course it should pursue.

Should he be of opinion that nothing decisive has been done in the interior of the country, the Porte will probably adopt your Lordship's counsel, namely, that of once more tendering an ultimatum, and, if that is not accepted, planting a cordon round the Principality as far as it can do so.

But having gone to such trouble and expense in preparations, this Government is not willing to abandon the chance of some decided result until it has ascertained from its Envoy the precise state of things, and judged of the probability or improbability of success.

In the meantime Abdi Pasha, the second in command in Northern Albania, has, on account of his want of energy, been superseded by Abdul Kherim Pasha, Governor of Monastir, who is said to be an officer of some merit educated at Vienna.

On the 4th instant an engagement took place between the garrison of Podgoritza and the Montenegrins near Péré, in Montenegro, in which the former are said to have been victorious and to have taken a standard.

Great hopes are entertained that the three forces now in movement may be so directed as to force the Montenegrins to an action under disadvantageous circumstances, and Dervish Pasha, at the head of a very large number of troops (twenty-two battalions), is advancing in the direction of the Turkish corps operating on the Albanian side of Montenegro.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

P.S.—The President of the Military Council is just returned; he states that Dervish Pasha and Abdul Kerrem will probably have joined their forces yesterday, and that an immediate and decisive action is to expected.

H. L. B.

No. 799.

Mr. Fane to Earl Russell.—(Received July 20.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 20, 1862.

I RECEIVED this morning the following telegram from Churchill, dated yesterday, from Scutari:—

"(Secret and Confidential.)

"Army make feint attack to-day at Zagoratz to push forward to-morrow by another route to Cettigné. Best spirit animates Ottoman troops, whilst Montenegrins are discouraged."

No. 800.

Mr. Lumley to Earl Russell.—(Received July 21.)

(No. 4. Confidential.)

St. Petersburgh, July 13, 1862.

My Lord,

IN my preceding despatches Nos. 2 and 3 I have endeavoured to give the substance of the reports of the Russian Consular Agent at Belgrade, which were communicated to me by Prince Gortchakow's orders. It may now perhaps be of interest to your Lordship to learn what communications have been made by the Turkish Government to their Representative here with reference to the late events at Belgrade. This I am enabled to do by the kindness of Khalil Bey, who has allowed me to take the copies I have herewith the honour to transmit of the different telegrams he has received from his Government, as well as of a despatch dated the 25th June, which he read to Prince Gortchakow a few days ago. At this interview Khalil Bey told Prince Gortchakow that nothing was further from the intentions of the Porte than any design either to violate or infringe the privileges of the Servians, or to reduce them by force of arms; the best proof of which was to be found in the small number of Turkish troops now in Belgrade and in Servia. The Porte was most anxious to remain on good terms with Servia, and would do nothing to alter their mutual relations as long as their relative positions as defined by Treaty were respected; but any attempt on the part of Servia to declare herself independent would compel the Turkish Government to act in a very different manner from what they have hitherto done, for the Sultan was determined, while respecting the privileges of the Servians, to uphold the rights and the independence and the territorial limits of his Empire which had been guaranteed to him by the Treaty of Paris.

"Allow me to tell you," said Prince Gortchakow, who during this interview appears to have been much excited, "that you lay too much stress on the Treaty of Paris, and depend too much on the assistance of some of the Powers who were parties to it; all I can say is, that if the approaching Conferences do not produce the changes so imperatively demanded, and if the condition of the Christian subjects of the Porte is not substantially improved, we shall wash our hands of the matter and leave you to yourselves, and I warn you that the result of this step on our part will be a general revolution throughout the Christian States of Turkey."

Khalil Bey said, for his part, he believed the condition of the Christian subjects of the Porte was, in many respects, better than that of the Russian peasantry, and he trusted the Porte would be found quite strong enough to put down, single-handed, any revolution of the kind referred to by Prince Gortchakow should such an emergency arise; and he then begged Prince Gortchakow would explain what he meant when he spoke of Russia withdrawing altogether from Turkish affairs. Would the other Powers withdraw likewise? "Not necessarily," Prince Gortchakow replied, "though they ought to do so if they have that respect for Treaties which they profess. They may proceed, however, without us, and I only hope they will do so. A link will then be broken in the chain of the Treaty of Paris—which has already been considerably damaged by the affair of Sutorina—and with our consent it shall never be re-united."

This was the first time, Khalil Bey said, that the Prince had mentioned the word "Sutorina" to me, and I was not sorry to ask him by what Article of the Treaty of Paris the Sultan was prohibited from calling upon a friendly Power for assistance (except in the case of the Danubian provinces and Servia, where no single Power can intervene). This very exception, Khalil Bey said, proves the rule, and leaves the Sultan at liberty to accept the assistance of a friendly Power in any other part of his dominions; consequently, in the case of the Austrian intervention in the Sutorina, he considered that if the Porte did not remonstrate against it, no other Power had the right to do so.

Prince Gortchakow said he did not refer to any particular Article, but to the general spirit of the Treaty, which was evidently intended to prevent the interference of any single Power in the affairs of Turkey. Khalil Bey contended that Treaties could not be considered in such a general light, but that the character of a Treaty was determined by the precise sense of each of its Articles, which were framed to meet certain eventualities, and that, as he said before, he could find nothing in the Treaty of Paris prohibiting the Sultan from claiming the assistance of a friendly

Power against his rebellious subjects in any part of his dominions except in the Danubian provinces and in Servia.

Upon this Prince Gortchakow said, in a very excited manner:—"I declare to you, that if any Christian Power assists the Sultan against his Christian subjects, I will attach that Power to the pillory of the public opinion of the whole civilized world."

After allowing the Prince to speak for some moments without interruption, during which time his language became calmer, Khalil Bey said:—"Will your Excellency allow me to explain what I mean by a case in point? I will leave England and Austria out of the question, and suppose, what has happened before, that the Pasha of Egypt should attempt to assert his independence of the Porte (fortunately for Turkey she is much stronger than she was in 1840, and Egypt is no longer what it was under Mehemet Ali); but supposing such a rebellion to take place, is there anything in the Treaty of Paris to prevent our concluding another Agreement of Unkiar Skelessi, and asking you to send us 50,000 troops to assist us in putting it down?"

After this observation, Prince Gortchakow did not continue the argument, but again referred to the condition of the Christian subjects of the Porte and the hardships and cruelties they had always suffered under the Mahometan rule. In the course of this conversation, Prince Gortchakow mentioned that while he was with the Emperor, a proposal was submitted to His Imperial Majesty to raise by subscription a monument to the memory of the Patriarch Gregorius, who was barbarously put to death by the Turks in the Morea in 1821. That person, Khalil Bey replied, was justly executed for having excited rebellion against the authority that had appointed him; and without seeking very far, a proceeding of a similar nature may be found in the case of the Polish Canon Brzewlski, which occurred only a few months ago. "Yes," said the Prince, "but we have not hung the Polish priest." And I assure you, said Khalil Bey, that if a Greek Patriarch were to be condemned to death to-morrow for a similar crime by Turkish laws, his life would also be spared if intercession were made in his favour.

This conversation, as related to me by Khalil Bey, appeared to me so characteristic that I hope I may be excused for having related it at such length.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. SAVILE LUMLEY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 800.

Communications addressed by the Turkish Government to Khalil Bey.

(No. 1.)

Aali Pasha to Khalil Bey.

Constantinople, le 18 *Juin*, 1862.

LES agressions journalières des Serbes contre les habitants Musulmans et les soldats ont produit le résultat que nous craignons. Des avis indirects nous annoncent le bombardement de la ville de Belgrade par la forteresse.

Nous avons expédiés immédiatement des ordres très-positifs pour faire cesser les hostilités. Nous n'avons encore aucun détail sur les motifs qui ont pu décider nos autorités à recourir à une mesure aussi grave sans en référer préalablement au Gouvernement.

Ahmed Vefik Effendi, accompagné d'Ali Bey, part aujourd'hui pour Belgrade avec la mission de faire une enquête sévère.

Le Gouverneur de la forteresse, Achir Pacha, a été remplacé par Rachid Pacha, ex-Gouverneur de Scutari d'Albanie.

(No. 2.)

Aali Pasha to Khalil Bey.

Constantinople, le 19 *Juin*, 1862.

Je vous communique ci-après le télégramme que la Sublime Porte vient de recevoir du Gouverneur de Belgrade.

Le bombardement de la ville a eu lieu le 17, et cette dépêche n'est que du 16. Nous n'avons encore aucune nouvelle sur les causes qui ont déterminé nos autorités à prendre une résolution aussi grave. Vous verrez que les Serbes pillaient déjà les maisons et les boutiques abandonnées par les Musulmans.

"*Belgrade, le* 16 *Juin*, 1862.

"Le feu et l'attaque des Serbes n'ont cessé de toute la nuit. M. Garachanin m'a représenté ce matin, devant tous les Consuls arrivés de bonne heure à la citadelle, l'impossibilité de mettre fin aux désordres sans faire rentrer les troupes des Corps du Garde situés aux deux portes de Stamboul et de Widin, et celles conservés dans le faubourg; laisser ces troupes à leur poste, c'était évidemment les exposer à une attaque et à un feu très violent encore; même en les renforçant ils seraient toujours obligés de se réfugier dans la citadelle après avoir eu un grand nombre de tués et de blessés. Les Consuls étaient aussi du même avis; par conséquent les troupes en question, ainsi que quelques familles Musulmanes qu'il avait été impossible de recevoir dans la citadelle pendant la nuit, y ont été admises. Les effets et marchandises laissés par les Musulmans dans leurs maisons et dans leurs boutiques sont en ce moment livrés au pillage.

"D'après ce qu'on a pu apprendre jusqu'ici, il y a eu un Adjutant-Major et cinq soldats tués et douze soldats blessés. Quant aux habitants, onze personnes des deux sexes ont été tués, et douze blessés. L'attaque contre la citadelle ne paraît pas encore imminente, mais elle est presque complètement assiégée."

(No. 3.)

Aali Pasha to Khalil Bey.

Constantinople, le 21 *Juin*, 1862.

Les deux dépêches que nous venons de recevoir d'Achir Pacha, et que je transcris textuellement ci-après, expliquent les raisons qui ont amené le bombardement de la ville.

Nous espérons pouvoir prouver à l'Europe impartiale la véracité des assertions de nos autorités.

"*Belgrade, le* 17 *Juin*, 1862.

"Aujourd'hui, à 6 heures à la Turque, les Serbes ont attaqué et fait feu sur la forteresse. Les cris répétés pour les engager à cesser cette agression ont été loin de produire aucun effet. Ils ont en outre commencé à venir sous forme de bataillons et ont apporté des canons qui ont augmenté la vivacité de l'attaque. Nous avons dû, de notre côté, recourir aux mêmes moyens et le combat continue à l'heure qu'il est.

"Les Serbes font feu d'un côté et, de l'autre, ils construisent des batteries et des retranchements vis-à-vis de quelques points de la forteresse. A cet effet ils amassent du bois et des pierres.

(Signé) "ACHIR."

"*Belgrade, le* 19 *Juin*, 1862.

"Mardi, après que l'attaque des Serbes a été empêchée par la force, ils ont continué à tirer des coups de fusil jusqu'au soir. Alors, ils ont attaqué la batterie dite Medjidié et la porte de Widin au moyen de fusils et de deux obusiers.

"Nous y avons ripostés par quelques coups de fusils et deux boulets.

"Depuis les Serbes ont complètement cessé leur feu, mais ils fortifient sans relâche leurs batteries.

(Signé) "ACHIR."

(No. 4.)

Télégramme de Son Altesse Aali Pacha à Khalil Bey.

Constantinople, le 2 Juillet, 1862.

Le plan d'évacuer les forteresses de Serbie ne saurait être admis ni même discuté par la Sublime Porte.

Inclosure 2 in No. 800.

Extract from the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" of $\frac{\text{June 30}}{\text{July 12}}$, 1862.

ON mande de Belgrade, le 30 Juin, à la "Gazette d'Agram":—

"Nonobstant les stipulations convenues, comme je vous l'ai écrit dans ma dernière lettre, entre le Gouvernement Serbe et le Commissaire de la Porte, notre pays offre toujours un aspect belliqueux. Non-seulement les barricades élevées dans la ville n'ont pas été démolies, mais on en construit sans cesse de nouvelles; elles servent cependent uniquement à la défense. Hier au matin est arrivé un autre corps de 1,200 vétérans; on évacue sans cesse les magasins de la ville, et on met les marchandises en sûreté dans les endroits les plus éloignés. Evidemment donc on se prépare à une attaque qui amènerait probablement la destruction totale de la ville. Du reste, il est hors de doute que les forces révolutionnaires sont en pleine activité et minent sans cesse le terrain. Le Prince se trouve en ce moment dans une impasse d'où il est très-difficile de sortir heureusement. Personnellement il ne veut pas la guerre et tâche d'obtenir par des négociations pacifiques autant de concessions en faveur de la Servie qu'il est possible d'en espérer en ce moment. Dans ce but, il a remis au Commissaire de la Porte une adresse de loyauté pour le Sultan, dans laquelle il repousse toute pensée d'une révolte contre la suzeraineté du Sultan et toute intention hostile. Jusqu'ici le Gouvernement Serbe n'a pas encore officiellement exigé la démolition des forteresses, mais on a répandu parmi les masses armées l'opinion de la nécessité de cette concession, de sorte qu'elles regarderaient comme traître quiconque voudrait leur conseiller de retourner dans leurs foyers tant que le drapeau de la Turquie flottera sur les murs de la citadelle de Belgrade.—"Evacuation ou prise d'assaut de la forteresse, voilà le cri de guerre des masses, et comme la Porte ne consentira pas à l'évacuer spontanément, on peut prédire avec une grande probabilité l'assaut de la citadelle ou une révolution."

On écrit de Belgrade a "l'Ostdeutsche Post," le 2 Juillet, que le Gouvernement du Prince a adressé le même jour à tous les Consuls un Memorandum sur l'origine des conflits qui ont eu lieu dans les derniers temps entre les Turcs et les Serbes, et spécialement sur celui du 15 de ce mois. De ce Memorandum il résulterait que les Turcs ont été les seuls auteurs de tous ces différends. L'attaque des portes aurait eu lieu sans aucune préméditation, et seulement lorsque les Turcs eurent commencé et provoqué le conflit. Toutefois, le correspondant ajoute: "Par de tels moyens on peut tout au plus tromper les personnes qui veulent se laisser tromper. Tous les hommes impartiaux qui ont été témoins oculaires des événements, et qui ont également eu occasion de voir un peu derrière les coulisses, se sont convaincus qu'il s'agit d'un plan préparé d'avance et avec beaucoup d'astuce, ayant pour but de conduire à un résultat la démission de M. Garaschanin."

Inclosure 3 in No. 800.

Aali Pasha to Khalil Bey.

Constantinople, le 25 Juin, 1862.

M. l'Envoyé,

VOUS connaissez déjà par mes télégrammes successifs les facheux événements dont Belgrade a été le théâtre. Les Serviens cherchent à se justifier en accusant les autorités de la forteresse et les habitants Musulmans, les faits prouvent le contraire.

Les nombreux assassinats, les attaques journalières qui ont précédé la nuit du 15 au 16 Juin, les exhortations des agents de l'autorité Princière, les armes fournies par les dépôts de la même autorité à une populace acharnée, les menaces déjà proférées ici même par le Capou-Kehiya de Servie, et le peu de force militaire que nous avons en Servie, sont autant de preuves irrécusables pour constater suffisamment de quel côté l'agression est venue. Ce qui se passe à l'heure qu'il est n'est pas moins édifiant. Depuis qu'il n'y a plus un Musulman dans le faubourg de Belgrade le pillage des maisons et des boutiques appartenant à ces derniers continue et deux autres Tatars de la poste Autrichienne ont été assassinés.

Pour le moment je me borne à ces détails généraux en me réservant de vous communiquer les renseignements plus circonstanciés que j'attends de la part de Vefik Effendi. Vous êtes autorisé dès aujourd'hui à repousser énergiquement toute insinuation tendante à attribuer aux Musulmans l'initiative des événements en question.

Un autre point qui nous paraît être de la plus haute importance, c'est les préparatifs incessants des Serviens sur les frontières de la Principauté. Tous les rapports reçus de différents pays qui environnent ces frontières sont unanimes à nous signaler l'activité extraordinaire avec laquelle on arme. A voir un tel état de choses et en considérant les provocations injurieuses que les gardes frontières Serbes ne cessent d'adresser aux nôtres, on disait qu'ils ont la mission de multiplier encore davantage les difficultés d'une situation déjà si tendue.

Les Serviens mettent en avant la singulière prétention de nous empêcher d'envoyer des forces militaires à leurs voisinages pour prévenir tout incident; ils s'efforcent à faire croire que l'approche de ses forces excite les esprits de leurs concitoyens. Cette objection ne peut pas être pris au sérieux, car le moindre bon sens indique que le Gouvernement Impérial ne peut avoir aucun intérêt à faire une expédition en Servie ou à toucher à ses immunités.

Les Serviens savent très-bien que s'il y a eu quelquefois des velléités d'empiètement sur leurs privilèges, elles ne sont pas venues de nous et que la Sublime Porte a toujours pris le parti du peuple pour empêcher les ambitieux de s'emparer de tous ses droits.

Il serait donc puéril, sous tous les rapports, de vouloir justifier une conduite si injustifiable par des pareilles raisons. S'il y a des mesures qui excitent les esprits et qui sont de nature à provoquer des conflits, ce sont celles que les Serviens ont adoptés et dont je parle plus haut.

Nous faisons tout notre possible pour empêcher les sinistres conséquences qu'on semble vouloir amener. La Circulaire adressée en dernier lieu à nos Gouverneurs, et que je vous envoie ci-jointe en traduction, prouve combien nous sommes sincèrement désireux de prévenir toute complication nouvelle.

Mais si les Serbes persistent dans leurs allures actuelles, il nous sera excessivement difficile de nous maintenir dans cette position.

Agréez, &c.
(Signé) AALI.

P.S.—Depuis l'arrivée de Vélik Effendi à Belgrade la situation se détend un peu. Vous devez avoir appris que les Serviens, sur la demande de notre Commissaire, lui ont donné une déclaration par laquelle il s'engageat à se tenir tranquilles. Garachanin et Marinowitch se sont empressés de voir Ahmed Vefik Effendi et celui-ci devait faire une visite au Prince Michel.

(Paraphé) A.

No. 801.

Mr. Fane to Earl Russell.—(Received July 21.)

(No. 24.)

My Lord, *Vienna, July* 17, 1862.

COUNT RECHBERG has received a report from one of his agents, who recently visited the camp of Dervisch Pasha, which gives a lamentable account of the condition of the Turkish troops. His Excellency has transmitted this report to Count Apponyi for communication to your Lordship. The facts revealed by this agent and the long-continued silence of Omer Pasha, during a period when Vienna was daily inundated with telegrams reporting Montenegrin victories, caused Count Rechberg to be anxious that some step should be taken to establish an armistice between the belligerents, as he deemed that any decided reverse sustained by the Turkish troops would render it difficult to bring the Prince of

Montenegro, flushed with victory; to entertain terms which could be conceded by the Porte. It was under this impression that he addressed an instruction on the subject to Count Apponyi for communication to your Lordship. But befor dispatching it he received reports, identical with those forwarded to your Lordship by Mr. Churchill's telegrams, announcing decided successes on the part of the Turks, and the junction of the two armies under Dervisch and Abdi Pashas. These reports his Excellency annexed to the despatch, which he then forwarded to Count Apponyi.

Count Rechberg's impression seems to be that, if the Turks are able to march with success up to Cettigné, it would be good policy to let them do so. But he doubts their power. Even if there is no strategical obstacle which they might not overcome, he fears it would be impossible for them to provision their troops, and especially to provide them with water, in that barren country. He thinks, therefore, that an armistice may still prove very desirable, especially as he hears that the Montenegrins have not at present any troops either in the Sutorina or the Dounga Pass to warrant their making any claim to these positions. The ultimatum of the Porte of the 9th of April should, in his opinion, form the basis of any arrangement which might be proposed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JULIAN FANE.

No. 802.

Mr. Fane to Earl Russell.—(Received July 21.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July 21, 1862.*

TURKISH Embassy have received following telegram from Osman Pasha:—

"*Scutari, July 20, 1862.*

"Our troops yesterday drove the Montenegrins from Sagratz and neighbourin heights, and pursued them for an hour on the road to Cettigné."

No 803.

Earl Russell to Mr. Grey.

(No. 26.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, July 21, 1862.*

I INCLOSE for your Excellency's information copy of a despatch on the subject of Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 804.

Earl Russell to Consul Holmes.

(No. 3.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 23, 1862.*

I HAVE to acquaint you that I have directed Mr. Churchill, Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General at Jassy, to proceed on special service to the head-quarters of Omer Pasha, and I have to instruct you to communicate with him there, and to afford him any assistance he may require while employed on this Mission.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

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* No. 801.

No. 805.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received July 25.)

(No. 443.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, July 16, 1862.*

IN my telegram of yesterday's date I acquainted your Lordship with the junction of the forces under Abdi and Dervish Pashas at Ourialouka, in Montenegro, preparatory to an advance on Cettigné.

The French Ambassador called yesterday on Aali Pasha, and suggested that now was the time to arrange matters by a peaceful settlement. His Highness answered, "Certainly, if the Montenegrins ask for it."

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

No. 806.

Mr. Fane to Earl Russell.—(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July 27, 1862.*

CHURCHILL telegraphs as follows from Scutari:—

"Montenegrins, considerably dispirited, are burning their villages, and being beaten everywhere. Peperi has tendered submission. Messenger from Prince waiting with letters at Spuz for Turks."

No. 807.

Mr. Fane to Earl Russell.—(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July 27, 1862.*

CHURCHILL telegraphs as follows:—"Prince telegraphs to Omer that he is sending him pressing and important communications. Scutari, July 27. Send this on."

No. 808.

Mr. Fane to Earl Russell.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July 29, 1862.*

THE Turkish Embassy has just received the following telegram from Omer Pasha, dated Scutari, July 28:—

"All the positions round Sagratz having been carried by our troops, we drove the enemy, on Friday, the 25th, with great loss, from Orialucca and the surrounding villages. The village and palace of Mirko destroyed. Details follow by post. To-day direct operations to be undertaken against Cettinjé. The demoralized enemy hardly resists."

No. 809.

Mr. Fane to Earl Russell.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July 29, 1862.*

A TELEGRAM just received from Churchill, dated Scutari, yesterday, says:—

"The Prince asks for an armistice of twenty days, hoping that it may lead to the total cessation of hostilities. The Commander-in-chief refers the matter to the Porte. More fighting to-day."

No. 810.

Acting Consul Cortazzi to Earl Russell.—(Received July 31.)

(No. 48.)
Scutari, July 15, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith to your Lordship copy of a despatch dated the 15th instant which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Consul at Janina.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FREDERICK A. CORTAZZI.

Inclosure in No. 810.

Acting Consul Cortazzi to Consul Stuart.

Scutari, July 15, 1862.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that on the 12th instant the corps d'armée, consisting of 10,000 regular troops and 2,000 Bashi-Bazouks, commanded by Dervish Pasha, succeeded in effecting a junction at Drebtecha, in the Bjelopavlici, with the corps d'armée under the command of Abdul Pasha. Their joint force, under the immediate command of Abdul Pasha, consists of 26,000 effective men, and are at the present moment stationed in the vicinity of Spuz, having advanced as far as the village of Sargovitz, five hours distance from Cettigné.

This junction has not been effected without severe loss, and Dervish Pasha in forcing the Ostrog gorge, had to sustain no less than four engagements with the insurgents. Abdul Pasha, in his attack at Planina, where the Montenegrins had strongly entrenched themselves, also suffered severely.

The Turkish troops thus diminished in number, and harassed by the fatigue of forced marches, will remain for the present in the cantonments they now occupy.

The Serdar Ekrem has informed me that he has this day issued a proclamation to the Montenegrins, calling upon them to lay down their arms, and to abstain from any further acts of violence, assuring them at the same time that the presence of the Turkish troops has simply for object the re-establishment of order and public safety in Montenegro.

If I am rightly informed, this junction of the Turkish forces has had, as it naturally would, the effect of greatly demoralizing the Montenegrins, and that at Cettigné a strong party has formed, calling loudly for a cessation of hostilities.

The corps d'armée of Hussein Pasha is still occupied in constructing forts and opening communications in the Lower Vassojevici. Hussein Pasha is at Banna, superintending the construction of a fort at that place, and which is already in a forward state of completion. This fort, when finished, is calculated to contain 1,000 men. Hussein Pasha as yet has not received orders to join his corps with the main body of the army, and, as far as I can learn, such orders are not even contemplated.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FREDERICK A. CORTAZZI.

No. 811.

Mr. Fane to Earl Russell.—(Received July 31.)

Vienna, July 31, 1862.

(Telegraphic.)
CHURCHILL telegraphs as follows:—

"*Scutari, July 31, 1862.*

"The Prince's letter is an appeal to Commander-in-chief's humanity to bring to a close the war which has already occasioned too much effusion of blood. He urgently requests the Commander-in-chief to acquaint him with the Porte's conditions, which he trusts will not be too humiliating to people who have fought bravely. No overtures have been made to the foreign Consuls here."

No. 812.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 454.)
Foreign Office, July 31, 1862.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna, respecting the affairs of Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 813.

Mr. Fane to Earl Russell.—(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)
Vienna, August 1, 1862.

CHURCHILL telegraphs from Scutari as follows:—

"Were hostilities to be suspended, 30,000 regular troops and 40,000 Bashi-Bazouks would be available for Servia if required, but I should not advise suspension of hostilities before the Porte's conditions, whatever they be, were accepted, and their scrupulous execution sufficiently guaranteed."

No. 814.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received August 1.)

(No. 461.)
Constantinople, July 22, 1862.

My Lord,

AS some misapprehension would appear to prevail with respect to the attempted pacification in Montenegro under French and Austrian auspices, I think it right to acquaint your Lordship with the version given me by Baron Prokesch of his share in these transactions.

The understanding between the French and Austrian Cabinets was that the former should propose to Prince Nicholas the unconditional acceptance of Omer Pasha's ultimatum. That acceptance was then to be communicated by the French Ambassador at Constantinople to the Internuncio, and the two would request the other Representatives of the great Powers to join them in urging the Porte to assent to an immediate armistice, with a view to negotiation.

But Baron Prokesch heard nothing from M. de Moustier on the subject, although aware, through other channels, that Prince Nicholas had returned, to say the least, an evasive answer to the overture made to him by France.

It was, indeed, generally understood and reported by the different Consuls that the ultimatum had been positively refused; and so matters stood until the recent successes of the Turks, when M. de Moustier, after a long conference with Prince Labanon, called on the Internuncio, and informed him that he considered Prince Nicholas had accepted the ultimatum, and that consequently he, the Internuncio, was bound to unite with him, the Marquis de Moustier, in calling upon the other Representatives to urge the Porte to grant an armistice.

Baron Prokesch, however, being unwilling to accept M. de Moustier's interpretation of the meaning of Prince Nicholas' letter, requested the Marquis to give him copies of the correspondence, which his Excellency, apparently with some reluctance, consented to.

The Internuncio having been good enough to communicate this correspondence to me, I herewith transmit a copy of M. Wiet's letter and of the Prince's answer.

I think your Lordship will agree with me that the terms of that answer, are so far from being an unconditional acceptance of the Porte's ultimatum, that it would be out of the question to ask the Porte, on such an answer, to agree to an armistice, and Baron Prokesch, being also of the same opinion, has declined for the present to take any further steps in the matter.

As I understand the letter, Prince Nicholas accepts the proposed armistice, but

* No. 801.

declines the condition of the ultimatum on the ground that the respective position of the parties has been altogether changed by the actual outbreak of hostilities.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 814.

M. Wiet to the Prince of Montenegro.

Scutari, le 10 Juin, 1862.

Prince,

JE suis chargé par son Excellence M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de faire connaître à votre Altesse que si elle veut bien me déclarer par écrit que sa réponse en date du 23 Avril dernier doit être considéré de sa part comme une adhésion pleine et entière aux conditions posées par la Porte dans la notification qui lui a faite Omer Pacha et que si elle veut bien prendre en outre, vis-à-vis des Puissances, l'engagement formel de les exécuter, l'Autriche, d'accord avec le Gouvernement Français, fera à Constantinople la demande d'un armistice immédiat. L'Ambassadeur de l'Empereur y appuierait cette démarche et réclamerait aussi le concours des autres Ambassadeurs.

Je m'empresse de faire cette communication à votre Altesse par l'envoi d'un courrier ad hoc que je mets à ses ordres et qui me rapportera la réponse qu'elle voudra bien me faire l'honneur de m'adresser.

Je suis, &c.
(Signé) WIET.

Inclosure 2 in No. 814.

The Prince of Montenegro to M. Wiet.

Cettigné, le 16 Juin, 1862.

M. le Consul,

J'AI pris connaissance de la lettre du 10 Juin courant qui m'a été remise par le courrier spécial expédié par vous à cet effet.

Je suis on ne peut plus reconnaissant envers le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur Napoléon III pour la bienveillante démarche tantée en faveur du Monténégro. Je vous serais bien obligé si vous vouliez bien, M. le Consul, transmettre à son Excellence M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères l'expression de tous mes sentiments de gratitude.

J'accepte en principe la proposition d'un armistice mise en avant par la France; j'y souscris, heureux de donner au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté une marque de ma profonde déférence et d'arrêter l'effusion du sang.

Je me permettrai simplement de vous faire observer, M. le Consul, que les derniers événements ont tout-à-fait changé la position des parties belligérantes. A l'époque de la note de la Sublime Porte la Turquie n'avait pas encore envahi mon territoire; elle n'avait pas brûlé mes villages, ni massacré et mis en fuite mes populations. J'ajouterai aussi qu'à l'époque de ma réponse à la note précitée je n'avais pas encore pris aucune part à la guerre et que je m'étais contenté, comme j'avais l'honneur de le dire alors, de faire des vœux pour le succès des Chrétiens.

Aujourd'hui, M. le Consul, souscrire purement et simplement aux conditions portées par la note Ottomane, serait me suicider moralement et physiquement d'autant plus que la note envoyée en temps de paix et avant les derniers événements avait une valeur et une portée autre que celles qu'elle peut avoir à présent.

Donc dans l'intérêt de mon peuple jaloux de sauvegarder ma dignité, sans cependant rien faire pour éloigner une pacification qui est un de mes désirs les plus ardents, j'accepte l'armistice, je promets d'en observer les principes, à la seule condition, qui me paraît naturelle et équitable, que pendant la durée, les deux parties belligérantes continueront d'occuper les positions qu'elles possèdent actuellement, et que ni l'une ni l'autre n'en profitera pour améliorer la situation aux défens de la partie adverse. Pour tout le reste, je remets les intérêts de mon peuple entre les mains du Gouvernement de l'Empereur.

(Signé) NICOLAS.

No. 815.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 2, 1862, 6·30 P.M.

THE best way of arranging the Servian affair seems to be to give up some of the smaller forts, and to keep those most important. If the Sultan consents to this, you will take such a (part) as may be most useful to the Porte, and most calculated to support the cause of Turkey.

No. 816.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received August 3.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August* 2, 1862, 7·30 P.M.

THE Prince of Montenegro seems at last to have demanded peace in a proper manner. My notion is that the Porte should grant it generously, even with additions of territory, in the places which would render people more ( ), but retain undiminished ( ) as guarantees of continual tranquillity, with a view to establish one or two principal roads.

No. 817.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received August 4.)

(No. 45. Political.)

My Lord,

Bosna-Serai, July 18, 1862.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a despatch, addressed by me to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, regarding the junction of the forces of Abdi and Dervish Pashas, and the action which preceded this movement. The Prince of Montenegro is said to have quitted Cettigné, and a telegraphic despatch from Mostar has informed the authorities here that Dervish Pasha had marched on that place, but the result is not yet known.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure in No. 817.

Consul Holmes to Sir H. Bulwer.

Sir,

Bosna-Serai, July 14, 1862.

I YESTERDAY transmitted to your Excellency by telegraph the following communication, based on a telegram received by the authorities here:—

"Official telegram just received here states that Abdi and Dervish Pashas have united their forces near Ostrog. The Montenegrins have suffered severely."

The day before, a telegram was received from Khourshid Pasha, of Mostar, of which the following is a copy:—

"J'ai l'honneur de vous communiquer deux dépêches reçues de la part de son Altesse le Serdar-Ekrem. Après quelques jours d'inaction causée par la retraite volontière d'Abdi Pacha, nos troupes ont pris l'offensive. Dimanche brillante victoire sur 15,000 Monténégrins. Mardi 8 nous attaqua, mais de nouveau l'ennemi fortement retranché sur la cime de la montagne de Plava, les Monténégrins soutenèrent la première attaque; mais au second assaut ils furent culbutés de tous côtés. Cette position conquise est importante comme clef de la route de Cettigné d'un côté, et couvrant d'autre part notre marche sur Ostrog.

"Au combat de Mardi 8, nous avons pris 1 affut de canon, avec accessoirs, 4 caisses munitions d'artillerie, la fonte de Mireo, 1 drapeau de periniks, quantité fusils, jataganes. Monténégrins perdirent Sénateur Petro Philipov, 4 capitaines, 3 baractars, 600 tués; de notre côté 103 morts, 261 blessés. Derviche Pacha s'est avancé vers Ostrog; la jonction est éminente. Derviche Pacha a battu les Monténégrins à Rita, s'est allé à Ostrog."

I did not, however, consider it worth while to telegraph to your Excellency until I had received the news of the junction of Abdi and Dervish Pashas' forces, as so many insignificant skirmishes have been converted into brilliant victories by both parties; but the fact that the Ottoman Generals occupy the country from Spuz to Nichsich, completely dividing Montenegro, is of considerable importance, and may have a satisfactory influence in bringing the mountaineers to terms.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 818.

Mr. Churchill to Earl Russell.—(Received August 4.)

(No. 16.)
My Lord, *Scutari, July 22, 1862.*

I HAD the honour to telegraph to your Lordship on the 18th that I had last succeeded in re-establishing friendly relations between the Turkish authorities and the French Consulate at Scutari.

I shall leave to Mr. Cortazzi, Her Majesty's Consul, who materially assisted me in bringing about this reconciliation, to report to your Lordship in detail the nature of the difficulties that had to be overcome. Suffice it for me to say, that Omer Pasha greeted my proffered mediation with unfeigned readiness, while M. Wiett was glad to see an old colleague and friend take upon himself the task of obtaining for the French flag the reparation due to it.

On Sunday, the 20th instant, the Mushir Abdi Pasha, Governor-General of Scutari, accompanied by all the Turkish authorities of the place, waited on the French Consul in full uniform, and expressed to him his regrets that a misunderstanding should have occurred; after which, in the presence of the Consular body, and of a large concourse of people, the French flag was deployed once more over the French Consulate with due honours.

This controversy, which, in itself, is of little importance, might, nevertheless, with the course of events, have led to serious consequences. It was not settled a moment too soon, for already the Mirdites were menacing the communications between this and the capital, while more than one village situated in their vicinity had to make preparations for an attack on the part of the discontented mountaineers. The French Consul, though he denies any participation in these hostile demonstrations, has, on more than one occasion, attempted to impress on my mind the influence he exercises over the Mirdite tribe in general, whose cause he has espoused against their Chief and against the Turkish Government. I have his word, however, that he will not only refrain from using this influence against the authority of the Porte, but that he will likewise intimate to the Mirdites to remain quiet; and this may be considered as a concession in favour of the Turks, and a departure, to some extent, from the policy dictated by M. Thouvenel to the French Consular officers in this part of the Levant, which is to the effect that though France does not wish to precipitate the downfall of the Ottoman Empire by any encouragement or material assistance to the various nationalities constituting the Turkish Empire, yet, viewing the ingratitude of the Turks towards France, the Government of the Emperor does not deem it necessary to support Turkey as we are doing, or expedient to exert itself in any way, in preventing its Christian population from rising or setting at naught the Porte's authority.

The Montenegrins have been given to understand this very clearly, but M. Thouvenel will not deny that France has sent large supplies to the Montenegrins, nevertheless, while Russia is furnishing them with money, of which they appear to stand in greater need, as the French supplies are said to have been sold at Cettigné and converted into gold as soon as they were delivered over to them by the French Consulate at Scutari.

I shall say little in my present report regarding the desperate struggle that is now taking place between the Turks and the Montenegrins, further than that the two armies, under Abdi and Dervish Pashas, having operated their junction in the Valley of the Tetta, are now marching upon Cettigné. The Turks anticipate little or no resistance, but on what ground Omer Pasha basis this belief will be seen hereafter.

The marching upon Cettigné is a bold stroke, but may it not be too bold a stroke? for a brilliant success may well be turned into an irreparable defeat if the

Turks do not properly secure their communications. I refrain from going into details at present, because it is the most difficult thing to get anything like the truth out of either Turk or Christian in any way connected with this struggle; but one thing is certain, and that is that both the Turks and the Montenegrins have sustained considerable losses in this campaign. The Turkish battalions are so reduced by sickness, fatigue, exposure, and actual warfare, that some of them count no more than 180 fighting men in them, while the Montenegrins have lost at least 3,000 of their best marksmen. The latter do not now fight with the same daring spirit as before, and discord is reported to exist amongst their Chiefs; but who can doubt the desperate and, I may say, heroic resistance of a people attacked in their own homes and fastnesses, that can fight so gallantly out of their country. They are now on the defensive, and if the Turkish troops push on to Cettigné, as they say they are doing, I only hope they may not be made to pay dearly for their temerity.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY A. CHURCHILL.

No. 819.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received August 4.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 3, 1862, 11 P.M.*

THE Porte wisely determines to accept whatever Omer Pasha has agreed to at Scutari, though the arrangement will cause future embarrassments. I understand that the 25,000 fr. were to be given to the Abbé to build the Catholic Chapel, which, considering he was under accusation of treason, would have been monstrous, but it appears that this sum is to be given to the French Consul.

The Porte is willing to give the sum, but desires to give it to the inhabitants for whom the chapel is intended, and not to a foreign functionnary. Aali Pasha thinks M. de Moustier will not object to this, which seems natural and reasonable.

Churchill should have informed me clearly of what was really the arrangement, which I have had to learn imperfectly from other sources.

No. 820.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 4, 1862.*

THE Porte will do well to give Prince of Montenegro liberal terms, but to fortify all approaches to his territory.

No. 821.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 816.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, August 4, 1862.*

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of two despatches upon the subject of Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 822.

Mr. Paine to Earl Russell.—(Received August 7.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, August 7, 1862.*

OMER PASHA telegraphs yesterday from Scutari that after successful fighting on Saturday, Sunday, and Monday, the Turks were advancing on Rieka, of which

* No. 816 and 820.

they expected to take possession yesterday evening. He describes the Montenegrins as completely demoralized and insubordinate to their Chiefs.

No. 823.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 828.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, August 7, 1862.*

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of two despatches upon the subject of Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 824.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received August 8.)

(No. 482.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, July 29, 1862.*

ACCORDING to the last telegraphic accounts from Montenegro, Omer Pasha had received a communication from Prince Nicholas requesting that he would consent to an armistice, in order to put a stop to further bloodshed.

The Serdar Ekrem has referred to the Porte for instruction, but appears to think that the Montenegrins are reduced to such distress that they are probably in earnest in seeking to come to terms with the Porte. The Porte is willing to grant terms, but it will only do so at Cettigné.

On the 27th instant, the Imperial troops had defeated the enemy in a series of engagements near Zagaratsch, with the loss of only 15 killed and 50 wounded, whilst the Montenegrins had suffered most severely. After halting for a day or two to repair some damaged guns, the troops were to resume their march yesterday on Cettigné, by way of Riga.

I inclose to your Lordship a précis of the details furnished me by the Porte as to these engagements, and which will doubtless be reported by Mr. Churchill.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

Inclosure in No. 824.

Précis of a Telegram from Omer Pasha to the Serashier, dated July 27, 1862.

THE Imperial troops have repeatedly defeated the rebels in the neighbourhood of Zagaratch; they have assembled, however, at the strong and inaccessible villages of Onia-Luca and Galavitcha, which is distant half an hour from Onia-Luca, in the rear of which there is a rocky and inaccessible hill. Both these villages have been strongly fortified. It was deemed unadvisable, under these circumstances, to advance upon Cettigné from Riga, but that after dislodging the enemy from their position to march through Riga on to Cettingé. Therefore, on Thursday last, twenty-eight battalions and some irregulars advanced from the hill of Belave and carried the position of the rebels, which they occupied on the line of march, and completely routing them.

Whilst the Montenegrins were hurrying on to Onia-Luca on the same day, the troops took the villages of Giouri, Gairlitsko, and Galavitcha.

The next day sixteen battalions attacked Onia-Luca, and after opening fire upon it, and with the object of capturing Mirco, who commanded the Montenegrins, the assault was given; the trenches of Onia-Luca, the handsome and strong house of Mirco, &c., were taken on the first spirited assault, which lasted half an hour. The Montenegrins, amounting to about 12,000 men, were completely defeated and dispersed.

According to their habit, the Montenegrins burned two towers at Onia-Luca

* No. 818 and 819.

containing their wounded and fugitives, who had been conveyed thither, rather than they should fall into the hands of the Imperial troops; though our troops did their best they were not able to save the whole of them. Next day (Saturday) the Imperial troops returned from Galavitza to the hill of Belave. The losses sustained by the rebels in these engagements cannot be estimated, and their distress and reverses are great. Our killed amounted to fifteen, and fifteen wounded.

The Pashas in command speak in the highest terms of the conduct of the officers and men. On Sunday preparations will be made, and the repairs of some of our guns will be attended to, and on Monday, with God's help, we shall advance direct on Riga, on our way to Cettigné.

No. 825.

Mr. Fane to Earl Russell.—(Received August 9.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, August 9, 1862, 6 A.M.*

A TELEGRAM received from Churchill, dated last night, from Scutari:—

"Montenegrins evacuated Dodosh. Turks carried heights above Riecka, eight miles from Cettigné, whither they are marching."

No. 826.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received August 11.)

(No. 47. Political.)
My Lord, *Bosna-Serai, July 22, 1862.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship the arrival of Sheffik Bey on a mission, the nature of which no one seems exactly to understand, but it appears to be simply one of useless interference with Osman Pasha's duties as regards the Servian movement. Sheffik Bey is the person who was head of the Commission for the affairs of the Herzegovina, and who was considered by Omer Pasha, on account of his fanaticism, not only incapable of any useful service, but as a positive obstacle to any advance in the way of reform. Your Lordship may remember that in a despatch I addressed to Sir Henry Bulwer, of the 20th August, 1861,* copy of which I inclosed in despatch Herzegovina Commission No. 20, to your Lordship, I mentioned that he was a Dervish, and that a considerable portion of his time was devoted to the religious duty of howling himself into fits. The day of Dervishes, however, I am happy to say, is rapidly waning, at least in the more civilized parts of Turkey, and it seems to me astounding that such men should be appointed to positions for which they are so evidently unfit.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 827.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received August 11.)

(No. 49. Political.)
My Lord, *Bosna-Serai, July 22, 1862.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a despatch of the 13th July, received from Mr. Vice-Consul Zohrab, regarding the establishment of steam communication between Trieste and Metcovich on the River Narenta.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

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* Inclosure 2 in No. 288.

Inclosure in No. 827.

Vice-Consul Zohrab to Consul Holmes.

Mostar, July 13, 1862.

Sir,

I HAVE to report that the Austrian Lloyds' Steam Navigation Company have placed the Austrian village of Metcovich, on the River Narenta, in steam communication with Trieste; a steamer now makes fortnightly runs between the two places.

By this arrangement the Herzegovina will be greatly benefited in its commercial relations with other countries. Hitherto the import and export trade of the province has been carried on by means of sailing vessels, which take in and deliver their cargos at Gabella, the Turkish Custom-house station on the Narenta, opposite Metcovich; the voyage between Gabella and Trieste generally occupies about twenty-four days, and considerable risk is incurred; by the new arrangement the voyage will be made in about four days, while the risks and also the expenses will be materially lessened.

The advantage, however, of bringing Mostar into steam communication with Europe will not be immediately felt by the commercial classes, as the want of a road through the short tract of country which separates Mostar from Gabella (twenty-four miles) prevents the adoption of carts as a means of transport, and the war with Montenegro has led to the absorption of almost all the horses in the province by the military. Merchants now experience great difficulty and delay in getting their merchandize to Mostar, trade is consequently languid, and the advantages of quick transport are not appreciated for the moment; but when peace is restored and commerce revives I am confident the benefits of steam communication will be fully admitted, and the Lloyds Company will find that the Metcovich line will be one of their most profitable lines.

Khoorshid Pasha is trying to get the road between Mostar and Metcovich completed, but through the demands made on the time of the peasants by the military, he is left without men to work; a little progress is made towards the desired end, but I regret to say that it is very small.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAS. ZOHRAB.

No. 828.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received August 11.)

(No. 50. Political.)

Bosna-Serai, July 22, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that an official telegram reached the authorities here yesterday reporting a battle at Zagaratz, in which the Turks were victorious. Zagaratz is not far from Spuz, and is the first step towards Cettigné, in the direction of which the Turks declare they pursued the enemy for an hour's distance.

The army is now, it would seem, not more than a few hours from Cettigné, but, from all I can learn, the mountaineers will make a most determined resistance to the Turkish advance, which will be over difficult ground, in the face of numerous towers and other artificial obstructions.

Dervish Pasha, after the junction of his forces with those of Abdi Pasha, proceeded to Scutari, when, after an interview with Omer Pasha, he commenced his march on Zagaratz with the above-mentioned result.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 829.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received August 11.)

(No. 51. Political.)

Bosna-Serai, July 25, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Mr. Layard's despatch of the 7th July, desiring me to draw up and send home a connected, and, as far as possible, an accurate narrative of the events which have occurred in Montenegro and the Herzegovina from the commencement of May up to the present moment.

The following account is founded on Turkish official statements, which, divested of their questionable details regarding killed and wounded, which I do not repeat, are doubtless correct as to the general result.

Towards the end of April Omer Pasha telegraphed to the authorities here that he had received permission from the Porte to carry the war into Montenegro, and on the 3rd May his Highness left Mostar for Scutari, Dervish Pasha having been named Mushir of the army of the Herzegovina. All the available troops in Bosnia, whether regular or irregular, were ordered to proceed to various points in the Herzegovina, and, as this measure removed the garrison of Senitza and weakened the defence of the important country between Servia and Montenegro, through which lies the high road from Bosnia to Constantinople, Osman Pasha, Governor of Bosnia, was ordered to proceed, with as many irregulars as he could raise to Senitza, and the Governor of Prisrend in Albania to Novi-Bazar. Osman Pasha left this on the 5th May. About the 9th the rebels and Montenegrins made an inroad into Nevessin, and Dervish Pasha hastened from Mostar to meet them. They retired, but carried off some 350 baggage horses and did other damage. On the 17th May information was received here that Nichsich was attacked. It was repeatedly affirmed by the Russians and French that the place had surrendered. This was not the fact. Two quarters of the town outside the fortress were, however, destroyed. Dervish Pasha hastened to Cristatz to prepare for its relief. The authorities at Mostar seemed to have become alarmed, and made an endeavour to arm the Christians, which did not, however, succeed. Matters appeared to have fallen into confusion since the departure of Omer Pasha from Mostar, and it was reported that at the instance of France and Russia his Higness had received orders not to pass the Montenegrin frontier. On the 21st May Dervish Pasha moved from Cristatz and made an effort to pass the Douga to relieve Nichsich. His advanced guard of Bashi-Bazouks was entirely routed, six Colonels of irregulars were killed, and he retired to Bilekia. The most exaggerated reports prevailed of the total destruction of his force and the aspect of affairs was in general extremely unsatisfactory for Turkey. About the same time, however, Hussein Pasha, with a force of some 15,000 men of all arms, succeeded in establishing himself in the district of Vassovich. He immediately fortified a strong position, from which he has since kept that important country quiet. This success secured the positions of Senitza and Novi-Bazar from Montenegrin attack, and protected communication with Constantinople. The insurgents also about the same time made an attack on the Turkish entrenchments in Zupzi, but were repulsed.

Affairs now began to take a turn favourable to the Turks. On the 24th May the troops under Abdi Pasha entered Montenegro from Spuz and occupied the district of Bielopavlovich. They routed the opposing force of Montenegrins and burnt or otherwise destroyed nearly all the villages and towers in the plain. About the same time Dervish Pasha made an incursion from Bilekia into Banjani, the inhabitants of which fled in a body to Montenegro. The Turkish Commander met with little or no resistance, and returned to Bilekia with considerable spoil in cattle. On the 31st he again left Bilekia with eighteen battalions of Nizams and a large body of Bashi-Bazouks, together with a convoy of provisions and ammunition for Nichsich. This time he took the road through Banjani, avoiding the fatal Douga Pass. He was opposed at two points by the rebels and Montenegrins in considerable force. In the first skirmish at Gomela they were easily repulsed, but in the second engagement at a steep and difficult descent into the plain of Nichsich near a bridge called "Kousinski-most," the Turks were taken by surprize and sustained a heavy loss. Several field officers were killed, among whom was the Ferik Salik Pasha of Varna notoriety. The Turks, however, gained the battle, and reached Nichsich on the 1st of June. After a short repose Dervish Pasha entered Montenegro and advanced towards Ostrog with the view of forming a junction

between his own division and that of Abdi Pasha in Bielopavlovich. He carried by storm a fortified position in the valley leading to Ostrog, where it was said that the Prince Nicola commanded in person. The extreme difficulty of keeping open the communication in his rear and want of ammunition and provisions decided him to return to Nichsich; but hearing soon afterwards that the Montenegrins were again fortifying the position he had just destroyed, he returned and carried their works a second time. After this, learning that the road between Nichsich and Bilekia was in danger of being occupied by the enemy, he retired again to Bilekia, having failed to effect the desired junction with Abdi Pasha's division.

From the 24th of May to the 12th July no authentic news was received here of what was taking place in Bielopavlovich. The Consulate at Scutari could probably supply the necessary information. Omer Pasha made no communication during this period, I am told, either to the authorities here or at Mostar. It was said that the Turkish troops were fortifying their positions, and that operations against the enemy were prevented by heavy rains which fell at this time. There was also a report about the middle of June that Abdi Pasha had been defeated and forced to retire on Spuz. This, I imagine, must have been to a certain extent true, as Omer Pasha, in a telegram to the authorities about the 12th July, alludes to a period of inaction caused by the voluntary retreat ("retraite volontaire") of Abdi Pasha. His Highness then proceeds to announce an important victory gained on the 8th over 15,000 Montenegrins, which opens to him the road to Cettigné, and protects the line of march to and from Ostrog. Dervish Pasha having passed the greater part of the month of June in collecting reinforcements, ammunition, and provisions, and in petty skirmishes with the enemy between Bilekia and Nichsich, was ordered again to march towards Ostrog, and, if possible, accomplish the long-desired junction with the division of Abdi Pasha. This he effected on the 9th or 10th, having defeated the enemy, who opposed his advance at a place called Kita. Dervish Pasha then proceeded to Scutari, where he had an interview with the Serdar Ekrem, immediately after which, according to a telegram received here on the 18th instant, he marched towards Cettigné. On the 21st a telegram was received reporting a battle at a place called Zagaratz, in which the Turks routed the enemy, and pursued him along the road to Cettigné, on which place the army was marching. No further news has been yet received.

The authorities here are, however, daily expecting to hear of the occupation of Cettigné. This appears to me to be now simply a question of a few days or weeks more or less. The Turks say that their progress will not be very difficult, as a good road at present exists to Cettigné; but some, among others the Austrian Consul-General here, Lieutenant-Colonel Jovanovich, who knows the country well, seems to think that the Turks will not obtain possession of the place so easily as they imagine. What will be the result of the capture of the capital of Montenegro it is difficult to say; some pretend that the mountaineers will obstinately continue the struggle. They may, perhaps, do so until the winter; but then the results of the past campaign will tell with fearful effect on them. Their ordinarily insufficient cultivation has been almost totally neglected, and a great part of what they have produced in Bielopavlovich and other places has fallen into the hands of the Turks. Besides themselves they have to feed half the refugee population of the Herzegovina; and the positions now occupied by Omer Pasha will, I imagine, render it difficult for them to receive supplies of grain such as were sent last winter by France and Russia. It may be fairly estimated that some 6,000 Montenegrins have fallen during the present campaign, and among these are many of their bravest and most influential men. I am told that there is hardly a family which does not mourn the loss of some relative. The faith of the mass of the people in the active intervention in their favour of France and Russia is becoming very feeble, and there is, I am told, a strong feeling against the Prince and his father, Mirco, as having ruinously deceived them as to the policy of the above-named Powers. When the horrors of cold and starvation, therefore, are added to the already existing causes of discontent, it is difficult to imagine any other result than surrender, or an arrangement based on the expulsion from Montenegro of all the members of the present Government, unless, indeed, a worse fate awaits them. However much they may have been led into their present critical position by the various foreign agents to whom, in spite of every warning, they seem implicitly to have trusted, the greater part of them merit little sympathy. They are mostly ignorant savages, whose sole idea is plunder. The Prince himself is most to be pitied. His influence is null the moment his face is turned against the maraunding propensities of his people. He

has been, I believe, if the truth were known, very unwillingly forced into the course he has followed by the all-powerful influence of his father, Mirko, an ignorant, rapacious, and unprincipled brigand.

Everything now seems to indicate that the end of the war is approaching. It is very desirable, however, that the Servian difficulty be settled as speedily as possible, and the continued success of the Ottoman arms in Montenegro will probably contribute to this end; but the prolongation of either of these difficulties will enhance the danger of the other. The systematic misrepresentation in the public journals of everything that occurs to the disadvantage of the Turks, by those whose object is to excite the Slavonic populations to revolt, in the belief of the impotence and constant defeat of the Ottoman Power, is also a source of danger not to be despised, and which can only be removed by a speedy termination of the present state of war; and I trust that the Turkish Government will strain every nerve to accomplish without delay this most desirable object.

What is afterwards to be done towards facilitating the complete and satisfactory return of the inhabitants of the Herzegovina to their allegiance will be a matter for much anxious consideration; but it is the opinion of everyone whose knowledge is such as to give value to his views that, unless the Government constructs carriageable roads throughout the Herzegovina, it will never be able to control the province, though it may perhaps hold the military positions with the surrounding country a desert, provided it can afford the ruinous expenditure which this state of affairs would entail. Intelligent officers—European as well as others—have assured me that the whole difficulty in the Herzegovina lies in the want of carriageable roads, which could be made with the utmost facility; but that without them the march of troops, the escorting of convoys, the mortality among the baggage animals, became insurmountable difficulties in the way of military operations, isolating every garrison, and rendering its supply with ammunition and provisions almost an impossibility. The only way in which the Russians were able to advance in Daghestan was by first making carriageable roads; the rest followed as a question of time alone. It is my belief that nothing would so much contribute to the general prosperity of Turkey, and her extrication from the difficulties of every kind which seem ready to overwhelm her, as a serious effort to connect her provinces and ports by good carriageable roads.

Your Lordship may have seen repeated announcements in the papers to the effect that Bosnia is in full revolt. The fact is, however, that the province is perfectly quiet from one end to the other. In the course of conversation to-day the Pasha informed me that lately the country has been inundated with political agitators from Servia, but their efforts have hitherto been completely unsuccessful. They are for the most part miserable adventurers who have in some instances confessed to receiving a monthly stipend for their services of some four ducats, of which, however, they are not likely to receive more than the first month's wages, which have been paid in advance.

Your Lordship may be assured that this province is tranquil as long as I write nothing to the contrary.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 830.

Mr. Fane to Earl Russell.—(Received August 11.)

(No. 81.)
My Lord, *Vienna, August 7, 1862.*

BARON WERTHER received on Saturday last a telegram from his Government informing him that the Prussian Minister at Constantinople was charged to use his best efforts to bring about the conclusion of an armistice between the Porte and the Prince of Montenegro, and instructing him to move the Austrian Government to support the proposal at Constantinople.

Count Rechberg informs me that he told Baron Werther that he could not consent to act in conformity with the wishes of the Prussian Government; that the Porte was itself the best judge of the opportuneness of a cessation of hostilities in Montenegro, and that he would be no party to an attempt to dictate to the Turkish

Government the course they should pursue with regard to the conclusion of an armistice.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JULIAN FANE.

No. 831.

Consul Paton to Earl Russell.—(Received August 11.)

(No. 5.)
My Lord, *Ragusa, August 1, 1862.*

I HAVE arrived too recently in this country to be able to write with confidence on public events; nevertheless, I venture to hope that the actual struggle between the Turkish forces and the Montenegrins is approaching a termination.

After the junction of the Turkish armies operating from the north and the south, and especially since the successful storming of the strong Montenegrin position at Orialuka on the 25th ultimo, a great discouragement has taken possession of all but Mirko and his sanguinary lieutenants. This is not to be wondered at, notwithstanding the prodigies of bravery of the Montenegrins (which have been unsurpassed by anything in the history of Slavic resistance to Ottoman rule), for while the Turkish losses have been supplied by the resources in men and money, as well as of material of a large Empire, the Montenegrins have from the first had every disposable man in the field without a reserve; consequently, there is not a single family in the mountains that has not lost several male members, and even females; for from the want of water in the canicular season, all the young and vigorous, amounting, I am told, from 1,500 to 3,000, have the exhausting and in many instances fatal service of the carriage of water and provisions, the females of the Prince's family setting the example.

Although the Montenegrins have never wanted for funds from abroad (for with their own they could never have organized and sustained this obstinate resistance to Turkish rule), yet they are as I hear in great want of ammunition, their attempts to smuggle nitre across the Austrian slip of land lying between them and the sea having been frustrated by the authorities.

Of the 30,000 fighting men which Montenegro has had since the great accession to their old territory by the Frontier Commission, at least a third have fallen, and these the bravest of the brave; so that now Mirko has a flying column in the rear of his troops to hound on all laggards, or shoot them on the spot. In short, the end is at hand, if Servia does not come to their assistance, for the common people have lost all hope of Russia or France actively intervening, and they now fight, not with hope and enthusiasm, but from fear of the bloodthirsty despotism of the father of the Prince.

Notwithstanding the firm attitude of the Turks in the fortresses of Servia, the menacing Bosniac cordon on the Drina and the vicinity of the Austrian forces on the Save, the great hope of the Montenegrins is in Servia; and should the co-operation of this Principality be tolerated, or should the Turks, from whatever cause, evacuate the fortresses of that country, it would be in vain to expect any peace in the regions to the east of the Adriatic.

I have learned that there is no Italian body of troops with the Montenegrins but some medical and mercantile men who may be in intelligence with Garibaldi; but I have as yet no positive details. The Austrian authorities are vigilant in their watch of the coast, and I really cannot see how Garibaldi, with all his astuteness, daring, and filibustering experience, could effect a junction with the Montenegrines, should this coast be the object of his reported volunteer levies.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. A. PATON.

P.S.—I reopen my despatch to report that news has just arrived of the Prince of Montenegro having sued for peace in humble terms. This was fully expected, vague rumours of this being impending having been already in circulation.

A. A. P.

No. 832.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received August 12.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 11, 1862, 11 P.M.*

THERE will be no Turks out of the fortresses. Porte would not leave them under Servian jurisdiction.

French Ambassador, after declining Conferences, has agreed to attend one, and I think we may come to an arrangement. I don't agree with Longworth about including cathedral within the rayon, nor does the Porte. I will explain reasons.

I shall communicate to the Porte what you say about Montenegro and have told it to Churchill. Turks would like to obtain a road across Montenegro between Albania and the Herzegovina; but I presume from what you say it would be impossible.

No. 833.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 833.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, August 13, 1862.*

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches respecting the state of affairs in Montenegro and the Herzegovina.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 834.

Earl Russell to Mr. Fane.

(No. 29.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August 13, 1862.*

I TRANSMIT, for your information, copies of despatches relating to Montenegro and the Herzegovina.†

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 835.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 488.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August 14, 1862.*

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches respecting the affairs of Montenegro.‡

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 836.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 490.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August 14, 1862.*

MR. CONSUL HOLMES, in his narrative of the events which have occurred in Montenegro and the Herzegovina since the beginning of May last, states that he has been assured by intelligent European officers that the disturbed state of the western provinces of European Turkey and the outbreaks which occur in them are mainly to be attributed to the want of carriageable roads, which could be made with the utmost facility.

I have to instruct your Excellency to state to the Porte that in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government nothing would so much contribute to the general prosperity of Turkey as a serious effort to connect her provinces with their towns

* No. 830 and 832. † Nos. 814, 824, and 829. ‡ Nos. 830 and 831.

and ports by good carriageable roads, and you will urge the Turkish Government to take this question into their early consideration.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 837.

Earl Cowley to Earl Russell.—(Received August 15.)

(No. 985.)
My Lord, *Paris, August 14, 1862.*

M. THOUVENEL appears to be convinced at last that the Turks are in a position to reduce the Montenegrins to submission. He says, however, that their last successes have been accompanied by acts of atrocity, which has induced him to desire M. de Moustier to call the Porte's attention to the necessity of sending severe orders upon the subject. His Excellency did not say this with any irritation, fully admitting the difficulty of restraining a wild soldiery waging a war of such intense bitterness, and expressing the conviction that neither the Sultan nor his Ministers entertained any but humane sentiments.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 838.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received August 15.)*

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 15, 1862, 6 P.M.*

PRINCE NICHOLAS has informed French Consul at Scutari he has no further means of resistance. I have strongly advised Porte to make peace without loss of time, and avoid further loss of blood. The cruelties perpetrated by Montenegrins might otherwise lead to reprisals.

No. 839.

Earl Russell to Mr. Lumley.

(No. 24.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August 15, 1862.*

I INCLOSE herewith, for your information, a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Consul at Bosna-Seraï, respecting the state of affairs in the Herzegovina and Montenegro.†

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 840.

Earl Russell to Mr. Lumley.

(No. 20.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August 15, 1862.*

I INCLOSE herewith, for your information, copies of despatches from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople and from Her Majesty's Consul at Ragusa, respecting the affairs of Montenegro.‡

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

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* Repeated to Earl Cowley. † No. 829. ‡ Nos. 814 and 831.

No. 841.

Earl Russell to Sir J. Hudson.

(No. 209.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August 15, 1862.*

I INCLOSE herewith, for your information, a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Consul at Bosna-Seraï respecting the state of affairs in the Herzegovina and Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 842.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 844.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, August 16, 1862.*

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches respecting the state of affairs in Montenegro.†

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 843.

Mr. Fane to Earl Russell.—(Received August 16.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, August 16, 1862.*

I HAVE received following figures from Churchill dated Scutari, August 15:—

"I have just returned from Turkish camp. That the Montenegrins have been thoroughly beaten and are now making their last stand is positive, but though Turks have brought despair and exhaustion into the heart of the country, they have yet Rieka and Cettigné to take to establish their undisputed supremacy. The Turkish posts are within half-an-hour of the former, but between them are the strongest positions of Montenegro occupied by the enemy's forces. These positions will have to be turned, which may take three days to accomplish, and before a week a decisive action must occur. Ottoman army is in the best possible condition. Prince has appealed to Russia and France for their intervention, and [suspension of hostilities?] is hourly expected by the French and Russian Consuls.

No. 844.

Mr. Fane to Earl Russell.—(Received August 17.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, August 17, 1862, 12 P.M.*

CHURCHILL telegraphed to me this day that France had made Prince of Montenegro a joint proposal with Austria by which suspension of hostilities is proffered, if Montenegro will accept the Porte's previously rejected ultimatum. I immediately referred to Rechberg, who says that he never authorized any such proposal to be made. He told the French Ambassador that if Prince of Montenegro desired peace, he could accept the conditions offered by the Porte, and if he desired the intercession of Austria on his behalf, he could himself apply for it.

The French Ambassador has told Rechberg that his Government will not make difficulties about other Servian fortresses if the Porte will give up Scabacz. Rechberg replied that he believed that fortress to be strategically necessary to the Porte.

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* No. 829. † Inclosure in No. 785 and No. 843

No. 845.

Mr. Churchill to Earl Russell.—(*Received August* 18.)

(No. 18.)

Scutari, August 2, 1862.

My Lord,

AFTER the junction, in the valley of the Zetta, of Dervish and Abdi Pashas' corps d'armées, consisting of twenty-one battalions of infantry under Dervish, and eighteen battalions under Abdi, representing a numerical force of 21,000 Nizam and 6,000 Bashi-Bazouks, with four batteries of artillery, the Ottoman troops establishing themselves in the wooded plain between Orialuka and Spuze, sent their sick and wounded to Podgoritza and Scutari, and prepared to carry the heights on either side of the valley which the Montenegrins still held, and were fortifying with earthworks.

The Prince was in the field, and so were Mirko, his father, Peter Stefanov, and the other Chiefs and captains; but it must here be observed that the features of the war had changed, for, whereas the Montenegrins had hitherto been the aggressors, and had followed a plan peculiarly adapted to the configuration of the country, namely, of encompassing the advancing columns of the Turkish army in the most difficult passes, and taking advantage of every stone and every inequality of the ground, they had now deemed it fitting to change their tactics and fortify the heights in the vicinity of the Turkish camp. This new plan, which I believe to have been adopted for the first time in the present campaign, was fraught with disadvantages for the Montenegrins, first of all because their knowledge in engineering was very limited, and, secondly, because, though they do possess some field-pieces that they took at Grahovatz in 1858, they have neither sufficient ammunition for them nor the men to work them properly.

After a few days of repose the combined forces commenced an attack on the heights of Zagaratz and those of Bielopavlici, and the Montenegrins, unable to resist the steady and combined attacks of a regular army, were, in the course of ten days, successively dislodged from their earthworks, and this with very little loss on the side of the Turks. They did not even, on any one occasion, I am informed, stand the shock of an assault, but withdrew from height to height, burning their own villages in regular succession as they abandoned them in the hands of the Turks. In this manner have the hamlets of Zagratz, Migost, Malsaki, and Mesterovici, in the Montenegrin district of Zagaratchi, and Guerliki, Vlaitza, Orialuka, and Zagarak, in the Bielopavlici, been reduced to ashes, and every thing therein destroyed. At Orialuka, the Prince's country seat, said to be furnished with every species of comfort and luxury, was burned to the ground, while the fortifications surrounding this residence were levelled.

The plan of operations contemplated by the Sirdar i Ekrem was to march up to Cettigné immediately. Having myself travelled over the road leading from Podgoritza to Cettigné in 1858, Omer Pasha begged of me to give him what information I possessed on the nature of the ground between those two places, and to comply more effectually with this desire I made a sketch of the country, as far as I could recollect it, along the line of march, showing him the most likely points of attack, and where water was to be had. The Commander-in-chief's previous plan to march up to Cettigné by the Dedo Pass was abandoned, and though Dervish and Abdi Pashas had at one time suggested the idea of pushing forward straight from Orialuka by the same route that Kara Mahmoud Pasha took, when he was cut off and his whole army annihilated, they ultimately admitted that the route indicated by me was the safest.

After seeing the districts of Bielopavlici and Zagaratz cleared out, the combined armies made a circuitous march round to the village of Kokat, near Farmaki, and are now steadily advancing, and making a carriageable road as they advance along the line of march. Two strong detachments are occupying the elevations in front, on either side of the road, to protect the pioneers, while the bulk of the army is in the rear. The Montenegrins occupy the crest of a mountain on the right, some distance off, commanding the routes that lead to Rieka and to Cettigné, and appear to be anxiously awaiting the advance of the Turkish troops.

At the mouth of the Rieka River is a fortified position in the hands of the Montenegrins; but Omer Pasha tells me he thinks it will not be necessary to attack that point before the advancing columns get to Rieka. Then, says Omer Pasha, it will be time enough to think of clearing the country between Reika and the Lake of Scutari, and open communications in that direction.

The distance between Cettigné and Rieka is about eight miles; the road, which is tolerably good here for the Montenegro, rises gradually through a narrow valley, cut up by garden hedges and enclosures of loose stones, and, then, all of a sudden, zigzags up an abrupt mountain, on the brow of which the Montenegrins are sure to make a vigorous defence. Once over this mountain, the Turk's Tower of Cettigné, so called because all the Turks' heads cut off in battle are paraded on its walls, is visible, but there is very little water in this dry season to be had at Cettigné, and the Serdar-i-Ekrem thinks of pushing on to Niegosh; only, in this case, the army of operations will, it strikes me, be somewhat distant from the base of operations; however, Omer Pasha, who, it must be owned, is a man of great military experience, and at the same time very prudent, has no apprehension whatever on this score.

The Montenegrins, from all I have been able to ascertain, are very much disheartened. They have, moreover, I am informed, very little ammunition and scarcely any provisions left them. The name of France appears now to be cordially execrated in the Black Mountains, because they were led to rely upon the Emperor's assistance, and then, all of a sudden, when they had gone too far, were told to accept the Porte's ultimatum. As for Russia, she has hitherto given them little beyond empty words of encouragement, and a subordinate engineer officer to help them to construct bad fortifications. The zeal, moreover, of the Russian agents in spreading false reports has, if anything, proved to be prejudicial to the interests of the Montenegrins, for it has fostered in their allies a belief that their protégés were doing well, and required no material help or interference from any of the Great Powers. They were said to be beating the Turks in every encounter, instead of which they were being most severely chastised by the Sultan's troops, and the terms in which Prince Nicolas, who, in the beginning of the campaign, sent a bombastic message to the Turkish Commander-in-chief expressing regret that the Serdar should have come all the way to Montenegro to lose his laurels, now sues for peace, addressing himself to Omer Pasha alone, and ignoring altogether the agents of the Great Powers, clearly show how severely he has been punished, and the distaste with which he views the zealous interference of his late allies.

The Prince's letter to Omer Pasha, of which I have the honour to inclose herewith a copy, has been transmitted by telegraph to the Porte, but the Ottoman Government has declined to grant an armistice, and, I think, with some show of reason for it; nevertheless, your Lordship will not fail to observe that Prince Nicholas wishes to be made acquainted with the conditions of the Porte, and I think the Porte ought to comply with the Prince's request in this respect, and put a stop to hostilities if those conditions are accepted and a sufficient guarantee is given that they will be faithfully executed. The Porte might insist upon hostages being sent to Constantinople, and she might continue to occupy the Montenegrin territory until the conditions were properly fulfilled, but she can scarcely be allowed to continue to wage war on a people who ask for the blessings of peace and are ready to submit to honourable conditions.

If hostilities were brought to a close in this part of the Empire, 30,000 men of the regular army might be spared from the forces that are now stationed in this quarter. The inclosed table will show the exact forces that the Turkish Government has in this part of the country. The sick and wounded may be calculated at 800 or 1,000 men.

I have not yet been able to detect any connection between the Garibaldians and the Christian populations of these regions. It is true a 100, or a 150 Italians, for the most part Lombards, are just now overrunning Rumelia. These people are naturally imbued with insurrectionary reminiscences and ideas, but, from what I have been able to learn, their trips into the interior have no other object than the purchase of silk. They enter the country at Saloniea, and, passing through Keuprili, they come out at Scutari, where they make arrangements for the chartering of steamers that come from Trieste to take them straight to Anana, whither they transport their merchandize. But that the levies that are being made in Italy have some connection with Servia, I have no doubt.

I have already had the honour to report the formation at Bucharest and in other parts of Wallachia of a corps of 2,000 volunteers under General Maguero, and the attempt to raise a similar body of men in Moldavia, and it was then, about two months ago, whispered that they were for Servia. It was furthermore rumoured at Jassy, about the same time, that a fresh supply of arms had been sent up the Danube, and it was even said that Russia was sending arms to Servia over

the Pruth, and this with the knowledge of Prince Couza's Government. I further know, as a positive fact, that many Poles, with Italian passports, have latterly proceeded from Italy to the Moldo-Wallachian provinces; and I now learn from Omer Pasha himself that the Servians have received large supplies of muskets that formerly belonged to the Austrian army.

Large masses of men could not land on any part of the Illyrian or the Albanian coast without detection, but they could find their way into Servia through the Moldo-Wallachian Principalities very easily, especially if the Prince's Government connives at it, and it has an object in doing so, for the independence of the Principalities on either side of the Danube is closely linked together.

The Servians count likewise on the Bulgarians, but I have reasons to know that an understanding on a solid basis did not exist between them three weeks ago.

Austrian Croatia sympathises with the Slav movement, and so do the whole Slav populations of the Illyrian coast, and the former is preparing, I am informed, to assist the Christians of Bosnia to rise against the authority of the Porte on the first favourable opportunity.

The Turks count upon 55,000 irregular troops, already enlisted in Bosnia, to oppose a rising of this nature, and I verily believe that this number might be considerably increased with the least exertion on the part of the Ottoman Government, as it enters into the interests of the dominant race in Bosnia to keep the Christian populations down, and from this feeling I infer that an outbreak in Bosnia would be attended with fearful bloodshed.

But the great ally of the Porte in the Slav movement is the want of harmony and unity of purpose amongst its component parts, and the pretentions every province has to take the lead in the new State to be formed. The Servians would have Belgrade to be the capital, the Croats would not submit to the humiliation of being governed by Servians or Montenegrins. The leaders of the Illyrian Slavs would wish to take the lead in political affairs, while the Montenegrins would enter into no combination that did not take its spring from the Black Mountains.

So long as these particles of the Slav element do not unite, the Turkish Empire is comparatively safe, and every party rising may be quashed separately, but far different will it be when the Slavs come to understand the advantage of standing by each other, and under the circumstances it is, if I may be allowed to express an opinion, urgent for the Porte and her allies to do everything in their power to keep the Slavs disunited as long as possible. To nourish the latent fire of individual ambition in the heart of every Slav chief appears to be the policy indicated by necessity. This, and an army no better than the one that is now under Omer Pasha, in the hands of an intelligent and honest commander, will be sufficient to keep everything in its present state for some time to come, if other combinations and unforeseen events do not come to change the face of things in the East of Europe.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY A. CHURCHILL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 845.

Turkish Forces in the North-Western portion of Turkey.

Stations.	Infantry.			Artillery.			Cavalry.		Total.	Bashi-Bazouks.	Grand Total.
	Battalions.	Mountain Battalions.	Total.	Field-pieces.	Mountain Guns.	Howitzers.	Regiments.	Horses.			
Rustchuk	5	3[illegible]	2,500	18	..	..	2	1,200	3,700	10,000*	13,700
Bulgaria	12	4[illegible]	5,000	6	..	..	4	..	5,100	3,000	8,100
									1,800	3,000	4,800
Nondistrict	3	4[illegible]	1,500	6	..	..	..	..		(at Shumla)	
									4,200	3,000	7,200
Yanina	4	[illegible]	4,200	..	4	..	..	..	2,150	5,000	27,150
Zeita under Davidi	21	12[illegible]	3,150	6	18	2	..	..	11,700		
Zeita under Abdi	18	1[illegible]	13,750	2	..	..	..	..	6,000	..	6,000
Widin	10	4[illegible]	6,000	..	..	..	4	..	6,000	..	3,000
Nish	5	3[illegible]	3,000	..	..	..	1	800	800	..	100
Prizrend	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	10,000* (Albanian	10,000
Monastir	1	1[illegible]	1,050	..	..	..	..	..	600	1,000	1,600
Asseeri	..	2[illegible]	2,000	..	..	..	..	..	200	..	200
Totals	82	..	46,150	30	20	2	3	1,800	40,650	90,000	125,650

* The irregulars marked with an asterisk are at their homes, but ready to march at a moment's notice.

Inclosure 2 in No. 845.

The Prince of Montenegro to Omer Pasha.

Altesse, *Cettigné, le 27 Juillet*, 1862.

DESIRANT mettre un terme à une effusion de sang déjà trop grande je n'hésite pas un instant à faire un appel direct à vos sentiments d'humanité en vous priant de vouloir consentir à un armistice de vingt jours.

J'espère que cet armistice, si votre Altesse veut bien l'accorder, sera le prélude d'une paix sincère et durable entre la Turquie et le Monténégro. A cet effet, je prie votre Altesse de me faire connaître ses intentions et les conditions que la Sublime Porte peut exiger.

Je connais trop la loyauté de votre caractère, j'ai trop de respect pour le Gouvernement de Sa Hautesse pour admettre un seul moment qu'on pourrait me proposer des conditions humiliantes.

M. Vaclik, mon Secrétaire particulier, remettra à votre Altesse la présente lettre, et aura l'honneur de lui développer plus longuement mon opinion.

Je ne serais pas faché que votre Altesse recueillit l'honneur de la paix après avoir si loyalement et si bravement fait la guerre.

Le Prince du Monténégro,
(Signé) NICOLAS.

No. 846.

Consul Paton to Earl Russell.—(Received August 18.)

(No. 6.)
My Lord, *Ragusa, August 3*, 1862.

ALTHOUGH my reports from the seat of war must have a very subordinate value compared with those of Her Majesty's Agents on the spot, I nevertheless transmit the news in circulation.

Ahmed Pasha has arrived here on his way to Mostar, and states that the Turkish army, having devastated Bielopavlovich and all the central district of Montenegro, is now concentrated at Zabliak, and will attempt similar operations on the Rieka, a rich district from which Cettigné derives much subsistence, Omer Pasha having treated as illusory the Montenegrin proposals for an armistice. The Montenegrin partisans here admit that these proposals were to gain time for the maturity of the Servian preparations, the last hope and reliance of the war party in Montenegro. That a peace party (impotent as yet) exists in Montenegro is no longer denied.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. A. PATON.

No. 847.

Consul Paton to Earl Russell.—(Received August 18.)

(No. 7.)
My Lord, *Ragusa, August 6*, 1862.

INTELLIGENCE of the commencement of the operations of the Turkish army from the basis of Zabliak, in the valley of Rieka, has arrived here, and, as might have been expected, the Turks, from their great numerical superiority, carried the Montenegrin positions in the undulating country below Rieka by combats on the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd of August, in the intense heat of the season; but there is as yet no intelligence of the fall of Rieka itself.

Even should it fall, the possibility of the occupation of Cettigné is scouted by the friends of the Montenegrins, and is considered problematical even by those who wish well to the Turks. But Montenegro is even now no longer the respectable Principality which the Frontier Commission created. Deprived of the lower and more productive districts, and the two great divisions of the territory connected safely by the imperfectly secured ridge of the Ostrog, the mountaineers are in course of being reduced to the most sterile and inaccessible districts, by that wary and sure strategy with which Omer Pasha, avoiding ambuscades and desperate ventures, wears out his enemies.

It is now clear that, unless Servia should by open revolt complicate and prolong the conflict, the Prince, even if not conquered in his last stronghold, must subside into the condition of an Illyrian Haiduck on a large scale.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. A. PATON.

No. 848.

Mr. Fane to Earl Russell:—(Received August 18.)

(No. 100.)
My Lord, *Vienna, August 12, 1862.*

COUNT RECHBERG, in again speaking to me of the sympathies manifested by the Slave races in Austria for the insurgents against the authority of the Porte, stated that information had reached him that some bands of sympathisers had succeeded in passing from Dalmatia to join the Montenegrins. His Excellency said that he had immediately telegraphed to General Mamula to take stringent precautions for preventing any reinforcements from reaching the Montenegrins from Austrian territory.

Subsequent to the above conversation I received a telegram from Mr. Churchill, stating that Omer Pasha was informed that the Montenegrins were receiving assistance in men and arms from the Slaves in Austria, and that a band of 3,000 men were reported as having already passed the frontier. This telegram was immediately succeeded by a second from Mr. Churchill, stating that the reports about the Slave reinforcements to Montenegro were greatly exaggerated and that no more than 500 had joined the standard of the Prince.

I informed Mr. Churchill by telegraph that the Imperial Government was most anxious that no assistance should be furnished to the enemies of the Porte by Austrian subjects, and that stringent precautions would be taken to prevent the passage of reinforcements into Montenegro.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JULIAN FANE.

No. 849.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 849.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, August 18, 1862.*

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, original despatches upon the subject of Montenegro and the Herzegovina.[a]

Your Excellency will return these despatches when read.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 850.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received August 18.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 18, 1862, 3 P.M.*

THE Turks are willing to give peace to the Montenegrins if asked by them to do so, but decline an armistice without anything be fixed, since it is thought that the Montenegrins want merely to gain time to see the result of Servian difficulties.

I urge a brief armistice. Twenty-four hours are necessary to draw up Articles of Peace.

Turks are moderate in their terms, but before withdrawing their troops, deem some material guarantee against an instant renewal of war essential, and would find this in opening a road through the country, connected by small garrisoned forts.

Unless something of the kind is done, they say their campaign will have been as useless as expensive.

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[a] Nos. 826 and 827.

No. 851.

Earl Russell to Mr. Fane.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 19, 1862.*

INFORM Churchill that he must not interfere in settling the question between Turks and Montenegrins.

No. 852.

Sir F. Rogers to Mr. Hammond.—(Received August 20.)

Sir, *Downing Street, August 20, 1862.*

I AM directed by the Duke of Newcastle to transmit to you, for the information of Earl Russell, with reference to my letter of the 22nd ultimo, a copy of a despatch from the Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands, pointing out that there are no Ionian laws giving powers to stop the proceedings of the Association formed in Corfu for the purpose of assisting the Montenegrins with money and provisions.

I am, &c.
(Signed) FREDERIC ROGERS.

Inclosure in No. 852.

Sir H. Storks to the Duke of Newcastle.

My Lord Duke, *Corfu, July 30, 1862.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Grace's despatch of the 22nd instant, referring to my report of the progress of the Association which has been formed in Corfu for the purpose of assisting the Montenegrins with money and provisions.

2. I did not fail, when the existence of this Association first came to my knowledge, to consult the Attorney-General as to its legality and as to the powers of the law to put a stop to proceedings of which a friendly Power might justly complain.

3. That officer informed me that there is no Ionian law which precisely meets the case now under consideration. By Article 200 of the Penal Code it is enacted that "hostile acts not authorized or not approved by the Government are prohibited." It is held that the Code means by hostile acts, acts of agression or acts of violence.

4. The Lord High Commissioner possesses very summary powers for preventing the export of arms or ammunition, the raising of men to invade a friendly territory, or the supply of what is strictly contraband of war—powers which I should not fail to exercise in a very summary manner if necessary; but the question is can I stop the export of corn or biscuit, or provisions which clear for a friendly or neutral port. All the vessels conveying these provisions take their papers for Cattaro or Antivari. And although I know that the provisions with which the vessels are laden are for the Montenegrins, there is nothing to show that the object which the owners have in view is other than a legitimate and regular trade.

5. Then as to subscribing money. What law can prevent an individual from confiding to another a sum of money for a special purpose, on which both are agreed? The local papers announce these subscriptions, but no steps can be taken against their editors otherwise than according to law, which, as I have had the honour to remark to your Grace on other occasions, is wholly inoperative.

6. Questions come before me frequently with reference to the export of ammunition into Albania. I refuse to permit the vessel to clear with ammunition, unless it is satisfactorily proved to me that such ammunition is not intended for any improper or illegal purpose.

7. The Turkish Government have complained in times past of the conveyance of ammunition to Candia in Ionian vessels when that island was in a state of insurrection, and steps were taken to put a stop to this illegal traffic. Great

quantities of ammunition find their way into Albania, principally through the Gulf of Arta, and always with the connivance of the Turkish authorities. Her Majesty's Consul in Albania reports that the country is full of arms and ammunition, and I am credibly informed that the Montenegrins obtain ammunition from Turkish traders. The greatest enemies the Turks possess are their own officials. The universal corruption which prevails in the Turkish provinces must prevent any improvement in Turkey, if it does not accelerate the dissolution of the Empire, which is so universally believed to be at hand, but which certainly might be indefinitely postponed, if not averted, by a wise, honest, and patriotic administration.

8. I am afraid, much as I desire to put a stop to the proceedings of the Association referred to in this despatch, that no steps can be legally taken with it so long as its operations are limited to the subscription of money, and the export of provisions through a neutral or friendly port.

9. It would be highly injudicious to adopt measures which might be evaded, or give orders which might be set at defiance with impunity.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. K. STORKS.

No. 853.

Mr. Fane to Earl Russell.—(Received August 20.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, August 20, 1862.*

CHURCHILL telegraphs that Prince Nicholas has replied to French Consul by accepting the Porte's previous ultimatum.

No. 854.

Count Rechberg to Count Apponyi.—(Communicated to Earl Russell by Count Apponyi, August 27.)

M. le Comte, *Vienne, le 21 Août, 1862.*

LA dépêche du 18 de ce mois a fait connaître à votre Excellence les nouvelles démarches du Duc de Gramont en faveur du Monténégro et l'accueil qu'elles ont trouvé auprès de nous.

Hier un télégramme de Scutari a annoncé que le Prince Nicholas avait déclaré au Consul de France qu'il acceptait purement et simplement l'ultimatum Turc.

En me communiquant cette nouvelle, l'Ambassadeur de France nous a demandé encore une fois de faire à Constantinople des démarches pour obtenir une suspension des hostilités.

Bien qu'antérieur à ce dernier incident, le rapport ci-joint en copie du Baron Prokesch nous donnait sur les dispositions de la Porte quelques informations utiles qui ne sont pas restées sans influence sur notre réponse au Duc de Gramont.

En effet nous avions pu constater avec satisfaction que le Gouvernement Ottoman maintenait sa détermination de ne rien changer aux bases de l'ultimatum.

Avant d'accorder un armistice, la Porte exigeait seulement les garanties positives contre tout acte de mauvaise foi de la part du Monténégro.

Me fondant sur ces dispositions de la Porte, j'ai fait observer à l'Ambassadeur de France que nous aurions, il est vrai, désiré connaître avant tout le texte même de la nouvelle déclaration du Prince Nicolas pour savoir jusqu'à quel point son acceptation de l'ultimatum était précise et complète. Cependant, ai-je ajouté, nous pouvons, dans l'état actuel de nos informations, représenter à la Porte les avantages qu'elle trouverait à mettre fin, le plus promptement possible, à une guerre sanglante. Nous inviterons le Baron Prokesch à donner dans ce sens des conseils amicaux à Aali Pacha. Mais nous ne saurions aller au delà et exercer une pression quelconque sur ces résolutions de la Porte. C'est à elle à bien consulter ses intérêts et à y conformer sa conduite.

Quant aux garanties démandées par le Gouvernement Ottoman, nous comprenons qu'il y tienne, et nous croyons qu'on devrait laisser la Porte et le Monténégro négocier directement entre eux cette question, sans l'intervention des Puissances.

Il ne dépend désormais, selon nous, que du Prince Nicholas de faire cesser les hostilités en satisfaisant de bonne foi aux conditions équitables et modérées posées par la Turquie.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) RECHBERG.

Inclosure in No. 854.

Baron Prokesch to Count Rechberg.

Bujukdere, le 14 Août, 1862.

L'ENVOI de Prusse vient de faire, par ordre de son Gouvernement, une démarche auprès de la Porte tendant à obtenir un consentement à l'envoi des Consuls à Cettigné, et à un armistice à accorder aux Monténégrins.

Aali Pacha lui a répondu que la voie directe était ouverte au Prince Nicholas, que la Porte ne changerait rien aux bases de l'ultimatum, mais qu'elle se croyait en devoir de demander des garanties contre une nouvelle violation de cet acte, qui des Consuls était inutile, puisqu'ils n'auraient rien à dire au Prince, et que l'armistice était inacceptable tant que la demande ne serait pas accompagnée de l'offre des garanties.

Ce matin M. de Moustier m'a demandé si je n'avais pas reçu des nouvelles instructions relativement au Monténégro. Lui ayant répondu négativement, il me dit que son Consul était chargé de tâcher à amener un armistice. Il me dit encore que le Prince se plaignait qu'Omer Pacha ne répondait à aucune de ces communications. Je lui ai observé que d'après l'information reçue par la Porte, les lettres du Prince ne faisaient que répéter la simple demande d'armistice à laquelle Omer Pacha avait déjà répondu, en lui demandant qu'elles garanties il avait à offrir. Le Prince a exprimé au Consul de France sa crainte de massacres à Cettigné, et que lui-même serait massacré s'il tombait dans les mains des Turcs.

J'ai prévenu sur cela l'Ambassadeur de France, que tant Sir H. Bulwer que moi, nous avions insisté auprès de la Porte sur les ordres les plus sévères à l'armée; mais en même temps je lui ai appris un fait qui prouve la nécessité d'agir dans un même sens sur les Monténégrins. Un neveu de Rifaat Pacha, jeune homme d'une vingtaine d'années, a été fait prisonnier; ils l'ont haché et envoyé les morceaux dans un sac à Omer Pacha.

Recevez, &c.

No. 855.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 860.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August 20, 1862.*

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, an original despatch from Her Majesty's Consul at Bosna-Seraï upon the subject of the state of affairs in Montenegro and the Herzegovina.*

Your Excellency will return this despatch when read.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 856.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received August 21.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 21, 1862, 1·30 P.M.*

AALI PASHA communicates to me confidentially conditions he means to offer to Prince of Montenegro:—

1st. Present limits of territory respected.

2. Montenegrins allowed free access to Antivari, and imports and exports to be free of duty, arms excepted.

* No 829.

3. Montenegrins may hire lands and cultivate them beyond their limits, paying the same taxes as Ottoman subjects.

4. Montenegrin Government to admit the residence of no Turkish families without permits from the authorities.

5. Road between Montenegro and Scutari to be kept open, and on certain points blockhouses to be established and held by Ottoman troops.

6. Primates of districts, as well as Prince, to sign engagement not to aid rebels in adjoining provinces, nor to cross Turkish frontier for purposes of brigandage.

Mirko to be banished.

Other Articles not important.

No. 857.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

Foreign Office, August 22, 1862.

(Telegraphic.)

THE Turks are quite right to ask a material guarantee for the future good behaviour of the Montenegrins. They can judge best what those guarantees should be. But they are bound to inform the Prince of Montenegro what it is they require.

No. 858.

Mr. Churchill to Earl Russell.—(Received August 22.)

Scutari, August 22, 1862.

(Telegraphic.)

TO-DAY Montenegrins are to be driven out of Rieka Seventy Turks prisoners, whose rendition formed clause in ultimatum, are reported to have been hanged at Cettigné since Prince accepted ultimatum as basis for negotiations.

No. 859.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received August 23.)

Constantinople, August 22, 1862, 11 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

OMER PASHA writes that whilst Prince of Montenegro was asking peace through the French Consul, he hanged one hundred prisoners.

The Porte is indignant, and doubts if any terms can be granted to such barbarians except those imposed by force.

No. 860.

Earl Cowley to Earl Russell.—(Received August 23.)

(No. 1024.)

Paris, August 22, 1862.

My Lord,

IN my despatch No. 984 of the 14th instant, I stated that M. Thouvenel had made some remarks to me respecting the excesses committed by the Turkish troops in Montenegro. I therefore thought it advisable to communicate to his Excellency the contents of the report of the Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands, inclosed in copy in your Lordship's despatch No. 844 of the 16th instant, respecting the atrocities which had been committed by the Montenegrins on a body of Turks which had unfortunately fallen into their hands.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 861.

Earl Cowley to Earl Russell.—(Received August 23.)

(No. 1026.)

Paris, August 22, 1862.

My Lord,

M. THOUVENEL informed me yesterday that M. de Moustier had apprized him by telegraph that a meeting of the representatives of the Great Powers had been held at Constantinople, to devise means for putting an end to hostilities between the Turks and Montenegrins, and that he hoped that this desirable object might be accomplished if the Porte was still disposed to abide by the terms offered some time back to the Montenegrins by Omer Pasha. M. de Moustier had been charged by his colleagues to draw up a project of arrangement.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 862.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 863.)

Foreign Office, August 23, 1862.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches as marked in the margin,* upon the subject of the affairs of Montenegro.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 863.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received August 25.)

(No. 53. Political.)

Bosna-Serai, August 8, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the authorities here received a telegram from his Highness Omer Pasha, announcing that on the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th of this month the Turkish troops engaged the Montenegrin forces at Rieka, and succeeded in putting them to rout. This place is only four or five hours from Cettigné.

Your Lordship will be doubtless informed of the details of affairs now passing in Montenegro from Scutari, as that place is close to the scene of action.

The taking of Cettigné is still unaccomplished, but every day the news of its fall is expected here.

Mr. Zohrab informs me that nothing worth reporting has lately occurred in the Herzegovina.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 864.

Consul Paton to Earl Russell.—(Received August 25.)

(No. 8.)

Ragusa, August 10, 1862.

My Lord,

THE news from the seat of war represent the Turks to have been unable to continue their progress up the Rieka valley.

Without referring your Lordship to the altogether incorrect maps of Montenegro, I may mention that Rieka is at the bottom of a basin, unattainable except through a narrow gorge, or by steep rocks, the paths over which have been barricaded by large stones; and the Montenegrins represent the Turkish losses as considerable above Kokota.

We have thus the normal state of affairs so often recorded in history—the Montenegrins unable to hold the productive plains against Turkish numbers and

* Nos. 856 and 857.

Turkish artillery, and the Turks able to reduce the mountaineers to narrow straits, but unable to force the rocky fastnesses of the upper country.

Your Lordship is aware of the ties of religion, nationality, trade, and even of personal relationship which unite the inhabitants of the Bocca di Cattaro with the Montenegrins. Some of the former having joined the Montenegrin force in the valley of Rieka, the Austrian authorities have intercepted other Bocchese who wished to follow their example.

I have, &c.
(Signed A. A. PATON.

No. 865.

Consul Paton to Earl Russell.—(Received August 25.)

(No. 9.)
My Lord, *Ragusa, August* 13, 1862.

THAT Rieka is considered in danger (although no news of its fall has arrived as yet) may be gathered from the fact of its inhabitants having removed all their families to Cettigné, and burnt most of the houses of the town; and, notwithstanding the fabulous telegrams that go from this place to the European journals representing the Turks as losing thousands of men, the gradual exhaustion of the Montenegrin resources is going on.

A Dr. Pancrazio, a Corsican medical man, who was in the French medical service, and is now the personal physician of the Prince Nicholas, has been here for a couple of days, and the ample statements he has made to the leading partizans of the Montenegrins here, and even some expressions in conversing with myself, show that the Montenegrin game is nearly played out. Besides the want of ammunition there is the want of arms; for while the Turks have good precision-rifles, the old flint muskets of the Montenegrins are nearly all out of order with the wear and tear of a year's incessant combats. The Montenegrins now fight very often with pistol and sabre; but many are picked off by the Turkish rifles before the hand-to-hand struggle can be commenced.

Great attempts are to be made to engage the sympathies of Europe, on the ground that the Montenegrins now fight, not for the original objects of the war, but to avert the general massacre that would follow a taking possession of Cettigné, which is now no longer considered impossible, but as simply involving a question of time for the formation of temporary roads barely practicable for artillery, so as to play with effect on the barricades that have been raised.

The incident in the Bocca di Cattaro mentioned in my last despatch, was the result of a secret appeal on the part of the Montenegrins in their extremity. I have since learned that some hundreds of Bocchese, who found an Austrian force on the frontier, were in reality nothing loth to be turned back. Although sympathizing with the Montenegrins some of them had privily given information of the rendezvous to the Austrian authorities, and not being disposed to risk their lives in a failing cause, had a pretext for saying to their Montenegrin coreligionists, "We were willing to go to your assistance, but we were prevented."

The Herzegovina is now almost denuded of Turkish troops, and as the Rayahs resist all appeals to rise, it is a proof that they consider the Montenegrin cause as hopeless. Luku Wukailovich has sent a very small contingent to the seat of war, but he remains himself almost quiet in an inaccessible mountain perch.

In conclusion, I feel persuaded that if Turkey be let alone by foreign Powers, she is more than a match for all domestic foes in this quarter, and that the wish for her downfall is father to the thought.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. A. PATON.

P.S.—I was mistaken in giving Mostar as Ahmed Pasha's destination; it was Trebigné.

A. A. P.

No. 866.

Mr. Fane to Earl Russell.—(Received August 25.)

(No. 109.)
My Lord, *Vienna, August* 16, 1862.

COUNT RECHBERG informs me that the French Ambassador having urged upon him the necessity of putting an end to hostilities in Montenegro, and having suggested that Austria should support the recommendation of an armistice on the acceptance by Prince Nicholas of the Porte's ultimatum, his Excellency had replied to the Duc de Gramont that the Imperial Government had already laid down the principle that if the Prince of Montenegro felt that he was conquered, and desired peace, he could accept the terms offered him by the Porte, and that, with regard to the intercession of Austria, it had never been asked for by the Prince of Montenegro, who could himself apply for it if he desired that it should be exercised on his behalf.

Count Rechberg said that he had addressed this latter observation to the Duc de Gramont with the express object of intimating that he did not understand on what grounds any one Power should constitute itself the champion of the Prince of Montenegro, and be the medium of a communication which the Prince could himself address to Austria, or the other Powers, if he desired them to intervene in his favour. His Excellency added that, in view of the strong sympathies felt for the Montenegrins by the Slav populations in Austria, it was a great object to the Imperial Government to prove to their subjects that the Powers who had countenanced the Prince of Montenegro in waging war against the Sultan had proved themselves far worse friends to the people of the Black Mountain than those Powers who, like Austria, had from the first discouraged the warlike policy which had brought nothing but a series of disasters upon the Montenegrins.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JULIAN FANE.

P.S. *August* 31.—Under the circumstances which I report to your Lordship in another despatch, I have thought it expedient to test the accuracy of the foregoing report by submitting it to Count Rechberg. I therefore placed the draft of it in his hands, and begged him to acquaint me if he found any error in it. After reading it through, his Excellency returned it to me, with the observation that it was a faithful record of the language he had held to me, and that there was not a word in it which he could desire to alter.

J. F.

No. 867.

Mr. Fane to Earl Russell.—(Received August 25.)

(No. 117. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Vienna, August* 21, 1862.

IN the afternoon of Sunday last I received from Mr. Churchill a telegram dated the same day from Scutari, in the following words:—

"France has made Prince Nicholas a joint proposition with Austria by which suspension of hostilities is proferred if Montenegro will accept Porte's previously rejected ultimatum."

The information thus conveyed to me was altogether irreconcilable with the language which Count Rechberg reported to me that he had held to the French Ambassador on the subject of an armistice in Montenegro, and I felt that it was my duty, before transmitting it to your Lordship, to ascertain from his Excellency whether it had any foundation in truth. I, therefore, called immediately upon Count Rechberg, and read to him Mr. Churchill's telegram, which was "en clair."

His Excellency expressed great surprise at the information which it conveyed, and which he at once characterized as entirely erroneous. Almost his first words were to thank me for giving him an opportunity of denying the report before forwarding it to your Lordship, because he would be very unwilling to have it supposed that the Austrian Government should have consented to address a proposal for an armistice to the Prince of Montenegro without previously consulting the Porte. Count Rechberg continued the conversation by observing that he was at

a loss to know on what grounds the rumour could rest, since nothing that he had said to the French Ambassador would warrant it, and his Excellency then recapitulated, in the precise terms recorded in my despatch No. 109 of the 16th instant, the language he had held to the Duc de Gramont on the question of an armistice in Montenegro.

Count Rechberg was so urgent in his request to me to give a denial to the report I had communicated to him, that I transmitted by telegraph to Sir Henry Bulwer the substance of my telegram to your Lordship of the 17th instant.

My reason for immediately bringing Mr. Churchill's telegram to the knowledge of Count Rechberg was that the information it conveyed was wholly incompatible with the language he had held to me in regard to Montenegro. The desire manifested by his Excellency that his denial of the report should at once be made known rested, I presume, on his anxiety not to appear to have acted disloyally to the Porte. Count Rechberg probably knew what Sir Henry Bulwer reports in his despatch to your Lordship No. 482 of the 29th ultimo, that the Porte, though unwilling to grant terms, desires to do so at Cettigné, and it could scarcely be the part of a good ally, without previous consultation with Constantinople, to proffer terms of peace to the Prince of Montenegro while he was still in possession of his capital.

On Monday I saw the Duc de Gramont, and mentioned the report of a joint intervention of France and Austria in favour of Montenegro, as a rumour to which I attached no credence. His Excellency said that he thought, on the contrary, it was likely to be true.

I asked whether Count Rechberg had authorized any joint proposition to the Prince of Montenegro. He said that the language of Count Rechberg entirely justified him in reporting to his Government that the former understanding which had been established between the two Governments, that, if the Prince of Montenegro accepted the Porte's ultimatum, France would propose and Austria support the conclusion of an armistice—still held good. It was, he thought, very probable that this information had been officially communicated to Prince Nicholas.

Yesterday the news arrived of the acceptance of the Porte's ultimatum by the Prince of Montenegro, and I again saw Count Rechberg. I said that the Duc de Gramont appeared to be under the impression that the former understanding existing between Austria and France respecting the proposal of an armistice (as reported in Sir Henry Bulwer's despatch No. 461 to your Lordship, a portion of which I read to his Excellency) was still in force, and I thought it important to define what attitude Austria intended to assume in regard to this question. His Excellency replied that he had just received a despatch from Baron Prokesch (which he gave me to read), stating that the language held by the Ottoman Government, in respect to a cessation of hostilities, was that the Prince of Montenegro could himself apply directly to the Porte if he desired to ascertain on what conditions an armistice might at once be established, and the Austrian Government would refer to that declaration of the Porte if any further application were made to them in the matter.

I said that the Porte might be willing to make peace on its former ultimatum, or it might now require further conditions, probably in the form of guarantees. Would Austria urge on the Porte the conclusion of peace on the simple basis of the ultimatum? Count Rechberg replied that Austria would not think of exercising any pressure on the Turkish Government to coerce its free action ("pour lui forcer la main"), and would support only such proposals as the Porte might be willing to accept.

There is not much significance in the latter phrase, since it is obvious that, if the condition on which Austrian support is made contingent be satisfied, that support will be simply superfluous, but I quote Count Rechberg's words as manifesting a disposition to act in the most friendly spirit towards the Porte. Indeed, I feel convinced that he has never been animated by any other spirit, but there appears to have been a want of precision about his language to the French Ambassador, which is to be regretted, even if it lead to no further embarrassment in this question.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JULIAN FANE.

No. 868.

Mr. Fane to Earl Russell.—(Received August 25.)

(No. 119.)
My Lord, *Vienna, August 21, 1862.*

I HAVE the honour to report that on the receipt of your Lordship's telegram of the 19th instant, I addressed to Mr. Churchill a telegram in cypher in the following words:—

"Her Majesty's Government desire you not to interfere in settling the question between Turks and Montenegro."

I received, by a telegram in cypher, the following reply from Mr. Churchill:—

"*Scutari, August 20.*

"I have received your telegram of the 19th. The commands of Her Majesty's Government shall be strictly obeyed."

I have, &c.
(Signed) JULIAN FANE.

No. 869.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 25, 1862.*

I THINK orders should be given by the Sultan that if his troops reach Cettigné no acts of revenge or cruelty should be allowed. This mercy will raise his character in Europe.

No. 870.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 25, 1862.*

WHAT are the French Ambassador's diminished proposals?

Have you assisted at any conference on the affairs of Montenegro, and if so, what were its proceedings? Mr. Allison's messenger must wait at Bagdad.

No. 871.

Mr. Fane to Earl Russell.—(Received August 25.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, August 25, 1862.*

CHURCHILL telegraphs as follows, dated Scutari, 24th August:—

"Prince Nicholas denies the hanging of the Turkish prisoners. Ricka is not yet taken."

No. 872.

Earl Cowley to Earl Russell.—(Received August 27.)

(No. 1035.)
My Lord, *Paris, August 26, 1862.*

M. THOUVENEL informs me that several days have elapsed since he has received any intelligence from Constantinople either on the Servian or on the Montenegrin question. He trusted that this proved that the Representatives did not despair of coming eventually to some understanding.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 873.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 27, 1862.

THE terms offered to the Montenegrins seem very fair, but we have heard from Fane that the Montenegrins put seventy Turkish prisoners to death after accepting them.

No. 874.

Earl Russell to Mr. Fane.

(No. 39.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 27, 1862.

I TRANSMIT, for your information, copy of a despatch relating to the affairs of Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 875.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 876.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 27, 1862.

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches upon the subject of the war in Montenegro.†

Count Rechberg's communication, being in original, is to be returned to this office at your Excellency's earliest convenience.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 876.

Mr. Fane to Earl Russell.—(Received August 27.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, August* 26, 1862.

CHURCHILL telegraphs from Scutari this day :—

"Montenegrins were driven out of their strong positions above Rieka on 24th. Yesterday they burnt Rieka before abandoning it to Turks, who are now between Rieka and Cettigné. An attempt has been made to assassinate Prince Nicholas. Culprit effected his escape."

No. 877.

Earl Russell to Mr. Lumley.

(No. 39.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 27, 1862.

I INCLOSE to you herewith a copy of a report from the Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands respecting the atrocities committed on some Turkish prisoners by the Montenegrins, and I have to instruct you to communicate a copy of this report to Prince Gortchakow.‡

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

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* No. 837.

† Nos. 854, 864, 865, 866, and 867.

No. 878.

Mr. Lumley to Earl Russell.—(Received August 28.)

(No. 66.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, August* 20, 1862.

IN my despatch No. 4 of the 13th ultimo I mentioned an observation made by Prince Gortchakow, in conversation with the Turkish Minister, to the effect that by their intervention in the Sutorina in the early part of this year the Austrian Government had infringed the Treaty of Paris of 1856.

In a despatch dated the 7th instant, which Conemenos Bey received last night from Aali Pasha, the Turkish Government reply to this assertion that the intervention in question, which was quite exceptional, was of great assistance in preventing a further complication, and that neither the Porte nor any of the other Powers parties to the Treaty of 1856 could find in it any infraction of the provisions of that Treaty.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. SAVILE LUMLEY.

No. 879.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 889.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 28, 1862.

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches as marked in the margin* upon the war in Montenegro.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 880.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 521.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 28, 1862.

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches as marked in the margin,† respecting the affairs of Montenegro.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 881.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received August 30.)

(No. 544.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, August* 19, 1862.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a copy of a note recently addressed by Prince Labanow to Aali Pasha, stating that the protraction of hostilities in Montenegro would induce the belief that the Porte, contrary to its solemn declaration at the outset of the campaign, was seeking to modify the existing administrative and territorial conditions of that country; and, consequently, that he has been directed by the Emperor of Russia to urge upon the Porte the conclusion of an armistice, with a view to a pacific arrangement.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

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* Nos. 856, 869, and 873.

† Nos. 837, 864, 865, 866, and 867.

Inclosure in No. 881.

Prince Labanow to Aali Pasha.

M. le Ministre, *Buyukdéré, le $\frac{2}{14}$ Août*, 1862.

DES l'ouverture des opérations militaires entreprises par la Sublime Porte contre le Monténégro, le Gouvernement n'a pas cessé d'en suivre les différentes péripéties avec la plus constante attention. A l'heure qu'il est les troupes Impériales sont sur le territoire Monténégrin, et il semble que le but que la Porte s'était proposé est atteint; prolonger la lutte au-delà, ce serait lui imprimer définitivement le caractère d'une de dévastation et d'extermination et donner lieu de croire que la Porte, contrairement à ses déclarations solennelles au moment d'entrer en campagne, aurait l'intention de modifier le *statu quo* administratif et territorial du Monténégro.

Quelqu'inadmissible que soit cette supposition, il paraît cependant certain que les propositions de paix recemment faites par le Prince Nicolas restent jusqu'à présent sans réponse, et que le Commandant-en-chef des troupes Ottomanes continue sa marche dans l'intérieur du Monténégro.

Dans cet état de choses, Sa Majesté l'Empereur, mon auguste Maître, a daigné m'ordonner de renouveller, en son nom, la demande d'un armistice déjà faite il y a quelque temps par d'autres Cours, pour arrêter l'effusion du sang et préparer les voies à un arrangement.

En m'acquittant de ce devoir auprès de votre Altesse, je crois superflu de faire valoir les considérations qui doivent engager le Gouvernement Ottoman à hâter le rétablissement de la tranquillité. Les rigueurs extrêmes dont une population Chrétienne serait victime, loin de calmer l'agitation qui existe déjà dans plusieurs Provinces de la Turquie, ne pouvait que créer à la Sublime Porte des embarras dont les conséquences, à tous les points de vue, seraient incalculables.

Veuillez, &c.

(Signé) LABANOW.

No. 882.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received August 30.)

(No. 550.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, August 20*, 1862.

ON hearing that the Turkish troops were entirely victorious, and that the Prince of Montenegro had declared they would almost immediately be at Cettigné, where he feared a massacre, I wrote first privately to Aali Pasha, saying I thought the time was come when the triumph of the Ottoman arms was sufficiently complete for the Porte to grant peace to Prince Nicholas if he demanded it.

Subsequently the Marquis de Moustier asked me if I would have any objection to write a collective note to the Ottoman Secretary for Foreign Affairs on the subject, and I said none, if it were civilly worded. We then drew up the inclosed, which received the signatures of the Representatives of the five Guaranteeing Powers.

Mr. Churchill has since telegraphed to say that Austria and France have offered Prince Nicholas immediate suspension of hostilities if he will accept the ultimatum he rejected, and that the Prince has informed the French Consul he will accept former ultimatum.

But the Austrian Government has not, I hear, made the offer in question, and the Porte says, if Prince of Montenegro wants peace from Turkey, he should address himself (which seems just) to the Turkish authorities.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

Inclosure in No. 882.

Collective Note addressed to Aali Pasha.

Altesse, *Constantinople, le 15 Août*, 1862.

ANIMÉS également par l'intérêt de l'Empire Ottoman et par les sentiments d'humanité, les Soussignés osent conseiller à la Sublime Porte, maintenant que le triomphe de ses armées est éclatant, de faire cesser au plus tôt la lutte sanglante qui a eu lieu dans le Monténégro.

La Turquie en faisant acte de générosité après avoir donné des preuves de courage aurait le double avantage de mériter et probablement de s'attirer les sympathies des vaincus et de prouver à l'Europe que fidèle aux assurances qu'elle n'a jamais hésité à donner, elle a saisi la première occasion que les circonstances lui ont offerte pour mettre fin aux malheurs de la guerre.

(Signé) H. L. BULWER.
MOUSTIER.
PROKESCH.
LABANOW.
WERTHER.

No. 883.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received August 30.)

(No. 551. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, August 20*, 1862.

AALI PASHA sent me confidentially the inclosed paper, which contains the proposals for peace that the Porte means to make to the Prince of Montenegro.

I told him what your Lordship's instructions to me were on this subject; but he said if the Turkish troops quit the Montenegrin territory with nothing but a barren promise of future good behaviour from a man who has shown that no reliance can be placed on his promises, all its treasure will have been spent and the blood of its troops shed for nothing. That the construction of a military road through the country would be a general benefit, if the Montenegrins remained well disposed. That the former ultimatum would have sufficed if it had been accepted when offered, but that now, after a costly and dangerous campaign, the position of things had changed. I advised him to charge M. Musurus to talk over this point with your Lordship.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

Inclosure in No. 883.

Memorandum.

1. ON laissera l'administration intérieure telle quelle.

2. La conscription territoriale actuelle sera respectée.

3. On permettra aux Monténégrins d'aller venir au port d'Antivari et on exemptera de droits leurs importations et leurs exportations, excepté bien entendu, les armes et munitions de guerre, qui restent toujours prohibés.

4. On permettra aux Monténégrins de venir louer des terres en dehors de leurs limites et de les cultiver, en acquittant les impots comme le reste des sujets.

5. Les Monténégrins pourront librement venir dans toutes les parties de l'Empire et y exercer leur commerce et leur industrie, et ils jouiront de l'entière protection des autorités.

6. Afin d'arranger les petites contestations qui peuvent surgir sur les frontières, il y aura dans chaque province limitrophe de la Montagne un Vekil ou préposé; dans le cas où il arriverait quelque contestation qui ne pourrait pas s'arranger sur les lieux, l'administration de la Montagne aura la faculté de s'adresser directement à la Sublime Porte.

7. On n'admettra pas à la Montagne aucune famille, qui ne sera pas autorisée par un Teskère des autorités locales, et si elle y entre on sera tenu de la renvoyer.

8. La route entre Scutari et l'Herzégovine à travers la Montagne sera ouverte, et il y aura sur les points à être indiqués des blockhouses occupés par les troupes Ottomanes.

9. Il sera remis entre les mains du Serdar Ekrem des engagements signés par les Primats de chaque Nahié, par lesquels on s'engagerait de s'abstenir désormais de franchir la ligne frontière, de commettre des actes de brigandages, et d'aider les habitants des districts voisins qui pourraient se trouver en état de rébellion.

10. Les criminels des deux parties seront respectivement rendus.

11. Les objets volés ou pillés par les habitants de l'un ou de l'autre parti devront être restitués et les coupables punis.

12. Mirko sera éloigné de la Montagne pour ne plus y rentrer.

No. 884.

Earl Cowley to Earl Russell.—(Received August 30.)

(No. 1061.)
My Lord, *Paris, August 29, 1862.*

I HAVE the honour to return herewith to your Lordship, the copy of a despatch from Count Rechberg to Count Apponyi respecting Montenegro, which were transmitted to me for my perusal in your Lordship's despatch No. 876 of the 27th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 885.

Mr. Fane to Earl Russell.—(Received August 31.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, August 31, 1862.*

THE Porte's conditions of peace have been sent to Prince of Montenegro; nevertheless early to-morrow morning Turkish troops march on Cettigné.

No. 886.

Mr. Fane to Earl Russell.—(Received September 1.)

(No. 130.)
My Lord, *Vienna, August 27, 1862.*

COUNT RECHBERG read to me to-day a despatch which he had received from Baron Prokesch, reporting that the Representatives of the Five Powers at Constantinople had addressed a collective note to the Porte recommending the suspension of hostilities in Montenegro. His Excellency, after also reading to me the note in question, observed that it was couched in the most judicious and courteous terms, and that he entirely approved of Baron Prokesch having signed it with his colleagues. A collective action of this nature was what he had always desired, and that was the reason why he had been so anxious to deny the report sent from Scutari that Austria, in conjunction with France, and without previous consultation at Constantinople, had proffered terms of peace to Prince Nicholas.

Count Rechberg then read me another despatch from Baron Prokesch, which stated that Aali Pasha, on being asked what terms would be offered to Montenegro, had replied that they would be founded on the previous ultimatum of the Porte, and would include a demand of guarantees for their strict observance, the nature of which guarantees he would state in his reply to the collective note of the Representatives.

Count Rechberg said he regretted that Aali Pasha should propose to take this course, because the effect of it would be to give occasion to the Representatives to discuss the terms offered to Montenegro, and thus to afford an opportunity to those who were hostile to the Porte to throw difficulties in the way of a satisfactory arrangement.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JULIAN FANE.

No. 887.

Mr. Lumley to Earl Russell.—(Received September 1.)

(No. 71.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, August 26, 1862.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 66, stating the views of the Turkish Government in regard to the intervention of Austria in the Sutorina, I have now the honour to inclose an extract from the despatch of Ali Pasha on this subject addressed to the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires, which Conemenos Bey has obligingly communicated to me.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. SAVILE LUMLEY.

Inclosure in No. 887.

Ali Pasha to Conemenos Bey.

(Extrait.) *Le 7 Août, 1862.*

QUANT à la manière d'envisager de M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Russie, l'intervention armée opérée vers le commencement de l'année courante par les forces Autrichiennes dans la Suttorina, je crois devoir vous donner à ce sujet quelques explications, afin de constater que cette affaire n'a porté aucune atteinte au Traité de Paris.

Il est à remarquer que les forces militaires Autrichiennes, en faisant l'opération dont il s'agit dans l'unique but de détruire les forteresses élevées par les bandes de Wucalovitch dans la Suttorina, paraissent avoir cédé instinctivement à un concours de circonstances demandant une action d'autant plus prompte que la moindre hésitation aurait infailliblement pour résultat de permettre à ces bandes de se fortifier davantage dans les positions qu'ils venaient de prendre sur ce territoire neutralisé, et de compliquer encore plus la situation. Cette considération, d'un caractère tout exceptionnel, a une valeur qu'on ne saurait lui contester, et devant laquelle ni la Sublime Porte, ni les autres Puissances, n'ont pu trouver la moindre atteinte portée au Traité de Paris.

No. 888.

Mr. Churchill to Earl Russell.—(Received September 1.)

(No. 20. Diplomatic.)
My Lord, *Scutari, August 19, 1862.*

IT appears likely that the Montenegrin war will be soon brought to a close. The Prince has made a pressing appeal to Russia and France to interfere, and already a message has been dispatched to Cettigné by the French Consul at Scutari, promising, in the name of France and Austria, the immediate suspension of hostilities, if the Montenegrins would accept as a basis for future negotiations of peace the Turkish ultimatum which Prince Nicholas had refused to accede to in the beginning of this campaign. From the pressing terms in which Prince Nicholas entreats the Russian and French Governments to come to his assistance in the hour of "supreme danger," it is just to conclude that the Montenegrins are reduced to the last extremity; yet, though the Turkish arms have, since the junction of the two armies under Dervish and Abdi Pashas in the valley of the Zetta, been invariably successful, though the Montenegrins have been driven from village to village, from hill to dale, though their houses have been burned and their fertile fields and vineyards have been devastated: the legions collected, in most instances against their own inclinations (by the ruthless Mirko, father of Prince Nicholas) still show a bold front to the advancing columns of the Turkish armies, and the Porte would but expose herself to be told afterwards, if she acceded to Prince Nicholas's prayer to conclude an armistice at the present moment, that Montenegro was never reduced; that the Turkish arms had never overpowered its hardy inhabitants, but that the Turks, who are really now in a measure to establish their supremacy for ever, had not the courage to face their enemy in his strongholds, and seized on the first opportunity offered to retreat into the safe plains of the south.

The Porte appears to have looked upon the Prince's message in this light, and has given him no reply; but it is not likely that she will be able to resist the representations of France, Russia, and Austria, and the uplifted sword of retribution may yet be sheathed without having done its work.

Omer Pasha is fully aware of these combinations, and though he admits that the Montenegrins have even now received a severe lesson, and that it would be barbarous if they were really reduced to their last resources to push the war on any further, he cannot, nevertheless, conceal from himself the incompleteness of the campaign if Cettigné be not reduced to ashes. Neither is the Porte, in instructing the Turkish Commander-in-chief to push on to the Montenegrin capital without loss of time, unmindful of the laws of humanity, since stringent orders have been issued that the old men, the women, and the children that might fall into the hands of the victorious troops should be spared; and I may here be permitted to observe that this humanity is more than the Montenegrins have ever displayed, for many Turks have I seen, even of recent date, mutilated in the most atrocious manner, while even the guides sent from Spuz by the Turkish authorities to conduct their own messengers safely through the Turkish lines, were murdered in cold blood.

As I have already had the honour to report, it was Omer Pasha's plan, at the outset, to penetrate into Montenegro by Farmaki, but, after pushing forward some distance in that direction, the army found itself in a country broken up with wild rocks, and without water, so that, after devastating the whole country far and near in that direction, the army was brought round to Zhabiak, and was pushed forward from this point straight towards the village of Rieka. Dodosh, a strong fort near the frontier, was abandoned by the Montenegrins, and the Turks took possession of the whole country on the left bank of the river up to within half an hour's distance from Rieka; but here they were stopped by the strongest position that the Montenegrins possess, consisting of a cluster of elevated and craggy mountains, crowned by perpendicular rocks, on the top of which Mirko, the Voivode, had established his head-quarters. The Turkish advanced posts were within hailing of the Montenegrin lines, but already the difficulty of bringing water from the rear to the more advanced lines was so great that the Commanders of the Turkish army shrank from the task and responsibility of pushing on any further in that direction; and, indeed, when I myself went to the outposts, I could not help perceiving the immense advantage the Montenegrins would have if they were attacked in the positions they occupied; but as it was likely that Omer Pasha, whose health is too much dilapidated to expose himself to any bodily effort, would, in his ignorance of the difficulties of the country, still persist in his plan of pushing forward against this position, I deemed it urgent to draw out, and lay before him, a sketch of the ground, and it became after this a comparatively easy task for me to induce him to accede to Dervish Pasha's plan of throwing a bridge of boats across the Rieka, and by this means turning the strong position of Grub, occupied by the Montenegrins.

The bridge was sent up the lake without any loss of time, and ere this the bulk of the army will have passed to the right bank of the river, and the river itself will have become the line of communications between the army and the base of operations. The Bashi-Bazouks and 6,000 men of the line will suffice to guard this line, while 15,000 men will be enabled to advance on to Cettigné; and ere the Porte is brought to acquiesce in the demands of the majority of the Great Powers, to put a stop to hostilities, the Montenegrin capital, and more especially the Turk's tower, will have been levelled to the ground.

Omer Pasha is very unwell, and his medical men do not promise him a long life if he is not allowed to recruit his health by immediate quiet and repose. He cannot travel by land or by sea, and I have proposed to him to pass the winter at Corfu, which he appears inclined to do.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY A. CHURCHILL.

No. 889.

Consul Paton to Earl Russell.—(Received September 1.)

(No. 10.)
My Lord, *Ragusa, August 16, 1862.*

IT appears to be certain that the Montenegrins have got a considerable supply of powder for their cartridge manufactory at Niegusch. It is said to be from Italy or Corfu, and to have been introduced contraband between Castel, Lustan, and Spizza: I will specially report to the Lord High Commissioner such details as I can procure, having applied for them to the Captain of the Circle.

I am informed that Omer Pasha could enter Rieka if he chose to incur the requisite expenditure of human life, but that he is husbanding his army against the possibility of operations in Servia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. A. PATON.

No. 890.

Consul Paton to Earl Russell.—(Received September 1.)

(No. 11.)
My Lord, *Ragusa, August 20, 1862.*

I HAVE received the following intelligence, which is reported as authentic. The Princess Darinka, widow of the late Prince Daniel, who arrived in Cettigné last week from St. Petersburgh (and of the object of whose journey nothing whatever was known on her passage through this place), brought communications from the Russian Government, recommending the Prince to arrange a peace with the Turks. The Prince, after a conference with the Princess and Dr. Panerazio, has declared his readiness to accept the Turkish ultimatum of last spring, binding himself to remain within his territories, and foment no troubles in Herzegovina or other provinces of the Porte; but he does not propose to recognize the suzerainty or sovereignty of the Porte.

Mirko, as the representative of the "no-surrender" party, remains ostensibly a stranger to all propositions of peace.

For some time back the Prince has spoken in the most abusive terms of France and Russia for leaving him in such straits.

All that I have said of the gloomy prospects of the Montenegrins turns out to be not over-coloured. The amount of gunpowder smuggled up to Niegusch does not exceed a few barrels. Notwithstanding many fever cases the spirit of the Turkish army is said to be excellent, and the Montenegrin victories are either fabrications or exaggerations. The pretended renewal of the Rayah war in the Herzegovina amounts to a contemptible brigandage in Zubzi, which is, if not politically, at least geographically, a part of Montenegro; an attempt to surprise the Turkish trenches at Toutu, on the 15th or 16th instant, having failed signally.

The inhabitants of Cattaro (which is the market of Montenegro, and depends on the resources of the mountains) are in a state of great commercial suffering and pecuniary inconvenience, not to mention domestic want. The Montenegrins have little produce left to sell, and have consequently deficient means for the purchase of groceries and manufactures.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. A. PATON.

No. 891.

Consul Paton to Earl Russell.—(Received September 1.)

(No. 12.)
My Lord, *Ragusa, August 22, 1862.*

ON the 18th instant, when the Prince of Montenegro was riding out with the Princess Darinka and others of his suite, to see the Montenegrin camp from an eminence called the Belvidere, on the mountains above the Rieka, an assassin fired at him, and missing his aim, grazed the Prince's horse, and then escaped to within the Austrian border, and the peasants, instead of delivering him to the Austrian police, gave him up to the Montenegrin frontier Monkes. But on the road to Cettigné, on a pretext of drinking water, he was unbound, and again escaped, no one knows where.

Two of his relations who were in the Montenegrin camp, and, perhaps, were his accomplices, suddenly left the camp, being, according to the custom of the Mountain, subject to the laws of revenge, even if innocent. One was taken prisoner on the Austrian territory, and conducted to Cattaro; the other, attempting to escape, was shot.

The alleged motive of this attempt was that a relation of the present Prince of Montenegro hanged a relative of the assassin. But in such cases it is usually political designs arising out of contemporary events that after so many years sharpen the recollection of long past injuries. Taken in connection with a report that "the Prince was about to sell the Mountain to the Turks," it seems an additional monition that it would be absurd to regard Montenegro as a Christian State capable of comprehending or fulfilling the sanction of Treaty obligations.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. A. PATON.

No. 892.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received September 1.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 1, 1862.*

THERE has been no Conference about Montenegro. Fuad and Aali have frequently assured me that strict orders were given against acts of revenge at Cettigné. Prince has asked terms of peace; they have been communicated to him. Churchill's account confused. When seventy men are said to have been hung, Prince Nicolas had not Porte's propositions but merely some made by French Consul apparently without authority. This butchery, however, if true, is equally atrocious.

No. 893.

Earl Russell to Mr. Lumley.

(No. 44.) *Foreign Office, September 1, 1862.*

Sir,

I INCLOSE herewith, for your information, a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris respecting the affairs of Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 894.

Earl Russell to Mr. Lumley.

(No. 45.) *Foreign Office, September 1, 1862.*

Sir,

I INCLOSE herewith, for your information, a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna reporting a conversation which he held with Count Rechberg upon the subject of Montenegro.†

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 895.

Mr. Fane to Earl Russell.—(Received September 3.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, September 3, 1862.*

CHURCHILL telegraphs from Scutari, September 2, as follows:—

"Prince of Montenegro having received Porte's conditions of peace, has asked for an armistice until Saturday to consult with all his Senators and sign document required by the Porte. Omer Pasha has accepted, and orders have been sent to the army to halt."

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* No. 837.

† No. 666.

No. 896.

Earl Russell to Mr. Grey.

(No. 64.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September 3, 1862.*

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches on the subject of Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 897.

Earl Russell to Mr. Lumley.

(No. 48.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September 3, 1862.*

I INCLOSE herewith, for your information, copies of despatches respecting the affairs of Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 898.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received September 5.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 4, 1862, 11·40 P.M.*

PRINCE OF MONTENEGRO has demanded a few days' armistice to consult with his Senate as to terms offered by the Porte. The armistice is granted and it is supposed that the terms will be accepted.

No. 899.

Mr. Lumley to Earl Russell.—(Received September 5.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, September 5, 1862, 5 P.M.*

I THINK Prince Gortchakow fears Montenegro will accede to Omer Pasha's conditions for peace. A collective proposition in his sense made by Consuls of five Powers might prevent this. His proposal goes by Vienna to Consul at Ragusa. He believes France and Prussia will agree to it.

No. 900.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 903.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, September 6, 1862.*

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches upon the subject of Montenegro.†

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 901.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received September 7.)

(No. 54. Political.)
My Lord, *Bosna-Serai, August 19, 1862.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the Austrian Consul-General, Lieutenant-Colonel Jovanovich, has just returned from a tour in the north of Bosnia,

* Nos. 888, 889, and 891.

† Nos. 898 and 899.

along the Servian frontier. He assures me that everything is perfectly tranquil, and that he could not perceive the slightest political excitement with regard to the position of affairs in Servia. He described the military arrangements of the Turks along the frontier as surprisingly good, but, at the same time, he says that they labour under the serious disadvantage of being totally unable to concentrate their forces in a reasonable time on any given point which might be attacked on account of the want of practicable roads.

It really seems impossible, with any practical result, to convince the Turkish Government of the necessity of constructing roads. Osman Pasha has certainly done as much as any man possibly could in the way of improving the communications in Bosnia; but I do not believe that the Government has contributed a piastre to these important improvements, and consequently a great deal which might be accomplished with a little pecuniary assistance from the Porte is left undone.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 902.

Mr. Fane to Earl Russell.—(Received September 7.)

(No. 148. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Vienna, September 3, 1862.*

AMONG the Consular despatches which I forward this day to your Lordship is one from Mr. Churchill, dated 25th August, 1862, in which he gives expression to the opinion that nothing short of the capture of Cettigné will serve to disabuse the Christian subjects of the Porte, and other sympathisers with the Montenegrins, of the belief they entertain that the mountaineers have proved victorious over the troops of the Sultan, instead of having been signally defeated by them.

A curious illustration of the justice of this opinion was afforded me in a conversation which I held yesterday with Captain Spaight, of Her Majesty's 9th Regiment, who has just returned from Cettigné, where he appears to have met with great attention and hospitality from Prince Nicholas and his family. Captain Spaight was led to visit the Montenegrins, I believe, simply by a desire to acquire some knowledge of this curious people, and he has certainly returned from their country a warm partisan of their cause. After lauding them in general terms for their high civilization, their generosity, their patriotism, after praising the devotion shown by the women to the cause in which the men had fought with such splendid gallantry, Captain Spaight observed that the Turks had entirely failed, and would never succeed, in conquering the Montenegrins. I asked Captain Spaight, who left Cettigné only last Sunday week, whether he was not aware that Ricka had been taken. He replied by putting me on my guard against reports coming from Ragusa or Scutari, and said that he was inclined to doubt altogether the truth of the intelligence. I then told him that the Prince of Montenegro had informed the Porte of his readiness to accept Omar Pasha's previously rejected ultimatum, and I gave him a brief account of the actual state of affairs between the Turks and Montenegrins.

I could see that Captain Spaight, although he was far too courteous to say so, considered me as the dupe of reports manufactured or garbled to suit the interests of the Porte, and that he could not bring himself to believe that the Montenegrins had really been beaten and were suing for terms of peace.

I should add that Captain Spaight is obviously a man of culture and high breeding, and that it is impossible to doubt for a moment the sincerity of his admiration for the Montenegrins and of his belief in their invincibility. The inference which may be drawn from the fact that such a person could leave Cettigné only ten days ago under the impression that the Montenegrins had suffered no defeat is of a nature to confirm Mr. Churchill's opinion that the capture of Cettigné will alone serve to convince the partisans of Montenegro that Turkey is not too weak to subdue even the most independent and warlike of its subjects.

It appears by Mr. Churchill's telegram of this day's date that Omer Pasha has consented to a short armistice, to enable Prince Nicholas to consider the conditions of peace offered to him, and has ordered his army to halt. It seems possible, therefore, that peace may now be made without Cettigné being taken, and there may be good reasons, strategical or other, for foregoing the advantages involved in its

capture; but I have thought it right to report to your Lordship the substance of my conversation with Captain Spaight, as illustrative of the justice of the general views embodied in Mr. Churchill's despatch.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JULIAN FANE.

No. 903.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received September 7.)

(No. 55. Political.)
My Lord, *Bosna-Serai, August 22, 1862.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 3 of the 23rd July, informing me that Mr. Churchill has been directed to proceed on special service to the head-quarters of Omer Pasha, and instructing me to communicate with him and to afford him any assistance he may require while employed on this mission. I shall not fail to comply with these instructions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 904.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received September 7.)

(No. 56. Political.)
My Lord, *Bosna-Serai, August 22, 1862.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that telegraphic information has been received here by the Austrian, French, and Russian Consuls that the Prince Nicholas of Montenegro has consented to accept the terms offered by Omer Pasha for the arrangement of the differences between the Porte and Montenegro. Up to the present moment, however, the authorities here have no information on the subject.

I have not telegraphed this news either to your Lordship or to Her Majesty's Ambassador, nor have I alluded to the various and conflicting reports of the late proceedings of either parties, as Mr. Churchill and our Consul at Scutari, who are in the immediate vicinity of operations, will be in a position to give, and doubtless have given, your Lordship more correct information than I can possibly do, as our only sources of information here at present are the occasional telegrams received by the authorities from Omer Pasha.

I beg to inclose copy of a despatch from Mr. Zohrab of the 6th August, by which your Lordship will perceive that nothing is now taking place in the Herzegovina.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure in No. 904.

Vice-Consul Zohrab to Consul Holmes.

Sir, *Mostar, August 6, 1862.*

SINCE the entry of Dervish Pasha's corps into Montenegro it has been very difficult to obtain correct information here of its movements, in fact, all the intelligence we get about it, or regarding the war in Montenegro, comes by telegraph from Omer Pasha, but as the events reported in these telegrams are, I suppose, communicated to Her Majesty's Government by our Consul at Scutari, to whose province they naturally belong, long before I could transmit them and probably much more correctly, I abstain from entering into details myself.

The removal of the war into Montenegro has naturally given relief to this province, Dervish Pasha's troops being supplied from Albania. The roads to the different garrisons are now, comparatively speaking, free from danger for the

conveyance of provisions. The Dougi Pass has been abandoned by all but a few robbers, and through it constant communication is kept up with Nichsich; it can now be said that the revolted districts are cleared of rebels and are open to the Turks.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAS. ZOHRAB.

No. 905.

Consul Paton to Earl Russell.—(Received September 7.)

(No. 13.)
My Lord, *Ragusa, August* 24, 1862.

THE individual who attempted the assassination of the Prince is Sava Milo Radanich, belonging to the family which had the chief civil and military power under the Vladikas of the eighteenth century, and who hence had the surname Governatorovich. Latterly they were the rivals of the Petrovitch family, from which the Vladikas were taken, hence the efforts made to extirpate them by the last Vladika, by Prince Daniel, and by Mirko Petrovich, father of the present Prince.

A Captain Spaight, whose regiment has been stationed at Corfu, and who has been for a month as he states in Montenegro, has called on me, and I have had a long conversation with him this afternoon. He has a violent hatred of the Turks, and strong sympathies for the Montenegrins. Nevertheless, as he has passed some weeks within the Montenegrin lines, I listened to all he said. He estimates the Montenegrin force concentrated at 6,000 men. He thinks that if the Turks were to risk several thousand men they could enter Rieka. For entering Cettigné many thousands must be sacrificed.

He states that the daily Turkish cannonade has, during the last nine days, caused the death of only two men and two women. He describes the Montenegrins as well supplied with money from France and Russia, and that they have a secret for a new substitute for gunpowder received from some parties in Vienna who are not known. The devastations of the Turks have ruined thousands of families, and the Prince is desirous peace. Mirko, who has been described to me as a "little tiger," is stated by Captain Spaight to be "mild and gentlemanly."

To enable Mr. Fane to have these statements although coloured, I have given Mr. Spaight a merely formal letter to his Excellency.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. A. PATON.

No. 906.

Consul Paton to Earl Russell.—(Received September 7.)

(No. 14.)
My Lord, *Ragusa, August* 26, 1862.

THE intelligence from the seat of war leaves no doubt that the Turks have at length made a decided movement in advance, in two columns, one up the left bank of the Rieka River, the other upon the heights overlooking the right bank; the latter to make the effective attack, which appears to have been successful, as the town of Rieka itself has been abandoned by the Montenegrins, and the Turks are now said to be on the heights opposite Dobro Selo. Of this further progress towards Cettigné, which will probably be desperately contested by Mirko, we have no intelligence.

The accounts Captain Spaight gave me of the buoyant spirit of the Prince prevented me from reporting last post the mental prostration of the Prince. It has been again reported to me as undoubted, and that he would fly to Cattaro if it were not from fear of his own people.

Instead of more Austrian subjects going into Montenegro, many Montenegrin families on the frontier are removing their property within the Austrian border, in case of accidents.

To prophecy military results while the operations are in actual progress is not advisable; yet I may mention that the friends of the Montenegrins believe at length that Cettigné is in danger.

To balance the loss of the Moslems of Kholacin, who were lately attacked by the insurgents of Sharanc, it is said that Ahmed Pasha, who commands the Turkish corps of diversion on the side of Herzegovina, has beaten off several hundred insurgents at Donga. His mission is to watch the turbulent districts on the opposite side of Montenegro facing Herzegovina.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. A. PATON.

No. 907.

Mr. Churchill to Earl Russell.—(Received September 7.)

(No. 21.)
My Lord, *Scutari, August* 25, 1862.

PRINCE NICHOLAS has not yet received a word of reply from the French Government since his acceptance of Omer Pasha's rejected ultimatum, nor does he appear to have much chance of saving Cettigné, if his only hope of doing so is grounded on the support he is likely to receive from France and Russia.

Omer Pasha, who has received the Porte's recent conditions of peace, appears to be in no hurry to communicate them to the Montenegrin Chief. He believes, and I have already ventured to express myself partial to this belief, that it would be impolitic, viewing matters from the Porte's point of view, to suspend hostilities before the taking of Cettigné, for the obvious reason that so distorted have been the reports spread by the Slavs, who naturally take a lively interest in the welfare of the Montenegrins, and these reports have been circulated with so much persistency and effrontery, that the majority of the Christian populations of European Turkey fervently believe in the successes of the Montenegrins, instead of their signal defeat; and it is natural that they should do so, for even Europeans who are not Slavs, and whose inclinations do not impel them to believe that which they might otherwise hope, look with hesitation and perplexity on the divergent reports that reach them from Ragusa and Scutari, and often, even by reason of their impartiality, are led to depart from the truth by taking the mean between the two versions on the same event. From this I conclude that, though no material advantage is to be gained by the taking of Cettigné, no more than we obtained by the ultimate capture of Sebastopol, yet the moral advantage is as great in the one case as it was important in the other, inasmuch as it will convince the Christian populations of Turkey hostile to its rule, by an undeniable proof, that Turkey is not too weak to resist the attacks of its enemies or to subdue even the most independent and warlike of its subjects.

The Turks, nevertheless, do not push on as vigorously as they might do with the overwhelming forces they have at their disposal, numbering now nearly 30,000 men; but much of this delay, it must be owned, is due to the fact that Omer Pasha's health does not permit him to take the saddle or even to quit Scutari, while he persists in conducting the operations of the army in the field, even to the most minute details.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY A. CHURCHILL.

No. 908.

Consul Paton to Earl Russell.—(Received September 7.)

(No 15.)
My Lord, *Ragusa, August* 29, 1862.

ACCORDING to the last intelligence, the Montenegrins occupy the position of Tsatsari (which I do not find on the maps), between Rieka and Cettigné, with the Turks opposite them. The Prince has again proposed to Omer Pasha to treat for a peace, but the latter has answered that he has no instructions.

The boat has arrived from Cattaro, and private letters mention that great alarm reigns at Cettigné. The wounded have been transported in all haste to Niegusch. Dr. Panerazio has sent his family to Cattaro, and preparations have been made by the Prince's Government to transfer itself to the Loutchin if Cettigné is taken. This lofty and sterile district has no villages and resources. If Cettigné

falls the Prince's power and that of Mirko has received its death-blow. It is rumoured that in consequence of internal dissensions the command has been resigned by Mirko and transferred to Petro Stephani, the father-in-law of the Prince, and the most intelligent of the Montenegrins of the old stock. It was he who held Dervish Pasha so long at bay in command of the corps on the northern slope of the Ostrog. In politics he has represented the party of moderation as opposed to Mirko.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. A. PATON.

No. 909.

Mr. Fane to Earl Russell.—(*Received September* 8.)

Vienna, September 8, 1862.

(Telegraphic.)
CHURCHILL telegraphs as follows:—

"*Scutari, September* 7, 1872.

"Armistice terminated. Prince still hesitates to accept Porte's conditions *in toto*. Troops march on Cettigné."

No. 910.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

Foreign Office, September 8, 1862.

(No. 541.)
Sir,

I HAVE received your despatch No. 550 of the 20th ultimo, inclosing a copy of a collective note addressed to the Porte by the Representatives of the Great Powers at Constantinople, recommending the Turkish Government to conclude peace with the Prince of Montenegro; and I have to state to you that your conduct in signing that note is approved.

Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that, on arriving at Cettigné, the first duty of the Turkish Government should be to show mercy to the vanquished, and the next to obtain effective guarantees against renewals of the barbarous incursions of the Montenegrins.

What those guarantees should be it is for the Sublime Porte to prescribe, and Her Majesty's Government have no doubt that the Turkish Government, in dealing with the Government of Montenegro, will act with all the moderation which may be consistent with future security.

You may read this despatch to the Plenipotentiaries who, with yourself, signed the collective note.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 911.

Mr. Lumley to Earl Russell.—(*Received September* 10.)

St. Petersburgh, September 9, 1862, 10 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)
THE Prince of Montenegro has accepted Turkish terms of peace.

No. 912.

Earl Russell to Mr. Lumley.

Foreign Office, September 9, 1862.

(Telegraphic.)
THE plan you send me regarding Montenegro is quite inadmissible. The European Powers have quite enough to do with the Danube Principalities and Servia. Great Britain will not take any part in Montenegro to save the Prince from the guarantees justly required by the Porte.

No. 913.

Mr. Erskine to Earl Russell.—(*Received September* 10.)

Constantinople, August 25, 1862.

(No. 561.)
My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith the translation of a telegram received by the Porte from Omer Pasha, announcing that 100 Turkish prisoners are reported to have been murdered barbarously by the Montenegrins.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

Inclosure in No. 913.

Omer Pasha to the Seraskier.

August 9, 1862.

(Translation.)
(Telegraphic.)

OUT of the 500 native irregular troops who had been induced some time back to join the Montenegrins, about 100 of these, consisting of Chiefs and standard-bearers, remained behind, whilst the rest, 400 in number, were sent back to their country. The Prince of Montenegro, however, after having written to the French Consul to say that he had accepted my ultimatum, caused the 100 men in question to be hanged. Intelligence has been received from Cattaro that this statement is correct, and it has moreover been confirmed by the woman sent to Cettigné.

On the day that Oria Luka was taken, the Prince of Montenegro addressed a letter to the Turkish Commanders, which he forwarded to them by an officer of artillery. The bearer, however, being afraid to proceed straight through the Turkish camp, went to Sputz, the Governor of which sent him on to the said camp escorted by two men from Sputz.

On their way thither they fell into the hands of the Montenegrins and were conducted to Cettigné; but losing sight of the fact that these persons were sent to protect the officer despatched by the Prince, they were shot.

No. 915.

Mr. Fane to Earl Russell.—(*Received September* 14.)

Vienna, September 10, 1862.

(Telegraphic.)
CHURCHILL telegraphs as follows:—

"*Scutari, September* 9, 1862.

"Prince Nicholas has accepted in writing Porte's conditions without exception, relying on the Sultan's clemency with respect to his father's exile. He likewise makes some observations on block-houses to be established between Sputz and Nichsich.

"Montenegrin war may now be considered as terminated."

No. 916.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

Foreign Office, September 10, 1862.

(No. 905.)
My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches upon the subject of Montenegro and the adjacent provinces.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

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* Nos. 901, 902, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, and 910.

No. 917.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received September 11.)

Constantinople, September 10, 1862, 11·10 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

THE Montenegrins have sent one of their shuffling answers to the Porte, saying they accept its proposals, and consequently request the Ottoman troops to be immediately withdrawn. At the same time they object to the exile of Mirko, and the establishment of the military road for which the Turks bargained.

The Grand Vizier and Aali Pasha may be disposed to yield as to the exile of Mirko, but will insist on the road, and I should think ought not to withdraw their troops until this point is clearly settled, and due precautions taken for its being carried out.

No. 918.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received September 11.)

Therapia, September 11, 1862.

(Telegraphic.)

I HAVE received from Mr. Churchill the following telegram :—

"Prince Nicholas has accepted in writing the Porte's conditions without exception, relying on the Sultan's clemency with respect to his father's exile. He likewise makes some observation on block-houses to be established between Spuiz and Nichsich. Montenegrin war may now be considered as terminated.

No. 919.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received September 13.)

Constantinople, September 2, 1862.

(No. 578.)

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 550 of the 20th ultimo, inclosing a copy of a collective note addressed to the Sublime Porte on the 15th ultimo by the Representatives of the Guaranteeing Powers, suggesting the conclusion of an armistice with Montenegro, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of the answer which has been returned by the Porte to that note.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

Inclosure in No. 919.

Aali Pasha to Sir H. Bulwer.

Sublime Porte, le 23 *Août*, 1862.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

J'AI reçu et mis sous les yeux de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan la note collective que votre Excellence et ses collègues de France, d'Autriche, de Russie, de Prusse, et d'Italie, m'ont fait l'honneur de m'écrire en date du 15 Août courant dans le but de faire appel aux sentiments de générosité de mon auguste Maître à l'égard des affaires du Monténégro.

Sa Majesté Impériale a trouvé dans cette démarche une nouvelle preuve de confiance de la part de ses augustes alliés. Elle me charge de vous en témoigner sa sincère satisfaction.

La Sublime Porte repousse toute idée de donner à la guerre qui se poursuit dans la Montagne Noire la couleur d'une lutte de dévastation. Votre Excellence sait combien a été grande la longanimité du Gouvernement Impérial et combien ont été modérées les conditions qu'il avait posées pour éviter toute effusion du sang.

Malheureusement, plus nous avons été modérés, moins les Monténégrins ont cru devoir l'être. Ce n'est qu'après plusieurs années de patience, après d'immenses sacrifices de tout genre que l'expédition dont il s'agit a été décidée.

Durant le long intervalle qui s'est écoulé entre le commencement de la guerre que les Monténégrins nous ont faite en dehors de leurs limites et la marche des

troupes Impériales dans la Montagne, nous n'avons cessé de leur demander de se tenir tranquille chez eux et de laisser tranquilles les pauvres habitants des districts de l'Herzégovine qui étaient continuellement menacés par les Chefs de la Montagne de fer et de feu, s'ils osaient proférer le mot de soumission à leur Souverain légitime. Dans ce laps de temps notre armée est restée, l'arme aux bras, spectatrice des horreurs inqualifiables commises sur des soldats mêmes qui en faisaient partie. Toute attitude passive de nos forces militaires ont fini par inspirer aux Monténégrins la conviction qu'ils pouvaient tout entreprendre sans le moindre danger d'être attaqués, ni inquiétés dans leurs foyers et leur audace n'en fut que redoublée.

Si j'ai cru utile de rappeler ainsi en peu de mots les principaux faits qui ont précédé l'état actuel des choses, ce n'est nullement dans l'intention de chercher à justifier des actes de vengeance proportionnés à la conduite barbare des Monténégrins, actes que la Sublime Porte et son armée croient indignes d'elles et qui n'y auront jamais recours. En entrant dans ces détails nous n'avons eu en vue que de constater une fois de plus la nécessité absolue de garanties propres à empêcher le retour des déplorables événements qui nous ont coûté tant de sang précieux et tant de sacrifices pécuniaires.

La Sublime Porte est donc prête à accueillir toute demande de pacification de la part des Monténégrins sincèrement, clairement et sérieusement faite et non démentie par des violations nouvelles comme toutes celles qui ont été adressées jusqu'aujourd'hui. Aussitôt que le Commandant-en-chef de l'armée Impériale recevra une pareille demande il s'empressera de faire connaître les conditions auxquelles il est autorisé à traiter, conditions dont la grande modération sera, nous avons lieu de l'espérer, appréciée par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique.

(Signé) AALI.

No. 920.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

Foreign Office, September 13, 1862.

(No. 916.)

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copy of a despatch on Montenegro.*

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 921.

Consul Paton to Earl Russell.—(Received September 14.)

Ragusa, September 2, 1862.

(No. 16.)

My Lord,

THE opening of conferences at Rieka between the Turks and the Montenegrins, and the assembling of a council of the nation at Cettigné, are reported, but the precise nature of Omer Pasha's instructions has not yet transpired.

I confess that I have little hope of peace, and am inclined to think that when Omer Pasha conceives himself capable of striking another blow that blow will be struck, in spite of all the ostensible instructions he may receive from the Porte, and all the diplomatic efforts of France to avert a catastrophe from her unruly Montenegrin protégés, because there is no secure guarantee for the future.

All traces of Austrian apprehension of attempts of Italian revolutionists on the coasts adjoining Montenegro have at length disappeared, and the prohibition of the conveyance of private telegraphic despatches coming from the Neapolitan side of the Adriatic on the wires of the Dalmatian lines has been withdrawn. I have already had the honour of offering to your Lordship my humble opinion of the improbability of Garibaldi being able to join the Montenegrins. This coast is crowded with Austrian troops, who would act instantaneously under a General of great energy and decision, and a landing on the Albanian coast in the rear of Omer Pasha's army would have been followed by Garibaldi being driven into the sea with his volunteers by superior numbers of troops inured to war; and in

* No. 918.

contrast to his first Sicilian expedition, neither would the peasantry have supported him, nor the troops deserted to him, even supposing he escaped the English, Austrian, and Ottoman ships of war in the Lower Adriatic.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. A. PATON.

No. 922.

Mr. Churchill to Earl Russell.—(Received September 14.)

(No. 22.)
Scutari, September 2, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, for your Lordship's information, the copy of a despatch I have addressed by this post to Her Majesty's Ambassador at the Porte on the subject of the communication of the Porte's conditions to Prince Nicholas.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY A. CHURCHILL.

Inclosure in No. 922.

Mr. Churchill to Sir H. Bulwer.

Scutari, September 2, 1862.

Sir,

THE day before yesterday I had the honour to report to your Excellency the sending of the Porte's conditions of peace to Prince Nicholas and the projected advance of the Turkish army on Cettigné.

The conditions of peace had already been transmitted by Fuad Pasha to the Serdar Ekrem in Turkish about a week ago, and when I told the Commander-in-chief that I had received a telegram from your Excellency enjoining me to communicate a copy of the conditions, in French, to him, he informed me that he had already telegraphed to Prince Nicholas to apprize him of the arrival of the conditions, and had requested him to send a sufficient escort to the Turkish outposts to conduct to the Prince's presence the officer to whom the conditions had been confided.

This morning a telegram was received from Prince Nicholas, dated the 1st of September, by which the Serdar is begged to grant the Prince up to Saturday next (five days) in order that he should consult his Senators and get them to sign the document required by the Porte in the 9th Article of the Conditions. The Prince's request has been acquiesced in by Omer Pasha, and orders to that effect were immediately transmitted to the commanders of the army of operations, who were to have pushed on to-day towards Cettigné.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY A. CHURCHILL.

No. 923.

Mr. Lumley to Earl Russell.—(Received September 14.)

(No. 88.)
St. Petersburgh, September 2, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAD the honour to receive yesterday your Lordship's despatch No. 39 of the 27th ultimo, instructing me to communicate to Prince Gortchakow a despatch from the Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands, respecting the atrocities committed on some Turkish prisoners by the Montenegrins.

This morning I called on Prince Gortchakow, taking with me a copy of Sir Henry Storks' despatch and its inclosure, the Report of the Captain of the Port of Corfu.

It was impossible for any despatch to have arrived more *à propos* than this has done.

In the "St. Petersburgh Journal" of this morning is an article, copy of which I have the honour to inclose, denying the report that Omer Pasha had refused to

grant an armistice to the Montenegrins in consequence of the cruelties they had perpetrated on some Turkish prisoners; and immediately following it appears an appeal to the Russian public for subscriptions in favour of the Montenegrins who have suffered during the war.

The subscription list which is attached to it is worthy of notice, from the circumstance that almost the only names it contains are those of members of the Foreign Office.

It is not surprising that few other names appear in this list, for up to the present moment the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" has not contained a single article on Montenegro which has not described a signal victory on the part of the Montenegrins or an equally signal defeat of the Turkish forces. The public, therefore, were not prepared for a call on their sympathies and purses on behalf of the victors.

There were several other questions with reference to which I wished to speak to Prince Gortchakow, but that on the subject of the proposal for an armistice between Omer Pasha and the Montenegrins was brought forward by his Excellency himself, who read to me a despatch from Prince Lobanoff, inclosing a copy of the collective note addressed by the Representatives of the Great Powers to the Porte on that subject.

I then asked Prince Gortchakow if he had heard of the barbarities which had been committed on some Turkish prisoners by the Montenegrins? He said he had, and that there was not a word of truth in the story. He had made inquires respecting it at Vienna, and heard from M. Balabin that the report was an invention.

I told Prince Gortchakow I was sorry to be obliged to contradict the information he had received from Vienna, as he would find in the papers I presented to him the statement of an eye-witness of the condition in which these wretched victims of Montenegrin barbarity had arrived at Corfu. After reading the report of the Captain of the Port of Corfu, Prince Gortchakow said he could not understand the complete contradiction between this account and that he had received from Vienna; and he added that, even if it were true, he should not be surprised at it, for he could well understand that a people in the exasperated condition of the Montenegrins might out of revenge commit such outrages on their prisoners.

Prince Gortchakow then sent for one of his clerks, and dictated in my presence a despatch to M. de Balabin, inclosing copies of the documents I had given him, calling attention to the contrast between the accounts from Corfu and the statement he had sent him from Vienna, and requesting him to make further inquiries on the subject and report the result to him as soon as possible.

Returning, then, to the question of the collective note urging on the Porte the necessity of granting an armistice to the Montenegrins, Prince Gortchakow said although he approved the object of that document, he thought the language in which it was worded most undignified.

He then read the note, commenting upon the words "Les Représentants osent conseiller à la Porte," a phrase which, he said, might have been employed when "Christian dogs" paid tribute to the Porte, but ought never to have been used by the Representatives of Europe in the nineteenth century. He remarked also on the high-sounding expressions employed in describing the successes of the large Turkish force over a small and brave band of mountaineers, and said that, with his consent, the Russian Minister should not have signed the note had he known the tone in which it was drawn up; however, time had pressed, an armistice was necessary, and he approved of the measure.

Prince Lobanoff in his despatch states further that the Porte had instructed Omer Pasha to make some overtures to Prince Nicolas, but that the terms of it had not been communicated to the Representatives of the Great Powers; he had, however, reason to believe that one of the conditions was that a military road should be made through Montenegro, with blockhouses at certain points and the right of garrison for Turkish troops. Such a proposal, Prince Gortchakow said, was quite inadmissible; it would prove to be impracticable; and the effect of bringing two races together which had never been in contact in Montenegro before, would be to render peace impossible, and to perpetuate murder and violence of every kind. I said I confessed I was afraid that such a system might introduce into Montenegro the state of things from which Servia was now suffering, and from which the Powers were endeavouring to relieve her. Prince Gortchakow then looked over the draft of the despatch he had dictated to M. de Balabin, made a few alterations

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

and additions to it, which he did not read to me, and then gave orders that it should be sent by post at once to Vienna.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. SAVILE LUMLEY.

Inclosure in No. 923.

Extract from the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" of August 20 and 21, September 1 and 2, 1862.

LES nouvelles relatives à la lutte des Monténégrins contre les Turcs sont souvent incertaines ou obscures, parfois elle sont intentionnellement fausses.

Quelques journaux étrangers ont prétendu ces jours derniers que les Monténégrins avaient massacré 70 prisonniers Turcs et que, sous ce prétexte, Omer Pacha avait refusé l'armistice.

Des renseignements que nous tenons de source très-sûre nous autorisent à démentir cette assertion de la manière la plus catégorique.

La nouvelle de ce massacre est une calomnie dont tout le monde devine aisément le but.

Souscription en faveur des Familles du Monténégro, Victimes de la Guerre.

Dans notre numéro de Samedi dernier nous avons annoncé que le journal la "Parole Contemporaine" avait ouvert dans ses bureaux, à St. Pétersbourg, une souscription destinée à secourir au Monténégro les malheureux qui souffrent si cruellement dans ce pays des suites fatales de la guerre.

Il est des maux si grands qu'il suffit d'appeler sur eux l'attention publique pour que chacun, dans la mesure de ses ressources, s'empresse de vouloir contribuer à leur soulagement. Les cœurs émus ne cherchent alors qu'un moyen de manifester leur pitié; l'appel qu'on leur fait répond à leur désir; le généreux accueil qui l'attend n'a pas besoin d'être longuement invoqué, et une nouvelle peinture des douleurs de la faim, de la misère, de la maladie, de la ruine accablant un peuple héroïque cruellement éprouvé, devient inutile.

Sur ces vieillards, sur ces femmes, sur ces enfants, sur ces blessés qui tendent vers le ciel at vers l'humanité leurs mains suppliantes, au milieu d'un pays ravagé nous appelons à notre tour une sympathie compatissante et nous ouvrons des listes de souscription dont le produit leur sera adressé par les moyens les plus prompts, les plus directs et les plus sûrs.

A dater d'aujourd'hui l'on peut souscrire au bureau des annonces du "Journal de St. Pétersbourg," à la Librairie de la Cour Impériale, au pont de police, sur la perspective de Nevsky, maison de l'Eglise Hollandaise.

Les noms des souscripteurs séront publiés dans nos colonnes. Voici la première liste:—

	Roubles.
Messieurs—	
N. Ignatiew	50
P. Strémooukhow	50
A. Engelgardt	50
G. Doubnitzky	25
Baron Th. Osten-Saken	25
A. Persiani, 1er	15
V. Persiani, 2	10
A. Smolsky	25
Baron D. Sourt	30
L. Lex	25
N. Lvvvow	20
A. Melnicow	20
W. Wolcow	25
V. Amirow	5
M. Gannzow	10
I. Wolf	10
Un anonyme	10
Dito	3
L. Bravoura	25
Un anonyme	3
R. P. Rainovsky	10
D. Lissowsky	3
La réduction du "Journal de St. Pétersbourg"	60
Total de la Liste	500

No. 924.

Mr. Lumley to Earl Russell.—(*Received September* 14.)

(No. 91.) *St. Petersburgh, September* 5, 1862.

My Lord,

ACCORDING to information received by Prince Gortchakow from Russian Agent at Cettigné, dated September 4, Omer Pasha's conditions of peace to Montenegro are:—

1st. Expulsion of Mirko.

2ndly. Military road from Herzegovina to Scutari, with block-houses at certain points.

3rdly. Engagement to admit no Christians into Montenegro without passports.

4thly. To erect no block-houses on the frontier.

Prince Gortchakow considers introduction of Turks into Montenegro incompatible with durable peace, and that the contact of the two races will produce in Montenegro the evil which the Powers are endeavouring at this moment to remove from Servia.

The proper basis for peace, in his opinion, would be what Turkey proposed to herself on commencing the war: after giving Montenegro a lesson, to re-establish the territorial and administrative *status quo ante*, a practical guarantee for which would be an equitable peace receiving the adhesion of Europe, and thus rendering it obligatory on both parties.

Prince Gortchakow has telegraphed this to Constantinople and Vienna, and proposes that Consuls should proceed at once to Omer Pasha and express this opinion, should it coincide with the views of their Governments. French, Prussian, and Austrian Envoys have telegraphed Prince Gortchakow's proposal to their Governments at his request.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. SAVILE LUMLEY.

No. 925.

Mr. Lumley to Earl Russell.—(*Received September* 14.)

(No. 93.) *St. Petersburgh, September* 5, 1862.

My Lord,

AT 12 o'clock to-day I received a note from Prince Gortchakow requesting to see me before 1 o'clock. I left the Embassy immediately after receiving his note, and on arriving at the Foreign Office found Count Revertera, the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires, sitting with Prince Gortchakow.

As soon as I entered his Excellency said, "I have a proposition to make to the Representatives of Austria and England, which I have already made to those of France and Prussia, who have just left me. I will not now allude to the statement made by Lord Russell to Baron Brunnow, that Omer Pasha's reason for refusing to grant an armistice to the Montenegrins was based on the cruelties exercised by those mountaineers on some Turkish prisoners, although a comparison of the dates would show that the savage act in question, which must have occurred early in July, could scarcely be the cause of the refusal to conclude an armistice proposed quite lately. My reasons," continued Prince Gortchakow, "for requesting your presence here now is to call your attention to the conditions on which Omer Pasha has proposed peace to the Prince of Montenegro. You are aware, from a despatch I read to you the other day, that the terms of what was then supposed to be a proposal, for an armistice sent by the Porte to Omer Pasha had not been communicated to the Representatives of the Great Powers at Constantinople; those terms, as I am now informed by our Agent at Cettigné, are conditions of peace and not of an armistice, and they are the following:—

1. "Expulsion of Mirko.

2. "Military road from Herzegovina to Scutari, with block-houses at certain points.

3. "Engagement to admit no Christians into Montenegro without passports.

4. "Engagement on the part of Montenegro to erect no block-houses on the frontier."

Prince Gortchakow had already discussed these conditions with Count Revertera. With regard to the first point Prince Gortchakow said it seemed to be out of

the question that a son should be called upon to expel his own father from his native country. The third and fourth points also met with his Excellency's disapproval; but it was with regard to the second condition that his Excellency showed the greatest repugnance; he said he considered the effect of such a measure, even if practicable, which he doubted, would be to render all hopes of a durable peace in Montenegro entirely vain, by placing in contact two hostile races in a country in which they had never been so placed before; violence and murder, which had hitherto been occasional, would now become the normal condition of the Mountain. The idea, also, of introducing such a system into Montenegro at the very moment when the Europeans Powers were striving to remove the evil consequences a similar mixture of Christians and Mahometans produced in Servia, seemed to him to be perfectly illogical; it would also be contrary to the determination of the Porte solemnly announced on undertaking the war, by which she bound herself to re-establish the *status quo ante* of the territorial and administrative condition of the country, after having inflicted a severe lesson on the Montenegrins. The lesson had been given, and the duty of the Porte was to re-establish order on the basis laid down by herself.

I remarked to Prince Gortchakow that I could see nothing in the formation of a military road through Montenegro which could affect the territorial or administrative condition of the country. "Territorial, perhaps not," said his Excellency, "but administrative certainly, and in a most important manner, by the introduction of a military element which had never before existed there."

Without going into further discussion on the terms of peace, Prince Gortchakow said he was most anxious that we should convey to our Governments by telegraph a proposition he had to make which he thought would be just to both parties. His idea, though his Excellency did not mention this to me, but to Count Revertera, is that a suspension of hostilities should take place without conditions at which the terms of peace might be arranged. His Excellency asserted also, on the authority of a report transmitted from Cettigné on the 5th instant, that a suspension of arms did exist. At all events, he said, it was evident the Turks were afraid to advance; they were waiting for reinforcements, and their position might soon be less favourable.

What he considered a proper basis for peace was that which Turkey had solemnly announced to Europe on commencing the war as her own intention—viz., after giving Montenegro a severe lesson, to re-establish the territorial and administrative *status quo ante*, a practical guarantee for which Prince Gortchakow said might be found in an equitable peace receiving the adhesion of Europe, and thus rendering it obligatory on both parties.

Prince Gortchakow added that he had telegraphed this to Constantinople and Vienna, and that, in order to lose no time, he was anxious that the Consuls of the five Powers should be directed from Vienna to proceed with the least possible delay to the Turkish camp, and inform Omer Pasha of the opinion of their Governments.

It appears that his Excellency's first idea was that such a step might be sufficient to induce Omer Pasha to modify the terms of peace he had proposed, and it was only after an observation of the French Ambassador that he agreed the action ought to take place simultaneously from Vienna and Constantinople. I have since heard from the Duke of Montebello and from Count Goltz, that a long discussion had taken place between them and Prince Gortchakow on the subject of his proposition, which it would seem his Excellency intended originally should be carried out by Russia, France, and Prussia alone.

Count Goltz, however, declined being drawn into a tripartite alliance of this kind, and proposed that Austria should be invited to take part in the intended measure, especially as he thought the formation of a road through Montenegro could not be indifferent to her. It might, under certain eventualities, be considered as endangering her safety, a view of the case which might perhaps induce the Austrian Government to oppose Omer Pasha's terms of peace, at all events the important article relating to the formation of a military road through Montenegro.

Count Revertera received his invitation to call on Prince Gortchakow at the same time as I did mine. Both notes were probably written while the Duc de Montebello and Count Goltz were still with Prince Gortchakow.

I confess I could not understand how Prince Gortchakow hoped to produce the effect he desires by the means he proposes to adopt.

The language in which his Excellency clothed his idea was so far from being clear and explicit, that I found, on referring to my colleagues, that not one of them was certain of having completely comprehended it. I imagine the real cause of Prince Gortchakow's anxiety that no time should be lost in communicating with Omer Pasha to be the fear that the Prince of Montenegro might be reduced to such straits as to be compelled to accede to a peace upon Omer Pasha's terms. Such an event would have the effect of annihilating to a great extent the prestige of Russia in Montenegro, since she would have the appearance of being unable to give that assistance to the Montenegrins of which they are sorely in want, and for which they naturally look to Russia. The idea of directing a Consular appeal to Omar Pasha from Vienna is explained from the circumstance that the Russian Government can communicate direct by cypher with Cettigné through Vienna and their Consul at Ragusa, whose Secretary, M. Petrokovitch, is now at Cettigné.

The views of Russia being communicated to Montenegro before those of the other Powers, she would appear to have taken the initiative in endeavouring to obtain more favourable terms of peace for Montenegro. How Prince Gortchakow can suppose that Omer Pasha would act upon suggestions made by members of the Consular body in contradiction to the orders received by him from the Porte I cannot conceive; but perhaps he does not expect it, and his aim will be gained to a certain extent, if he succeeds in showing the Prince of Montenegro that he has made an effort to modify the Turkish conditions of peace.

Your Lordship will have remarked that, while informing the Representatives of the Four Powers here of the sense of his telegraphic despatch to Constantinople and Vienna, Prince Gortchakow refrained from giving us a copy of it. I learn also that while the first part of the despatch relating to the Turkish terms of peace was *en clair*, the latter part, containing his Excellency's judgment on those terms, was in cypher; these circumstances induced one to suppose, though this supposition may be erroneous, that the Russian proposition may have contained something more than the words we have telegraphed to our respective Governments. As I was desirous of conveying the exact terms of Prince Gortchakow's opinions and proposals, I begged his Excellency to be good enough to dictate them to me; this he did, and my despatch No. 91 was accordingly written at Prince Gortchakow's table and from his dictation.

Before returning home I called on the French Ambassador, Count Goltz, and Count Revertera, and on comparing my version with theirs I found it was almost identical with them all, except that the Duc de Montebello referred in his despatch to the suggestion he had made for simultaneous communication with Constantinople and Vienna.

Although Prince Gortchakow will oppose to the utmost the 2nd Article of the Turkish conditions of peace, I believe he might be brought to agree, though with great reluctance, to the other Articles.

His own idea is that even the *status quo ante* is much less than Montenegro ought to accept, and that an addition of territory ought also to be given to that province; but he allows now that there is no chance of his views being carried out, or any possibility of proposing them, and, under the circumstances, he has been induced to make the proposal alluded to.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. SAVILE LUMLEY.

No. 926.

Mr. Fane to Earl Russell.—(Received September 14.)

(No. 167.)
My Lord, *Vienna, September 11, 1862.*

I SAW Count Rechberg on Monday, and his Excellency informed me that both the Russian and Prussian Ministers had made representations to him on that article of the conditions offered by the Porte to the Prince of Montenegro which stipulates for the construction of a military road through Montenegro, and had invited him to associate himself to their respective Governments in urging the Porte not to insist on a condition which would, they asserted, entirely destroy the independence of Montenegro.

His Excellency tells me that he declined to accede to the request thus made to him, and that he observed to the Prussian Minister that it would be mere waste of

time to discuss this question, as he had just received intelligence that the Prince of Montenegro had already accepted the condition of the Porte to which the Prussian Government took exception.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JULIAN FANE.

No. 927.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

Foreign Office, September 14, 1862.

(Telegraphic.)

HER Majesty's Government cannot judge of the terms offered to the Montenegrins, but are ready to believe that the Sultan asks only for necessary securities.

You will say this to Aali, and decline to discuss terms with him or any of your colleagues. The interference of Russia is not justifiable.

I have said this at St. Petersburgh.

No. 928.

Mr. Lumley to Earl Russell.—(Received September 18.)

St. Petersburgh, September 18, 1862.

(Telegraphic.)

SUBSTANCE of telegrams of 9th communicated to Prince Gortchakow. At his request I telegraph his reply. The promise given by the Porte to Europe has not been fulfilled. A military road cutting Montenegro in two essentially modifies its territorial and administrative condition. An arrangement on this basis offers no chance of security; it will perpetuate bloodshed, and can only be carried out by exterminating the mountaineers.

Prince Lobanow is ordered to propose to his colleagues a protest against it, based on the engagement of the Porte. If they decline, he will protest alone.

No. 929.

Earl Cowley to Earl Russell.—(Received September 20.)

Paris, September 18, 1862.

(No. 1115.)

My Lord,

I WAS pleased to find, from a conversation which I have had with M. Thouvenel, that his Excellency does not seem disposed to interfere to prevent the execution of the conditions offered by the Ottoman Government as those on which the Porte would consent to suspend definitively hostilities against the Montenegrins. His Excellency said that some of them were honourable, under the circumstances, to the Porte to have granted. He mentioned particularly the use of a sea-port, and certain lands for cultivation by the Montenegrins. He applauded the idea of a road through the Mountain, but he doubted the establishment of block-houses along the road answering the intentions which the Porte evidently had in creating them. He would say nothing of such block-houses being in contradiction to the *status quo ante*, which the Porte had signified its intention of observing; but he feared the consequences of the irritation which the constant presence of Turkish soldiers in the interior of Montenegro would provoke. He could have better understood the erection of strong forts at each extremity of the projected road for the maintenance of the Sultan's authority over it. This he thought would give greater security than detached forts, from which it was to be apprehended that no Turkish soldier could stray a few yards without exposing himself to be shot by a Montenegrin. However, this was matter for the consideration of the Turkish Government. He merely expressed his own opinion.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 930.

Mr. Churchill to Earl Russell.—(Received September 22.)

(No. 21. Diplomatic.)

My Lord,

Head-Quarters of Omer Pasha's Army, September 9, 1862.

I HAVE the honour to transmit, herewith inclosed, for your Excellency's information, the copy of Prince Nicholas' letter to Omer Pasha, accepting the Porte's conditions of peace. This copy was furnished me by M. Wiet, the French Consul, who returned last night from Cettigné, bringing with him the Montenegrin Senator, Ivo Rako, the bearer of the above communication.

The political reasons adduced by Prince Nicholas appear to be, that the country being reduced as it is to its lowest ebb of misery, brought on by the war, if he were deprived of his father—the only man in the country who exercises, by his sternness of character, any moral influence over the Montenegrins—the Prince would perhaps not be able, single handed, to cope with the different factions that are likely to rise against his dynasty, and this might in the end result in involving the Mountain into fresh hostilities by the disorder that such a state of things would produce.

The Prince's observations with reference to the block-houses to be established on the road between Niksich and Sputz would be just if his power over the Montenegrins were nugatory; but so long as he has the power that his predecessors have ever exercised of awarding condign punishment to such as disobey his orders, there would be no fear of conflicts, if the Prince were sincere in his present protestations, and the Turks were equally disposed to live on terms of good neighbourship. But a very important point that must not be neglected is the withdrawal from the vicinity of the Mountain of all Bashi-Bazouks and zaptiehs, who, by their want of discipline and their predatory habits, are ever ready to excite discord and strife.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY A. CHURCHILL.

Inclosure in No. 930.

The Prince of Montenegro to Omer Pasha.

M. le Maréchal,

Cettigné, le 7 Septembre, 1862.

M. RAETCHET m'a remis la lettre que votre Altesse m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire ainsi que la note renfermant les conditions que la Sublime Porte soumet à mon acceptation.

Ce ne sera pas en vain que votre Altesse aura fait appel à mes sentiments d'humanité. Je déplore comme vous, M. le Maréchal, une effusion de sang qu'il serait cruel de prolonger plus longtemps. J'accepte donc dans toute leur teneur les conditions posées par la Sublime Porte. J'appellerai seulement l'attention la plus sérieuse sur les Articles 5 et 6 de ces conditions. Votre Altesse remarquera que l'Article 6 s'éloigne évidemment de l'esprit et de la lettre des Articles 1 et 2, qui consacrent l'intégrité du territoire Monténégrin. En outre, ce même Article, exécuté dans toute sa rigueur, serait plutôt une porte ouverte à de nouveaux conflits, qu'une garantie réelle à une paix sérieuse et durable. Votre Altesse sait qu'il n'existe déjà que trop de points de contact pouvant donner lieu à des conflits entre Turcs et Monténégrins pour les multiplier encore.

Je ferai également remarquer que la clause qui concerne mon père m'afflige comme Prince et comme fils. Elle présente d'ailleurs de graves inconvénients pour le Gouvernement Ottoman lui-même. Des considérations politiques de haute importance, sur lesquelles il est superflu que je m'étende, mais que votre Altesse ne peut manquer de saisir, me portent à prier instamment la Sublime Porte de modifier la rigueur de cette clause. J'engage, dès aujourd'hui, ma parole de Prince, que mon père rentrera dans la vie privée et qu'il ne prendra désormais aucune part à l'administration du pays. Mon père a bien voulu, d'ailleurs, consentir tout spontanément à habiter tout autre point du Monténégro.

J'ai la ferme confiance que la Sublime Porte prendra en sérieuse considération que je viens de vous soumettre à son appréciation éclairée, et qui touchent également à ses propres intérêts. En les accueillant favorablement, elle acquierre des

droits incontestables à ma reconnaissance, comme elle contribuera puissamment à une pacification qui est, j'en ai la conviction, dans ses désirs comme dans les miens.

Je termine en renouvelant à votre Altesse ma déclaration que j'adhère entièrement aux conditions posées par la Porte et que je suis prêt à les exécuter au plustôt.

Je considère donc les hostilités comme ayant cessé définitivement à la réception de ma lettre. J'ai déjà donné les ordres nécessaires à mes lieutenants d'observer, dès aujourd'hui, la plus stricte défensive et d'éviter avec soin tout motif à de nouveaux conflits. Je prie votre Altesse de vouloir bien donner des ordres analogues à l'armée placée sous son commandement. Il importe aussi pour des considérations de réorganisations intérieures après une telle lutte, que l'évacuation du sol Monténégrin, par l'armée Turque, s'opère le plustôt possible. J'insiste tout particulièrement sur ce point et j'ai la conviction que votre Altesse comprendra les motifs sérieux de mon insistance.

Agréez, &c.
Le Prince du Monténégro et des Berdas,
(Signé) NICOLAS.

No. 931.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received September 22.)

(No. 58. Political.)
Bosna-Serai, September 5, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the Montenegrins are said to have burnt Cettigné and retired to the mountains. I have not yet heard, however, that the Turkish forces have occupied the site of the Montenegrin capital.

The war is evidently drawing to a close, and unless your Lordship desires that I should continue to communicate the information received here regarding the progress of affairs in Montenegro I shall not in future do so, as much earlier and more correct intelligence will doubtless be forwarded to the Foreign Office from Scutari.

Bosnia continues to be perfectly tranquil, and no operations are now taking place in the Herzegovina, most of the insurgents being probably occupied in Montenegro assisting to resist the advance of the Turkish army.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 932.

Consul Paton to Earl Russell.—(Received September 22.)

(No. 17.)
Ragusa, September 6, 1862.

My Lord,

No intelligence has as yet been received of a decided result having been arrived at in the negociations now pending. The Turks very reasonably placing no faith in documents signed by Montenegrins, demand the material guarantee of a military road from Spuz to Nichsich, and as that arrangement, if successfully forced on Montenegro, would be the tearing up by the roots of French and Russian influence, every effort is made to prolong the negotiation. My Russian colleague here has been for a week in Cettigné, and the French Consul at Scutari, who is also in the Montenegrin capital, is said to have been the person who counselled the sending back of the Turkish prisoners to Omer Pasha, which has been done. It is much to be regretted that from some futile motive Dervish Pasha delayed for twenty-four hours the grand attack on Cettigné, which he was ordered to make by Omer Pasha; at Cettigné the Turks would have dictated, not negotiated their terms.

Not having the advantage of being in either the one head-quarters or the other, like some of my colleagues, I find that, in spite of every exertion, a certain time elapses before the haze clears away from the fragmentary, unsatisfactory, and often contradictory intelligence in this place relative to Montenegro. I therefore think it

better to await further data before offering detailed opinions on the new phase into which this question has entered.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. A. PATON.

No. 933.

Consul Paton to Earl Russell.—(Received September 22.)

(No. 18.)
Ragusa, September 10, 1862.

My Lord,

INTELLIGENCE yesterday arrived here that the Prince of Montenegro has accepted the ultimatum of Omer Pasha, and if both parties henceforward act in good faith the Montenegrin war may be considered at an end. The Russian Consul here went to Cettingé on the first rumour of negotiations, and made every effort to prevent the Prince from consenting to the military road from Spuz to Nichsich; but partly from the nullity of Russian influence in Montenegro during the last stages of the war, partly from the exhausted state of the population, who, sick of being made holocausts to interests foreign to Montenegro, but, above all, from the imposing attitude of Omer Pasha, who had made all his dispositions for attack, the Prince yielded at the eleventh hour, and sent Ino Rako Radonich with the acceptance of the ultimatum.

The Prince had been informed by Omer Pasha that the terms had been consented to by the Great Powers, but the Russian Consul stated that it was impossible that his Government could have consented to the fortified commercial road; he therefore telegraphed to Vienna on his return here on the 7th, and received instructions to act with the French and Prussian Consuls; but the Prussian Consul here (accredited to Montenegro) declined to do anything in the matter, and the French Consul of Scutari had, in Cettigné, given no sort of encouragement for further resistance. The Russian Consul, therefore, gave up all idea of returning to Cettigné, and the peace has been consented to in his absence, the Prince and the Princess Darinka (who has great influence in the present affairs with the governing few, and who is entirely French in her sympathies) having no faith in the prospects held out by the Russian Consul.

The Prince begs that his father may not be exiled, and that the condition of the military road may be modified; but it is needless to remark to your Lordship that if Omer Pasha yields these he yields everything, for Mirko's ambition has been the lever, and his energy the mainstay, of the war, and without the road there is no material guarantee. It may be true that the road will be a source of future discontent to the Montenegrins, but, like the Servian fortresses, it enables the Porte to commence a defensive with a positive and unequivocal advantage.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. A. PATON.

No. 934.

Consul Paton to Earl Russell.—(Received September 22.)

(No. 19.)
Ragusa, September 12, 1862.

My Lord,

OMER PASHA has this morning telegraphed to the Turkish Consul here that the Servian question is settled, and adds his surprise that the Pan-Illyrian party in Ragusa should be ignorant of the fact. It was the Montenegrin successes in spring which inflated the expectations of the Servians; that they should collapse with the defeat of the Montenegrins ought to have appeared to the Pan-Illyrian party here inevitable. But up to yesterday they were confident that Servia would make war, although the large army of Omer Pasha, which is in fine fighting condition, is about to be disengaged.

We learn from Montenegro that the Government is not considered solid, and that there is dissatisfaction with the Prince not having shown the heroic qualities required in a leader. The emigrants from Bielopaulovich remark that they burned their own houses at the Prince's order in order to restrict the resources of the invading Turks, and yet the Prince, whose banner was victory or death, made peace

to save his palace at Cettigné and his effects at Niegush. The answer of the party of the Prince is, that the Servians have not fulfilled their promises to the Government of Montenegro.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. A. PATON.

No. 935.

Mr. Lumley to Earl Russell.—(Received September 22.)

(No. 115.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, September* 17, 1862.

I HAVE the honour to inclose a copy of an article which has appeared in the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" of this date, describing the relations between the Porte and Montenegro from a Russian, and as it appears to me very incorrect, point of view, and announcing the intention of the Russian Government to protest against the Turkish conditions of peace accepted by the Prince of Montenegro. I called on Prince Gortchakow this morning with the intention of speaking to him with reference to this document, which, though published in the unofficial part of the newspaper, bears evidence of being his own composition, but I found that his Excellency was with the Emperor at Tsarskoe Seloe.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. SAVILE LUMLEY.

Inclosure in No. 935.

Extract from the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" of September $\frac{5}{17}$, 1862.

LORSQUE, il y a trois ans, les Grandes Puissances intervinrent diplomatiquement entre la Turquie et le Monténégro, pour faire cesser l'effusion du sang et préserver l'Orient de graves complications, deux solutions se présentaient à elles: l'une plus large et plus complète, qui semblait promettre de fonder le repos de ces contrées sur des bases solides et durables; l'autre plus restreinte, mais considérée comme plus appropriée aux difficultés du moment.

La première consistait à écarter une fois pour toutes de la position du Monténégro les obstacles matériels qui la rendaient précaire.

A cet effet, il eût suffi d'accorder à la Montagne quelques agrandissements territoriaux nécessaires à sa subsistance et pour lesquels elle aurait payé une redevance annuelle.

Cette combinaison, dont la garantie de l'Europe aurait assurait le respect de part et d'autre, fut chaleureusement recommandée à la Porte par le Cabinet Impérial et appuyée par la France. Les circonstances ne permirent pas de la faire prévaloir.

Les Grandes Puissances s'en tinrent à la seconde. Elle consistait à maintenir le *statu quo* en faisant cesser, par une délimitation exacte, l'incertitude des frontières, cause perpétuelle de conflits entre les deux pays.

Les Cabinets Européens crurent faire acte de modération et de prévoyance en ménageant par cette transaction les difficultés du moment. Mais dans leur pensée, l'œuvre qu'ils venaient d'accomplir n'en était pas moins une œuvre sérieuse, puisqu'ils lui avait donné pour basé une délimitation exécutée sous leurs auspices immédiats et pour garantie une Convention formelle revêtue de leur signature.

Cependant, moins de trois années après la conclusion de cette Convention, la guerre éclatait avec plus de violence que jamais.

Nous n'en rechercherons pas les causes. Elles ont été contestées de part et d'autre. Nous ne voulons exposer ici que l'état de la question politique.

La plupart des Grandes Puissances s'émurent de cette reprise des hostilités; indépendamment des sentiments d'humanité qui s'y rattachaient, il était impossible qu'elles vissent indifféremment des événements qui menaçaient de compromettre les fruits de leur sollicitude.

Aux démarches pressantes qui furent faites pour prévenir ce conflit, la Porte répondit par une déclaration formelle: celle qu'en prenant les armes pour le redressement de ses griefs, elle n'avait l'intention de rien changer au *statu quo* de la Montagne.

Cette déclaration fut adressée officiellement, dans les termes les plus explicites, à tous les Cabinets signitaires de la Convention de 1858.

Il est essentiel d'en préciser la valeur.

En aucun cas elle ne saurait être envisagée comme l'expression accidentelle d'une intention subordonnée à la marche des événements et révocable selon l'issue des opérations de la guerre.

Elle reposait sur des principes considérés comme faisant partie du droit public Européen.

En effet, dans les Protocoles du Traité de 1856, lorsqu'il fut accidentellement question du Monténégro, la Porte, tout en maintenant certaines prétentions éventuelles, avait expressément déclaré qu'elle respecterait, à l'égard de ce pays, le *statu quo* existant.

C'est ce *statu quo*, précisé et entouré de nouvelles garanties par la Convention de 1858, que le Gouvernement Turc a expressément confirmé dans sa déclaration faite au début de la guerre actuelle.

Les Puissances, qui en ont pris acte, ont dû par conséquent y voir un engagement, et désormais certaines du maintien d'un état de choses revêtu de leur sanction, reconnu, confirmé, itérativement garanti par la Porte, elles pensèrent pouvoir se borner à attendre un moment favorable pour reprendre leurs tentatives de conciliation auprès des deux parties.

Toutefois, lorsque, malgré l'énergique résistance d'une population qui luttait pour sa vie et sa liberté, la supériorité de forces acquise à une armée régulière à même de se renouveler sans cesse, eut amené les Turcs dans l'intérieur de la Montagne, des démarches pressantes furent faites à Constantinople pour obtenir un armistice. Le moment d'une entente paraissait venu. Le Prince de Monténégro acceptait toutes les conditions de l'ultimatum posé par Omer Pacha au début des hostilités. Cet ultimatum renfermait toutes les satisfactions réclamées par le Gouvernement Turc. Son acceptation semblait dès lors écarter les causes de la lutte, sans porter atteinte au *statu quo* consacré par les Puissances.

Cependant la Porte ne répondit à ces démarches que par des assurances vagues. A ses précédentes réclamations elle ajoutait une demande de garanties qu'elle s'abstenait de préciser. En attendant, les opérations militaires se poursuivaient, et, dans l'état des forces respectives, la guerre prenait un caractère d'extermination.

Le Prince Nicolas résolut, en conséquence, d'épargner ces calamités à son pays en souscrivant aux nouvelles conditions formulées par Omer Pacha.

Le télégraphe nous a appris que parmi ces conditions se trouve celle de l'établissement d'une route militaire à travers le Monténégro et de la construction de blockhaus destinés à être occupés par des garnisons Turques.

Après les antécédents que nous venons de rappeler, il est évident qu'une pareille condition ne saurait se concilier ni avec les obligations des Puissances, ni avec les engagements de la Porte. S'il est désirable de trouver des garanties contre le renouvellement des faits qui ont amené la guerre actuelle, ces garanties peuvent être recherchées dans les voies diplomatiques, de manière à concilier tous les droits et tous les intérêts.

Mais une route militaire qui couperait le pays en deux et s'appuierait sur des blockhaus gardés par des troupes Turques, ou bien rendrait l'état de guerre permanent, ou bien équivaudrait à un asservissement complet, à une prise de possession réelle du Monténégro. Le mot serait évité, le fait serait accompli. Il ne modifierait pas seulement, il anéantirait le *statu quo* promis par le Gouvernement Turc et garanti par l'Europe.

Nous aimons à espérer que les Grandes Puissances ne permettront pas la violation d'un engagement contracté vis-à-vis d'elles, et qu'elles y rendront la Porte attentive.

Dans tous les cas, nous croyons être certains que le Ministre de Russie à Constantinople a reçu l'ordre de convier ses collègues à une protestation commune, et même à protester seul s'il y avait lieu.

No. 936.

Mr. Lumley to Earl Russell.—(Received September 22.)

(No. 116. Confidential.)

St. Petersburgh, September 17, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE had no opportunity of speaking to Prince Gortchakow on the subject of Montenegro, nor of communicating to him your Lordship's telegram of the 9th instant in reply to his Excellency's propositions with reference to the Turkish conditions of peace accepted by Prince Nicolas.

I have, however, learnt that Prince Gortchakow has acquainted Baron Brünnow as well as the Russian Ministers accredited to the Powers parties to the Treaty of 1856, including the Italian Government, with the decision taken by the Russian Government of protesting against that condition of peace in accordance with which a military road with block-houses is to be established through Montenegro.

I am informed that Prince Labanoff has been instructed to endeavour to obtain the consent of his colleagues to a note to be addressed to the Porte representing this obnoxious condition of peace as being contrary to the declaration made by the Porte on commencing hostilities with Montenegro; if unsuccessful in this, Prince Labanoff is directed to protest with energy against this condition of peace either singly or in connection with one or as many more of his colleagues as may be inclined to join him. In stating this to the Greek Minister, Prince Gortchakow said he was certain that the French Government would join him in the protest, and he had every reason to believe the Prussian Government would do the same.

This morning an interview took place between Prince Gortchakow, the French Ambassador, and Count Goltz, with reference to the Russian protest. I may here remark that since the opening of the Conferences at Constantinople these diplomatists have met at Prince Gortchakow's very often, and that since the late news from Montenegro these meetings have been still more frequent and prolonged.

The following is a report which I have received of this interview and which I believe to be correct in every point:—

Prince Gortchakow opened the conversation by reading a telegraphic report he had received from M. d'Oubril acquainting him with the course the French Government intended to adopt; it led Prince Gortchakow to believe that the French Government would follow the course he had adopted, since they shared his views with reference to the proposed military road through Montenegro and reserved the rights of European Governments in the question. Count Goltz said that his Government had urged Baron Werther to point out how injurious to the cause of peace would be the contact of hostile races in Montenegro, and had instructed him to make representations against any important change being made in the *status quo* of Montenegro. Prince Gortchakow said his instructions were much more explicit and that he had communicated them to all the Courts, including Turin, and his Excellency then stated what his instructions to Prince Labanoff were, in the terms in which I have already given them. Prince Gortchakow then went on to say that he had every reason to believe that the French Government would support his views, and that if Baron Werther would only act up to the instructions of his Government, they might also expect to receive the support of the Prussian Government. Prince Gortchakow has more than once criticized severely the conduct of Baron Werther at the Conferences of Constantinople; on this occasion the remark was made in the presence of the Duc de Montebello. Count Goltz replied with some warmth that he could not allow any one except the Prussian Minister for Foreign Affairs had the right of criticizing the course adopted by a Prussian Representative. Prince Gortchakow replied that he had been induced to make the remark by the want of energy shown by Baron Werther in the discussions on Servian affairs. Count Goltz said he could not see what the course adopted by him in discussions on Servian affairs had to do with the execution by Baron Werther of the instructions of his Government in the case of Montenegro. Prince Gortchakow protested that nothing he had said was intended to reflect on the policy of Prussia, for he was only too happy to take every opportunity of acknowledging how much the Russian Government was indebted to Prussia for the valuable assistance they had received from her in their Eastern policy.

In connection with Prince Gortchakow's remarks on Baron Werther's proceedings at Constantinople, I may state that the French Government in the

representations they have lately made to the Russian Government on the necessity for adopting a more conciliatory tone at Constantinople, have given in explanation of the course in which they have been obliged to acquiesce the awkward position in which they were placed by the abandonment of their Prussian colleagues; it was necessary that they should find some excuse for the more moderate course they latterly adopted at Constantinople, and they have done so by throwing the whole blame of the failure of the Conferences upon their Prussian colleague at Constantinople.

Prince Gortchakow has during these negotiations not only complained to Count Goltz, and amongst others to myself, of Baron Werther's conduct, but he has continually instructed Baron Morenheim, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to make representations on the subject to Count Bernstorff. In a late report from Berlin, Baron Morenheim, referring to this circumstance, states that while he has, in accordance with his Excellency's instructions, repeatedly made unpleasant remarks to Count Bernstorff on the difficulty under which the French and Russian Representatives at Constantinople laboured from the lukewarmness or silence of their Prussian colleague, he could not help remarking that the French Chargé d'Affaires had not once been instructed to make observations of a similar nature to the Prussian Government.

This would lead one to believe that Russia is again deceiving herself as to the amount of support given to her policy in the East by France.

In the same way I imagine that Prince Gortchakow deceives himself in supposing that Prussia follows blindly in the wake of Russian policy in the East; this, it is true, has been so much the case apparently for many years, that his Excellency may be excused for supposing that it must always continue; and yet, while counting with such certainty on Prussia in support of his own policy, he does not hesitate to act with almost incredible disregard to the views and policy of Prussia in questions on which the two Governments are supposed to be acting in unison, as, for instance, in the case of the recognition of Italy; nor does he conceal a marked indifference, not to say neglect, of the interests of Prussia in questions to her of vital interest such as that of Schleswig-Holstein.

It is evidently the interest of Count Goltz to be on the most intimate terms with Prince Gortchakow; the line of policy formerly pursued by him at Constantinople ensured him a hearty welcome and a good position on arriving at St. Petersburgh, and this Count Goltz has managed to improve to such an extent that there is no foreign Minister to whom Prince Gortchakow is more communicative. But the indifference, real or affected, of Prince Gortchakow to the interest of Prussia, though not remarked upon by the Prussian Minister in a way that might lead to a coolness of relations between him and the Vice-Chancellor, does not pass unnoticed, and it may not have been altogether without effect on the course pursued by the Prussian Minister at Constantinople during the Conferences on Servian affairs.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. SAVILE LUMLEY.

No. 937.

Mr. Paue to Earl Russell.—(Received September 24.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, September* 24, 1862.

CHURCHILL telegraphs as follows:—

"Orders have been received for the withdrawal of the troops from Montenegro and the construction of the blockhouses. What are Earl Russell's wishes respecting myself?"

No. 938.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 941.) *Foreign Office, September* 24, 1862.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches, &c., upon the subject of Montenegro.*

Your Lordship will return Mr. Churchill's despatch at your early convenience.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 939.

Earl Russell to Mr. Fane.

(No. 55.) *Foreign Office, September* 24, 1862.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT, for your information, copies of the despatches relating to the affairs of Montenegro.†

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 940.

Earl Russell to Mr. Fane.

(No. 62.) *Foreign Office, September* 24, 1862.

Sir,

IN reply to your despatch No. 167 of the 11th instant, I have to inform you that Her Majesty's Government concur with the Austrian Government in the answer which they returned to the representations of the Russian and Prussian Ministers relative to the Article in the Convention proposed to Montenegro respecting the military road through that State.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 941.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 563.) *Foreign Office, September* 25, 1862.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, copies of two despatches from Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburgh on the subject of Austrian intervention in the Sutorina.‡

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 942.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 564.) *Foreign Office, September* 25, 1862.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, copies of correspondence respecting the affairs of Montenegro.§

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

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* Nos. 924, 925, 928, 930, 932, 933, 935 and 936.

† Nos. 926, 927, and 929.

‡ Nos. 878 and 887.

§ Nos. 923, 927, 929, and 931.

No. 943.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received September 26.)

(No. 614.) *Constantinople, September* 16, 1862.

My Lord,

I FORWARDED to your Lordship the conditions which the Porte proposed to the Chief of Montenegro, and which have been accepted by him.

The Porte has, I think wisely, insisted on holding the road open to the Herzegovina, but dispensed with the banishment of Mirco, the Prince's father, who is, however, to take no future part in affairs.

There seems to me nothing in the Porte's above-named conditions contrary to the well-being and prosperity of Montenegro, or which materially infringe on its autonomy and independence. The Prince, moreover, seems finally to have accepted them with satisfaction, and to have become aware that the policy which he has of late years pursued could only end in his ruin, and very possibly in the destruction of that sort of independence which Montenegro has so long enjoyed.

I hear that he talks of coming to Constantinople and cultivating the most friendly relations with the Porte.

The triumph of the Ottoman arms is, in every sense, a great moral as well as military victory.

Firstly, the Sultan did not act against Montenegro till after a series of injuries and insults he was bound to take notice of.

Secondly, his regular armies seem not to have retaliated the cruelties which have constantly been perpetrated by the Montenegrins.

Thirdly, these armies have shown both valour and discipline in a very difficult campaign against a very brave enemy, which derived, from the position it was enabled to occupy, the greatest advantages.

Fourthly, the terms imposed on the conquered party have not only been moderate, but have a tendency to advance all its real and material interests.

Lastly, an example has been given to all those who, led away by false expectations or unsound advice, promote disorder, or enter into conflict or rebellion against the Sultan or the Ottoman authorities without just motive.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

Inclosure in No. 943.

Conditions of the Sublime Porte communicated by Omer Pasha to the Prince of Montenegro, and accepted by him.

(Télégraphique.) *Scutari, le* 31 *Août*, 1862.

Prince,

L'ADMINISTRATION intérieure du Monténégro restera telle qu'elle a été avant l'entrée des troupes Impériales sur son territoire.

2. La ligne de démarcation tracée par la Commission Mixte en l'année 1818, continuera à l'avenir la limite du Monténégro.

3. Le Gouvernement Ottoman permettra aux Monténégrins l'exportation et l'importation de marchandises dans le port d'Antivari sans payer aucun droit de douane. L'importation d'armes et de munitions de guerre est prohibée.

4. Les Monténégrins auront la faculté de prendre à ferme des terrains en dehors de Monténégro dans le but de faire l'agriculture.

5. Mirco quittera le Monténégro et n'y pourra plus rentrer (cet article la Sublime Porte consent à le modifier moyennant l'engagement souscrit par le Prince de Monténégro portant qu'à l'avenir son père ne s'occupera plus d'administration civile et militaire du pays.—Lettre de son Altesse le Serdar Ekrem en date des 8 et 12 Septembre courant.) A cette condition M. Mirco pourra continuer à résider en Monténégro.

6. La route de l'Herzégovine à Scutari passant par l'intérieure du Monténégro sera ouverte au commerce. Sur le bujet de cette route des points nécessaires seront occupés par des troupes Impériales tenant garnison dans des blockhouses. Les points à occuper seront désignés plus tard.

7. Les Monténégrins ne doivent plus faire des excursions hostiles hors de leurs frontières. En cas de soulèvement d'un ou de plusieurs districts voisins du Monténégro, les Monténégrins ne leur accorderont aucun appui moral ou physique.

Tous les Sénateurs, chefs de nations, et autres dignitaires du Monténégro, devront donner au Serdar Ekrem leur engagement par écrit d'observer cette condition.

8. Toutes questions de moindre importance survenant sur les confins seront réglées de commun accord. Chaque Gouvernement autour du Monténégro aura un représentant pour le règlement des différends, et dans le cas qu'une question d'importance ne puisse trouver une solution satisfaisante, les deux partis, l'administration du Monténégro s'adressera directement à la Sublime Porte.

9. Aucune famille ne pourra entrer au Monténégro sans un passeport délivré de part leur autorité Turque respective; tout contrevenant devra être rigoureusement renvoyé.

10. Il sera permis aux Monténégrins, dans l'intérêt de leur commerce, de voyager dans tout l'Empire Ottoman. Les voyageurs auront la protection du Gouvernement.

11. Tous les criminels seront arrêtés et consignés aux autorités respectives sur la base d'une extradition réciproque; sur le même principe de réciprocité tous les objets volés seront restitués et les auteurs des vols punis.

12. De part et d'autre les prisoniers devront être mis en liberté et renvoyés dans leurs foyers. Tous les réfugiés Rayahs seront renvoyés avec famille.

13. Les Monténégrins s'engageront à ne continuer aucun Kaulé ni ouvrage de fortification sur les confins de l'Albanie, Bosnie, et d'Herzégovine.

(Signé) OMER.

Le Prince de Monténégro soussigné accepte dans toute leur teneur les conditions posées par la Sublime Porte et contenues dans les articles ci-dessus de sa note.

Cettigné, le 13 Septembre, 1862.

(Signé) NICOLAS.

No. 944.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received September 26.)

(No. 616. Private and Confidential.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, September 16, 1862.*

THE Sultan told me to-day, confidentially, what Fuad Pasha subsequently confirmed, that the Prince of Montenegro has said that he was induced to resist the Porte by Russia and Prince Michael, but that he had seen the folly of the attempt, and that if at any time the Porte had need of his services against an insurrection in Servia his people should always be at the disposition of the Ottoman Government.

The Porte has gained immensely by the moral power which the settlement of the Montenegrin and Servian questions has brought it.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

No. 945.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 961.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, September 27, 1862.*

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copy of a despatch upon the subject of Montenegro.*

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

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* No. 926.

No. 94[illegible].

Earl Cowley to Earl Russell.—(Received September 27.)

(No. 1138.)

My Lord, *Paris, September 26, 1862.*

M. THOUVENEL, in the course of conversation with me this afternoon, stated that although he agreed that it was unwise and impolitic in the Ottoman Government to insist on the erection of block-houses on the road to be established through Montenegro, the Imperial Government had no intention of joining the Russian Government in the protest which the latter had ordered to be addressed to the Porte with reference to this matter.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 947.

Consul Paton to Earl Russell.—(Received September 29.)

(No. 20.)

My Lord, *Ragusa, September 14, 1862.*

EVERYTHING in this quarter assumes a pacific aspect. The Herzegovinian rayahs engaged in the Montenegrin war have returned to their agricultural employment, and delivered up their arms, and the pardon of Luka Vukalovitch has been promised by Omer Pasha, at the recommendation of the Turkish Consul here, a man of great good sense and highly honourable character. Omer Pasha, as we learn, is preparing for his return to Constantinople. He announces the settlement of all the subordinate Articles of the Ultimatum, the probable prospective value of which can be better elucidated by the local experience of Her Majesty's Consular officers in the Paschalics of Herzegovina and Scutari than by myself. But I am conferring with the most intelligent persons in these parts on the new era which the late events open up to the Government of the Sultan, and I will take an early opportunity of reporting thereon to your Lordship.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. A. PATON.

No. 948.

Consul Paton to Earl Russell.—(Received September 29.)

(No. 21.)

My Lord, *Ragusa, September 18, 1862.*

LUKA VUKALOVITCH has not yet presented himself in Ragusa, notwithstanding the assurances of pardon, and the pressing invitations of the Turkish Consul here to accompany him to Omer Pasha's head-quarters. He states that his gala clothes are in pawn. But this is a mere pretext. It is said that he cannot as yet fully believe that a man who has shown such hostility to the Porte as he has done can be so readily pardoned. And even if pardoned, his pride revolts at the idea of appearing humble and contrite before the Turks; and he has been heard to curse both Montenegrins and Servians for having led him upon the ice, and settled their affairs without him, inasmuch as last year the emissary of the Prince of Servia exacted from him a promise that, if the joint operations were successful, he would recognize the authority of this servant of the Sultan as the head of the new Illyrian Empire or State to be constituted independently of the Porte.

Whatever happens, Luka is too insignificant to occasion serious apprehensions to the Turks. The Montenegrin hostilities constituted a serious war; Luka's proceedings were those of a mere Heyduck, and were most absurdly magnified by the European journalists. The secret of his confidence was his power to retreat from Zubzi into either the Montenegrin or the Austrian territory.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. A. PATON.

No. 949.

Mr. Churchill to Earl Russell.—(Received September 29.)

(No. 25.)

Head-Quarters of Omer Pasha's Army, Scutari, September 16, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit, herewith inclosed for your Lordship's information, the copy of a despatch, together with its inclosure, I have addressed to his Excellency Sir H. Bulwer, on the subject of the Prince of Montenegro's compliance with the Porte's wishes that he should accept its conditions of peace without any observations, and the final termination of the war.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY A. CHURCHILL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 949.

Mr. Churchill to Sir H. Bulwer.

Head-Quarters of Omer Pasha's Army, Scutari, September 16, 1862.

Sir,

YESTERDAY I did myself the honour to send your Excellency a telegram to the effect that on the Porte's further insistance its conditions of peace had been accepted by the Prince of Montenegro, without any observations on his part such as those contained in his letter of the 7th September, which appear to have been disapproved by the Porte.

I have now the honour to transmit, herewith inclosed, for your Excellency's information, a copy of the document that, I trust, puts a stop to the Montenegrin war. The document in question is the Porte's conditions, translated from the Turkish by Omer Pasha, and transmitted to Prince Nicholas on the 31st ultimo, at the foot of which Prince Nicholas declares his acceptance thereof without reserve.

Your Excellency will perceive that Omer Pasha has added to the Porte's conditions several clauses that the Ottoman Government appears to have overlooked, but which are important for the pacification of the Herzegovina.

The war is now virtually over, and, for many reasons, the sooner the Turkish troops are withdrawn from the positions they now occupy the better; first of all, because the feverish and rainy season has already made its appearance, and secondly, because, so long as they are in Montenegro, its inhabitants cannot resume their peaceful occupations of roofing their burnt houses and preparing for the approaching winter, in which great misery will necessarily be felt. At least 2,000 purses might be economised by the immediate withdrawal of the troops, and this saving, together with whatever might be spared by the Treasury, might go towards the payment of a certain portion of the thirty-three months of arrears due to the troops that have, it must be admitted, gone through a campaign fraught with hardships.

The Montenegrins now make no secret of their accusations against the Russians and the Servians for having urged them to defy the authority of the Porte, and then having abandoned them to fight it out single-handed; and nettled, as they are, by resentment, they even go so far as to express themselves ready and most willing to furnish a contingent to the Ottoman Porte against Servia, if hostilities should happen to break out between the Sultan's Government and that of Prince Michael; while, on the other hand, the Russian Consul at Ragusa, who wished to go up to Cettigné to lay before the Prince a telegram he had received from Prince Gortchakow, advising him, most authoritatively, not to accept the 5th and 6th clauses of the Porte's conditions on any account, was informed that his visit would be distasteful to Prince Nicholas; and when Prince Nicholas was made acquainted with the Russian Minister's message, he gave a curt reply, addressed to Prince Gortchakow himself, "that the Montenegrins had been compelled to wage war alone against the Turks, and would now make their peace alone."

The Montenegrins have at present 1,500 wounded. From this large number may be guessed the sum total of their dead in a campaign of six months' hard fighting. The Turkish rifled cannon appear to have done great execution. Dervish Pasha has, from all accounts, displayed throughout the campaign great military skill and a thorough knowledge of this sort of mountain warfare, though I cannot, up to this day, understand why Cettigné was not taken.

Omer Pasha will very shortly quit this for Constantinople, viâ Monastir, when I shall telegraph for further instructions as to my ultimate movements.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY A. CHURCHILL.

Inclosure 2 in No. 949.

Conditions of the Sublime Porte, communicated by Omer Pasha to the Prince of Montenegro, and accepted by him.

[See Inclosure in No. 943.]

No. 950.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 576.)

Foreign Office, September 30, 1862.

Sir,

I HAVE received your despatch No. 609 of the 13th instant,* conveying the thanks of the Sultan for the part taken by Her Majesty's Government in the Servian question; and I have to instruct your Excellency to congratulate his Imperial Majesty on the settlement of the affairs of Servia and Montenegro.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 951.

Earl Russell to Mr. Lumley.

(No. 57.)

Foreign Office, September 30, 1862.

Sir,

I HAVE read and laid before the Queen your despatches Nos. 88 and 93 of the 2nd and 5th instant, relating to the affairs of Montenegro.

Her Majesty's Government have to express their regret that they cannot agree with the views of Prince Gortchakow either on the general question of interference in the affairs of Turkey or on the particular question of Montenegro.

Her Majesty's Government have always understood that when Turkey was allowed to form part of the system of Europe, she was to have all the advantages and be liable to all the duties of an independent State. She was, in short, to be as independent as Prussia or Portugal, Sweden or Saxony, and on the other hand to be bound like those States by the faith of Treaties and the ties of international amity and good-will.

If this be so, it is not justifiable, where Treaties are silent, to interfere without necessity or provocation in a case where an insurrection has broken out in Turkey, and that insurrection has been supported by a neighbouring Prince.

Such was the case in Herzegovina where an insurrection broke out, and in Montenegro, from which it was fomented and supported.

If the Prince of Montenegro was a vassal, the Sultan had a right to reduce him to obedience and to impose such conditions as will secure that obedience for the future; if he was an independent Prince, the Sultan had a right to force him to accept such terms of peace as would prevent a renewal of this aggression.

As to the particular terms demanded by Turkey, Her Majesty's Government do not pretend to justify or to condemn them.

It is for the Porte to declare what guarantees are necessary for her future quiet.

The terms proposed, however, are not without example.

Soon after the beginning of the last century, the Highlanders of Scotland attempted to overthrow the Throne of the Hanoverian Family and to set up another

* On Servian affairs.

dynasty. The advisers of the British Crown took means to overcome this resistance. They defeated the insurgents in two rebellions, they made good roads through the Scotch mountains, and they erected forts to keep the disaffected in awe.

At the present day Her Majesty has no more loyal subjects than the Highlanders of Scotland.

I will not conclude without giving in a few words the view taken by Her Majesty's Government of what is going on in Turkey.

If the Slavonic and Greek subjects of the Sultan rise in insurrection and that insurrection is suppressed, the weight of authority will be made heavier, privileges will be withdrawn, and the sums which ought to be expended in making roads and harbours, and in promoting improvement, will be diverted to the pay and maintenance of a large military force.

If, on the other hand, the darling scheme entertained in some quarters of overthrowing the Turkish rule should be successful, Greeks and Slavonians will quarrel, each province will claim supremacy, civil war will ravage the countries where the authority of the Sultan shall have been thrown off, and an appeal will be made to the Great Powers of Europe to put an end to this anarchy by dividing among themselves the Turkish provinces.

But the European Powers would hardly be able to perform this task without giving rise to fresh conflicts, probably to a general war.

Such are the views which induce Her Majesty's Government, while sincerely desirous of improving the condition of the Christian subjects of the Porte, to refuse all countenance to projects which in Greece go by the name of the "Great Idea," and which, whether Greek or Slavonic, tend to the disruption of all existing ties of allegiance in the Turkish Empire, and are more or less connected with the criminal intrigues of which Turkey feels the effects in Servia, and which aim no less at the subversion of every Monarchy in Europe than at the destruction of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

You may give a copy of this despatch to Prince Gortchakow.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 952.

Earl Russell to Mr. Lumley.

(No. 62.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 30, 1862.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 115 of the 17th instant, inclosing a copy of an article which has appeared in the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg," describing the relations between the Porte and Montenegro, and announcing the intention of the Russian Government to protest against the conditions of peace accepted by the Prince of Montenegro.

Prince Gortchakow surely will not pretend that a Power which offers to an independent State, or requires from a vassal compliance with certain reasonable and moderate conditions, is bound ever after in new circumstances to grant the same conditions.

To compare small things with great, it would hardly be pretended that the Allies were bound to grant to Napoleon I at Fontainbleau, in 1814, the same terms which he had refused in 1813 at Dresden.

In the present case the Prince of Montenegro had assisted the rebellious subjects of the Porte; had refused all reasonable terms; had declared that he could not prevent his people from going in arms to aid the rebellion. After a series of costly and bloody conflicts he is reduced to extremity, and then Prince Gortchakow protests because the Porte adds somewhat to the terms before rejected, and asks at least for some security for their observance. Such a premium on rebellion, treachery, and cruelty has never been offered before by a settled and regular Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 953.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 966.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, October* 1, 1862.

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches, upon the subject of Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 954.

Earl Russell to Mr. Lumley.

(No. 65.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 1, 1862.

I INCLOSE herewith, for your information, copies of despatches respecting the affairs of Montenegro.†

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 955.

Earl Russell to Mr. Lumley.

(No. 68.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 1, 1862.

I HAD some conversation yesterday with Baron Brünnow in regard to the affairs of Montenegro and of Servia.

In respect to Montenegro, Baron Brünnow repeated the arguments used by Prince Gortchakow in order to show that the block-houses proposed by Turkey would lead to fresh and frequent collisions between Turks and Montenegrins.

I could only repeat the arguments I had already used at St. Petersburgh and at Paris.

In respect to Servia, we agreed in hoping that the arrangement adopted after the concessions made on both sides would work well. I told Baron Brünnow that I had instructed Sir Henry Bulwer to give way on the French proposal respecting the Servian houses to be demolished at Belgrade; but when Baron Brünnow said that he hoped that on all points I should evince a similar spirit of concession, I said there were points on which concession was reasonable, others on which no concession could be made. For instance, when Russia wished to advise the Turks to retire from the citadel of Belgrade, I thought we might as well advise Russia to retire from the citadel of Warsaw. No doubt the one concession would be as agreeable to the Poles as the other would to the Servians; but the one would add as little to the security of Russia as the other would to the security of the Ottoman Porte.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 956.

Earl Russell to Mr. Fane.

(No. 65.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 1, 1862.

I TRANSMIT, for your information, copies of despatches relating to the affairs of Montenegro.†

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

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* Nos. 951 and 952.

† Nos. 929, 943, and 946.

No. 957.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 579.) *Foreign Office, October* 2, 1862.

Sir,

I HAVE received from Mr. Churchill a copy of his despatch to your Excellency, No. 35 of the 16th ultimo, inclosing a copy of the agreement signed by the Prince of Montenegro on the 16th of September accepting the terms of peace offered him by the Porte, and I have to instruct you to assure the Prince that so long as he observes those conditions he will find a warm friend in Her Majesty's Ambassador at the Porte.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 958.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 979.) *Foreign Office, October* 4, 1862.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches relating to the affairs of Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 959.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 4, 1862.

IF Prince accepts the Firman, well; if not, he must not expect the Great Powers to support him, and he may have to submit to much harder conditions. The Prince of Montenegro now regrets he did not accept terms first offered by the Porte.

No. 960.

Earl Russell to Sir J. Hudson.

(No. 249.) *Foreign Office, October* 6, 1862.

Sir,

I INCLOSE herewith, for your information, a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburgh respecting the affairs of Montenegro.†

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 961.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 59. Political.) *Bosna-Serai, September* 9, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose copies of two despatches lately received from Mr. Vice-Consul Zohrab.

The first contains some observations regarding the Montenegrins which are both interesting and correct. All Europe seems to labour under the impression that Montenegro is an oppressed nation fighting for freedom, whereas the fact is, that as far as Turkey is concerned, it has been for years in the enjoyment of perfect freedom and independence. The Turks have asked for nothing but to be let alone, and for a long time endured patiently the aggressions of the Montenegrins, until at

* No. 957.

† No. 951.

last they became perfectly insupportable, and the mountaineers were actually carrying on war against Turkey in the Herzegovina.

Mr. Zohrab also sets forth his ideas as to what ought to be done by the Turkish Government to secure the future good conduct of Montenegro when the present war is over. On this point, however, your Lordship's knowledge of what has occurred both previous to and during the present contest will, I imagine, enable you perfectly to judge what is best to be done. The difficulty seems to me to be how far what is best will prove practicable. It is evident that, with the strong places and the approaches to Montenegro in their hands, the Turks will most effectually secure a continuance of peace, but the quasi-independence of Montenegro will then be at an end. Will the European Powers consent to this? I expect that it will be a matter of immense difficulty to come to any arrangement which will satisfy the friends of Montenegro and at the same time be just to Turkey.

Mr. Zohrab's second despatch relates to the conduct of Khoorshid Pasha, who seems, contrary to general expectation, to be doing very well at Mostar.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure 1 in No. 961.

Vice-Consul Zohrab to Consul Holmes.

Sir, *Mostar, August* 30, 1862.

THE success which at last appears to be attending the Turkish arms in Montenegro naturally draws attention to the moment when the attempt to restore peace to these unfortunate provinces will be made. The experience which a residence of six years has given me of the people inhabiting these countries, their character and ideas, makes it a duty in me to state my opinion on the course which should be adopted for the maintenance of tranquillity when peace is established.

In coming to an arrangement with Montenegro, it should not be lost sight of by the Porte that a treacherous, faithless people have to be dealt with, who would not fail to take advantage of any favourable opportunity to break through their engagements if the ability to do so were left to them. This national dishonesty has been proved on so many occasions, and is so well known, that to cite examples in confirmation would be superfluous.

The Montenegrins and the people of this province professing the Greek faith are taught from their earliest years to look upon the Mussulman as a being so far without the pale of civilization that his extermination is a desirable, praiseworthy object, and the murder of one of the faith opens to the assassin the road to heaven. Such a dogma, held at the present day by a people professing to be Christians, appears almost beyond belief, but it is nevertheless quite true.

The Greek priests, who alone are responsible for this sentiment, have been the great movers in the revolt, and they have been the originators of the cruelties committed on defenceless Mussulman women and children. By these priests the people have been taught that to hold faith with the Turks, to be honest towards them, is a sin. Can it, therefore, be supposed that these people, who regard their priests as infallible, will remain quiet, in opposition to their wishes, whenever they may have the opportunity to inflict injury?

The Montenegrins, from the Prince down to the poorest peasant, consequently look upon the surrounding Turkish provinces as lawful fields for plunder; the clothes, the arms, the ornaments they wear, have, with few exceptions, been the fruits of murder. In a word, Montenegro is but a nest of barbarous robbers, and as such it must be treated.

It is quite a mistaken idea to suppose that the Montenegrins are fighting for the maintenance of their liberty. Montenegrin freedom has not been menaced since 1857, yet the Montenegrins have not lost an opportunity of inflicting injury on the Turks since that period. For every Montenegrin, or rebel, killed from 1857 to 1861, at least ten Mussulmans have fallen victims. From 1857 to the beginning of this year the Montenegrin frontier has seldom been crossed for hostile purposes by the Turks, and whenever crossed it has been for reprisals; but since 1857 some portion of the Herzegovina and Albania has been constantly occupied by bands of Montenegrins; while, therefore, they have for several years been unprovoked aggressors, how can it be said that they act only on the defensive?

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

During the past summer the Montenegrins have been heavy losers in men, killed in fair fight. Their loss is stated by their warmest admirers to have been from the commencement of the year to July about 7,200 men, but their real loss must far exceed this number, but evidently they have not suffered sufficiently to make them beg for mercy yet.

Supposing the Turks succeed in compelling the Montenegrins to submit, and it is not the intention of the Sultan to constitute Montenegro an integral portion of his Empire, is their mere assurance of future good behaviour to be the only pledge on which peace is to be secured? If such is to be the case, I do not hesitate to say great disappointment will be experienced, and the labour and expense of another expedition would soon have to be undergone.

I have no doubt the Montenegrins would, when reduced to extremities, promise anything; but I am equally certain, for the reasons already given, that they would forget their most solemn engagements on the first favourable opportunity.

Nor would these engagements be considered more binding by them were they guaranteed by one or more of the Great Powers.

The way in which these people have been petted and shielded by some of the Powers, the petty intrigues to which the agents of those Powers have stooped to supplant each other, have resulted in exalting the Montenegrins in their own estimation, and in creating the belief that they are necessary to those Powers; and that, act as they may, they cannot fail of being protected by at least one of them. Imbued with this belief, it is reasonable to suppose that they would not be bound by the engagements entered into by others for them.

To me there seems but one way of securing the future tranquillity of these provinces and the peaceful behaviour of the Montenegrins, without ruinous outlay to the Porte, and that is by permanently occupying certain points in Montenegro which, by commanding the seaboard, would oblige the Montenegrins to remain quiet, for, on the first signs of hostility, their supplies could be cut off. Their Government need not be interfered with, in their civil affairs they would enjoy perfect autonomy, and be as free as ever they were, but they should be deprived of the power to undertake military operations.

Such a method of establishing tranquillity would, I have no doubt, be opposed by the protectors of Montenegro, as it would be a serious check to the Slav movement; but it must be decided, once for all, whether peace is to be established on firm bases, or whether the struggle is to continue, with short intermissions, till one of the two races is driven entirely out of the country.

To allow Montenegro to collect her forces again, and to stir up the populations of these provinces to revolt, would be the result of giving her peace on the terms which would be granted to a civilized, honourable people. It therefore only remains to make it impossible for the Montenegrins to do this, and it can only be effected, I believe, by military occupation of certain points. Ustrog, Bielopavlovich, Riaka, Cettigné, and Grahovo appear to be the points best adapted for military occupation. Ustrog and Bielopavlovich place the Herzegovina in easy communication with Albania, and divide Montenegro; Cettigné commands the road to Cattaro, and Grahovo that to Suttorina and Risano, while Riaka holds the easiest and most secure outlet to the Lake of Scutari.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAS. ZOHRAB.

Inclosure 2 in No. 961.

Vice-Consul Zohrab to Consul Holmes.

Mostar, August 31, 1862.

Sir,

I SHOULD be neglecting an agreeable duty were I to pass over without notice the zeal and activity of our Governor, Khoorshid Pasha.

His Excellency arrived here some months since with rather a tarnished reputation, but he has shown so much ability in forwarding supplies to the frontier garrisons, and in endeavouring to lighten the burdens necessarily imposed on the people, as also in his mode of government, that I feel real satisfaction in bringing him to the favourable notice of Her Majesty's Government, the more so as the Porte, while decorating others in the province less worthy, passed him over.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAS. ZOHRAB.

No. 962.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 617.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, September* 17, 1862.

THE success of the Ottoman arms in Montenegro, the settlement of the Servian question, the overthrow of Garibaldi, the continued tranquillity of Hungary, the knowledge of the active support given by Great Britain to the Sultan's rights, the improvement in the financial state of the Empire, have damped the hopes of that party among the Christian population of Northern Turkey which so confidently counted upon foreign aid and the active co-operation of the democrats of Italy and the opponents of Austria for shaking off its allegiance to the Porte.

Major Stuart writes to me that "comparative tranquillity now reigns throughout Albania."

Mr. Holmes, on the authority of Colonel Jovanovich (the Austrian Consul-General in Bosnia), who had lately returned from a tour in the north of Bosnia, states that everything is perfectly quiet and that all political excitement had subsided. The military arrangements of the Turks along the Servian frontier are described by Colonel Jovanovich as surprisingly good; but at the same time he adds that they labour under the serious disadvantage of being unable to concentrate their forces, in a reasonable time, on any given point which might be attacked, on account of the want of practicable roads, which, however, appear from Mr. Holmes' accounts to be commencing in Bosnia. To this point I have repeatedly called the serious attention of the Ottoman Ministers, and did yesterday that of the Sultan, nor shall I discontinue to press it, the more particularly since an opening is afforded by the engagement taken by the Prince of Montenegro to agree to a military road through his territory.

The removal of the war into Montenegro naturally gave relief to the Herzegovine, the Sultan's troops being supplied from Albania. The communications with the different garrisons are now, comparatively speaking, free from danger for the conveyance of provisions, the Douga Pass has been abandoned by all but a few robbers, and through it anything may pass easily to Nichsich. Mr. Zohrab concludes one of his reports by the following remark:—"It can now be said that the revolted districts are cleared of rebels and are open to the Turks."

Mr. Ricketts observes that the disturbances at Gabrova, which were quelled by the energy and tact of the Governor Hassan Taksin Pasha, were chiefly caused by the intrigues of emissaries from Belgrade evidently connected with Russian agents.

Ismail Pasha assumed the duties of Governor of Thessaly towards the middle of last month. He expresses the determination of improving the condition of the provinces which some months past had been so unsatisfactory. His proceedings so far have produced a strong impression in his favour, and the earnestness with which he has taken up the question of brigandage is accepted as a guarantee of the reality of his good intentions. He has already secured and placed in confinement at Larissa a large number of accomplices of the formidable gangs headed by the Banditti Xistra and Semo. The first mentioned Chieftain is said to have crossed into Greece on learning Ismail Pasha's arrival at the seat of his new Government, and to have offered to surrender himself there to the authorities. Sixteen of Semo's followers, comprising two of the principal lieutenants, have also lately been caught near Cardizza, through the activity of the Derbend Chief Mooslem Aga, and no doubt seems to be entertained of the early capture of Semo himself and the rest of his band, now reduced to fourteen persons. Should that expectation be realized, the effectual extinction of brigandage in that part of Turkey will become an easy task.

Three of the murderers of the Armenian missionary, the late Rev. Mr. Miriam, whose melancholy fate is described in my despatch No. 471 of July 28, have been arrested.

The yearly fair of Perlepe, in Upper Albania, just terminated, has exhibited the return of public confidence and marked the improvement in commercial transactions. The comparative abundance of cash has raised the value of goods, and arrears were paid with great punctuality.

So much for Turkey in Europe.

Her Majesty's Consul at Erzeroom, under date of the 29th ultimo, states that,

on the application of the inhabitants of Bitlis, the residence of the Caïmakam of Moosh has been transferred to the former place.

The city of Bitlis is larger than Moosh, and its district may probably require a separate Caïmakam, but it seems the Porte demurs to this on the ground of expense.

The inhabitants of the neighbourhood of Moosh, who suffered much from the Kurds, and who have already declared their intention, if the Porte will do nothing to remedy the present state of things, of emigrating in large numbers to Russia, are highly indignant at the change.

A deputation from Moosh arrived lately at Erzeroum on this matter, and wished to lay their complaints before Her Majesty's Consul, but he prudently declined to see them, and told them that the proper persons to whom they should complain were the Sultan's authorities.

I shall once more lay the subject before Aali Pasha.

The main road from Constantinople to Persia is again infested by gangs of brigands, chiefly Kurds. I have urged upon the Porte the necessity of issuing stringent orders to the Pasha of Erzeroum to procure for the courriers charged with the public correspondence for Persia a sufficient escort to protect them. Your Lordship will have already learned by Mr. Skene's reports full details of the lamentable collision and loss of life which have recently occurred at Zeitoun, near Marash, originating in a dispute of the most ordinary and trifling character.

The measures adopted by the authorities in Syria appear to have been attended with the most complete success. Mr. Skene unites with Colonel Frazer in speaking in the highest terms of Aziz Pasha, by whose forbearance, and the judicious promptitude of Her Majesty's Consul, serious danger has been averted and tranquillity restored to that important section of Northern Syria.

A deputation from Zeitoun has lately arrived at Constantinople. They have addressed a Memorial to the Representatives of the Great Powers full of accusations against Aziz Pasha, and representing him as a bloodthirsty fanatic. I happen, accidentally, to be well acquainted with that functionary, and, as he is both enlightened and moderate, I could hardly give credit to these misrepresentations, which I am glad to find flatly contradicted by the statements of our agents, and the thanks returned to Mr. Skene in the Memorial of the Christian Community of Zeitoun, a copy of which is before your Lordship. This makes his testimony of great value.

I should add that Mr. Skene has acted remarkably well throughout this affair.

I regret to find that a strong opposition to the authority of Daoud Pasha has again manifested itself in the Kesroüan. The immediate occasion was the road which the Pasha is desirous of making between the village of Gazir and the plain. The people of that district assembled in force and commenced firing off their pieces and singing war songs. They attacked certain sheikhs and other persons who had favoured the construction of the road, and very roughly handled those who had not succeeded in saving themselves by flight. The rioters next assailed the prisons, where a number of their fellow-villagers were incarcerated for various offences; forcing open the doors, they liberated those confined in them. They declared, moreover, that they will not pay the taxes at the increased rate authorized by the new Constitution of the Mountain, nor certain new increased taxes on tobacco, cattle, &c.

What Daoud Pasha will ultimately do to vindicate his authority remains to be seen. At present he appears to have decided on measures of conciliation and has deputed a Bishop and a notable to treat with the insurgents.

I confess, for my own part, I place little reliance in him as the Governor of a wild people. He was a good man in a "Bureau," but as unfit a man as could well be conceived to govern amidst mountains or deserts. It will, I fear, be found that where order is to be maintained, there are only the Turks, with all their faults, capable of maintaining it.

At all events, the confining the choice of the Governor of Mount Lebanon to Armenian Catholics, none of whom are fit, by character or training, for such a post, will always prove a great embarrassment; and I doubt if such a man will be able to fulfill his duties with moderate impartiality or authority, unless protected by a Turkish force.

In regard to the further East, the discontent occasioned by the imposition of the new taxes, and more especially by the mode employed by Hamick Pasha at Bagdad to obtain recruits for the army, threatened, on the 18th of July, to find

vent in an emeute which happily, however, in the absence of leaders and of any definite aim, was restricted to an empty demonstration.

Finding that volunteers for military service did not present themselves in sufficient numbers, the Pasha had recourse to the plan which, judiciously adopted by the late Reschid Pasha (former Governor of Bagdad), was attended with much success, namely, that of enlisting persons charged with minor offences; but the indiscriminate exercise of such a power in the present instance, and the abuses of subordinates who took advantage of this opportunity for gratifying their avarice or their personal animosities, created general alarm, and it was only with difficulty that a serious outbreak was prevented.

There is little else in our Consular Reports that merits your Lordship's attention.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

No. 963.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 625.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, September 19, 1862.*

I HAVE the honour to state that I have communicated to the Porte the substance of your Lordship's telegram of the 14th instant from Gotha, declining to discuss the terms offered to the Montenegrins.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. L. BULWER.

No. 964.

Consul Paton to Earl Russell.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 22.)
My Lord, *Ragusa, September 20, 1862.*

LUKA VUKALOVITCH having sent an evasive verbal message to the Turkish Consul here, inviting him to visit him in his mountain retreat in Herzegovina, the latter has withdrawn the promise made to him of a pardon in the following terms:—

"For your own sake and that of the Christian population of Zubzi I regret that you have not done justice to the good faith in which I made myself the interpreter of the Sovereign clemency.

"It is impossible to accept your proposal, which presents no prospect of a result corresponding in a satisfactory manner to my intimation. You are, therefore, to consider the offer of clemency made by Omer Pasha as withdrawn; subsequent generosity must be a matter of intercession. The responsibility of this step falls on yourself, for the Sovereign clemency was most liberal.

"I regret that I have not succeeded in convincing you of the truth of the sentiments I have expressed to you.

(Signed) "A. RESCH."

I am not surprised at this issue. Luka can neither read nor write, and he is surrounded with dependent people who receive their inspirations from the enemies of Turkey, and who read to him all the letters he receives with the additions or suppressions that suit their political plans.

Accurate information from Montenegro leaves no doubt that the envoy of the Prince has signed the late peace in bad faith, and that Omer Pasha has committed a capital error in not forcing his way to Cettigé and reducing the ruling faction to extremity. It is merely a hollow truce to enable Mirko to arm the mountaineers with precision rifles, their late failures being principally from the inequality of arms, and your Lordship may rest assured that Mirko will be neither given up nor expelled, for Mirko's consolidated tyranny and the Montenegrin State are at the present moment convertible terms, and without Mirko the Prince's Government would not have a month's existence.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. A. PATON.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

No. 965.

Consul Paton to Earl Russell.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 23.)
My Lord, *Ragusa, September 23, 1862*

YESTERDAY Khurshid Pasha of Herzegovina arrived here on his way to Scutari, and Luka Vukalovitch also arrived here to make his submission, which took place this morning in the Turkish Consulate, in presence of the Pasha and the Civil Governor of this province, who had lent his mediation. Having consented to take charge of the Turkish Consulate during a short absence of the Consul, I was also present.

On entering the room I at once recognized Luka from among the group of Herzegovinian Rayahs by the well-known photographic portraits of him which have been reproduced in the European publications. He seems about forty years old, with nothing sinister in the expression of his countenance; a massive chest and shoulders, with muscular limbs, produce the impression of his possessing great corporeal strength and activity. He was decently attired in the native costume, and wore the medal and cross of Montenegro.

The Civil Governor of the Province of Ragusa then read over the previously concocted submission of Luka, who thereunto appended his seal-signature (his initials surmounted by an arm with a drawn sword), and, presenting it to the Pasha, received the document of pardon, comprising amnesties to all the revolted Christian inhabitants, and power granted to Luka to approach the Pasha at all times to make known the grievances of the Rayahs, and concert measures for their redress.

Verbal arrangements were then made for a patent giving him the rank of Bin Bashi, with power to recruit 500 pandours for the observation and protection of the frontier, Luka to receive 150 florins a-months with rations, each pandour to have an oke of bread a-day and 8 florins a-month, and the intermediate Boluk Bashis proportionate pay and rations.

Liqueurs were then presented, and Luka, lifting his glass, said in a loud voice, "Long life to the Sultan." On his quitting the Consulate the assembled orthodox mob received him with loud huzzas, but it was certainly the ex-rebel, and not the new Bin-Bashi, who received this popular tribute.

The Pasha having immediately gone on board the steamer for Antivari, I regret that there was no time to get copies or translations of these documents, but I have accurately given their tenor.

On the previous evening I had a conversation with the Pasha of Herzegovina and an intelligent officer who was in attendance on him. I stated my impression that the peace, without the storming of Cettigné and the expulsion of Mirko, was a military and political blunder. They both answered "that is our private opinion, but you know how our Goveenment was harrassed by certain diplomatists."

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. A. PATON.

No. 966.

Mr. Churchill to Earl Russell.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 26. Diplomatic.)
My Lord, *Head-Quarters of Omer Pasha's Army, Scutari, September 23, 1862.*

YESTERDAY evening orders were received from the Porte by Omer Pasha to withdraw the troops from the Rieka, in Montenegro, to dismiss the irregular levies, with the exception of 2,000 Albanians, and to take the necessary measures for the construction of the block-houses mentioned in the conditions of peace. The said block-houses are to be eight in number, and their erection is calculated at 25,000*l*. Two of these are to be constructed this autumn, and for this purpose a portion of the army of Roumelia under Abdi Pasha will be encamped for the next month at Yenikoy, in Montenegro, near Spuz. The Redifs of the army are to be sent to their homes, and the corps of Khassa and Dersaadet, under Dervish Pasha, will return to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Porte has further issued orders that provisions be sent to the Montenegrins, who are in great want of them.

The rebellion in the Herzegovina will now necessarily die a natural death. Indeed, it has of late shown but few signs of life. The Sultan has pardoned the rebels, who, finding themselves abandoned by their supporters, the Montenegrins, will eventually resume their peaceful occupations; but the Porte must now think seriously of establishing a more regular system of administration in this part of the Empire, one to which both Christians and Mussulmans may fearlessly and confidently appeal for impartiality and justice.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY A. CHURCHILL.

No. 967.

Mr. Fane to Earl Russell.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 194.)
My Lord, *Vienna, October 2, 1862.*

I HAVE read to Count Rechberg your Lordship's despatch to me, No. 6 2 the 24th ultimo, explaining the concurrence of Her Majesty's Government in the answer returned by his Excellency to the Russian and Prussian Ministers relative to the Article in the Convention proposed to Montenegro by the Porte respecting the military road through that State.

His Excellency thanked me for this communication, and said that he had had occasion to repeat his answer to the Prussian Minister, who, no later than Sunday last, had made to him a second communication on the inexpediency of the Porte's carrying out the Article of the Convention above referred to.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JULIAN FANE.

No. 968.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 994.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, October 8, 1862.*

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copy of a despatch upon the subject of Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 969.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 597.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October 9, 1862.*

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, copies of correspondence respecting the affairs of Montenegro.†

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 970.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received October 10.)

(No. 641.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, September 30, 1862.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a copy of a note addressed by the Russian Minister to Aali Pasha, formally protesting against the arrangement recently concluded by Omer Pasha with the Prince of Montenegro, and also a copy of the Porte's reply.

I have, &c.
(In the absence of Sir H. Bulwer),
(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

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* No. 967. † Nos. 949, 951, 952.

Inclosure 1 in No. 970.

Prince Labanow to Aali Pasha.

Buyukdéré, le 12/24 Septembre, 1862.

LORSQU'AU mois d'Avril dernier la Sublime Porte s'est décidée à entreprendre des opérations militaires contre le Monténégro, elle a eu soin de définir elle-même le but qu'elle se proposait. Les instructions qui ont été adressées au Commandant-en-chef des troupes Ottomanes, et que son Altesse Aali Pacha, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, a fait au soussigné l'honneur de lui communiquer dans le temps portaient expressément que le Serdar Ekrem était autorisé "à prendre toutes les mésures qu'il croirait nécessaires uniquement pour repousser les agressions des Monténégrins et pour rétablir l'ordre et la sécurité des habitants sans aucune intention tendant à modifier le *statu quo* de la Montagne, par rapport à sa position administrative et territoriale."

Ce *statu quo*, en ce qui concerne le territoire, n'était autre que celui qui résultait de l'acte de délimitation, arrêté en Novembre 1853, entre la Sublime Porte et les Représentants des Grandes Puissances.

Le soussigné doit ajouter que chaque fois que l'occasion s'en est présentée, son Altesse n'a jamais hésité à lui renouveler l'assurance que le Gouvernement Ottoman avait la ferme résolution de n'apporter aucune modification au *statu quo* territorial et administratif du Monténégro.

Le Gouvernement Impérial n'a pas manqué de prendre acte de ces diverses déclarations. Il ne pouvait qu'avoir pleine confiance dans la sincérité de ces assurances et même il s'est cru fondé à y attacher toute la valeur d'un engagement formel, attendu qu'elles se référaient à des arrangements revêtus de la sanction Européenne, et qui par cela même ne sauraient être modifiés par la seule volonté de l'une des Parties Contractantes.

Il a donc été péniblement surpris d'apprendre que parmi les conditions que le Commandant-en-chef des troupes Ottomanes avait été récemment chargé de notifier au Prince Nicolas, il s'en trouvait qui constituaient une modification essentielle au *statu quo* solennellement établi: telle est nommément la condition par laquelle la Sublime Porte a réclamé la construction d'une route militaire à travers le Monténégro avec le droit d'élever des blockhaus sur le parcours de cette route et d'y entretenir des garnisons. Cette clause, à l'égard de laquelle la Sublime Porte a d'ailleurs jugé nécessaire de garder le secret jusqu'au dernier moment envers les Représentants des Puissances qui ont concouru aux engagements concernant le Monténégro, équivaut en effet à une occupation militaire de ce pays, et se trouve par conséquent manifestement incompatible avec l'état de choses dont on était convenu en 1858.

En présence d'une atteinte aussi grave à des stipulations dont il est signataire, le Gouvernement Impérial ne saurait laisser subsister le moindre doute sur sa manière de voir, et le Soussigné a reçu l'ordre de protester formellement contre la disposition indiquée plus haut.

En se voyant à regret dans le cas de remplir ce devoir par la présente communication le Soussigné saisit, &c.

(Signé) A. LABANOW.

Inclosure 2 in No 970.

Aali Pasha to Prince Labanow.

Le 29 Septembre, 1862.

LE Soussigné, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la Sublime Porte, a reçu et mis sous les yeux de son auguste Maître la note que son Excellence le Prince Labanow lui a fait l'honneur de lui adresser en date du 12/24 Septembre courant, relativement à quelques unes des conditions de l'arrangement conclu avec le Monténégro.

Le Soussigné se flattait de l'espoir que les éclaircissements qu'il s'était empressé de donner de vive voix à son Excellence sur les points qui font l'objet de sa note auraient suffi pour dissiper tous les doutes à cet égard. Mais comme il n'en a pas été ainsi, il se fait un devoir de les répéter avec les développements qu'ils comportent.

M. l'Envoyé de Russie voit que le premier ultimatum de la Sublime Porte, rédigé dans l'unique but d'éviter ce qui est arrivé plus tard, n'a pas été accepté par les Monténégrins, que la situation anormale à laquelle on voulait remédier, loin de s'améliorer par suite d'un acte d'une si grande modération, a considérablement empiré, que les choses en étaient venues au point où la Sublime Porte ne pouvait les laisser sans compromettre ses plus graves intérêts, et que ce n'est que réduite à cette extrémité, et après beaucoup de temporisations, qu'elle a donné l'ordre à son Général-en-chef de marcher sur la Montagne Noire.

Une fois ses conditions rejetées et contraint de faire des sacrifices de tout genre, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan ne pouvait guère croire qu'on lui contesterait le droit incontestable de chercher quelques garanties plus ou moins propres à empêcher le retour des événements qui, depuis plusieurs années, ont ensanglanté les contrées avoisinantes de la Montagne et qui l'ont forcé à y laisser se décimer une armée condamnée à recevoir les injures continuelles des Montagnards et à tomber victimes de leurs atrocités.

La Sublime Porte avait cette conviction toute légitime, toute naturelle, comme elle avait celle d'avoir à combattre des prétentions contraires à sa dignité et à ses intérêts, si des succès militaires n'étaient intervenus.

Le Gouvernement Impérial était d'autant plus fondé à penser ainsi qu'il était persuadé, comme il l'est encore en ce moment, qu'il n'avait rien exigé des Monténégrins qui eut le moindre rapport avec une stipulation internationale quelconque.

Malgré tout celà, malgré les raisons majeures qui autorisaient et obligeaient même la Sublime Porte de poser des demandes de garanties beaucoup plus sérieuses, qu'a-t-elle fait? en quoi a-t-elle modifié son premier ultimatum? La plupart de ses dernières conditions ne sont-elles pas plutôt favorables aux Monténégrins? L'autonomie administrative et la circonscription territoriale, telle qu'elle a été tracée par la Commission Mixte de 1858, ne sont-elles pas respectées et suffisamment assurées?

La clause contre laquelle son Excellence M. l'Envoyé de Russie croit devoir élever des objections, est la seule qui offre quelque peu de garantie, sans cependant toucher ni affaiblir en rien le *statu quo* territorial et administratif du Monténégro. Deux des plus importantes Provinces de l'Empire, la Bosnie et l'Albanie, se trouveraient complètement privées de toute communication à défaut d'une route sûre à travers la Montagne, route qui ne profitera pas moins aux habitants de la Tchernagore.

Quant à l'occupation de certains points de cette route par des soldats Ottomans elle n'est nullement incompatible avec les principes que la Sublime Porte est décidée à respecter.

Une voie de communication qui traverse un pays encore très peu policé ne devient praticable que si elle est protégée par quelques ouvrages militaires dont l'existence ne peut affecter en aucune façon ni l'autonomie administrative ni les limites de ce pays.

M. le Prince Labanow doit se rappeler que la Sublime Porte a toujours déclaré qu'elle se réservait de formuler les garanties qui lui paraîtraient nécessaires aussitôt que les Monténégrins s'adresseraient directement à son Altesse le Serdar Ekrem pour demander la paix. Toutes les fois qu'il y a eu des propositions d'armistices ou d'arrangement, le langage des Ministres du Sultan n'a pas varié sur ce point.

Il est également à remarquer que le Gouvernement Impérial n'a pas fait un secret, comme votre Excellence paraît le penser de l'article en question; s'il ne le lui a pas communiqué d'avance, c'est qu'il a voulu être conséquent avec sa réserve de ne poser ses conditions que lorsque les Monténégrins viendraient eux-mêmes les demander au Commandant-en-chef des troupes de Sa Majesté.

La Sublime Porte espère donc que toutes ces explications franches et loyales, jointes à sa protestation formelle contre l'accusation de porter une atteinte grave à des stipulations dont la Russie est signataire, ainsi que la circonstance de l'acceptation positive et très explicite des Chefs de la Montagne de toutes les conditions, ne manqueront pas de trouver, auprès du Gouvernement Impérial de Russie, une appréciation juste et équitable.

Le Soussigné, &c. (Signé) AALI.

No. 971.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 1007.)
Foreign Office, October 11, 1862.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches upon the subject of Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 972

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received October 13.)

(No. 61. Political.)
Bosna-Serai, September 23, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a despatch received from Mr. Vice Consul Zohrab, relating to the steps taken by Luka Vukalovitch and other leaders of the rebels to obtain favourable terms of surrender.

In the last paragraph of the despatch Mr. Zohrab suggests mistrust as to the good faith of the submission of the Montenegrins. I am also decidedly of opinion that, unless the Turks render it impossible for the mountaineers to recommence the struggle, it will be renewed on the first favourable opportunity. Among other means to secure the maintenance of peace, the principal one is undoubtedly the road to be constructed between Nichsich and Spuz, to be held by the Turks. Good carriage roads must also be made throughout the Herzegovina, which should in the same manner be connected with Bosnia. This is the only possible condition on which a reasonable Turkish force can hold the Herzegovina. In the absence of roads, the different corps placed in that province cannot act together or aid each other, and are liable to be cut up in detail, while an increase of numerical force only adds to the difficulty of providing supplies. When the country is made accessible to the march of troops, and is open to the transport of provisions and ammunition by waggons, there will be no further difficulty of maintaining tranquillity in the Herzegovina. The civilization of the people and the interests of commerce and agriculture in these provinces also imperatively demand the construction of roads. This has been so often repeated, and is so self-evident, that the continued apathy of the Turkish Government with regard to this first element of prosperity is perfectly inconceivable.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure in No. 972.

Vice-Consul Zohrab to Consul Holmes.

Mostar, September 17, 1862.

Sir,

THE defeat and submission of the Montenegrins having, it seems, deprived the rebels of all hope of being able to hold out against the Turks, their Chiefs are now endeavouring to find out, before laying down their arms, what terms will be accorded to them by the Sultan.

Luka Vukalovitch, the principal leader of the insurgents, has asked, through the Turkish Consul at Ragusa, whether the Sultan will accept his submission. Khoorshid Pasha has replied that he and his people will be pardoned if they at once lay down their arms and return to their homes. The presence of Luka Vukalovitch will, however, be required at Mostar.

Pop Milé, the faithless leader of the band which infested Bagnani, and who, when refused the rank of Senator last spring by the Prince Nicholas, came over and was received by the Turks, now asks for land and a house in this province.

In a conversation I had yesterday with Khoorshid Pasha regarding these people, I expressed the opinion that whatever was done with the other leaders, Pop Milé should on no account be allowed to reside in any Sclavic province of the

* Nos. 961 and 966.

Empire. Being himself a Sclav, a priest, and also a treacherous, intriguing, and clever man, his presence in any Sclav community must always be feared.

The Government having granted him protection and hospitality when he voluntarily come over, could not now punish him for his past crimes, but they could and ought to make it impossible for him to make further mischief, and this could be done without their being accused of want of faith.

His Excellency agreed entirely with me, and he anticipated the Government would pursue such a course with Pop Milé.

I cannot, however, help thinking that treachery still lurks under the submission of the Montenegrins and the professions of the rebel Chiefs, and if great caution is not used a catastrophe may result.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAS. ZOHRAB.

No. 973.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received October 13.)

(No. 353.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, September* 30, 1862.

I WAITED on Prince Gortchakow this forenoon by appointment. His Excellency received me with his usual cordiality. After an exchange of remarks of an unofficial character I asked the Prince whether he desired to enter upon any discussion of the pending questions of political interest. The Prince replied, smiling, that he feared that neither of us would have anything agreeable to communicate to the other, and that unless I had some intelligence of a positive nature to import to him we might defer these matters to a future occasion.

I begged his Excellency to signify my return to the Emperor and Empress, and to submit to their Majesties my desire to have the honour of waiting on them.

The Prince promised to do so.

As his Excellency appeared to stand on the defensive, I did not press him for any explanation of his present views. Your Lordship is fully informed of the posture of affairs here by Mr. Lumley. The ascendancy of Her Majesty's Government in the East is complete, and the justice of their policy so fully proved by the issue of events that nothing remains to be gained by argument. The Prince will, I apprehend, continue for some time to expatiate and complain to the Representatives of France and Prussia and exclude Her Majesty's Embassy from his confidence on those subjects. I shall wait with indifference until his natural communicativeness and impatience resume their sway.

I have seen the Duc de Montebello and Count Goltz. With the latter I had no conversation on Eastern affairs. The French Ambassador spoke with moderation in general terms, and seemed to disapprove of the precipitation with which Prince Gortchakow had entered upon a separate opposition to the conditions of settlement presented by Omer Pasha to Montenegro.

His Excellency did not, however, approve of the tenor of those conditions, and considered that they might become matter for debate between the European Powers, in so far as they clashed with the stipulations of Paris and the declarations of the Porte in the outset of the recent struggle.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 974.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received October 13.)

(No. 359.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October* 4, 1862.

I HAD the honour of being received by His Majesty the Emperor this day at Tzarskoe Zeloe at 10 o'clock.

His Majesty having graciously stated his satisfaction in seeing me again, expressed the warmest interest in the welfare of Her Majesty the Queen, and directed me to submit to Her Majesty through your Lordship anew the expression

of the pleasure which the visit of His Royal Highness Prince Alfred had given to the Empress and to himself. His Majesty then added that he hoped he might have the happiness some day or other of welcoming here Her Royal Highness the Princess of Hesse.

After some conversation on indifferent topics, the Emperor suddenly struck into the Eastern question. His Majesty remarked that since I had left St. Petersburgh the affairs of Servia and Montenegro had been settled after a fashion. In Servia an arrangement had been made which he must consider a mere patching up (*un replâtrage*). In Montenegro the Turks had imposed hard conditions, which, in his opinion, contained the seeds of future disorders. The projected road through the Montenegrin territory, guarded by block-houses, garrisoned by Turkish soldiers, would be a source of constant collision. A road was a good thing, and might have been useful to all parties, if guarded by the Montenegrins and placed under their responsibility. The Emperor recurred to this reflection two or three times, and laid great stress on it. In Herzegovina, His Majesty said the measures of Omer Pasha had been conciliatory and useful, the conduct of the Pasha had been appreciated by the agents of Russia in those parts, and it was to be regretted that he should retire from his post at a moment when his influence was salutary. It would be difficult to replace him.

In replying to the Emperor, I remarked that I did not possess your Lordship's views in reference to this or that article of the arrangement between the Porte and Montenegro. I could not affirm that your Lordship particularly approved of the projected road or not, but I gathered that Her Majesty's Government were disinclined to interfere between the Porte and its late enemies. Her Majesty's Government believed that in the recent struggle the Montenegrins had been decidedly the aggressors, and that it was expedient to leave the terms of arrangement to the spontaneous counsel and independent decision of the Porte. We did not wish to interfere at all. I would, however, not fail to state His Majesty's views to your Lordship.

In Servia it might be hoped that tranquillity was now restored. The Servians had for many years lived on very tolerable terms with the Turks in the enjoyment of their local franchises. The late explosion was accidental and exceptional. There was no reason to anticipate a renewal of such catastrophes.

The Emperor, while still maintaining that the arrangement in Servia did not embody the elements of a permanent settlement, declared his warm satisfaction in the restoration of peace. He said that after the reduction of the Montenegrins had been effected, it was evidently the interest of the Servians to come to terms, otherwise the same fate might have befallen them, unprepared as they were for resistance, at least there would have been a deplorable effusion of blood, which we were all interested in preventing. His Majesty then added, with the greatest appearance of sincerity, that whatever had been said to the contrary, he could assure me that his influence had always been used in counselling moderation and adjustment.

Having solicited and obtained His Majesty's permission to express to him my personal opinion on the state of the East, founded on a long residence in that quarter at two periods of high interest, I said to him: "The events in Syria, Montenegro, Herzegovina, and elsewhere, of which we have been spectators, have been in great part the inevitable consequences of the great European movements of the times. The war in the East naturally produced a partial reaction of Mussulman intolerance. The war in Italy and the development of revolutionary aspirations attending it caused a ferment among the unsettled Christian populations on the Adriatic. The causes have now ceased to operate, and their results have gradually expired. In great part by its own strength and from its own resources, in part also by the advice, assistance, and intervention of the European Powers, the Porte has triumphed over all its internal embarrassments, and tranquillity is now re-established in the length and breadth of the land. That tranquillity, in my humble judgment, is destined to endure. We have entered upon a period of comparative repose, similar to that which followed the crisis of 1841, and which extended to 1848. In this interval," I said, "much good may be done to all the subjects of the Sultan, but in order that such a happy result may be attained, we must learn to look upon the Government of the Sultan itself as the only source and instrument of practical improvement for its people. I wish," I added, "that the Imperial Government could recognize the justice of these views and act in conformity with them; in that case the sympathy and assistance of Her Majesty's Government would never be wanting in furthering the welfare of all the Sultan's

subjects, especially that of the Christians, if the Christians were shown to be the greatest sufferers." To these reflections the Emperor promptly replied that he trusted my anticiptions of tranquillity might be realized; for his part he desired nothing more than to seek for the improvement of the Christians in the East, through their Government; that was no doubt the regular and proper course. He hoped that the Porte might prove to be a more efficient instrument of reform hereafter than it had been as yet.

The Emperor did not on this occasion animadvert with any sharpness on the abuses of Mussulman rule, on the wrongs of the Christians, or on the dangers of a general convulsion in Turkey. Perhaps His Majesty has seen ground in late events to modify his views, to form a higher estimate of the vitality of the Ottoman Power, and a lower conception of the combination and resistance to be expected from the Christian races.

The Emperor then alluded lightly to the various topics of public interest in Europe, passing in review the state of Germany and Italy, and the relations of France to the latter country. His Majesty spoke temperately and agreeably on these subjects in a speculative way, but said nothing bearing a decided stamp of personal opinion or that could be useful to your Lordship as indication of the policy of this Government.

I was happy to observe that his Majesty expressed no positive incredulity of the success of the Italian cause. He stated that in the opinion of Count Stackeltry, the Russian Envoy at Turin, the work of unification had been perfected in one department at least of the new State—in the army.

In alluding to the manner in which he had spent the past summer, the Emperor warmly expressed the satisfaction which he had experienced in visiting the Baltic provinces; his Majesty spoke gratefully of the loyal greeting which he had received from all classes of the population, and stated his hope that the welfare and industry which he had there witnessed might soon be imparted to the other portions of the Empire.

I took leave of the Emperor after an interview of about three quarters of an hour. The Empress did not grant me the honour of an audience, in consequence of being slightly indisposed. I hope to be permitted to wait upon Her Majesty at Gatchina, where the Court proceeds in the course of a few days.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 975.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(*Received October 13.*)

(No. 362.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October 6, 1862.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, in reference to Mr. Lumley's despatch of the 2nd September, an extract of the "Official Journal" of the 2nd instant, showing that the whole amount of subscriptions on behalf of the Montenegrins was up to that date 3,440 roubles, about 500*l*. This does not prove that the Russians feel a very warm interest in the misery of their coreligionists, whose misfortunes may certainly be laid in part at the door of the Imperial Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

Inclosure in No. 975.

Extract from the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" of October 2, 1862.

Souscription en faveur des Familles du Monténégro, Victimes de la Guerre.
(Dix-huitième Liste.)

	R.	c.
M. Pierre Koborowsky de Tiflis	5	0
Total des listes précédentes	3,435	50
Souscriptions reçues jusqu'aujourd'hui	3,440	50

On souscrit au bureau des annonces du "Journal de St. Pétersbourg," à la Librairie de la Cour Impériale, au pont de police, sur la perspective de Nevsky, maison de l'église Hollandaise.

No. 976.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received October 13.)

(No. 368.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October 7, 1862.*

HAVING obtained an interview with Prince Gortchakow yesterday forenoon, I placed in his Excellency's hands your Lordship's instruction No. 57 of the 30th of September, containing the reflections prompted on the part of Her Majesty's Government by Mr. Lumley's Reports Nos. 88 and 93 respectively, of the 2nd and 5th of last month, relative to the affairs of Montenegro.

Prince Gortchakow read your Lordship's despatch carefully through, and as he proceeded offered several remarks upon its contents, of which I now submit the substance to your Lordship's attention.

His Excellency stopped at the end of the 6th paragraph, in which your Lordship enforces the right of the Sultan to impose such terms on the Prince of Montenegro as would prevent a renewal of his aggressions. He remarked that the right of the Porte in this respect was not unlimited. The Porte had spontaneously declared to the European Powers what the objects were for which it prosecuted the late war. He did not allude to the first terms offered by Omer Pasha to the Prince —terms which the Porte held to have been declined by Montenegro—he referred to the engagements publicly and voluntarily assumed by Omer Pasha in entering on active operations, to the effect that he had no view of introducing any change in the territorial or administrative States of Montenegro. That declaration was binding, and could not be affected by the course of subsequent events. The declarations thus made had no doubt influenced the counsels and attitude of the Powers interested in the welfare of Montenegro. If, in the course of hostilities, the Porte saw fit to change its views, that change should have been duly imparted or published, and an opportunity would thus have been given to the Powers to take such steps as they might have deemed in these altered circumstances to be due to themselves and to the interests at stake. The terms now imposed by the Porte were, in his opinion, inconsistent with the engagements publicly taken; he had consequently protested against them, and he trusted that the Porte would not persist in carrying them into effect.

I observed to Prince Gortchakow, in reply, that Her Majesty's Government saw nothing absolute in the declarations of the Porte. The objects of the war might justly be affected by the course and continuation of it, and by the sacrifices involved in its prosecution. The declarations of the Pasha were to be regarded as conditional; they might be modified or annulled by subsequent incidents and necessities. I could not anticipate any change in your Lordship's sentiments on this subject. Your Lordship's opinion was repeated and confirmed in another despatch, in which you remarked that, "comparing small things with great, it might be as well said that the Allies were obliged to offer Bonaparte the same terms at Châtillon which he had refused at Dresden." I said Châtillon by mistake, your Lordship says Fontainbleau.

The analogy does not hold good, replied the Prince. In the case cited by Lord Russell the whole of Europe stood opposed on one side, to France alone on the other. There was no third party. But here there was Turkey on one side, Montenegro on the other, and all Europe looking on—Europe, to which declarations had been publicly made, a party deeply interested in the event, a party in his opinion not to be slightly treated.

Your Lordship goes on to say that you do not pretend to justify or condemn the particular conditions prescribed by the Porte, of which the Porte itself is the only competent judge; but in the 10th paragraph of the despatch you cite a precedent for the Article concerning a road through the Montenegrin territory, namely, the construction of roads in the last century through the Highlands of Scotland, a measure productive of the most salutary and civilizing results.

Prince Gortchakow, having perused this passage, contended that here again the cases were not parallel. "The Scotch Highlands," said his Excellency, "were subjects of the British Crown, subjects of a country, indeed, which had given a

King to Great Britain; when, after a revolution, a new branch of the dynasty was raised to the Throne, they adhered to the old line, they were defeated, but were reconciled by a humane, enlightened, and opulent Government, not only by the creation of roads, but by all the benefits which attended a participation in the power and emoluments of the general Empire. Here there was no local independence sacrificed, no insurmountable difference of race or religion. The Montenegrins are an independent people and a Christian people, they stand towards Turkey in no respect as the Scotch Highlanders did towards the British Government. And the British Government cannot be likened to the Ottoman Porte; in its own behalf, for its own honour, I repel the comparison."

To these animadversions I replied that your Lordship had not intended to establish an absolute analogy between the Montenegrins and the Clans, or the Government of George II and that of the Sultan, but simply to offer an example of the good effects which the construction and maintenance of good roads could have in a barbarous region. The example was an undeniable one. All historians affirmed it. It was notorious in Scotland how much the military roads had effected. The value of these public works had been confirmed by the verdict as it were of the common people themselves. The projected road through Montenegro might, I said, cause collisions, but it might also gradually produce the familiarity of daily intercourse between the Turks and Montenegrins, and accustom them to pacific traffic.

Prince Gortchakow, nevertheless, reiterated his conviction that the road, if guarded by Turkish block-houses and garrisons, would perpetuate hostilities; as a track of commerce, under the charge of the Montenegrins, it might have a useful result.

When the Vice-Chancellor came to that passage in your Lordship's despatch in which you allude to the "darling scheme entertained in some quarters of overthrowing the Turkish rule," his Excellency said, with some animation, "not in my quarters," and when your Lordship alludes to those "criminal intrigues" which "aim no less at the subversion of every monarchy in Europe than at the destruction of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire," he remarked that he was happy to see such designs so justly qualified by your Lordship, for the principles advocated by your Lordship in reference to the rights of Sovereigns and the popular will in Italy were a different complexion.

In conclusion, the Vice-Chancellor observed that there was much in your Lordship's despatch with which he agreed mixed with much that he could not accept; the despatch might be destined for publication, he would, therefore, probably prepare a reply to it in writing.

I said to his Excellency that I would endeavour to make a faithful report to your Lordship of his remarks, but our conversation had been desultory, and it might certainly be desirable to avoid all misunderstanding, that his sentiments should be imparted to your Lordship through Baron Brünnow, as well as through Her Majesty's Embassy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 977.

Earl Russell to Lord Napier.

(No. 172.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, October 15, 1862.*

I ENCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople,* inclosing a copy of a Russian protest against the construction of a military road through Montenegro, together with a copy of Aali Pasha's reply, in which Her Majesty's Government think his Excellency gives very fair reasons in support of the proceedings of the Porte.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

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* No. 970.

No. 978.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 608.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 15, 1862.

THE Ottoman Ambassador at this Court has communicated to me a copy of the terms offered by the Porte to the Prince of Montenegro, and agreed to by His Highness on the 13th ultimo; and I have to state to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government are glad that these terms have been accepted by the Prince.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 979.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received October 17.)

(No. 374.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October* 11, 1862.

I OMITTED to report to your Lordship by the last messenger that I had carefully repeated to Prince Gortchakow the substance of my conversation with the Emperor, as related to your Lordship in my despatch No. 359 of the 4th instant.

The reflections of the Emperor on the proposed military road through Montenegro furnished the Vice-Chancellor an opportunity of expatiating upon the pernicious consequences which might be expected to arise from that project. His Excellency contended that it was both inconsistent with the letter of the engagements of the Porte, and opposed to the benevolent designs of all the Powers, who were alike desirous to lay the foundation of a permanent peace in those quarters. "Far from this," said the Prince with animation; "in sanctioning this road, you sow the teeth of Cadmus on the rocks of Montenegro."

Prince Gortchakow did not dispute the humanity and discretion of Omer Pasha's late conduct towards the Herzegovinian insurgents, so candidly recognized by the Emperor. He acknowledged the merit of the Pasha, but added that in acting wisely he had acted consistently with the principles advocated by Russia; he had employed local and Christian agencies in the settlement and government of a Christian district. His Excellency added his hope that this system would be further extended.

I said to Prince Gortchakow that what was possible in one district might not be practicable in another. I feared there were few parts of the Turkish dominions in which families still existed which possessed a degree of wealth and ascendancy which could render them useful instruments of Government. This was especially the case with the Christians. There was no rural Christian aristocracy whatever in Turkey.

Prince Gortchakow replied that it was not absolutely necessary that they should be Christians. Even a Mussulman leader, interested in the welfare of a locality, might be a better administrator than the necessitous and rapacious Pashas dispatched from Constantinople,—"the lean leeches," his Excellency called them.

I objected to the Prince that the Mahommedan aristocracy of Asia Minor had been extinguished by Sultan Mahmoud. Among the Bedouins and Kurds native Chiefs existed. The same order of men survived elsewhere in Bosnia alone. I, speaking as an Englishman, must certainly deplore in some respects the levelling centralization which had been effected in Turkey; but the Porte, in pursuing this policy, had only followed in its own way the universal example of Continental Europe. It had thus acquired an unprecedented authority over the whole surface of the Empire; and I must say, with all due respect to the notions of local independence and hereditary rank, I believed on the whole a Pasha from Constantinople would be a more enlightened Governor than a Turkish lord, if such a thing could be found. There was much to be said both for and against the centralizing system.

The conversation became speculative, and the subject was gradually dropped.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 980.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received October 17.)

(No. 375.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October* 12, 1862.

I CALLED on the Vice-Chancellor yesterday, on his Excellency's invitation, when he read to me the draft of an instruction which he had addressed to Baron Brunnow, in reply to your Lordship's despatch No. 57 of the 30th ultimo, which I had placed in his Excellency's hands.

When the Prince had finished reading his despatch, which will be imparted to your Lordship, I said to his Excellency that I thanked him for the communication of a paper of which no one could deny the ability. There were things in it which would no doubt be agreeable to your Lordship, and others which would not meet with your assent; it belonged to your Lordship to reply to it or not, as you deemed expedient. I would take the liberty of offering a remark on one passage in it only. When his Excellency spoke of the "war of extermination" waged by the Turks "on the Montenegrins and Herzegovinians," I heard his expressions with deep regret, for the war had been one of a defensive character on the part of the Turks. It had been waged with reluctance; it was a war which the Turks had been ready at any moment to terminate on humane and reasonable terms. Surely the term "extermination" could not be used with any justice; such language tended to exasperate controversy and to widen alienation. Her Majesty's Government would thus be made to feel more sensibly the distance between them and the Government of Russia on this subject, and would really despair of being able to co-operate with his Excellency for any practicable good purpose in the East.

Prince Gortchakow took my remark in good part. He observed that he did not mean to say that the Turks waged war with the deliberate design of exterminating their enemies; he intended merely to imply that such a war waged by the Turks would inevitably assume a character of unsparing cruelty. It was far from his wish to employ language susceptible of misinterpretation such as I had adverted to; and he would have expunged the word "extermination" if his despatch had not already been sent off.

Prince Gortchakow had occasion to see me again this afternoon, when he told me that he had modified the expression, I presume by telegraph, to which I had particularly referred. The passage alluded to will therefore not appear in the copy of the despatch presented to your Lordship by Baron Brünnow.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 981.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 1026.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, October* 18, 1862.

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches upon the subject of Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 982.

Mr. Erskine to Earl Russell.—(Received October 18.)

(No. 1.)
My Lord, *Therapia, October* 7, 1862.

IN the course of an interview I had yesterday with Aali Pasha, His Highness said that he had just been engaged in a somewhat warm discussion with the French Ambassador respecting the terms of pacification granted to the Prince of Montenegro.

Without formally protesting against that Article of the conditions which concedes to the Sultan the right of constructing a road through Montenegro protected by block-houses, M. de Moustier said that the French Government were disposed to look upon it as a departure from the spirit of the arrangement concluded in 1858,

* Nos. 975, 976, 979, and 980.

under the auspieces of the Great Powers; and as at all events calculated to perpetrate hostilities between the Turks and the Montenegrins.

M. Thouvenel had not, he said, acquiesced in a proposal recently made to him by the Government of Russia to join them in a formal protest against this project, because he believed that a friendly remonstrance was more likely to put a stop to a scheme which he could not but think was fraught with danger to Turkey.

Aali Pasha replied that he regretted it was now too late to listen to this well-meant advice, as the Porte had very carefully weighed all the arguments for and against the intended road, and was fully persuaded of its necessity. The labours of the European Commission which traced the boundary line had no bearing upon the present question, which concerned the Porte and the Prince of Montenegro alone.

Before leaving, M. de Moustier made a last effort to carry his point, and requested that the Emperor's intercession in behalf of a people in whose welfare he took a deep interest might yet shake the determination of the Porte; but His Highness would hold out no expectation of any such result.

I took that opportunity of acquainting Aali Pasha with Earl Cowley's report of a conversation in which M. Thouvenel disclaimed any intention to dictate to Turkey in this matter; but His Highness said that M. de Moustier's language was far more peremptory than that of M. Thouvenel to Earl Cowley.

As your Lordship has instructed Her Majesty's Ambassador to refrain from discussing with the Porte the conditions of peace imposed on the Montenegrins, it is of course my duty to attend strictly to that injuction. But I would venture to observe that there is some truth in what M. Thouvenel said to Lord Cowley.

The possible advantages to be derived from the opening of such a road as that contemplated are not in my opinion at all commensurate with the increased risk of collision between the Turks and Montenegrins which will be the consequence. Should such a collision take place and not be summarily chastised, the Montenegrins would be emboldened to resume the aggressive tactics which led to the late war; whilst any effectual attempt to punish them must be made on a scale which would be ruinous to Turkey.

The Porte has now vindicated its exclusive right to deal with this question, firmly and with dignity. It is, perhaps, too late for it openly to recede from the completion of the route; but it would, perhaps, be no misfortune were it to display as little energy in the prosecution of this work through an enemy's country as it habitually does in its own dominions.

Indeed, it is almost useless to construct a military road through the heart of Montenegro whilst the communications on neither side are yet practicable for carriages of any sort.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

No. 983.

Mr. Erskine to Earl Russell.—(Received October 22.)

(Telegraphic.) *Therapia, October 21, 1862, 11 P.M.*

AM I to convey your Lordship's message in No. 579 to the Prince of Montenegro through the Consul at Montenegro, and if so, would you wish him to go to Cettigné or write?

No. 984.

Earl Russell to Mr. Fane.

(No. 75.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October 22, 1862.*

I TRANSMIT, for your information, copies of despatches relating to Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

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* Nos. 979 and 980.

No. 985.

Earl Russell to Mr. Erskine.

(No. 1.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October 22, 1862.*

I HAVE received your despatch No. 1 of the 7th instant, reporting the statement, which Aali Pasha made to you on the 6th, of what had passed between his Highness and the French Ambassador respecting the terms of pacification conceded by the Porte to the Prince of Montenegro.

It seems to be supposed by the French and Russian Governments that Montenegro has hitherto been a scene of harmony and repose, so that no danger of collision could arise were it not for the projected road and block-houses.

But the history of Montenegro leads to a very opposite conclusion, and we may be sure that if the Turks were to retire, leaving the Montenegrins better off than they were before the war, collisions would very soon take place.

Those who live near the district are of opinion that good roads and open communications for trade would afford the best hope of civilizing the Montenegrins.

This is also the conclusion at which all who use their common sense on the subject will arrive.

Those, on the contrary, who favour robbers and murderers because they profess some kind of Christianity wish to maintain the Montenegrins in their barbarous independence.

The British Government are glad to see the Porte asserting its authority and taking its own measures, in spite of advice which, though well meant, is not well directed. The Porte would therefore do well to complete the road with the least possible delay.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 986.

Earl Russell to Mr. Erskine.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 23, 1862.*

THE Consul at Scutari should go to Cettigné with my message.

No. 987.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 619.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October 23, 1862.*

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh reporting what the Emperor of Russia had said to him upon Eastern affairs in an audience which he had on the 4th instant.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 988.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 620.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October 23, 1862.*

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency, for your information, copies of despatches on the subject of affairs of Montenegro which I have received from Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh.†

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

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* No. 974.

† Nos. 976, 979, and 980.

No. 989.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 1045.)
Foreign Office, October 23, 1862.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches relating to Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 990.

Consul Dickson to Earl Russell.—(Received October 25.)

(No. 7. Confidential.)
Soukoum-Kalé, September 17, 1862.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 5, Confidential, of the 22nd of July last, I have the honour to report that the Ps'khoo reconnoitring mission has returned to Soukoum Kalé by the way of Tiflis and Poti.

From such accounts as I have been able to gather, their route on leaving Gouma valley kept ascending through a dense forest and over innumerable small rivers, until, after crossing the Daoo Pass on the first or lower range of mountains, the party entered, on the third day after quitting Soukoum Kalé, the broad valley of Ps'khoo. Their stay here lasted but one night, and they put up at Amziuka, the residence of Prince Batoo Marshani.

Ps'khoo appeared to them to consist of an agglomeration of wooden huts, each apart from the other, like those used in most parts of the Caucasus, and the land was well cultivated.

Prince Batoo Marshani, along with Prince Shamakwa of Akhchipsoo, had been previously engaged, through the medium of the reigning Prince of Abkhasia and by gifts, to accompany the mission from Soukoum Kalé.

From Ps'khoo they proceeded by a broken and circuitous track, gradually ascending the Caucasian Alps towards Tsaherker and Akhbirts, on the summits of which lay patches of snow.

The view from this spot was described by an eye-witness as most magnificent.

These mountain tops consisted of bare granite rock, while the slopes on each side were clothed with fir, and teemed with deer, wolves, bison, and other wild animals.

Their course, which had hitherto been nearly due north, now took an easterly direction, and, gradually descending on rich undulating soil, they came to a meadow, the tall, rank grass of which frequently impeded their progress. Save an occasional shepherd with his flock, no inhabitants were seen; but a number of deserted stone dwellings, doubtless those of the Bessilbey and Baskhaghi tribes, besides some cemeteries, evidently showed that emigration must have been rife here.

They subsequently reached Kefar River, on which, and not on the greater Zelentchouk, stands the Russian post of Nadiojinskoi, or, as it is now called, Storojeonaya, a small fort or blockhouse, held by some 400 Cossacks, and mounting four field pieces. The mission were here surprised to learn that no intimation of their coming had been given, and the Commandant even demurred furnishing them with fresh horses to convey them to the next station. From Storojeonaya, the party continued by Piatigorsk and Vladikadkas on to Tiflis.

The whole journey from Soukoum Kalé to Storojeonaya occupied nine days, no stoppages having been made. Except a few sketches of the route, no observations were taken, nor were the party provided with any suitable instruments; even the statistical information obtained is stated to have been of the most meagre kind, such topics being, as a rule, studiously avoided by the natives. Nor were the Russian members composing the mission permitted to go any distance beyond the line of march traced out for them, the risk to their lives if they did so being constantly urged upon their attention.

The defile of Zaghdan, which divides Ps'khoo from Akhchipsoo, not far from the small Lake Ragitsa, and supposed to extend from the valley of Pzibbe right through the Caucasian range, was equally represented as being beset with hostile Circassians, and as carefully avoided. There is every reason to believe that this

* Nos. 982 and 985.

has been from time immemorial one of the most important links of communication between the coast of Circassia and the Cis-Caucussian districts. It is said by some natives to be at all seasons of the year practicable, even for carts, and is generally free from snow. This pass would, doubtless, be eminently adapted for strategical purposes.

The mission met at Ps'khoo no less than ten individuals, natives in appearance, but in reality Russians and Poles, and formerly deserters and prisoners from the Russian army. Many more were said to be found there. Their condition was that of serfs.

On the arrival of the mission at Tiflis, presents in money were made to the natives who accompanied it, while the Russian officers received each a step in rank. Hassan Marghani has been made a lieutenant-colonel and his son an ensign in the Russian army.

Although I am not aware what decision, if any, the Russian authorities may have come to in regard to a military route being constructed through that part of the country just travelled over by the mission, it is obvious that the engineering, as well as the political, obstacles thus to be overcome must be very great, and such as the Imperial Government are probably not prepared to encounter at present.

Some of the above-named localities are, I believe, not marked on the published maps of the Caucasus; and only a few I have seen noted on the large map reserved for the sole use of the general staff of the Russian army, on the scale of 10 versts to an inch.

I have the honour to forward this despatch, under flying seal, through Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople, for his Excellency's information, and to be, with great respect, &c.

(Signed) C. H. DICKSON.

No. 991.

Earl Russell to Lord Napier.

(No. 183.)
Foreign Office, October 25, 1862.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE herewith, for your information, copies of despatches to and from Her Majesty's Secretary of Embassy at Constantinople respecting Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 992.

Consul Paton to Earl Russell.—(Received October 27.)

(No. 25.)
Ragusa, October 12, 1862.

My Lord,

OMAR PASHA has left Scutari for Constantinople viâ Dulcigno, after having concluded contracts for the construction of eight block-houses, three of them to be finished before the winter. On the other hand, we hear from Cettigné that the Government there states confidently that the block-house Article, like that relative to Mirko, will, thanks to the diplomatic friends of Montenegro, remain a dead letter. If that is to be the case, we may well ask what Turkey has for her enormous sacrifices in men and money.

My intelligent Prussian colleague here, Baron Lichtenburgh, who is a military man by profession, has just returned from visiting the lately disturbed districts of Zubzi in Herzegovina. He counted nineteen block-houses, all terminated, and so ably placed that a renewal of the revolt by Luka Vukalovitch, even if he should turn traitor, would be very difficult. The Turks will also employ, or profess to intend to employ, moral means. I had a confidential conversation with Khoorshid Pasha on his return from Scutari to Mostar, and he informed me that his plan was to detach the Herzegovinian Christians from the Montenegrins by compelling the Mussulman aristocracy to avoid all oppression of the Rayahs, and that as sixteen

* Nos. 982 and 985.

battalions of the army lately in occupation are to winter in Herzegovina, he would have the physical means to carry out his project.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. A. PATON.

No. 993.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 1068.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, October* 29, 1862.

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copy of a despatch concerning Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 994.

Mr. Erskine to Earl Russell.—(Received October 30.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 30, 1862.

THE Porte has just learnt by telegram from Montenegro that the Prince has no intention of abiding by the conditions he accepted. He says he did so only to avoid further bloodshed. The Porte has not yet decided what course to pursue.

No. 995.

Earl Russell to Mr. Erskine.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November* 1, 1862.

HER Majesty's Government have no advice to give to the Sultan on the affairs of Montenegro.

No. 996.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 1080.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, November* 1, 1862.

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches respecting the affairs of Montenegro.†

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 997.

Consul Paton to Earl Russell.—(Received November 3.)

(No. 26.)
My Lord, *Ragusa, October* 21, 1862.

WE learn that Dervish Pasha and Abdi Pasha have shown considerable promptitude and energy in pushing on the military road in the environs of Spuz, and that there is every appearance of the Turks on this occasion not letting go a golden opportunity. On the other hand, the people of Pipeu, deceived by the secret assurances of the Cettigné Government that the Article of the block-houses would remain a dead letter, assembled in masses, and showed signs of interrupting by force the further prosecution of the works in progress. Dervish Pasha did not attack, but prudently told them to address themselves to the Prince, who had in the most formal manner signed the Convention; in consequence of which no blood has as yet flown, and the Prince has addressed a most pitiable letter to M. Wiett,

* No. 992.

† Nos. 994 and 995.

the French Consul of Scutari (now here), pointing out the precarious position in which he found himself between the stipulations and the national feeling—an inevitable result of his own insincerity to both the Turks and his own people, and of his clinging to foreign protection, notwithstanding the lesson which recent events ought to have taught him.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. A. PATON.

No. 998.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 1097.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, November* 5, 1862.

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches respecting the affairs of Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 999.

Earl Russell to Lord Napier.

(No. 199.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, November* 5, 1862.

WITH reference to the opinion expressed to you by Prince Gortchakow, as reported in your Excellency's despatch No. 374 of the 11th ultimo, respecting the construction of roads and forts in Montenegro, I transmit to you herewith a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Consul at Soukoum Kalé,† from which you will perceive that the Russian Government appears to rely on the forts, block-houses, and roads to keep order in Circassia; and I have to instruct you to take an opportunity of mentioning this to Prince Gortchakow in conversation.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 1000.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 65. Political.)
My Lord, *Bosna-Serai, October* 18, 1862.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship copy of a despatch received from Mr. Vice-Consul Zohrab, announcing the termination of the rebellion in the Herzegovina.

This is, of course, the natural result of the successful campaign against Montenegro, and is satisfactory as far as it goes; but the permanent tranquillity of the Herzegovina, notwithstanding the zeal attributed to Luka Vukalovitch in his new position, will depend in a great measure on the nature of the future relations between Montenegro and the Porte, and also on the manner in which the province is governed by the Turks. The moment has now arrived for the Porte to introduce the long-promised reforms; to take care, moreover, that they are fairly carried out, and not allowed to evaporate, as so many promised reforms have done, with the ink of the Firman in which they are promulgated. It is not too much to say that probably the future existence of Turkey depends on the manner in which she may profit by her present success.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

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* No. 997.

† No. 999.

Inclosure in No. 1000.

Vice-Consul Zohrab to Consul Holmes.

Mostar, October 13, 1862.

Sir,

IT is with much pleasure I have to report that the revolt in this province has at length been brought to a happy termination; the Herzegovina is once more restored to tranquillity and the Turkish authority is recognized through all its districts.

The late rebels of Zupzi are now busily engaged in rebuilding their houses.

The insurgents of Piva and Baynani still show some hesitation, but all idea of further resistance appears to be quite out of their thoughts. Their fears are caused by their belief that the Porte will not adhere to her liberal offers; there is, however, no doubt that they will speedily tread in the steps of the people of Zupzi.

The roads to Nichsich, Piva, and Zupzi are open and safe.

Khoorshid Pasha proceeded to Scutari towards the end of last month to receive instructions from Omer Pasha; on his way thither he consented to an interview with Luka Vukalovitch at Ragusa; the Pasha at this interview granted Lucca a free pardon in the name of the Sultan, and named him at the same time chief of police for the maintenance of tranquillity on the frontiers of the Herzegovina. He has already shown his zeal in the cause of order by ridding the province of several bandits who refused to submit.

Khoorshid Pasha on his return hither, about ten days since, at once commenced arrangements for the relief of those who have been ruined by the revolt and to assist the late rebels who have returned to their homes in a starving condition; in this work he naturally meets with much opposition and has to overcome many and serious difficulties; but the good common sense and energy he manifests overcome all obstacles and at the same time prevent discontent. Turks and Christians are alike engaged in the work of charity.

The reasons why the Porte has acted so generously towards the rebels have been explained to me by Khoorshid Pasha; they are as follows:—

To have attempted to seize the leaders, his Excellency said, would have been extremely difficult; surrounded as the province is by secret enemies of the Turks and by sympathisers with the insurgents, the endeavour would probably have failed, and the Chiefs would have fled to Austria and Russia, from whence they could have kept the country in a chronic state of agitation; whereas by showing generosity now the populations will learn that the Turkish Government is not the monster of cruelty it has been represented to them by its enemies, and the Chiefs will attach themselves sincerely to a service which offers more solid benefits than mere illusory and distant prospects of liberty.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAS. ZOHRAB.

No. 1001.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 1117.) *Foreign Office, November* 8, 1862.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copy of a despatch on Montenegro and the Herzegovina.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 1002.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received November 10.)

(No. 389.) *St. Petersburgh, October* 27, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith the official newspaper of the $\frac{1}{13}$th instant, containing your Lordship's despatch to Mr. Lumley,

* No. 1000.

No. 57 of the 30th September, and a despatch from Prince Gortchakow to Baron Brunnow in reply to the same.

There appears to be something rather precipitate and unusual in this publication, but Prince Gortchakow delights to keep up the appearance of activity and intervention to mask his real want of power. I understand that some communication has passed between Baron Brunnow and your Lordship on the subject, and that your Lordship's despatch is made public with your consent.

My attention has been drawn to an error in the French translation of your Lordship's despatch. The expression "in certain quarters" is rendered "in certain provinces." I pointed out to Prince Gortchakow this forenoon that "quarters" had a personal as well as a local meaning, and that the word "province" was altogether unsuitable.

The Prince said that he had not seen the translation before it was printed; he recognized the error at once, sent for one of his secretaries, and directed that the word "régions" should be substituted for "provinces," and should be inserted in the official newspaper as an erratum.

I told the Prince that in transmitting this correspondence to your Lordship I should make but one reflection on it with reference, namely, to that passage in his Excellency's despatch in which he affirmed that the Porte had made, during the course of the recent hostilities in Montenegro, no communication to the European Governments pointing to a modification of their orignal declaration to the effect that no change was meditated in the territorial or administrative status of the Mountain.

I learned from the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires that Khalil Bey had imparted to him, on the 13th of June, the substance of a telegraphic despatch addressed on the 11th of that month by Ali Pasha to Her Majesty's Government, to the effect that the Porte would not suspend hostilities without sufficient "guarantees" being given by the Prince of Montenegro for the maintenance of peace hereafter, and that the text of this telegram had been placed in the hands of M. Monkhahoff by the Turkish Legation.

Here there was due intimation given to the Russian Government of the ulterior views of the Porte.

Prince Gortchakow acknowledged that he had received the communication referred to both from the Turkish Legation here and from Prince Lobanow, but that the Porte had not defined the "guarantees" referred to, and he was justified in supposing that they would be conformable to the terms of the original declaration, which, in his opinion, they were not.

I did not see any object in carrying the discussion further. The protest of the Russian Government has, I imagine, become a dead letter, and the Turkish road an active reality. The Russian Minister is reduced to inaction; it would not be possible to reduce him to silence.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

Inclosure in No. 1002.

Extract from the "Journal de St. Petersbourg" of October $\frac{13}{25}$, 1862.

Earl Russell to Mr. Lumley.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 30, 1862.

I HAVE read and laid before the Queen your despatches of the 2nd and 6th instant, relating to the affairs of Montenegro.

Her Majesty's Government have to express their regret that they cannot agree with the views of Prince Gortchakow, either on the general question of interference in the affairs of Turkey or on the particular question of Montenegro.

Her Majesty's Government have always understood that when Turkey was allowed to form part of the system of Europe, she was to have all the advantages, and be liable to all the duties of an independent state. She was, in short, to be as independent as Prussia or Portugal, Sweden or Saxony, and, on the other hand, to be bound like those States by the faith of Treaties and the ties of international comity and good will.

If this be so, it is not justifiable where Treaties are silent to interfere without necessity or provocation in a case where an insurrection has broken out in Turkey, and that insurrection has been supported by a neighbouring Prince.

Such was the case in Herzegovina, where an insurrection broke out, and in Montenegro, from which it was fomented and supported.

If the Prince of Montenegro was a vassal, the Sultan had a right to reduce him to obedience, and to impose such conditions as will secure that obedience for the future; if he was an independent Prince, the Sultan had a right to force him to accept such terms of peace as would prevent a renewal of his aggression.

As to the particular terms demanded by Turkey, Her Majesty's Government do not pretend to justify or condemn them.

It is for the Porte to declare what guarantees are necessary for her future quiet.

The terms proposed, however, are not without example.

Soon after the beginning of the last century, the Highlanders of Scotland attempted to overthrow the throne of the Hanoverian family, and to set up another dynasty. The advisers of the British crown took means to overcome this resistance. They defeated the insurgents in two rebellions; they made good roads through the Scotch mountains, and they erected forts to keep the disaffected in awe.

At the present day Her Majesty has no more loyal subjects than the Highlanders of Scotland.

I will not conclude without giving, in a few words, the view taken by Her Majesty's Government of what is going on in Turkey.

If the Slavonic and Greek subjects of the Sultan rise in insurrection, and that insurrection is suppressed, the weight of authority will be made heavier, privileges will be withdrawn, and the sums which ought to be expended in making roads and harbours, and in promoting improvement, will be diverted to the pay and maintenance of a large military force.

If, on the other hand, the darling scheme entertained in some quarters of overthrowing the Turkish rule should be successful, Greeks and Slavonics will quarrel; each province will claim supremacy; civil war will ravage the countries where the authority of the Sultan shall have been thrown off, and an appeal will be made to the Great Powers of Europe to put an end to this anarchy, by dividing among themselves the Turkish provinces. But the European Powers would hardly be able to perform this task without giving rise to fresh conflicts, probably to a general war.

Such are the views which induce Her Majesty's Government, while sincerely desirous of improving the condition of the Christian subjects of the Porte, to refuse all countenance to projects which, in Greece, go by the name of the "Great Idea," and which, whether Greek or Slavonic, tend to the disruption of all existing ties of allegiance in the Turkish empire, and are more or less connected with the criminal intrigues of which Turkey feels the effect in Servia, and which aim no less at the subversion of every monarchy in Europe than at the destruction of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

You may give a copy of this despatch to Prince Gortchakow.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

Lord Russell à M. Lumley.

(Traduction.) *Foreign Office, le 30 Septembre*, 1862.

Monsieur,

J'AI lu et placé sous les yeux de la Reine vos dépêches sub Nos. 88 et 93, en date du 2 et du 5 courant, relatives aux affaires du Monténégro.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté doit exprimer ses regrets de ne pouvoir adhérer aux vues du Prince Gortchakow, quant à la question générale d'intervention dans les affaires de Turquie ni quant à l'affaire particulière du Monténégro.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté a toujours entendu que du moment où la Turquie a été admise à faire partie du système Européen, elle devait aussi participer à tous les avantages et à tous les devoirs qui incombent à un Etat indépendant. En un mot, elle devait être aussi indépendante que l'est la Prusse, le Portugal, le Suède ou la Saxe, et d'un autre côté elle devait être liée, comme ces Etats, par la foi des Traités et les rapports internationaux de courtoisie et de bon vouloir.

Si tel est le cas, il n'est pas juste, lorsque les Traités se taisent, d'intervenir sans nécessité ni provocation, dans un cas où une insurrection a éclaté en Turquie et où cette insurrection a été soutenue par un Prince voisin.

Tel a été le cas en Herzégovine, où une insurrection avait éclaté, et dans le Monténégro, par qui cette révolte avait été fomentée et soutenue.

Si le Prince de Monténégro était un vassal, le Sultan avait le droit de le réduire à l'obéissance et de lui imposer telles conditions qui pussent assurer cette obéissance dans l'avenir; si, au contraire, il était un Prince indépendant, le Sultan avait le droit de lui imposer telles conditions de paix qui pussent prévenir le renouvellement d'une agression de sa part.

Quant aux conditions particulières exigées par la Turquie, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté ne prétend ni les justifier ni les condamner.

Il appartient à la Porte de déclarer quelles sont les garanties nécessaires à sa tranquillité à venir.

Les conditions qu'elle propose ne sont pas cependant sans exemple.

Au commencement du dernier siècle, les Highlanders d'Ecosse avaient essayé de renverser le trône de la maison Hanovrienne et d'y substituer une autre dynastie. Les Conseillers de la Couronne d'Angleterre prirent des mesures pour dompter cette résistance.

Ils défirent les rebelles à deux reprises; ils établirent de bonnes routes à travers les montagnes d'Ecosse, et ils érigèrent des forts pour tenir les révoltés en respect.

Aujourd'hui, Sa Majesté n'a pas de sujets plus loyaux que les Highlanders d'Ecosse.

Je ne veux pas terminer sans exposer en peu de mots le point de vue du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté sur ce qui se passe en Turquie.

Si les sujets Slaves et Grecs du Sultan se révoltent et que l'insurrection soit réprimée, le poids de l'autorité deviendra plus lourd, des priviléges seront retirés, et les sommes destinées à la construction de routes et de ports, et à l'introduction des améliorations, seront distraites pour le payement et le maintien d'une force militaire imposante.

Si, au contraire, la chimère caressée dans certaines provinces de renverser le pouvoir Ottoman réalisait, les Grecs et les Slaves entreraient en lutte; chaque province réclamerait la suprématie; la guerre civile ravagerait les pays où l'autorité du Sultan aurait été renversée, et un appel serait fait aux Grandes Puissances de l'Europe pour mettre une fin à l'anarchie en partageant entre elles les provinces Turques. Mais les Puissances Européennes seraient difficilement en état d'accomplir cette tâche sans donner lieu à de nouveaux conflits et probablement à une guerre générale.

Telles sont les vues qui engagent le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté, sincèrement désireux d'ailleurs d'améliorer la situation des sujets Chrétiens de la Porte, à refuser toute coopération à la réalisation des projets connus en Grèce sous le nom de la "grande idée," projets qui, tant chez les Grecs que chez les Slaves, tendent à la dissolution des lieus d'obéissance dans l'Empire Ottoman, et sont plus ou moins en relation avec les intrigues criminelles dont la Turquie éprouve les effets en Servie, et qui ne visent pas moins au renversement de toute monarchie en Europe qu'à la destruction de l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman.

Vous êtes autorisé à donner copie de cette dépêche au Prince Gortchakow.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.

(Signé) RUSSELL.

Prince Gortchakow à M. le Baron de Brunnow.

M. le Baron, *St. Pétersbourg, le 28 Septembre*, 1862.

J'ai l'honneur de transmettre ci-près à votre Excellence la copie d'une dépêche de Lord Russell dont M. l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre m'a donné communication, d'après l'ordre du Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique.

Elle a trait aux événements du Monténégro ainsi qu'à la question générale d'intervention dans les affaires de Turquie, et exprime le regret du Cabinet Anglais de ne point pouvoir adhérer aux vues que nous avons émoncées à cet égard.

Le prix que nous attachons à nous trouver autant que possible d'accord avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique m'engage à examiner de plus près la

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

question, afin de constater les points sur lesquels cet accord peut exister et ceux sur lesquels nous devons maintenir une opinion différente.

Nous ne contestons nullement le point de vue général émis par Lord Russell que, du moment où la Turquie a été admise à faire partie du système Européen, elle a droit aux mêmes avantages que tout autre Etat indépendant, et est liée par les mêmes devoirs résultant des Traités et des rapports internationaux de convenance et de bon vouloir. Lord Russell en infère que dès lors le Gouvernement Ottoman était parfaitement libre d'agir à son gré à l'égard du Monténégro ; de le réduire à l'obéissance si c'était un Etat vassal, à telles conditions qui pouvaient assurer à l'avenir le maintien de cette obéissance ; et si c'était un Etat indépendant, de lui imposer telles conditions de paix qui pouvaient prévenir de nouvelles agressions.

Ici je ferai observer incidentellement que l'Angleterre a toujours professé des doctrines politiques tendantes à la reconnaissance de Gouvernements de fait, c'est-à-dire de ceux dont l'existence se manifeste par des faits assez notoires et assez durables pour constater leur vitalité.

D'après cette doctrine, il nous semble que le Cabinet Anglais ne devrait pas contester au Monténégro un droit à l'indépendance que ce pays a maintenu depuis plus d'un siècle avec une indomptable énergie, à moins d'admettre que le principe en question ne cesse d'être applicable du moment où il s'agit de réduire un Etat Chrétien sous la domination Turque.

Quant à l'opinion que la Porte, étant en guerre avec le Monténégro comme avec un Etat indépendant, était en droit de lui imposer des conditions ressortant de la situation respective des belligérants à l'issue de la guerre, nous ne la contestons nullement.

Or, dans la question présente, à côté de la Porte et du Monténégro comme belligérants, il y a un troisième élément : les Grandes Puissances de l'Europe. Indépendamment de l'intérêt profond qu'elles doivent vouer à des événements dont les conséquences, en affectant le repos de l'Orient, rejaillissent sur la sécurité générale, et sans parler des antécédents qui ont amené leur participation sollennelle à des actes publics concernant les rapports entre la Turquie et le Monténégro, les Grandes Puissances ont vu leur sollicitude appelée sur ce débat par la Porte elle-même, qui, en prenant spontanément vis-à-vis d'elles l'engagement de ne modifier en rien le *statu quo* territorial et administratif de la Montagne, a posé de sa propre initiative une limite à son droit de belligérante.

Il nous paraît impossible d'admettre qu'elle en soit dégagée par le fait que le Prince Nicolas n'a accepté que d'une manière évasive le premier ultimatum d'Omer Pacha.

Lorsque la Porte a fait la déclaration dont nous parlons, la réponse du Prince Nicolas lui était parfaitement connue, et c'est même à la suite de cette réponse qu'elle s'est décidée aux opérations militaires, sur les conséquences desquelles elle a pris soin de rassurer d'avance les Grandes Puissances intéressées à ce débat.

Il en eût sans doute été autrement si, dans le cours de la guerre, le Gouvernement Ottoman avait déclaré qu'il ne se considérait plus comme lié par sa promesse antérieure. En pareil cas, les Puissances auraient été à même de combiner en conséquence leur attitude et leurs conseils.

Ce n'est pas ainsi que les choses se sont passées. Aucune déclaration semblable n'a été faite. Pas une parole n'a été prononcée qui fût de nature à affaiblir l'engagement primitif spontanément contracté par le Gouvernement Ottoman. Les Grandes Puissances ont été tenues jusqu'au dernier moment dans l'ignorance des conditions envoyées à Omer Pacha, et lorsqu'elles ont pu les apprécier, elles se trouvaient en présence d'un fait accompli qui ne saurait invalider le droit que la Porte elle-même leur avait concédé.

C'est donc à ces Puissances à juger si ces conditions sont d'accord avec les engagements pris à leur égard ; si nommément la clause qui stipule la construction d'une route militaire avec des blockhaus gardés par des garnisons Turques n'équivaut pas à une véritable occupation militaire, à une prise de possession réelle du pays ; si elle n'introduit pas dans la Montagne un principe dangereux, celui du contact immédiat des races, principe qui vient précisément d'être condamné d'après ses résultats, et définitivement abolie en Servie, comme incompatible avec le maintien des relations pacifiques que l'Europe désire voir s'établir et se consolider en Orient pour la sécurité générale ; si, par conséquent, cette clause ne détruit pas entièrement le *statu quo* que la Porte s'était engagée à maintenir, et si enfin elle n'est pas de nature à constituer un état de guerre permanent là où les efforts collectifs des

Puissances qui sont intervenues dans la Convention de 1858 ont eu pour but de prévenir des conflits.

Nous croyons, quant à nous, que l'examen de ces questions est pour ces Puissances un devoir de prévoyance et de dignité.

Lord Russell cite comme un exemple à l'appui des derniers actes de la Porte à l'égard du Monténégro, un fait historique du siècle dernier, la révolte des Highlanders d'Ecosse contre la Maison de Hanovre, révolte qui fut domptée par les mêmes moyens dont le Gouvernement Ottoman prétend user envers les Monténégrins.

Lord Russell nous permettra de lui faire observer que l'Ecosse se trouvait réunie depuis longtemps à l'Angleterre lorsqu'une fraction du pays, les Highlanders, essaya de renverser la Dynastie Hanovrienne ; tandis que le Monténégro n'a jamais reconnu ni souveraineté ni suzeraineté de la part de la Porte, et a su maintenir son indépendance de fait à travers une lutte de plus d'un siècle.

J'ajouterai qu'en employant la rigueur à l'égard des Highlanders, la Dynastie de Hanovre les rallia sous un Gouvernement qui leur apportait les lumières et le bien-être ; c'est pourquoi ses efforts ont abouti à faire aujourd'hui des Highlanders de loyaux sujets de Sa Majesté la Reine.

Quelque convaincus que nous soyons des bonnes intentions qui prévalent dans les conseils du Gouvernement Turc, le respect que nous professons pour le haut degré de civilisation dont s'honore à juste titre la nation Britannique ne nous permet pas d'établir sous ce rapport une analogie qui d'ailleurs n'existe, quant aux faits, ni dans leur principe, ni dans leurs conséquences probables.

Lord Russell aborde en terminant la question plus générale soulevée par l'état présent de la Turquie.

Il n'y voit que deux solutions possibles : ou bien des insurrections permanentes des sujets Slaves ou Grecs du Sultan, dont la répression devrait avoir pour effet de restreindre leurs priviléges, de rendre plus lourd le poids de l'autorité, et d'obliger celle-ci à dépenser en armements militaires les ressources qui pourraient être affectées à l'établissement de routes ou de ports,—ou bien le succès définitif des entreprises tentées par les populations Chrétiennes pour secouer la domination Musulmane,—résultat qui aboutirait à l'anarchie, à la lutte des races, et finalement à l'intervention de l'Europe et au partage des provinces Turques au prix d'une guerre générale.

Le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique nous permettra d'abord de lui rappeler que les priviléges dont jouissent les provinces Chrétiennes du Sultan réposent sur la garantie des Grandes Puissances de l'Europe, et que par conséquent elles ne sauraient être restreintes sans violer une des stipulations les plus solennelles du Traité du 18 (30) Mars 1856.

Mais, en outre, nous ne pouvons pas nous résigner à admettre que la solution d'un problème d'un si haut intérêt pour la sécurité, le repos, la prospérité générale, les principes modernes de civilisation et de progrès, et les sentiments d'humanité des Grandes Puissances de l'Europe, ne puisse se trouver ailleurs que dans les termes extrêmes où le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique la cherche exclusivement, en ne laissant d'autre alternative aux deux parties en présence qu'une lutte d'extermination réciproque, et d'autre rôle aux Grandes Puissances de l'Europe que de se diviser en appuyant, selon leurs vues particulières, les unes des répressions à outrance de la part de la Porte, les autres des aspirations passionnées de la part des populations Chrétiennes.

A notre avis, cette solution doit plutôt être cherchée dans les voies de la conciliation mieux appropriées aux intérêts en conflit et aux besoins de notre époque.

La conservation de l'Empire Ottoman est pour nous, comme pour toutes les Grandes Puissances, un principe essentielle d'équilibre Européen. Mais en présence des éléments de désordre et de lutte légués à ces contrées par les siècles passés, un pareil résultat ne saurait être atteint d'une manière solide et durable que par un système de gouvernement qui tendrait à concilier au Sultan l'affection et la reconnaissance de ses sujets Chrétiens, en donnant à leurs besoins et à leurs vœux une satisfaction légitime, et en les dotant à cet effet des conditions d'existence indispensables à une vie sociale heureuse et prospère.

Sous ce rapport, nous accueillons avec plaisir l'assurance de Lord Russell que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique désire sincèrement l'amélioration du sort des sujets Chrétiennes du Sultan.

C'est là en effet la voie que nous n'avons pas cessé de recommander, comme la

seule qui puisse conduire à l'affermissement et à la prospérité de l'Empire Ottoman dans des conditions compatibles avec les Traités existants comme avec les sympathies, les convictions, et les intérêts généraux de l'Europe.

C'est également dans ce but que nous n'avons pas cessé de convier les Grandes Puissances à un accord qui, en écartant tous les calculs fondés sur leur rivalité politique, aurait exercé une salutaire influence, d'un côté sur les Chrétiens en leur inspirant confiance et espoir, de l'autre sur le Gouvernement Turc en le fortifiant dans les bonnes intentions manifestées à plusieurs reprises par Sa Majesté le Sultan.

Nous avons la conviction que si nos conseils avaient été écoutés, ils eussent prévenu les calamités qu'on a aujourd'hui à déplorer.

Nous ne voulons pas porter un jugement trop sévère sur les actes du Gouvernement Ottoman. Nous savons qu'il a à lutter avec de grandes difficultés, et nous sommes tout disposés à lui tenir compte de ses moindres efforts. Mais nous devons aussi reconnaître que des faits tels que la guerre qui vient de s'accomplir en Herzégovine et dans le Monténégro, ou le bombardement d'une cité sans défense, ne sont pas les moyens qui peuvent conduire au but désiré.

Ce sont précisément ces mesures violentes qui, en exaltant à la fois les prétentions des vainqueurs et les ressentiments des vaincus, amènent les choses à un point où il n'y a plus de recours possible qu'à la force, et plus de solution que l'une ou l'autre des deux extrémités signalées par Lord Russell.

C'est parce que nous croyons qu'un pareil résultat n'est conforme ni à l'intérêt des Chrétiens, ni à celui du Gouvernement Turc, ni à celui des Grandes Puissances de l'Europe, que nous persistons à recommander aux premiers la prudence, au second la modération, aux dernières le bon accord qui peut seul donner à leurs conseils l'autorité nécessaire.

Le jour où le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique voudra entrer dans cette voie de conciliation, vous pouvez l'assurer qu'il nous trouvera à ses côtés, pourvu toutefois qu'il ne se renferme pas dans un optimisme que nous ne pourrions pas partager, et qu'il consacre avec nous ses efforts à ramener les populations Chrétiennes à la confiance par le sentiment réel d'une amélioration pratique.

Quant à l'éloignement exprimé par Lord Russell, à la fin de sa dépêche, pour toute co-opération à des intrigues criminelles tendantes à la dissolution des liens d'obéissance des sujets envers le souverain et au renversement de toute monarchie en Europe, nous prenons acte de cette assurance avec une sincère satisfaction, et je n'ai pas besoin d'ajouter qu'elle rencontrera toujours la plus complète adhésion de la part du Cabinet Impérial.

Votre Excellence est autorisée à donner lecture et à laisser copie de la présente dépêche à M. le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) GORTCHAKOW.

No. 1003.

Mr. Erskine to Earl Russell.—(Received November 10.)

(No. 24.)
My Lord, *Therapia, October 23, 1862.*

ALTHOUGH I was not instructed to communicate to the Porte your Lordship's despatch No. 57 of the 30th September (to Mr. Lumley), respecting the general question of interference in the affairs of Turkey, it appeared to me desirable that the Porte should be informed of the views entertained by Her Majesty's Government on a question of such importance. I therefore requested Mr. Pisani to read that despatch to Aali Pasha, and his Highness having expressed a wish to be furnished with a copy of it for the information of the Sultan, I have taken upon myself to comply with his wish. As I observe that Mr. Lumley was directed to leave a copy of this despatch with Prince Gortchakow, and it is consequently to be presumed that your Lordship does not object to the policy of Her Majesty's Government being distinctly explained also to those whom it so nearly concerns, I trust I have not misinterpreted your intention.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

No. 1004.

Mr. Erskine to Earl Russell.—(Received November 10.)

(No. 39.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, October 30, 1862.*

ON communicating to Aali Pasha the substance of your Lordship's despatch No. 608 of the 15th instant, stating that Her Majesty's Government are glad that the terms offered to the Prince of Montenegro have been accepted, I was concerned to find that a telegram was received yesterday at the Porte from Dervish Pasha which throws some doubt upon the sincerity of that acceptance.

The Pasha reports that Prince Nicholas has shown but little disposition to carry out the arrangement to which his Highness had assented on the 13th ultimo. He now alleges that he did so merely to avoid further effusion of blood, but not with any intention of abiding by the terms imposed by the Porte.

Owing to the Grand Vizier's absence with the Sultan at Nicomedia, no decision has yet been taken as to the means it will be necessary to adopt in order to compel the Prince to observe the obligations he has contracted.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

No. 1005.

Mr. Erskine to Earl Russell.—(Received November 10.)

(No. 47.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, October 30, 1862.*

THE Grand Vizier has spoken to me with great satisfaction of the cordial reception experienced by Mahomed Djemil Pasha, on presenting his letters of credence as Ottoman Ambassador to the Emperor Napoleon.

His Highness appeared to attach special importance to the expression "conduite courageuse," used by the Emperor in replying to the Ottoman Ambassador's discourse, as he is of opinion that His Majesty, by this allusion, could only have intended the Sultan's recent policy towards Montenegro.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

No. 1006.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received November 10.)

(No. 406. Confidential.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, November 5, 1862.*

THE Turkish Chargé d'Affaires called upon me last week, and said that in Prince Gortchakow's despatch to Baron Brunnow of ~~September~~ October 10[23] published in the Official Journal, there were assertions relative to the conduct of the Government of the Sultan which he felt bound to notice. The Russian Minister affirmed that the Porte had made no communication to him which could lead him to expect any demands upon Montenegro similar to those embodied in the conditions of peace concluded with that country, and especially such as the construction of the military road. Yet, said M. Conémènos, the Porte had distinctly signified to the Russian Cabinet, subsequent to its original declaration, that "solid guarantees" would be demanded from Montenegro pointing to future security and the maintenance of a durable peace. M. Conémènos asked me whether I saw any objection to his addressing a note to Prince Gortchakow on the subject.

I said to my Turkish colleague that I saw no objection to his doing so. The communication referred to had passed through the Turkish Legation here. The Vice-Chancellor ought to be set right on the subject.

On the following day Conémènos Bey called on me again, and read me the draft of his note. I took the liberty of suggesting the modification of a passage which appeared rather provocatory though strictly appropriate. My colleague was so good as to accept my advice, and the note was given by him in person to Prince Gortchakow in the accompanying form. The Prince has not sent him any written

reply, but merely made some verbal animadversions on it similar to those made to me, as reported in my despatch No. 389 of the 27th ultimo.

I considered it desirable that Conémenos Bey should address the Vice-Chancellor spontaneously on this occasion. Every manifestation of spirit and independence on the part of the Turkish mission here is useful. It recalls the Russian Government to a sense of their present relations towards the Government of the Sultan, and such a step on the part of Conémenos Bey is particularly becoming, as he is a Greek by race and religion, though a faithful servant of the Porte.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

Inclosure in No. 1006.

Conémenos Bey to Prince Gortchakow.

St. Pétersbourg, le 28 Octobre, 1862.

Mon Prince,

LE "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" du $\frac{13}{25}$ de ce mois a publié une dépêche de votre Excellence à M. le Baron Brunnow et destinée à être communiquée un Cabinet de Londres.

Votre Excellence rappelle que la Sublime Porte, au début de la guerre entre la Turquie et le Monténégro, avait annoncé l'intention de respecter le *statu quo* administratif et territorial de la Montagne. Votre Excellence ne voit pas cependant dans cette déclaration un engagement irrévocable. Elle admet que la Sublime Porte eut été dégagée de toute obligation à deux conditions.

Il aurait fallu en premier lieu que durant le cours des hostilités elle eut fait connaître aux Puissances qu'elle ne se regardait plus comme liée par les pourparlers antérieurs.

Il était nécessaire aussi qu'à l'époque où la Sublime Porte a fait la déclaration dont nous parlons, la réponse du Prince Nicolas eût été inconnue.

Dans cette hypothèse le Gouvernement du Sultan, mon auguste Souverain, aurait été complètement dégagé même d'une promesse positive par le fait que le Prince Nicolas n'a accepté que d'une manière évasive le premier ultimatum d'Omer Pacha.

Votre Excellence semble croire que la Sublime Porte ne s'est pas conformée à ces deux conditions et qu'elle a aussi franchi la limite qu'elle avait jugé convenable de poser elle-même à l'exercice d'un droit incontestable.

Vous ne trouverez pas mauvais, mon Prince, que je discute avec votre Excellence les faits qui ont donné lieu au dissentiment existant sur ce point entre nos deux Gouvernements d'autant plus que les principes proclamés par elle-même me donneraient l'espoir de faire disparaître tout malentendu.

Un exposé succint des faits relatifs à la pacification du Monténégro sera le meilleur moyen d'élucider cette question.

Vers le 13 Mai dernier Khalil Bey a fait connaître à votre Excellence le contenu d'une dépêche de son Altesse Aali Pacha, en date du 28 Avril, traitant de la nécessité dans laquelle se trouverait la Sublime Porte d'avoir recours aux armes si le Prince Nicolas n'acceptait pas l'ultimatum d'Omer Pacha. M. le Ministre de Turquie annonça en même temps que le Gouvernement du Sultan respecterait le *statu quo*, l'indépendance territoriale et administrative du Monténégro, ce n'est que plusieurs jours après cette déclaration de la Sublime Porte qu'elle reçut la réponse du Prince Nicolas; cette pièce ne pût donc avoir aucune influence sur une résolution prise déjà un mois auparavant par les Conseillers du Sultan.

C'est dans les premiers jours du mois de Juin que Khalil Bey, dans un entrevue avec votre Excellence, lui annonça que le Prince Nicolas, malgré sa promesse d'accepter les ouvertures qui lui avaient été faites, commettait de nouvelles aggressions et que même l'action du Monténégro était devenue plus évidente et plus officielle qu'auparavant.

La Sublime Porte ayant perdu tout espoir de faire rentrer le différend dans les voies pacifiques ne pouvait plus attendre que de la force la reconnaissance de ces droits.

Le succès vint couronner les entreprises de l'armée Ottomane. Les Gouvernements Français et Autrichien, désireux de faire cesser l'effusion du sang, conçurent le projet de proposer à la Sublime Porte une suspension d'armes à la condition de

faire accepter par le Monténégro l'ultimatum d'Omer Pacha. Le Cabinet Anglais consulta la Sublime Porte pour savoir comment ces propositions seraient accueillies. Son Altesse Aali Pacha répondit le 11 Juin que le Sultan désirait, aussi vivement que qui que ce soit, mettre un terme aux hostilités, mais qu'il ne pourrait faire cesser les opérations militaires quand même l'ultimatum serait accepté. Les dernières négociations lui ayant appris combien peu il devait compter sur les promesses des Monténégrins, la Sublime Porte se voyait donc dans l'obligation d'exiger de garanties solides et capables d'empêcher le renouvellement d'un état de choses qui lui imposait de si grands sacrifices. Elle voulait savoir avant d'accepter ou de réjéter une suspension d'armes quelles étaient les garanties que les Monténégrins offriraient directement.

Khalil Bey a fait connaître le 14 du mois de Juin à votre Excellence le contenu de la dépêche du Gouvernement Anglais, ainsi que de la réponse de la Sublime Porte. Pareille communication a été faite aux autres Puissances.

D'ailleurs dès le commencement du mois de Juin lorsque Khalil Bey avait exposé à votre Excellence les raisons pour lesquelles il était momentanément impossible d'établir un accord avec le Prince Nicolas, il lui a fait pressentir que la Sublime Porte se verrait désormais dans la nécessité d'exiger de nouvelles garanties.

Les deux conditions demandées par votre Excellence se trouvent donc réunies. La Sublime Porte ne connaissait point la réponse du Prince Nicolas lorsqu'elle a déclaré qu'elle respecterait le *statu quo* territorial et administratif de la Montagne. Elle a fait connaître pendant le cours des opérations militaires que de nouvelles garanties lui étaient désormais nécessaire.

Le Gouvernement du Sultan était donc en droit d'entourer cette reprise des anciennes relations de garanties destinées à rendre la pacification durable. Ces garanties n'enlèvent rien à l'autonomie de la Montagne. Je puis me dispenser de discuter ce point, me référent à la réponse faite par son Altesse Aali Pacha à la protestation du Prince Labanow.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) CONEMENOS.

No. 1007.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(*Received November* 10.)

(No. 360.)

My Lord,

Vienna, November 5, 1862.

ON the occasion of my first interview with Count Rechberg since I returned to Vienna, his Excellency spoke with great satisfaction of the complete understanding which had existed between the two Governments during the late negotiations concerning the affairs of Servia and Montenegro.

He rejoiced that they had been so far successful that peace was re-established, and that there was some prospect of tranquillity in those countries. How long the arrangement between the Porte and Montenegro would remain in force he was not, however, prepared to say, for he had just heard that Prince Nicholas was projecting a modification of the arrangements entered into with the Porte, and intelligence had reached him from Scutari that His Highness had appealed to the French and Russian Consuls for advice, in consequence of the ill-will which existed throughout the Principality respecting the roads and forts to be constructed for the advantage of the Turkish Government, and because he felt unable to control the opposition which had been raised on the subject.

Count Rechberg was not aware of the answers that have been returned by the two Consuls to this communication, but he apprehends that this first step is only a precursor to others of a more pressing nature.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 1008.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 1133.)
Foreign Office, November 15, 1862.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches on the subject of Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 1009.

Mr. Erskine to Earl Russell.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 58.)
Constantinople, November 6, 1862.

My Lord,

THE French Ambassador continues, as strenuously as ever, to oppose the Porte's intention to construct a military road across Montenegro, defended by block-houses.

His Excellency has informed the Porte that the Emperor is personally averse to the project, and when at Biarritz repeatedly wrote to M. Thouvenel to insist on its abandonment. M. Drouyn de Lhuys' first despatch to Constantinople was to renew the instructions from M. Thouvenel in this sense. For the moment, M. de Moustier has consented to suspend further remonstrance, because Aali Pasha informed his Excellency that it was his intention to address the French Government through the Ottoman Ambassador at Paris; but M. de Moustier assured me that on the failure of that attempt to modify the view taken by the French Government, he should resume his position here, and leave the Porte no peace until it agreed to give up the block-houses.

The language held by the French Ambassador is, that the road itself is in the interest both of the Porte and Montenegro, and that, as far as the latter is concerned, Turkey may impose what conditions it pleases on its vanquished enemy, but that, as far as the Great Powers are concerned, the Sultan is bound, by engagements taken before he entered Montenegro with his troops, not to do anything calculated to modify the *status quo ante*. The Porte, it is true, denies that there is any intention of militarily occupying Montenegro; but this is a mere subterfuge, as, veil it as you will, a chain of block-houses across Montenegro garrisoned by Turkish troops is nothing less than a military occupation.

Aali Pasha has addressed an instruction to Mehmed Djemil Pasha, firmly asserting the Sultan's right to carry out the arrangement accepted by Prince Nicholas, and the negotiation is thus momentarily transferred to Paris; but I have thought it my duty to report the language held to me by the Marquis de Moustier, as I scarcely anticipated such decided opposition on the part of the French Government from M. Thouvenel's tone when speaking to Earl Cowley.

A Cabinet Council was held on the 4th instant at Aali Pasha's, to consider the refusal of Prince Nicholas to abide by the terms he has accepted. The Cabinet decided, without hesitation, that it would not give way, and an instruction was addressed to Dervish Pasha by telegraph to notify to the Prince that the Porte will hold him to his engagements.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

No. 1010.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 415.)
St. Petersburgh, November 11, 1862.

My Lord,

AN article taken from the "Times" newspaper, relative to the correspondence between your Lordship and Prince Gortchakow, on the affairs of Montenegro, was translated in the "Official Journal" of the $\frac{25\text{th October}}{5\text{th November}}$.

That article on the part of a newspaper so important and powerful was calculated to have a bad effect abroad by disseminating erroneous impressions of the

* Nos. 1002 and 1006.

state of public feeling in England respecting the East and the policy of Her Majesty's Government in that quarter.

In the "Official Journal" of this morning, an article is inserted from the "Post," and accompanied by a long controversial commentary. The "Post," in my humble judgment, goes rather too far on the other side, and does not state the points at issue with perfect accuracy.

For the language of the newspapers I know that Her Majesty's Government are in no degree responsible, and it may be superfluous for me to offer an opinion on this subject. I cannot but often feel a regret, however, with a view to a just appreciation abroad of the sentiments of Her Majesty's Government, that the leading newspapers, and especially those which habitually support Her Majesty's Government, do not address themselves to two objects with greater attention:—

1. To prove that the support which Her Majesty's Government has given since the Peace of 1856 to the Government of the Sultan has been just, necessary, and conformable to Treaty; and—

2. To show that this support involves no difference whatever to the welfare of the Christians of the East, but is consistent with their true interest; that all the concessions made by the Porte in past times to the Christians were chiefly owing to the incessant counsels of Her Majesty's Government; that those reforms have not been so barren of good results as the French or Russians are pleased to affirm; and that Her Majesty's Government has lost no part of its sympathy for liberal innovations and social progress in the Ottoman Empire, but intends to support measures of that character whenever they are consistent with the existence and safety of the Porte.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

Inclosure in No. 1010.

Extract from the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" of $\frac{\text{October 25th}}{\text{November 5th}}$ 1862.

LA publication récente des dépêches de Lord Russell et du Prince Gortchakow, concernant le Monténégro et les affaires générales de la Turquie a suggéré au "Morning Post" du 3 Novembre les réflexions suivantes:—

"Le Gouvernement Russe ne veut pas se voir finalement exclu du Monténégro sans essayer de combattre. La correspondance que nous publions, et qui a été échangée entre le Prince Gortchakow et Lord Russell, indique très-clairement cette détermination. La Russie a, pendant un demi-siècle, et cela par diverses raisons, travaillé à transférer l'allégeance du Monténégro de la Turquie à elle-même, et à établir son protectorat sur ce petit État en place de la suzeraineté Turque. Elle est allée si loin dans cette voie d'intrigues qu'elle s'est proclamée, il y a trente ans, protectrice du Monténégro. Il n'y avait sans doute pas plus de fondement à cette prétention que si la Russie avait revendiqué un protectorat sur l'Ile de Malte, ou la France sur les Iles du Canal, dépendances Anglaises qui toutes deux étaient, comme le Monténégro, en possession de certains droits et priviléges.

"Cette prétention de la Russie n'étant reconnue ni par la Turquie ni par le reste de l'Europe, ne présente qu'un mot vide de sens, et s'il fallait un déni formel, il a été donné par la clause du Traité de 1856, qui prescrit qu'aucun droit de protection exclusive ne sera exercé par aucune Puissance isolée sur les sujets Chrétiens de la Porte. Mais l'établissement d'une pareille influence dans le Monténégro a été la plus hautement prisée de toutes les intrigues de la Russie au sud du Danube. Le Monténégro, dans les mains de la Russie, aurait été un levier contre la Turquie et l'Autriche.

"L'histoire de la politique Russe à cet égard est très-curieuse. Mais pour la bien comprendre, nous devons remonter au Traité d'Andrinople en 1829.

"La Russie avait autrefois entraîné l'Autriche dans ses guerres avec la Turquie. Mais aussitôt que l'Autriche s'aperçut qu'elle ne faisait que tirer les marrons du feu pour son alliée du nord et que, dans l'éventualité d'un partage de la Turquie, elle ne recevrait, comme précédemment en Pologne, que la part du chacal, cette Puissance adopta une politique conservatrice à l'est de l'Europe. La Russie, dès lors trouvant impossible soit de gagner l'appui de l'Autriche contre les Turcs, soit de conquérir la Turquie sans l'appui de l'Autriche, s'efforça de paralyser l'influence Autrichienne.

En conséquence, à la fin de sa guerre contre les Turcs, en 1829, le Traité de Paix qu'elle dicta à Andrinople fut dirigé autant contre l'Autriche que contre la Turquie. Ce Traité donna à la Russie les bouches du Danube et la mit à même de fermer ce qui était alors la véritable artère du commerce Autrichien. Odessa acquit ainsi à peu près le monopole du commerce de la Mer Noire. L'Autriche alors développa son commerce de Trieste et le défendit par l'arsenal maritime de Pola, en avant de Trieste, sur la côte orientale de l'Adriatique. Aussitôt la Russie travailla à établir une menace permanente contre Pola et Trieste, plus bas encore sur l'Adriatique. Dans ce but, elle tâcha d'obtenir le magnifique port de Cattaro, qui était en possession de la Turquie. Sa seule voie pour arriver à Cattaro était par le Monténégro.

"Les Monténégrins, comme un coup d'œil sur la carte l'indique, sont un petit peuple entièrement isolé, avec les vieux Musulmans de la Bosnie au nord, et une petite bande de territoire Turc les dominant à l'ouest et les coupant de la Méditerranée. C'est sur cette bande qu'est Cattaro. La Russie insista donc pour que le Monténégro eût un accès à la mer et réclama longtemps Cattaro en sa faveur, après avoir d'abord fait reconnaître aux Monténégrins son protectorat.

"La concession de Cattaro au Monténégro, qui sans Lord Palmerston, aurait probablement été faite, aurait été à peu près l'équivalent de sa cession à la Russie. La Turquie aurait ainsi été menacée à la fois de Sévastopol et de Cattaro, et Trieste aurait été menacée de ce dernier port autant qu'elle avait été lésée par l'expulsion de son commerce des bouches du Danube. Telle est l'histoire des intrigues Russes à l'égard du Monténégro, et il n'est pas étonnant que le Gouvernement Russe soit extrêmement vexé en assistant à l'occupation militaire du Monténégro par les troupes du Sultan. Sa dernière carte est jouée, son dernier espoir perdu de ce côté, si le Sultan ne peut pas être contraint à rendre aux Monténégrins leurs priviléges.

"Le Prince Gortchakow attaque par conséquent très-vivement la conduite du Gouvernement Turc, en se fondant sur deux raisons: en premier lieu, il dit qu'une occupation militaire et l'érection de blockhaus dans le Monténégro équivaut à la destruction de ses droits politiques; et que cela est contraire au Traité de Paris, qui, dit-il, garantit partout le *statu quo*. Examinons ce premier point. Il faut se rappeler que cet argument est émis en réponse à la dépêche du Comte Russell affirmant que le Sultan n'a fait qu'exercer les droits légitimes du conquérant. Le Prince Gortchakow essaye donc de démontrer que le Traité de Paris dépouille le Sultan de ses droits ordinaires de conquête, et que par conséquent les Grandes Puissances sont obligées d'intervenir et de protéger le Monténégro. Mais, en premier lieu, nous contestons que le Traité de Paris garantisse le *statu quo*. S'il en était ainsi comment le Gouvernement Russe aurait-il convoqué une Conférence à Constantinople sur les affaires de Servie, en vue de modifier ce *status quo*? Ce que le Traité a garanti, ce sont les droits généraux des Chrétiens; et il les a spécialement placés sus la garantie des Grandes Puissances, pourvu qu'il n'y eût aucun droit d'ingérence isolée de la part d'aucune de ces Puissances. La seule chose qui était du ressort de la Russie était de demander une Conférence pour examiner si les Monténégrins n'avaient pas des droits à la protection des cinq Grandes Puissances. Si la Russie voulait le faire, la question serait de décider si le Traité de Paris a entendu pourvoir à autre chose qu'une aggression spontanée de la Porte contre ses dépendances Chrétiennes.

"Mais si les prévisions du Traité pouvaient recevoir cette interprétation, ce Traité équivaudrait à la destruction de l'Empire Ottoman;—ce serait dire à toutes ses dépendances qu'elles ont tout à gagner et rien à perdre à rompre la foi due à leur Suzerain. 'Soulevez-vous contre le Sultan tant qu'il vous plaira. Nous vous garantissons, quoi qu'il arrive, tous les droits que vous possédiez auparavant.' C'est l'interprétation que le Prince Gortchakow voudrait donner à un Traité dont le but avoué est de soutenir et de fortifier l'Empire Ottoman! Quelle a été notre propre politique aux Indes? Nous nous étions engagés par Traité à soutenir le Gouvernement indigène du Punjaub. Mais quand le Punjaub est venu à plusieurs reprises nous faire la guerre, nous avons finalement supprimé et annexé cet Etat. Est-ce que personne conteste que ces violations de foi et ces irruptions de notre territoire par le Gouvernement indigène annulait notre reconnaissance primitive de ses droits?

"La seconde proposition du Prince Gortchakow, que le mélange des Turcs et des Chrétiens dans le Monténégro est contraire à ce qu'il appelle le principe général de leur séparation, mérite à peine d'être relevée. Ce qu'il appelle un principe général

est contraire au fait. Est-ce que les Turcs et les Chrétiens ne vivent pas ensemble, et amicalement, dans la plupart des grandes villes de la Turquie d'Europe et d'Asie? Il suffit de citer comme exemple Constantinople et Smyrne. La question actuellement soulevée est exactement pareille à celle qui a conduit à la guerre de 1854. La Russie n'a pas beaucoup gagné à ce mouvement, et si elle est sage, elle ne renouvellera pas l'expérience."

Le haut patronage qu'à tort ou à raison on attribue à cet organe de la presse donne à ses appréciations une valeur que, sans cette considération, leur caractère passionné leur enlèverait aux yeux de la plupart des lecteurs éclairés. Nous croyons donc lui devoir quelques mots de réponse.

Nous ne nous occuperons pas du cours d'histoire Russe par lequel il débute. Ce n'est qu'un résumé de toutes les banalités accumulées depuis cinquante ans à l'usage des badauds de tous les pays contre l'ambition effrénée du colosse Moscovite.

Le "Morning Post" avait sans doute sous les yeux la carte des empiétements qui de Gibraltar à Aden et Périm conduisent l'Angleterre jusqu'aux Indes, lorsqu'il a dressé le tableau des envahissements médités par la politique Russe contre la Turquie et l'Autriche, d'un côté par les Principautés du Danube, de l'autre par le Monténégro et le port de Cattaro.

Nous avons peine à comprendre qu'un journal sérieux puisse de nos jours se livrer à de pareils travertissements politiques.

La Russie a suivi dans sa marche la même loi qui a présidé à celle de tous les Etats, et elle a subi comme tout le monde le courant des idées de chaque époque. Elle a dû d'abord travailler à atteindre ses frontières naturelles, et la mer, ce grand et unique agent de civilisation. Elle a pu, comme d'autres, rêver des conquêtes à une époque où le système des arrondissements et des contre-poids qui prévalait dans la politique générale entraînait les Etats à remanier perpétuellement la carte au prix de guerres continuelles.

Mais il faut une dose d'aveuglement peu ordinaire pour ne pas reconnaître qu'à dater de 1815 la Russie est devenue l'Etat le plus conservateur de l'Europe, par principe et par intérêt. Peupler son immense territoire, en développer les richesses naturelles, le conquérir à la civilisation agricole, industrielle, et commerciale, et dans ce but maintenir la paix et l'équilibre général afin de ne pas être détournée de ce travail intérieur, telle devait être son unique préoccupation; il est vraiment singulier que tout en prêtant au Gouvernement Russe un prestige d'habileté et de profondeur politique exceptionnel, on lui refuse l'intelligence de ses intérêts les plus clairs et les plus positifs.

Nous ne voulons pas donner au "Morning Post" des leçons d'histoire moderne. Cela nous entraînerait beaucoup trop loin et nous serions probablement fort mal accueillis.

Nous prendrons seulement la liberté de faire observer à ce journal que la politique de l'Empereur Nicholas a valu à l'Europe et à l'Orient vingt-cinq ans de paix au milieu de complications très-graves, tandis que depuis six ans il n'y a de stabilité nulle part, en Orient moins que partout ailleurs. Les éléments d'antagonisme que les siècles passés ont accumulés sur ce sol brûlant, contenus jadis par l'action de la Russie, se dressent aujourd'hui les uns contre les autres avec une animosité que rien n'arrête plus, et qui promet d'amener des calamités affligeantes pour la civilisation et l'humanité, si les Grandes Puissances de l'Europe y ajoutent les complications de leurs propres rivalités, au lieu de s'entendre pour apaiser les passions et concilier les intérêts.

Mais arrivons aux questions du jour.

Le "Morning Post" reproche au Cabinet Russe d'attaquer la conduite du Gouvernement Turc; d'abord parce que l'occupation militaire et la construction de blockhaus équivaut à la destruction des droits politiques du Monténégro, ensuite parce que ces mesures sont en contravention avec le Traité de Paris, qui a garanti partout le *statu quo*. Il en résulterait que le Prince Gortchakow aurait invoqué le Traité de Paris pour contester au Sultan les droits ordinaires de la conquête.

Il nous est impossible de ne pas relever la mauvaise foi de cette assertion, car la dépêche du Prince Gortchakow était trop explicite sur ce point pour permettre de croire à un malentendu.

Le "Morning Post" confond, pour les besoins de son argumentation, la question du Monténégro avec celle des garanties consignées au Traité de Paris en faveur des droits et immunités acquises aux provinces vassales du Sultan.

Le Monténégro n'a jamais été une province vassale de la Turquie; le "Morning Post" constate lui-même que ce petit pays, enclavé entre les territoires de la Turquie

et de l'Autriche, a su, par sa seule énergie, conserver pendant des siècles son indépendance de fait.

Le Traité de Paris n'avait donc pas à s'en occuper, et par là les Puissances ont rendu un hommage tacite à la position particulière de ce pays. Il n'en a été question qu'incidemment dans l'un des Protocoles. Les Plénipotentiaires de Russie, interpellés par le Comte de Buol sur les intentions du Cabinet Impérial, quant à un droit de protectorat à l'égard du Monténégro, ont répondu que la Russie n'avait avec ce pays pas d'autres relations que celles qui naissent des sympathies des Monténégrins pour la Russie et des dispositions bienveillantes de la Russie pour ces Montagnards. Le Plénipotentiaire Turc a déclaré à son tour que son Gouvernement, tout en considérant le Monténégro comme partie intégrante de l'Empire Ottoman, n'avait pas l'intention de rien changer au *statu quo* existant.

Le Monténégro est donc sorti de cette discussion tel que l'histoire l'a produit, c'est-à-dire comme un pays indépendant de fait, ayant des liens d'amitié avec la Russie, et l'assurance du maintien du *statu quo* par la Porte.

Deux années plus tard, la guerre ayant néanmoins éclaté, l'Europe est intervenue pour l'empêcher, parce qu'apparemment elle n'a pas cru pouvoir rester indifférente à un événement qui affectait le repos de l'Orient et la paix générale. Sans préjuger aucune question de droit, elle a cherché dans une délimitation plus précise et plus équitable des frontières une garantie contre le retour des hostilités. Ce fut alors que la Russie et la France conseillèrent à la Porte de compléter cet arrangement pacifique en accordant au Monténégro, non pas le port de Cattaro, comme l'affirme le "Morning Post," mais simplement un accès à la mer; non pas pour créer un Gibraltar Russe dans l'Adriatique, selon l'assertion du journal Anglais, mais simplement afin que les Monténégrins, cessant d'étouffer dans leurs frontières sèches, pouvant recevoir les subsistances qui leur manquent et échanger leurs produits, fussent mis à même de s'adonner à des occupations pacifiques.

Ces conseils n'ont pas été écoutés. Toutefois une Convention fut conclue à Constantinople, et la signature de l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre y figure à côté de celles des Représentants des Grandes Puissances et de la Porte.

Cet état de choses dura deux années, et lorsque enfin, en dernier lieu, le Gouvernement Ottoman se décida à faire la guerre aux Monténégrins pour le redressement de ses griefs, il déclara spontanément et officiellement aux Grandes Puissances que rien ne serait changé au *statu quo* politique et territorial de la Montagne.

C'est sur cette base que le Gouvernement Russe s'est fondé pour apprécier les conditions de paix imposées par le Gouvernement Turc aux Monténégrins, et il a dû reconnaître que sans contester les droits de belligérants du Sultan, l'établissement d'une route militaire et de blockhaus n'était pas d'accord avec l'engagement spontanément pris par la Porte vis-à-vis des Grandes Puissances, quant au maintien du *statu quo*.

Mais la question du Monténégro n'est pour le "Morning Post" qu'un épisode qu'il arrange à sa façon, afin de pouvoir émettre un principe nouveau et fort inattendu quant à la question générale de garanties consignées dans le Traité de Paris en faveur des Chrétiens de la Turquie.

Ce principe mérite d'être attentivement médité.

Lord Russell avait déjà insinué en passant, dans sa dépêche récemment publiée, que si les sujets Grecs ou Slaves du Sultan se révoltaient, leurs priviléges seraient retirés et les ressources du pays consacrées à l'entretien d'une force militaire.

Le "Morning Post" est plus explicite. Il conteste que le Traité de Paris garantisse le *statu quo*; s'il en était ainsi, dit-il, pourquoi la Russie a-t-elle demandé une Conférence sur les affaires de Servie, en vue de modifier ce *statu quo*? Selon le "Morning Post," le Traité de Paris n'a pas entendu autre chose que garantir les Chrétiens dépendants de la Porte contre une agression spontanée du Gouvernement Turc. Autrement, cela équivaudrait au renversement de l'Empire Ottoman, que le Traité de Paris a eu pour but de soutenir et de fortifier. Ce serait faire comprendre aux Chrétiens qu'ils ont tout à gagner et rien à perdre en rompant la foi due à leur suzerain; ce serait leur dire:—"Soulevez-vous contre le Sultan aussi souvent que vous le voudrez, nous vous garantissons, quoi qu'il arrive, tous les droits que vous possédiez auparavant."

Si nous professions des doctrines aussi passionnées que le "Morning Post," nous pourrions lui répondre en renversant son argumentation, et à notre tour l'accuser de dire aux Turcs:—

"Ne vous embarrassez pas des garanties qui protégent vos provinces Chrétiennes contre les abus d'une autorité arbitraire; multipliez contre eux les mesures

de violence; s'ils se soulèvent, vous en profiterez pour restreindre leurs priviléges; plus vos rigueurs les pousseront à des actes de désespoir, plus vous resserrez les chaînes, plus vous rendrez pesant le joug que vous leur préparez, jusqu'à ce que toute résistance étant brisée, toute énergie noyée dans le sang, vous établissiez sur des ruines une autorité désormais sans obstacles et sans limites!"

Nous demanderions alors au "Morning Post" ce que deviendraient, non pas les principes de la civilisation et de l'humanité, ce sont des plantes qui ne fleurissent point pour lui sur le sol de l'Orient, mais le respect des Traités et de l'autorité de l'Europe, de l'Europe qui, après avoir supporté tant de sacrifices pour régler enfin cette formidable question d'Orient qui ne lui laissait pas de repos, après avoir hautement répudié toute idée de vouloir se faire la complice de l'oppression des Chrétiens, s'est concertée dans un Congrès pour placer leurs immunités sous sa garantie collective, qui les a inscrites dans un Traité solennel comme un legs de l'histoire placé désormais sous la sauvegarde de son honneur, et qui devrait assister avec indifférence à la destruction d'une œuvre dont la ruine coûterait plus de sang, de misère et de souffrances qu'il n'en a fallu pour l'édifier!

Mais, encore une fois, nous protestons contre ces solutions extrêmes qui, selon l'expression du Prince Gortchakow, "ne laissent pas d'autre alternative aux parties en présence qu'une lutte d'extermination réciproque, et d'autre rôle aux Grandes Puissances de l'Europe que de se diviser en appuyant selon leurs vues particulières, les unes des répressions à outrance de la part de la Porte, les autres des aspirations passionnées de la part des populations Chrétiennes."

Non, certes, nous ne croyons pas que l'Europe doive dire aux Chrétiens: Soulevez-vous à l'abri des priviléges qui vous sont garantis; mais nous ne croyons pas non plus qu'elle doive dire aux Turcs: Poussez les Chrétiens au désespoir et à la révolte, afin d'abuser du droit de la force pour étouffer leurs libertés; nous ne croyons même pas qu'elle doive dire aux uns et aux autres: Égorgez-vous, nous traiterons avec les derniers survivants!

L'Europe, à notre avis, a d'autres devoirs et d'autres intérêts. Le problème oriental est posé par l'histoire. Il ne dépend de personne de l'effacer de ses annales. Deux éléments sont en présence, séparés par un profond antagonisme.

La tâche de l'Europe est de les réconcilier. Elle y est appelée par ses engagements solennels, par l'intérêt de son honneur et de son repos. L'indifférence ne lui est pas permise. Elle ne peut pas tolérer, encore moins encourager une situation qui ne laisse entrevoir d'autre issue qu'une lutte d'extermination.

La Russie a fait tous ses efforts pour l'empêcher; elle n'a pas cessé de convier les Grandes Puissances à une entente qui seule pouvait prévenir de déplorables extrémités en calmant les passions et les haines, en modérant les prétentions réciproques et en conciliant les intérêts.

La Russie n'a nullement provoqué une conférence sur les affaires de Servie pour modifier le *statu quo*, comme le prétend le "Morning Post." Ce *statu quo* était rompu par les canons de Belgrade. Un conflit était imminent; les Consuls se sont interposés, celui d'Angleterre en tête, et ils ont arrêté l'effusion du sang. La Russie n'a pas dévié de son attitude modératrice. Là comme partout, elle a appuyé les mesures qui, à son avis, pouvaient effacer les traces de ce funeste événement et en prévenir le retour.

Le "Morning Post" fait bon marché du principe de la séparation des races, et il cite l'exemple de Smyrne, où Chrétiens et Musulmans coexistent en paix. Nous ne demanderions certes pas mieux que de voir cette bonne intelligence s'introduire partout dans l'Empire Ottoman, mais devons-nous rappeler au "Morning Post" les horribles massacres qui viennent périodiquement troubler cette harmonie?

Tout le monde a dû reconnaître qu'en Servie la source du mal provenait du contact des races, et l'on est convenu de les séparer. Or ce contact condamné en Servie, on veut l'introduire dans le Monténégro, où jamais il n'a existé! Si la Russie a protesté contre un pareil système, ce n'est pas seulement parce qu'il détruisait le *statu quo* que la Porte avait promis de maintenir, mais encore parce qu'il tendait à créer une situation violante qui devait perpétuer les conflits.

Le "Morning Post" se préoccupe fort peu de cette considération. Cette feuille ne brille pas en général par un goût excessif pour la paix et le repos du continent. A son avis, l'Angleterre, qui est très-loin et qui est une île, n'a pas lieu de se soucier qu'il y ait quelques millions de Chrétiens de plus ou de moins; pourvu que la force reste en définitive à l'autorité Turque, peu lui importe qu'elle règne sur un désert ensanglanté!

Mais c'est précisément là que réside la grande divergence entre nos vues et celles

du "Morning Post." Sa politique de boute-feu ne nous paraît pas seulement un scandale, mais encore une faute, parce qu'elle nous semble inconciliable avec le but même qu'elle se propose, c'est-à-dire le maintien de l'Empire Ottoman dans les seules conditions qui peuvent lui assurer une existence solide et durable.

Nous en appelons sans crainte au jugement de nos contemporains et à celui de l'histoire du soin de décider lequel des deux systèmes est plus conforme, nous ne dirons pas à l'esprit et aux mœurs de notre siècle, mais même aux vrais intérêts de l'Empire Ottoman, et par conséquent à la sécurité de l'Europe,—celui qui tend à encourager le Gouvernement Turc dans une voie de violences dont le résultat est d'envenimer les haines et de perpétuer des conflits qui ne sauraient contribuer à la prospérité d'aucun Etat,—ou celui qui a pour but de ramener la concorde entre le Sultan et ses sujets Chrétiens par de sages transactions, et qui, écartant toute possibilité d'arrière-pensées exclusives, convie toutes les Grandes Puissances à s'entendre en vue de cette œuvre de conciliation.

Nous en appelons au jugement de la nation Anglaise elle-même. Nous avons trop d'estime pour le sens moral et l'esprit éclairé qui la distinguent pour admettre que les provocations du "Morning Post" reflètent fidèlement son opinion. Nous en avons pour garant un autre organe de la presse Anglaise, mieux placé pour représenter la pensée du pays. Dans un article que nous avons reproduit, le "Times" n'admet pas "que l'Angleterre, qui a encouragé les Lombards, les Romains, et les Napolitains, puisse songer un seul instant à soutenir une domination Musulmane dix fois plus onéreuse que tout ce que les Italiens ont jamais eu à supporter."

Pour nous qui ne voulons ni la chute des uns ni l'extermination des autres, parce que nous y voyons un danger pour tout le monde, nous persistons à croire que la vérité est entre ces extrêmes; elle est dans le système de conciliation indiqué par la dépêche du Prince Gortchakow, système fondé sur un accord de l'Europe et sur une entente des parties en conflit, qui ne cherche point à faire des vainqueurs et des vaincus, mais à amener par la diplomatie, entre des intérêts que l'histoire a faits divergents, des transactions conformes aux tendances progressives de notre époque, à la sécurité et à la prospérité de tous.

C'est là la politique que nous défendons; nous avons la ferme confiance que l'opinion publique éclairée de l'Europe nous donnera raison, et si le système de violences patroné par le "Morning Post" venait à prévaloir, nous lui en laisserons porter toute la responsabilité.

No. 1011.

Mr. Erskine to Earl Russell.—(Received November 17.)

(No. 60.) *Constantinople, November 6, 1862.*

My Lord,

I TOOK advantage of Mr. Holmes' despatch of the 18th ultimo, to Sir H. Bulwer, to urge the Porte to carry into effect the reforms which were promised by the Sultan when Omer Pasha first proceeded to the Herzegovina in 1861, and endeavoured, with the aid of the European Powers, to induce the insurgents to make their submission.

With this view I requested Mr. Pisani to read Mr. Holmes' despatch both to the Grand Vizier and Aali Pasha, and to remind them that an opportunity now offered, which might not occur again, of conciliating the good-will of the people of the Herzegovina without any appearance of acting at the dictation of foreign Powers.

Their Highnesses assured Mr. Pisani that so fully is the Porte alive to the expediency of adopting the policy to which I have referred, that directions have already been sent to the Governor of the Herzegovina to carry out immediately all the measures of reform which were promised by Omer Pasha in the Sultan's name. The Austrian Internuncio has also given the Porte similar advice.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

No. 1012.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 1138.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November 17, 1862.*

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches relating to Montenegro.*

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 1013.

Consul Paton to Earl Russell.—(Received November 18.)

(Separate.)

Sir, *Ragusa, October 10, 1862.*

ACTIVE hostilities in Montenegro having terminated for the present, I avail myself of your passage through this country to offer a few observations of a speculative and historical character.

I am frequently impressed with the remarkable failure of the designs attributed to Russia which the gradual evolution of the Illyrian question presents. For her own ends she fostered the movement of the Serbo-Illyrian race on the Danube and the Adriatic, but to her surprise and disappointment it has, for the last twenty years, taken more and more an independent and national direction, and since the military, political, and financial bankruptcy of the Crimean War, we see her influence shaken and balanced even in the previously constant Montenegro. The independence of Poland, not the aggrandizement of Russia, is the foreign combination wished for by those southern Slavic populations who formerly looked to the Autocrat.

The ambition of France, which, in the Ottoman Empire, was formerly confined to Egypt, under Mohammed Ali and his successors, to the Barbary coast, and to the Roman Catholic populations of Syria and Mesopotamia, has been turned to the former sphere of Russia with a pernicious success too visible in Servia and Montenegro. The obscure and barbarous Montenegrins had their vanity suddenly inflated by M. Hecquard, the French Consul at Scutari, whose friend and protector was M. Mocquard, private secretary of the Emperor. The Oriental question was the diplomatic problem of Europe, and the Montenegrins at once assumed that they held the solution of the problem in their hands. Add to this the general tone of the French press and the ill-advised extravagant attentions shown to certain Montenegrins in Paris, and we are at no difficulty to account for the extravagance of the Montenegrin pretensions. Even M. Hecquard, before he left this country, was shocked at the height to which the vanity he had himself planted had suddenly grown. The disasters of the recent war, brought on as they were mainly by Montenegrin presumption, were, therefore, a most necessary and proper lesson; but I maintain the opinion that it did not go far enough, and that a military and political blunder was committed in not attacking Cettigné, the object of the war being, not the possession of the sterile rocks around Cettigné, but the expulsion of a small knot of political intriguers, who are not content that the Mountaineers should be restricted to the simple cultivation of the territory within the limits fixed by the Commission, but aspire to playing a conspicuous part in the general politics of Europe.

The object of the southern Selavs (speaking of the educated classes in the towns) is the fall of Austria and Turkey, who hold Illyrian populations under similar conditions; hence a natural alliance between Austria and Turkey. But between the wish and the active attempt there is a wide interval, many of the most sanguine who entertain this idea in Dalmatia, Croatia, and Servia being unwarlike, literary men, and whatever projects people in Belgrade, Agram, and Ragusa may have, the great majority of the Christian inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina have no idea of a Pan-Illyrian Kingdom, and wish merely to satisfy their physical wants and be protected from gross oppression; but I do not believe that any hasty attempt will be made to construct the new Pan-Illyrian Kingdom. The propagandists are waiting for another 1848 or 1859, and hope that the part of Servia will correspond with that of Sardinia in Italy.

* No. 1009.

The centre of the Illyrian movement here is Count Pozza, but he is closely watched by the Government. He is, however, allowed to vegetate, as he has an extensive correspondence with the leaders of the Slavic movement in Poland, Servia, and Croatia, and, indirectly, even with Russia, where I am told there are now secret societies on the Mazzinian plan, and curious scraps of information come out in spite of every precaution, for important letters are not trusted to the post.

The Sclavs attribute their late failures to "Palmerston," that is to say, to British policy having diverted Garibaldi from revolutionary alliances on this side of the Adriatic to the conquest of Rome, and believe that France has abandoned the Sclavs in order to avoid a rupture with England; but they look upon this as temporary, and that the French projects relative to this side of the Adriatic are postponed and not abandoned, and that from her naval power, military genius, and her inherent antagonism to Austria and Turkey, she is the Power likely to suit their purpose.

The Princess Darinka is said to be the pensioner of both Russia and France, but her real sympathies are with France. The sympathies of the Prince of Montenegro are also French, but he is an idle, thoughtless young man, having no taste for State affairs; and his amusing himself all day with photography when his people are in such a wretched condition reminds one of Louis XVI acting as a locksmith and watchmaker when France was in the throes of revolution.

It is said that Russia gave much money to support the war in Montenegro and Herzegovina (usually Austrian ducats, carried by private hands from the Russian Consul in Trieste to the Russian Consul in Ragusa); but it is certain that at the pacification the Russian Consul here had no influence or power to stop the signature of the block-house Article. The recent Russian protest as to the military road has aided some restoration of Russian influence. Considerable subscriptions are also in course of collection in Russia for the Montenegrins in distress, and I have no doubt that this will further aid a momentary return of Russian influence, as a certain prestige of that Power with the people, although much shaken, has never ceased entirely to exist; but I believe that a large part of these subscriptions will go partly into the private coffers of Mirko and partly to purchase precision muskets.

The last communications from Servia received here by the Slavic party represent the reason of the Servians for not moving lately to have been consciousness of the superiority of the Turkish precision rifles. I, therefore, fully expected that the exercise of these populations in the new rifles will precede any revival of revolutionary operations against Turkey; and (as I have already had the honour to state to Lord Russell) I believe the late peace to have been a hollow truce, signed in bad faith, and ready to be broken as soon as Montenegro has somewhat recovered strength, and been enabled to import, and teach the population the use of, the new rifles.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. A. PATON.

No. 1014.

Earl Russell to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 209.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, November 19, 1862.*

I TRANSMIT, for your information, copy of a despatch relating to the affairs of Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 1015.

Earl Russell to Mr. Erskine.

(No. 22.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 20, 1862.*

I HAVE to state to you that I approve of your having communicated to the Porte a copy of my despatch to Mr. Lumley, No. 57 of September 30, on the question

of interference in the affairs of Turkey, as reported in your despatch of the 23rd ultimo.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 1016.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 367.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 20, 1862.*

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency, for your information, the accompanying copies of despatches from Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, relating to the affairs of Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 1017.

Mr. Hammond to Acting Consul Cortazzi.

(No. 9.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 20, 1862.*

I AM directed by Earl Russell to transmit to you herewith, for your information, a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Minister at Constantinople, reporting that orders had been sent to the Governor of Herzegovina to carry out all the reforms promised by Omer Pasha in the Sultan's name.†

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. HAMMOND.

No. 1018.

Earl Cowley to Earl Russell.—(Received November 21.)

(No. 1295.)
My Lord, *Paris, November 20, 1862.*

AS M. Drouyn de Lhuys has never touched upon the subject of Montenegro with me, and as I have been unwilling to moot unnecessarily any matter relating to the East on which we might have a difference of opinion, I have not as yet asked whether M. de Moustier, in holding the language which is attributed to him in Mr. Erskine's despatch of the 6th instant, respecting the Turkish block-houses now erecting in Montenegro, is acting under instructions or not; but I have inquired of my Turkish colleague whether representations of a similar nature have been made to him by M. Drouyn de Lhuys.

Djemil Pasha informs me that M. Drouyn de Lhuys has been very courteous in his language, disclaiming all responsibility for the instructions sent to Constantinople by his predecessor. M. Drouyn de Lhuys, nevertheless, expresses the opinion that it is advisable that the erection of the block-houses should not be proceeded with. While refusing to join in the protest addressed to the Porte by Russia, and determined that any advice he may tender in this matter shall be conceived in the most friendly tone, he puts it to the Porte's consideration whether some substitute for these block-houses may not be found.

Djemil Pasha has written in this sense to his Government, but as yet has received no answer.

I have had some conversation on this subject with Mr. Churchill, whom your Lordship has been so good as to send to Paris, in order that he might communicate with me, and I must confess that the more I hear of this matter, the more I regret that M. Thouvenel's suggestion that strong forts, one at each end of the road which is to intersect Montenegro, should be substituted for the half-dozen scattered block-houses in process of construction, was not adopted. It appears from Mr. Churchill's report that this road will only be ten miles in length, and that it is to be kept open by half-a-dozen block-houses, capable of containing 200 men each.

* Nos. 1002 and 1006. † No. 1011.

with six months provisions, but without artillery. These block-houses, it stands to reason, are liable to be surrounded and forced by superior numbers; whereas, had two forts, each capable of holding a battalion, with artillery to sweep the approaches, been constructed, such forts, if attacked, might hold out without difficulty until reinforcements could reach them, and would be quite as efficacious in keeping so short a distance of road open as forts of inferior size, though at easy distance from each other.

But even if there had been some drawback in a military point of view to the plan I am advocating, such drawback could hardly weigh against the immense advantage to Turkey of having France with her in a question connected with Montenegro, and there certainly was a moment when, had the Porte made a merit of acceding to M. Thouvenel's modification and substituted exterior ports for interior block-houses, the Imperial Government must have expressed itself satisfied, an admission which might be of great value hereafter.

I asked Djemil Pasha whether M. Drouyn de Lhuys had in any way intimated the opinion which it appears is now put forward by M. de Moustier, in conjunction with Russia, that the erection of those block-houses is in contravention of engagements previously contracted by the Porte, that is, that the Porte's voluntary assurances at a previous period that it had no intention of altering the *status quo* existing in Montenegro are violated by the course now taken. Djemil Pasha replied that something of the kind had been said by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, but had not been insisted upon, when he had shown that whatever declarations the Sultan might have made previously to the late campaign had been rendered null and void by the conduct of the Montenegrins. The Sultan's declarations had been given on the supposition that the Montenegrins would not persist in their aggressive acts. They had persisted in them, consequently the Sultan had been released from his word.

It seems to me that this argument cannot be controverted, unless the Montenegrins are to be exempted from all the duties and obligations of international law, whether as an independent race or as the Sultan's vassals.

I am, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 1019.

Mr. Erskine to Earl Russell.—(Received November 24.)

(No. 56.)
Constantinople, November 5, 1862.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 576 of September 30 to Sir Henry Bulwer, directing his Excellency to congratulate the Sultan on the settlement of the question relating to Servia and Montenegro, I have the honour to inclose herewith a copy of a note from Aali Pasha, requesting me to thank Her Majesty's Government for the friendly assistance the Porte has received from them in the adjustment of those difficulties.

I may take this opportunity of repeating to your Lordship the terms of heartfelt gratitude in which Aali Pasha speaks of the firm and able instructions which have been recently addressed by your Lordship to Her Majesty's Representative at St. Petersburgh on Turkish affairs. His Highness was also much gratified at learning how warmly Lord Napier had defended the cause of Turkey in his conversations with the Emperor of Russia and Prince Gortchakow.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

Inclosure in No. 1019.

Aali Pasha to Mr. Erskine.

Sublime Porte, le 4 Novembre, 1862.

M. le Chargé d'Affaires,

J'AI reçu la note que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'adresser en date du 20 Octobre pour me transmettre les félicitations du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté la Reine, sur l'arrangement des questions de Serbie et de Monténégro.

Ayant soumis à Sa Majesté le Sultan le contenu de cette note, je viens par son ordre souverain, vous prier d'en exprimer au Ministère Royal ses plus sincères remerciments.

Cette démarche est considérée par mon auguste Souverain et par son Gouvernement comme une nouvelle preuve de ces sentiments de bienveillante amitié que la Grande Bretagne ne cesse de témoigner dans toutes les circonstances importantes à l'égard de la Sublime Porte.

Je suis heureux d'avoir cette occasion pour vous réitérer encore une fois l'expression de notre reconnaissance du concours amical que nous avons trouvé auprès de votre Gouvernement dans l'arrangement des difficultés que nous venons de traverser.

Agréez, &c.
(Signé) AALI.

No. 1020.

Mr. Erskine to Earl Russell.—(Received November 24.)

(No. 62.)
Constantinople, November 12, 1862.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 39 of the 30th ultimo, reporting that the Prince of Montenegro now declines to abide by the arrangement he had accepted, I transmit to your Lordship herewith copies of the Prince's letter on this subject to Dervish and Abdi Pashas, and of the answer they have been instructed to return.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1020.

The Prince of Montenegro to Dervish Pasha and Abdi Pasha.

Le 28 Octobre, 1862.

J'AI pris connaissance de la dépêche que vos Excellences m'ont fait l'honneur de m'adresser en date du 22 Octobre courant, contenant les dernières résolutions de la Sublime Porte au sujet de la "route"* des blockhouses à construire entre l'Herzégovine et l'Albanie. Je regrette que le Gouvernement Impérial, s'en tenant au sens littéral de la construction, n'ait pas daigné prendre en considération les observations que la gravité de la situation m'avait engagé à lui soumettre. Je regrette encore davantage que son Altesse le Serdar Ekrem, dont l'opinion est d'un si grand poids, n'ait pas jugé convenable de faire connaître les graves conséquences qui découleront inévitablement de la mise en exécution de l'Article VI de la dite Convention.

Dans ma première acceptation de ces conditions j'avais fait observer au Serdar Ekrem lui-même combien je voyais de dangers à exécuter à la lettre cet Article, et ce ne fut que pour mettre un terme aux horreurs de la guerre que j'acceptai sans restrictions autres la teneur de la note de la Sublime Porte. J'aurai l'honneur de répéter de nouveau à vos Excellences que bien que toujours disposé à tenir fidèlement ma parole, je ne puis me dissimuler l'impression fâcheuse que produira sur les populations la construction de ces blockhouses. Le pays ne voit et ne veut y voir, quelques efforts que je fasse pour le dissuader, qu'une prise de possession réelle de son territoire. La vue de ces ouvrages ramènera à l'esprit de tous le souvenir de la lutte à peine finie et entretiendra dans ces esprits des velléités d'agitation qui ne pourront qu'aboutir, tôt ou tard, à des résultats regrettables pour tous.

J'avais cru à cette fin devoir faire un appel pressant à cet esprit de modération et de bienveillance dont je croyais et crois encore la Sublime Porte animée envers le Monténégro. Je la supplierais d'ajourner sinon de renoncer à une mesure qui, ne sauvegardant rien, était une cause de troubles et une humiliation pour mon pays. J'espérais aussi que l'esprit si éclairé et si bien au courant du caractère des Monténégrins du Serdar Ekrem, comprendrait l'urgence d'ajourner la mise à exécution de cette mesure et que son Altesse ferait à la Sublime Porte des observations conformes à la saine appréciation des choses. Je ne renonce pas encore à tout espoir et veux

* *Sic.*

bien me persuader que le Gouvernement n'insistera pas d'une manière péremptoire sur ce point et qu'il daignera prendre en considération le grand embarras dans lequel me mettent les circonstances et l'impossibilité où je pourrais me trouver de ne pouvoir parvenir, malgré ma ferme volonté, à calmer l'agitation des esprits et les amener à envisager les choses d'une manière conforme aux vues de la Sublime Porte. Je souhaite que tout se passe sans nouvelle effusion de sang; j'employerai toutes mes forces et toute mon autorité pour éviter tout conflit; mais le Gouvernement le sait, la raison n'est pas toujours écoutée quand les passions nationales sont surexcitées et que tout un peuple voit dans une mesure projetée une atteinte directe à ses libertés et à son existence comme nation. Je signalerai encore un autre inconvénient résultant de la concentration de nombreux corps de troupes à deux pas de ma frontière, le peuple voit dans cette armée une menace perpétuelle suspendue sur sa tête, celà empêche le calme de rentrer dans les esprits et nuit à tout établissement définitif. Le peuple Monténégrin ne croira sérieusement à la paix que lorsqu'il aura vu l'armée Turque rentrée dans ses cantonnements et renoncer à cette attitude hostile qu'il lui attribue jusqu'ici. Quoiqu'il en soit de la décision définitive de la Sublime Porte, j'aurai rempli mon devoir en lui soumettant la question dépouillée de tout artifice, sans lui cacher ni mes appréhensions ni mes craintes. Si le malheur voulait qu'à présent ou plus tard la construction des block-houses fut la cause d'une nouvelle prise d'armes entre la Turquie et le Monténégro il me restera du moins la satisfaction d'avoir fait mon possible pour conjurer ce grave malheur et de pouvoir au besoin décliner la responsabilité des événements fâcheux qui pourraient surgir.

Je prie vos Excellences de vouloir bien porter à la connaissance de la Sublime Porte mes présentes observations et suspendre jusqu'à sa réponse définitive le commencement des travaux de la note.

Agréez, &c.
Le Prince du Monténégro,
(Signé) NICOLAS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1020.

Dervish Pasha and Abdi Pasha to the Prince of Montenegro.

NOUS nous sommes empressés de soumettre au Gouvernement Impérial la réponse que votre Altesse nous a fait l'honneur de nous adresser en date du 28 Octobre dernier.

La Sublime Porte a été aussi surprise qu'affligée du contenu de ce document et nous charge de répéter à votre Altesse que c'est sur la foi de l'acceptation formelle de toutes les conditions de la part de votre Altesse que les opérations militaires ont cessé et les troupes Impériales ont été retirées des positions qu'elles occupaient; qu'elle espère encore que vous ne voudrez pas soutenir sérieusement l'assertion de n'avoir adhéré aux dites conditions que pour arrêter la guerre, assertion qui ne saurait être admise ni en droit ni en justice, qui fausserait, si elle prévalait, toutes les notions reçues jusqu'ici, et constituerait un principe sans exemple dans les annales des nations civilisées; que votre Altesse n'a signé et accepté notre dernier ultimatum qu'après y avoir mûrement réfléchi et délibéré avec les Chefs du Monténégro, que par suite de ces délibérations vous avez proposé des modifications sur certains Articles qui ont été adoptés par le Gouvernement Impérial, que les Ministres de Sa Majesté sont persuadés que votre Altesse ne démentira pas la confiance qu'ils ont mise dans sa signature; qu'elle peut être convaincue que la Sublime Porte n'a aucune arrière-pensée de se servir des blockhouses comme instruments d'ingérance dans les affaires administratives du pays; que la route à construire sera un moyen très-puissant de développer la prospérité de vos administrés, de rétablir des bons rapports entre eux et leurs voisins; que le Gouvernement du Sultan ne peut pas consentir à l'annulation d'une clause qui, tout en respectant le *statu quo* territorial et administratif du Monténégro, offre la seule garantie de paix et de tranquillité; que le rejet de cette clause équivaudrait à une nouvelle rupture et remettrait tout en question; que confiant dans votre fidélité à vos engagements, confiant dans la justice de sa cause, la Sublime Porte est résolue de continuer les travaux, que le cantonnement des troupes Impériales dans ces contrées, n'ayant pour but que la défense des travaux entrepris, elles n'exerce-

ront aucune espèce de molestation sur les habitants dont elles sont entourées, et entretiendront les meilleurs rapports avec eux; si contre toute attente on s'avisait d'inquiéter soit les ouvriers qui travaillent, soit les troupes préposées à leur défense, alors les agresseurs seraient repoussés et poursuivis, de tels actes ne pouvant être envisagés que comme une violation flagrante des engagements contractés et signés par votre Altesse et comme une reprise des hostilités, dans ce cas le Gouvernement Impérial, sincèrement affligée de voir sa bonne volonté et sa modération si peu appréciées et libre de toute liaison, sera forcé de chercher d'autres garanties dans des combinaisons qui paraîtraient les lui procurer.

No. 1021.

Mr. Erskine to Earl Russell.—(*Received November* 24.)

(No. 69.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, November* 12, 1862.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a copy of a report from Mr. Pisani as to the language held to the Porte respecting the question of Montenegro by the Russian Minister.

It is worthy of your Lordship's attention that in this instance at least the Prussian Government would appear to be acting in concert with that of Russia; and I have reason to believe that as Count Bismarck has not found the present Prussian Minister, Baron Werther, sufficiently pliant for his purposes, he will shortly be replaced by Prince Reuss, the Secretary of the Prussian Legation at Paris.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

Inclosure in No. 1021.

Mr. E. Pisani to Mr. Erskine.

Sir, *Pera, November* 12, 1862.

AALI PASHA informs me that Prince Labanow called on him on Monday last, and read to him a private letter he had received from St. Petersburgh, instructing him to urge the Porte not to insist any longer upon the construction of the road and block-houses between Albania and the Herzegovina, and to advise it to apply for the intervention of the Powers, parties to the Treaty of Paris, for the settlement of the question—asserting, at the same time, that Prussia entirely coeurs in the same opinion, and that without the interference of the European Powers no solution could be expected.

Aali Pasha's reply was that the arrangement was made without intervention on the part of the Powers, and formally accepted by Prince Nicholas, and the Porte therefore does not see any cause for an European interference, and that the Prince of Montenegro is bound to abide by the clauses of the arrangement to which he has subscribed and officially acknowledged.

With regard to what the Russian Envoy said of Prussia, observed his Highness, there is not the least doubt as to the correctness of the assertion; because, the account given by Aristarchi Bey of the view entertained by the Prussian Government on the affairs of Montenegro does not much differ from that of the Russians.

The Marquis de Moustier likewise called on his Highness the same day, and talked on the affairs of Montenegro; but said that, although he does not think that the Porte's letter to Djemil Pasha will alter the opinion of the French Government as to the road and block-houses, yet he must wait for fresh instructions previous to his taking further steps.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. A. PISANI.

No. 1022.

Consul Paton to Earl Russell.—(Received November 24.)

(No. 27.)

My Lord, *Ragusa, October* 28, 1862.

LUCA WUKAILOVICH has not yet presented himself to Dervish Pasha, the Military Commander of the Herzegovina, although he had lately confidentially assured the Captain of this Circle that he would solemnly maintain all his engagements. There can be no doubts that attempts have been made to deter him from entering into close and confidential relations with the Turks by the Pan-Illyrian party, and Luca does not appear to be as yet fully persuaded that Turkey is no longer the old barbarous Power that used to invite Rayah guests and leave them a head shorter. The Government here has therefore taken measures to induce the Turks to counteract the manœuvres of these parties, and convince Luca that the Turks could no longer commit such acts of treachery in presence of public opinion in Europe, but that such acts would be suicidal, as the present Turkish policy is, by all fair means to detach the Herzegovinian Rayahs from the Montenegrin cause. I hope these efforts will be successful, as the Pan-Illyrian party look on their late failures in Servia, Herzegovina, and Montenegro as only temporary.

The manager of the Havas Telegraphic Company writes to his agent here in allusion to those failures:—"We must admit that England is the arbiter of the destinies of the world."

M. Biett, the French Consul of Scutari, whom I knew many years ago, is here at present. He is an intelligent man, but sees things through the usual French medium. He does not think that Turkey will be able to hold these provinces very long, on account of the waste of troops which their tenure involves, and the increasing difficulty which Turkey experiences of setting armies on foot after all the blood-letting ("saignées") of so many foreign and domestic wars. But he rendered ample justice to their warlike qualities, their cool courage in combat, and the stoical perseverance and resignation with which they support sufferings and privations that would demoralize completely any other army. Still he looks on the formation of a great Slavonic Empire out of the ruins of Turkey in Europe as inevitable; and Colonel Gionanovich, the Austrian Consul-General in Bosnia, when lately here, told me that had the Servians, after the defeat of Dervish Pasha in the spring, been under a real warrior, and assumed the offensive, the consequences might have been most disastrous. Now the Pan-Illyrian party admit that their plans have failed on all sides, and the disembarkation of 4,000 fresh troops from Constantinople at Klek to fill up the reduced battalions, the purging of the Turkish army of a great number of feeble and invalided troops who encumbered the hospitals, combined with the new policy of the Turks in Herzegovina, remove all fears for some time to come.

The indisputably great strategic value of the military road from Spuz to Niehsich is the bitter pill for the opponents of Turkey, hence no means will be left untried to preserve the *status quo*. Dervish Pasha, corrupt intriguer as he may be, for his personal ends, is a man of great energy, intelligence, and activity; and under his direction the labours are progressing with a rapidity that astonishes and alarms those who counted on Turkish indolence and the chapter of accidents rendering this Article of the Convention a dead letter; and it seems reasonable to hope that no plausible French or Russian prognostics of the road being a certain source of future disturbances will avert its execution.

The friends of the Prince, in his present dilemma, are saying that should he fall, some Prince in the Russian interest will be his successor. It is not to be denied that the ultra-national party is again raising its head, animated by the Russian protest, and has held secret meetings at Niegush, and that the Princess Darinka, who has shown herself to be more French than Russian, is the object of some hostility, and may possibly be compelled to leave Montenegro.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. A. PATON.

No. 1023.

Consul Paton to Earl Russell.—(Received November 24.)

(No. 28.)

My Lord, *Ragusa, November* 10, 1862.

ACCOUNTS from Montenegro leave no doubt of the existence of extreme and dire distress through all the Mountain; so that the succours sent and expected from France and elsewhere will be barely sufficient to avoid famine. The mountaineers are selling their lean cattle and horses to their neighbours, having neither corn nor hay to feed the latter; and in spite of the hopes which the Greek revolution has infused into the Slavic committees, the great mass of the people are completely tired of war and indisposed to renew it for some years at least, as the casualties of the last twelve months—deaths from combat or fever, wounds still unhealed, lingering maladies from bad water, exposure, and insufficient food—turn out, on calculation, to be not less than 10,000.

The new military road has been advanced close to the Montenegrin frontier, but no part of it, or of the contemplated blockhouses, has as yet been executed on the Montenegrin territory itself. Yet although the people in the immediate vicinity of the projected road, with the traditional feeling of inextinguishable feud with the masters of Spuz and Niehsich, abhor the idea of Turks in blockhouses cutting Montenegro and Berda in two, yet dire distress has made the great majority of the mountaineers indisposed to resist Dervish Pasha. The statement of the spontaneous opposition of the whole population is therefore a fallacy got up by foreign influence acting through the priests and the remnant of the old Russian party, which has recovered courage since the Russian protest (for of French action in this sense I have heard nothing lately), and to these we may add the action of the Slavic committees abroad, who wish well to the schemes of the Servians, who, as we hear from Uschitza, are incessantly under drill, as if a levy of the whole population was intended for next year. In short, your Lordship may rest assured that there is a pressure from without to make Montenegro appear more determined to resist the execution of the road than it really is; for this wretched population, lately instruments and now victims of foreign intrigue, are resigned to their fate although deploring it.

Even if the Pan-Illyrian plot, which failed so signally in 1862 from want of coincidence was to be renewed in 1863 with the simultaneous action of the Greek and Illyrian elements under the occult and scientific supervision of Russia, there would, from what I hear, be some hesitation on the part of the majority of the population to proceed to extremity, so terrible has been the lesson given them.

On the other hand, the dominant faction in Cettigné, so unfortunately and so unaccountably spared by the Turkish armies, has up to the present time successfully baffled the policy of the Porte in the districts that border on Montenegro. In Zupzi Luca Vacalovich has much influence, but he is puzzled and paralyzed, as it is openly predicted that if he perseveres in the project of reconciling the Herzegovinian Rayahs with the Turks he will be murdered. The Banjanin malcontents receive every hospitality and encouragement in Cettigné, and at a fray in Banjanin between those who were for wearing, and those who were not for wearing, the cross of Montenegro on the fez, above twenty persons were killed and wounded on the 6th instant. All this is deplorable, because it must in the end drive the Turks to rely, as before, on the fanatic local Moslem population and render abortive all schemes of curbing the Moslems in the reasonable interest of the Christian Rayahs.

This morning 700 Turkish infantry, originally destined to return to Constantinople, were embarked for Antivari, to await orders consequent on the measures of precaution now taken by the Porte in consequence of the Greek revolution.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. A. PATON.

No. 1024.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received November 24.)

(No. 381.)

My Lord, *Vienna, November* 20, 1862.

THE Turkish Ambassador has communicated to Count Rechberg copies of papers forwarded to him by his Government, relating to the attempts which have

been lately made by the Prince of Montenegro to induce the Porte to discontinue the works connected with the new road and blockhouses in course of construction.

Prince Callimaki says that the documents he has received consist of a representation addressed by Prince Nicholas to the Turkish officer charged with the works in question, in which he declares that, in agreeing to their construction, he only yielded to the pressure of a superior force, in opposition to the wishes of his countrymen, and of the reports of the proceedings of the Representatives of Russia and France at Constantinople.

The former, he observed, simply maintained the original protest of his Government against the terms of the Convention with Montenegro, and the Marquis de Moustier gave unofficial support to the pretensions of the Prince.

After communicating with Count Rechberg, the Turkish Ambassador telegraphed to Constantinople, exhorting his Government to refuse all concessions, and to hold Montenegro to the terms of the Convention.

Prince Callimaki, after giving me the foregoing information, said that the intelligence which reached him from various quarters all tended to show that the Revolution at Athens had produced much excitement amongst the Christian subjects of the Porte, and that the temporary calm which had resulted from the events of last summer in Servia and Montenegro had passed away, and he feared storms were again to be expected.

I may add that Count Rechberg has confirmed these impressions, and, he added, with reference to the dissatisfaction in Montenegro, and the efforts made by the Prince to escape from the fulfilment of his engagements with Turkey, that he had just received information that Mirko, the father of Prince Nicholas, might be shortly expected here.

It is supposed that he is on his way to St. Petersburgh and Paris.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 1025.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 1186.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, November* 26, 1862.

I HAVE to state to your Excellency, in reply to your despatch No. 1295 of the 20th instant, that, whenever spoken to by the Turkish Ambassador in London, I have refused to give any opinion on the proposal to make blockhouses on the proposed road through Montenegrin territory.

Her Majesty's Government consider the Sultan as an independent sovereign, who has a right to require such terms from a beaten enemy as he may think necessary for his security. We neither praise nor blame the conditions which he has required and his enemy has accepted. Her Majesty's Government consider any other course as tending to impair the independence of Turkey.

It is singular that Russia, while possessing the greatest desire to support the independence of Turkey as an essential element of the balance of power, advises a policy to the Sultan exactly the contrary to that which the Emperor pursues in his own dominions. The Emperor of Russia advises the Turks to evacuate Belgrade and all the Turkish fortresses in Servia, because it would please the Servians. But he sends strong garrisons to Warsaw and the fortresses in Poland, although their evacuation by Russian troops would no doubt be pleasing to the Poles. In the same spirit he advises that no blockhouses should be erected in Montenegro, while he erects blockhouses to keep in check the mountainous tribes of Circassia, men as brave and as turbulent as the Montenegrins. Your Excellency may point out this discrepancy to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, in conversation on those subjects.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 1026.

Earl Russell to Mr. Erskine.

(No. 34.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 29, 1862.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 69 of the 12th instant, I have to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government concur in the answer returned by Aali Pasha to the Russian Minister's representations respecting the road and blockhouses which the Porte is constructing on the frontier of Montenegro.

The European Powers have nothing to do with this question, which rests on an arrangement made by Turkey, as an independent State, with the Prince of Montenegro.

Her Majesty's Government have never interfered with the construction of blockhouses in Circassia by the Russians, although they would have quite as good grounds for doing so as the Russians have for their interference in Montenegro.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 1027.

Consul Paton to Earl Russell.—(Received December 1.)

(No. 29.)
My Lord, *Ragusa, November* 18, 1862.

I HAVE already adverted to the pernicious intrigues of the Pan-Illyrian party, and the audacity with which they aspired to influence in Herzegovina and Montenegro, in a sense entirely different from what we know to be the policy and intentions of Austria, and that, although Austrian subjects, they have been serving the Russian hostility to the Porte. But at the very time when the Greek revolution, accomplished by the known enemies of Turkey, inspires them with hope of a proximate downfall of the Turkish power in Europe, we learn that these intrigues are to be tolerated no longer by this Government which is about to act with decision. In this there will be no difficulty, as, notwithstanding their intelligence and astuteness, they (the Pan-Illyrians) have no real root in the population of this province of the Austrian Empire. The peasantry is quite a stranger to their dangerous and ambitious projects, and in the towns there is a division. In Zara and Spulato, for instance, the Italian-Dalmatian element prevails, so that a short time ago, the whole Slavic party had to withdraw itself from the Casino of the latter city. Ragusa is the centre of these intrigues. I will report whatever occurs; in the meantime the party is full of alarm, and no doubt has suspended all its activity for the present.

The ostentatious publication of Prince Gortchakow's despatches does not appear to have produced any real effect in Montenegro. With the naïveté of semi-barbarians they remark that, having shed their own blood copiously for Russia, the latter Power copiously sheds her ink; and there is evidently an approximation between the Montenegrin Government and the Austrians, brought on by the dreadful straits of the Mountain and the glaring diplomatic impotence of Russia. Mirko is now on his way from Cettigné to Vienna, and is on board the steamer which takes this to Trieste. Dr. Pancrazio accompanies him. I therefore conclude that France is not entirely a stranger to the factorage of this new turn which the Montenegrin Government has taken. Mirko dislikes the Russians less than he does the other European nations, but at the present time he will say anything or do anything to avert the execution of the military road.

Orders have come from Constantinople to transfer a portion of the troops of Herzegovina to Albania. If Montenegro would remain quiet, the Porte would never have the smallest trouble with Herzegovina.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. A. PATON.

No. 1028.

Consul Paton to Earl Russell.—(Received December 1.)

(No. 30.)
Ragusa, November 20, 1862.

My Lord,

MIRKO did not land here as the steamer passed, but a person who saw him on board represents him to be haggard and grey-haired, from his almost overpowering physical exertions, and the moral tortures of disappointed ambition.

Mirko had kept his own counsels at certain recent marriage festivities, at which the Russian Consul here was present, in Cettigné a few days ago; and when the Consul learned that Mirko was in a steamer outside on his way to Vienna, he showed the utmost astonishment.

Mirko carries with him a Memorial on the impossibility of the Prince restraining his own people, if the military road is persevered in, Dervish Pasha being now ready to commence the strictly Montenegrin part of the road. The Memorial is said to have been drawn up by the Princess Darinka and Dr. Pancrazio. I therefore conclude that France, in order to paralyze the Russian influence, means to sublet her virtual protectorate of Montenegro for a season to Austria. The Captain of the Circle of Cattaro, an intelligent man, is understood to have promoted the present good understanding of Austria with Montenegro, which has been accompanied by so signal an overthrow (for a time at least) of Russian influence in Montenegro. The projected road will favour Antivari rather than the Dalmatian ports. On the other hand, in presence of revolutionary plans directed against Austria through a convulsion in Turkey in Europe, the gain to her by the road seems to me to be beyond doubt.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. A. PATON.

No. 1029.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received December 1.)

(No. 396.)
Vienna, November 29, 1862.

My Lord,

WITH reference to that part of my despatch No. 381 of the 20th instant, in which I reported that Mirko Petrovits, the father of the Prince of Montenegro, was expected here, I have now the honour to inform your Lordship that he has arrived, and was received yesterday by Count Rechberg.

He has requested to be admitted to see the Emperor, and an audience will be granted to him.

Count Rechberg has assured me that, to judge from what Mirko said to him, his sole object in coming here is to obtain the cessation of the Turkish works now in course of construction in Montenegro, in conformity with the stipulations of the Convention signed with Omer Pasha.

Mirko declares that Prince Nicholas cannot prevent a revolution in Montenegro if these works are persisted in, and that, on the other hand, if they are discontinued, the Prince will cordially assist the Porte in maintaining peace and order in the Turkish provinces bordering on Montenegro.

Count Rechberg appears to have replied that the Prince should have refused to sign the Convention if he had not intended to abide by its stipulations. They had made a Convention and must keep it.

This is the only matter of importance which seems to have been discussed at this first interview.

Mirko was accompanied by M. Vailitz, a Bohemian, as interpreter, who has been for several years in the service of Montenegro, and by Dr. Pancrazio, Prince Nicholas' French physician.

Count Rechberg tells me that M. Balabine, the Russian Minister here, has condemned the idea of Mirko's going to St. Petersburgh.

The Duc de Gramont speaks of the position of the Montenegrins as very deserving of commiseration, and he says that it is absolutely necessary that the

Turks should desist from the works, and I hear further that the Marquis de Moustier has now been officially instructed to speak to the Porte in this sense.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 1030.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received December 1.)

(Telegraphic.)
Vienna, December 1, 1862.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 396 Rechberg has written to Internuncio, stating object of Mirko's mission to Vienna, and directing him to communicate with the Porte, to whom he desires to leave all initiative in the matter, and calls attention to arguments of Prince of Montenegro against construction of blockhouses.

Austrian Government suggest substitution of two considerable forts, one at each end of road, for blockhouses at intervals along the whole line.

Mirko has called on me and delivered a letter from Prince Nicholas to my address.

Rechberg is much satisfied to hear from Austrian Chargé d'Affaires of your Lordship's intended instruction to Bucharest on question of arms.

No. 1031.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 1194.)
Foreign Office, December 27, 1862.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches relating to the affairs of Montenegro and the Herzegovina.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 1032.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 1213.)
Foreign Office, December 3, 1862.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches on the subject of Montenegro.†

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 1033.

Mr. Churchill to Earl Russell.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 39. Diplomatic.)
London, December 2, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to report, for your Lordship's information, that, in conformity with your Lordship's wishes, expressed to me verbally on November 11, I proceeded to Paris on Thursday, the 13th ultimo, and have returned to London, after conferring with Lord Cowley on the affairs of Montenegro, and having given his Excellency all the information he wished to be made acquainted with on that subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY A. CHURCHILL.

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* Nos. 1023, 1024, and 1027.

† Nos. 1026 and 1029.

No. 1034.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 1226.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, December* 4, 1862.

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches relating to the state of affairs in Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 1035.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 654.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 4, 1862.

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency, for your information, copies of despatches on the subject of the affairs of Montenegro.†

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 1036.

Mr. Erskine to Earl Russell.—(Received December 6.)

(No. 87.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, November* 25, 1862.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatches Nos. 579 of the 2nd, and No. 3 of the 23rd ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a despatch from Mr. Acting Consul Cortazzi, reporting the delivery of the message he was instructed to convey to the Prince of Montenegro.

I likewise inclose a copy of the Prince's answer to the last letter addressed to him by Dervish and Abdi Pashas upon the subject of the block-houses the Porte is desirous of erecting for the protection of the military road. By this communication your Lordship will perceive that the Prince, whilst still continuing to deprecate the strict execution of a measure which he looks upon as fatal to a good understanding with his people, professes his willingness to abide by the engagement he has contracted, if the Porte should decline to entertain this appeal to its spirit of conciliation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

November 27.

P.S.—Since this despatch was written the French Ambassador has been again urging the Porte not to insist on the construction of the block-houses. His Excellency said that his Government had no sort of objection to the road itself, but that the Emperor would esteem it an especial favour to himself if the Porte would abandon the block-houses.

Aali Pasha held out no hope that this fresh appeal would be more successful than previous ones of the same kind.

E. M. E.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1036.

Vice-Consul Cortazzi to Mr. Erskine.

Sir, *Scutari, November* 11, 1862.

I HAVE the honour to report that, in compliance with the instructions contained in your despatch of the 24th ultimo, I have personally informed Prince Nicholas that, as long as he observes the terms of peace with the Porte which he has accepted, he will find a warm friend in Her Majesty's Ambassador at the Porte.

* Nos. 1027 and 1028. † Nos. 1007, 1018, 1022, 1023, 1025, and 1029.

Prince Nicholas, in his reply to this communication, has assured me that it is his firm intention to carry out the terms which he has subscribed if insisted on by the Porte, but at the same time he endeavoured to impress upon me the difficulties that stood in his way with regard to the road between Nichsich and Spuz. His father, Mirko, President of the Senate, is violently opposed to this measure, and is supported by a considerable party, who indeed look upon him as the real Chief of Montenegro, and who are buoyed up with the hope that neither France nor Russia will permit such a work to be carried into execution.

I have reason to believe that the mass of the people in the Bielopavlovitch, worn out by the fatigues of the late struggle, depressed in spirit, and suffering from hunger, are not disposed to question the erection of the different block-houses proposed on this road; they even look forward towards their construction as the probable means of giving them bread, as their services they consider would be required; but as long as they perceive, and I must own it is sufficiently apparent, that the Prince himself is lukewarm in the matter, and as long as Mirko is allowed to stir up their imaginations by broad hints that the Prince has been cheated into the acceptance of conditions hostile to their welfare, difficulties will be thrown in the way.

I suggested to the Prince that he should boldly and plainly explain his present position to the people, and he gave me his word of honour that he would in a few days visit the Bielopavlovitch and do so. I believe him to be sincere in this desire, but I cannot but doubt that he will be overawed when it comes to the push by his advisers, both foreign and domestic, into at best but a feeble compliance with this wish.

The late subsidy of 60,000 fr. granted by the French Government to Montenegro has been paid, the French Consul at Scutari having transmitted by bills of exchange in favour of Prince Nicholas that amount.

In the meantime, Dervisch and Abdy Pashas remain encamped at Spuz, awaiting positive orders from the Porte. The season is greatly advanced, and the materials necessary for the construction of block-houses are to a certain extent wanting. The line of block-houses, five in number, now being built between Spuz and Podgorica are not in a forward state of progress. It is true that the continual rains is the principal cause of the delay experienced by Mahmoud Pasha in the execution of this work.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. A. CORTAZZI.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1036.

The Prince of Montenegro to Dervish and Abdi Pashas.

MM. les Maréchaux, *Cettigné, le* 12 *Novembre,* 1862.

J'AI l'honneur de vous accuser réception de votre lettre du 10 Novembre et de la dépêche de son Altesse le Serdar Ekrem.

Je vois avec un profond regret que la Sublime Porte s'en tenant strictement à la lettre de la Convention est décidée à passer outre et à donner suite à un projet que je considère comme peu fait pour apaiser les rancunes anciennes qu'un peu plus de générosité de sa part aurait entièrement effacées.

Je regrette aussi que le Gouvernement Impérial n'ait voulu voir dans mon insistance qu'un moyen de dégager ma parole, me soustraire aux engagements souscrits.

Ma pensée, mal interprétée, avait cependant un but plus élevé. Je désirais conclure une paix ne laissant derrière elle aucune animosité et je la voulais exempte de tout signe de domination. J'incline devant un refus absolu d'entendre la voix de la conciliation. J'ai donné ma parole, je la tiens, mais je n'en persiste pas moins à dire une dernière fois à la Sublime Porte qu'en méconnaissant ce qu'il y avait de désintéressé dans mes observations, elle prépare pour l'avenir bien des mécomptes qui auraient pu être facilement évités.

Dieu veuille que je me trompe et que la Porte ait raison.

Je fais encore un suprême appel à ses sentiments de modération.

Agréez, &c.
(Signé) NICOLAS.

No. 1037.

Earl Cowley to Earl Russell.—(Received December 6.)

(No. 1348. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Compiègne, December 5, 1862.*

PRINCE METTERNICH has been good enough to show me the instructions which he has received from his Government with reference to the visit of the Montenegrin Chief Mirko to Vienna. Count Rechberg, while admitting the right of the Porte to hold the Prince of Montenegro strictly to his engagements, hints that it may be more prudent to cede upon the question of the block-houses, and in a despatch which he has addressed to Baron Prokesch, a copy of which is sent to Prince Metternich, the Internuntio is charged to hold similar language to the Ottoman Ministers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

P.S.—It is curious that Prince Metternich has heard nothing from his Government on the subject of the transport through the Principalities of arms destined for Servia. The Prince is not even aware that anything of the kind has occurred.

C.

No. 1038.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received December 8.)

(No. 415.)

My Lord, *Vienna, December 4, 1862.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the Voivode Mirko Petrovitz, father of the Prince of Montenegro, whose interview with Count Rechberg I reported to your Lordship in my despatch No. 396 of the 27th ultimo, having requested me to receive him, called on me by appointment on November 29.

He was accompanied by his interpreter, M. Vaclik, and by the French physician of Prince Nicholas, Dr. Pancrazio.

After compliments and assurances of Prince Nicholas' desire to obtain the goodwill and insure the friendship of England—a country that was always ready to promote civilization and Christianity all over the world—he delivered me a letter from Prince Nicholas, requesting me to make its contents known to Her Majesty's Government, and I have the honour to forward it herewith in original, and to request your Lordship's orders as to the answer which should be returned to it. Similar letters have been delivered here to the Representatives of the Great Powers and have been duly forwarded to their Governments.

Mirko assured me that Prince Nicholas felt himself personally bound by the arrangements made with Omer Pasha, but he said they had been wrung from him at the point of the sword, and that he now felt it would be impossible to execute his engagement as to the military road and the block-houses. The Prince would construct a commercial road across his territory according to the line which had been settled, but the building of block-houses to be occupied by small Turkish garrisons was more than ought to be demanded of, or conceded by, an independent State. Prince Nicholas, he said, would give every moral guarantee as to his future conduct that could be demanded of him, and, he added, that if the Porte persisted in building the block-houses, the Montenegrins would take the first favourable opportunity, after they had recovered from the effects of the late disastrous war, of recommencing hostilities; and the assistance of England was therefore implored by Prince Nicholas to save the Montenegrins from destruction; that they were resolved to do everything in their power to maintain their independence, the people would all unite, and the inhabitants would rather be cut in pieces than allow the establishment of these Turkish garrisons within their territory.

The interpreter and Dr. Pancrazio, who are both most zealous partizans of the Montenegrin cause, spoke of the block-houses if constructed as likely to prove much more dangerous to the Turks than to the Montenegrins, for they would surely fall hereafter into the possession of the latter, and become so many strong positions in their hands. They said 10,000 Turkish troops would be always required to keep

this road, a vast expense to Turkey, and a perpetual source of jealousy and discontent to the Montenegrins would be the consequence of the projected works. In the course of conversation hints were thrown out that a sea-port should be granted to them, for that the little State of Montenegro could otherwise never have any prosperity; that Prince Nicholas made no concealment of his wants or of the cruel position in which he should be placed if these proposed military posts were created, and of the lasting grievances they would become in the heart of every Montenegrin, that to enforce the construction of them, and the exact fulfilment of the engagements, would certainly not insure a prospect of peace, but a certainty of future war.

The substance of my reply to Mirko was, that it was useless for me to remind him that though England was always ready to give her moral support to every Christian State, she was the friend and ally of Turkey, that in the present case Montenegro was in the wrong. She had fostered revolutions in the Herzegovina, and when it became clear that the rebellion against the authority of the Porte in her own provinces was chiefly maintained from Montenegro, the only course left to the Porte was to call Montenegro to account and obtain from her certain conditions and securities against a repetition of the like proceedings. The Prince Nicholas refused the terms originally offered, until he was compelled by the chances of war to agree to them. Turkey, I said, was perfectly justified in the conduct she had pursued, and she now required guarantees and securities that she should not be exposed to the recurrence of similar attempts to subvert her authority in her own provinces. Montenegro had put herself in the wrong, and must not look to England for assistance. England was not a lover of war, but of peace, and that unless Montenegro remained quiet and kept strictly within her frontiers, she must not count on English sympathy.

Mirko declared in the most solemn manner that Prince Nicholas would engage to keep the peace towards Turkey provided the question of erecting the block-houses was abandoned.

I inquired of Mirko whether it was his intention to remain here for some time; he said as long as it might be useful for the interest of his country, and that he should then return home. He said he had been very graciously received by the Emperor, and he appears not to be without some hope of obtaining the goodwill of the European Powers to assist Montenegro in procuring a mitigation of the severe terms which had been imposed on her by the Porte after the termination of hostilities.

Before leaving I asked if he had seen the Turkish Ambassador. I said it was to the Porte and not to foreign Powers that Montenegro should apply. He answered that he had not yet been to Prince Callimaki, but that he should take immediate steps to procure an interview with his Excellency.

This he has now done, and the Turkish Ambassador mentioned to me last night that Mirko has also delivered to him a letter, and spoken frankly on the subject of the road and the block-houses. That he replied that he could do nothing but send his letter to Constantinople.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 1038.

The Prince of Montenegro to Lord Bloomfield.

Excellence, *Cettigné, le 17 Novembre, 1862.*

VOTRE Excellence n'ignore point les événements de la dernière guerre entre la Turquie et le Monténégro, ni les circonstances qui amenèrent la Sublime Porte à consentir à une courte suspension d'armes entre les deux armées. Pendant cette courte trêve, dont il dépendait entièrement du Commandant-en-chef des forces Ottomanes d'en abréger ou d'en prolonger la durée, le dernier soumit à mon acceptation une série de conditions, parmi lesquelles quelques mesures semblèrent contraires aux déclarations antérieures de la Sublime Porte et en désaccord avec sa note circulaire communiquée par elle aux Grandes Puissances avant le début des hostilités.

Dans cette note la Sublime Porte déclarait ne prendre les armes que pour se défendre, repoussait toute idée de conquête et manifestait son intention formelle de respecter, en tout état de choses, l'administration intérieure du Monténégro et les limites territoriales fixées par la Commission Mixte en 1858.

Dans une note publiée au fort même des hostilités, et postérieure à celle déjà indiquée, le Gouvernement Turc renouvelait les mêmes déclarations et maintenait les mêmes principes.

En dernier lieu cependant la Sublime Porte, par l'Article VI de la Convention, que j'étais tenu d'accepter sans délai, modifiait son programme et créait un nouvel ordre de choses préjudiciable à l'existence politique du Monténégro, qu'il est de mon devoir de porter à la connaissance des Grandes Puissances. Cet Article VI dit: Une route commerciale sera ouverte à travers le Monténégro, reliant l'Herzégovine à l'Albanie, et un certain nombre de blokhaus, destinés à recevoir en tout temps une garnison Ottomane, seront élevés sur son parcours.

Il est de toute impossibilité de pouvoir concilier la création de cette route avec le principe si solennellement proclamé par la Sublime Porte, déclarant le maintien du *statu quo*. Il serait permis au contraire d'y voir l'intention arrêtée d'une occupation permanente du territoire Monténégrin, jusqu'à le jour libre de toute ingérence extérieure et la tendance à introduire dans les rapports futures entre la Turquie et le Monténégro quelque chose d'analogue à ce qui existe entre elle et la Servie, dont le système politique repose sur des bases bien différentes. Il est à craindre, si on prend exemple sur la Servie et si on prend en considération les événements qui s'y sont passés en dernier lieu, que ce qu'on aurait l'intention d'introduire dans le Monténégro, ne soit guère un moyen bien efficace d'engendrer une paix sérieuse et durable, comme il serait dans l'intérêt des deux parties de l'établir, étant prouvé que l'ingérence directe dans les affaires intérieures d'un pays donne toujours lieu à des complications et à des tiraillements sans fin, mais finirait inévitablement par leur mettre les armes à la main et par remettre tout en question.

Insistant d'une manière toute spéciale sur le fait capital de la route et des blokhaus, qui peut décider de l'avenir du Monténégro, je passerai sous silence des faits ne manquant pas cependant d'une certaine valeur et ayant eu pour résultat de porter une atteinte grave à mon autorité morale; de ce nombre est la mesure qui appelle des chefs de district et même des simples capitaines à souscrire individuellement l'engagement de ne plus se permettre à l'avenir aucune tentative préjudiciable aux intérêts de la Turquie, et celle qui m'oblige à expulser de mon territoire les quelques familles de l'Herzégovine qui sont venues y chercher un asile pendant la guerre.

Frappé des conséquences graves que pouvait avoir la création de cette route toute militaire, connaissant l'esprit de mes populations et les extrémités auxquelles pouvait les pousser la surexcitation des sentiments nationaux, mais mis dans la pénible alternative d'accepter immédiatement et sans discussion les conditions qui m'étaient posées, ou de voir les hostilités recommencer avec plus d'énergie et d'acharnement, j'acceptai ces conditions, étant personnellement disposé à accomplir toute sorte de sacrifice pour mettre un terme aux horreurs de la guerre, mais tout en m'inclinant devant la force je me permis quelques réserves et fis à la Sublime Porte les observations qu'il était de mon devoir de lui soumettre, tant dans l'intérêt de mon peuple, que dans le but d'écarter tout nouveau prétexte à des hostilités.

J'espérais en usant de franchise que la Sublime Porte appréciant mieux ses propres intérêts et en tenant même compte des ménagements auxquels pouvait avoir droit un petit peuple qui s'était défendu avec tant d'abnégation et de patriotisme, renoncerait à la prétention qu'elle manifestait de prendre possession de mon territoire et ferait aux circonstances et aux justes susceptibilités patriotiques quelques concessions, qui n'avaient par elles-mêmes rien de bien exagéré.

A deux reprises j'ai réitéré mes observations à la Sublime Porte, la conjurant de les examiner, et cela non point dans le but mesquin de me retracter, mais avec l'espoir de lui faire partager mes appréhensions touchant l'avenir et la décider par là à l'abandon d'un projet, dont la réalisation serait un grave malheur et la cause certaine d'une nouvelle guerre dans un temps peu éloigné.

La Sublime Porte s'appuyant sur la lettre de la Convention, ne voulant voir dans mon insistance qu'un moyen indirect de dégager ma parole, s'est refusée à toute discussion, en me signifiant son intention formelle de mettre immédiatement la main à la construction des blockhaus.

Que les Grandes Puissances me permettent cependant de faire un suprême appel à leur juridiction avant de renoncer à tout espoir de conserver intact le sol que nous avons tout récemment arrosé de notre sang; qu'elles daignent prêter un moment d'attention à nos justes plaintes avant de consentir à l'anéantissement de notre existence politique, car telle sera la conséquence de la route que la Turquie

est décidée à construire. Par elle en effet l'unité territoriale du Monténégro disparaît, le pays sera partagé par ce chemin en deux portions, et la seule partie du pays susceptible d'un peu de culture sera abandonnée par ses habitants. Cette route, à laquelle la Turquie semble accorder une si grande importance, ne sera d'aucune utilité pour elle, car loin d'accroître sa force, elle l'obligera à une occupation militaire permanente et dispendieuse; on aura ainsi sans nécessité reconnue créé une nouvelle et sérieuse cause de guerre; car le Monténégro ne pourra jamais voir dans ces blockhaus autre chose que la marque de son affaiblissement et la preuve irrécusable de l'atteinte portée à ses droits politiques. Cette vue réveillera les rancunes à peine endormies, et le pays se lancera dans une guerre d'extermination pour reconquérir le sol envahi et occupé par la Turquie.

Si la Turquie en créant cette route eut en pour but de favoriser les relations entre les deux populations naguère ennemies, si elle eut voulu faciliter les transactions commerciales et établir entre elles un lien réposant sur l'intérêt réciproque, si elle n'y eut point introduit les blockhaus, elle eut trouvé le Monténégro tout entier disposé à en faciliter l'accomplissement; elle m'aurait trouvé toujours personnellement disposé à la seconder de tout mon pouvoir, dans tout ce qui pouvait avoir pour but d'accroître le bien-être matériel de nos populations limitrophes jusqu'ici si pauvres et les faire jouir des progrès de la civilisation, que les préoccupations exclusives de la guerre ont tenu éloignés de nos contrées. Combien je regrette que telle ne soit point l'intention de la Turquie et que pour elle cette route ne soit qu'une route purement stratégique, destinée à protéger l'occupation, à produire des malheurs, tandis qu'en restant ce qu'elle devait être, purement commerciale, elle aurait pu être une source de prospérités.

C'est donc aux Grandes Puissances que nous en appelons dans cette grave circonstance d'où dépend le sort de notre pays. Nous les supplions de ne pas abandonner dans pareille détresse un petit peuple qui a besoin de repos et qui désire sincèrement la paix. Nous les supplions de tenter en notre faveur une démarche bienveillante auprès de la Turquie et d'empêcher par là la disparition de tout ce qui a été si péniblement accompli par les efforts de trois Gouvernements successifs; car je ne puis le dissimuler la création de cette route avec ses blokhaus changera le courant des idées, détournera les populations des travaux de la paix, les poussera à la guerre pour rentrer en possession du sol occupé par le chemin et les fortifications, et produira les conséquences les plus funestes.

J'ose encore espérer que les Grandes Puissances nous tendront une main secourable, mais si la Providence en disposait autrement et que dans sa sagesse l'Europe jugeât à propos de permettre à la Turquie de construire les blokhaus, nous en serons navrés, mais nous nous inclinerons humblement devant son suprême arrêt, ayant la conviction intime d'avoir accompli notre devoir après en avoir appelé au grand tribunal, qui seul pouvait nous entendre et écarter de notre patrie le malheur qui la menace.

Je prie, &c.
Le Prince du Monténégro,
(Signé) NICOLAS.

No. 1039.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received December 8.)

(No. 416.)

My Lord, *Vienna, December 4, 1862.*

WITH reference to the telegram recorded in my despatch No. 402 of this day, in which I reported the nature of instructions sent to the Internuncio in consequence of the representations that have been made here as to the inability of the Prince of Montenegro to carry out his last engagements with the Porte respecting the military road and the block-houses, it is to be presumed that Count Rechberg must have had some good reason for yielding to the Prince's arguments; for, though leaving the initiative entirely to the Porte, he evidently thinks the difficulties of Montenegro are serious and deserving of consideration.

His Excellency has suggested the substitution of one considerable fort of a substantial character, to be erected at each end of the military road which is to intersect the Principality, for the construction of smaller ones at intervals along the whole line, and how far this will be agreed to by the Porte remains to be seen, for accounts have been received here to the effect that since the pretensions of the

Montenegrins have been made known at Constantinople the Turkish Government have increased in activity in regard to the road and block-houses, and as the construction of the latter in stone would require time, it is said they are being built of wood.

This Count Rechberg considers a useless and dangerous proceeding, for he says the Montenegrins will burn them down before they are half completed.

I apprehend that the argument of the French and Russian Governments on this question may have had their influence here, and that the block-house system has been strongly represented to the Austrian Government as unlikely to give satisfactory results as a defence and future guarantee for the interests of Turkey.

I think it also not impossible that the Austrian Government perceive in the mission of Mirko—which, I may observe, is believed by some persons to have been contrived, if not instigated, by the Imperial authorities at Ragusa and Cattaro—an opportunity of re-establishing the good relations with Montenegro which were formerly of immense importance to them; and that, in endeavouring to do so, they will not fail to make conditions with the Prince that he will discourage within his sphere of influence all attempts that may be made to develop the Panslavist idea, which causes no inconsiderable alarm to the Imperial Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 1040.

Acting Consul Cortazzi to Earl Russell.—(Received December 13.)

(No. 52.)
My Lord, *Scutari, December 2, 1862.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Mr. Hammond's despatch No. 9 of the 20th ultimo, transmitting to me a copy of a despatch No. 60 of the 6th November, from Her Majesty's Minister at Constantinople, informing me that orders had been sent by the Porte to the Governor of Herzegovina to carry out all the reforms promised by Omer Pasha in the Sultan's name.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FREDERICK A. CORTAZZI.

No. 1041.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 1260.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, December 13, 1862.*

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copy of a despatch on the subject of Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 1042.

Consul Paton to Earl Russell.—(Received December 15.)

(No. 31.)
My Lord, *Ragusa, December 3, 1862.*

ABDI PASHA passed yesterday by Ragusa in a Turkish steamer, having others with him containing infantry for Herzegovina. He states that one block-house is finished on the Montenegrin territory and another well advanced, and that on its termination the labours will be suspended for the winter.

Abdi Pasha and Dervish Pasha have exchanged places, the latter having the military command of the Scutari district.

The Porte has suspended the distribution of corn to the Montenegrins in consequence of the Government of Cettigné having given out that this beneficence was an annual tax to be paid by the Sultan for the use of the road.

* No. 1038.

The Government of Cettigné has ordered a list of all the remaining men fit for military service to be made out.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. A. PATON.

No. 1043.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received December 15.)

(No. 431.)
My Lord, *Vienna, December 11, 1862.*

COUNT RECHBERG tells me that the Duc de Gramont has been conversing with him on the interests of the Montenegrins, and that he appears to have been charged to speak unofficially in support of the appeal lately addressed to the different Governments by Prince Nicholas which Mirko Petrovitch brought to Vienna.

The French Ambassador maintains, and I think Count Rechberg lends a willing ear on the subject, that something must be done to modify the conditions of Omer Pasha's Treaty in regard to the road and the block-houses, and it is said, moreover, that the Turkish Ambassador has given some hopes to Mirko that a modification of the Treaty may be obtainable.

The question of a guarantee for the future good conduct of the Montenegrins has even been mooted, in which the Great Powers were to be concerned, and on Count Rechberg mentioning this, I told his Excellency that he might be assured Her Majesty's Government would not be better disposed to entertain this question now than they were some months ago.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 1044.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 465.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December 9, 1862.*

YOUR Lordship has probably been informed by Mr. Erskine that the Prince of Montenegro addressed a letter, dated October 28, to the Turkish Commanders Dervisch and Abdi Pashas, remonstrating against the erection of block-houses on the road to be constructed through the Montenegrin territory, in conformity with the tenor of the recent arrangement unconditionally accepted by the Prince. The Prince also complains of the continued concentration of Ottoman troops on his frontiers.

The Turkish Commander, having taken the orders of the Porte, replied to the Prince, recalling to his memory his solemn engagements, affirming the resolution of the Porte to continue the works of the road and block-houses, and declaring that these works do not imply any view on the part of the Porte of interfering in the internal government of the country.

While the Prince of Montenegro was raising difficulties at home, he seems to have charged Mirko with the duty of moving the Austrian Government in his favour, and Prince Gortchakow appears to have been contemporaneously stirring up the French Cabinet to harass the Porte with remonstrances.

These manœuvres having been communicated to me by the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires, I spoke to Prince Gortchakow on the subject on the 6th instant, and again yesterday, pointing out to his Excellency what deplorable consequences might ensue if the Prince of Montenegro were encouraged to evade his engagements with the Porte. In that case, I said, I had every reason to believe that the Porte would be led to resume hostilities, and would hereafter require other guarantees from Montenegro than those already given.

The Vice-Chancellor told me on the 6th instant that the course of the Porte would no doubt be considerably affected by the representations offered to it from various quarters. He understood that Mirko had been favourably received at Vienna, and that the Austrian Government was disposed to advise the Porte to accede to the remonstrances of the Prince of Montenegro. If hostilities broke out

again it would be owing to the obstinacy of the Porte in persevering in a scheme inconsistent with its engagements, and sure to provoke conflicts and collisions. For his part he had exhausted all the means of influence and persuasion at his command.

Being surprized by the views ascribed to the Cabinet of Vienna, I asked the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires whether anything had reached him in that sense.

Count Revertera told me that the report was certainly unfounded. The solicitations of Mirko had no success at Vienna. The Austrian Cabinet regarded the creation of the road and its protecting forts as a legitimate guarantee in the interest of Turkey.

I told Prince Gortchakow yesterday that I apprehended that Mirko was under an erroneous impression respecting the views of the Government of Austria, which defended the execution of the road and block-houses.

The Vice-Chancellor renewed his former reflections respecting the bad consequences which would result from the works referred to, and alluded to the remonstrances offered by the French Cabinet in this matter.

As far as I am informed, the remonstrances of France were conveyed verbally by M. de Moustier to Aali Pasha at the end of October; and the reply of the Porte is contained in a letter to Djemir Pasha, the Ambassador of the Porte at Paris, under date of October 30. This letter contains an able exposition of the motives of the Porte in insisting on the strict and literal execution of the recent settlement with the Prince of Montenegro.

I enter upon these particulars because I am convinced that Prince Gortchakow will do all in his power to thwart the proceedings of the Porte in this matter; and because I fear that the attitude of the Russian Minister may again have a lamentable effect on the Prince of Montenegro, and induce him to resume a posture of hostility to the Government of the Sultan.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 1045.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 469.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December 10, 1862.*

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship that I have asked Prince Gortchakow whether Mirko, the Montenegrin, will come to St. Petersburgh after he has terminated his visit at Vienna.

The Vice-Chancellor informed me in reply that Mirko had originally intended to go the whole round of the Great Courts, but that he had been discouraged from coming to Russia by the Imperial Government.

It was certainly prudent on the part of Prince Gortchakow to keep Mirko at a distance, but we are not to suppose that for this reason there is no exchange of counsels between the Vice-Chancellor and his wild adherent. M. Balabine, the Russian Minister at Vienna, is a zealous propagandist of Pan-Slavonian aspirations. His Excellency would no doubt find it a congenial duty to deal with Mirko.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 1046.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 473.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December 11, 1862.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship, with reference to my despatch No. 465 of the 9th instant, that Prince Gortchakow has stated to me most positively that the Austrian Government has instructed Baron Prokesch to point out to the Porte the disadvantages which would be attached to the erection of block-houses and the establishment of Turkish garrisons on the road projected across the Montenegrin territory.

I asked the Vice-Chancellor whether this news was founded on a statement on

the part of Mirko, or whether it was the result of personal communication between M. de Balabine and Count Rechberg.

The reply of the Prince was not very distinct; but he said that Her Majesty's Government would no doubt learn all about it from Lord Bloomfield.

The Austrian Chargé d'Affaires has telegraphed, at my request, to Vienna, to ask whether the intelligence circulated by Prince Gortchakow be well founded or not.

If the Austrian Cabinet should go against the Porte in this matter, the combined representations of Russia, France, Prussia, and Austria could not fail to have considerable weight with the Government of the Sultan, and might result in giving Prince Gortchakow a little triumph in that quarter of which he stands very grievously in need.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 1047.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 1273.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, December 17, 1862.*

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches upon the subject of Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 1048.

Earl Russell to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 230.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, December 17, 1862.*

I TRANSMIT, for your information, copies of despatches relating to the affairs of Montenegro.†

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 1049.

Earl Russell to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 233.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, December 17, 1862.*

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your Excellency's despatch No. 416 of the 4th instant, relative to the support given by Count Rechberg to the endeavours of the Prince of Montenegro to obtain a relaxation of his engagements with the Porte.

Among other reasons for regretting the course which Austria, together with France and Russia, has now adopted in this matter, there is this, namely, that it will induce the Montenegrins to look to foreign Powers and not to the Sultan for indulgence and favour, and if the Sultan should be induced to abandon the right which the agreement with Prince Danilo gives him, to make a military road and to establish block-houses in the Montenegro district, the Montenegrins will attribute such a concession to Russia, to France, and to Austria, but in no way to the Porte.

It must be observed also that the interference of the three Powers in these matters is entirely one-sided and therefore unjust, for while, on the one hand, they endeavour to protect the people of Montenegro against the natural and proper consequences of their aggressions upon the Turks, the three Powers would probably make no efforts to assist the Turks in repelling a renewal of unprovoked aggression by the people of Montenegro.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

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* Nos. 1042, 1044, 1045, and 1046.

† Nos. 1037, 1044, 1045, and 1046

No. 1050.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 1283. Confidential.)
Foreign Office, December 18, 1862.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches as marked in the margin,* upon the subject of the affairs of Montenegro.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 1051.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 667.)
Foreign Office, December 18, 1862.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 654 of December 4, I transmit, for your Excellency's information, copies of despatches from Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh on the subject of the affairs of Montenegro.†

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No 1052.

Consul Paton to Earl Russell.—(Received December 22.)

(No. 32.)
Ragusa, December 10, 1862.

My Lord,

ALL the accounts that come to me represent the countries inland to enjoy at the present time such a state of tranquillity, as has not been experienced for several years, even making allowance for the season, with its usual depressing influences on political turbulence.

Abdi Pasha at Mostar, surrounded by the tried soldiers of the arduous Montenegrin campaign, and at the same time holding moderate and conciliatory language so as to make "bye-gones be bye-gones," has made a favourable impression on both the Moslem and Christian populations.

Luka Wukailovich, undeterred by all the Montenegrin threats of assassination, has been incessant in his efforts to detach the Christians of the lately revolted districts from Montenegrin influence, and his Secretary is now at Mostar concerting ulterior measures with Abdi Pasha and Khershed Pasha, the Military and Civil Governors of the Herzegovina.

This is the season of the year when the cattle and pig dealers return from the interior, and they state that for several years the roads have not been so clear of the usual petty brigandage on the south-western borders of Servia.

The Montenegrins say that the list of able-bodied men now being made out is for the purpose of distinguishing who are entitled or disentitled to relief, and has no reference to the Servian armaments; and I continue in the opinion that it will be very difficult to get the Montenegrins to move for some years. The traditional Russian opposition to Turkey will always have some influence with the Montenegrins, but they begin to reason very sensibly on the naval nullity and political paralysis of Russia, and the intrigues to expel the Princess Darinka, the principal agent of France, has been quite unsuccessful. This crafty personage makes no unremunerative expenditure of hostility, and treats the Russian Consul here with a great show of attention and management.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. A. PATON.

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* Nos. 1039, 1049, and .

† Nos. 1044, 1045, and 1046.

No. 1053.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received December 22.)

(No. 478.)
St. Petersburgh, December 14, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to state to your Lordship, with reference to my despatch No. 473 of the 11th December, that Count Revertera has showed me a short instruction from Count de Rechberg to Baron Prokesch, in which the Turkish project of block-houses on the road through Montenegro is slightly deprecated. The Austrian Minister says that it belongs to the Porte to judge whether this design will conduce to the maintenance of tranquillity and the foundations of good relations between the Montenegrins and the Turks. This means in diplomatic language, unless I am mistaken, that in the opinion of Austria the presence of Turkish troops in Montenegro will not conduce to the interests of peace.

The Cabinet of Vienna has, therefore, succumbed in some degree to the solicitations of M. Balabine and of Mirko.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 1054.

Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 1309.)
Foreign Office, December 24, 1862.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copy of a despatch on the state of affairs in Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 1055.

Earl Russell to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 239.)
Foreign Office, December 24, 1862.

My Lord,

I TRANSMIT, for your information, copy of a despatch relating to the affairs of Montenegro.†

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 1056.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received December 29.)

(No. 460.)
Vienna, December 25, 1862.

My Lord,

I HAVE taken an opportunity of reading to Count Rechberg your Lordship's despatch No. 233 of the 17th instant, respecting the support which he has given to the endeavour of the Prince of Montenegro to obtain a relaxation of his engagements with the Porte.

His Excellency said that he was far from calling in question the justice of your Lordship's remarks that the three Powers should not encourage the Montenegrins to look to them for assistance against the Porte, but, on the contrary, to look to the Porte alone for such concessions as they might desire to obtain. He continued that an unfair interpretation had been put on his despatch to Baron Prokesch of the 30th ultimo at Paris, which had caused some misunderstanding, and that M. Drouyn de Lhuys now admitted to Prince Metternich that he had mistaken its true meaning when he supposed that the Austrian Government was disposed to do more than submit the request of the Prince of Montenegro to the consideration of the Porte and leave to them the "entière initiative" in the matter, and he called

* No. 1052.

† No. 1053.

my attention to the following passage at the end of the instruction to the Internuncio:—

"Votre Excellence voudra bien appuyer particulièrement sur le caractère purement amicale de cette communication, attendu qu'il est loin de notre pensée de vouloir exercer à ce sujet la moindre pression sur les déterminations du Cabinet Ottoman;" which shows that the views of Austria are very different from those that were attributed to her by the French Government, when it was assumed that she was ready to employ pressure on the Porte.

I told his Excellency that the simple fact of having suggested that the Turkish Government might take the wishes of the Prince of Montenegro into consideration had caused the misconstruction which had been put on his despatch at Paris and elsewhere.

Count Rechberg repeated that his intentions had not been fairly interpreted, and he then allowed me to bring home the draft of his despatch to Baron Prokesch, which he had read to me, and I have the honour to inclose a copy of the same herewith, in case Count Apponyi should not have left one with your Lordship.

Count Rechberg closed his observations by saying that Austria had always been ready to prove her good-will to the Christian populations in the East, and to assist them in maintaining all their privileges and immunities; but they had, at the same time, been told that the friendship and support of Austria would be withdrawn from them so soon as their proceedings ceased to be of a pacific character.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 1057.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received December 29.)

(No. 464.)
My Lord, *Vienna, December 25, 1862.*

THE Secretary of the Montenegrin Chief, Mirko Petrovitch, called at the Embassy a few days ago for the purpose of communicating to me a telegram which had been received from Prince Nicholas, a copy of which I have the honour to inclose.

Your Lordship will observe that, according to this telegram, the Turks are constructing a block-house on a point not included in the conditions of the Convention with Omer Pasha, and I understand it is situated on the road to Cettigné, a considerable distance from the stipulated military line of communication.

Mirko Petrovitch has sent this telegram to Count Rechberg and to the Representatives of the Great Powers at this Court.

Having had occasion to see the Duc de Gramont yesterday, I asked if he had answered Prince Nicholas' letter, a similar one to that addressed to me, and forwarded to your Lordship in my despatch No. 415 of the 4th instant. His Excellency said he had done so some time ago, and he read some passages from the answer, all of which were teeming with compliments to the brave Montenegrin people, in whose welfare, he says, the Emperor Napoleon and the French nation always take the most lively interest, and that he himself has sincere pleasure in being the interpreter of these sentiments to the Prince.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 1057.

Prince Nicholas to Mirko Petrovitch.

(Télégraphique.) *Cattaro, le 19 Décembre, 1862, 11·35 P.M.*

TURCS construisent un blockhaus à Rassowina Glawitza, ce qui n'était pas dit dans les conditions. Nous nous portons bien.

No. 1058.

Consul Holmes to Earl Russell.—(Received December 31.)

(No. 69. Political.)
My Lord, *Bosna-Seraï, December 19, 1862.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that Abdi Pasha, formerly of Scutari, has been named Commander-in-chief in Bosnia and the Herzegovina, and has arrived at Mostar. Dervish Pasha has been appointed Commander-in-chief in Albania.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 1059.

Consul Sir F. Gilbert to Earl Russell.—(Received December 31.)

(No. 54.)
My Lord, *Scutari, December 16, 1862.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that Muschir Abdi Pahsa, late Governor of Scutari, having left for Herzegovina some days since, Vasif Pasha arrived here last Friday from Prisrend, as Civil Governor, and Dervish Pasha from Podgoritza, as Military Governor. The latter has issued an order to the retail shopkeepers, who almost universally sell powder, cartridges, flints, &c., in the bazaar, that the trade in those articles is for the future prohibited, and all stock in hand of the above-mentioned nature must be conveyed to the fortress, where payment will be made for the same by the Government. The plea put forward for this order is that the Government wants ammunition for the troops. My own impression is, and I trust a true one, that this is only one step towards the eventual disarming of the populace. Such a measure would greatly tend to the tranquillity of the country, for there is not a more sneaking, cowardly fellow than an Albanian without his arms, and they richly deserve such a punishment for their pusillanimous conduct during the late war with Montenegro.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. H. GILBERT.

No. 1060.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 680.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December 31, 1862.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 667 of the 18th instant, I transmit, for your Excellency's information, copies of reports relating to the affairs in Montenegro.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 1061.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received January 5, 1863.)

(No. 471.)
My Lord, *Vienna, December 29, 1862.*

THE Montenegrin Envoy Mirko called on me yesterday and begged to be informed if I had received any answer from Her Majesty's Government on the subject of the communication which Prince Nicholas had charged him to deliver to me.

I replied that I had forwarded his letter to your Lordship and had not yet received the reply. Mirko said he was much disappointed to hear nothing from

* Nos. 1053, 1056, and 1057.

England, or to be able to take back any assurances that would lead the people of Montenegro to hope the influence of foreign Powers was being exercised at Constantinople to obtain a modification of the stipulations of the Convention concerning the military road and the block-houses, observing that if the people were left without hope on the subject the consequences might be serious, and fresh conflicts might be looked for between the Montenegrins and Turks, and war might again be kindled.

I replied that he must not expect the British Government to afford assistance under such circumstances, that the question was not one in which we could interfere; Montenegro had signed a Convention with Turkey and must abide by its stipulations, and that if Montenegro were sufficiently ill-advised to provoke fresh hostilities the consequences would be dangerous to her, that it was not to England that the Prince of Montenegro should apply, but direct to the Porte.

Mirko asked me if I should advise him to go to London to seek friendly counsel, or to Constantinople? He felt it was useless to stay any longer at Vienna.

I answered that I thought he had better go home and advise Prince Nicholas to execute his engagements with the Porte, with whom alone it must rest to decide as to any modification of the Convention.

Mirko left me after expressing his regret at the evident failure of his mission to enlist sympathy in favour of Montenegro, and again alluded to the consequences which may result to his country from this failure.

He seemed much dejected, and I understand that he will set out in the course of this week for Cettigné.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

P.S.—*January* 1. Mirko left Vienna last night for Trieste.

B.

No. 1062.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.—(Received January 5, 1863.)

(No. 473)
Vienna, December 30, 1862.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 471 of yesterday, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that I have had some conversation with Count Rechberg on the subject of Mirko's visit, which he told me he had advised him to pay me as he hoped I should speak to him as strongly as he had done. His Excellency said that he had used very plain language in reply to Mirko in allusion to the possibility of war resulting from the refusal of the Porte to listen to the complaints of the Montenegrins as to their inability to abide by the stipulations of the Convention. Count Rechberg told Mirko the responsibility of any violation of the Convention would rest with the Prince Nicholas, and that His Highness would forfeit the good-will of those Powers who were now well disposed to him if he committed any hasty act which should hereafter produce a resumption of hostilities.

His Excellency said that Mirko's language was much less measured than on the occasion of his first interview with him; that his tone as to the war amounted almost to a menace that it would be inevitable unless the Turkish Government made some concession on the question of block-houses, and that he must suppose that Mirko had been encouraged in his expectations of sympathy, by the assurance on the subject of the French and Russian Representatives, both of whom had spoken to him in his favour.

I inquired of Count Rechberg what was the meaning of an advance of money that was said to have been made by the Emperor of Austria to the Prince of Montenegro. He replied that no money whatever had been placed at his disposal, as it would have certainly been employed in bying arms and ammunition, but that His Imperial Majesty, on learning the starving condition of some of the population of Montenegro, had authorized General Mamula, who commands in Dalmatia, to distribute grain to relieve the wants of these people to the amount of 30,000 florins (3,000*l.*)

I also asked Count Rechberg if he had seen the telegram (copy of was forwarded in my despatch No. 464 of the 25th instant) from Prince Nicholas, stating

that a Turkish block-house was in course of construction at a considerable distance from the military road, and in a spot not included in the conditions of the Convention.

His Excellency replied that he had seen this telegram, and that he doubted its correctness, and, moreover, that he was inclined to doubt the statement as to the discontent of the Montenegrins at the presence of the Turks in their country, for according to his own intelligence from Scutari the inhabitants appeared only too thankful to have work to do, for which they were well remunerated and which insured the circulation of a little money in that poor district.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.